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CSR legislation in France and the European regulatory paradox: An analysis of EU CSR
policy and sustainability reporting practice

Article  in  Corporate Governance International Journal of Business in Society · August 2008

DOI: 10.1108/14720700810899149

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CSR legislation in France and the
European regulatory paradox:
an analysis of EU CSR policy and
sustainability reporting practice
Olivier Delbard
Olivier Delbard is based at
ESCP-EAP European
School of Management,
Paris, France.
DOI 10.1108/14720700810899149
Abstract
Purpose – The aim of this paper is to investigate the corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy
orientations in the Euopean Union (EU) by focusing on the specific case of the French legislation on
compulsory sustainability reporting for publicly-listed companies.
Design/methodology/approach – The approach is mostly exploratory and based on secondary
literature review as well as empirical classroom work on reporting.
Findings – This exploratory paper provides findings about the relevance of the French law, thus
highlighting some critical aspects of sustainability reporting practices. It also raises the broader issue of
the consistency of the European CSR approach.
Research limitations/implications – This research needs to be completed by field studies on
sustainability reporting practices both in France and in all EU members.
Practical implications – This paper may help firms improve their sustainability reporting practices.
Originality/value – There have been hardly any papers on the impact of the French NRE law so far.
Another original feature is the issue raised about the somewhat unclear links between environmental
legislation and CSR policy in the EU. The paper provides a case for regulation in CSR, showing the
possible positive impacts on corporate behavior.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility, Environmental regulations, Economic sustainability, France
Paper type Research paper
Introduction: the EU environment policy
This paper pursues three main objectives: while examining the positioning of corporate
social responsibility (CSR) in the Euopean Union (EU), the aim is to understand its links with
the EU sustainable development strategy largely based on environmental regulation. The
ambiguity of these links shall be emphasized through the specific case of the 2001 French
‘‘new economic regulations’’ (NRE) law.
Since it launched its first action plan for the environment in 1972, the European Union has been
developing a unique supranational policy in the field of the environment. A typical case of
command and control approach, the EU environment policy consists today of more than 300
directives, decisions and regulations, some of which directly affecting the corporate world.
Companies operating in the EU are indeed subjected to several environmental regulations,
notably in the field of effluent discharge and recycling. Among recent legislation, the end-of
life vehicles[1] or waste electronic and electronic equipment[2] recycling directives which
clearly put the responsibility of recovering waste on companies, with a view to encouraging
innovation and the minimization of product impact on the environment.
As one of the three foundational dimensions, EU environmental policy is ‘‘naturally’’ related
to the sustainable development concept which was officially endorsed by the EU in the 1992
VOL. 8 NO. 4 2008, pp. 397-405, Q Emerald Group Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 j CORPORATE GOVERNANCE j PAGE 397
 Maastricht treaty. Sustainable development has since then become a fundamental principle
in the EU strategy one could define as: the obligation to manage economic development and
job creation in a sustainable way. Sustainable development is thus mostly seen at a
macro-economic level in the EU, as a necessary bridge between economic development
and the ecological imperative. It is besides worth noticing that the EU sustainability strategy
mostly appears under the ‘‘environment’’ heading, being mostly viewed as the strategic
development of environmental policy.
Among the latest EU environmental law proposals, breakthrough legislations such as the
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH)[3] and Environmental
Liability[4] directives are very significant examples of the will to put ever more responsibility
on companies by forcing them to limit their negative impact on the environment while
fostering innovation and clean economic development. In spite of all the controversy around
those new legislations, the consensus reached within the EU shows the high level of
environmental integration in EU economic development policy. Whereas most surveys
conducted among European firms in the 1990s showed the low level of acceptance of and
compliance with EU environmental legislation due to the largely negative image of the latter,
companies today in the EU have no other choice but integrate EU environmental regulation
and legislation into their daily practice, and for the proactive ones, anticipate future
legislation.
This trend is further evidenced by the recent diversification of EU environment policy, with
the integration of market-based instruments, as the launch on January 1, 2005 of the
EU-wide CO2 emissions trading scheme testifies to it. Consequently, it has become today
compulsory for more than 1,700 industrial installations within the EU to report on their CO2
emissions.
To conclude, EU environment policy has become today a daily reality for the majority of EU
firms confronted with new obligations due to the environmental regulation imposed on them.
Being compelled to cut their polluting emissions, reduce and recover the waste, firms have
to put into place new strategies, which implies setting up measurement and reporting
systems to meet regulatory requirements. Environmental reporting obligations are clearly
increasing in the EU, which is a concrete example of the advanced integration of sustainable
development in EU economic policy.

