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Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire from the Peace of 1503 to the War of Cyprus
Author(s): Lester J. Libby, Jr.

Source: The Sixteenth Century Journal , Winter, 1978, Vol. 9, No. 4, Central
Renaissance Conference (Winter, 1978), pp. 103-126
Published by: Sixteenth Century Journal
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/2540047
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Sixteenth Century Journal
IX,4 (1978)
Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire

From the Peace of 1503 to the War of Cyprus
Lester 1. Libby, Jr.

Fayetteville State University
In the early decades of the sixteenth century, the republican city-state

of Venice fought almost continually to safeguard its independence in a
world increasingly dominated by huge, centralizing monarchies. The most
intense phase of the struggle came between the attack of the Cambrai allies
in 1509 and the conclusion of a lasting agreement with Charles V twenty
years later. The result of this prolonged conflict was that the Venetians
obtained a guarantee of their land frontiers at the expense of accepting a
passive and subsidiary role in European affairs. No sooner had the western
threat been averted than the patriciate was compelled to confront the
resurgence of an older menace in the East. At the end of the previous
century the maritime supremacy of Venice had been shattered by the
Turkish sultan's galleys at the 'deplorable' battle of Zonchio. Subsequently,
the Ottomans had gained control of Egypt and Syria and thus of the
Levantine outlets of the vital spice trade. Finally, just a few years after the
settlements with Charles V, the lagoon city was forced into war with his
rival for universal hegemony, Sultan Suleiman I. Despite the aid of Spanish
and papal fleets, the republic was defeated at Prevesa (1538) and con-
strained to make a separate and costly bargain with the common enemy.
Thereafter the government pursued a policy of cautious neutrality and
sought to purchase with bribes and lavish gifts the security it could no
longer win by armed might.'
'The conflicts of 1499 and 1537 and their consequences for Venice are treated at some
length in R. Cessi, Storia della repubblica di Venezia (2 vols., Milano, 1968), II, pp. 44-52, 101-
105 and in H. Kretschmayr, Geschichte von Venedig, (3 vols., Gotha, 1905-1938), III, pp. 21-
34. F. C. Lane's new Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 356-361 contains
much valuable information on the Venetian navy and on the effect of technological in-
novations on war at sea. F. Chabod, "Venezia nella politica italiana ed europea del
Cinquecento," La civilta veneziana del Rinascimento (Venezia, n.d.), pp. 27-55 sharply
delineates the republic's precarious situation amidst the great-power rivalries of the age.
Special topics are taken up in F. C. Lane, 'Naval Actions and Fleet Organization, 1499-1502,"
Renaissance Venice, ed. J. R. Hale (Totowa, N.J., 1973), pp. 146-173 and in T. F. Jones, 'The
Turco-Venetian Treaty of 1540," in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association
for 1914 (2 vols., Washington, 1916), I, pp. 161-167.

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104 The Sixteenth Century Journal
The psychological impact of these startling events on the Venetian

ruling elite was unsettling. Deprived of its traditional illusions of superiority
and unchallengeable strength, the patriciate turned to artistic and literary
activities for compensation. In particular, the study of history and politics
flourished as humanistic writers strove to identify the hidden sources of
their society's longevity and past success and so to discover instructive
lessons for an uncertain future.2 Although primarily concerned with
domestic issues, the works of the patriotic humanists also touch on Oriental
questions from time to time. Moreover, traces of the distinctive ideas of this
intellectual movement can be found in the reports or 'relations' (relazioni)
delivered before the senate by envoys newly returned from Con-
stantinople.3 Together, the compositions of scholars and diplomats display
the efforts of the nobles and citizens of the lagoon city to gain the deepened
understanding needed to cope with the irresistibly expanding alien power
on the eastern frontier.
The earliest surviving example of a Turkish relation is that given in
1503 by Andrea Gritti, negotiator of the peace treaty signed with Bajazet II
in the same year. The ambassador had been chosen for the delicate mission
because of his exceptionally close personal ties at the Porte, and his
narrative is characterized by vivid portrayals of court personalities and
subtle speculations about the sultan's probable plans and intentions.4 Such
concentration on current affairs at the expense of analysis of the structure of
the state itself is typical of the relazioni of the decades before 1530.
Nonetheless, even Gritti's pioneering effort does contain some discussion of
broader themes.
The Ottoman emperor, the emissary notes, is the wealthiest and most
powerful ruler on earth.- Military setbacks at the outset of Bajazet's career
induced him to reorganize his forces, introducing a 'marvelous order' into
the cavalry and reinforcing the artillery and the famous Janizaries. These
2See L. J. Libby, "Venetian History and Political Thought after 1509," Studies in
Renaissance, XX, (1973), pp. 7-45.
3These accounts are printed in the Third Series and Appendix (volumes 12-15) of E.
Alberi's Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato durante il secolo decimosesto (15 vols.,
Firenze, 1839-1861). Henceforward, all references to Alberi's work will be to the volumes of
Series Three (designated simply as I, II and III) unless otherwise stated. The unique nature of
the relations as diplomatic documents is pointed out by D. E. Queller in "The Development of
Ambassadorial Relazioni," Renaissance Venice, ed. Hale, pp. 174-196. M. Gilmore, "Myth and
Reality in Venetian Political Theory," op. cit., pp. 431-444 shows how they reflected the
political beliefs of the patriciate.
4The relation is in Alberi, vol. III, pp. 9-43. Gritti is said to have been a friend of Bajazet
and of the grand vizier Ahmed. One of the ambassador's three illegitimate sons born at
Constantinople later rose to prominence in the Turkish administration. See A. da Mosto's
article on Gritti in his I Dogi di Venezia (Milano, n.d.). The background to the orator's mission
is recounted in III, pp. 3-6.
sJJJ, p. 18.

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Venetians and the Ottoman Empire 105
improvements have borne fruit in splendid victories in Croatia and against

Venice itself. Gritti exposes the secret causes of the latter conflict on the
basis of information from a highly placed source in the imperial entourage.6
The sultan is not, however, exempt from difficulties. His sons con-
stantly intrigue against him and one another, each hoping to gain the throne
at his parent's death. The worst peril is that they might call in foreign
assistance and so endanger the whole realm for the sake of their private
quarrels. Bajazet himself favors the eldest, but one of the younger heirs
enjoys the favor of the Janizaries, who are kingmakers. The emperor's
domestic troubles can be depended on to convince him of the need for peace
with his neighbors, which leaves them secure for the first time in many
years and him free to settle the succession dispute to his own satisfaction.
Another problem is disaffection in the newly conquered Turkish
possessions. In case of another struggle with the republic, Bajazet must fear
an uprising of the Christians within these areas, who still recall af-
fectionately their former status as subjects of the Serenissima. Moreover,
the Venetians might choose to ally themselves with Hungary or some other
European realm against him. For all these reasons, Gritti asserts, the sultan
is eager to remain on good terms with the senate. Another factor tending in
the same direction is the friendly attitude of the first pasha, Achmet. 7
Already the author had touched briefly upon the vital role of the
pashas in the Ottoman regime and upon the characters of the incumbents.
Their immense authority is stressed, but is contrasted somberly with the
insecurity of their exalted position, which depends wholly upon the whims
of their terrible master. Speaking about one of the pashas, the envoy notes
the man's intense hatred of all 'infidels', which can nonetheless always be
overcome by a suitable bribe." This contemptuous appraisal of Turkish
morality recurs throughout the series of relations and receives forcible
expression by Gritti himself when he says of the sultans: "They do most
dishonest things, and failing to keep their word, they break faith, for which
the other monarchs are accustomed to have great reverence and respect."9
Several of the themes found in the oration of 1503 are frequently
repeated in its successors: the emphasis on Ottoman might combined with
an optimistic assessment of the weaknesses of the empire, the importance of
the pashas, the controversies over the inheritance of the throne, and the
6III, pp. 20-23.
7III, pp. 23-24, 39-41. Some later observers also noted the possibility of a revolt among
the sultan's Christian subjects, e.g. I, p. 277 and III, p. 134 and also B. Ramberti, Libri tre delle
cose de' Turchi (full citation in n. 13 below), fol. 138v.
,III, p. 41.
JIII, p. 39. "...fanno cose inonestissime, e mancando della parola, rompono la fede, alla
qual li altri sogliono aver rispetto e reverenzia grande."

