Cultural Trends

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccut20

COVID-19, inclusion and workforce diversity in the

cultural economy: what now, what next?

Doris Ruth Eikhof

To cite this article: Doris Ruth Eikhof (2020) COVID-19, inclusion and workforce diversity
in the cultural economy: what now, what next?, Cultural Trends, 29:3, 234-250, DOI:
10.1080/09548963.2020.1802202

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09548963.2020.1802202

Published online: 04 Aug 2020.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 4400

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 8 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ccut20
CULTURAL TRENDS
2020, VOL. 29, NO. 3, 234–250
https://doi.org/10.1080/09548963.2020.1802202

POLICY REVIEW

COVID-19, inclusion and workforce diversity in the cultural

economy: what now, what next?
Doris Ruth Eikhof
School of Culture and Creative Arts, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cultural economy COVID-19; cultural economy;
poses a significant threat to inclusion and workforce diversity. This workforce diversity; inclusion;
article combines pre-COVID-19 research with emerging industry screen industries
and policy evidence to identify where key impacts on inclusive
practice and, consequently, workforce participation and
advancement in the cultural economy are likely to occur. The
article demonstrates how considering the cultural economy’s
typical business models and resultant work and employment
practices allows understanding that the inclusion and diversity
impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic will be driven by more than
workers’ differing abilities to buffer short-term income insecurity.
The article highlights four areas relevant to inclusion and
workforce diversity that research and policy responses to COVID-
19 should attend to in revising existing and designing new
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Introduction
The cultural economy, in the UK and internationally, has an inclusion and workforce
diversity1 problem: Women, workers from BAME and working class backgrounds, dis-
abled and older workers and workers with caring responsibilities are significantly
under-represented and find it disproportionately more challenging to establish and
maintain a career (e.g. Aylett, 2016; Coles et al., 2018; Diversity Arts Australia et al.,
2019; Pilarcyk, 2020; Reelworld, 2020; Saha & van Lente, 2020). There is increasing
agreement between academics and campaign groups as well as employers and govern-
ments that improving inclusion and opportunity in the cultural economy should be a
strategic priority (e.g. for the UK, CIF, 2017; HM Government, 2018). However, these stra-
tegic priorities are now in danger of being sidelined by the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic has seen vast shares of cultural economy activity grind to a
halt. In the UK, which is the empirical focus of this article, COVID-19 led to a near-complete
lockdown of public life from late March 2020. Within days, the cultural and creative pro-
duction upon which thousands of workers’ livelihoods were based, broke away (e.g.
Bectu, 2020a; Brabin, 2020a; Oxford Economics, 2020; Tsioulakis & Fitzgibbon, 2020). At

CONTACT Doris Ruth Eikhof dorisruth.eikhof@glasgow.ac.uk School of Culture and Creative Arts, University of
Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK @DEikhof
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 CULTURAL TRENDS 235

the time of writing, lockdown measures are being lifted and production and demand for
cultural labour are set to slowly resume. However, for the UK, the cultural economy’s turn-
over is projected to fall by 30% over 2020, and employment reduced by 400,000, out of an
estimated 2 m cultural economy jobs (Oxford Economics, 2020), and cultural workers
remain sceptical about their future prospects of making a living (e.g. a-n The Artists Infor-
mation Company, 2020; Creative Access, 2020; CVAN, 2020). Governments around the
world have set up substantive rescue programmes for the cultural economies (e.g.
Bailey, 2020; Deutscher Kulturrat, 2020; GOV.UK, 2020a; Jericho, 2020). Although those
initiatives were welcome, many commentators also pointed out that they are focused
on cultural economy institutions and businesses rather than workers, and questioned
their effectiveness in supporting in particular the substantive share of cultural workers
earning their living from a precarious portfolio of self-employment and short-term
employment contracts (Campbell & Brown, 2020; Evans, 2020; Jericho, 2020; Pratt, 2020;
Wilderman, 2020).
What has, to date, been much less discussed is that job losses and increased pre-
carity of work and employment in the wake of COVID-19 might have different impli-
cations for different groups of workers, and thus affect inclusion and opportunity in
the cultural economy more broadly (e.g. Brabin, 2020b; CDN, 2020b; Ibekwe, 2020).
Indicatively, Comunian and England (2020)’s analysis of more than 20 surveys run
by UK sector organisations to establish the impact of pandemic on individuals as
well as businesses and organisations, found that “none of the live surveys […]
asked for demographic information and no demographic differences have been
reported from the completed surveys so far” (Comunian & England, 2020, p. 120).
Moreover, where concerns about inclusion and opportunity have been raised (e.g.
Banks, 2020; Film & TV Charity, 2020; Tsioulakis & Fitzgibbon, 2020), they have
focused on workers’ ability to cope with loss of income – an important aspect, but
by no means the only one.
Pre-COVID research on the cultural economy in the UK and internationally strongly
suggests that the pandemic will have demonstrably different outcomes for different
groups of workers. Bringing together pre-COVID research and emerging empirical evi-
dence, this article identifies where key impacts on inclusive practice and, consequently,
workforce participation and advancement in the cultural economy are likely to occur. In
so doing the article demonstrates how considering the cultural economy’s typical
business models and resultant work and employment practices allows understanding
that the inclusion and diversity impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic will be driven by
more than workers’ differing abilities to buffer short-term income insecurity. The con-
clusion highlights four areas that research and policy responses to COVID-19 should
pay attention to.
Pre-COVID-19 research evidence is predominantly drawn from the UK screen indus-
tries,2 while recent evidence includes the broader cultural economy in the UK and inter-
nationally wherever possible. Because this article is being written as both research and
policy responses to COVID-19 unfold, the detail of evidence and examples cited may
change swiftly. However, the underlying principle of how research and policy should
attend to the impact of COVID-19 on workforce participation and advancement in the cul-
tural economy is likely to remain current, both in its substance and, unfortunately, its rel-
evance, for some time yet.
236 D. R. EIKHOF