CSR in the EU
This naturally leads us to the question of CSR in the EU: corporate social responsibility may
indeed be seen as the logical extension of the sustainable development concept to the
corporate world, given that the new responsibilities of companies towards the society fall into
two main broad categories, societal implications and the ecological imperative.
Nevertheless, the CSR theory which has emerged in the last thirty years of Anglo-Saxon
research[5] in management, while largely focusing on new strategic models (Sethi, 1991;
Carroll, 1979) and stakeholder governance issues (Freeman, 1994; Wood, 1990; Donaldson
and Preston, 1995), rarely integrates environmental responsibility into the theory, leaving it to
environmental economists and to more general strategic model (Porter, 1998; Porter and
Kramer, 2002). Therefore, as CSR theory today has become a principle which is accepted
worldwide and whose flexible nature leaves room for interpretation and implementation, one
may question its degree of relevance with respect to sustainability management within the
EU.
The concept of CSR was officially introduced in the EU through the July 2001 Green Paper
which defined CSR as ‘‘A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a
voluntary basis[6].’’ This definition was further reaffirmed by a 2002 communication and by
the results of the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR launched in 2002 and whose final report
was published in 2004. While this definition clearly draws from Anglo-Saxon theory
mentioned earlier, with its focus on the voluntary nature of CSR and its intrinsic links with
stakeholder models, it is clearly the product of a compromise between business
stakeholders and non-business stakeholders: while non-business stakeholders naturally

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PAGE 398 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VOL. 8 NO. 4 2008
push for more regulation on companies, the official position on CSR clearly shows a new
orientation in the EU, with a shift from the traditional regulatory approach to a more liberal
and pro-business stance. As said explicitly in the latest communication on the subject:
‘‘Because CSR is fundamentally about voluntary business behavior, an approach involving
additional obligations and administrative requirements for business risks being
counter-productive and would be contrary to the principles of better regulation’’[7]. This
position is also reflected in the Lisbon strategy launched in 2000 and reaffirmed in 2005
which aims at making the EU ‘‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion’’. The current CSR view thus appears to be an ideal compromise
between market pressures and the need for innovation and competitiveness on the one
hand, and the European social model and its specificities on the other. This is further
evidenced by the emphasis placed today in the EU on the exchange of best practices, on
the objective of ‘‘making Europe a Pole of Excellence on CSR’’ by encouraging companies to
be proactive in their social and environmental policies, by recommending (but not imposing)
the publication of annual CSR reports for any firm with more than 500 employees[8].
By adopting a flexible stance favoring voluntary initiatives and proactive sustainability
strategies, the European approach to CSR seems very much in line with international
practices, thus reassuring both international investors and managers. It is at the same time
typically European in its emphasis on a set of common values such as social cohesion. But it
also seems paradoxical with regards to the high level of environmental regulation as shown
briefly earlier. How can the EU be both adopting strict environmental regulations imposing
ever more constraints and obligations on companies while opting for a liberal approach to
CSR? Does not it reflect the paradox inherent in the EU integration process, caught between
unification and diversity, or to put it differently harmonization and flexibility? This ambiguity
seems to be at the core of CSR policies in Europe where strict CSR regulations and fully
voluntary initiatives coexist, giving a rather blurred image of EU sustainable development
strategies today.

