Core Executives and Coordination of EU Law

Transposition: Evidence from New Member States

Radoslaw Zubek
London School of Economics and Political Science

(forthcoming in Public Administration)

Abstract
This article compares cabinet institutions for coordinating the transposition of EU
legislation in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. It examines how national
executives have adapted to European integration and what factors have shaped
institutional variation across countries and over time. During pre-accession, the
Hungarian, Polish and (to a lesser extent) Czech cabinets established strong core
executives for tracking EU-related legislative commitments, monitoring progress
and reviewing the quality of transposition. After accession, the cores in all three
cabinets loosened the grip on transposition, although to different degrees. The
analysis shows that, if sectoral factors are kept constant, variation in the patterns
of national adaptation can be explained with reference to external incentives and
constitutional rules. High benefits of transposition before accession encouraged
centralization, particularly in prime-ministerial cabinets. Fewer incentives under
full membership contributed to a halt or reversal in core executive ascendancy,
especially in ministerial-type cabinets.

Keywords: core executive, cabinet, coordination, Europeanization, transposition.

INTRODUCTION

Europeanization research – both in its Western and Eastern European variant –

has shown a continuing interest in studying the influence of EU membership on
national cabinet institutions (Bulmer and Burch 1998, 2005; Goetz 2000; Lippert
and Umbach 2005; Laffan 2007; Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008). Most of this
literature focuses on the organizational and procedural structures, chiefly at the
centre of government, used to coordinate national positions on EU affairs (Kassim
et al. 2000; Laffan 2006; Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007; Fink-Hafner 2007). Much
less attention has been paid to the institutions that manage the ‘down-loading’
phase of the EU policy process – the transposition, implementation and
application of EU laws at the domestic level (but see Dimitrakopoulos 2001a,
2001b, 2008; Kaeding 2007 for notable exceptions). Relatively little is thus
known about what impact Europe has on EU-related cabinet lawmaking, whether
governments diverge or converge around a common model and how cross-
national similarities or differences can be explained.

This article examines the evolution of cabinet structures responsible for

coordinating EU transposition in three new member states. In studying
institutional trajectories, the analysis focuses on the centralization of lawmaking
as measured by the strength of core executives in planning, reviewing and
monitoring transposition. The approach is institutionalist: the core executive is
defined as an array of position, authority and information rules designed to
constrain departmental lawmaking autonomy. The process at the heart of the
analysis is the coordination of transposition of EU directives. Transposition
constitutes only a first stage in the process of national compliance with EU law.
Once adopted, national transposing measures must be properly implemented and
enforced. Yet, since timely and effective transposition constitutes a precondition
for full implementation, it provides a good starting point for investigating the role
of domestic core executives in the broad area of EU compliance.

The key question considered is that of how and why institutional configurations
vary across countries and over time. In explaining institutional variation, the
article proposes a theory of executive adaptation which accords primary
explanatory power to ministerial incentives, external pressures and constitutional
traditions. These expectations are tested against empirical evidence from
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The timeframe of the analysis runs
from 1998 (start of accession talks) to 2008 (four years after Eastern
enlargement). The choice of new member states and of a decade-long period of
observation, encompassing both pre-accession and membership, ensures variation
in the key explanatory factors. The article can thus check the effect of shifts in the
structure of external incentives and of different traditions of cabinet organization.
At the same time the three states share sufficient similarities to allow for a
controlled comparison. All are new parliamentary democracies and coalition
cabinets provide the dominant form of government (Table 1). All began accession
negotiations in 1998 and joined the EU in 2004.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The article proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature on
the Europeanization of national cabinets, with a special focus on the coordination
of EU transposition. It then presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the
evolution of cabinet institutions and formulates hypotheses regarding the
institutional trajectories in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Section 3
applies the framework to the empirical data by studying the variation in
institutional rules in each of the three new member states. The final section
assesses the relevance of the findings for the studies of Europeanization and EU
compliance.

EUROPEANIZATION AND CORE EXECUTIVES

Literature Review

Research on national cabinet coordination of EU transposition is rather scarce.

