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III. Verba Legis Case Digests
Kapisanan ng Mga Mangagawa v. Manila
Railroad Company.
Facts
Petitioners are contending the decision of the
court regarding what they consider to be a right
under Section 62, RA 2023 which the first two
paragraphs reads as “(1) A member of a co-
operative may, notwithstanding the provisions
of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor
of the co-operative authorizing his employer to
deduct from the salary or wages payable to him
by the employer such amount as may be
specified in the agreement and to pay the
amount so deducted to the co-operative in
satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing
from the member to the co-operative. (2) Upon
the execution of such agreement the employer
shall, if so required by the cooperative by a
request in writing and so long as such debt or
other demand or any part of it remains unpaid,
make the deduction in accordance with the
agreement, and remit forthwith the amount so
deducted to the co-operative.”
The lower court denied their petition. The
petitioners contended that under the stated
law, the cooperative is entitled to priority
regarding the deduction of the employee’s
wages. The lower court ruled that to rely on
such would be to write into the words of the
law where there is no such word. To do so is the
sole power of the legislature.
Issues
- W/N the lower court erred in denying
the petition
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Ruling
No, the Court ruled that there is no ambiguity,
therefore the law should be applied as worded.
There was nothing in the law that said that the
credit cooperative had the priority in the
deduction of debts owed by an employee. The
Court cited Gonzaga v. CA “It has been repeated
time and time again that where the statutory
norm speaks unequivocally there is nothing for
the courts to do except to apply it. The law,
leaving no doubt as to the scope of its
operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have
consistently been to that effect.”
Sec. of Justice v. Koruga
586 SCRA 513
Facts
The BOC of the BI had Christopher Koruga
deported from the country based on the
violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 which provides “Sec. 
37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated
by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground
for deportation as charged against the alien.
(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced
for a violation of the law governing prohibited
drugs”
Koruga violates (4) since he was convicted of a
drug related case in the US, for Violation of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act for
attempted possession of cocaine. The
respondent contends that the article ‘the’ in the
cited provision refers only to the law on
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Dangerous Drugs Act of the Philippines and
does not apply to foreign laws.
Issues
- W/N the respondent is correct in
contending that the article ‘the’ in
Section 37(4) of the Philippine
Immigration Act f 1940 applies only to
Philippine laws and not to foreign laws
Ruling
No, respondent is wrong in arguing as such. The
Court ruled that, although one of the rules of
statutory construction is to interpret the laws in
the absence of legislative intent, based on the
ordinary and plain meaning of the words of the
statute. The Court said that to do so with be
absurd and unjust. Since to construe the word
‘the’ in the cited law would bring about a flood
of foreigners convicted of foreign drug law to
enter the Philippines. The Court had always
cautioned against the narrow construction of
statutes; indeed courts are not to give words
meanings that would lead to absurd or
unreasonable conclusions. Were the Court to
follow Section 37(4) only to apply to convictions
under Philippine drug laws, such is not the
envisioned situation of the legislature.
“This Court has, in many cases involving the
construction of statutes, always cautioned
against narrowly interpreting a statute as to
defeat the purpose of the legislator and
stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty
to construe statutes so as to avoid such a
deplorable result of injustice or absurdity, and
that therefore a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results.
Moreover, since Section 37(a)(4) makes no
distinction between a foreign prohibited drugs
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law and the Philippine prohibited drugs law,
neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos.38 Thus, Section
37(a)(4) should apply to those convicted of all
prohibited drugs laws, whether local or
foreign.”
CSC v. Maricelle v. Cortes
723 SCRA 609
Facts
Maricelle Cortes is the daughter of one of the
Commissioners of the Commission on Human
Rights, Commissioner Mallari. Cortes was
appointed to the position of Information Officer
V by the Commission En Banc, with her father
Mallari not voting in the said appointment so as
not to constitute nepotism. However, the CSC
ruled that such appointment is nepotism and a
violation of the law against such. Cortes then
contends that it was not her father,
Commissioner Mallari, but rather the
Commission En Banc that appointer her, the
Commission en banc is a separate entity that
has no relatives, therefore it cannot violate
nepotism and that her appointment is not one
of nepotism. The CA then reversed the decision
of the CSC
Issue
- W/N the CA erred in reversing the
decision of the CSC in determining the
nepotism of such appointment
Ruling
Yes, such appointment is characteristic of
nepotism which is defined as the appointment
of relatives up to 3rd civil degree or affinity to
the following the appointing authority, the
recommending authority, the chief of the
bureau or office and the immediate supervisor
of appointee. Cortes contends under Section 59
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of the Administrative Code that the appointing
officer is the Commission en banc and not
Commissioner Mallari. The Court ruled that to
interpret the law as such would be defeating its
purpose. The Court quoted the maxim “we
must interpret not by the letter that killeth but
by the spirit that giveth life.” The Court ruled
that to apply Sec. 59 only to the Commission
and not to its individual mem members would
render the prohibition meaningless. Even if
Commissioner Mallari did not vote on the
appointment his mere presence at the voting
had already exerted undue influence on the
objectivity of the appointment. The Court said
that if acts cannot be done directly then it
cannot be done indirectly; if the acts that
cannot be done legally directly then certainly it
should not be done indirectly since it would
render the laws illusory. Hence, petition is
granted. The appointment is declared nepotistic
in character.
Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines
832 SCRA 282
Facts
This is a consolidated petition assailing the
constitutionality of the acts of both Houses of
Congress regarding their concurrence of
Proclamation 206: Declaring a State of Martial
Law and Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus
in the Whole of Mindanao. The petitioners
herein are contending that Congress erred in
the manner of concurrence with Proclamation
206 after hours of the declaration of such. The
Senate had deliberated on P.S. 338 declaring
support of President Duterte’s Proclamation of
Martial law, and P.S. 390, calling for a joint
session of Congress to vote regarding the
concurrence of continuing Martial Law.
Likewise, the House of Representatives also
deliberated and voted on House Resolution
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1050, “Resolution Expressing the Full Support of
the House of Representatives to President
Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason to
Revoke Proclamation No. 216, Entitled
‘Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.” PS 338 and
HR 1050 were both passed by their respective
houses and the issue of whether Congress
should convene in a joint session was rejected
by both Houses, separately. Herein lies the
contention of the petitioners. They contend
that the actions of Congress are in violation of
Sec. 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides in part “Within 48 hours of the
proclamation of Martial Law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the
President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of majority of all its members
in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which the
revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
of rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.” The Petitioners contend that
Congress should have voted jointly in a session
to revoke or support the proclamation of
martial law.
Issue
- W/N Congress violated Sec. 18 of Art.
VII of the Constitution in voting for the
support of Proclamation 206
Ruling
No, the court ruled that Congress did not
violate the Constitution. The Court said that “A
cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
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when the law is clear and free from any doubt IV. LINGUISTIC CANONS OF INTERPRETATION
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction
A. Whole Act Rule
or interpretation. There is only room for
application. According to the plain-meaning rule Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
or verba legis, when the statute is clear, plain, CoA
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its 621 SCRA 461
literal meaning and applied without attempted
Facts
interpretation. It is expressed in the maxims
index animi sermo or “speech is the index of By virtue of PD 252 the Philippine International
intention and verba legis non est recedendum Trading Corporation (PITC) was established. EO
or “from the words of a statute there should be 756 was issued on December 28, 1981
no departure.” authorizing the reorganization of the PITC. Then
on February 18, 1983 EO 877 was issued
The Constitution expressly provides that to
authorizing further the reorganization of the
revoke martial law, Congress has to vote jointly
PITC. On Dec. 31, 1983 Elgia Romero had retired
in a joint session, on the other hand the
under RA 1616, receiving a gratuity for her
Constitution does not expressly provide that in
services rendered 1955 – 1983. She was
concurring with the proclamation of martial
immediately rehired on a contractual basis until
law, that Congress should likewise be in joint
her compulsory retirement on April 2, 2000. She
session. The petitioners assailing the
now claims gratuity and retirement benefits
Constitutionality of PS 338 and HR 1050, which
under Sec. 6 of EO 756 which provides “any
provides concurrence with the proclamation of
officer or employee who retires, resigns, or is
martial law and the suspension of the privilege
separated from the service shall be entitled to
of the writ of habeas corpus, which was voted
one month pay for every year of service
in the respective resolutions in their respective
computed at highest salary received including
chambers. Therefore, has no merit since the
allowances, in addition to the other benefits
Constitution does not expressly provide that
provided by law, regardless of any provision of
Congress should be in joint session when
law or regulations to the contrary.” This was
concurring to martial law. In the debates of the
then forwarded to the Office of the
Constitutional Commission, the intent of the
Government Corporate Counsel for
framers can be found in the sense that if the
interpretation of her gratuity and retirement
need for Congress to convene jointly to support
benefits. The OGCC ruled that a liberal
martial law, such would be an impediment in
construction of the Sec. 6 of EO 756 should be
the President’s power to defeat rebellion or
given in favor of the retiree whom it seeks to
invasion. The intent of the framers is clear in
benefit and to affect its humanitarian purpose.
how the Constitution was framed therefore
The CoA challenged the decision of the OGCC
there is no need for interpretation of the
saying that EO 756 was a special law that was
Constitution.
only temporary and effective during, and
because of the consequence of the
reorganization the PITC is undergoing.

Issue
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- W/N Sec. 6 of EO 756 should be
interpreted as a permanent retirement
rule for PITC employees
Ruling
No, the Court ruled that it is a rule in statutory
construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.9 Because the law must not
be read in truncated parts, its provisions must
be read in relation to the whole law. The
statute’s clauses and phrases must not,
consequently, be taken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce
a harmonious whole.10 Consistent with the
fundamentals of statutory construction, all the
words in the statute must be taken into
consideration in order to ascertain its meaning.
With the above principle, the Court referred to
Sec. 4 of EO 756 which expressly states that the
purpose of such is for the reorganization of the
PITC and the allowances referred thereto are
only applicable for the reorganization of the
PITC and are not meant to be permanent
retirement law, as only the GSIS can do so.
Furthermore, EO 756 has been repealed by EO
877 which specified further that the
reorganization and its consequences should
only be effective within 6mos of EO 877. Hence
the petition is denied for lack of merit.
JMM Promotions v. NLRC
228 SCRA 129
Facts
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The petitioner JMM had filed a petition with the
NLRC regarding a decision of the POEA. The
NLRC had denied the appeal of JMM for failure
to perfect the needed bonds for the appeals.
The NLRC cites Art. 223 of the Labor Code which
provides that:
In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award
in the judgment appealed from. JMM
Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC, 228
SCRA 129, G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
And Rule VI of Sec. 6 of the new Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC:
Section 6. Bond. —In case the decision of a
Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission or the Supreme
Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc.
vs. NLRC, 228 SCRA 129, G.R. No. 109835
November 22, 1993
JMM contends that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in applying these provisions
to decisions of the POEA that pursuant to Sec. 4
Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, JMM had
already paid 30k for a license, posted 100k as a
cash bond, and 50k as a surety bond, in addition
to these JMM also deposited in escrow with
PNB 200k “to primarily answer for valid and
legal claims of recruited workers as a result of
recruitment violations or money claims.”