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desire of the current sovereign to avoid war with Venice. On the other
hand, Gritti's account is unusual in omitting any intelligence on Bajazet
finances and his navy.
Until the 1530s, there is little variation from Gritti's model in the
makeup of the relazioni. '0 In general, somewhat more detail is provided on
the imperial bureaucracy and armed forces, but the leaders of the republic
appear to have been concerned more with prominent figures at court than
with the nature of the sultan's government. Despite the phenomenal in-
crease of Turkish strength in this era, the emissaries of the lagoon city
evidently remained unawed by their potential adversary. Nevertheless,
Marco Minio in 1522 noted grimly:
And not only to his Excellency, but to all those lords,

it appears that they have in their hands the keys to all
Christendom since they have taken Belgrade, in such a
way that they can easily penetrate into the vitals of the
Christians, and this they say openly, and it is believed that
his Excellency will not undertake an enterprise against
anyone except the Christians."
The year 1534 marks a new stage in the evolution of Venetian con-
ceptions of Turkey.After a long period of enforced neglect, the Levant had
once more become the major field of action for Venice. 2 Simultaneously
the creative influence of politically oriented humanism began to modify
significantly previous approaches to the study of Ottoman affairs.
The effect of these trends is vividly illustrated in two closely connected
narratives composed in 1534, the Constantinople relazione of Daniele de'
Ludovisi and the Libri tre delle cose de' Turchi of his cousin and traveling
companion, Benedetto Ramberti. Both men belonged to the semi-
aristocratic class of cittadini originari, the only nonpatricians allowed to
hold public office. Ramberti in particular was to become a prominent figure
-oThese include the works of A. Giustiniani (1514), B. Contarini (1519), A. Mocenigo

(1518), M. Minio (1522 and 1527), P. Zen (1524 and 1530) and P. Bragadin (1526), all in III, pp.
45-122. Except for Minio's report of 1522, these exist only in condensed form, but the sum-
maries are sufficiently explicit to give a clear idea of the character of the originals.
IE non solamente a Sua Eccellenzia, ma a tutti quelli grandi, pare avere nelle mani le
chiavi di tutta la cristianita per avere ottenuto Belgrado, per modo che facilmente possano
penetrare nelle viscere de' cristiani; e questo palesemente dicono, e si crede che Sua Eccellenzia
non sia per tor impresa, salvo che contra cristiani," III, p. 75, and see also p. 71.
21t is noteworthy, for instance, that the bailo or resident envoy at Constantinople (as
opposed to the "ambassadors" who were sent there on special occasions) was replaced only
twice between 1507 and 1519, although two or three years appears to have been a more usual
period of service in the office. See the list of baili in III, p. xxii, and also the editor's comments
on p. xiv.

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in the republic's intellectual life, and eventually succeeded Pietro Bembo as

custodian of the Marciana Library. The patriotic humanists Gasparo
Contarini, G. B. Egnazio, and Giambattista Ramusio were associates of
Benedetto, whose anonymously published book was at one time ascribed to
still another member of the humanistic circle, Andrea Navagero.
Ludovisi's report incorporates many of the topics usually included in
such productions, but treats them in a distinctive way. He consistently
attempts to place his individual facts within a framework of shrewd
generalizations that endow the specifics with deeper meaning. This method
is strikingly demonstrated in his discussion of the sultan's army. '4 Overall,
the speaker rates the troops highly for their loyalty while disparaging their
technical efficiency. Infantry, he maintains, have been historically more
effective than cavalry both in the ancient world and in the present age,
when the invention of firearms has strengthened the superiority of the
unmounted fighter. But the Turkish warriors are predominantly horsemen
unskilled with guns and so would be no match for modern European forces.
A counterbalancing advantage for the Ottomans, however, is that their
levies are raised and trained together from boyhood and therefore have
more unity than do the heterogeneous collections of foreign hirelings
employed by Christian rulers.
Here the envoy digresses to denounce the contemporary Italian custom
of depending on mercenary armies, a practice which he believes has ruined
the country by replacing reliable footmen with worthless riders:
...and if in more recent times men-at-arms have been

well regarded in Italy, this has happened because of the
bad spirit and ill-will of the condottieri, who, slighting the
infantry, and depriving the princes of good troops, drew
from men-at-arms all their reputation in order to make
-The relazione is in I, p. 1-32. Ramberti's treatise was republished as part of Viaggi fatti
da Vinetia alla Tana..., ed. Antonio Manuzio (Venezia, 1545), which is the edition I have used.
Biographical data on Ludovisi may be found in I, p. 2. He apparently served as a legation
secretary during the joint embassy of B. Contarini and A. Mocenigo to the sultan in 1518 (III,
pp. 55, 68). His cousin's life and writings are treated in G. degli Agostini, Notizie istorico-
critiche intorno alla vita e le opere degli scrittori veneziani (2 vols., Venezia, 1752-1754), II, pp.
556-573. Ramberti's associations with Egnazio, Ramusio and Contarini are mentioned on pp.
560, 561, 566 and 572-573. The attribution of the Libri tre to him was made by Agostini (pp.
568-569) on the basis on internal and manuscript evidence and was accepted by Alberi (III, pp.
8, 124) and by E. A. Cicogna, Delle inscrizione veneziani (6 vols., Venezia, 1824-1853), III, p.
49). See in addition A. H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of
Suleiman the Magnificent (New York, 1966, originally published in 1913), p. 134 and the
authorities cited by him. The assertion that Navagero wrote the Libri is noted by Agostini on
p. 569.
P41, pp. 7-13, 14-17. The defects of the sultan's army are pointed on pp. 8-11.

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themselves the arbiters of Italy, and this was with ruin and
desolation, and in good part the enslavement of the
country. 1 5
Corresponding views had been put forward by Andrea Navagero in

1515 when contemplating the overwhelming Venetian defeat at Agnadello a
few years earlier. 16
Returning to the subject, Ludovisi asserts that the Moslem autocrat's
domains are incapable of supplying him with good infantry because of an
inherent lack of talent among the people themselves. Furthermore, any
attempt to arm and train the peasants would risk inspiring a revolt against
their hated overlords. Finally, the whole government suffers from the laxity
and indolence of the present emperor, Suleiman, who refuses to concern
himself with official business. He prefers instead to delegate all respon-
sibility to his grand vizier, Ibrahim.
Ludovisi's treatment of the imperial navy is equally critical. 7 Man-
power and raw materials are abundant, but skilled shipwrights and
mariners are lacking. The underlying cause of the shortage is that the Turks
are not a seafaring race like the Spanish or the Venetians, and hence there is
no large merchant fleet to serve as a source of recruitment for the war
galleys. In addition, the Ottomans are basically uninterested in maritime
conflicts and choose rather to seek glory and reward in terrestrial cam-
paigns. Here, too, the apathy of the sultan himself is a major debilitating
factor. In conclusion, the diplomat considers at length the personality and
ambitions of Suleiman's new admiral, -the corsair Barbarossa, who is
suspected of secret disloyalty to his employer.
The despotic nature of the Turkish regime is stressed heavily in this
relation, as in many others. Every inhabitant of the realm is a slave of the
sovereign: there are no vassal princes in his dominions. Hardship has
reduced the populace to a condition of abject submission. Yet his vast
authority is not really his own, but is wielded by his corrupt favorite
5"E se nei tempi piu propinqui ai nostri sono state in Italia le genti d'arme in
reputazione, questo e proceduto dal mal animo e dalla trista volunta delli condottieri, li quali
deprimendo le fanterie, e privando li principi della buona gente, tiravano nelle genti d'arme
loro tutta la reputazione per farsi arbitri d'Italia, e cio fu con rovina e desolazione, e in buona
parte con servitu di quella." (pp. 8-9). Ludovisi evidently considered the medieval art of war
unworthy of mention, an attitude that reveals a characteristic bias of humanism in general.
I 6Navagero's ideas on this subject are discussed in Libby, "Venetian History and
Political Thought," pp. 9-10. They were embodied in his funeral oration for the republic's
commander Bartolommeo d'Alviano, who died in 1515. Agostino Valier, writing around 1580,
refers to the speech "che ancora si legge," indicating that it was still known and admired two
generations later, Dell'utilita che si puo ritrarre dalle cose operate dai veneziani libri XIV,
trans. N. Giustiniani (Padova, 1787), p. 267.
71, pp. 17-21.

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Ibrahim, who has achieved eminence by successfully intriguing against all

the abler individuals who have tried to enter the court. Thus the first pasha
continually weakens the state for his personal gain. Venice, however,
benefits from his machinations since he must pursue a pacific course in
international affairs in order to avoid a crisis that would expose his in-
competence. '8
Besides such general remarks, the orator includes in his account a

careful listing of the major and minor positions in the Ottoman
bureaucracy, together with the title, functions, and salary pertaining to
each one. Similar information is provided for the army, and the usual
estimates of total revenue and expenditure are not neglected. '9 In these
respects the report of 1534 is more complete than most of its predecessors,
yet it is scanty by comparison with some later examples of the type.
Like many of his colleagues, Ludovisi is convinced of the sultan's
conciliatory intentions toward the republic. Suleiman's seapower is thought
to be currently insufficient to face a joint Veneto-Spanish assault in the
Mediterranean. Indeed, the Spaniards alone might be able to overwhelm the
Turks at sea. Other influences for peace are the already mentioned attitude
of Ibrahim-pasha and the advice of his trusted counsellor, Alvise Gritti, son
of the senate's former representative at the Porte, Andrea Gritti. Since
Alvise's status at Constantinople depends on his ability to serve as a link
with the lagoon city, where his father now reigns as doge, the younger man
must do his best to avoid a breach between the two governments.
The Libri tre of Ramberti echo his cousin's ideas in amplified form. The
same principal defects in the Ottoman fighting forces are emphasized, with
the added comment that the comfortable billets and regular salaries enjoyed
by the soldiers in time of truce diminish their enthusiasm for actual combat.
The harshness of the sultan's rule is graphically described. Conquered
nations are deliberately demoralized by oppression and want and are
deprived of their natural leaders by the calculated destruction of local
aristocracies and their castles. However, Christians are permitted to retain
their faith in order to avoid driving them to desperation and complete
alienation.2 1
-J, pp. 6, 11-13.
191, pp. 13-17. Owing to the nature of the Turkish government, this account is
thoroughly intermingled with one of the feudal component of the army.
201, pp. 26-28, 29-32.
2'Ramberti, Libri tre, fols. 137v-139. The cousins' low estimate of Turkish naval might
did not stand the test of events in the 1537 war, but it is significant that the victorious fleet at
Prevesa was actually outnumbered by its opponents. The failure of the Christians was due
chiefly to poor coordination among their leaders. The Venetians themselves ascribed the defeat
to treachery on the part of Charles V's Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria. See Kretschmayr,
Geschichte von Venedig, III, pp. 29-31 and Lane, Venice, p. 361, as well as the comments of the
ambassador Antonio Barbarigo in Alberi, III, pp. 159-160.