The few studies that address the issue in West Europe focus chiefly on identifying
patterns of national adaptation. In his study of old member states Dimitrakopoulos
(2001a) has found that cabinets adapt to the exigencies of EU transposition by
limiting the role of ministers whilst delegating authority to civil servants, and by
establishing core executive bodies responsible for legal coordination (see also
Dimitrakopoulos 2008). Recent research by Kaeding (2007) finds evidence of
administrative convergence around institutional solutions recommended by the
European Commission (cf. European Commission 2004). Thus, most, if not all,
cabinets appoint a member responsible for transposition; maintain a centralized

2
database for transposition; and hold monthly discussions of the transposition
record. The related research on East Central European member states has
examined mainly the link between different institutional arrangements for
transposition and the pace of EU transposition. A comparative study by Zubek
(2008) demonstrates that centralized cabinets had better success than
decentralized ones in achieving legal transposition before EU accession.

This literature has given relatively less consideration to the questions of why and
how national cabinets adapt to the exigencies of EU transposition. A notable
exception is the work by Dimitrakopoulos (2001b, 2008). In a study of the
adaptation of the Greek executive, Dimitrakopoulos (2001b) relies on insights
from organizational theory to argue that a combination of persisting non-
transposition and pressure from the European Commission triggered a process of
organizational learning inside the central administration in the 1980s and 1990s.
Institutional change is found to have been conditional on the presence and
willingness of organizational innovators and the occurrence of critical events. In
his comparative study of Greece, France and the UK, Dimitrakopoulos (2008)
argues further that the way in which governments coordinate transposition is
shaped by the national patterns of policy formulation. He claims that governments
that find it difficult to coordinate their actions in EU-level bargaining tend to
encounter problems with coordinating EU transposition.

Theorizing about origins of institutional adaptation has been more prominent in

the research on national coordination of EU positions. Kassim et al. (2000) show
that common coordination challenges and organizational mimicry account for the
establishment of centralized cabinet structures, but that such adaptation is also
shaped by domestic policy styles and ambitions as well as political and
administrative opportunity structures. Laffan (2006) argue that models of
coordination that member states adopt are shaped by the degree of
institutionalization, while Fink-Hafner (2007) stresses the critical role of
administrative traditions and modes of party competition. Laffan and O’Mahony
(2007) point to the importance of critical junctures for explaining the timing of
core executive development. Dimitrova and Toshkov (2007) propose and find
some evidence for an actor-centred theory of adaptation in which change is related
to cabinet alternation, inter-institutionalist rivalries and politico-administrative
relations.

Theoretical Framework

Building on the existing literature, this article proposes a theoretical framework

for explaining and understanding the conditions under which European integration
leads to a centralization of cabinet institutions for coordinating transposition. The
starting point is a recognition that Europe exerts little direct pressure for domestic
adaptation at cabinet level because there is no binding EU policy on how national
executives should be organized. However, European integration puts pressure on
institutional arrangements indirectly by challenging the performance of existing
domestic rules and procedures (Börzel and Risse 2003). In conceptualizing the
mechanisms of institutional change the analysis adopts a rational institutionalist
approach. It assumes that EU accession and membership result in a redistribution
of resources as actors are offered new opportunities or are constrained in the
ability to pursue their goals. Rational actors react to such transformations of

3
opportunity structures by opposing or mobilizing in favour of institutional
innovation. Any theorizing about domestic responses to transposition must hence
begin by establishing what the nature of the EU challenge is, who domestic actors
are and how opportunity structures they face are transformed.

The key challenge of EU transposition is that national cabinets implement policies

that have been agreed jointly with other member state governments, Commission
officials, and the European Parliament. Since EU laws are shaped by many
different national and supranational actors, any government has restricted
influence over the final outcome. Moreover, many EU directives and other
measures do not require unanimous support for final approval, and it is possible
that policies will be adopted even though they are contested by one or more
governments. Accession states, by definition, cannot exert an impact on the
content of legislation they implement and have to adopt all or almost all of the
acquis communautaire regardless of whether they agree with it. Under such
circumstances, national cabinets may find themselves having to give effect to
policies that bring net costs or have negative impacts at the domestic level. This
may lead to national governments failing to transpose EU laws (cf. Tallberg 2003;
Thomson 2007; but see Falkner et al. 2004). Describing such opportunity
structures, Tallberg writes,

