Functional Definitions of 

Religion

One common way to define religion is to focus on what are known as functional definitions: these are definitions
which emphasize the way religion operates in human lives. When constructing a functional definition is to ask
what a religion does — usually psychologically or socially.

Functional definitions are so common that most academic definitions of religion can be categorized as either
psychological or sociological in nature. Psychological definitions focus upon the ways in which religion plays a
role in the mental, emotional, and psychological lives of believers. Sometimes this is described in a positive way
(for example as a means of preserving mental health in a chaotic world) and sometimes in a negative way (for
example as with Freud’s explanation of religion as a type of neurosis).

Sociological definitions are also very common, made popular by the work of sociologists like Emile Durkheim and
Max Weber. According to these scholars, religion is best defined by the ways in which it either has an impact upon
society or the ways in which it is expressed socially by believers. In this manner, religion is not simply a private
experience and cannot exist with a solitary individual; rather, it only exists in social contexts where there are
multiple believers acting in concert.

From the functionalist perspective, religion doesn’t exist to explain our world but rather to help us survive in the
world, whether by binding us together socially or by supporting us psychologically and emotionally. Rituals, for
example, may exist to influence our world, to bring us all together as a unit, or to preserve our sanity in a chaotic
existence.

One of the problems with both psychological and sociological definitions is that it can be possible to apply them to
almost any system of belief, including those which don’t look much like religions to us. Is everything that helps us
preserve our mental health really a religion? Surely not. Is everything that involves social rituals and which
structures social morality a religion? Again, that hardly seems likely — by that definition, the Boy Scouts would
qualify.

Another common complaint is that functional definitions are reductionist in nature because they reduce religion to
certain behaviors or feelings which aren’t inherently religious themselves. This bothers many scholars who object
to reductionism on general principle, but is also troubling for other reasons. After all, if religion can be reduced to
a couple of entirely non-religious features which exist in many other non-religious systems, does that mean that
there isn’t anything unique about religion? Should we conclude that the distinction between religious and non-
religious belief systems is artificial?

Nevertheless, that does not mean that the psychological and sociological functions of religion are not important —
functional definitions may not be enough by themselves, but they do seem to have something relevant to tell us.
Whether too vague or too specific, functional definitions still end up focusing on something very relevant to
religious belief systems. A solid understanding of religion cannot be restricted to such a definition, but it should at
least incorporate its insights and ideas.