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The dishonesty imputed to the grand vizier in the relazione of 1534 is

attributed to the whole Ottoman society in the Libri tre delle cose de'
Turchi. The race is said to be lazy, arrogant, sensual, treacherous,
superstitious and supremely avaricious. Suleiman is a tyrant who enslaves
his subjects. No private property is safe from his arbitrary exactions or from
the greed of neighbors and of prospective heirs. Any crime will be forgiven
by the judges for money.22 The autocrat's ministers have been chosen from
among his own bodyservants, and they show their gratitude by repeatedly
deceiving and cheating him. In fact, although he is unaware of it, only the
perfidy of his subordinates prevents him from obtaining control of the
entire world.23
More objectively, book two delineates the organization of the Turkish
polity. The author's presentation seems to have been modeled on con-
temporary efforts to explain the Venetian constitution in terms of its
various magistracies.24 Thus the personnel of the civil and military branches
is set forth in meticulous detail from the pashas, defterdars (treasurers) and
beglerbegs (generals) down to the menials of the Seraglio and the
cavalrymen of the guards regiments. Important personages like the sanjaks
(governors) are given considerable space, but the pay, responsibilities, and
names of even the lowest grades are recorded. Often, equivalents are
supplied for unfamiliar nomenclature. The Nisangi is "like our Grand
Chancellor," while the Mufti resembles "our Pope in ancient times", and a
cadi is comparable to the podesta of a town. Special attention is paid to the
Janizaries, whose training is recounted at length. The book closes with
itemized estimates of the public revenue and expenditure.
Conventionally, Ramberti discerns serious flaws in the impressive
edifice of imperial dominance. The flattery of Suleiman's administratively
inexperienced and venal lieutenants encourages him to lapse into a
dangerous and self-delusive complacency. Another constant threat is posed
by the Janizaries with their unremitting desire to meddle in politics.
2Libri tre, fols. 134v-136.
2-Ibid., fols. 139v-140v. D. Barbarigo asserted in 1564 (II, p. 35) that the sultan
be irresistible if he knew his own strength.
24Libri tre, fols. 118v-132. This book was translated by Lybyer and incorporated
into The Government of the Ottoman Empire as Appendix I (pp. 239-261). An examp
treatment of Venetian government in terms of its magistracies is M. A. Sabellico, De
magistratibus in the author's Opera omnia, ed. C. S. Curione (4 vols. in 3, Basileae, 15
cols. 278-300. Gasparo Contarini's famous dissertation on the constitution is a f
development of the type, which seems to have been popular in Renaissance Venice. R
intention of describing the formal or legal structure of the Ottoman state is indicat
exclusion of the influential Alvise Gritti from this section on the ground that, as a Ch
the Doge's son could not technically be considered a member of the government (f
Similarly, the army is covered in Book Two as an extension of the imperial court, but t
is relegated to Book Three. The introduction to the Libri tre says that the second part
with 1a porta, cioe la corte de Soltan Soleimano" (fol. 109v).

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Recently they have menaced the vizier Ibrahim and caused the sultan
himself to fear for his throne and his life. The writer also notes with surprise
that the fratricidal impulses of the dynasty have not already brought about
its extinction.25
Throughout the Libri tre, the intellectual impact of patriotic humanism

appears. For instance, the introduction explains that comprehension of the
customs, laws and governance of the huge Ottoman realm should "bring
not only pleasure, but great usefulness to everyone who lives among men
civilmente. " For this reason, Ramberti asserts, he has taken pains to adopt a
plain and unadorned style that anyone may readily grasp. Some years
before his journey to the Levant, he had expressed in a private letter the
wish to travel thither in order to seek insight that might prove helpful to the
republic he served as a diplomatic secretary. Such emphasis on the worth of
knowledge to politically active citizens is especially characteristic of the
city's literary culture in the years after the Cambrai crisis.26
The deep conservatism of postwar Venice shows itself in the praise
accorded to Suleiman's family for retaining the traditions of its ancestors,
"which is judged by wise men an excellent and singular cause for which
Kings and Republics may rule enduringly, there being on the other hand
nothing more dangerous than the frequent alteration of the government."27
Adrift in a hostile and rapidly changing world, the lagoon dwellers clung as
tightly as they could to the customs derived from the days of their bygone
greatness and assured security.
Both cousins conclude their discussions with remarks on the enigmatic
figure of Alvise Gritti and his possible value to the senate. The two concur
in regarding him as a person of outstanding ability and much potential
utility, but nevertheless caution that he is not altogether to be trusted
because of his ambiguous role of Christian courtier in an Islamic capital.28
25Libri tre, fols. 139v-140v, 138v, 132v.
2 Ibid., fol. 109v. "...laquale cognitione per giudicio mio suole apportare non solamen
delettatione, ma utilita grande a cadauno, che viva tra le genti civilmente." Cf. the sam
writer's remarks in a private letter composed a few years earlier while on a diplomat
assignment in Germany: "praeclare mecum agi existimavi, si Graeciam quoque ipsam
peragrarem, ac demum Ottomanorum florentissimam totius orbis terrarum aulam pe
spicerem, illiusque vires, opesque ita perpenderem, ut aliquando judicium facere de iis rebu
quae in diem emergunt, et quae ad Reipublicae gubernationem maxime pertent, mihi quoq
liceret...." (quoted in Agostini, II, p. 562). Cf. also Marino Cavalli's observations to the sen
in 1560 on the indispensability of the political intelligence gleaned by envoys to the conduct
an effective foreign policy (Alberi, I, pp. 273-274).
2 Libri tre, fol. 137. "Laqual cosa ottima et singulare cagione e giudicata da tutti i sav
che gli Re, et le Rep. possano longamente dominare, non essendo all'incontro cosa al mon
piu pericolosa, che la spessa mutatione del governo." (Alberi, I, p. 117, from D. Trevisa
relation of 1554). For other examples of such ideas in contemporary Venetian humanis
works, see Libby, op. cit., pp. 25-42.
2sLibri tre, fols. 140v-143. Ludovisi's comments are in I, pp. 29-32.

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Alvise himself was partly responsible for a pamphlet on Turkey

published at Venice in 1533 and reprinted in 1538. His collaborator in this
endeavor was the court dragoman or interpreter (and unacknowledged
Venetian agent), Junis Bei. The work closely resembles Ramberti's second
book in form and content and may have been based on the same source,
perhaps a manuscript belonging to Gritti.29 Evidently, the patriciate and its
cittadini allies were well provided in the 1530s with up-to-date information
on Near Eastern affairs.
By contrast, the widely read Commentario de le cose de' Turchi of
Paolo Giovio reveals the existing level of general European awareness in
regard to these matters. Although ostensibly intended to guide Charles V in
planning a crusade against the infidels, the volume is in reality devoted
almost entirely to historical events. 30 The few pages dealing with the current
situation are superficial and contain little of strategic significance despite
claims that sundry individuals well acquainted with the Porte, among them
Doge Andrea Gritti, were consulted.3 Comparison between the Com-
mentario and the compositions of Ludovisi and his cousin suggests the
degree to which the latter two observers and their compatriots had ad-
vanced beyond other Westerners in penetrating the mysteries of the rival
civilization in the east.
After 1534 there is a gap of twenty years in the series of extant Con-
stantinople relations. Bernardo Navagero's report of 1553, however,
surpasses in length and thoroughness all its precursors and shows that the
signoria had not become indifferent to the Ottoman problem in the interval.
The author was the nephew and disciple of the celebrated Andrea Navagero
and was to win a high reputation in his own right as a diplomatist and
scholar.32 On the whole, Bernardo's views are strongly reminiscent of his
29The pamphlet is printed in Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire, Ap-
pendix II (pp. 262-275). A new edition appeared in 1537. On the relationship between this
production and Ramberti's treatise, see Lybyer, pp. 315-316.
3oPaolo Giovio, Commentario de le cose de' Turchi (Venezia, 1538). A statement in t

introduction (sig. A2v) indicates the work was finished by 1531. Lybyer calls it "a book that
had a wide influence" (op. cit., p. 313). A Latin translation was published in 1539.
3 'Commentario, sigs. A2v, C3.
32Bernardo's connection with Andrea Navagero and the similarity of some of their
opinions are discussed in my Brown University Ph.D. thesis, "Venetian Patriotic Humanism in
the Early Sixteenth Century" (1971), pp. 145-148. The younger man's literary efforts were
compared to his mentor's by contemporaries (A. Valier, "Vita di Bernardo Navagero" in
Orazioni, elogi, e vite scritti da letterati veneti..., (2 vols., Venezia, 1798), II, pp. 77, 83.
Bernardo was also acquainted with the patriotic humanist G. B. Egnazio (ibid., p. 90). A brief
biography of Bernardo Navagero and a list of his many writings may be found in Alberi,
Relazioni, seconda serie, III, pp. 366-368. W. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican
Liberty (Berkeley, 1968), pp. 182-185 uses his Roman relation of 1558 as an early instance of a
deeper and more thoughtful Venetian approach to ecclesiastical history characteristic of the
second half of the sixteenth century. The Constantinople relation of 1553 is in I, pp. 33-110.