‘as agents, member states prefer to soften the adjustment demands of new EU policies on
national political, economic, and administrative structures. Modifying national practices
to EU rules is often anything but smooth, automatic, and costless; (…) introducing new
rules generally challenges those with interests vested in existing procedures. Proper
implementation and subsequent compliance therefore tend to involve substantial
economics, political and administrative costs and strains, making non-compliance an
attractive option’. (Tallberg 2003, p. 29)

Not only can EU directives be difficult to transpose at the national level, but also
their transposition is in the hands of actors who directly bear the political and
other costs of adaptation. The conventional wisdom is that EU transposition is
driven by domestic executives (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988). What is perhaps less
well recognized is that, while governments have overall responsibility, EU
policies are implemented only if legislative or bureaucratic action is taken by the
competent members of the cabinet. Executives are often conceptualized as unitary
actors but, in fact, are collective bodies consisting of ministers who head
ministerial departments, each with near exclusive jurisdiction over a given policy
field. The jurisdictional system of cabinet government has important implications
for EU transposition. Since ministers and departments control transposition, they
are liable to use their gate-keeping powers to delay or block adaptational measures
if EU policies entail net costs to sectoral constituencies or bring benefits that are
beyond the time horizon of ministers and officials.

Such perverse opportunity structures may lead to a national compliance problem,

in particular if there are many ministerial departments that face net sectoral costs
from transposition. This latter situation will be particularly common if ministries
lack the ability to ‘upload’ domestic interests to the EU-level decision-making
(Heritier et al. 1996). Transposition problems will be also widespread if there is
generally a poor fit between EU policies and domestic conditions. Under such
circumstances, attempts to evade transposition may be a preferred strategy for
most, if not all, members of the government. Non-transposition may take various

4
forms. Governments may ‘pick and choose’ directives for full transposition or
give effect to some parts of a directive. Failures to transpose need not, however,
be permanent. Domestic decision-makers may also delay the full transposition of
particularly onerous provisions (Kaeding 2006; Haverland and Romeijn 2007).

This situation is likely to change, however, if there exist high external incentives
for improving the cabinet transposition record. The latter may arise as a result of
actions taken by the European Commission or the European Court of Justice
(Mendrinou 1996; Tallberg 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). EU
pressures may be reinforced by domestic opportunity structures extended by the
media, parliament or the courts. External incentives for transposition open up
opportunities for the emergence of political entrepreneurs (Frohlich et al. 1971;
Fiorina and Shepsle 1989). This role may be assumed by the prime minister or
some other senior minister. If such entrepreneurs consider the incentives for better
transposition to exceed the sectoral costs, they will be likely to invest in
counteracting ministerial opportunism and mobilizing departments to undertake
transposition. Besides encouraging entrepreneurship, external incentives may also
trigger a process of deliberation and reflection and result in collective rule-making
to govern transposition.

In cabinet settings, ministerial nonresponsiveness is typically addressed through

the development or reinforcement of a core executive (cf. Dunleavy and Rhodes
1990; Weller et al. 1997; Andeweg 2000; see also Hallerberg 2004). The latter is
normally taken to comprise the prime minister, finance minister, non-sectoral
ministers and ‘a web of institutions, networks, and practices surrounding the
prime minister, cabinet, cabinet committees and their official counterparts’
(Rhodes 1995: 12). The primary task of the core executive is to identify the
collective interests of the government and mobilize individual ministers and
departments behind such goals. To be effective in their role, central actors are
furnished with institutional authority and resources that can be used to transform
ministerial incentive structures. The core uses its powers to monitor and reward or
sanction the behaviour of ministers and officials. In organizational terms, the
strengthening of the core executive denotes a shift from ministerial-type
government to primeministerial or collective government (Andeweg 1997; Elgie
1997).