Cultural economy business models, inclusion and workforce diversity

As Comunian and England (2020) point out, a lack of data impedes direct analyses of the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on workforce participation and advancement. Research
and policy responses to the pandemic thus have to, at least in the first instance, turn to
pre-COVID studies to identify likely impacts. In doing so, it is important to distinguish the
different drivers of unequal workforce participation and advancement discussed in that
research. The first of these drivers is a Eurocentric, white, middle class, non-disabled and
male idea of talent, which influences decision-making in recruitment, casting, awarding
finance or access to training and education to the detriment of individuals who deviate
from this idea (e.g. Banks, 2017; Eikhof, 2017). A second driver is the persistence of misogynist
and discriminatory working cultures in large shares of the cultural economy, which makes
them a less welcoming environment for individuals from under-represented groups to estab-
lish and maintain a career in (e.g. House of Lords, 2015; O’Brien, 2014; Raising Films, 2018;
Randle & Hardy, 2016). A third driver are the cultural economy’s typical business models
and their resultant exclusionary work and employment practices (e.g. Brook et al., 2018;
Eikhof & Warhurst, 2013; Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2012; O’Brien, 2014). While it is possible
that COVID-19 will entrench or worsen exclusionary perceptions of talent or discriminatory
working cultures, the main and immediate impact of the pandemic is on the cultural econo-
my’s business models. In the absence of rigorous “live” data on a developing situation, the
most promising approach for projecting and mitigating the impact of COVID-19 on workforce
participation and advancement is therefore to revisit the links between cultural economy
business models and exclusionary work and employment practices, and explore how these
links are likely to be impacted by COVID-19.
Cultural economy production is focused on projects. This “cite par projects” (a project
oriented society or state, see Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005) has variously been explained as
resulting from, or accompanying, an allegedly innate need to organise creative production
dynamically and flexibly (e.g. Howkins, 2001). Notably though, project-focused production
is a business model of choice for keeping costs, especially sunk costs3, low in the face of
high product market risks and nigh-impossible predictions of what will sell and what will
flop (Caves, 2000; Hesmondhalgh, 2007). Project-focused production translates into
project-focused work and employment: Employment contracts are often of short duration,
offered at short notice and undertaken in a self-employed or quasi-freelance capacity. In
addition, “famine & feast” working patterns dominate, which require long, unsocial hours
and considerable geographical mobility, and are often scaffolded by high performance/
high commitment industry cultures (for an overview see Eikhof & Warhurst, 2013). To miti-
gate the risk of recruiting unsuitable project staff, financially backing an unsuccessful
project or commissioning a flop, decision-makers excessively rely on personal networks
and recommendations (e.g. Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2012). Unpaid work, whether as an
internship, pitch preparation or to gain exposure, is widespread at all career stages.
From a business model perspective, unpaid work, too, allows cutting cost and reducing
risks – it provides a free sample of someone’s ability to do the job. These elements of
the typical cultural economy business models result in exclusionary work and employment
practices. They create conditions under which establishing and maintaining a career is dis-
proportionately more challenging for workers whose availability is limited (e.g. because of
caring commitments (Raising Films, 2018)), who have less access to influential networks
(e.g. disabled and BAME workers (Randle & Hardy, 2016; Saha & van Lente, 2020)) or are
 CULTURAL TRENDS 237

more vulnerable to income uncertainty (e.g. workers from working class backgrounds
(Brook et al., 2018)). While individual work and employment practices, most notably the
recruitment through networks, are widely recognised as exclusionary, there is less discus-
sion of how these practices combine and interact to support the cultural economy’s
project-based production models. This article deliberately emphasises the link between
work and employment practices and business models. As the following section outlines,
the primary impact of COVID-19 is on the business model, and from there, secondarily
but powerfully, on work and employment practices.

The cultural economy under COVID-19

In the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected, and will continue to affect, the cultural
economy’s business models in three waves. Immediately, the lockdown measures
implemented by the UK and national Governments from March 2020 necessitated
the closure of venues and production across much of the cultural economy (e.g.
Brabin, 2020a; Oxford Economics, 2020; Thorne & Aurthur, 2020). Disrupted supply
chains meant that activities which could, wholly or partly, be moved to online pro-
duction or remote collaboration, were impacted too. For 2020, the UK cultural econo-
my’s turnover is estimated to be 30% lower than in 2019 (Oxford Economics, 2020).
Large shares of cultural economy activity, and with it the demand for cultural labour,
broke away within days. In the first quarter of 2020, which only covers a week of UK
lockdown, more than one third of respondents to a Creative Industries Federation
survey had all their freelance contracts terminated, and a further 46% had seen half
of their freelance contracts cancelled (Oxford Economics, 2020). In the short-term and
as the UK moves out of lockdown, cultural economy production resumes, at greatly
differing paces and under various measures for “COVID-safe” working and engaging
with the public, including measures that make trading not economically viable, for
instance for performing arts organisations and music venues (House of Commons,
2020). This resumption will reignite some demand for cultural labour, though not at
previous levels (e.g. a-n The Artists Information Company, 2020). With the end of UK-
wide lockdown, Government support schemes are also being phased out, and where
employers have been able to furlough4 workers, many organisations are now forecast
to close down or at least have to lay off part of their workforces instead. A fifth of
employed and self-employed cultural workers in the UK economy are projected to
lose their job over the course of 2020 (Oxford Economics, 2020). For the mid- to
long-term, the impact of COVID-19 on the UK economy overall is forecast to put
long-lasting strains on public and consumer/audience budgets, leading to a much
lower influx of finance via public funding. Mid- to long-term there will thus likely be
significantly less resource flowing into the cultural economy.
For the foreseeable future, cultural economy organisations and businesses will thus find
themselves in a triple bind: there will be less resource available for cultural production
overall, organisations and businesses will incur additional production costs for “COVID-
safety” measures, and any financial reserves will already have been depleted in attempts
to survive lockdown. The cultural economy will be pushed into this triple bind from the
already precarious position in which the economic impacts of the Global Financial
Crises in 2008 left it (Banks, 2020; Comunian & England, 2020).
238 D. R. EIKHOF

The impacts outlined above put major pressures on the cultural economy’s business
models. Organisations and businesses will need to cut costs to remain competitive in
an intensified battle for reduced funding and commissioning budgets, and despite
having to now include costs for “COVID-19 safe”-production. In doing so, they will likely
seek to reduce especially sunk costs, so that they are able to respond to any new devel-
opments (for instance further lockdowns to counteract a second wave of COVID-19 infec-
tions) flexibly and with as little lost investment as possible. In relation to staff cost, there
will be strong incentives for organisations and businesses to:

. use flexibly contracted labour and services (e.g. short-term PAYE, self-employed, sub-
contractors) instead of more permanent contracts;
. commit to contracts for labour and services at as short a notice as possible;
. cut salaries, day rates or hourly wages;
. request or at least encourage unpaid work, possibly in return for future reward;
. recruit via existing contacts rather than more costly formal appointments processes;
. cut back voluntary inclusive practice, e.g. paid internships, travel support or on-site
childcare provision;
. intensify work, for example by contracting fewer days/hours than before to deliver a
certain output or by requesting individuals to fulfil multiple production functions
(e.g. camera and sound) instead of hiring separate staff for each function.

As outlined above, it is precisely work and employment practices like these that act as bar-
riers for workforce participation and advancement for individuals from under-represented
groups. The first general projection of the impact of COVID-19 on workforce participation
and advancement in the cultural economy is thus that without intervention, increased
pressures on existing business models will make already exclusionary work and employ-
ment practices even more exclusionary and will further curtail the representation of
workers from already under-represented groups. The following sections 4 and 5 discuss
projected impacts in detail.