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Issues
- W/N the NLRC committed a grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed the
petition of JMM for failing to post the
necessary bond.
Ruling
No, the Court ruled that It is a principle of legal
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a
set of rules as in this case), care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Under the petitioner’s interpretation,
the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity,
but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a
construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole. JMM
Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC, 228
SCRA 129, G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the
monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to
post the appeal bond required under Section 6,
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
condition for perfecting an appeal from a
decision of the POEA. JMM Promotions &
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Management, Inc. vs. NLRC, 228 SCRA 129, G.R.
No. 109835 November 22, 199
Cocofed-Phil. Coconut Producers Federation v.
COMELEC
703 SCRA 165
Facts
Cocofed is desiring to run in the upcoming May
13, 2012 elections, one of the requirements of
RA 7941, Sec. 8 is the submission of ‘not less
than five nominees’ in case the party list
garners enough votes to earn and win a seat in
legislature. However, Cocofed did not comply
with this requirement, hence it’s application ro
run was cancelled. The petitioners now contend
that COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
discretion for cancelling its registration and
application on the grounds that Sec. 8 of RA
7941 provides for the nomination of nominees
upon exhaustion of the list submitted by the
party-list.
Issues
W/N the COMELEC erred in cancelling their
registration and application for failing to submit
five nominees required by law
Ruling
No, the Court held that while the law allows the
submission of additional nominees once the list
is exhausted, the exhaustion of the list
presupposes prior compliance with the
requirement of Section 8 of RA No. 7941. Since
the exhaustion of the list is an event that can
rarely happen under this interpretation, then
the law effectively upholds the people’s right to
make informed electoral judgments. Again, it is
a basic rule of statutory construction that the
provisions of the law must not be read in
isolation but as a whole, as the law must not be
read in truncated parts; its provisions in relation
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to the whole law and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.
COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections,
703 SCRA 165, G.R. No. 207026 August 6, 2013
B. Ejusdem Generis
Mutuc v. ComElec
Benguet State U v. Commission on Audit
Colgate v. Jimenez
Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. CA
Espinas v. Commission on Audit
C. Noscitur a Sociis
GSIS v. COA
Facts
The GSIS board approved Board Resolution 326
pursuant to RA 8291 allowing the GSIS to create
a retirement plan for its employees, the plan
was known as GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive
Program (ELIP) which was later renamed to GSIS
Retirement Financial Plan (RFP.) GSIS general
auditor Dimagiba questioned the legality of the
RFP but the GSIS general counsel said it was
legal, Dimagiba later on raised the issue to GSIS
President Garcia but the latter still did not
question the legality of such RFP. Dimagiba
went to the COA, which said that the RFP was
unlawful since it violates RA 4968 or the Teves
Retirement Plan, which provides that there shall
be no other retirement plans unless that
approved by law, and that no plan shall be
supplementary to such retirement plan.
Issue
 W/N the GSIS RFP is unlawful and
violates RA. 4968
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Ruling
Yes, the Court ruled that such is violative of RA
4698. The Court, to address the contention of
the petitioners that the RFP is in accordance
with RA 8291 which allows GSIS to create a
retirement plan for its employees. The Court
ruled that such power is not absolute since Sec.
41 of RA 8291 is qualified by the terms “early”,
“incentive,” and “for the purpose of
retirement.” The Court said that it is clear from
the intention of the law that only those who
would be affected by reorganization should be
qualified for such retirement benefits as their
employment will have to be terminated earlier.
The petitioners aver that “financial assistance”
should be construed independently, the Court
ruled no and applied the doctrine of Noscitur a
Sociis to wit:
The above interpretation applies equally to the
phrase “financial assistance,” which, contrary to
the petitioners’ assertion, should not be read
independently of the purpose of an early
retirement incentive plan. Under the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis, the construction of a particular
word or phrase, which is in itself ambiguous, or
is equally susceptible of varius meanings, may
be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated. In other words, the
obscurity or doubt of the word or phrase may
be reviewed by reference to associated words.
Thus, the phrase “financial assistance,” in light
of the preceding words with which it is
associated, should also be construed as an
incentive scheme to induce employees to retire
early or as an assistance plan to be given to
employees retiring earlier than their retirement
age.”
The GSIS RFP is not such early retirement
program. What it is, is a program to reward
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employees for “meritorious, faithful, and
satisfactory service.” That according to the
Court is contradictory to an early retirement or
financial assistance plan.
The petition is partially granted.
Buenaseda v. Flavier
Facts
In this case, Dra. Buenaseda and other have
been accused of violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The ombudsman then
issued an order directing the preventive
suspension of the petitioners. The petitioners
contend that the Ombudsman has no such
power, what the Ombudsman may do is
recommend the suspension of the concerned
employees to their respective department
heads. The respondent argues that the issued
order of the ombudsman is pursuant to Sec. 24
of RA. 6770 and was contemplated by Sec. 13 of
the 1987 Constitution which is “exercise such
other power or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.”