The reinforcement of the core executive is more or less difficult depending on the
constitutional-level rules. More robust core executives can be expected to emerge
where national constitutions delegate strong coordinating powers to the prime
minister or the cabinet as a whole. If national constitutions provide for extensive
ministerial autonomy, the development of extensive core executive rules may be
problematic not least because governments are not able to rely on a rich repertoire
of core executive instruments in domestic policy-making. The electoral rules are
also important. Plurality systems produce single-party governments or small
coalitions. Under such conditions delegation of strong monitoring and
enforcement powers to central actors is fairly unproblematic because it does not
coincide with inter-party rivalries inside the cabinet (Hallerberg 2004; Dimitrov et
al. 2006). In contrast, proportional systems produce large coalitions and minority
governments. In such circumstances, the centralization of lawmaking carries a
high political cost or is largely redundant since the key policy-making sites shift
to parliament.

5
Cases, Methods and Data

The article checks such theoretical expectations against empirical evidence from
three Central European states – Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic – in the
period between 1998 and 2008. This country selection makes it possible to
achieve variation in the two key explanatory factors – the external incentives and
constitutional rules. As regards the former, a decade-long period of observation,
encompassing both pre-accession and membership, ensures variation in external
incentives for timely and full transposition. Prior to EU membership, transposition
is likely to have been valued highly (Goetz 2005). In return for adopting the
acquis, candidate states secured admission to higher levels of integration, and
ultimately full membership (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). In contrast,
post-accession transposition is likely to be less compelling, while the price of non-
transposition relatively benign (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2006; Sedelmeier
2008).

As regards constitutional traditions, the three countries are representative of very

different patterns. Hungary has a mixed electoral system which has contributed to
the emergence of a bipolar party system and formation of small stable coalitions.
The Hungarian constitution also provides for a dominant position of the prime
minister inside the cabinet (Schiemann 2004; Brusis 2006). Poland and the Czech
Republic have proportional electoral systems which has been conducive to more
volatile coalition politics and frequent minority administrations. The two states
differ, however, in terms of prime ministerial powers. In Poland, the constitutional
reforms in 1996 reinforced the prerogatives of the head of cabinet (Zubek 2006).
In contrast, the Czech constitution provides for a strong autonomy of cabinet
ministers and limited formal powers of the premier (cf. Kabele and Linek 2004;
Dimitrov and Zubek 2006).

The selection of the country cases and the observation period allows one to keep
the nature of sectoral incentives relatively constant both across countries and time.
The cabinets in the three states are likely to have faced problems of high net costs
of legal adaptation and low ministerial incentives for transposition in a similar
number of policy areas. Even a cursory analysis of problematic negotiation
chapters and transitional arrangements reveals that governments in all of the three
states grappled with adaptation costs in the same set of core sectors: agriculture,
environment, taxation, competition, transport, energy, audio-visual policy and free
movement of capital and services (European Commission 2004; Vassiliou 2007).
It is also unlikely that these patterns have changed significantly after accession,
not least because the ability of upload national preferences can be assumed to
have remained more or less stable over time: both before accession and in the first
few years of membership, the new members are likely to have operated as policy-
takers with limited capacity to shape EU policies. This relative lack of variation
makes it possible to focus the analysis on testing the effects of external incentives
and constitutional traditions, although it also means that the impact of variation in
sectoral incentives cannot be tested with this selection of country cases.

The article employs a small-N comparative method. In doing so, it examines six
cases (pre-accession and post-accession in three states) for evidence of
correlations between the values of the explanatory factors (external incentives and
constitutions) and the values of the dependent variable (strength of the core

6
executive). The key expectations is that stronger external incentives for EU
transposition prior to EU membership have led to reinforcement of core
executives; weaker incentives after enlargement contributed to a reversal or halt in
such institutional tendencies. The core executive reinforcement can be expected to
be particularly marked in Hungary where constitutional conditions will have made
centralization easier to achieve; somewhat less pronounced in Poland where
coalitions tend to be more conflictual, but prime ministers enjoy extensive formal
powers, and least evident in the Czech Republic where volatile coalition politics
co-exist with limited constitutional powers of the head of the government.
Similarly, the reversals or halts after accession should be less pronounced in
Hungary than in Poland or the Czech Republic. It must, of course, be recognized
that small-n comparisons do not allow for advanced tests of theories, yet they are
useful as the first stage of research before statistical analysis is undertaken (cf.
Lijphart 1971). To minimize the ‘many variables, small N’ problem the analysis
focuses on most similar countries: all are new parliamentary democracies and all
started accession negotiations in 1998 and joined the EU in 2004. To further
reinforce any claims of causality, where possible, process-tracing is employed to
look for any evidence of causal mechanisms that link the main explanatory factor
with the observed effect.

