| wettensned popunasietue teres Wie ‘ena cn werd ppp api mes (mieten Avenues Psion phn powo SOO tn cone soa cera ee eb ‘TEienalcamponeschuntie penne supa rs Pcie een bronh ape eT pee ws RSS cet a aco a SSS Se epee Df seri, i Br even, ord ‘Seetrenearberas sndonmentet accom ain bP ently rnp ool pang core AES ‘She is pda cu 18 es SWALLOWING THE BITTER PILL Sources of Popular Support for Neoliberal Reform in Latin America KURTWEYLAND Vanderbilt University ‘THE PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE ‘Teetiggestupssen Latin American pois curing the past decade has F scone tong poplar suppt that tough sealiberal eformshave citedin [ral coun nthe barn, these draconian change posed cons MP Sos consen bon sco of soci, especialy ough asin dle, fine sem publicity pies cus I substi, reetion in sori ercing a smal f public fiat: Nevertheless, Carlos Menem a roe re Pi Or Noy Foes Rea eb. Me tnd we eset pcomnes. ana ai reer eee ree Une ear et or One) ‘eee‘ip CONPARATIVEPOLTICAL STUDIES? Oster IE Deghnd/ SWALLOWING THEBIFTER RA, 341 “Asgemina (1989 to the presen), Victor Paz Estnssoro in Bolivi@985- ‘SEoy arbre Pier in Pra (1990 othe presen). and, fr same tine Pee i Calor de Mati in Bra (1980-1993 found widespread apron ei economte shock programs Italy, S510 80% of pllrespondent exe competing hypotheses reston ferent theoreti foundations. aely ones aol ec asumgeon vers psycologialdeison hea” "Te analy below finds the rescue Rypobeis more persuasive, Neo- | iberfabac progam reaie stone iimediate approval nl in cous pense coy andy change: Tis song tacking lowed Bo ram hypernioniy pis: this approval preva despite tbe resets en poston sve inet and pus head wih et anal compensation progam. Bot one the is pais, {pe bene a soppr or marke arinedrefors. Thus, win ‘efor Popular ppm ough neoliberal measures adn May sean hese ewe mene co Me ion agin, 190) le, oly arian Grn tbe Pinochet cathy i Chile—coub cons ae Sek rte resting (Foxy 198, p16, 12) The wena ten donating Ba ae art ofaponing seu austen daring te 1980s seemed seo if om arin blcexeaie MM Sone of ow examen idee opps ti eaten esd ane ce gM er emp dst of a els enn he Frees Min Pe ance |i prt ne (opel & rata 95 Cla Cri lean in 985 pron SDH pI, Cha, 1954; Hagel & Web, 196, 9p. 23-25; tonne osaracepuns coy ers) ty 1990p 197-208, To ali she cons of marine sche cos ee era TRS Nidough aM om eel goverment Saran pee aa eed tv reasons tf chief encase! Dl MI ay peopl teat nly) worse ot bye aa es age democracies (Aco Ssh 194: aged Oe vsbl hand oft mat, hte goverment have ted 10 auf, 195,ch 6 Wiliams, 1998) sorpesngy wie inl voneof tela wiht wel bade te ate, The benef ata evenness cums as gone gel eA vf cergency pops erp soppt he govern a rn as peet Cares Anes Peer ONS-O9S) acu sons wee cpposton of rope that have safered especialy Ie 7 her earn osiniasock rogram in Veezca eis according ose clr gtd Helis re therefore ny en cao a a MME ni enon ley il “Mee at ‘We dy eet soc ir? er bth iment ne of poverty alleviation measures (ales “This vadiongem te fomnof rede oie fr moe efesive ws wich inkl rn am necstry forte nial cceplanofmacoeconoi t- Tomer rps bt oremmest 28 Taste aed? (angel & Geum, 1995, p. 192 ee aso Cornelis ‘ea congested S81 1994 pp 3-18; Graham, 1996 Wad, 1983, pp. 197208). The ‘Brenna teres lais da seh bene acres hat compeston poems db, he songe should 2h medi lnc cased dase en terms nb indepen pomeoend ep. {aon whch spond oe Toss on : 1 ann Snip. 2948) dB 980m ey cre cuca nes veers yn strep cbr osha irom erve problems the eonoidaon| ‘te non plas, ly i ope sing He con aks mary people endorse ough saber ref ate: omens ROEM irc sock. ‘THE COMPENSATION HYPOTHESIS Hs my ges ny pega il cic enero i pc osc of ss cnet sno a we eatin pro re h Peta tent eet tet rot ia tenereth sppet te reat for nents. Bx ani Tinos met Says energy mer eerie rome ur bcking fr rostral stnet Poe prnaees of etl in Tr Wold pls mak ioe pene hypothesis partulrtypluvble.Tareed benefit pograzs Prove ese hat pain an dtrbu in fer fo eletor sp eerie role eo Hits pak ecng te ier Gh Sst cmereency progam seer new paonag. hs ew fem laned to poo sectors, they may oy moe votes fore ‘eT tm nay econee reforms eaangr by imposing am ein Eejtudon on the lle an eveaivd woking cls. Aiport {ranean ong prego poree a Eevee hime escuces Alle ie he trl went 3 Serotype can ths nestling pola cost of nese farm forthe gover. | comnsaton hypotheses onanasumpson at ater tf ton noe have cates best Tepe. vse benef ae pail ‘esi namentsfor tain per (es 9 7) Tea Ses roca emergency porams per he government dren urrchtccallocatonwhichanbe ied pltcl condom, Pots SRE Stee “slave neotves” (soe 1971 pp 138130) Seek By const peplecenntbeexcaded om coletive bese ‘Wate lenny, cht ection of avy en, Tei sh nana pblic goods re es wsefl for gare ‘Tai povernmen preter programs hut site pri ‘nse mse tht gsr universe igh er rove Ecc gts ame, 1987 Bats, 9B, ch 67,82 Roberts 1995. sb Sac saromptos the spl systema owndann Compensation ype ' ‘THE RESCUE HYPOTHESIS in hypothesis sims that polically provided pis uly laure losses stemming from ast adjustment, Unde ‘Cae ssumpion ia aint ad Tsses have, in pape ea for people However, this ymmery premise questionable. ayo 5 saci emt popam cee eco ening Se crenata Wejn/ SWALLOWING THERITTERPL, 343 cision teovies hae found a cles symmetry between gin and losses, stemming fom a marke avenon lates among mot people Expeinen fal subjectsrequaly weigh loses more beaviy than ojetvelyequivalet tis Fo instance, mos people ae ore pet abot losing St than hey ‘oul ejoy winning this amour (Kahseman, Kaesch, Tiler, 1390: Katocman & Tverky, 1979, pp. 275-287; Payne, Beinan, & Jehson 1952.9 9657, 12) ‘Based on ths fig of oss aversion, pycholois dein hoists ii convertion rina choice approaches, such as