Issues
 W/N the Ombudsman has the power to
suspend government employees and
officials outside of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Ruling
The Court said that the suspension
contemplated in Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution
was a punitive suspension and that the
questioned order suspending the petitioners is
not punitive but rather preventive. The Court
applied the doctrine of Noscitur a Sociis to wit:
“When the Constitution vested on the
Ombudsman the power “to recommend the
suspension” of a public official or employees
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(Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a
punitive measure. All the words associated with
the word “suspension” in said provision referred
to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the
rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word “suspension”
should be given the same sense as the other
words with which it is associated. Where a
particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made
specific by considering the company of terms in
which it is found or with which it is associated
(Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371
[1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]).”
People v. Flores
Facts
Isidro Flores is the “adoptive father” of AAA.
Their relation is established as BBB is the
adoptive mother of AAA. BBB is married to
Isidro Flores. Flores was accused of raping AAA,
Flores was then apprehended, and a trial
ensued where the RTC found him guilty of 181
counts of rape. On appeal the CA reduced the
counts of rape to two counts stating that the
179 counts of rape were not proven and merely
alleged by AAA’s testimony of being raped at
least 3x a week. The CA also passed the
sentence of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. The question of appellant is
the qualifying of the crime of rape since he is an
alleged guardian of the minor.
Issues
 W/N the appellant is the guardian of
AAA as contemplated in Sec. 31(c) of RA
7610 and should be sentenced with
death for qualified rape.
Ruling
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No, the Court construed the term “guardian” as
found in Sec. 31(c) of RA 7610 in relation to the
other associated words as found in the law. This
construction is noscitur a sociis. To wit:
Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing
of the circumstances of relationship between
the perpetrator and the victim which will justify
the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely
when the perpetrator is an “ascendant, parent,
guardian, stepparent or collateral relative
within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity.” It should be noted that the words with
which “guardian” is associated in the provision
all denote a legal relationship. From this
description we may safely deduce that the
guardian envisioned by law is a person who has
a legal relationship with a ward. This
relationship may be established either by being
the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian)
or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is
neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s
adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
“guardian” contemplated by law.”
D. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
Paramount Insurance Corp v. A.C. Ordonez
Facts
In the case at bar, Maximo Mata, as
represented by Paramount Insurance was in a
vehicular accident with a truck mixer driven by
Franklin Suspine but owned by A.C. Ordonez
Corp. Paramount filed a complaint with the
MTC of Makati but the summons was not
received by Suspine but the summons for
Ordonez Corp were received by Samuel D.
Marcoleta a clerk of said corporation.
Petitioners filed a motion to declare defendants
in default the Defendants countered that the
motion should be denied since the summons
were received by Marcoleta, a secretarial staff,
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and that the summons were only received by
the President and GM only later on. The MTC
allowed the motion of respondents, which led
to an appeal to the RTC where a ruling was
issued in favor of Paramount. On appeal to the
CA Ordonez was granted a favorable decision.
Hence, the present appeal for certiorari to the
Court by Paramount.
Issues
 W/N there was a valid service of
summons on Ordonez Corp.
Ruling
No, the Court cited Sec. 11 Rule 11 of the Rules
of Court:
“SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private
juridical entity. — When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.”
According to the facts of the case, Marcoleta is
not one of the officers mentioned in Sec. 11.
Applying the doctrine of expressio unius est
exlclusio alterius, which provides that in a
statute the express mention of persons, things
or consequences implies the exclusion of all
others. Applying this to the case at bar the
contention of the petitioners does not grant
merit by the Court and is denied.
Gomez v. Ventura
Facts
Dominador Gomez’s license to practice
medicine and surgery is being revoked by the
Board of Medicine for unprofessional conduct
inter alia for administering opium as
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prescription when the physical condition of the

patient does not need it.
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Application to StatCon
Exceptions to Expressio Unius est exclusion
alterius
The maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius
should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent and should not be
permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose
of the Legislature. It does not apply when words
are mentioned by way of example, or to remove
doubts
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
Facts
Centeno and one other man were accused by
Judge Villalon for soliciting without a permit
under PD 1564. Centeno had been found guilty
of violating PD 1564 by the RTC and CA. The
petitioners had contended that they did not
violate the said law since what was specified
therein were only solicitations for “charitable or
public welfare purpose,” and not for religious
purposes.
Issue
 W/N the term “charitable” PD 1564 is
construed to include solicitation for
religious purposes
Ruling
No, the Court ruled that –
“Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.”
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The Court applied the doctrine of expressio
where the express mention of things in an
enumeration implies the exclusion of all others.
It was also passed upon by the Court that in the
Constitution charitable and religious institutions
were separately mentioned and also in the law
granting such institutions along with
educational institutions exemption from
taxation. By analogy the Court construed PD
1564 as not intending to apply to solicitations
for religious purposes.
Petition granted, judgement of acquittal.
Escribano v. Avila
Go-tan v. Sps. Tan
E. Casus Omissus
People v. Manantan
Facts
Guillermo Manantan a Justice of the Peace has
been accused of violating Sec. 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Said Code provides that "No
justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of
any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial,
city, municipal or rural police force, and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall
aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in any election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer."
Said Judge Manantan pleaded not guilty to the
charges and filed a motion to dismiss. Judge
Manantan contends that in the present Code
the term “judge” does not include a justice of
the peace as in the previous law C.A. 357, Sec.
48 which specifically mentions a Justice of the
Peace who may not take part in electioneering.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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Issue
 W/N Sec. 48 of the Revised Election
Code contemplates Justices of the
Peace within the term “judges” as those
banned from electioneering
Ruling
Yes, the Court ruled that the term “judge” as
contemplated is meant to include all types of
judges. Applying the doctrine of Casus Omissus
- The rule has no applicability to the case at
bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and
apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices
of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace
were just called "judges."