Increased precarity and employment insecurity

Presently, the most discussed impact of COVID-19 is the reduced opportunity for cultural
workers to earn a living. The sudden breaking away of cultural production under lockdown
has put many workers’ livelihoods into existential crises, especially where employment
contracts were flexible or freelance. A survey of nearly 3000 cultural workers about how
they coped with lockdown revealed that “many film, TV, theatre, live events and arts free-
lancers have access to extremely limited support and are being forced into debt or relying
on charity to get through the crisis” (Bectu, 2020a, no pagination).
In the UK, public debate of this impact has mostly related to Government’s emergency
support schemes. The contractual relationships underpinning much cultural economy
employment made large shares of cultural workers ineligible for support from either of
the two flagship rescue initiatives, the Job Retention Scheme or the Self-Employment
Income Support Scheme (Campbell & Brown, 2020).5 Up to three quarters of UK film
and TV workers, for instance, self-assessed as not eligible for government support (Film
& TV Charity, 2020; WFTV, 2020). Visual artists, too, reported struggling to identify relevant
 CULTURAL TRENDS 239

support they were eligible for (CVAN, 2020). International evidence suggests similar
struggles elsewhere (e.g. Morris, 2020; Wilderman, 2020).
Again, different waves of likely impact need to be distinguished. Emerging evidence
suggests that with fairly immediate effect, the lack of financial support will result in individ-
uals dropping out of the cultural economy workforce to seek more secure employment in
other sectors (e.g. Bectu, 2020a; Brabin, 2020a; Evans, 2020). Over half of UK film and TV
workers responding to Viva La PD’s (2020) survey stated that they would need to find
work elsewhere if production remained suspended or substantially reduced for longer
than three months. Cultural workers have, for a long time, been used to bridging consider-
able periods of unemployment – a third of film workers surveyed by Screenskills (2008), for
instance, had been out of work for more than half of the reporting year. The strongly nega-
tive projections of individual ability to buffer loss of income due to COVID-19 thus indicate
that pre-COVID-19, the cultural economy workforce was, as Banks (2020, p. 3) puts it, “already
‘low immunity’ – a vulnerable body susceptible to almost any kind of economic shock”. Pre-
COVID evidence suggests that this “low immunity” and financial inability to sustain a cultural
economy career are likely to be more widespread amongst workers from working class and
ethnic minority backgrounds, workers with caring commitments and disabled workers (e.g.
Brook et al., 2018; CAMEo, 2018; Raising Films, 2018). Early findings from Creative Access’
(2020) survey of industry entrants support these projections, showing that income
sources, job prospects and, as a result, mental health had worsened amongst the predomi-
nantly non-white respondents. A study of visual artists showed how for disabled workers,
carers and members of the LGBT+ community, the loss of day-to-day support structures
during lockdown further compounded problems to uphold professional practice (CVAN,
2020). Without policy intervention, it is thus likely that disproportionately more workers
from already under-represented groups, and especially those who belong to more than
one under-represented group, will drop out of the cultural economy workforce.
For the mid- to long-term, pre-COVID-19 research suggests that the pandemic will affect
the diversity of entrants into the cultural economy workforce. Pre-COVID-19, work and
employment conditions in the cultural economy deterred particularly young people from
ethnic minority and working class backgrounds from pursuing a creative career (Allen & Hol-
lingworth, 2013; Work Foundation, 2017). Similarly, many new parents did not even contem-
plate a return to their previous careers after parental leave (e.g. Raising Films, 2018). Given
that the mid- and long-term pressures on cultural economy business models are projected
to result in a sustained increase of precarious employment and income insecurity, workers
from under-represented groups are, if anything, now even less likely to consider the cultural
economy an attractive, viable career destination. Negative impacts of precarious employ-
ment on a sector’s reputation as a viable career destination post COVID-19 are not
confined to the cultural economy (Warhurst, 2020). However, given the ubiquity of
making a living from self-employment, from a portfolio of contracts and often across mul-
tiple professional roles within and outwith the cultural economy, such considerations are
likely to be particularly pertinent for inclusion and diversity in these sectors.

Exclusionary work and employment practices

At the time of writing it is impossible to comprehensively predict how exactly work and
employment practices in the cultural economy will be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
240 D. R. EIKHOF

Guidelines for “COVID-safe” working are still in development, and will apply differently to
practices that already vary, between and partly within, cultural economy sectors. However,
in the light of previous research on exclusionary work and employment practices, some
recent developments and emerging evidence do give cause for concern in a number of
areas.
Firstly, workers from “at risk” groups will require additional measures to work safely, for
instance extra space, physically separated workspaces or extra cleaning, as well as more in-
depth, individual consultations (Bectu, 2020b; GOV.UK, 2020b; ITV et al., 2020). Such
measures make them “costlier” human resources. Previous studies show that disabled
workers often struggle to find work because employers do not want to engage with
(let alone fund) the reasonable adjustments disabled people are entitled to (e.g. Randle
& Hardy, 2016). Such evidence suggests that organisations and businesses will, in the
future, also avoid contracting workers for whom additional COVID-19 safety measures
have to be put in place. UK disability campaigners have already raised such concerns
(Brown, 2020). Most likely to avoid contracting workers who require reasonable adjust-
ments are micro-, small and medium-sized organisations and businesses – a group that
makes up large shares of the cultural economy.
Secondly, information about who is considered to be “at risk” is, at the time of writing, still
ambiguous, and is set to remain so for some time. Again, previous research on disabled
workers showed that employers’ lack of knowledge about disability made them less likely
to even consider contracting a disabled person, even if no reasonable adjustments were
required (Eikhof et al., 2019). Extrapolating from this evidence it is likely that the lack of
clarity about “at risk” workers will make employers “play safe” and favour workers without
potential “at risk” characteristics. Such practices would particularly negatively impact
BAME and disabled workers, for whom infection and mortality rates have been reported
to be significantly higher (e.g. Pareek et al., 2020; Tidball et al., 2020). Employers are thus
likely to see BAME and disabled workers as a “less safe” choice than non-BAME or non-dis-
abled workers – even though it is still unclear which individuals are indeed more vulnerable
to COVID-19 infection and which statistics had interfering variables, e.g. Black or Asian
workers being over-represented in jobs with higher infection risks (Pareek et al., 2020).
Thirdly, implementing “COVID-safe” workplace measures will require, or at least incen-
tivise, organisations and businesses to ask workers to disclose personal information
believed to be related to increased risks of contracting COVID-19. Such information
would likely include conditions workers would previously have been much less likely to
(have to) disclose, for instance asthma, diabetes or HIV-AIDS. Moreover, workers might
conceivably be asked to disclose such information not only about themselves, but also
about other members of their household. The disclosure of personal information is gener-
ally associated with a considerable risk of discrimination, as research on disability and
workers with caring commitments shows (e.g. Raising Films, 2018; Randle & Hardy,
2016). The concern here is that COVID-19-related information might, now or in the
future, lead to intentional or unintentional discrimination against workers who have dis-
closed certain characteristics.
Fourthly, there is emerging evidence from film and TV production that organisations
are adapting production processes with the benign intention of reducing infection risks
but without awareness of the potentially exclusionary consequences. In Germany, for
instance older actors report being unable to find work: Because production companies
 CULTURAL TRENDS 241