Sustainability reporting
The issue of sustainability reporting is a very significant example of CSR implementation.
Voluntary reporting is obviously the dominant rule, not only within the framework of EU policy,
but also at international level through the widely recognized GRI guidelines. Nevertheless,
sustainability reporting is resorted to by more and more companies for many reasons among
which external pressures from such stakeholders as investors, NGOs, consumers. A debate
over compulsory non-financial reporting was initiated a few years ago within the EU, which
was consistent with the traditionally prevailing regulatory approach to environment and
society. If, as we saw it, no consensus was reached on such an issue, some member states
have initiated their own legislations making sustainability reporting compulsory for some
companies in certain cases. Not surprisingly, such legislations exist in Northern Europe, i.e.
Scandinavian countries (Denmark[9], Finland, Sweden[10]), Belgium[11] (Flanders[12]),
The Netherlands[13] and Germany[14], for certain categories of companies, depending on
size or sector of activity. Though the UK has also introduced some provisions[15], the former
decision to make such reporting compulsory for the big UK companies as part of the national
sustainable development strategy was dropped in 2006, the government considering that it
would stifle firms’ innovation and competitiveness. In Southern Europe and apart from
Portugal where a social statement has been made compulsory for companies, a definitely
more surprising case is that of France and its NRE law that was voted in 2001 and enforced
in 2002. This law is indeed unique in Europe, making social and environmental reporting
compulsory for all publicly listed French companies, i.e. about 700 companies. We shall now
examine this law more closely and assess its impact on French companies.

The NRE law in France

The article 116 of the law voted in 2001 introduced the obligation for all publicly listed French
companies to include information within their annual reports on a series of social and

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 environmental impacts on their activity. The decree published in 2002[16] lists three main
types of required information:
1. A first list of 32 elements related to internal social data: workforce, training, hygiene,
safety, parity, disabled people, etc.
2. A second list of eight items related to the territorial impact of the firm’s activity:
subsidiaries, subcontractors, etc.
3. A third and final list of 28 elements of environmental nature: natural resource use, effluent
discharge, greenhouse gas emissions, impact on biodiversity, compliance cost, etc.
The law compels companies to inform their stakeholders on their social and environmental
impact but does not include any specific constraints in terms of standards, norms, pollution
thresholds or any new form of regulatory requirement. The legal obligation is on reporting as
such. Besides, while requiring companies to include the information within the annual report,
the law does not require any certification of this information, contrary to the other information
contained in the report (firms may of course choose third party certification on a voluntary
basis). Finally, the law, as a typical example of French-style ‘‘soft law’’ does not clearly
include possible sanctions in case of non compliance.
The objectives of the law were threefold, as clearly stated in the impact study originally
accompanying the text:
1. Compelling companies to provide transparent and comprehensive information to all their
stakeholders, i.e. business and non-business stakeholders alike, on the social and
environmental consequences of their activities.
2. Enabling, in relation to the GRI indicators, a comparison between corporate sustainability
performances through the creation of a common framework.
3. Enticing French companies to develop a more proactive approach to sustainable
development, adopting it as a competitive advantage factor, thus following an
international trend based on Anglo-Saxon theoretical research (see Porter, 1998).
Obviously, setting up legislation meeting those three requirements is no easy task. But
surprisingly enough, the article of the law was barely discussed in Parliament, the social and
environmental reporting obligations being no more than one sentence long. Conversely, the
publication of the application decree brought about a real controversy over the concrete
implementation of the law and the likely consequences for companies. While making it a
legal obligation for companies, the decree remained very vague on the means used to
implement the law, notably on two major points: the creation of relevant indicators and the
scope of consolidation. A memo which was supposed to be published with the decree and
whose aim was to help companies implement the law in an effective and relevant way was
finally never made public, thus letting companies choose their own reporting methods. This
reinforced the mounting criticism among companies on the counterproductive effect of
these reporting obligations, thus antagonizing business and non-business stakeholders.
Another difficulty linked to the application of the law was the confusion brought about by the
NRE reporting obligations on the one hand, and the fact that many French companies,
among which the multinational groups, were also eager to publish separate sustainability
reports aimed at communicating on their strategy in the CSR field. Conversely, the fact of
publishing the data within the annual reports logically favored traditional stakeholders to the
detriment of non-traditional stakeholders, thus not always well integrated into the reporting
approach.
The first year of application (2003) brought evidence of that, with fewer than half of all
companies concerned meeting some of the requirements of the law. The same year, the
French government commissioned an independent report[17], whose aim was to critically
assess the application of the law by French companies and give conclusions on the
relevance of the law, given that many in the government were in favor of canceling the law,
thus letting companies adopt voluntary approaches to sustainability reporting. This report,
which serves as main reference of the present paper, was based on both the surveys already