Sps. Nereo v. St. James Hospital
Facts
St. James Hospital was a 2-storey, 10-bed
hospital established in 1990. St. James wanted
to expand the hospital into a 4-storey, 40-bed
hospital. Petitioners contended the expansion
that it was not allowed under the Zoning
Ordinance of 1991. St. James averred that the
expansion was allowed in the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance. The case was filed to the HLURB
which did not allow the expansion. The case
was brought to the Office of the President
which rendered judgment in favor of St. James.
Hence the present petition
Issue
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 W/N the term ‘institutions’ in the
Zoning Ordinance is to include hospitals
such as the proposed expansion of St.
James.
Ruling
No. According to the rule of casus omissus in
statutory construction, a thing omitted must
be considered to have been omitted
intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of
the phrase "hospital with not more than ten
capacity" in the new 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
and the corresponding transfer of said
allowable usage to another zone classification,
the only logical conclusion is that the legislative
body had intended that said use be removed
from those allowed within a residential zone.
Thus, the construction of medical institutions,
such as St. James Hospital, within a residential
zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance.
F. Last Antecedent Rule
Cadayona V. CA
Facts
In this case the petitioner prays that judgement
be rendered in his favor concerning the
dismissed petition from the CA. The CA
dismissed outright his petition for failing to
provide certified true copies of his certificated
of non-forum shopping, specifically Annexes D,
E, and F. Petitioner relies on the doctrine of Last
Antecedent that what the Rules of Court
require are only the certified true copies of the
Award,
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G. Reddendo Singula Singulis Ruling

City of Manila v. Lagiuo No, the Court applied the doctrine of Reddendo
singular singulis.
Facts
It is important to distinguish the punishable
City of Manila issued Ordinance No. 7783 which
activities from the establishments themselves.
prohibited certain types of business from being
That these establishments are recognized
established or operated in the Ermita-Malate
legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from
area on the basis that these businesses “use
another Section of the Code. Section 131 under
women as tools in entertainment” and
the Title on Local Government Taxation
“adversely affect the social and moral welfare
expressly mentioned proprietors or operators
of the community”. The prohibited businesses
of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish
enumerated under the Ordinance include --
baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as
Sauna Parlors, Massage Parlors, Karaoke Bars,
among the “contractors” defined in paragraph
Beerhouses, Night Clubs, Day Clubs, Super
(h) thereof. The same Section also defined
Clubs, Discotheques, Cabarets, Dance Halls,
“amusement” as a “pleasurable diversion and
Motels, Inns. The Ordinance also provided that
entertainment,” “synonymous to relaxation,
the erring establishment shall be closed and
avocation, pastime or fun;” and “amusement
padlocked permanently. The Ordinance gives
places” to include “theaters, cinemas, concert
the owners and operators of the "prohibited"
halls, circuses and other places of amusement
establishments (3) months from its approval
where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
within which to "wind up business operations or
by seeing or viewing the show or
to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
performances.” Thus, it can be inferred that the
Malate area or convert said businesses to other
Code considers these establishments as
kinds of business allowable within the area."
legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to
Malate Tourist Development Corporation
recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis
(MTDC), owner and operator of Victoria Court,
which means that words in different parts of a
challenges the constitutionality of such
statute must be referred to their appropriate
Ordinance on the ground that (1) The
connection, giving to each in its place, its proper
Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
force and effect, and, if possible, rendering
protection under the law (2) Ordinance is ultra
none of them useless or superfluous, even if
vires -- the City Council has no power to prohibit
strict grammatical construction demands
the operation of motels as the Local
otherwise. Likewise, where words under
Government Code of 1991 grants it only the
consideration appear in different sections or are
power to regulate. (3) the Ordinance is an
widely dispersed throughout an act the same
invalid exercise of police power and amounts to
principle applies.
taking without just compensation.

Issue

 W/N the City of Manila has the power

to declare such establishments illegal
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H. Use of the word “shall,” “must,” and
“ought.”
Mirasol v. CA
Facts
The Mirasols are sugar cane producers. They
finance their sugar cane plantations through
loans from the PNB, under a crop loan finance
scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing
Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage.
Exercising his law-making powers under Martial
Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 5792 in
November 1974. The decree authorized private
respondent Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export
to the United States and to other foreign
markets. The price and quantity was
determined by the Sugar Quota Administration,
PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry,
and finally, by the Office of the President. The
decree further authorized PNB to finance
PHILEX’s purchases. Finally, the decree directed
that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from
sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a
special fund of the national government, after
commissions, overhead expenses and liabilities
had been deducted. The government offices
and entities tasked by existing laws and
administrative regulations to oversee the sugar
export pegged the purchase price of export
sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at
P180.00 per picul.
PNB continued to finance the sugar production
of the Mirasols for crop years 1975-1976 and
1976-1977. These crop loans and similar
obligations were secured by real estate
mortgages over several properties of the
Mirasols and chattel mortgages over standing
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crops. Believing that the proceeds of their sugar
sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were
more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the
proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB
ignored the request. Meanwhile, petitioners
continued to avail of other loans from PNB and
to make unfunded withdrawals from their
current accounts with said bank. PNB then
asked petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts. As a result of these
demands for payment, petitioners on August 4,
1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued at
P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago,
leaving an unpaid overdrawn account of
P1,513,347.78.