expected ity ‘bear (Machin 1987; Tvenky de Kehremia, 186), Whereas these ac Son raonal choice terete pine nd lates cquivaen td the frac on inv alps of wea, poe dion tears demon that people teat gains and losses: Tey ses gues an lesion elrence po en he atu oI fic, result floss averion, people tend to accommodate losses mich ts ply a gain. Wheres mot people GURY rec Pte pois air eceving eis they fuse tolower tafe uring lone. Ee Perineal subjecttendomake great efor defend ii “Steve po- Shon gant estan orsopert ifr experincing les When ings gong wel by ont mo people par ahr aie wiles el They proven with ret cation when fing prospec of asta ‘oneal als when contoning the test floes Indeed mort people scjetasrelossfmoerate magic and pete instead aloteytatolds tepromise of avoiding ny loss—but ao thera fag los Ths, ost Theasymmetical response o gins and loses found in poycologisaler- nen cats dob onthe cnim ih ered benefits can neutralize he sa cons of eoiberl ref. Because people overvalue the loses they es gtebenei. eunbrce aries pin, The compet FOO wd eventonal rational choice assumption unde it are therefore esionsble ‘What sccount forthe surpitingly widespread (yet not uniform) approval fubliation programe? The common tendency toward lose version mag festhis parse Yet tale upgestean newer: Col neoliberal messi opus ely bap ocean seating Epa may be oe coors ase bho aos ino ee an ke ance a, 1p 1.1,44 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES Ose 1958 ((-W scorpale ony if hey ean pony recuperate age pst ses an ‘Kent iminen rte owes Draconian adjosient may eli stone uP {ortonlyfthelds ut the hope fending adeepcisistha ast most peo Fran at treatens them wit fhe eterstion The promis of ser Tngand reverting loses—raher than the gains sesed by he commpenstion pothesis the eral reason for popular endorsement of ait Thea acl programs shoul ind uch higher uppt io cou er nulfering fom deep tss, och as hypesinfation than naions wih eter economies prospects” Sich crises are bth necessary and suficien Condon for tic ajusment id widespread acepiance, etry rescue hypotbests embodies people's tendency tard isk cco tance inthe domain floss, which pyehoogical experiments consistently {Bod Embroing untested shock proprats wa. in fat, ighly sky. The co ic surcts ad poltel vay of neoliberal refs tat Latin Amer an democracies ha never enacted before shan rensrer could easily fll and realy worsen an alrody ifs Shunt they nevertheless (ound widespread suppart a sve in ances Whereas paytolo gel deision tears systemaizally account ft think aceplance nthe domain of ves, conventional rational coe &F- roshes cider postulate general isk aversion or make ad hoc assumptions ‘eis propensiy. nihis way, poyehologial deislon theories and Choice sumptions. ‘diverges from convening ational [RESEARCH PURPOSE AND DESIGN “Which one ofthese competing hypesss encounters song epi only shed ght onthe Surprising: ee democracy bat liso advance loge and psyehologe erin ‘heaves, which hs atractd growing atetionin plies cienee Fast support? Adaressng this question nt Tikal viability of tetera efor un fete between conventions rial 1992; Levy, 1997; Quatone & Tversky, 1988; Stein & Fly, 19) Tani 1996) The llwing analysis provides preliminary asses “ens eh 9% 19019) Mana chim tel re psa tar Fyne can my oie ‘tte rh onmsn t's 9 ad Preven 1, maf conte tn a Perea scan pe nd Wynd 73. was quteuncein, These 0- i the rescue hypothesis embodies the ogi of meat ‘pases deed fom these ial approaches. For this plasty obeli cence on Lan Aner cones ha she any economic, po Garand cll bachground shuatriscs Jt difer nthe independent Salas sessed by the congestion hypotheses of oe emer tote programs) andthe rexce hypothe he depth he crs eceing secerl refor) Four ofthe cues under cxaminmton—Arpenion Bolivia, Brazil and effec rofondryperiafanary ces Among maton, Bo tinted substan eompensaon ogra Yoon er nacing no Tend vform 8 cones. Vener id oo epee: hypinfltionbe- {cating ee acu djreentn 189, bl be govern ey {kl ceed swede ll energeacy progam. ally. Menico {ier yovernment of esto Zea Ponce deLebn(998t0 the presen) ves oly etn ee of ese round) srt ajsent bing | plonencd wins vlunisas scl competion pogran ws aay npc. Ths the six cats examined i ths aril ese! the dierent | sectnuons of conn sree by te compenaion and ecu ste fly wel, COMPENSATION PROGRAMS aceseary forthe ial acceptance enroesanomi efor” (Angell & Graham, 195, p. 192)? To mses the persion hypoth ston compares social emergency measies Arena, Bolivia, Bri. Mexico, Pe, and Vesezuela. Remarkably, ef these countnes nated oly meager compersaicn programs fale enatingstuctural adjustment Carlos Menem and Alberto Fuimor \yeushone he ough economic reforms they decreed Fernando Color fo seat any aoe emergency propa, and Vier Pr Extensor or 16 months beforiasiwing compensation mesures In compar hems. the goverment of Carlos Andrés Pre in Venezuela and Ere Besoin Mexico spent the most resources on poverty alleviation, and By i so while or immediatly ser enacting Loup austerity measures. or year the Menem government id notesct significant social emer orem (Eduardo Amadeo, Secretary for Social Developmen, pr comtmuieaten, March 2, 1995) Although te president di eek to impact of his neoliberal reform plan-—becaase Argentina's ep omic cis ad unleathed considerable socal unestn I989--bis com: on measres were actualy ui limited Te main benefic progam. tang scheme, ely amounted o approximately US-$50 milion in aad S.