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conducted on the subject[18] and a direct evaluation based on both company reports and
questionnaires and interviews with both companies and external stakeholders (NGOs, labor
unions, investors etc.). The data was analyzed on the basis of 52 replies to questionnaires
and 24 direct interviews for companies (16 CAC40þ8 SBF120), meetings with 12 NGOs,
four labor unions, and a dozen investment companies. The interviews conducted with
stakeholders clearly showed the anticipated gap between business and non-business
stakeholders on the relevance and usefulness of the law, companies especially being very
critical of the content of the law and its very domestic nature.
Unsurprisingly, the low rate of compliance among companies was the first principal finding
of the report: a compounded analysis of all the surveys on the application of the law[19]
provided an average rate of compliance of 35 percent. More direct scrutiny showed wide
discrepancies between a few best practices and numerous companies complying with the
law in a minimal way to say the least (incomplete information, no reliable indicator, hardly any
precise figures etc.). All reports also underlined the fact that more than one-third of French
companies had not complied with the law at all. More precisely, eight themes were covered
on average, i.e. 15 percent of the scope of the law, with two-thirds social issues vs one-third
environmental themes. On average again, the number of indicators was 5.5.
Whereas the sector of activity did not appear as a relevant factor, size was critical since a
distinction clearly emerged between the bigger, more international CAC 40 companies and
the smaller-cap more domestic SBF120 companies: compliance among the former was
definitely better, with half of the companies setting precise objectives, two-thirds of which
being quantitative (against one-third qualitative). It also appeared that 28 percent of the
CAC40 companies had their reporting certified by a third independent party. The
importance of compliance costs (availability of staff, gathering of data, certification and
publication) obviously accounts for the different treatment of the law.
Regarding the information provided by companies, two major weaknesses emerged, first
the scope of reporting and second the indicators used.
The question of the scope of reporting is a crucial issue in the field of non financial reporting:
while striking divergences often oppose business and non business stakeholders, it seems
that any sustainable approach, by extending corporate responsibilities beyond the
traditional sphere, has an ethical obligation to include in its social and environmental
reporting the largest scope possible in order to give a complete and accurate view of its
activity and of the related risks. Yet, since the NRE law did not provide any precise indication
about this, companies opted for all kinds of approaches to it. While 25 percent of them did
not even mention the scope of consolidation chosen, many companies did not retain the
same criteria for their social and environmental data.
If one takes three levels of scope of consolidation, i.e. the holding or registered office in
France, an intermediary level including some other geographical areas, and the
consolidated group, Table I shows the scope chosen by the CAC40 companies[20] in
their publication of environmental and social data:
Table I highlights the obvious lack of harmonization and its negative consequences as to the
relevance of the law: while comparability is made impossible, many companies have not
even harmonized their own social and environmental scopes of reporting. Some specific
cases further showed the very negative consequences of such loopholes in the law, since
some of the companies having chosen to report on their registered offices were actually
dealing with less than 1 percent of their workforce! This crucial point needs to be addressed,