seek to avoid the higher costs of “COVID-safe” working for individuals from “at risk” groups,
parts for older actors are written out of scripts (Mittagsmagazin, 2020). Similarly, early rec-
ommendations for COVID-safe productions in Sweden and Denmark actively discouraged
“casting actors at ‘increased risk of severe illness’ and those above 70” (Keslassy, 2020: no
pagination; similarly Bectu, 2020b). Such practices not only reduce work opportunities for
older actors (who are already under-represented (CDN, 2020a)), they also effect diversity of
representation on screen. A different example of potentially exclusionary practice comes
from Californian TV production, where actors’ real-life partners are used to shoot scenes
that involve two characters touching (Porter, 2020). Also introduced with the benign
intent to protect workers, this “solution” incentivises hiring actors who have an available,
non-“risk group” partner without caring or career commitments. It encourages discrimi-
nation against actors without a real-life partner or whose real-life partner is shielding or
unavailable.
In addition to such changes to organisations’ and businesses’ practices, at sector level
the cultural economy’s reliance on personal networks gives cause for concern, too. Indus-
try events such as festivals or awards ceremonies are key to building networks and gaining
visibility vis-à-vis gatekeepers and decision-makers, both in person and through the exhi-
bition of one’s work. The cancellation of these events has reduced these opportunities for
making contacts and building visibility (a-n The Artists Information Company, 2020). While
online-festivals may make participation possible for a wider range of audiences, there are
fears that fewer opportunities to meet face-to-face will exacerbate existing inequalities in
accessing networks (Vahabzadeh, 2020). Where industry events do take place in the phys-
ical world, admittance may be limited or events may be less accessible, generally because
of general transport and travel restrictions, and specifically for workers who are at higher
risk of COVID-10 infection. Overall, the difficulties in accessing key networks that workers
from under-represented groups have been shown to have had pre-COVID are likely to
persist or worsen – at least in the short term.
Lastly, personal networks are the main conduit for “soft information”, for instance about
workers’ personality and work ethic (Grugulis & Stoyanova, 2012). It is possible, even prob-
able, that such crucial “soft information” will start to include information about (a) some-
one’s attitude to COVID-19, i.e. how much risk they are willing to take, whether they insist
on “COVID-19 safe” measures, and (b) whether someone is believed to be from an “at risk”
group, e.g. due to invisible underlying health conditions. Previous studies have demon-
strated that gaining reputation as a “killjoy” or “trouble maker”, for instance for not accept-
ing unsafe or exploitative working conditions, negatively affected access to work (House of
Lords, 2015; O’Brien, 2014). Inferring from these findings, there is considerable danger that
COVID-19-related information about individual workers circulating through personal net-
works will create new and entrench existing exclusion from opportunity.
As the pandemic and its impacts develop, the issues outlined above may be superseded
by new evidence, policy and regulation. However, the above examples do illustrate general
principles of how pre-COVID-19 research can be drawn on to identify areas of concern. The
next section uses the same approach to discuss research and policy responses.

What next for researchers and policy-makers?

At the time of writing, public and policy debate is moving towards mid- to longer term
responses to the impact of COVID-19 on the cultural economies (e.g. Evans, 2020; Film
242 D. R. EIKHOF

& TV Charity, 2020; Pratt, 2020). The above projections strongly suggest that inclusion and
workforce diversity need to be a fundamental consideration of such responses. Bringing
pre-COVID-19 research in conversation with emerging evidence, this section suggests
four areas that warrant particular attention in this regard.
Firstly and with respect to policy responses beyond immediate financial support, pre-
vious research clearly highlights the limited efficacy of “empowering interventions”: inter-
ventions that aim to support individual workers from under-represented groups to “get in
and on” in the existing system (Newsinger & Eikhof, 2020). Progressing inclusion and work-
force diversity requires “transforming interventions” that do not merely help specific indi-
viduals, but change industry practice overall. Such transforming interventions might, for
instance introduce paid internships and training, carer-friendly work-arrangements, acces-
sible workplaces or inclusive recruitment practices as a matter of course, not a one-off
initiative. In some instances, public funding for cultural economy organisations and
businesses has, pre-COVID0-19, been tied to applicants evidencing attempts at transfor-
mative change (e.g. Arts Council England, 2017; BFI, 2020). Given the – justified – immedi-
ate pressures to financially support individual cultural workers, in particular self-employed,
there is a danger now that empowering interventions again receive more attention than
transforming ones. In the mid- to long-term, such a shift in attention would give even
greater cause for concern than before. Because COVID-19 puts cost cutting pressures on
the cultural economy’s business models, organisations and businesses can now even
less be relied upon to voluntarily make work and employment practices more inclusive,
especially where doing so might create a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis others,
who, for sake of argument, might not be paying their interns or investing in accessible
workspaces (Brown, 2020). It is thus important that where funding, licensing, commissions
or the eligibility for industry awards are already tied to evidence of inclusive practice, these
requirements remain firmly in place. If anything, existing schemes should be strengthened
and extended, to previously not covered industries and sectors, but preferably also by
asking businesses and organisations how they assess the impact of their COVID-19
responses on inclusion and opportunity. Also, COVID-19 could usefully fuel conversations
about more radically transformative interventions such universal basic income (UBI) in the
arts (e.g. Pratt, 2020). Similar to the Intermittence du Spectacle in France or the Künsterso-
zialkasse in Germany, such a scheme could guarantee a minimum of financial support
where cultural economy workers’ income from other sources fails to reach a certain
minimum level, per month or year. In so doing, a UBI scheme would disrupt the link
between project-based production and income from project-based employment, and
make working in the cultural economy a more accessible and financially sustainable pro-
spect for workers from currently under-represented groups. Moreover, modelling of
COVID-19 responses in the UK showed that UBI schemes were more likely to benefit
those in most financial need, whereas the support schemes introduced by the UK Govern-
ment were more likely to benefit workers on higher incomes (Painter, 2020; Painter et al.,
2020). From an inclusion and opportunity perspective, this potential to deliver better dis-
tributive justice makes UBI schemes a particularly interesting intervention for rebuilding
and reforming the cultural economy. Of course, UBI schemes for the cultural economy
would not completely decouple business models from exclusionary work and employ-
ment practice, e.g. they would not prevent recruitment through networks or facilitate
accessible, carer-friendly work practices. But UBI schemes would provide at least some
 CULTURAL TRENDS 243