$75 milion in 1990 (Mie, 1992, pp, 367-370), In adton,‘he inplmentaion ofthese emergency measures wasrarredy temendon ineiceny and Watar aud Repetto, 1994, p, 140, Compensation p> (Gams therefore di lie if anything alleviate poverty, and they #008 ated to exist. “The goverment of Alberto Fujimori undetook even more modes po ey alevinton measures ring fs 3 yearn fice. The present ait Sprnngly ite eff to cshion the wemendous socal costo theharshad jsment be imposed (Figueras, 1995p. 386387; Kase 1992p. 4043) any, the demands of asteriy andthe ff to resume etre det ‘eves baited the resources tht jim could commit eal proans However the goverment i ot ven use the cheap fsns that nteration ‘Pomel antuinsoflered fr social emergency measires, Te main ‘on was plea: Reliance on frig funds woald have subjected Fujin tonighstandtds of transpterey a hindered the us of povery alleviation Inessres for prposes of plc panage (Graham, 1994, pp 106-12). ‘Thos otrsourceconstrs reve but pola eaelations weredeise ‘Beth peident'slongrfsaltoenctnotewethy soil emexeecy menses: ‘Dane is re dination, which was ct shorty his impeach for camaption in Septembre 1992, Fernando Cllr id not enact ay sai at compensation meas. He (edt istbute material beefs th poucihe shes ones” whose interestshe had promised to advance ine ‘evioncampuignef 1989 Adeuss Bases." 1991, Eve fon stand ‘Satinautaons such asthe welfare agency headed by Coll’ wife sacincomuption and paronage pending tan in power alleviation. OM {ne second of 1991 dhe presen besieged plea duty {Uh mot nite on th soil font But the negates faction {fate sought o sac tthe national level never got ofthe ground end tot make a dentin Brazil's emendous social problems ‘Boivia's Vitor Paz Esensor insted more substan comp tion program -bat only Yost after inposing drastitabiiah August 1985. This Fondo Social de Emergencia PSE) provided emg ‘rployment fo espace workers and base socal series othe ‘Sau por (Caepero, 1990, pp 50H; Graham, 194, pp 57-69 than plementng rograne wiht ova Saf te FST selene once for projects proposed and executed by poor local conn ‘aoa 1990s detond-ivenfnasbarsed US $181 milion ret Schacter, 1992, yandbeneStd about | out 64m fviens directly or indety (Graham, 1994, p60) ‘By contra tote meage funding o at nstition oscil propre in Argentina, Bolivia Dei and Per, Venera’ Cui [rte ane Menico's Ernesto Zeit wndrtook mote brant Weyind/SWALLOWING THE BIFTERLL SAT ion mesures mate guchy.ARer hie sutra djstent plan prompted tegesaleritsin Fetraary 1989, President Prete to buy supp by i trodcing several new socal programs (Comisn Presidencal, 1989; Con ‘sjoNalonl para Superson ySeguimiento de los Programas Sociales del jeutvo Nacional [CONASSEPS], 1994). Spending incensed from 1USS146 milion in 1989 to US$857 milion in 1990 ad a respectable [U8 $935 milion in 1991 (Angel & Grab, 195, p. 213 Macque, 199, pp. 4424), Cert, stim Argentina, Pru, and Brazil these social ergo messes were mare by beesurtaicressince andelientls \nerference (Angell Graham, 195, p. 216; Nal, 1993 pp. 7982; Ne ‘are, 1994p, 1620) But Pez pen more esorcespercapia On poverty [evition tan did Menen-—and expecially more than Fyjimor or Color President Zello could conto the wel funded Programa Nocona de ‘Selidiridad (PRONASOL) insitted by his predecessor Carlos Salinas de Gore (1988-1998 a custion the Set impact ofthe das adjusiment ‘mesures imposed in respon tothe peto ess of December 1994, Dur {Salinas seen, PRONASOL had disbured atta of US.816billion fr Wide variety af projet proposed by groups of urban an ural poor rang atom edocaona programs tothe constuction of sports faces (Come: seta. 1994, While plannng'o overhaul PRONASOL, President Zed Fred tat nacly the 1996 level, allocating USS.726 billion in 1995 Preset, 195), Based on hve findings, te compenstionhypshesis—ceterisparibur— pers nil popular aceptanec of pelibealeformto be lovin geting Pera, eve ower in Baal nd Bolivi, nd yet much igherin Mexico ‘THE SEVERITY OF CRISES ow do these ounses score nthe faciorstesedby he rescue hypthe arcl the seventy ofthe erie acing the reforeiatrs? Hypernla ination exceeding SOB pe month) i the most import threat be- Ht gly imposes enortous cons on ge numbers of people. The of tis dteriorason prevents people fom lowering their reference Tus bypernlacion puts amajaiyofckzeas inthe domi lues, an plle repay conti tat skyrocketing inflton outweighs ay ober among people's cones (eg. Apoyo, 1990b, p35: Moray i989.) Atte ime goverment doped ough caliber meas H.re stig on don Wynd 9192199148 COMPARATIVE FOLITICAL STUDIES / cbr 08 ures, Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Bolivia were expeiecing incipient ot {albscals yperaltion, which severely dpe helreconomies. By con tras Menic's and Vener’ economic pablems remained fr below the level of profound hypetiatationary cis, ‘uring the 1980s, Arpt had aflered om persistent ination, ea get nestment, and iow growth The Austa Pla, acerodox sabia ‘opm doped in 1985 levine the difcules temporary but di not ‘ng definite slain. The economy deteriorated rpily in 1988, ad yperalton rupted neatly 1989 (Sith, 1990, pp. 25-29) Monty rice Teueasesveached 34% in Ap of hat year and skyrocketed to 145% in Tne, Hypeifiatin inprerihed many peopl, impeded fvestment and growth tnd winger soil utet and ota, Ths, Argentines faced a6 ‘ee eri mid1989. ‘en's station was even worsen 1990 hypeiniation was undo | ing the economy and powsful gutsllamovemets were stacking tbe 0" co The natonlist programs of the mia regime (1968-1980 and the lied neoliberal refonns ofthe goverment of Femando Belande (19801985) had eased considerable economic problems. In response President Alan Garfa (1985 199) enacted an eterodox aban plan ‘atic rough years of boom bul be unleashed a wemendou criss. The [overoment limited stailtartion measures proved unsvecesfu nif vrom apa ot of contol, reaching 373% per month in Api 1990 nd (6320 July Forhermove, «val puereila movement had spread aon Tange prs ofthe oun, prompting an equally bral response fram tt falar Ths, resident Fujin tak fice in Fly 1990 the mist off ‘open ls fii Brain March 1990 when President Coli sssumed office. The goverment ofthe 1980s hal undertaken nanerout ‘odor and heterodox effet to conta rice ise without any esting Ine lte 1980 he amination of Jou Sarvey (1985-1990 ‘Comtelcverinfltion, which ost 443% per month ia November Spe in Febrny 1990. Even ba widespread readjostment of wae Fenelon or pot flan filet mint good pa ofthe louse Eprmpily ang paces Ths, cary 1990, Brazilians fced sever rome challenge. Tn 1984 1985, Boivis sufered ihe worst bout ofhypeaation Bl Amerie history Taking office ater 4 years of seer oli ‘de poverment of Hern ile Sona (1982-1985) proved unable 1084 {hecountryseconemle problems which wer exacerbted by mounting 10 oni Come 7 abr (erste, 1987,59.