Table I Scope of consolidation chosen by CAC40 companies, 2003

Holding or registered office 8 28

þ Some other geographical areas 22 28
Consolidated groups 48 36
Percentage of CAC40 companies Environmental data Social data

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 to give sustainability reporting full credibility: many empirical studies have shown that a
rather satisfactory solution for companies would be to break down their data along several
geographical areas of consolidation and thus have several data portfolios. Yet, the inherent
costs of collecting, compiling and reporting the data should not be underestimated. Clearly,
the choice of scope of consolidation made by companies today is often based on the
availability of data and/or the search for minimization of reporting costs.
A related issue is that of the supply chain and the integration or not of subcontractors and
suppliers in the scope of reporting. Though the law remained vague for subcontractors and
did not set any requirements for suppliers, best practices show that it is essential that
companies integrate their subcontractors and suppliers into their non-financial reporting.
This is even one of the most relevant criteria to assess the degree of integration of
sustainability management within a firm. According to the EPE-Orée-ORSE report, 50
percent of the CAC40 and 35 percent of the SBF120 companies included their
subcontractors in their reporting, but very poorly for most of them.
The second major flaw of the NRE law is the choice of indicators and its comparability with
the GRI indicators. If, as said previously, the average number of indicators used of 5.5 is in
itself not satisfactory, the other fundamental issue is that of the type of indicators used by
companies. A major contradiction to be found within the NRE law is its normative approach
which does not provide companies with precise reporting methods and indicators while
enticing companies to resort to GRI indicators, many of which largely differ from the NRE
approach. The result of this lack of constraint in the use of indicators is a multiplicity of
indicators, some directly linked to the NRE requirements, others deriving from broader
objectives set by the companies in their sustainability strategies. Furthermore, a close
comparison between the NRE reporting requirements and the GRI sustainability reporting
guidelines shows many discrepancies: for instance, about one third of the GRI indicators do
not fall within the NRE scope. As a result, several companies have a double set of indicators,
with the NRE requirements within the annual report on the one hand, and the GRI guidelines
in their separate sustainability reports on the other. This shows the need to give the NRE law
a consistent and reliable set of indicators, with a clear link to the GRI framework.
Whereas the assessment of the NRE law rightly focused on the weak points, i.e. the lack of
consistency and clarity in the approach to sustainability reporting, the final conclusion of the
report was positive in that it recommended to maintain the law despite all the flaws
described and the subsequent reluctance of companies. This conclusion was based on the
conviction that such regulation seemed necessary since regulatory constraints traditionally
are main drivers for change in France, where proactive strategies are rare among
companies. The main benefit of the law seemed to be its ‘‘snowball effect’’ dimension and
the report rightly stated that such a law had to be seen as part of a continuous improvement
process. The following years seem to have confirmed this position since the surveys
conducted[21] as well as our own empirical studies of French company reports[22] show a
positive trend with an increased rate of compliance every year and a better synergy with the
GRI framework, despite a certain stagnation in the quality of reporting. Whereas major
variations remain among companies regarding the methods used, the scope of
consolidation and the objectives set for the future, the overwhelming majority of CAC40
and SBF120 companies have integrated the NRE requirements today and publish social and
environmental data[23]. The French public authorities that originally intended to abolish the
NRE reporting obligations have thus chosen to maintain the law against the opinion
dominantly expressed by the corporate world. According to the French public authorities,
the crucial question of the efficiency of the law shall be dealt with once companies have
accumulated several years of experience in the field of non-financial reporting. The most
striking point today is that French companies have obviously ‘‘accepted’’ the law, which
makes France a case apart in the context of current CSR policies in Europe.