buffer between pressures on business models on the one hand, and inclusion, workforce
diversity and opportunity on the other.
Secondly, and with respect to supporting work and employment practices that are
COVID-safe and inclusive, previous research on disabled workers in particular can help
identify potential ways forward. In the UK, where organisations and businesses are knowl-
edgeable about Access to Work (GOV.UK, no date), a scheme that helps fund the reason-
able adjustments a disabled worker might require, the provision of financial support
does have a positive impact on employment opportunities (Adams et al., 2018). A
similar fund to help organisations and businesses resource “COVID-safe” workplace
measures in particular for workers from “at risk” groups could thus help counteract the
already occurring narrowing of opportunities for some workers. Evidence on disabled
workers’ opportunities also shows that such financial support infrastructures in themselves
do not prevent discrimination, but that demonstrable change depends on the level of
knowledge and understanding amongst organisations and businesses. In a previous
study, UK broadcasting industry experts explained how the widespread lack of knowledge
about disability led to fear of “uncomfortable conversations” or legal consequences as the
major obstacle to organisations and businesses engaging with, let alone contracting dis-
abled workers (e.g. Eikhof et al., 2019). Governments and sector organisations should thus
provide and actively promote information about why assessing the impact of business
responses to COVID-19 on workforce participation and advancement is important, how
changes in business practice can be assessed (for instance akin to the Equality Impact
Assessment mandatory for public organisations in the UK (EHRC, 2020)) and how non-
exclusionary practice can be designed. In addition, to avoid discrimination against “at
risk” workers, workers need to know which personal information they can rightfully be
asked to disclose. Organisations and businesses need to be given clear guidance on
what they are allowed/required to ask, and how the personal information obtained may
be acted upon and stored. Again, lessons can be learned here from guidance on the
implementation of the 2010 Equalities Act (GOV.UK, 2013). But “diversity [as] a constant”
(Ibekwe, 2020; no pagination), as an integral ubiquitous element, is currently missing from
Government and industry guidance and responses (Brabin, 2020b; Ibekwe, 2020), and
researchers and policy-makers should marshal evidence from previous research to demon-
strate its importance.
Thirdly, and with respect to data gathering, current discussions of policy responses to
COVID-19 have exposed a longstanding general problem of designing effective interven-
tions for improving inclusion and workforce diversity. Because large shares of cultural
workers earn income from a portfolio of contracts, conventional employment statistics
and employer surveys (e.g. Ofcom, 2019a; Screenskills, 2016) can provide only limited
information about the size and diversity make-up of the cultural economy workforce
(e.g. Film & TV Charity, 2020; Ofcom, 2019b). Alternative approaches, for instance in the
UK screen industries Project Diamond, which gathers self-reported diversity data (CDN,
2020a), or the BFI’s (2020) analysis of diversity information in funding applications, can
equally only provide certain pieces for the overall jigsaw of information required for
designing effective policy responses. The lack of attention to inclusion and workforce
diversity in current policy responses, in the UK and elsewhere, may not be caused by
the lack of data about freelancers in the cultural economy workforce. But the absence
of easily accessible, comprehensive and good quality data has certainly not helped
244 D. R. EIKHOF

make the case for including these concerns in policy-making. Researchers and policy-
makers should heed this COVID-19 wake-up call to expand existing and develop new
methodologies for monitoring workforce diversity information across the cultural econ-
omies, in the UK and internationally.
Fourthly, researchers and policy-makers should seek to capture, evaluate and promote
those responses to COVID-19 that have made industry practice more inclusive. Most pro-
minently, cultural production under lockdown has proved that remote working and collab-
oration are possible in much larger shares of cultural economy production than
practitioners considered possible. The UK games sector, for instance, cites a rapid shift
to remote working as key to maintaining productivity and meeting increased consumer
demand under lockdown (Oxford Economics, 2020). Working remotely for all or part of
one’s role can greatly increase opportunities for disabled or older workers, workers from
outwith urban cultural economy centres or workers with caring responsibilities, for
instance. There are opportunities for cultural outputs here, too: the now widespread con-
sultation of experts via video-link could significantly broaden the range of on-screen rep-
resentations, for instance. Using video conferences or self-shot tapes not only for casting
(e.g. Keslassy, 2020) but also for job interviews, auditions or admission interviews for uni-
versity degree programmes could greatly lower job search costs and thus increase oppor-
tunities for anyone with increased access costs (e.g. long distance travel) or with limited
access to finances for supporting a career in the cultural economy. And while the initial
loss of face-to-face networking likely has problematic implications for inclusion, online net-
working, if it were to become a more widespread industry practice, could potentially
widen opportunities to access gatekeepers and decision-makers (a-n The Artists Infor-
mation Company, 2020). App features such as live captioning mean that the accessibility
of remote interactions of all kinds can often be increased with much lower effort or invest-
ment than in face-to-face situations (Ibekwe, 2020). Such shifts in practices may not be as
radical as, say, introducing a universal basic income for artists. But given that organisations
and businesses now have at least temporary experience with these practices, they stand a
higher chance of being adapted. Their introduction, however, needs to be flanked by
research and educated industry guidance – not least to prevent new exclusions from
arising, for instance due to lack of access to digital infrastructures.
The economic impact of COVID-19 on cultural economies across the world has been
“sudden and massive” (Oxford Economics, 2020, p. 19), and previous and emerging evi-
dence gives cause for great concern about its impact on inclusion and workforce diversity.
However, as writer Viet Thanh Nguyen (2020, no pagination) reminds us, “our real enemy is
not the virus but our response to the virus”. That response, Thanh Nguyen continues, has
so far “been degraded and deformed by the structural inequalities of our society”. The
research and policy task at hand now is to reform our responses to the impact of
COVID on inclusion and workforce diversity in the cultural economy before it is too late.
Our pre-COVID work provides plenty evidence and experience with which to approach
that task.

Notes
1. The use of terms such as inclusion, diversity, opportunity and equality vary considerably across
academic and policy literature. This paper uses three main terms: Inclusion/inclusive practice is
used to describe a social setting in which individuals are treated equitably and are not
 CULTURAL TRENDS 245

excluded from (work) opportunities on the basis of what is typically termed diversity charac-
teristics or protected characteristics (GOV.UK, 2013). Inclusion or inclusive practice explicitly
refers to more than the mere presence of individuals with certain characteristics in a particular
population; it pays attention to how everyone is treated (e.g. remunerated), the power
relations within a population (e.g. participation in decision-making) etc. The term workforce
diversity is used descriptively, to refer to the degree of heterogeneity or homogeneity
within a specific workforce regarding certain characteristics. Because the degree of workforce
diversity can (but does not have to) indicate presence or absence of inclusive practice, work-
force diversity is often cast as a goal in its own right – a usage this paper does not advocate.
The phrase workforce participation and advancement shifts attention to the perspective of the
individual and there opportunities (or lack thereof) to be included and to progress in the cul-
tural economy workforce. The term ‘advancement’ is added deliberately to emphasise that
while workforce diversity refers to the variance within a particular population of workers at
a point in time, any discussion of inclusion and opportunity also needs to consider individual
workers’ opportunity to progress within their chosen occupational or professional context, e.g.
through promotion or training (see also Eikhof, 2017).
2. The UK screen industries constitute a particularly well-evidenced empirical footprint with respect
to workforce diversity. Legislation and practices for gathering diversity-relevant information vary
considerably between (e.g. OECD, 2018). The UK’s Equality Act 2010 (GOV.UK, 2013) provides the
basis for gathering and analysing possibly the widest range of diversity characteristics internation-
ally. It mandates (for public organisations) or recommends (for private organisations and
businesses) the collection of information on nine protected characteristics, and in its extension
allows, for instance, provision of such data about employees to be a condition of funding (e.g.
BFI, 2020) or broadcast licencing via Ofcom (Ofcom, 2019a). Campaigning organisations, aca-
demic and industry research in particular in the UK screen industries have used this data to
build an expansive body of evidence (for an overview see CAMEo, 2018) that offers systematic
insights into the structural dimensions of inclusion and workforce diversity.
3. Sunk costs are irrecuperable, often one-off investments that cannot be adapted to volume of
activity at a later point (e.g. the costs for building a stage set remains the same, whether it is
used for one or 100 shows ). Long-term investments or commitments can be considered sunk
costs if they cannot be changed during a particular planning period (e.g. the lease/rent of a
property that cannot be terminated if production stops).
4. Under the UK’s Job Retention Scheme, the Government financially supported employers to
‘furlough’ employees, i.e. to continue paying part of their wages, if they would otherwise
have been laid off because the business/organisation was shut down under COVID-19 lock-
down restrictions.
5. The Job Retention Scheme supported employers to continue paying up to 80% or £2,500 of
wages for workers who would otherwise have been laid off. Because workers needed to have
been employed for a minimum length of time when the UK went into lockdown, many cultural
economy workers on short-term employment contracts were not eligible under this scheme.
The Self-Employed Income Support Scheme provided grants of up to 80% or £2,500 of a self-
employed’s monthly profit. Eligibility restrictions such as minimum trading periods, maximum
income earned from other sources or as dividends meant that large shares of self-employed, in
particular in the cultural economy, were not eligible for the scheme (e.g. Campbell & Brown,
2020; Warhurst, 2020).