On August 10, 1982, the balance of outstanding
sugar crop and other loans owed by petitioners
to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite
demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due
and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded
to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. After applying the proceeds of the
auction sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB still
had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for
the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar
for crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975,
insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding
obligations with the bank. PNB remained
adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579,
there was nothing to account since under said
law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar
pertained to the National Government and
were subject to the disposition of the President
of the Philippines for public purposes.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for
accounting, specific performance, and damages
against PNB with the Regional Trial Court of
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Bacolod City, docketed as Civil Case No. 14725.
The Case was ruled in favor of the Mirasols. The
Mirasols appealed to the CA the declaration of
the validity of the foreclosure of the properties.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction in declaring a law
unconstitutional without notifying the Office of
the Solicitor General
Ruling
No, the Court cited Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court, Section 3 which reads:
“SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. —In any
action which involves the validity of a statute,
or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor
General shall be notified by the party attacking
the statute, executive order, or regulation, and
shall be entitled to be heard upon such
question.”
This should be read in relation to Section 1 [c]
of P.D. No. 478,13 which states in part:
“SECTION 1. Functions and Organizations—(1)
The Office of the Solicitor General shall . . . have
the following specific powers and functions:
“[c] Appear in any court in any action involving
the validity of any treaty, law, executive order
or proclamation, rule or regulation when in his
judgment his intervention is necessary or when
requested by the court.”
It is basic legal construction that where words
of command such as “shall,” “must,” or “ought”
are employed, they are generally and ordinarily
regarded as mandatory.14 Thus, where, as in
Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the
word “shall” is used, a mandatory duty is
imposed, which the courts ought to enforce.
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The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule
64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General
to decide whether or not his intervention in the
action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of
his day in court. We must stress that, contrary
to petitioners’ stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving
declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule
itself provides that such notice is required in
“any action” and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity
in the words used in the rule, there is no room
for construction.15 In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree,
order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor
General is mandatory.
In this case, the Solicitor General was never
notified about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor did the
trial court ever require him to appear in person
or by a representative or to file any pleading or
memorandum on the constitutionality of the
assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did
not err in holding that lack of the required
notice made it improper for the trial court to
pass upon the constitutional validity of the
questioned presidential decrees.
Berces v. Guigona
Facts
Petitioner Berces filed a complaint against
Mayor Corral of Tawi-Tawi Albay, for non-
payment of her accrued leaves, and for
dishonest and abuse of authority. Both
complaints were filed in different administrative
complaints. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
found Mayor Corral guilty of both charges. The
Mayor appealed to the Office of the President
to stay the execution of the suspension. The
Office granted the petition on the grounds of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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Sec. 68 of RA 7160, and Sec. 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18 which reads as follows,
respectively:
SEC. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. —An appeal
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final
or executory. The respondent shall be
considered as having been placed under
preventive suspension during the pendency of
an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In
the event the appeal results in an exoneration,
he shall be paid his salary and such other
emoluments during the pendency of the appeal
(R.A. No. 7160).
'SEC. 6. Except as otherwise provided by special
laws, the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from is
stayed upon the filing of the appeal within the
period prescribed herein. However, in all cases,
at any time during the pendency of the appeal,
the Office of the President may direct or stay
the execution of the decision/resolution/order
appealed from upon such terms and conditions
as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm.
Order No. 18).”
Issue
W/N the word “shall” in Sec. 68 of 7160 should
be construed to mean it as mandatory
Ruling
No.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides
that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory." As worded,
there is room to construe said provision as
giving discretion to the reviewing officials to
stay the execution of the appealed decision.
There is nothing to infer therefrom that the
reviewing officials are deprived of the authority
to order a stay of the appealed order. If the
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1C
intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used
more direct language expressive of such
intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is
procedural and in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to remove from the reviewing
officials the authority to order a stay of
execution, such authority can be provided in the
rules and regulations governing the appeals of
elective officials in administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as
mandatory or directory depending upon a
consideration of the entire provision in which it
is found, its object and the consequences that
would follow from construing it one way or the
other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533
[1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis
to justify the construction of the word as
mandatory.
Diokno V. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
Facts
Ramon Diokno has a Backpay Certificate worth,
P70,000. Diokno has an outstanding loan from
the Rehabilitation Finance Corp. worth
P47,335.28. He wanted to pay the loan using
the Backpay Certificate, however the RFC
refused the action on the grounds that said
action is contrary to the provisions of R.A. 304.
the law permits only "acceptance or discount of
backpay certificates," not the repayment of
loans. The court a quo held that section 2 of
Republic Act No. 304 is permissive merely, and
that even if it were mandatory, plaintiff's case
cannot fall thereunder because he is not
acquiring property for a home or constructing a
residential house, but compelling the
acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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debt he contracted after the enactment of
Republic Act No. 304. It, therefore, dismissed
the complaint with costs.
Issues
W/N Sec. 2 of RA 304 is mandatory according to
the petitioner
Ruling
No, the Court ruled that RA 304 should be
construed to be permissive. The word “shall”
should be taken to mean “may” and not
mandatory since to do so would be contrary to
legislative intent.
It is first contended by the appellant that the
above provision is mandatory, not only because
it employs the word "shall", which in its
ordinary signification is mandatory, not
permissive, but also because the provision is
applicable to institutions of credit under the
control of the Government, and because
otherwise the phrases "subject to availability of
loanable funds" and "any provisions of this
charter, * * * and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding" would be superfluous.
It is true that in its ordinary signification the
word "shall" is imperative.
