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Risk Engineering Position Paper 01 Atmospheric Storage Tanks 2015
Risk Engineering Position Paper 01 Atmospheric Storage Tanks 2015
ATMOSPHERIC
STORAGE TANKS
ii • Atmospheric Storage Tanks
CONTENTS
Section Title.............................................................................................................................Page
1. Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
2. Objective ......................................................................................................................................... 1
3. Scope............................................................................................................................................... 1
Marsh • iii
1. BACKGROUND
There have been numerous incidents in the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry involving
atmospheric storage tanks. Data has been compiled by a reputable operator in the USA that indicates
that overfilling of atmospheric storage tanks occurs once in every 3300 filling operations. In 2009
there were two separate incidents just days apart, one in Jaipur, India (October 29), and one in San
Juan, Puerto Rico (October 23) that demonstrated the destructive capabilities of incidents at
terminals and tank farms.
2. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this position paper is to define the standards that would be expected of a very good
atmospheric storage facility in the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry. These standards are also
reflected in the Marsh Energy Risk Ranking criteria. They can be used to determine risk improvement
opportunities and also to provide detailed advice to clients seeking to improve their atmospheric
storage facilities.
3. SCOPE
The scope of this position paper includes:
• Guidance on the appropriate selection of atmospheric tank design for class of product to be stored.
The table below summarises the design of tank suitable for each class of
hydrocarbon:
Marsh • 2
5. LAYOUT AND SPACING
Ideally, tank layout should be optimised to ensure that there is sufficient access to tanks for fire fighting
and to minimise the risk of escalation in the event of a tank fire.
Minimum spacing for tanks is specified in the table below, although Marsh would advocate a minimum
separation distance of 1x the diameter of the largest tank with an absolute minimum of 15 metres, as such
a distance provides sufficient access for fire fighters.
One notable exception is the separation between crude tanks, where the destructive effects of a boil over
can extend from 5 to 10 diameters. Therefore consideration should be given to locating crude tanks at the
edge of tank farm installations and with the largest practical separation from adjacent tanks.
These distances should only be used in conjunction with appropriate levels of fire protection (see below).
In the event that tanks are existing and do not conform to the above spacing, then additional fire
protection should be considered.
Floating roof tanks, with external metal domed roofs extending over the entire roof area (i.e. internal
floating roof tanks or tanks fitted with geodesic domes), may be considered as fixed roof tanks for the
purpose of tank location and spacing.
Marsh • 4
6. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
It is essential that the risk of loss of tanks, refer to the UK Health and • High level alarm and independent
containment is properly managed. Safety Executive’s review of back-up high level instrument (with
This can be achieved by the proper standards, Mechanical integrity executive action only if
design, operation, maintenance, and management of bulk storage tanks, appropriate).
inspection of tanks. Ideal practice is which can be found at the following
outlined below. website address: • Continuous automatic monitoring
of tank contents, including “rate of
change” during filling/emptying.
The most effective way to prevent a http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/
major accident at any site is the rr760.pdf • Anti-rotation devices on floating
continued provision of suitable roof tanks.
primary containment of the Outlined below is a summary of the
flammable materials. This is achieved features considered to be the most • Closed water drains.
through the suitable design, appropriate for a modern facility:
• Single skin floors.
construction, and maintenance of the
storage systems in accordance with • Double seals on floating roof tanks • Tank floor leak detection on double-
standards. (NB foam dam heights should be floor tanks. This is normally
above the height of the upper rim comprised of an instrument to
For guidance on the most appropriate seal to provide suitable protection detect loss of vacuum in the inter-
standards to use for the design and against a rim seal fire). floor space.
construction of atmospheric storage
6.1 TANK DESIGN AND accordance with a relevant standard Whenever valves are left normally
such as EEMUA 183 or BS EN 14015. open, then the following measures
OPERATION Leak detection should also be should be put in place:
Tanks should be designed to a provided on double-bottomed tanks.
relevant standard, such as API 650 or • Hydrocarbon detection in drained
BS EN 14015. water with automatic isolation.
TANK ROOFS
• Testing of operability of isolation
In some instances single skin bottom Double deck roofs on floating roof valves and detection systems (see
tanks are a better option than double- tanks are preferred to single deck overleaf).
bottomed tanks as these provide the roofs with external pontoons as they
optimum conditions for ensuring are more stable and less likely to lose
integrity of the tank floor by the buoyancy. VENTS
inspection of tank floor plates.