Notes on contributor
Doris Ruth Eikhof is Professor of Cultural Economy & Policy at the University of Glasgow, School of
Culture & Creative Arts. She has published widely on work, employment and careers in the cultural
economy, recently with a special focus on inclusion, opportunity and diversity. Doris’ current projects
include her AHRC Leadership Fellowship Everyday Diversity in the UK Screen Industries as well as col-
laborations with Creative Diversity Network, the British Film Institute and BAFTA. From 2016–2020
Doris was Deputy Director of the CAMEo Research Institute, University of Leicester.
246 D. R. EIKHOF

References
Adams, L., Tindle, A., Downing, C., Morrice, N., & Domingos, M. (2018). Access to work: Qualitative
research with applicants, employers and delivery staff. Department for Work & Pensions.
Retrieved July 5, 2020, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/756414/access-to-work-qualitative-research-with-
applicants-employers-and-delivery-staff.pdf
Allen, K., & Hollingworth, S. (2013). “Sticky subjects” or “cosmopolitan creatives”? Urban Studies, 50(3),
499–517. http://usj.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0042098012468901
a-n The Artists Information Company. (2020). Covid-19 impact survey. a-n The Artists Information
Company. Retrieved July 7, 2020, from https://static.a-n.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
Covid-19-impact-survey-2020.pdf
Arts Council England. (2017). National portfolio 2018-22: Equality analysis. Arts Council England.
Retrieved July 3, 2020, from https://www.artscouncil.org.uk/sites/default/files/download-file/
NPO%202018-22_Equality%20Analysis_FINAL.pdf
Aylett, H. (2016). Where are all the women directors?: Report on gender equality for directors in the European
film industry. EWA – European Women’s Audiovisual Network. Retrieved January 20, 2019, from
https://www.ewawomen.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Complete-report_compressed.pdf
Bailey, J. (2020). Government responses to the impact of COVID-19 on the arts and creative industries.
BYP Group. Retrieved June 20, 2020, from https://www.bypgroup.com/blog/2020/3/21/
government-arts-responses-to-covid-19?fbclid=IwAR1mc44Yc4ulSHhUDmhHJws7mqgiOMFCi6L
MnkRRz0OL2n5NTW7RcgdeHIw
Banks, M. (2017). Creative justice. Cultural industries, work and inequality. Rowman & Littlefield.
Banks, M. (2020). The work of culture and C-19. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 1–7. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1367549420924687
Bectu. (2020a). Half of creative freelancers borrowing money to survive COVID-19 crisis. Bectu. Retrieved
July 6, 2020, from https://bectu.org.uk/news/half-of-creative-freelancers-borrowing-money-to-
survive-covid-19-crisis/
Bectu. (2020b). Bectu report on scripted film & TV recovery plan, v9. Bectu. Retrieved July 2, 2020
from https://d28j9ucj9uj44t.cloudfront.net/uploads/2020/07/BECTU-REPORT-ON-SCRIPTED-FILM-
TV-RECOVERY-PLAN-v9.pdf
BFI. (2020). BFI Diversity Standards Key Findings. Production June 2016-March 2019. BFI. Retrieved
April 20, 2020, from https://www.bfi.org.uk/education-research/film-industry-statistics-reports/
reports/diversity-standards-initial-findings
Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, E. (2005). The new spirit of capitalism. Verso.
Brabin, T. (2020a). Creatives and the Covid-19 pandemic economic impacts of the current crisis on
freelancers and self-employed workers in the creative industries. Written evidence to the DCMS
Select Committee Inquiry into the impact of COVID-19 on DCMS sectors. Retrieved July 7, 2020,
from https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/4865/pdf/
Brabin, T. (2020b). The impact of Covid-19 on BAME workers and communities in DCMS sectors.
Submission to Baroness Lawrence’s review into the impact of Coronavirus on black, Asian and
minority ethnic (BAME) communities by the Shadow DCMS team. June 2020.
Brook, O., O’Brien, D., & Taylor, M. (2018). Social class, taste and inequalities in the creative industries.
panic! It’s an arts emergency report. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from https://createlondon.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Panic-Social-Class-Taste-and-Inequalities-in-the-Creative-Industries1.pdf
Brown, M. (2020, June 19). Disability campaigners warn of UK’s progress unravelling in the arts. The
Guardian. Retrieved July 3, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2020/jun/19/
disability-campaigners-warn-of-uks-progress-unravelling-in-the-arts
CAMEo. (2018). Workforce diversity in the UK screen sector. Evidence Review. CAMEo Research Institute,
University of Leicester. Retrieved July 4, 2020, from https://www.bfi.org.uk/education-research/
film-industry-statistics-research/reports/workforce-diversity
Campbell, L., & Brown, M. (2020, June 18). ‘Seismic, torturous and gruelling’: Forgotten UK arts
workers fall through support cracks. The Guardian. Retrieved July 6, 2020 from https://amp.
theguardian.com/stage/2020/jun/18/seismic-torturous-and-gruelling-forgotten-uk-arts-workers-
fall-through-support-cracks
 CULTURAL TRENDS 247

Caves, R. E. (2000). Creative industries. Harvard University Press.