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predecessors' and demonstrate the continuity of certain strains of thought

despite the passage of decades. Thus the military, political and ethical
deficiencies of the Turkish system are pointed out in the by now usual
way.33 Morality and leadership are the vital issues, according to the
speaker. Such universal corruption is a major threat even to a power which
controls "two-thirds of the world." Moreover, no polity can be effective
without capable direction from the top, but Suleiman is slothful and his
premier dishonest. There is a hint that the dominant race may have
degenerated over the centuries. The early successes of the dynasty's founder
Othman against heavy numerical odds are scornfully held up beside the
present inefficiency of the sultan's disorganized hordes. Finally, the Turks
fear that a succession battle at their aged ruler's death could destroy the
state altogether. 34
Navagero's work is outstanding for its combination of unprecedented
factual completeness with rare analytical depth. Most enlightening is the
section on the Islamic realm's recruitment of its elite soldiers and high of-
ficials from among the subjugated Christian populations. This unique
procedure, the defining feature of the Ottoman regime, is fully explained for
the first time. The healthiest and most intelligent of the small boys taken in
wartime as slaves are sent to the imperial palaces for a rigorous and
prolonged course of study.35 Periodically, especially promising youths are
singled out for advancement to further stages of education or to privileged
employments. The luckiest are made personal attendants to the sovereign.
They may hope to become pashas some day. Less talented persons enter the
bureaucracy as apprentices or join crack cavalry units. The instructors at
the schools are of course native Ottomans and are charged with bringing up
the lads as fanatical Moslems. The teachers often later rise to high religious
or judicial posts.
Conscripts destined for Janizary careers are placed in peasant
households of Anatolia in order to absorb the customs, faith and language
of their adoptive people.36 After a period of unpaid labor, the pick of the
group is sent to Suleiman's own chambers. The rest are given various
remunerative jobs at the capital. A few of the trainees are assigned to the
emperor's gardeners as assistants. From these assorted tasks, young men are
called up to filll vacancies in the ranks of the famous infantry corps. The
armament, discipline and habits of the troops are carefully delineated by
Navagero. The warriors are absolutely devoted to the sultan, who uses
33Thus, the army is criticized on pp. 64-66 and the navy on pp. 69-70, and pp
50, 55-56, 91, 108 give examples of official misconduct.
34I, pp. 55, 65, 71, 74, 78-79, 89-93, 101.
35I, pp. 42-47.
36I pp. 48-57.

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them for all his great enterprises and for many ceremonial functions. In
politics the Janizaries play a vital part because they alone can decide who
will triumph in case of a quarrel over the inheritance of the throne. Then,
remarks the envoy, they rage through the streets "like unchained devils,"
knowing they are immune from retribution. Indeed, when the present
monarch acceded, he was compelled to grant them a donative, although he
should have been the unquestioned heir as his father's only son.
The remainder of the army is treated in similarly meticulous fashion,
and the nature of Turkish feudalism is brought out with exceptional clarity.
Several pages also are alloted to the court and to the staffs of Suleiman's
various residences.37 The comprehensive treatment of the fleet is excelled
only in Domenico Trevisan's report of 1554.38 Treasury records are utilized
in order to arrive at precise figures for the principal categories of public
income and outgo. (Archival materials appear to have been frequently used
by the composers of relazioni in this era.39)
Navegero's opinions on the crucial question of Ottoman attitudes
toward the republic are boldly stated and would be echoed by most of his
successors at Constantinople. The reputations both of Venice and of
Christendom generally, he suggests, have been severely damaged by the
humiliating outcome of the conflict of 1537-1540. The Turks believe the
Signoria may be insulted with impunity, above all because of the lagoon
city's dependence on eastern trade and on regular grain shipments from
Asia Minor. Conversely, however, the Venetian navy is still formidable,
and there is always the possibility of a crusading alliance with Spain. The
emissary recommends an attempt to dispense with food imports from the
Levant for two years on the theory that such action would soon force the
Moslem merchants to beg for a resumption of orders. His prediction was
afterwards to be borne out by events. Meanwhile, peace can best be kept by
conciliatory gestures and by lavish bribery of the pashas together with
prudent maintenance of the war galleys as a last resort.40
37I, pp. 39-47. Ottoman feudalism is mentioned by M. Minio as early as 1522 (III, p. 73)
and is described more fully by Ludovisi (I, 15-17) and by Ramberti (fols. 129-131v) as well as
by Junis Bei in his pamphlet (Lybyer, pp. 271-272). Navagero's treatment, however, far sur-
passes any of the foregoing in length and thoroughness.
38I, pp. 66-71. Trevisan's relation is described below.
39Navagero's use of official records for various purposes is mentioned in I, pp. 37-39,
55-56 and 108. Other emissaries who consulted such sources either directly or through in-
termediaries are Trevisan (I, pp. 148-150), A. Erizzo (III, pp. 130-131) and D. Barbarigo (I, pp.
15-16). (Trevisan does not actually state that he employed Turkish sources for the financial
estimates given on the cited pages of his account, but the figures listed are so precise as to imply
that some type of public archive must have been examined.)
40J, pp. 83-85. For similar thoughts expressed by subsequent envoys, see I, pp. 160-162,
183-184, 282, 283-286, II, pp. 21-22, 48, III, pp. 140-141, 144, 159-160, 164, 204-205. The
provision of adequate food supplies for the capital was often a matter of concern to the

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On the whole, the subsequent relations of the 1550s strikingly resemble

that of 1553 because of the common ambassadorial practice of copying
from a predecessor's work. Navagero's speech was long thought to be a
model of its kind.4 Nevertheless, the accounts of Trevisan, Antonio Erizzo
(1557) and Antonio Barbarigo (1558) individually contain observations of
distinctive value.
For example, Trevisan provides an especially lucid and revealing
description of the imperial divans or audiences where the bulk of govern-
ment business is transacted. The preliminary session is held by the pashas
and is attended by generals, admirals, the chief judges and the chancellor.
Supplications are heard and all current issues are reviewed. Most matters
can be settled then and there, but some must be referred to the judiciary and
a small proportion is reserved for the ruler's own decision. Next, certain
lesser ministers are permitted under very restricted conditions to approach
the throne. The sovereign never listens to private requests in person or
negotiates directly with foreign diplomats. Formerly, the emperors were
accustomed to eavesdrop on the proceedings of every divan, but Suleiman
prefers not to bother. Whenever he is away on campaign, a regency council
is convened in the capital. Less elaborate arrangements are made on the
occasion of his pleasure trips to remote cities.
Having explained the functioning of the higher echelons of the regime,
the orator proceeds to mention the minor magistrates and courtiers already
listed by Navagero, but with the addition of new data on tax collection and
law enforcement in the provinces. Like Ramberti, Trevisan sometimes
includes Venetian equivalents for the assorted grades of Ottoman of-
ficialdom.42
In connection with the armed forces, the main stress is on their capacit
for rapid mobilization with a minimum of disruption and expense. The
Venetian statesmen, particularly in wartime. The need for Paduan grain had been a majo
factor in shaping the senate's military strategy in the most critical period of the Cambrai w
for instance. (L. J. Libby, "The Reconquest of Padua in 1509 according to the Diary o
Girolamo Priuli," Renaissance Quarterly, XXVIII, no. 3 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 323-331. G
Cozzi, "Authority and the Law in Renaissance Venice," (in Hale, op. cit., pp. 293-345), p. 3
notes that the same motive impelled the republic to try to regain Ravenna in 1527. During th
winter of 1539-40, there was famine in Venice due to the cutting off of Anatolian grain ship
ments as a result of the war with the sultan. (Jones, "The Turco-Venetian Treaty of 1540,
165.) Evidently, the situation in regard to Levantine supplies had improved by 1564, however
for in that year Daniele Barbarigo reported a Turkish request for a resumption of Veneti
grain purchases, which had recently been suspended. According to the diplomat, the Ottoman
now depended more heavily on the commerce with the lagoon city than his own countrym
did (II, p. 22). (Some other envoys also emphasize the importance of Venetian trade to th
sultan and his people, e.g., I, pp. 160-161, 283-285 and III, pp. 140-141, 164.)
4'Queller, "The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni," pp. 176, 180 and (on t
reputation of Navagero's work) Alberi, I, p. 34.
42The relation is in I, pp. 111-192. Pp. 117-123 are devoted to the Turkish government.
This effort is the only one of the pre-Lepanto Constantinople relazioni comparable in co
prehensiveness to Navagero's.