$179-5190), Six stabilization plane fied du to pent-up Aeands from vrious soll groups ad evr Bcc opposition fom the peauaion Cental CbreraBoiiana(COB).In 1984, pe se span vt ont they reached a angualied rate of 6.000% fom May to August of 1985, The mminent economical andthe comple ak of goverabil iy fered the pesident o cll elections l yea ahead of chodale. Thus, is ‘id 985, Bolivia seemed beded toward a eaasuopbe- By coat to the cues of hyperiafinion, Venezuela's ase eco- sami ificaltie were ss serious. aded, he government hd deliberately Fiden looming ess from the popslaton. Certainly, the county had sete during the 198 from ow prow and spreading povery. Yet the | govenmento sme Lasnci (1984-1989) had avoided adjustment and a fay soppested song infationary pressures with ice contra, There or, pie rice seaced only 281° during al of 1987 and 29.3% in {BAL “compared to monty rates above SO% i Argenta, Boi, Brazil, ander, Ths, the population id not fae sue deterioration and was ut ono te seriou dicts wating the new government tat tok office senpele tres the enormous deeqilibria aficting Venezaca aod hy afiscal deicitol 9.4% of the rss domestic product (ODP) in 1988, ‘Simic, incoming President Ernesto Zed fee grave economical ies tate outgoing administration, headed by Cals Salinas, ha eli jy hen from the pub, After the debe ess of 1982 andthe painful ization measures iat by Prvient Miguel de la Madrid (1982 ft) he Sains governmet had cheved prize ability nad eenewed eco- roth (Cartene& Schwa 1996; Lustig 1992) owes, fr po- enone, sche pein lection of 1998, Sains team didnt ‘touring problems especial the overvalued exchange ate and he al curent ccoun det Intad, used huge sums of short-term api o cover uti nsutainable station (Nam, 1995. Most ans were therefore unaware of he tine bomb avating te Zeiload- inion Forced to devalue shar afte taking fice, the new gover haired investor confidence tte resulting capital ight equred sdjartment mesures many Argentines, Peruvians, Brains, and Bolvanshad suffered dion loses and fered signet forer deteiratin, whereas clans and Mexicans id ot conont as pen criss, Asaresil. acest of opinion pil respondents in Argatna, Brasil, and Per com ‘ou aecem decline i tec well-being, ad may feared forter (apoyo 1980 pp. 1-42 IDESP 1989, p. 2, #3: Moray Arm, ph a Venezbela nd Mexico, by coast. majority reported recentnso no los aad had smarty opis or neural expectation fo the Faroe (Buena 1985, pp. 5-5, Coppedge, 1994, p. 43; Domingue & ‘MCten, 196, p. 202 Templeton, 1985, p. 8-82-Considering tes di {erences th esue hypothesis expects neoliberal adjestment programs 1 {indrmach mote widespend endorsement in Ageia Pee Bra and Bo- tive han in Vneeele and Meco, Tur, is expeciaions ae dameialy ‘opposed to hte ofthe compensation hypothe [ENDORSEMENT VERSUS REJECTION "OF NEOLIBERAL ADJUSTMENT In which ofthese counties dit tough market reforms eit widespred inl approval? Opinion pol dts ye the bes indication of pol eo ‘orsementor jection rng the weeks immediately following th sabia ‘Gon program." Where sureysare avalible asnhe Bolivian seth {ent Of popular priest lows for some tentative lferences, According © thes cera, cost stabilization plan received ver highimmediate suppor in Argentina (1989) an Braz (190) and tong apprcvain Peru(950)and Bali (1985) bot encountered widespread oppostion in Veneznels (1989) snd Mexico (1985). Large nmbers of Argentines uprated Present Mener'scoly aus ment efforts even before thy tine latig socest. In aubeequent week tnd mans, 72% 1075 of Greater Buenos Aires resdents endorsed the str Tanon plan of ly 199, and 859 to 89% approved the presides per. focmance Cory Ars, 1990p). Widespread popular backing beled ‘Monem contain esitance to is pif measures om epposon paris [Enduade unions. Ths stong suppor remarkable because Argetizes Su fered considerable losses, Business had rasta led prices in anti tion of Menem’ssabization pln, The stctorl refoms the goveranet nnounced such as the prvateton of publi enters, so themed [port setrs. Thos Menem’ fs economic progam enaed conse ie cous and sks (MoCuire, 1998, pp. 4-5: Powers, 199, pp. 95-100 ‘Neverteen fund verwhsiming apport because promised eve tie the lure loses caused by hypeiaion and avert immient fret lczsen Although eizen approval of Present Menem and hi economic QOSEA ESTING See ees F toliste, equialenstoUSS1,300forsavings ccoom)his program ua ernst ls ie oreion len Wolmd/ SWALLOWING THEBITER FILL Sst policies diminished with che deteriorating conjnctre of 1990 and early 1991, i ecperted with new sebilaation effets and remained postive ‘omiid-1991 on" Indedbe Menem goverment won he uber and ‘rfamenay elections of 991 and 1993 ag the ene eleuons of 1995. President Fujmerts ajusmen plan of Augnt 1990, which ated the rc of sic neces by up to 3,000 had bet inpact onthe already Sowing standard of many Peruvian. Nevertheless the pln won approval fom 30 i 608 of oan pl rspondens in abuequent weeks, whereat recon reached only 25 020% (Apoyo, 1991, pp 3 16 