Tanks should be provided with a weak
Disadvantages of double-bottom For floating roof tanks, the water seam/frangible roof construction, or
designs include settlement, product drains to remove rainwater from the with an emergency vent suitably sized
entrapment, and modification to roof should be normally closed. To for the worst case relieving scenario,
nozzle compensating plates. ensure roofs are emptied of rainwater, to prevent overpressure under all
procedures should be in place and relief conditions. Emergency vents
Where double-bottomed tanks are followed for the opening and should comply with relevant
provided, additional inspection re-closure of valves. standards, such as API 2000.
measures should be provided in
Flame arresters should be included in When installing double rim seals, the
preventative maintenance routines to height of the second, upper rim seal
ensure they do not become blocked should be below the height of the
by scale, paint, ice or other materials. foam dam to ensure coverage
Flame arresters are not whenever rim seal pourers are
recommended for use when the activated.
material being stored is liable to
polymerise or foul the arrester. Due to Foam dams should be provided with
are specifically designed to maximise
the potential for blockage, intermittently-spaced gaps to allow
spread of fluids over a tank’s surface.
conservation vents (vacuum and the drainage of rainwater. However, if
pressure relief) should not be fitted the gaps are too large or too
numerous, they may affect the ability For existing tanks, consideration
with flame arresters.
to form a single continuous foam should be given to modifications of
barrier in the event of a fire. tank top design and to the safe-re-
Fixed roof tanks can be fitted with a routing of overflowing liquids.
gas blanket (normally nitrogen) to
maintain an inert atmosphere in the OVERFLOW
vapour space. Nitrogen supply VALVES
pressure should be just above Consideration should be given to
providing suitable overflow systems All important valves on atmospheric
atmospheric, but sufficient to
to ensure that in the event of a tank tanks should be labelled and their
displace any liquid pumped out. As a
overfilling, the tank contents are function indicated.
back up, a vacuum breaker should be
provided in the event that nitrogen safely routed into suitable secondary
supply is lost. containment. Additionally, the Fire-safe shut off valves should be
overflow route should be designed to provided, preferably automatic and
minimise turbulent flow, reduce the remotely operated shut off/isolation
Vents or vapour recovery systems
surface area of flammable valves (ROSOV/ROIV). They must be
(often venting back to the source
hydrocarbon, and reduce the fitted close to the tank on both the
vessel) are required. These should be
generation of flammable vapours, inlet and outlet connections. Valves
designed to relieve pressure slightly
such as through splashing. Particular must either conform to an
above that of the nitrogen and at a
care needs to be taken with appropriate standard, such as BS EN
suitable margin below the design
strengthening rings and firewater ISO 10497 or equivalent international
pressure of the storage tank.
dispersion rails around tanks which design, or should be of intrinsically
Marsh • 6
fire-safe design. Such features • Designed to minimise pressure HOUSEKEEPING
include: surges on system pipework and
couplings, particularly ship to shore Debris within bunds should be kept at
• Metal-to-metal seats (secondary flexible pipes. an absolute minimum. In addition to
metal seats on soft-seated valves the checks within formalised
are acceptable). Tank drainage valves should be inspection and maintenance routines,
blanked off when not in use. operators should also conduct
• Must not be of cast-iron Whenever operations to remove frequent checks of tanks and their
construction. accumulations of water from components as part of their routines
underneath the product are to be to ensure that the tanks are kept in a
• Should not be wafer-bolted
conducted, isolation of the drain reasonable condition. A sample of
(sometimes referred to as long bolt
should be achieved by the use of two items to check is included in
flanges).
valves in series. The second valve can Appendix B.
In regions subject to a high risk of be a temporary installation.
earthquake and/or rapid ground-
acceleration, the isolation valves and
PIPING
actuators should also be secured
directly to the tank wall and not to the In areas where earthquake is a
ground. Anchoring the valve to significant exposure, all associated
surrounding structures or the ground piping on storage tanks should have
could result in the valve separating step geometry to allow flexing in the
from the tank during excessive piping and prevent puncturing of the
vibrations. tank during an earthquake.
Bund capacity should be sufficient to contain the largest predictable spillage. A bund capacity of 110% of the capacity of
the largest storage vessel within the bund will normally be sufficient. When estimating bund capacity, the space occupied
by other tanks should be taken into account.