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discussion of the army is notable primarily for a vivid portrayal of the

Tartar hordes that aid Suleiman against Persia. On the other hand, the
depiction of the navy is the best discoverable in any of the relations
delivered before 1570.43 The entire fleet is under the orders of the beglerb
of the sea, whose duties and prerogatives are set forth at length. Subor-
dinate to him are two hundred or more reis captains who are salaried in
peacetime as well as on active operations. Each reis has a cadre of officers
beneath him; they too are regularly paid. Oarsmen and money are supplied
by a well organized system of conscription extending throughout the
empire. A quota of recruits is fixed for every district, but the prospective
draftees may elect to pay a cash sum in lieu of serving. Furthermore, a
special tax is levied on the population at large for the support of the ships.
The captains hire experienced seafarers with the proceeds and thus sup-
plement the raw peasants collected from the countryside. To the Venetian
commanders, chronically short of funds and manpower, these
arrangements must have seemed truly admirable. Equal care is lavished on
the provisioning of the vessels. Besides the galleys kept by the monarch
himself, there is a sizeable contingent of pirates constantly ready to join
battle on his behalf. Consequently, he incurs little financial burden by
sending out a Mediterranean expedition. The descriptive part of Trevisan's
remarks concludes with a statistical breakdown of current maritime
strength and dispositions.
Certain deficiencies nonetheless help to counter the overwhelming
advantages just mentioned. The arsenal at Pera is poorly run and so the
fighting craft are badly conditioned. Most of them are ill-constructed from
the outset because of a shortage of competent artisans. The majority of the
seamen lack experience and skill, which is the severest limitation of all on
the otherwise immense Turkish marine potential. Therefore the sultan has
never launched the invincible armada that might have been expected under
somewhat altered circumstances.44
Passing beyond the purely factual, Trevisan seeks to define the
essential uniqueness of the Ottoman polity.. Suleiman's fiscal solvency,
military preparations and mode of governance are totally unlike those of
the European princes. Also, he is far wealthier than rival potentates and can
consequently keep up an enormous standing combat establishment that
would be well beyond their means. They must rely on mercenaries engaged
43, pp. 123-124 (mobilization), 124-135 (army), 135-148 (navy).
44I, pp. 157-159. "...tutti i sudditi del serenissimo Gran-Signore, riconoscendo la roba e
la vita da sua maesta, gli portano quella maggiore obbedienza che possano, non pensando ad
altro se non a servirla; ma li sudditi delli cristiani, sapendo che gli e avuto molto rispetto, cosi
per le molte giurisdizioni, come per non dar loro causa che diventino ribelli, danno quella
obbedienza che il principe si acquista con la sua bonta e giustizia." (pp. 158-159). Others who
mention the "obedience" rendered the sultan are Erizzo (III, p. 131) and A. Barbarigo (III, p.
153).

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for the duration of each struggle. His riches in turn stem from his
totalitarian authority, unparalleled elsewhere:
... all the subjects of the most serene Gran-Signor, owing

life and property to his majesty, bear him the greatest
obedience they can, thinking of nothing but to serve him;
but the subjects of the Christians, knowing that much
respect is owing to themselves, because of the many
jurisdictions, in order not to give them cause to become
rebels, give that obedience which the prince draws to
himself by his goodness and justice.45
More explicitly than his colleagues, Trevisan expresses his coun-

trymen's intuition of the gulf that divides Ottoman despotism from th
political structures of the Occidental world.
Antonio Erizzo's contribution is distinguished chiefly by its vigorous
exposition of the supposed inherent weaknesses of the Turkish state. All
problems are created by the excessive centralization of power in the
autocrat. If he travels to the western borders to attack his neighbors there,
he must fear a sudden assault by the Persians at the opposite end of his vast
dominions. This could prove dangerous in conjunction with an insurrection
by the peasants of Asia Minor, who sympathize with the Iranians on
religious grounds. The possible role of Persia as an agent for the destruc
of the sultan was a favorite theme for Venetian speculation at mid-century.
A second menace is the constantly recurring chance of a quarrel between
brothers over the succession. Furthermore, if the emperor should die
leaving no male offspring, none of the pashas could fill the gap by usur-
pation:
...for all the great men of this empire being equally slaves
of the Sultan during his life, none of them could ever give
place to the other after his death, nor is one ever so
superior in power and favor to all the others, that he could
easily conquer. The people then, and those who are native
Turks, would never consent to obey one who had been a
slave. Concerning the discord which might follow from
45I, p. 133.. "...perche essendo egualmente tutti li grandi di questo imperio schiavi del
suo Signor vivendo lui, mai non potrebbono dopo la morte sua cedere uno all' altro, ne alcuno
e mai si superior di potenza e favore a tutti gli altri, che gli potesse facilmente vincere. Li popoli
poi, e quelli che sono turchi nativi, mai non si acquieterrebono ad obbedire ad uno che fosse
schiavo. Da questa discordia quello che ne seguirebbe ognuno dagli esempi delle cose antiche
facilmente lo puo giudicare." Cf. the observations of D. Barbarigo (II, p. 19) and Andrea
Dandolo (III, pp. 201-202).

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this everyone may judge for himself from the examples of

antiquity. 46
Summing up, Erizzo asserts that the dynasty commands astonishing

obedience from its subjects, but through terror and hope of gain rather than
genuine loyalty. Any severe defeat would quickly eliminate the motives for
submission and thus undermine the government.47
Antonio Barbarigo too lays much stress on the monarch's limited
authority. There are no truly free men in Suleiman's domain; the whole
population surrenders its property and its children at his pleasure. The
imperial ministers glory in the name of their suzerain's slaves. No real
hereditary aristocracy can exist in such a society, avers the patrician
diplomat disdainfully.48
He also underscores the immense might of Turkey and especially of its
perpetually battle-ready fleet. The Ottomans are well aware of their
potency, remarks the envoy: "This nation knowing its power respects no
one and they say that their sultan has no need of aid or favor from
Christians, being most puissant and wealthy, but rather the Christians of
him." Nevertheless, adds the speaker, the republic's representatives are
honored more than any other foreigners at the Porte, perhaps because the
ambassadors from Venice bring the richest gifts.49
After 1560 the reports tend to become briefer and more selective and
deal principally with matters of immediate concern to the senate. Par-
ticularly important seems to have been the issue of piracy. The
Mediterranean was now infested by corsairs operating under the tacit
protection of Turkish magistrates who shared in the rewards of successful
voyages. The Venetian admirals were restrained from acting vigorously in
defense of their commerce by the political leaders' apprehensions about
45A summary of Erizzo's relazione is in III, pp. 123-144. His treatment of the structural
defects of the Turkish state covers pp. 131-134. Similar views were expressed by M. Cavalli in
1560 (I, pp. 281-282). Other writers who make a point of the pro-Persian leanings of some of
the sultan's subjects are Navagero (I, pp. 86-87), Trevisan (I, p. 170) and D. Barbarigo (II, p.
23). The possibility of a two-front war is also mentioned by Barbarigo (II, pp. 35-36). An
anonymous Venetian account of Persia dating from the same period says that some consider
the Persians alone a serious threat to the Ottoman realm. (See pp. 268-269 of Relazione
anonimo della guerra di Persia dell' anno 1553 in I, pp. 193-289.) In 1570, the republic appealed
to the Persians for help when Sultan Selim attacked Cyprus (Cessi, Storia della repubblica di
Venezia, II, p. 129.)
47III, pp. 149-150. An almost identical remark about the servility of the pashas had been
made by Erizzo during the previous year. Barbarigo's narrative is printed in summary form in
III, pp. 145-160.
48III, pp. 151-153.
49III, p. 160. "...questa generazione conoscendo la potenza sua non stima alcuno, e
dicono che il Signor loro non ha bisogno d'aiuto ne favore da' cristiani, essendo potentissimo e
ricchissimo, ma bensi li cristiani di lui...."

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provoking a violent reaction at Constantinople. Suleiman consistently