CDN – Creative Diversity Network. (2020a). Diamond. The third cut. Creative diversity network.
Retrieved June 25, 2020, from https://creativediversitynetwork.com/diamond/diamond-reports/
diamond-the-third-cut-report/
CDN – Creative Diversity Network. (2020b). Written evidence to the DCMS select committee inquiry into
the impact of COVID-19 on DCMS sectors.
CIF – Creative Industries Federation. (2017). Creative diversity. The state of diversity in the UJ’s creative
industries and what we can do about it. Creative Industries Federation. Retrieved June 29,
2020, from https://www.creativeindustriesfederation.com/sites/default/files/2017-06/30183-CIF%
20Access%20&%20Diversity%20Booklet_A4_Web%20(1)(1).pdf
Coles, A., Macneill, K.M., Vincent, J.B., Vincent, C., & Barre, P. (2018). The status of women in the
Canadian arts and cultural industries. Research review 2010-2018. Ontario Arts Council.
Retrieved July 15, 2020, from https://www.arts.on.ca/oac/media/oac/Publications/Research%
20Reports%20EN-FR/Arts%20Funding%20and%20Support/OAC-Women-the-Arts-Report_Final_
EN_Oct5.pdf
Comunian, R., & England, L. (2020). Creative and cultural work without filters: Covid-19 and exposed
precarity in the creative economy. Cultural Trends, 29(2), 112–128. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09548963.2020.1770577
Creative Access. (2020). On the verge. The impact of coronavirus on underrepresented communities
within the creative industries. Creative Access. Retrieved July 2, 2020, from https://creativeaccess.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/On-The-Verge-A-Creative-Access-Report-June-2020.pdf
CVAN. (2020). Impact of COVID-19 on visual arts workers. Summary of findings. CVAN. Retrieved July 16,
2020, from https://cvansoutheast.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CVANCOVID-19Summary-
view.pdf
Deutscher Kulturrat. (2020). Corona vs. Kultur: Weg für NEUSTART KULTUR frei. Deutscher Kulturrat.
Retrieved July 5, 2020, from https://www.kulturrat.de/presse/pressemitteilung/corona-vs-kultur-
weg-fuer-neustart-kultur-frei/
Diversity Arts Australia, BYP Group and Western Sydney University. (2019). Shifting the balance:
Cultural diversity in leadership within the Australian arts, screen and creative sectors. Retrieved
July 16, 2020, from http://diversityarts.org.au/app/uploads/Shifting-the-Balance-DARTS-small.pdf
EHRC – Equality & Human Rights Commission. (2020). Coronavirus (COVID-19) guidance for employ-
ers. EHRC. Retrieved July 8, 2020, from https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-
guidance/coronavirus-covid-19-guidance-employers
Eikhof, D. R. (2017). Analysing decisions on diversity and opportunity in the cultural and creative
industries: A new framework. Organization, 24(3), 289–307. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1350
508416687768
Eikhof, D. R., Marsden, S., Norman, K., & Randle, K. (2019). Doubling disability research report, for crea-
tive diversity network. CAMEo Research Institute, University of Leicester. Retrieved July 3, 2020,
from https://le.ac.uk/cameo/publications/research-and-policy-reports
Eikhof, D. R., & Warhurst, C. (2013). The promised land? Why social inequalities are systemic in the
creative industries. Employee Relations, 35(5), 495–508. https://www.emerald.com/insight/
content/doi/10.1108/ER-08-2012-0061/full/html
Evans, P. (2020). The creative sector is going to need a Marshall Plan to recover from Covid-19.
Reaction, 23 April 2020. Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://reaction.life/the-creative-sector-is-
going-to-need-a-marshall-plan-to-recover-from-covid-19/
Film & TV Charity. (2020). Impact of Covid-19 on DCMS sectors: Issues for the film and TV workforce.
Submission to the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee. Film & TV Charity.
Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://filmtvcharity.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Film-and-
TV-Charity-Covid19-DCMS-Select-Committee-Final-19Jun20-1.pdf
GOV.UK. (2013). Equality Act 2010: Guidance. GOV.UK. Retrieved July 7, 2020, from https://www.gov.
uk/guidance/equality-act-2010-guidance
GOV.UK. (2020a). £1.57 billion investment to protect Britain’s world-class cultural, arts and heritage insti-
tutions. GOV.UK. Retrieved July 7, 2020, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/157-billion-
investment-to-protect-britains-world-class-cultural-arts-and-heritage-institutions
248 D. R. EIKHOF

GOV.UK. (2020b). Working safely during Coronavirus. GOV.UK. Retrieved June 23, 2020, from https://
www.gov.uk/guidance/working-safely-during-coronavirus-covid-19
GOV. UK. (no date). Get support in work if you have a disability or health condition (Access to Work).
GOV.UK. Retrieved July 8, 2020, from https://www.gov.uk/access-to-work
Grugulis, I., & Stoyanova, D. (2012). Social capital and networks in film and TV: Jobs for the boys?
Organization Studies, 33(10), 1311–1331. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840612453525
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2007). The cultural industries. Sage.
HM Government. (2018). Industrial strategy creative industries sector deal. HM Government. Retrieved
Dec 20, 2019, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/695097/creative-industries-sector-deal-print.pdf
House of Commons. (2020, June 9). Digital, culture, media and sport committee; oral evidence: The
impact of Covid-19 on DCMS sectors: Creative industries, HC 291. House of Commons. Retrieved
July 7, 2020, from https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/477/html/
House of Lords. (2015). Women in news and current affair broadcasting. Select Committee on
Communications. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldcomuni/91/91.pdf
Howkins, J. (2001). The creative economy. Penguin.
Ibekwe, D. (2020, March 31). CDN chief: We must not lose sight of diversity in pandemic. Broadcast.
Retrieved June 2, 2020, from https://www.broadcastnow.co.uk/broadcasters/cdn-chief-we-must-
not-lose-sight-of-diversity-in-pandemic/5148683.article
ITV, TV, BBC, Sky, Channel 4, Channel 5, STV, ITN & Pact. (2020). TV production guidance: Managing
the risk of coronavirus (COVID-19) in production making (Version 1). Retrieved July 8, 2020, from
https://www.pact.co.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/bafea386-4e38-4bfe-b77a98e804384e9b.pdf?
userDownload=true
Jericho, G. (2020, June 24). The arts and recreation sector stimulus was long promised. It is probably
too little, far too late. The Guardian International Edition. Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://www.
theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2020/jun/25/the-arts-and-recreation-sector-stimulus-
was-long-promised-it-is-probably-too-little-far-too-late
Keslassy, E. (2020, April 22). Film production restarts in Sweden, Denmark under new coronavirus
rules. Variety. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://variety.com/2020/film/global/coronavirus-
sweden-denmark-coronavirus-production-restart-1234586965/?fbclid=IwAR18tkXQLEwX4hikH1z
kuQr85JBHvZFroP11ckYkXzvVdIGPczhqLgi-XLM
Mittagsmagazin. (2020). Schwerpunkt: Corona und die Filmbranche. Das Erste. Retrieved July 2, 2020,
from https://www.ardmediathek.de/ard/video/mittagsmagazin/schwerpunkt-corona-und-die-
filmbranche/das-erste/Y3JpZDovL2Rhc2Vyc3RlLmRlL2FyZC1taXR0YWdzbWFnYXppbi9iOTcwMjky
Yy03MDc4LTQyMjItODgwNS1mYjkyYzVkZWIwNjU/
Morris, L. (2020, April 20). ‘Something out of a satire’: Thousands in arts not saved by JobKeeper. The
Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved July 3, 2020, from https://www.smh.com.au/culture/art-and-
design/something-out-of-a-satire-thousands-in-arts-not-saved-by-jobkeeper-20200419-p54l94.
html
Newsinger, J., & Eikhof, D. R. (2020). Explicit and implicit diversity policy in the UK film and television
industries. Journal for British Cinema and Television, 17(1), 47–69. https://doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.
2020.0507
O’Brien, A. (2014). “Men own television”: Why women leave media work. Media, Culture & Society, 36
(8), 1207–1218. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443714544868
OECD. (2018). Diversity statistics in the OECD: How do OECD countries collect data on ethnic, racial and
indigenous identity? SDD WORKING PAPER No. 96, OECD. Retrived July 7, 2020, from http://www.
oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)9&docLanguage=En
Ofcom. (2019a). Diversity and equal opportunity in television 2019. Monitoring report on the UK-based
broadcasting industry. Ofcom. Retrieved January 15, 2020, from https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0028/166807/Diversity-in-TV-2019.pdf
Ofcom. (2019b). Diversity in UK television: Freelancers. Ofcom. Retrieved January 15, 2020, from https://
www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0025/166804/diversity-in-tv-2019-freelancers.pdf
Oxford Economics. (2020). The projected economic impact of COVID-19 on the UK creative industries.
Creative Industries Federation. Retrieved June 30, 2020 from https://www.creativeindustries
federation.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/20200619_OE_Slides.pdf
 CULTURAL TRENDS 249