7.1 BUND INTEGRITY augment non-fire resistant materials. Bund floor penetration joints are
Similarly, joints to wall and floor inherently weak as failure of the
(LEAK TIGHTNESS) penetrations need to be protected integrity is difficult to predict and
Bund wall and floor construction against the effects of fire. detect and may continue for some
should be leak tight. This includes the time unnoticed. Consequently, floor
provision of leak tight expansion Whenever designing protection plate, penetrations should not be
joints between different casts of consideration should be given to incorporated into new bund designs.
concrete in bund walls and wherever avoiding weakening the wall structure Existing bund floor penetrations
there are penetrations in the wall for in relation to resistance to fire, should be eliminated wherever
pipes. Surfaces should be maintained hydrostatic, and hydrodynamic practicable. Where flexible sealants
crack free, and without any forces. are used in floor penetration joints,
discontinuities, and without any failed these should be replaced with fire-
joints that may allow liquid migration. Bund penetrations should be avoided resistant sealants.
unless alternative over-wall routings
As observed in major incidents, such are not practical. On existing bunds, There have also been a number of
as the Buncefield fire of 2005, the fitting steel collars or bellows to significant accidents resulting from
joints in concrete bund walls are improve fire resistance at pipework leaks of hydrocarbons from tanks
particularly susceptible to the effects penetrations may introduce local through the base of storage tanks.
of fire and/or subsequent cooling. corrosion initiation sites in the Therefore the provision of a suitable
Therefore, to maintain integrity, joints pipework and is not recommended impervious base (ideally concrete
should be capable of resisting fire. unless corrosion prevention can be with a membrane liner) or floor leak
Ideally, steel plates (waterstops) assured. Where corrosion can not be detection on double floor
should be fitted across the inner prevented, joints should be improved configurations should be provided.
surface of bund joints and fire by replacing existing sealants with
sealants should be used to replace or fire-resistant sealants.
Marsh • 8
7.2 TERTIARY • Of cellular configuration to allow
segregation and limit the extent of
CONTAINMENT spread of pollutants and/or fire.
Tertiary containment need only be
• Robust under emergency
concerned if there is a significant risk
conditions, e.g. loss of electrical
of secondary containment being
supply.
insufficient to prevent an escalation
to a major accident affecting • Capable of allowing the controlled
personnel, assets, or the movement of contained liquids
environment. Firewater containment under normal and emergency
is one such example. Implementation conditions.
of tertiary containment should
therefore be a risk-based decision. • Capable of aiding the separation of
However, tertiary containment should water from pollutants (e.g. oil/
be: water separator).
However, justification for a single combined gauging and The site receiving any batch or delivery must have ultimate
overfill protection device could be made if the integrity of control and responsibility for stopping the transfer and
the instrument is sufficient for the risk of failure. should have local systems and valves to stop the operation.
This should not therefore be under the sole control of an
Tank gauging systems should have a high level alarm (LAH) automatic system or operators at a remote location.
to alert operators to the status of the tank which gives
sufficient time to interrupt the filling operation and the Tank level instrumentation and information display
subsequent activation of the back-up overfill protection systems should be of sufficient accuracy and clarity to
device high-high level alarm (LAHH). This should also take ensure safe planning and control of product transfer into
into account any thermal expansion of the fluid within the tanks.
tank. It is important that LAH should not be used to control
routine filling. It is preferable for tanks to be continuously and
automatically monitored for rate of level change during
Analogue sensors are preferred to digital (switched) transfer operations to match the actual rate of transfer with
sensors (i.e. there are two analogue sensing elements on expected rates. This would give an early indication that the
the tank), as these are able to alert whenever there is a fault main level gauging system was not functioning correctly or
in the primary level sensor before reaching high level. that the incorrect tank was being filled. During normal
storage operations, such a tool could also notify operators
Electro-mechanical servo gauges should be avoided for of a significant loss of containment.
use with flammable materials as these are intricate devices
considered to be vulnerable to a number of potential failure It is not within the scope of this document to detail the SIL
modes. Modern electronic gauge sensors, such as radar determination or its implications. However the following
gauges, should be used instead. points should be noted:
Marsh • 10
9. MAINTENANCE AND
INSPECTION
All tanks must undergo regular • Full floor scan.
external and internal (out-of-service)
inspections to ensure their integrity, • Internal examination of shell to
and as such a written scheme of annular floor weld.
examination should be provided. • Non destructive examination (NDE)
Overall guidance on the suitable of annular plate and shell nozzles.
methods and frequency of such
inspections are detailed in EEMUA • Visual inspection.