refused to enforce treaty provisions against the raiders who, in fact,
comprised the backbone of his seagoing forces.5Q Considerable attention is
also paid in these documents to the regular navy, and its efficiency is rated
far higher than formerly.
Despite their obvious awe of Ottoman grandeur, however, the
emissaries of this decade emulate their forerunners in searching out con-
cealed defects in the organization and management of the Moslem empire.
Denunciations of avarice and dishonesty are commonplace among the
relazione in general, but an observer in 1560 went so far as to predict that
moral decline would ruin the entire realm eventually. Already the martial
qualities of the ruling group had been sapped, and soon the whole race
would lose its vigor. Curiously, a generation afterwards, two Turkish
authors ascribed the deterioration of their country's fortunes to essentially
similar causes.52 In the present, nonetheless, the sultan remained for-
midable. A few years before the outbreak of the 1570 war, a newly returned
orator claimed anxiously that the crown prince had laid plans for the
conquest of Cyprus and could be expected to put them into effect when he
acceded. The future emperor, it was rumored, aspired to emulate the deeds
of his terrible ancestor and namesake, Selim the Grim.53 This prophecy,
which was soon fulfilled, led to the great Christian victory at Lepanto in
1571 and to the beginning of a different phase in the long rivalry between
Venice and Constantinople.
The portrayal of Turkey in the relations and in Ramberti's book
represents the total negation of the political ideals set forth in the "Venetian
myth" developed by the humanists of the lagoon city in the decades
5oThe authors of these later relations may have felt that their predecessors had co
most general topics so thoroughly that there was little left to add on such themes. See, f
example, I, p. 274 and II, p. 16. Piracy is discussed in I, pp. 289-291 (1560), II, pp. 21-22, 48
(1564) and II, pp. 194-196 (1562), as well as in the earlier accounts of Trevisan (I, p. 141) and
Erizzo (III, pp. 141-143).
5'The works of Marino Cavalli (1560) and Marcantonio Donini (1562) include especially
favorable opinions about the Ottoman navy, which is also treated in the relazioni of Daniele
Barbarigo and Andrea Dandolo. (See, respectively, I, pp. 291-295, III, pp. 191-194, II, pp. 33-
35, and III, 164-166). Cavalli and Dandolo also thought unusually well of Suleiman's army (I,
p. 280 and III, p. 166). In general, from the time of Trevisan the fleet is emphasized more than
the land forces, a striking reversal of the earlier situation. Perhaps the reason is that the navy
had recently been improved substantially, but the army remained basically unaltered (III, p.
196).
52I, p. 281 (Cavalli). In 1534, Ramberti had claimed that the purpose of the sultan's
frequent wars was simply to keep the Ottoman race from becoming wholly enervated by
excessive indolence and licentiousness (Libri tre, fol. 134v). The Turkish critics are mentioned
by V. J. Parry on pp. 350-351 of "The Ottoman Empire 1566-1617," in Volume Three (pp. 347-
376) of the New Cambridge Modern History.
3III, p. 182. This orator (Marcantonio Donini) also speaks fearfully of the young
sultan's extraordinary cruelty toward his own countrymen.

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following the Cambrai crisis.54 If the constitution of the republic stood for
the perfect balance between liberty and order and for the harmonization of
competing class interests, the Ottoman society was nothing but a huge
military slave camp in which all distinctions of birth were abolished in a
common servitude. The pashas and the autocrat himself were not really
secure, it was pointed out, since they were threatened by palace intrigues
and the inbred jealousies of a tyrant's court. 55
More than anything else, the ancient and proud aristocracy of Venice
dreaded the possibility that one of its own members might gain complete
ascendancy over the state. Perhaps reflecting this concern, the am-
bassadorial narratives are full of instances of the inefficiency and duplicity
bred by excessive concentration of power. On occasion the elective Persian
monarchy is contrasted favorably with a system that obliges the sovereign
to murder his brothers and sometimes his children, and forbids him to speak
with anyone except his personal servants privately and informally..5, The
disastrous moral effects of despotism on the population at large are cogently
summed up by Domenico Trevisan in a passage very revealing of his
countrymens' attitudes. Suleiman rules less by love than by fear "as a better
.and easier way, in my opinion, of keeping (the people) in obedience; for
being all born in such poverty and servitude that they not only have not
tasted the fruit of freedom, but have never even heard its name, it is to be
54Myron Gilmore, Myth and Reality in Venetian Political Theory" pp. 437-439
analyzes the relazioni as expressions of the patriciate's political assumptions, noting that
Turkey was used as an example of the defects of despotism. The Swiss and German free cities,
on the other hand, were held up as proof of the dangers of too much democracy. Additional
references on the subject of the Venetian myth" are given in Libby, op. cit.
55The relations contain many statements about the insecurity of the pashas as a group
together with numerous instances of assassinations of such men at the orders of the emperor.
Usually the victim would offer no resistance in these cases. See I, pp. 115, 176, II, 32-33, III, 25,
54, 73, 107-108, 131, 156-157 and also Libri tre, fol. 135. Threats to the ruler himself, most
often by his sons, are recorded in II, pp. 24, 38 and III, pp. 179, 183-184.
5sThus, for example, the Venetian diplomats frequently claimed to be able to

manipulate Ottoman foreign policy by means of bribery, e.g. I, pp. 85, 91-93, 108, 162, 176-
177 and III, pp. 137 and 144 (especially), but also 141. It was asserted, moreover, that the
sovereign's condition of health fundamentally affected the interests of the state. For instance,
one ambassador maintained that the Turks could not go to war if Suleiman and his grand vizier
were too ill to participate in person, since the army would not fight well in their absence (II, p.
35. Note also II, p. 18 and III, p. 202). The contrast with Persia is made most clearly by M. A.
Donini in III, p. 199. Pp. 196-202 of his report contain much valuable data on the Persians, as
do additionally I, pp. 166-171, 193-269 and III, pp. 278-279. Bernardo Navagero describes
Suleiman at one point telling his favorite son that an elder sibling must ascend the throne
eventually and then kill all his brothers for the sake of the dynasty (I, p. 77). The emperor later
arranged the deaths of two other sons himself (I, pp. 171-176, 207-211, II, p. 24, III, pp. 149,
167-168, 176-179, 182-183, 197-198). An earlier sultan, Selim I, was said to have murdered
several members of his immediate family (III, p. 62, but see also p. 54). The remarks on
Suleiman's isolation are in III, p. 138.

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feared that otherwise governed they might someday, like ignorant persons,
attempt an insurrection in the country... 57
Besides attacks on the concept of monarchy, other themes charac-
teristic of contemporary Venetian political ideology crop out from time to
time in the relazioni. A trace of the patriciate's anticlericalism appears in a
remark of Trevisan's that inordinate expenditure on mosques is a serious
drain on the imperial treasury and ought to be curbed. Also typical is the
same author's description of his native city as "a republic which now alone
sustains the reputation and glory of all Italy." In 1515, Andrea Navagero
called his native place "the home of liberty for all Italy."58 Another echo of
patriotic humanism resounds in a statement of 1564 that any citizen of the
republic should be endowed by nature with a certain instinctive grasp of
affairs of government regardless of the extent of his actual experience of
them.59 Several orators discourse eloquently of the debt owed by every
Venetian to his city for the benefits conferred on him by his residence there.
This thought is most forcefully expressed by Bernardo Navagero in a few
lines that also illustrate the tendency of the patricians to exalt their
homeland in semi-religious terms. Disclaiming near the close of his speech
any extraordinary merit for his exertions at Constantinople, he affirms:
I have not done anything, however, on which I could pride

myself... for even if a citizen of this most illustrious state
acquired for it a province, and made your serenity master
of the world, he ought to say, "Domine, cum haec fecisse
servus inutilis sum." Too great is the debt, Most Serene
Prince, which is owed to the fatherland, for anyone to be
57"...come mezzo, per mia opinione, migliore e piu facile a tenerli nell' obbedienza;
perche essendo nati tutti in poverta ed in servitu tale, che non solo non hanno gustato il frutto
della liberta, ma ne anco udito il nome di quella, sarebbe da temersi che altrimente governati
non facessero coll' occasione, come gente ignorante, alcuna sollevazione nel paese...." (I, p.
154). A. Giustiniani in 1514 also observed that the sultan was more feared than loved (III, p.
50). Machiavelli contended in chapter seventeen of The Prince that this was the wisest course
for a ruler to pursue. A comment on the inability of those born in slavery to use freedom
properly is included moreover in the work of a Venetian contemporary of Trevisan's, Niccolo
Zeno, Dell' origine di Venetia (Venezia, 1558), fol. 14 "...se un e nato in servitu, quando e
messo in liberta, non la conosce cosi bene, come farebbe uno, che fosse stato libero, e poi
servo, fosse di nuovo posto in liberta...."
58I, pp. 152-153 (mosques), 178 ("una repubblica la quale sola sostiene il nome e la gloria
d' Italia"). Navagero's phrase was "libertatis domicilio, totius Italiae," from Opera omnia, ed.
J. A. Vulpius (Patavii, 1718), p. 33. The same author further claimed the League had attacked
Venice in order to destroy the last independent republic on the peninsula and so to assure the
maintenance of monarchical and foreign domination (ibid., p. 50). Bernardo Navagero, in a
funeral oration for Doge Gritti delivered in 1538, described the role of Venice in language very
close to Trevisan's. Speaking of Venetian resistance to the trans-Alpine invaders, Bernardo
asserted that the patriciate not only preserved its own subjects from the devastation of war but
also "totius Italiae auctoritatem cedentem sustinuistis," Oratio in funere Andreae Gritti in
Orazioni, elogi, e vite scritti da letterati veneti (2 vols., Venezia, 1798), I, p. 275. 59II, p. 33.