7). Tepes Seattmsl, who ed bln beraye hs eampalg promises o avid a nedera shock, achieved a 57 approval ating (agains 19% approval) {x Osaber 1990 IMASEN, 1990, p14). Ths, Fujimori won widespread Inkl pprva fr his coy andi measures Because they promised tre- tov pa sss ond ave frer deterioration eran rom hyperinfs: + San, With the dep recession of 1991, czen endorsement of the president {ands economic police fel considerably. But popular approval reeper ‘eco fom Per’ dee esto and poital css, Based on hi nor ows popular, which hveted around D6 to 70% afer mid1992,” Fu ‘er wen the Constivent Astmbly elections of 1992 the constationl toi of 1993, and the general elections of 1985." "President Cllrs audacious, cosy stabilization plan of March 1950.50 speed masive endorement nthe bepnnog- By raising taxes, decrecing FH eiety messes, and conSscag all Geancial assets hat exceeded low | ‘ed wit jr mat daring st-p—bscoop of April 1992—andthe slow ied erpendous hardship for many individuals ad paralyzed the eo fey, ducing wages and hveaening to cause geal vnemgloyment Fete these sks and con's, popular approval of Cllrs bod efor to end perniation oe from S8% to Deteen 71% and 81% during the Ft ow ts (Dataoha 1990 lsat Basler de Opinio Publica Es asia PE}, 1990.13). Yer this widespread support eroded fst in Beal in Argentine and Per, Ope earn ws prbubly that compechensiv in reduced the cost of hyperinflation, Because any people hadi es dtc conte nd forennelowe losses than in Argeatna wd Pers, wet pcbably mre reluctant to acept great safes. As Cole's dary declined and he Tae powefl enemies with his imperious 2 pig prety on a paar TT Teapot of seo bean Mea a aed op ein eed lantecson-makingsyle"heincesingl ls polical clout and was usbles prevent bis impeachment on compo charges." “The lack of survey daa make itor iat asses the popula ee tion to President Pz Estnstoros shock rogram, which includ toagh bodget ts, subrtanil rice kes and wage feees, The peak union COB Smeditly called general stike to force a revaction of thee pif ‘measures: Butte walkul emsine ted and was about fiz on whee the goverament imposed ste of ge to beak he labor moverent. The weary middle clases supported) Pa'sastery programme Equally Uecsive in [the COB's)defet was the lack of peasant suppor forte ‘tik (Stik Likely to Fale Ot" 1985p. 1) Thus. the alae ev lence suggests tat here vas "an explicit cr implicit consensus in tavoral. harsh macrocconomiemessres" Paster, 1992 p92: Gaara, 1994 10), With the recession eeating Som adjustment, tis backing imi | [shed in subsequent years a indicated by the defeat of te governing ‘Moviniento Nacional Revolcionarie (SINR) nthe moni eeton (of 1987, Ashe Bolivian economy sagnatedin the lt 1980, te MN ca || Aide td man architect ofthe ajstment program, Gonzalo Siscber de | TLovade. won lower vote share inthe preside lection of 1989 han az sensor tad garnered in 1985 (at his esult—gven the rowing fg ‘mentation ofthe ary yscm—consttuted pray), Only teeny 190 | Siw sustained economic growth, and Stachez de Loads indeed woo he presidential election of 1993 with 3625 ofthe vote, which was a song resi Ful for Bota "The four casts of hyperinton thus shared an iporantexprece ‘Toughajrmentpogas ound considerable—someimes massive— oppor Temes! plasible explanation for ths stiking dig is ta pogrnms ough caying reat ris, posed tend incipient yp Ti nd ths rcapera sible pt losses and aver igh fete om By contrast a ari) of Venerelas and Menicns rejected sabi tion meatues enacted thir goveramens inthe absence of hypeifa ‘Mos Wenervelans dd acpnte he rave economies tain resident Carlos Anceés Pees foresaw, Tey Bereta disapproved of only adjustment program tha Pex enacted by slashing consumer syahh_top ig ot eg aso me ie oe pre vif oa Pare eo 9 . cei ce eur hess ftp ml es oer tree nee {ict eraimstey etos lbp ot ies, iting price contol, cuting publi pending, and devaliag the cu ‘eacyby 10%. esubuequent weeks ony 29% of Venemsans domed ‘afr package; 53% rejected i (Conaores, 1989p 31). Unprecedented fer Venues lange seals erupted, aking tas 300 ives. Therese "popular suport forthe goverment” emained at "angerusl low levels” (lempeon, 199, p. 84) andthe president was impeached on comuption hares in mid-1993 (Coppedge 194, pp 49-51). Even the social emer ey mensrs that the Pirex goverment quickly inte ulled wo revert Tis ection ‘Sinlarto the Veoezvlan cae, ew Mexicans had a inkling ofthe prob lens that made de Mexican economy eve more vulerble in 194. The fovermeatsajusen measures—both the botched devaluation of De- ember 1994 and the dest stablizaon plans of easly 1998—derefore the aa great suprise, Ar etl, 52% of pol respondent disapproved of resident Ze’ banding of the economy in March 1995, whereas oaly 1% endorsed it (Poregn Broadesst Information Sevie-Latin America [FBIS-LAT], 1995. The presidents popularity ating was clearly negative rom mid-995 trough mid-1996 (eg, 39% endorsement vs, 57% rejecuon shone 1996) (FBIS-LAT, 1997). The substan resources disbursed by }\ PRONASOL failed to make painful stabilization acceptable. Only with > the economic recovery of 1996 die support for Zedillo improve. Ia March 5 1997, the president won te Sst postive net ang in 2 years, with 54% ap- oval verte 39% diapyeval (BIS-LAT, 197) Th Inthe absence of | spentypeifiaionary eves, mos people donot accep paint programs at i Stecessry ei designed to recuperate large past losses and avert futher suetoton [Inthecazerunderinveigno, hpi of popular approval and isap- eval of ough are-riented reform is lyin ine withthe csoue By si yet diverges fom the compensation Mypathesi (se Tbl 1) The erour cots of hypeiaon made many people sallow the ite pilof samen even witout soil compensation Inthe absence of hyperaf by contrast, President Pca’ and