The cross-cultural factor

To understand this French specificity better, we think it relevant to analyze it in the light of the
cross-cultural management research emphasizing the diversity of national responses to

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regulatory constraints. In this respect, the five cultural dimensions by Geert Hofstede may
help us understand the French attitude within the EU. Working as a sociologist on more than
70 countries since the 1970s (based originally on IBM employees), Hofstede, through his
five cultural dimensions, was instrumental in giving the cultural factor its true weight in the
analysis of national business models[24]. Among the five dimensions, the relevant one here
is uncertainty avoidance (UA) since this ranking shows the degree of tolerance for
uncertainty and ambiguity for a given country. A high score is indicative of a society that is
rule-oriented, i.e. seeks to reduce the amount of uncertainty through rules, regulations and
laws. On the contrary, a low ranking is indicative of a country that tolerates uncertainty much
more, i.e. is much less prone to resort to rules systematically. France’s UA score, superior to
80, is one of the highest in the world. This score needs to be compared to the world average
score of 62; at EU level, the average score is around 70 with countries like the UK around 30
and Germany around 60.
If cross-cultural research can be useful in understanding various national approaches to
regulation and rules, this does not solve the question of the need for regulation or not in the
field of sustainability reporting. CSR regulation is obviously pushed forth by political and
strategic motives. Despite its high level of acceptance of uncertainty, the UK had opted for
regulation in the field of sustainability reporting in the first place. The decision to finally let
companies adopt reporting on a voluntary basis was more consistent with the traditional
approach to business regulation in the UK. But the very fact that this country was at first
ready to impose such types of constraints on companies is a case in point to help us
understand the CSR approach in the EU and its ambiguities today.

Conclusion
CSR policy in the European Union is at a crossroads these days: the CSR alliance launched
this year by the European Commission following two years of further consultation with
business and non business stakeholders is criticized more and more severely by
non-business stakeholders (NGOs and labor unions) which point to the very liberal nature of
the strategy and feel excluded from the process. This flexible attitude is clearly meant to
reassure international business circles while betting on European companies’ capacity of
innovation and dynamism in the field of CSR and sustainability management. If the CSR
policy stands on the enterprise side, one may wonder about the stakeholder governance
issue and the involvement of the non-business stakeholders in the strategy. Besides, as this
paper suggested, such legislation as the French NRE law may prove positive in certain
national environments. What is clearly needed is an improvement of the reporting guidelines,
among which the crucial questions of the scope of consolidation and the relevant set of
indicators.
The current evolution of the CRS policy in the EU clearly goes against such type of
regulation, and this is where the real paradox is to be found: whereas environmental
regulation has kept on increasing over the last 30 years in the EU, putting many constraints
on companies, the CSR policy orientation is leading to a dichotomy between the
environmental side of development and the social/societal implications of corporate
sustainability, thus questioning the place and purpose of sustainable development within the
EU. The latest precisions given by the commission on what the CSR definition implies add to
the confusion. Four main objectives are stressed:
1. CSR covers social and environmental issues, in spite of the English term corporate social
responsibility.
2. CSR is not or should not be separate from business strategy and operations: it is about
integrating social and environmental concerns into business strategy and operations.
3. CSR is a voluntary concept.
4. An important aspect of CSR is how enterprises interact with their internal and external
stakeholders (employees, customers, neighbors, non-governmental organizations,
public authorities, etc.)[25].