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able to do so much as not to be obligated to do more, and

the cry, "I have deserved well of my country" is the voice
of a narrow and sordid spirit.60
Diplomats like Navagero were not the only members of the Venetian
elite to manifest deep concern over the inexorable expansion of Ottoman
dominion in the decades before Lepanto. For instance, the nobleman
Antonio Longo composed an account of his service in the war of 1537-1540,
evidently hoping to provide useful hints on policy for the beleaguered
republic. Subsequently, his manuscript was revised by his son and supplied
with a preface extolling the benefits of good relations with Turkey. Interest
in such questions must have been great at mid-century because popularized
works on Ottoman history published between 1540 and 1560 at Venice went
through multiple editions. 61
Moreover, writings on ostensibly unrelated topics also show the im-
pact of the chief preoccupation of statesmen upon politically conscious
humanists. Thus the secretary of the Council of Ten, G. B. Ramusio, in-
cluded in his famous anthology of tales of exploration an explicit com-
parison of the modern Turks with the Teutonic tribes who destroyed the
civilization of antiquity. He laments the ruin of classical Greece and the
repeated devastation of Italy by bands of savage marauders, first the early
Germans and later the infidel hordes from Anatolia. 62 A similar comparison
appears in a work printed two years before Ramusio's, a history of the Dark
Ages by Niccolo Zeno, in which the nascent Venetian community is
depicted as the last refuge of Roman culture amid the general collapse. At
one point the writer calls Friuli "the gateway by which the barbarians enter
Italy, as we have seen in our times by the raids of the Turks."63 Previousl
60I, p. 108 "...non ho pero fatto cosa che mi possa gloriare... perche sebbene ogni cit-
tadino di questo illustrissimo stato gli acquistasse una provincia, e facesse vostra serenita
padrone del mondo, dovrebbe dire, Domine, cum haec omnia feci, servus inutilis fui.' Troppo
gran debito e quello, serenissimo principe, che si ha alla patria, per la quale nissuno puo tanto
che non sia obbligato a molto piu, ed e voce d'animo angusto e sordido il dire: "Io ho meritato
della patria'." Cf. I, p. 178 (Trevisan) and II, p. 57 (D. Barbarigo).
6Cicogna, Inscrizioni veneziane, III, pp. 431-432 describes Longo's history and quotes
from the son's proemio. The pains taken in recasting the original and translating it from
Venetian dialect into Italian suggest that the revised version may have been intended for a
wider readership, although the work appears never to have been printed. Some published
books on the Ottomans dating from the middle decades of the century are listed by G. Cozzi in
"Cultura politica e religione nella 'pubblica storiografia' veneziana del '500"' Bolletino dell'
istituto di storia della societa e dello stato veneziano, V-VI (1963-1964), p. 239 and by C.
Goellner, Turcica: die europaeischen Tuerkendrucke des XVI Jahrhunderts (Bucuresti, 1968),
pp. 31, 78-80. A few of the relations from this period also mention the existence of such
popular accounts of Turkey (I, pp. 117, 274, II, p. 16).
62G. B. Ramusio, Navigationi et viaggi (3 vols., Amsterdam, 1970), II, fol. 65. This set
is a facsimile reprint of an early sixteenth-century edition. Volume Two of the original first
came out in 1559.

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Benedetto Ramberti, among others, had identified the trans-Alpine

Cambrai allies with the "barbarians" of ancient times.6
An active citizen like the nobleman Zeno had good reason to wish to
present his city in the best possible light at the time.65 His treatise dates from
1557. The republic had long been unpopular in Europe, and had in par-
ticular suffered much from accusations of irreligion made during the
struggle with Pope Julius II in 1509. Suspicions of unorthodoxy in Venice
were reinforced by the senate's desertion of the crusading alliance in 1540.
This action revived older charges of willing collaboration with the common
enemy of all Christians. 6
These claims were not in fact wholly unfounded. After the disaster of
Agnadello in 1509, the patriciate had considered requesting Turkish aid
against the aggressors, and it did secretly cooperate with Suleiman against
Charles V during the War of the League of Cognac (1526-1529). Alvise
Gritti and Junis Beg were agents of this partnership. Furthermore, am-
bassadors and consuls at Constantinople would frequently report home that
the Ottomans relied principally on them for dependable intelligence about
63Niccolo Zeno, Dell' origine di Venetia et antiquissime memorie de i barbari che

distrussero per tutto 'I mondo l'imperio di Roma onde hebbe principio la citta di Venetia libri
undici (Venezia, 1558), fol. liv ". la porta, per laquale entravano i Barbari in Italia, come anco
habbiamo veduto a i tempi nostri nelle correrie de i Turchi. " (The quotation is taken from the
second, revised edition of Zeno's work, which appeared for the first time in 1557 under the title
Delle origine dei Barbari...). Fols. 7v-8 of the 1558 version compare Venice in the midst of the
invasions to Noah's Ark in the Flood.
64Ramberti's observations were made in a private letter of the year 1530 quoted by
Agostini in Notizie, II, p. 561: "Venetos terra, omnique orbis totius delitias, terram Italiam,
non prolatandi fines libidine incitatos, sed tanquam a coelo demissos ut a barbaris nationibus
eam defenderent, saepissime conservasse." He refers to his friend Bembo's commission to
compose a history of Venice during the troubled decades from 1485 to 1530. The general
Venetian tendency to regard the northern intruders as "barbarians" is noted by A. Bonardi in
"Venezia e la lega di Cambrai" Nuovo archivio veneto, serie 2, VII, pt. 2 (1904), pp. 233-234.
65In the introduction to the 1558 edition, the printer speaks of the author's deep in-
volvement in public affairs, which has kept him from attending to the revisions in person (sig.
A2v, but see also A3 and the introduction to the edition of 1557, reprinted on sigs. A4-A5v of
the new edition. It should also be noted here that Zeno's work is numbered by both folio pages
and signatures, but the introduction has only signatures. References to the body of the text are
given in this article according to the folio designation, which is more convenient for anyone
wishing to verify a particular point).
66These accusations were made as early as the fifteenth century (F. Babinger, "Le
vicende veneziane nella lotta contro i Turchi durante il secolo XV," La civilta veneziana del
Quattrocento (Firenze, n.d.), p. 71. In fact, all of the Italian city-states collaborated with the
sultan at one time or another (ibid., p. 52). The sixteenth-century denunciations of Venice are
noted in Kretschmayr, Geschichte von Venedig, III, p. 21, Cessi, Storia di Venezia, II, p. 103,
Chabod, "Venezia nella politica italiana," pp. 44-45 and Bonardi, 'Venezia e la lega di
Cambrai," p. 212.

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the West. One envoy noted as a matter of course the absence of thfe typical
European hostility toward Turkey among the people of the lagoons. 7
Personal contacts between the two regimes were also unusually close.
Alvise Gritti was only the most successful of many of the Serenissima's
subjects who sought to better their fortunes in the imperial service. The
sultan's navy was largely manned by officers and mariners drawn from
Greek islands subject to the republic, and one ambitious aristocrat
voluntarily participated in a Moslem expedition against the Portuguese in
the Red Sea.68 Although such joint projects were doubtless produced by
pressure of necessity or by simple greed rather than by religious affinity,
they did provide grounds for questionings of the Venetians' zeal for the
faith.
Conversely, the patricians and citizens strove to answer the criticisms
by stressing their own historic efforts on behalf of Catholic Christianity.
The humanist Giambattista Egnazio appended to his much admired book
on the Roman emperors (published in 1516) a short sketch of Turkish
history, which was later reprinted separately more than once. The narrative
naturally gives special emphasis to the battles of the republic with Ottoman
expansionism in the previous century. Great importance is attributed to the
deeds of the admiral Tommaso Mocenigo, who commanded a fleet that
rescued the remnants of Sigismund of Hungary's failed offensive against
Bayezid I. The author's major work, begun in 1512, was a massive
assemblage of moral exempla taken mostly from the lives of prominent
670n proposals to ask the sultan's aid in 1509, see Pietro Bembo, Della istoria vinizia
libri dodici (2 vols., Venezia, 1790), II, pp. 108-111, Marino Sanuto, I Diarii (58 vols., Venezia,
1879-1903), VIII, col. 251, Bonardi, op. cit., pp. 232-233, 243-244. The clandestine dealings
with Suleiman during the 1520s are mentioned in Kretschmayr, op. cit., III, p. 23 and in the
contemporary account of Niccolo Da Ponte ("Mangeggio della pace di Bologna" in Alberi,
Relazioni, ser. 2, III, pp. 142-253. The relevant pages here are 150-152, 159, 210-212, 221 and
236). In 1529 the Florentines threatened to call the Ottomans into Italy rather than surrender to
the besieging Papal and Spanish forces (ibid., pp. 208-209). The diplomats' remarks on their
role as informants about Western affairs are in III, pp. 75-77, 87, 140, 159. The claim of
nonhostility was put forward by D. Barbarigo in 1564 (II, p. 36).
6sFor Venetian sailors in Turkish pay, see I, pp. 147-148, III, pp. 129, 152, 192-193, 194.
Most of these men were either drawn by the prospect of high salaries or compelled to leave
their homes by sentences of exile imposed by the republic's own authorities. The nobleman
who voluntarily joined the attack on the Portuguese was G. F. Giustiniani, who is mentioned
by Ludovisi in I, pp. 17, 19, 22-23 and also by G. Cozzi in "Authority and the Law in
Renaissance Venice," p. 328. Cozzi further states that a second member of the aristocracy,
Giovanni Contarini, left for Constantinople at the same time. Some other Venetians took part
in the sultan's Red Sea operations unwillingly after they and their ships were seized at
Alexandria on the outbreak of war in 1537. An account of their voyage is in Ramusio,
Navigationi,, I, fols. 274-280v. During the course of the 1537 conflict, a number of merchants
from the lagoon city became naturalized Ottoman subjects in order to protect their property (I,
pp. 185-186). In 1565, an exiled patrician, Giovanni Michiel, was reported to be acting as a
principal advisor, to Sultan Selim (II, pp. 66-67, 91). Somewhat earlier, another Michiel had
served Sultan Suleiman's son Mustafa as a bodyguard after being taken prisoner at the battle of
Prevesa (I, p. 212).