Presideat Zell's significant pov- ‘levition programs could ot mak cizeasaceptasteriy and re ing. Certainly, the compensation hypothesis eannat be completly mise argeedbonefs mayseengten popular suppor fr neliberal- tozorne—albeit ited exten, The ejection of Pre’ and Zale’. izaon plans could have been even stonget od tee goverment ot ed tarpeted social programs” The rescue hypothe, however, ac opin yl fm nage en at Oh te a ery wet er te iat Pa eee congeny eaesadhel e. vpn ea (Coes 18 p29 9$56 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIS Oost 98 ‘see Conensatin nt Ree pert Thine Pew ola Veni Meo “mine formate) 1 ares) Sem Nina an ttn TEER pan ct pve il comptes mas. on opi sectneyrinpenpact ef bomemnea gc a pm "Mr En oer, es UO gu oct desarch logs emi Seep nn a ase ed pope alate eee pn carere meororeal SE etait ensuring tn Sine how tyne See lesan ese ony one by PRISCA, ret enfin Eres (97 6 Fo 95 9 SO: ges aa to thoy gus spp. iene tr rote rah aati i aire Coe Re | 0 a tan Spi eh coma RP De Era agrase bear ily how's An na P| ORC oe oven tated Rone 8) counts much bette for ntl popular approval and rejection af sien: ‘Sie change than its val, Even if rei emergeny programs buy sone | ‘oppo the eocerain promise to recover past sss and ave fhe det retin weighr much beaver Ate experiences of Argentina, Boi Brat and Peru suggest His oubfl tat "poverty alleviation met I troy aesocestry fre nial acceptance of macroeconomic refer (hagall & Graham, 1995, p 192), At the Mexican and Venezeln cas Spee ompennton propams are cerainy ot sufficient for uarseig I ‘uppert or aeoiberalsm. “Tae vision eon teu cases alo cuts doubt on sever ateraivey theses" Fir, te immedi rejection of Preshent érer's nd President ‘Zetio'sstablzation programs suggsts—by way of contrast—that the 1] eceymoon fect (Williamson & Hagand, 1994, pp. 571-572) was nt J deive for popular approval of President Meaen’s Fujimor's, Col 4] estPar's sock plane Secon, Pérer’s program dd not ous widespread tppostin for lac of redible commitment bythe goverment, 8 scholars flowing Rodrik(1989)might lnm, Large aubers of clizns ejected this ‘Bock program because hey sa as oo drastic rater han as 10 hesitant (Consus 1989, pp. 30-32). The presidents persistence in enacting this rogram dvpitethe as exacerbatedoppesionraerthan layedit Tid {ie massive discontent with Pere’ adjntment plan suggest that the depth tenance doef expan foal tm, ene mre slenatrneahodseny fll be tami ag evslbe bominows Sits pny perenne [Steg nal poe um 00 9 ea an O8 tot bp) Neve Cote’ a nd mach fre pert Peer ocr emus Ph cl Serer nate deca vo tepese est opens h Sa a te Bie Pa detect snap tatansiacpateqpace tonrejetons ares eeesieh ier occredane mono re mouceet al be fn Cena, (aos cout ict thee Ann adnan SIDER Seas Sheen afm [aoe eed apn Re Pecan per AS decir Soper seen et ran Sorta cveh a aneen cs eciattten cet eeel eee rh 4 pp “Pen aed P's tele wih nnd pep sper a Cn ea aloo Btn Wain ape st mani gee radu fatanhdegesterseaty th Ae aes on espe ae ie way an wpe wc clans at be rene ue opt med saan get ed oa ao ct eo WH yrange nap) ened penn sere156 COMPARATIVEFOLITICAL STUDIES Oar IE Wend /SWALLOWNG THE SITTER 58) Fujimori shock progiam received strong soppor, bough i quickly caused a severe recession and pushed large numbers of people deeper ine ‘over (Pers 1996" 1994, p. 12). The dep of he initial exis has # Srongr impact on citizen response to marke-rented reform han did te ‘mediate outcomes of adjement Fizally tbe eases of Menem and Fj ‘mor show’ that electoral mandster cannot account forthe accepance of a {ie edjusment plan. Menem and parulrlyFajmer had campaigned ‘snoliberal patos but nated tongh market forms on aking of. Despite this beryal ftir campaign pledges. ther shock programs fous widespread suppor In sum, te resco hypethesis seems more coming than he compenanion hypothesis and other val expantions, 4 tel choce approaches Inthe domainof sins, peoplecan beinfuencedy {he provision ofbeefis—albough they atach ess weight hese bem than o objectively equivalent losses. Pat more fly nto the domain of [pins poverty leviaon measures, cllzens turn mote isk averse retain fom cllenging the itor of nelibera reform, ad acount the ro: Iusoftheoppeson. ‘Maitining electra spor waste primary mative fe Presiden Fj: mod's bated desison 1 nau socal emergency programs. Afr 2e- ding compensation measure for2 yer, Pjimor changed course when Teficed electoral contests afer his coup of Api 192. From mid-192 08 ‘be resident finally enacted signicantanpovery programs. Indeed, ater _tedinost ett conettuional lb of Octeber 1983, which woul ‘ow fori recleconbeargeted expends o ares wher his sopporthad Galen preceding year (Gram & Kate, 198, pp. 85-0; Roberts, 1385, p. 103-108, For hese pital prpees,Fujimor raised he project ‘Qudetof he social compensation fund, Fondo Nacional de Compesaciony Deere Social (FONCODES), fom US$ 14 milion in 1991 to USS 2} lion in 1992, US$ 204 millon in 1993, and a projected US 220, lon in 195 (FONCODES, 1994, .15, 1985p 6). The presen alto socked ona hool-biding spe, which allowed im o bask in support iy ateding momerous inauguration cormones. Funding decisions for NCODES ad the school biling program stint Nocona dere ra Edscatvay de Solud INFES) were highly ceatalized and heavily iced Resourcer were directed wear where the goverment expected ight lector pay Itematonal agencies that provide facil tc only led eveceein focusing these programs on poverty allvi- and in redcing the pial mise” The avaible data sugeshat FONCODES and INFESindod strength popular uppot forthe goverment ad consid 10 Fujimor's te. on m Api 1995, As th ain reson fr ter endorsement, 289% of takers among he poorest Lima residents mentioned his “public works oppor for edcain” IMASEN, 19946, . 