159 and API 653.
Deferral of internal inspections should
Individuals responsible for the be risk assessed and approved by a
formulation of schemes of inspection suitably competent person. Particular
and for the inspection of tanks should attention should be given to tanks
be competent and have the that have had no previous internal
appropriate qualification for tank inspection, as the probability of floor
inspection and for the grade of failure will increase with every year
materials used in construction. As a that the recommended interval is
minimum, personnel should be exceeded. In such cases, it is unlikely
competent to The Welding Institute’s that a deferral could be justified.
(TWI’s) certification scheme for Pontoons should be included in
welding and inspection, or Failure of either a top or bottom floor formal maintenance and inspection
equivalent. in double-bottomed tanks (as regimes as loss of pontoons (as a
detected through the failure of result of corrosion or long-term
External inspections should be vacuum between plates) should be removal of pontoon cap) will affect
conducted on a higher frequency rectified within one year. Continued the stability and buoyancy of the
than internal inspections based upon operation in the interim period deck. The presence of flammable
risk based inspection (RBI) pending repair should be supported vapours within a pontoon also
requirements, or as stated in the by a technical justification supporting increases the risk of vapour cloud
relevant codes. If active degradation its fitness for purpose. explosion (VCE) within a pontoon.
mechanisms are found, then more
frequent inspections should be Tank repairs and modifications are The functional integrity of overfill
conducted. specialist activities and should only protection systems is critical to
be conducted by suitably qualified ensuring primary containment.
Particular attention should be given personnel with appropriate Overfill protection systems may be in
to insulated storage tanks, as qualification (as specified above). a normally dormant state without
corrosion under insulation, and the being required to operate for many
quality of external coatings applied Water drains on floating roof tanks years. For this reason, periodic testing
prior to insulation, can have a should also be formally included in is an essential element in assuring
significant effect upon tank integrity. routine maintenance if normally left their continuing integrity.
open, including a check that isolation
Thorough internal inspection can only valves can be closed. The detection
be achieved by removing a tank from systems for hydrocarbons should also
service, cleaning it, and then be tested on a regular basis. All tests
conducting, as a minimum: should be formally documented.
Marsh • 12
Damaged Earthing Cable
One of the most common sources of ignition for Often, foam is applied to provide a blanket to
large tanks is lightning. Therefore, the provision suppress vapour emissions and prevent ignition.
of suitable lightning protection with bonding However, if this occurs on tanks storing
and earthing would help to minimise this. NFPA materials, such as naphtha, that are susceptible
780 Standard for the Installation of Lightning to ignition from splash-filling, careful
Protection Systems provides more details on the consideration should be given prior to the
specification of lightning protection systems. application of foam. If foam is to be applied, for
example in the event that electrical storms are
Some installations are provided with lightning expected, then this should be gently applied
masts intended to act as preferential routes for along the shell wall and not by splash-filling to
lightning to discharge itself, as opposed to via the surface of the material.
the storage tank. This concept is not proven and
some parties suggest that such masts act to
attract lightning to the vicinity of the storage
ZONING
tanks. Therefore, these are not currently A detailed assessment of the hazardous area
considered to be a robust mitigation against the classification (HAC) of the storage tank, ancillary
effects of lightning. equipment, and bunded area must be
conducted. This should take into account the
Some materials are susceptible to the effects of class of material being stored.
static during splash-filling. Therefore, measures
should be taken in such instances to prevent the The specification of spark-inducing equipment
generation of electrostatic charges. should be suitable for the HAC zones location
and should be made in accordance with relevant
It is possible that floating roofs can become electrical standards, such as IP (Institute of
unstable and sink, maybe as a result of rainwater Petroleum) Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15,
accumulation, or failure of flotation devices. ATEX 95, ATEX 137 or BS 5345.