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VOL. 8 NO. 4 2008 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PAGE 403
 It appears that these four objectives, while trying to reach a compromise among diverse
approaches, stress three main contradictions inherent in the current CSR approach:
1. Regulation vs voluntary initiative.
2. Corporate strategy vs civil society expectations.
3. Environmental vs social issues.
More research is definitely needed in order to bridge the gap between CSR theory on the
one hand and environmental sustainability management theory on the other. Our view is that
further regulation in the field of CSR is not incompatible with EU specificities; quite on the
contrary, existing environmental regulation has given birth to a specifically European
approach to sustainability management, why not follow the same orientation regarding CSR
more broadly considered? Another fundamental issue is that of the real implication of the civil
society in the constitution of a European CSR policy: this could also be viewed in the light of a
distinctly European model of society.
To conclude, recent research on the changing role of government in the field of corporate
responsibility (Mendoza, 2007[26]) has clearly shown the need to move from the traditional
role of the state (liberal rule of law or welfare state) to a relational model whereby the
decision-making process is the result of multi-stakeholder consultation, in a context of an
internationalized economy. This is the very challenge the European model is currently faced
with: despite its many hesitations and contradictions, EU CSR policy is definitely moving
toward a relational model, thereby trying to solve the liberal vs welfare state model.
In this respect, the French case appears as a very interesting transitional model: the
adoption of the French NRE Law was a typical illustration of the French Welfare State model,
based on a vertical regulatory approach. But interestingly enough, the evaluation process
set up by the French government led to a new-style consultation process in which various
stakeholders, including companies, NGOs, trade unions and expert groups, were
interviewed. In a way, the fact that the final recommendations made by the French
authorities were to maintain this rather controversial piece of legislation is largely due to the
relational approach, i.e. the influence exerted by non business stakeholders in the evaluation
process. By moving from a ‘‘traditional’’ to a ‘‘transitional’’ status, the NRE Law itself has
gained more relevance at the European level, or at least been instrumental in bridging the
gap between a traditional national model and the innovative European policy-making model:
hence the original purpose of this paper to study the French NRE Law case in the light of the
EU CSR policy orientation.

Notes
1. Directive 2000/53/EC.
2. Directives 2002/95/EC and 2002/96/EC.
3. COM(03)644. The REACH Directive was finally adopted in December 2006 and has been in force
since June 1, 2007.
4. COM(2002)17 final.
5. Further to the seminal work of Bowen (1953) and Heald (1961).
6. COM(2001)366 final.

7. COM(2006)136: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and
the European economic and social Committee: Implementing the partnership for growth and jobs:
making Europe a pole of excellence on corporate social responsibility, p. 1.
8. EU recommendation, May 2001, www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal market

9. Green Accounts Act, Law no. 975, December 1995.

10. 1991 Code of the Environment.
11. Social statement, 1996.
12. Environmental Report, 1995.

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PAGE 404 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VOL. 8 NO. 4 2008
 13. Environmental Protection Act. 1997 Law, art.12.

14. Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz, 2004.

15. Combined Code and Turnbull Report, enacted in 2000.

16. Décret n82002-221 du 20 février 2002 pris pour l’application de l’article L.225-102-1 du code de
commerce et modifiant le décret n867-236 du 23 mars 1967 sur les sociétés commerciales (Loi
NRE). Decree 2002-221 of Feb. 20, 2002 on the implementation of section L.225-102-1 of Code of
Commerce modifying decree 67-236 of March 23, 1967 on companies (NRE Law).

17. Rapport de mission EPE, Orée, ORSE: Bilan critique de l’application par les entreprises de l’article
116 de la loi NRE, avril 2004. EPE, Orée, ORSE Mission Report: Critical assessment of the
application of section 116 of NRE Law by French companies, April 2004.

18. MEDEF-PwC Survey, June 2003; KPMG, Non-financial information in CAC40 company reference
reports, July/Aug 2003; Novéthic, July/Aug 2003 survey; CFIE Survey, October 2003; Ernst & Young
Survey, November 2003; Utopies, December 2003, Mr Jourdain in the world of reporting/Status of
sustainability reporting.

19. See note 13.

20. From KPMG study.

21. See especially the 2004 and 2005 Novethic surveys of the application of the NRE law.

22. Conducted with students as part of classroom teaching.

23. An estimated rate of compliance would be around 80-90 percent for the CAC40 and 60-70 for the
SBF120 companies. This estimated rate has to be taken with precaution, since no major
comprehensive survey has been published since the 2004 reference report.

24. As most scores were published in the early 1980s, some critics argue that they are no longer valid
today. However, recent surveys have shown very few variations concerning these scores for the five
dimensions.

25. European Commission Website, Enterprise and Industry, CSR Homepage.

26. Mendoza Xavier, ESADE Business School, The Relational State and its implications for corporate
responsibility, paper originally presented at ESADE on March 24th 2006.

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