CASE DOCTRINES

TORTS AND DAMAGES | SUNDAY | 1:00PM-3:00PM

ATTY. NICO VALDERRAMA

NAME: SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P.

STUDENT NUMBER: 2017-0064
CASE DOCTRINES
CASE # 78: MHP GARMENTS, INC., and DE GUZMAN vs. CA

QUESTION:
May a party, who is indirectly responsible for the violation of another’s constitutional right, be held
liable to the same extent as those who are directly liable?

ANSWER:
Yes, a party indirectly responsible for such violation may be held liable to the same extent as to those
who are directly liable as Art. 32 does not qualify the extent of liability of each party.

Article 32 of the Civil Code speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the
actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain
terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

Neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for its violations.
CASE # 79: MADEJA vs. CARO and ARELLANO-JAPZON

QUESTION:
May a separate civil action be instituted upon the pendency of the criminal action in ex-delicto
cases?

ANSWER:
Yes, a separate civil action may be instituted as enunciated under Sec. 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Sec. 33 of the Civil Code.

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. Article 33 of the Civil
Code creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In
these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been
no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the
claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended

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TORTS AND DAMAGES | SUNDAY | 1:00PM-3:00PM
ATTY. NICO VALDERRAMA

until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the
result of the criminal action.
CASE # 80: YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORP., et al.

QUESTION:
1. Can libel be instituted in a purely civil action despite being defined in the Revised Penal
Code?
2. What is the standard required in determining if the words used are defamatory in character?
3. Can a libelous article assert that it is under the qualified privilege communication?

ANSWER:
1. Yes, libel can also be instituted as a purely civil action as enunciated under Art. 33 of the
Civil Code. It states that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

2. The standard required in determining whether the words used are defamatory in nature is the
standard of an ordinary reader. The words used are to be construed in their entirety and taken
in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by persons
hearing (or reading, as in libel) them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense. For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be
libelous, that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as
is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally
understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed
as a whole. In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard
any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The
whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they
not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to
have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication.

3. If malice-in-fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly
privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications
merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching in a defamatory imputation.
CASE # 81: HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON vs. CHAN and CA

QUESTION:
1. May a party institute an independent civil action arising from the violation of BP No. 22 upon
the pendency of a criminal case for the same cause of action?
2. How can litis pendentia be successfully invoked to bar an action?

ANSWER:
1. There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22 as enunciated under Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The Court agrees
with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly

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TORTS AND DAMAGES | SUNDAY | 1:00PM-3:00PM
ATTY. NICO VALDERRAMA

instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under
the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no
longer needed. As stated under Circular No. 57-97 of the Supreme Court, the criminal action
for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also
requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the
inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the
payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint.

2. For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such
as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two
requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.
CASE # 82: BONITE vs. ZOSA and ABAMONGA

QUESTION:
Is the filing of an independent civil action for damages deemed barred due to the aggrieved party’s
failure to make a reservation to file a separate civil action in its criminal action?

ANSWER:
No, the failure of the party to to make a reservation to file a separate civil action does not bar
recovery of damages thru an independent civil action as stated under Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be
instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable.
The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt.

In addition to anchoring the right to bring a separate civil action for damages under the express
provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, an aggrieved party may base such separate civil action
for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for recovery
of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It
has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts
"not punishable by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores (delict and quasi-delict).

It is important to note that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an
independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising

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TORTS AND DAMAGES | SUNDAY | 1:00PM-3:00PM
ATTY. NICO VALDERRAMA

from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil
action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on
reasonable doubt.
CASE # 83: DULAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION:
What is the scope of applicability of Art. 2176 under the Civil Code?

ANSWER:
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused.
CASE # 84: SPOUSES CUSTODIO and SPOUSES SANTOS vs. CA, HEIRS OF MABASA
and RTC PASIG

QUESTION:
1. What is the difference between damage and injury?
2. What is the doctrine of damnum absque injuria?

ANSWER:
1. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

2. There can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a
person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury,
the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.

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 CASE DOCTRINES
TORTS AND DAMAGES | SUNDAY | 1:00PM-3:00PM
ATTY. NICO VALDERRAMA

CASE # 85: PEOPLE vs. HALIL GAMBAO, et al.

QUESTION:
How will the amounts in the civil liabilities of the accused be apportioned?

ANSWER:
The ruling of the Court in People v. Montesclaros is instructive on the apportionment of civil
liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees
of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-
appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than those
accused-appellants who were adjudged as only accomplices.
CASE # 86: GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM and CA

QUESTION:
May an injured party be awarded with actual or compensatory damages, as well as moral damages,
notwithstanding the fact that there was a Joint Affidavit stating that she will no longer be filing a
civil or criminal complaint?

ANSWER:
Yes, the injured party may still recover damages provided that there was no valid and actual waiver
of their rights. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal.

The Court held that the award for damages depends upon the foregoing circumstances of each case.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and
assessable. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury
upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving rise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of
surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.

With regards to moral damages, the long-established rule is that it may be awarded where gross
negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. In the case at bar, the Court concluded that
respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus
mishap which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive maneuvers
of respondent, through his wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as
they were still hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled to such moral damages.