In common or ordinary parlance, and in its
ordinary signification, the term "shall' is a word
of command, and one which has always or
which must be given a compulsory meaning; as
denoting obligation. It has a peremptory
meaning, and it is generally imperative or
mandatory. It has the invariable significance of
operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor
of this meaning or when addressed to public
officials, or where a public interest is involved,
or where the public or persons have rights
which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless
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a contrary intent appears. People vs. O'Rourke,
13 P. 2d. 989, 992, 124 Cal. App. 752. (39 Words
and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 90.)
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a
statute is used in an imperative, and not in a
directory, sense. If a different interpretation is
sought, it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context
which will justify a different meaning. Haythorn
vs. Van Keuren & Son, 74 A. 502, 504, 79 N. J. L.
101; Board of Finance of School City of Aurora
vs. People's Nat. Bank of Lawrenceburg, 89 N. E.
904, 905, 44 Ind. App. 578. (39 Words and
Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 93.) However, the
rule is not absolute; it may be construed as
"may", when so required by the context or by
the intention of the statute.
In its ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative,
and not permissive, though it may have the
latter meaning when required by the context.
"Must" or "shall' in a statute is not always
imperative but may be consistent with an
exercise of discretion. In re O'Hara, 82 N. Y. S.
293, 296, 40 Misc. 355, citing In re Thurber's
Estate, 162 N. Y. 244, 252, 56 N. E. 638, 639.
(Ibid. p. 92.)
The word "shall" is generally regarded as
imperative, but in some contexts it is given a
permissive meaning, the intended meaning
being determined by what is intended by the
statute. National Transit Co. vs. Boardman, 197
A. 239, 241, 328 Pa. 450,
The word "shall" is to be construed as merely
permissive, where no public benefit or private
right requires it to be given an imperative
meaning. Sheldon vs. Sheldon, 134 A. 904, 905,
100 N. J. Ex. 24.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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Presumption is that word "shall," in ordinance,
is mandatory; but, where it is necessary to give
effect to legislative intent, the word will be
construed as "may." City of Colorado Springs vs.
Street, 254 p. 440, 441, 81 Colo. 181.
Words like "may," "must," "shall," etc., are
constantly used in statutes without intending
that they shall be taken literally, and in their
construction the object evidently designed to
be reached limits and controls the literal import
of the terms and phrases employed. Fields vs.
United States, 27 App. D. C. 433, 440. (39 Words
and Phrases, Permanent Ed., pp. 89, 92).
In the provision subject of controversy, it is to
be noted that the verb-phrase "shall accept or
discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject
to availability of loanable funds" and "at not
more than two per centum per annum f or ten
years." As to the second modifier, the interest
to be charged, there seems to be no question
that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not
only does the law use "at not more" but the
legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the
value of the backpay certificate for the benefit
of the holders, for whose benefit the same have
been issued, can be carried out by fixing a
maximum limit for discounts. But as to when
the discounting or acceptance shall be made,
the context and the sense demand a contrary
interpretation. The phrase "subject" means
"being under the contingency of" (Webster's Int
Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount
of the certificates is to be "subject" to the
condition of the availability of loanable funds, it
is evident that the Legislature intended that the
acceptance shall be allowed on the condition
that there are "available loanable funds." In
other words, acceptance or discount is to be
permitted only if there are loanable funds.
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Adasa v. Abalos
Facts
Petitioner is accused of Estafa in a criminal case.
The City Fiscal of Ilagan had found probable
cause for the filing of charges and ordered that
charges be filed against petitioner. The RTC had
ordered the Office of the City Fiscal to conduct a
reinvestigation, in which the Fiscal affirmed the
probable cause. Upon arraignment the
petitioner pleaded not guilty. The petitioner had
filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ,
regarding the findings of the Fiscal. The DOJ
granted the petition which prompted the Fiscal
to file Motion to Withdraw. The Fiscal appealed
the resolution stating that according to Sec. 7 of
DOJ Circular No. 70, that when an accused has
already been arraigned the DOJ is mandated to
outrightly dismiss the petition for review of the
accused. The Petitioner contends that the cited
Circular is not mandatory in nature but
discretionary. The DOJ also supported its own
resolution citing Sec. 12 of the same Circular
which uses the word “may” which implies a
discretionary nature. The CA reversed the
resolution of the DOJ.
Issue
W/N Sec. 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 in relation to
Sec. 12 of the same, should be construed as
permissive according to the petitioner?
Ruling
No.
Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to
the mandatory import of the word “shall” is
misplaced. It is petitioner’s view that the
language of Section 12 is permissive and
therefore the mandate in Section 7 has been
transformed into a matter within the discretion
of the DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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cites a portion of Agpalo’s Statutory
Construction which reads:
“For instance, the word “shall” in Section 2 of
Republic Act 304 which states that “banks or
other financial institutions owned or controlled
by the Government shall, subject to availability
of funds x x x, accept at a discount at not more
than two per centum for ten years such
(backpay) certificate” implies not a mandatory,
but a discretionary, meaning because of the
phrase “subject to availability of funds.”
Similarly, the word “shall” in the provision to
the effect that a corporation violating the
corporation law “shall, upon such violation
being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto
proceedings” has been construed as “may.”12
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it
becomes apparent that the same is not
applicable to the provision in question. In the
cited passage, the word “shall” departed from
its mandatory import connotation because it
was connected to certain provisos/conditions:
“subject to the availability of funds” and “upon
such violation being proved.” No such
proviso/condition, however, can be found in
Section 7 of the subject circular. Hence, the
word “shall” retains its mandatory import.