Marsh • 14
• Location of equipment, e.g. Additionally, remote monitors are correctly, although if there are
monitors not too far from tanks for wasteful of foam and cannot direct changes to the foam type, foam
foam application to tank surface. the jet so accurately as the objective proportion or even water supply,
is to apply foam to the rim seal as then the flow characteristics could
• Attention to any faults in the quickly and gently as possible be affected so that a foam seal is
fabrication and installation of (irrespective of the roof level) and to not possible.
hardware, e.g. check valves retain a complete foam seal for as
installed the wrong way round, long as possible. • Forced/irregular addition of foam.
transport packing still present The intention is to apply foam
around air inductors. gently down the side of the tank
The most common and (arguably)
shell so that it forms an even
most effective method to control a
Once a system has been designed blanket within the rim seal area. If
rim seal fire is the application of foam
and installed, it is critical that it is the pourer has been incorrectly
via fixed rim seal pourers on the top of
tested. Whilst this may be expensive, positioned it may not apply the
the shell wall. Even with simple, fixed
it is critical to ensure that the system foam in such a way, e.g. catching
purpose-built systems, such as rim
actually completes the job it is on the top edge of the seal,
seal pourers, there is the danger that
intended to do. Ideally, systems resulting in splashing and loss of
basic errors can be made so that the
should be tested at the manufacturers foam to the roof.
system does not operate as intended.
as it is then cheaper, quicker and
easier to rectify any mistakes.
Such examples that should be • Foam pourers located too high on
avoided are: the tank, exposing them to wind
and impairing their passage to the
FLOATING ROOF TANK FIRES • Top of foam dam below the top of rim seal itself.
the rim seal – this is especially an
Rim seal fires are the most common issue where secondary rim seals To overcome these issues, tests
type of fire on floating roof tanks. have been added to the tank to should be conducted on the system
There is little chance of these reduce tank emissions. The top of to ensure it operates correctly.
escalating to other tanks or turning to the foam dam should be at least 50 Depending upon the number of tanks
full surface tank fires if the design, mm above the top of the rim seal, being protected, annual testing
maintenance, and layout of the tanks but ideally about 150 mm. frequency would be appropriate.
is suitable. This should not be
considered a rule, however, as a • Too many or too large gaps at the
bottom of the foam dam. The Inspections should be conducted
poorly maintained tank could lose its
purpose of the dam is to hold the regularly to ensure air inlets to foam
integrity or be vulnerable to
foam in position around the generators are clear and that foam
subsequent explosions, perhaps as a
circumference of the tank to reduce pourers are not blocked by, for
result of vapour ingress into one of
the amount of foam needed. This example, birds’ nests. Other good
the pontoons.
ensures efficient application to the features to aid inspection or fire
rim seal and prevents unnecessary fighting in the event of a system
Rim seal protection should only be
loads being placed on the tank roof. failure are:
used on certain types of roofs (i.e.
double deck, steel pontoon, etc). Pan With large gaps at the bottom of
• Walkway around the top of the
roofs for example, should have full the dam, a significant quantity of
floating roof tank – this can be the
surface protection. foam could leak to the roof.
wind girder with a handrail around
However, small, intermittently
the circumference. This allows for
The application of foam from a remote spaced drains should be provided
the pourers to be accessed for
monitor (i.e. one outside the bund) to allow rainwater to drain away.
maintenance or for fire fighters to
would not represent best practice as • Incorrect spacing of the foam access the roof with manual hoses.
it can create roof instability and pourers. Modern foams can flow in
potentially escalate the incident. excess of 30 metres if proportioned
Marsh • 16
12. REFERENCES TO INDUSTRY LOSSES
Examples of Industry losses have been included in Appendix C.
BS EN 61511-1:2004/IEC 61511- API 653. Tank Inspection, Repair, EEMUA PUB N° 183 - Guide for the
1:2003 Functional safety. Safety Alteration, and Reconstruction, Third Prevention of Bottom Leakage from
instrumented systems for the process Edition. December 2001. American Vertical, Cylindrical, Steel Storage
industry sector. Petroleum Institute. Tanks. January 2004. Engineering
Equipment and Materials Users’
BS EN ISO 10497:2004. Testing of API 2000. Venting Atmospheric and Association.
valves. Fire type-testing Low-pressure Storage Tanks, Sixth
requirements. British Standard/ Edition. November 2009. American RR760 - Mechanical integrity
European Standard/International Petroleum Institute. management of bulk storage tanks.
Organisation for Standardisation. HSE.
API RP 2350. Overfill Protection for
HSG 176. The storage of flammable Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities, http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/
liquids in tanks. HSE. ISBN 0 7176 Third Edition. January 2005. rrpdf/rr760.pdf
1470 0.