Painter, A. (2020, May 20). The case for universal basic income after COVID-19. RSA. Retrieved July 16,
2020, from https://www.thersa.org/discover/publications-and-articles/rsa-blogs/2020/05/ubi-
basic-income-covid
Painter, A., Lockey, A., & Wallace-Stephens, F. (2020). The RSA emergency basic income scheme: Cash
now for the self-employed. RSA. Retrieved July 16, 2020, from https://www.thersa.org/discover/
publications-and-articles/reports/emergency-basic-income-self-employed
Pareek, M., Bangash, M. N., Pareek, N., Pan, D., Sze, S., Minhas, J. S., Hanif, W., & Khunti, J. (2020).
Ethnicity and COVID-19: An urgent public health research priority. The Lancet, 395(10234),
1421–1422. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30922-3
Pilarcyk, H. (2020, July 1). Diversität in der Filmbranche: “Wir brauchen zusätzliche Anstrengungen”.
Der Spiegel. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/kino/wir-brauchen-
zusaetzliche-anstrengungen-a-81f148d2-8bfe-4c55-99b1-bfd1c651a82c
Porter, R. (2020, June 17). ‘Bold and the beautiful’ pauses filming to ramp up coronavirus testing. The
Hollywood Reporter. Retrieved June 28, 2020, from https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/amp/live-
feed/bold-beautiful-pauses-filming-ramp-up-coronavirus-testing-1299132
Pratt, A. (2020, July 6). Arts and culture: The need for a ‘live’ support system. Creative Industries Policy
& Evidence Centre blog. Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://www.pec.ac.uk/blog/arts-and-culture-
the-need-for-a-live-support-system
Raising Films. (2018). Making it possible. Voices of parents & carers in the UK film and TV industry.
Raising Films. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from https://www.raisingfilms.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/12/Making-It-Possible-Full-Report-Results.pdf
Randle, K., & Hardy, K. (2016). Macho, mobile and resilient? How workers with impairments are doubly
disabled in project-based film and television work. Work, Employment & Society, 31(3), 447–464.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017016643482
Reelworld. (2020). Changing the narrative. 2020 Status of Canadian black, indigenous and people of
colour in Canada’s screen based production sector. Reelworld. Retrieved July 16, 2020 from
https://www.reelworld.ca/reportsignup
Saha, A., & van Lente, S. (2020). Rethinking ‘diversity’ in publishing. Retrieved June 24, 2020, from
https://www.spreadtheword.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Executive-Summary.pdf
Screenskills. (2008, published as Skillset). Feature film production. Workforce survey report 2008,
London, Skillset.
Screenskills. (2016, published as Creative Skillset). 2015 employment survey: Creative media industries,
key findings. Retrieved 21 November 2016 from http://creativeskillset.org/assets/0002/0952/
2015_Creative_Skillset_Employment_Survey_-_March_2016_Summary.pdf
Tidball, M., Lawson, A., Lindsay, L., Sloan, B., Holloway, D., Mallick, K. and Ryan, S. (2020). An Affront to
Dignity, Inclusion and Equality: Coronavirus and the impact of law, policy and practice on people
with disabilities in the United Kingdom, The Oxford University Disability Law and Policy Project,
received on 20 June 2020 from https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/executive_summary_0.
pdf
Thanh Nguyen, V. (2020, April 10). The ideas that won’t survive the Coronavirus. Covid-19 is killing off
the myth that we are the greatest country on earth. New York Times. Retrieved July 7, 2020, from
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-america.html
Thorne, W., & Aurthur, K. (2020, March 12). All the shows and movies shut down or delayed because
of coronavirus. Variety. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://variety.com/2020/film/news/films-tv-
delayed-coronavirus-canceled-1203532033/
Tsioulakis, I., & Fitzgibbon, A. (2020, April 9). Performing artists in the age of COVID-19: A moment of
urgent action and potential change. Queen’s Policy Engagment blog. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from
http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/performing-artists-in-the-age-of-covid-19/
Vahabzadeh, S. (2020, May 19). Shecession: Gebt uns eine Stimme. Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved
June 25, 2020, from https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/shecession-gebt-uns-eine-stimme-1.
4912344
Viva La PD. (2020). Freelancers: Fighting for Survival. COVID-19 survey for the TV industry. Viva La PD.
Retrieved June 24, 2020, from https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yhnbX_0iQd41nRRk90f-DTfs
Wyugwace/view
250 D. R. EIKHOF

Warhurst, C. (2020). Do the self-employed have a future in the UK? Institute for Employment Research
blog. Retrieved July 5, 2020, from https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/news/?start=10&
WFTV. (2020). WFTV freelancer survey results. Women in Film & TV. Retrieved July 6, 2020, from https://
wftv.org.uk/wftv-freelancer-survey-results/
Wilderman, P. (2020, June 28). Kulturschaffende in der Coronakrise: Wie Künstler verzweifelt nach
Perspektiven suchen. Der Tagesspiegel. Retrieved July 5, 2020 from https://www.tagesspiegel.
de/kultur/kulturschaffende-in-der-coronakrise-wie-kuenstler-verzweifelt-nach-perspektiven-suchen/
25957316.html?fbclid=IwAR1QM7yRiR8RBXx4v08aItjxwfiB5HpJa5-JiUue4_eVcxur0Mqewvm8s_0
Work Foundation. (2017). A skills audit of the UK film and screen industries. Work Foundation. Retrieved
July 7, 2020, from https://www.bfi.org.uk/sites/bfi.org.uk/files/downloads/skills-audit-of-the-uk-
film-and-screen-industries-2017.pdf