11: ef. Apoyo, 194, p 'Acompurton of th 199 plebiscite andthe 1995 presidental contest, fst electoral payoff soil emergecy prograns. nares ttre ed high FONCODES expenditres, voles fr Fuimer ros toa dispro- exten Roberts de Are, 1998, pp. 233236). The reresson analysis repre in Tle 2 ads similar rest for IN- 8 svies, whore impct measured bythe percentage of the popasion rovice that benefited fm the dition feduetoal material ‘THE POLITICAL PAYOFF OF SOCIAL "EMERGENCY PROGRAMS “The preceding analysis sugges hat social emergency progres ae ne ster nsesay nor suet forthe acceptance of sinh reforms be hope toclimiat rs Ioser looms mucharge. suppor fr neobber [nmtherefore ely tobe temprary? Wil structural adjustment becomeeve fers bearable asthe ei ents, memos of hyperinflation fade, an omic recovery Begins, a Acubs and Smith (994, p. 37-41 suggest ‘on socil emergency programs vinbly spread the benefits of recover thas soli popular acceptance of ecliberlsm? Although aged ‘sae not elect in compening fo oases, do hey elit spp people face prospects of pias? ‘Where govermmens managed consol hyperinltion, sue sin inn and Peru they eliminated huge income loses fr may izes. the hardships of stabilization ented, growth resumed in both counties poverty fell” and more and more people entered the domain of apoyo, 1995.42: IMASEN, 19945, p 17; Moray Araujo, 1995.9p. 1 14 Ins sting of recovery, rete benefits sengtien suport governmet.Asough rch pogtams cannot easly compensa fo {hey do clic support whes people face prospects of pins. Unde the ‘chmstancs, pryholopcal decision theories yl sila expecains sre Wy wort a enone i wl page? Wy wel yt ‘farce orc ter ang petnuy hgh nem rr ak hcp. er seep 1 oer Cate Be A il otto 10 421 Sn Oo 91 TSM a coeur Line Pern Fay 198 an Anat 16‘ePaper Pe or cot er nim sabes hoes ee ones ” os o Yer vonint9 8 » ie 2 a in 1994 NFES, 1995,p. 30, A cont fctor, used he yes vor inte | Constitutional plebiscite of 1993, which was wiel seen asa efeendum | jms performance; poverty, as measured by the government's povey {nex (FONCODES. 1995, p28; and exon growth i each province dering 1993 and 1954 Grom Cudnte Lima, asreporidinRoberts Are, 1998p. 235) INFES activi provesto be significant predictor of Fujin | sis woe i 1995. Ifthe increat in Fujian vote fm the conte ‘lebiscteof 1993 the presidential elocdon of 199 isusedas the depend ‘pre (folowing Robens & Are 1998), INFES scdmty becomes gh senor . “Thos when Peru's emendour criti cased the goverment cucest ted ered son programe to reinforce popu backing combing ‘imino ofsupportrevealedinthe consitona plebiscite of 1993. Ths ‘programs alone, however, wee notdecisive;Fujimon's seessfu at ‘ba hyperinflation the economic recovery his government achieve, a 13 Sesconrcon shear sone pene dion cutl pease ope re Be ‘Pee spec fri nth er as ome ir al ene) ‘Popcorn Won SWALLOWNG THEBITTERPLL 559 tis defet of powerful guest movements—that is his success ete ‘heeft were also exe! forthe presides wiumph in 1995 “The Menom goverment also iaeiuted socal emergency measures, al thoogh ler than id Pujmor. Beeatedstuton diminished realy with the endof hyperifaion andthe economic boom of 1991 to 194 in Argen- tina (Ministerio de Beano, 196, , 60) the government saw antipovery ‘rorameas lesser roy. Only o prepare his reelection in May 1995 db enem poise a tar atackon poverty. Forts polical purpose, the fovermnt announced a comprehensive social plan in ery 1995, raised Finding for tavgeted compensation measures to U.S1.773 billion in 1904, nd planned frer occas to US $2,795 billion in 195 (Menem, 1995, pp. 2223, 27-29 Secretaria de Desaalo Socal 1995a, pp. 910)" ‘Ahouphthe Mexican crisiad the esulangrecessonin Argetina neces {aed drastic budget cus (E. Amadeo, personal communication, March 21,1995). thistageted social pending iconv to President Menem’'s ‘election, the following regresion analysis shows ‘Menem's ot shar inte 1995 presidental contest atthe provincia level (om Seastrman, 196 p. 110) served asthe dependent variable. The inde pendent vail ofcetalinerest was argeted soil spending budgeted for {995-—the only year for whch provincia-evel dat are available (rm Serer de Desarlla Soca, 195 p14) Sir othe Peruvian case, ‘te conza fairs were poverty, metuted the percentage ofthe opel tin with “unas base ees" (compute rom Secretaria de Desoto Seca, 199S, p25, andthe Peroit Party's vote share i the Constant ‘Asser elections of Api 1994 (Cent de Estados Union praia Nueva Mayra, 1994)" Given the rength f party loyalty in Argetina consid tre afin wth the Peroni Parry (rm Cento de Estudios Uni para [a Noeva Mayor, 1993, p28) san sditinal conto factor. As Table 3 shows ogee sell spending ha sigaiian impact on Menem's vote ‘Sar regurless of whether party loyalty sineloded sa conero vail.” ‘Tun social programe ineiued during 2 phase of economic recovery _tenihened spot or President Menem.” 2 tga pn tnd ee a nO 13 Unni, nec onthe he poi et eae Spay cee 95 om Caen Mi 1994p. 130 ctu tein oat pre oan topes pin pcr of ‘Svouin (= chotanedtse vets ace ta airy ie Secret te ft oe fe en abs emi pet vn Nt (hone soranpeng hr he ale athp= Tee dten iguon). "7 ne inicicon Nexen nase! tw ea eri ut ag ‘ese cen te pn Grn 718 On, 8 229).‘ela Ref Sc Sdn ete ePaper Sal eet ei Tepetwcuigeing 2s = a A : . amvoeinioes % foot ® ” ” a Py su s a ‘ar ar Li Pen Php vas cee maa ‘Sores tant apace Proviecial governments, which administer two tid of Argentina's 0 cialerpenitres, lo lcresied thr rpeted spending. Buenos Aires prov. noe, which hoses one third of ll Argentines, insted the aget social program, Since 1992, goveror Eduard Dale as wed S.