NFPA 11 Standard for Low-, Medium-, Note: RR760 provides a summary of
CIRIA Report 164: Design of and High-Expansion Foam, 2010 relevant codes and standards for the
Containment Systems for the Edition. assurance of mechanical integrity in
Prevention of Water Pollution from storage tanks. These provide an
Industrial Accidents. January 1997. Buncefield. The Final Report of the assessment of the most appropriate
Construction Industry Research and Final Investigation Board. December standards for different elements of
Information Association. ISBN 2008. Buncefield Major Incident maintenance and design of facilities.
086017476X. Investigation Board. http://www.
buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/
reports/index.htm#final
ELEMENT/FEATURE CRITERIA
Containment All tanks separately bunded and sized for 110% of capacity. Bund walls sized and
designed to contain and prevent bund overtopping (may include tertiary containment).
Layout/Spacing Meets risk-based tank spacing evaluation and risk evaluation available.
Non-crude inter tank spacing equal to or greater than one diameter of largest tank and at
least 15 metres. Crude oil tanks separated by five tank diameters to prevent risk from
boilover.
Instrumentation HLA, HHLA (totally independent includes tappings, transmitters, etc.) linked to automatic
shutdown of feed. Temperature indicator. LLA, LLLA (independent) linked to automatic
shutdown of pump out and complete with on-line diagnostic capability (i.e. not simple
switch). Shutdown system and components SIL rated in accordance with application and
location. All indicators to control room. Continuous mass balance system for tank farm.
Online blending.
Construction Double welded seals on floating roof. Weather shield. Concrete base with impervious
membrane and sides sloped away from base weld. Anti rotation device on floaters.
Earthing, lightning conductors. Good access to pontoons, and handrails on access walk
way around periphery. Auto bottom water drain. Tank floor leak detection with double
floor.
Roof drainage: rainwater receptors and spill over connections to product (limits water
level to 10”).
Equipment and Pipework Buried common inlet/outlet pipework and no equipment within bund area.
Bund Construction and Condition No penetrations or gaps in the walls. Any gaps in bund walls should be sealed
appropriately with a fireproof material. Concrete faced earth wall. Consideration given to
preventing bund overtopping.
Gas Detection Bunds fitted with flammable gas detectors for low flash point materials capable of
sustaining a VCE. Detectors interlocked with tank filling system to interrupt transfer.
Fire Detection Linear Heat Detection or fusible-link/ tube (for rim seals only). Systems are self
monitoring with status indication to HMI (Human/Machine Interface).
Fixed Fire Protection Multi-head foam pourers with foam dam for all tanks. Shell cooling water spray, or use of
- Floating Roof multiple monitors with proof of response capability. Supply from two separate locations.
Foam for bunded area. Fixed system supplies foam.
Fixed radiant protection on exposed walls.
Fixed Fire Protection Subsurface foam injection (for non-polar compounds, otherwise foam chambers). Roof
- Cone Roof and shell cooling. Foam for bunded area - dual supply. Fixed systems.
Fixed Fire Protection Foam pourers. Roof and shell cooling; bund protection with foam - dual supply. Fixed
- Cone roof with internal floater system.
Cleanliness
• Debris on roof?
• Ponding or rainwater on roof?
Leakage
• Signs of oil or holes on roof?
Roof Drains
• Clogging of roof drain screen mesh?
PV Vent Mesh
• Clogging of PV vent mesh?
Weather Shields/Seals
• Damage or corrosion?
• Excessive gaps between seal and shell?
Pontoon Compartments
• Presence of water or oil?
• Covers tight?
Earthing Cable
• Damage on cable or connections?
Guide Poles
• Damage on guide pole rollers?
Rolling Ladder
• Damage on wheel?
Bottom of Shell
• Water pooling?
• Corrosion?
• Vegetation?
Marsh • 20
APPENDIX C - LOSS INCIDENTS
The application of the measures specified in this document should minimise the risk
of a major accident occurring at a storage facility or individual storage tank.
The table below gives some examples of incidents that have resulted in loss of
containment to illustrate that they should not be considered as rare events. Data has
been compiled by a reputable operator in the USA that indicates that overfilling
occurs once every 3,300 filling operations.
Below are statistics on the frequency of incidents taken from the LASTFIRE project, a group of operating companies
sharing information on the prevention and protection of fires in large atmospheric storage tanks. This data is valid up to
2006 and should not be seen as comprehensive.
• Escalation to two downwind tanks in one full surface fire (volatile fuel).
• One boilover in six full surface fires. Note: of the six fires, one was a crude tank which resulted in a boilover. It should
always be assumed that a crude tank full surface fire will boilover.
Marsh • 22
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