I. Use of the word “may”
Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong
Facts
President Marcos issued P.D. 1123 which
provided for an increase of P60.00 to the
emergency pay of employees. The private
respondent Allied Sugar Central Company
(Allied) was going to pay the increase however
it changed its mind and did not pay the increase
in 1977 instead it filed for an exemption
granted to companies that do not have the
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capacity to pay said increase. The exemption
was given recommendation by the Wage
Commission to the Secretary of Labor, who was
then Acting Secretary Inciong, who granted the
exemption for one year. The following year
Allied again applied for exemption which was
contested by the petitioners, however, the
exemption was again recommended by the
Wage Commission and granted by the Acting
Secretary of Labor Inciong. The petitioners
contend that the first exemption granted was
beyond the 30-day reglementary period
provided by PD 1123 which states that:
“x x x. Employers falling under Section 1,
paragraph (1) thereof, may apply for exemption
with the Secretary of Labor within (30) days
from the effectivity of these Rules. x x x”
Issue
W/N the word “may” in Sec. 6 of the
implementing rules of PD 1123 is mandatory or
permissive?
Ruling
In In re Guarina,10 this Court had this to say on
the proper interpretation of the use of this
word in a statute, viz—
“Whether the word ‘may’ in a statute is to be
construed as mandatory and imposing a duty,
or merely as permissive and conferring
discretion, is to be determined in each case
from the apparent intention of the statute as
gathered from the context, as well as from the
language of the particular provision. The
question in each case is whether, taken as a
whole and viewed in the light of surrounding
circumstances, it can be said that a purpose
existed on the part of the legislator to enact a
law mandatory in its character. If it can, then it
should be given a mandatory effect; if not, then
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
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it should be given its ordinary permissive effect.
x x x.”
It must be stressed that Presidential Decree No.
1123 did not set a deadline within which
employers may seek exemption therefrom.
While the ostensible purpose behind
Presidential Decree No. 1123 is to protect
wages, incomes and employment,11 the law
also takes into consideration the possibility that
some private employers may not be in a
financial position to pay an increase in the
monetary benefits of their employees. Thus, the
Decree allows distressed employers to seek
exemptions while in such condition and the
Secretary of Labor has been mandated to issue
the pertinent rules governing the procedure by
which distressed employers can seek such
exemption.
Petition denied.
Social Security Commission v. CA
Facts
Jose Rago an electrician who was working on a
ceiling accidentally fell and injured his back.
Thereupon he filed for benefits with the SSS.
Asked for the restructuring and reclassification
of his disability several times and was approved
several times. Again, asking for reclassification
of the same benefits, he was denied by the SSS
upon recommendation of the SSC. On appeal
the CA ruled in favor of Rago granting the
appeal and reversing the ruling of the SSC. The
SSC avers that Rago had failed to file a Motion
for Reconsideration with the SSC which is
required before filing an appeal with the CA.
Issue
W/N an MR before the SSC is mandatory or
permissive before filing an appeal with the CA
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Ruling
The rule of filing an MR before appeal to the CA
is mandatory, citing Sec. 5 of Rule VI of the
SSC’s Revised Rules of Procedure:
“The party aggrieved by the order, resolution,
award or decision of the Commission may file a
motion for reconsideration thereof within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same. Only
one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed
any party.
The filing of the motion for reconsideration
shall interrupt the running of the period to
appeal, unless said motion is pro forma.”
The ordinary acceptations of the terms “may”
and “shall” may be resorted to as guides in
ascertaining the mandatory or directory
character of statutory provisions. As regards
adjective rules in general, the term “may” is
construed as permissive and operating to confer
discretion, while the word “shall” is imperative
and operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.19 However, these are not absolute
and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law
and equity. Depending upon a consideration of
the entire provision, its nature, its object and
the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other, the
convertibility of said terms either as mandatory
or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory
construction.
Conformably therewith, we have consistently
held that the term “may” is indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity or an option. The
grantee of that opportunity is vested with a
right or faculty which he has the option to
exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he
must comply with the conditions attached
thereto.
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FINALS DIGESTS 1C

Applying these guidelines, we can construe reconsideration before the SSC, it was
Section 5, Rule VI as granting Rago, or any nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he
member of the System aggrieved by the SSC’s wanted to subsequently avail of judicial
resolution, the option of filing a motion for remedies.
reconsideration which he may or may not
However, the SC ruled the petition in favor of
exercise. Should he choose to do so, he is
Rago, citing that the Social Justice principle of
allowed to file only one motion for
the Constitution should prevail over the
reconsideration within fifteen days from the
procedural technicalities. Petition denied, CA
promulgation of the questioned resolution.
decision affirmed.
This is as far as we go in construing the
provision in isolation because a second
procedural rule now comes into play: the
requirements for appeals filed against the
rulings of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC rules provides:

[A]ny order, resolution, award or decision of the

Commission, in the absence of an appeal
therefrom as herein provides, shall become
final and executory fifteen (15) days after the
date of notification to the parties, and judicial
review thereof shall be permitted only after any
party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has
exhausted his remedies before the Commission
XXX

It now becomes apparent that the permissive

nature of a motion for reconsideration with the
SSC must be read in conjunction with the
requirements for judicial review, or the
conditions sine qua non before a party can
institute certain civil actions. A combined
reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier,
and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC’s 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure reveals that the
petitioners are correct in asserting that a
motion for reconsideration is mandatory in the
sense that it is a precondition to the institution
of an appeal or a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals. Stated differently, while Rago
certainly had the option to file a motion for