$600 milion per year to finance a wise vat af public works” This puronge ha engtened support fr Dual a wel a Mener. The national goverr- tent wat Kenly ava ofthe electoral weight ofthe well geasd Duals aching which bereforeesageduscahes from th budget cto 1995. the presidental election, Menem indeed won disproportionate share of ‘tes in Dubai's bailvicks ("Menem Backes Suggest Third Ter.” 1998.6. a's sting of persistent economic stagnation, by conrat Blivi's Fondo Social de Emergencia PSE) di ot seem to boost electors suppart forthe government ina significant way. Ine Ite 1980s, economic growth Inthe counry ws ener (on average 28% pe yar fom 1987 te 1989) (Gamarea 1994p 108) andborely kept pace withpopalation growth Te goverment deliberately sought to ure FSE resources to sengthes is ‘lester! Backing in the residential election of May 1989 (Graham, 1984, pp 6367) Toe FSE commanded sbsantia fords, approving new proecs ‘oth US$ 784 milion n 1986 orgensen tal, 1982_p.3) Nevereles, the avilable evidence suggetthat hs paonape spending did et eshance 2. Seen Sein 9p 8; A Oh” 128.515 Sins ntti amet comee supp forthe incumbent MNR ands standart heuer Gonzalo Stochez de ‘Emde principal designer of the 1985 shock pla. As Table 4 shows,” trpeted sot! spending des nt elp account forthe MN vot in 1989 cr Cetiffereoce between the party's retin 1989 and 198S (computed from Miler Asocidoe, 1990, p82). This analysis used "soil investment” per Captain {988—te only avalale aor trgted socal spending by poy te oe Miler & Ascelados, 1994p, 333)asthe ain independent va- tle Te poverty headcount ati per province (from Mller & Asoci- es, 1998, 321) and the MINE vote in 1985 served as onl factor. Dileent permuaions of independent vibls conti the ul findings re ‘ped ia Table” “Tvs in times of eovery,trgtedbeneits reinforce popular bcking for the intntors of necibral programs, atthe cases of Argentina and Per nan 94 pp 1-7) os aes “sac eden sie 98 oma 198 \notgens seh voc tnrin ep ccs 97 eileen be resin in congo ey a led ge ea "bung Meni sani erent 50, PRONASOL ae aged ecg ere PO Coma, 99M We (eco, 21 Mana, 195p 19-65; Vial. 185. p38) Com ‘yan Ba 9 OT62 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / uber 1998 show" Ax counties emerge from profound crises and resume growth, sc ‘morgecy measures Wsly spread thes gist large numbers of votes By placing people more rly inte damn f gan, they induce itzesio make the aeavere cole of acceoing the Incumbent reform init ‘ber thas giving te oppositions wy Becaase antpovert messes an inforce gins, thy tem imponant forthe consolidation of market-oriented refer. But because social emerpency programs cant compensate fo! Tesen they canot make the ination of adjrtmentpoiialy Wale Ine expert, during the recession easel by neoliberal adjust Fin ties pssst stagnation tht rogram ono signiicanlysrengben pope Tar support for aolberaim, a he Bolivian eae seers to confi. ‘CONCLUSION ‘This stody suggests that contrary 1 cams in he erature, sail com pension programs sre eis necesar or sufcint for making the ini {option of neoliberal shock programs politcal vith.” Guins—even Sistribted in vil, plically targeted fashion cannot easly compes sti forthe loses esting rom ajusinent asthe Venerueln and Mesean cases demonstrate, The hope to ever large losses cased by hypeifan Seems fr more rial for generating suppor for markt aintedreforns theeaperencesof Argentina, Boia, Brea and Per soggest. Many peop te ligto shoulder sate ony ft hold be encarta promised ‘Timing and foestaling much pater Garage ve tonal ik "These findings ave important theoretical pions Because sed befits aeunlkey wo compensate for loses, the symetica viw ofp fl tnd loses that undecesconvetonl fatal chsce approaches ape louttul” Rather, most people sem 0 atach fr greater imprace lowes tha guineas pryholgie! dein theres hae found fore, loses are acceptable ony if hey appear as necessary 10 ave eater losses. Te results of hs plausibly probe hus suggest hat psych Toga decision theres re valid case the aberaory and tha hey Fnmportant ramifications fe poi! fe. Therefore, ckalassould ra thevepaychological insights and ses their capacity to explain pl Phenoment 132 at 7 crt ap te engin beh. 3. Aime a ng enn [Ney SWALLOWNG THEATER PILL 562 My findings so have practical implications, The compensation hypthe- si suggess that goverment can shape popular responce to adjustment ‘emphasizes salecall By cons he rescue hypothesis stresses opportai- tes and contin hat ae largely given espeilly the political open ‘povided by a dep criss" Govemmentscanot easly engineer aes [nthe opporunity for enacting painful reforms. Thus, he comaboraonof| the escue hypothesis inthis study Implis ta government have less inf ‘ence oer popairrestonso draconian meats than the compensation ypthesi cas. “Ts the plc visit of neoibral shock programs depends on pre teising codidons Onlyincounris that suffer fom deep crises, especially type, isa maoriy of zane itly to endore Grate ejustet, ‘Tureted benefit schemes can strengthen poplar supp or aoliberalism nly after economic recovery bat mitigated the nial costs of austen. Yet when these conlonspevall and when leaders take advantage of he lied opprtntienthey sce, market-ointdreformisindeedcampatle with dermoerey 14 For sine lh et easel pepe Da a i REFERENCES. aC & Sit Winn (1980 Tp nny fare a ‘tu Sens Cua A & Eset Conran Aner palit Uji an ont 7-45) New Boe Raion sonst ene magn 1981, ino Seer 3835, ‘ct try 9) Pinal nl Bey Unies of air Pr 5 fa Rc ny mst ta lof Po i Alona Ca. (99). Coil ce for mae anes sine “atop rao Ln aro an 3719. ‘aye 98 Agi Op, Ln, Po tr ‘Sop pu goede Ope Li Pr Ato, 15 any) nf de pn ine Poe he ‘Soe in See ered Opn Li Pe: ‘Sop Fe. ome Opa Line, ee ee ‘Sfp 90 Moron ss inp Yn beni erty Cafe ‘aE Che aya inaontinen rce Com hi ale (19) Soil pending ad oppor. Compra Poli, 26eh COMPARATIVE FOLTIEAL STUDIES scr un oe. 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