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Venetians and intended to vindicate the city against accusations of impiety

raised since 1509.69
Many years afterward, Egnazio's associate G. B. Ramusio dwelt at
length on the republic's devotion to religion in an essay on the Fourth
Crusade inserted into his Navigationi et viaggi.70 According to him, Venice
played the leading role in acquiring and holding Greek Orthodox Con-
stantinople for the Roman Church. Only disunity among the Franks
enabled the schismatics to win back the Byzantine capital in the end.
Division within the Christian camp was often cited by Venetians as the sole
cause of Ottoman greatness, and the parallel between the failure to retain
Constantine's metropolis in the thirteenth century and the inability of the
Westerners to hold back the Turks since 1453 readily suggests itself when
reading Ramusio's discourse. He himself is careful to point out the "con-
siderable benefit to Christendom" of his compatriots' former influence in
the Levant. At the time of his writing, the secretary's son Paolo had already
been commissioned by the senate to prepare a full-scale history of the events
of 1204, using as a factual basis the recently discovered manuscript of the
French eyewitness Villehardouin. The new account, however, was to
present the story from the patriciate's point of view. Although the "public
historiography" of the post-Cambrai decades had been permitted to lapse
some years before, the government had not wholly lost interest in
strengthening its "reputation" through literary patronage, but now the
endeavor was to have an Oriental rather than a European focus. 71
'9I. B. Egnatius, "De origine Turcorum" in Bellum christianorum principum... Roberto

monacho auctore, (Basileae, 1533), pp. 143-146. J. B. Ross, "Venetian Schools and Teachers
Fourteenth to Early Sixteenth Century: A Survey and a Study of Giovanni Battista Egnazio"
Renaissance Quarterly, XXIX, no. 4 (Winter, 1976), pp. 521-566 indicates on p. 553 that this
little work was originally part of Egnazio's revised edition of Suetonius. The reference to
Tommaso Mocenigo, late Doge, is on pp. 144-145 of De origine. Egnazio's De exemplis
illustrium virorum venetae civitatis atque aliarum gentium, (Venetiis, 1554) is discussed at
length in Libby, "Venetian History and Political Thought," pp. 33-41. The humanist's friend-
ship with Contarini is shown by Ross in his op. cit. Egnazio's ties with Ramusio and the other
patriotic humanists are set forth in Chapter Three of L. J. Libby, "Venetian Patriotic
Humanism in the Early Sixteenth Century," unpublished Brown University Ph.D. thesis
(1971).
70"Espositione di M. Gio. Battista Ramusio sopra queste parole di M. Marco Polo: 'Nel
tempo di Balduino Imperatore di Constantinopoli: dove alhora soleva stare un Podesta di
Venetia, per nome di Messer lo Dose, correndo gli anni del nostro Signor 1250'." in
Navigationi et viaggi, II, fols. 9-13v. Ostensibly, this is the story of the establishment
office of bailo, but in reality it is a brief history of the events of the Fourth Crusade a
aftermath. Christian disunity is deplored on fol. 12v of the "Espositione," where the "
beneficio di Cristianita" of the republic's role at Constantinople is also mentioned. The
moreover in several of the relazioni (e.g. I, pp. 155-156, 268-269, 280-281 and III, pp. 139-140)
and by Egnazio (De origine, pp. 144-145) and Ramberti (Libri tre, fol. 132v).
7 The elder Ramusio's "Espositione" contains on fols. 12v-13v an admiring notice of his
son's literary project. Paolo's book finally appeared in 1573 and was eventually translated into
Italian by his own son and published in 1604. The public historiography is analyzed by G.

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On the whole, the Turkish problem did not require the type of
systematic justification of republican institutions that had been called forth
earlier in the century by the propaganda of the Christian kings and Pope
Julius. Instead, the primary need was for understanding and knowledge that
would enable judicious negotiation and adroit manuevering to compensate
for the disparity in physical resources. 72 The relazioni and Ramberti's book,
still prized as documents by modem historians, helped to meet the demand,
although with limitations imposed by the authors' own cultural biases.73
Meanwhile, the scholars of the lagoon city continued their efforts to defend
it against its detractors and to enhance its standing within the wider Italian
and European community. Together the contributions of diplomats and
literary men bear witness to the creativeness of Venetian intellectual life and
its continuing dedication to the active service of the commonwealth in an
era of political decline.
Cozzi in his "Cultura politica e religione nella 'pubblica storiografia' veneziana" and by F.
Gilbert in "Biondo, Sabellico and the Beginnings of Venetian Official Historiography,"
Florilegium Historiale, eds. J. G. Rowe and W. H. Stockdale (Toronto, 1971), pp. 275-293.
Cozzi's article also touches on Paolo Ramusio's appointment by the Senate (p. 236). G. B.
Ramusio himself translated Villehardouin's chronicle into Italian (p. 18 of the introduction to
Volume Two of the 1970 reprint of the Navigationi).
72Marino Cavalli, for instance, spoke eloquently in 1560 on the need for accurate in-
formation in order to formulate an effective Turkish policy (I, pp. 273-274).
7-Lybyer in The Government of the Ottoman Empire, p. 311, calls the relations "a group
of excellent sources for studies of both the government and the history of the Ottoman em-
pire." He relies heavily on them throughout his work. He also has high praise for Ramberti's
Libri tre (p. 314). The prejudices of the Venetian observers are obvious, expecially in their
entire lack of sympathy with Turkish customs, religion and culture. Ramberti even dismisses
the undeniable valor of the sultan's soldiers as the product merely of superstitious and ignorant
fatalism (fol. 135v). Still stranger is the general tendency to undervalue Ottoman power. (See
also note 21 below.) However, the statesmen of the republic were well aware that their Moslem
opponents possessed enormous advantages due to economic and geographical factors having
nothing to do with maritime proficiency. Note, for example, the comments of the ambassador
Marco Minio in 1522 (III, p. 75) and most notably the remarks of the senator Alvise Gradenigo
in 1529 (Da Ponte, "Maneggio," p. 211. Under such circumstances, victory could prove nearly
as disastrous for Venice as defeat. Thus, the city was forced to accept harsh terms from Selim II
after the brilliant Christian triumph at Lepanto (Lane, Venice, p. 248, Cessi,
Storia di Venezia, II, p. 140). Consequently, the Venetians were inclined to ascribe Ottoman
successes to luck rather than fortitude or intelligence (e.g. Egnazio, De origine, p. 144, A.
Dandolo in III, p. 188). The clearest expression of this attitude may be found in Ramberti's
book: "ma nel condur questa fameglia nel luogo, ove mai piu non ha condotto alcuno huomo
esterno, sola essa fortuna come ambitiosa deprimendone la vertu ha voluto in se il nome et
tutta la fama." (Libri tre, fol. 132v).

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Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire from the Peace of 1503 to the War of Cyprus

Author(s): Lester J. Libby, Jr.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/2540047

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Venetian Views of the Ottoman Empire

Lester 1. Libby, Jr.

In the early decades of the sixteenth century, the republican city-state

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The psychological impact of these startling events on the Venetian

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improvements have borne fruit in splendid victories in Croatia and against

6III, pp. 20-23.

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And not only to his Excellency, but to all those lords,

-oThese include the works of A. Giustiniani (1514), B. Contarini (1519), A. Mocenigo

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in the republic's intellectual life, and eventually succeeded Pietro Bembo as

...and if in more recent times men-at-arms have been

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Corresponding views had been put forward by Andrea Navagero in

71, pp. 17-21.

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Ibrahim, who has achieved eminence by successfully intriguing against all

Besides such general remarks, the orator includes in his account a

-J, pp. 6, 11-13.

201, pp. 26-28, 29-32.

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The dishonesty imputed to the grand vizier in the relazione of 1534 is

2Libri tre, fols. 134v-136.

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Throughout the Libri tre, the intellectual impact of patriotic humanism

25Libri tre, fols. 139v-140v, 138v, 132v.

2sLibri tre, fols. 140v-143. Ludovisi's comments are in I, pp. 29-32.

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Alvise himself was partly responsible for a pamphlet on Turkey

3oPaolo Giovio, Commentario de le cose de' Turchi (Venezia, 1538). A statement in t

3 'Commentario, sigs. A2v, C3.

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predecessors' and demonstrate the continuity of certain strains of thought

34I, pp. 55, 65, 71, 74, 78-79, 89-93, 101.

35I, pp. 42-47.

36I pp. 48-57.

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38I, pp. 66-71. Trevisan's relation is described below.

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On the whole, the subsequent relations of the 1550s strikingly resemble

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discussion of the army is notable primarily for a vivid portrayal of the

43, pp. 123-124 (mobilization), 124-135 (army), 135-148 (navy).

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... all the subjects of the most serene Gran-Signor, owing

More explicitly than his colleagues, Trevisan expresses his coun-

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this everyone may judge for himself from the examples of

Summing up, Erizzo asserts that the dynasty commands astonishing

48III, pp. 151-153.

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provoking a violent reaction at Constantinople. Suleiman consistently

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5sThus, for example, the Venetian diplomats frequently claimed to be able to

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I have not done anything, however, on which I could pride

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