The examination of core executive institutions responsible for EU transposition at

the domestic level is based on over one hundred semi-structured interviews
conducted in Budapest, Prague, Warsaw and Brussels between 2002 and 2008.
The interviewees included high and middle-ranking officials, ministers and
political advisors. Studying institutions through interviews is not without its
problems, not least because it risks conflating rules with individual behaviour. To
avoid such pitfalls, transposition practices were considered as institutions only if
they have been indicated by two or more interviewees. Special care was also taken
to select interviewees in a way that would allow for comparison both across
countries and across time. In addition the interview material was supplemented
with data from written questionnaires answered by country experts and where
possible with primary and secondary written sources.

Operationalization of the Core Executive

To map the strength of core executive, this article examines rules-in-use

governing the process of transposition at the domestic level. Rules are defined as
shared understandings regarding what action is required, prohibited or permitted.
The focus is on rules-in-use rather than rules-in-form to capture actual constraints
and opportunities that ministers and departments face in proposing and adopting
transposing legislation (Ostrom 1990; Sproule-Jones 1993). The analysis focuses
on three types of rules (cf. Ostrom 2005). Position rules determine whether –
besides proposers of legislation – there exist special positions of monitors or
authorities at the centre of government. Authority rules establish the permissible
scope of actions that such central monitors may take at any time. Information
rules specify what information is available to these actors.

The article examines the constellation of rules-in-use in three principal

dimensions: transposition planning, substantive review and monitoring of
deadlines (see Table 2). The focus is on rules governing the role of cabinet-wide
core executive actors such as Chancelleries, EU secretariats, ministries of foreign

7
affairs and justice; specialized sectoral coordinators are beyond the scope of the
analysis. With regard to planning, a key position question is whether an individual
or collective monitor exists which has responsibility for transposition planning
inside the executive. This role may be fulfilled by a minister for EU affairs, EU
secretariat or a special cabinet committee. The authority rules may give the
monitor the right to check if ministers have included all required EU measures in
the work plans of individual ministries. The monitor itself may also have the right
to propose bills to the cabinet programme, in particular when implementing
legislation cuts across many policy jurisdictions. It may further have the authority
to ensure that transposition deadlines are adhered to when ministries plan their
work. Information rules complement such authority rules. A key information issue
is whether non-sectoral information is available to the monitor on the timing and
substance of EU-related policy commitments. Another information question is
whether the monitor circulates such information widely inside the government.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

The next dimension is the substantive review of transposing legislation. The key
position rule is whether a central monitor exists who screens all EU-related
legislation prepared at the ministry level. The role may be fulfilled by central legal
services at the EU secretariat or the Prime Minister’s Office. It may involve the
right to check if draft legislation correctly and fully transposes EU measures.
More importantly, the monitor may have the authority to draft horizontal
legislation. These authority rules are complemented by information rules. The
extent to which a monitor can act as gate-keeper in substantive terms depends on
whether all transposing legislation must be subject to central review. It is further
contingent on the resources such as staff and time that are available to the
monitor.

As regards the monitoring of transposition deadlines, the crucial position issue is

whether a monitor exists with responsibility for monitoring transposition with
transposition deadlines. The key authority issue is whether the monitor may
request ministers and departments to report regularly on transposition progress.
The authority rules may also give the monitor the right to verify if transposition
pledges are actually fulfilled, take remedial action and sanction non-transposition
if necessary. The authority rules come with related information rules. The latter
determine whether non-departmental information is available to the monitor on
the progress of transposition at ministry level. Another information issue is how
such information is distributed inside the government, and in particular whether it
is supplied to the cabinet and the prime minister.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Executive Rules Before Accession

At the start of the accession negotiations the Hungarian cabinet developed strong
core executive institutions for coordinating EU transposition. The position of
central monitor was assigned to the ministries of justice and foreign affairs. The
minister heading the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) also became involved on an
ad hoc basis. An Interministerial Committee for European Integration (ICEI) at
state secretary level provided a forum for interministerial consultations. The

8
tandem of justice and foreign affairs ministries relied on extensive authority and
information rules. The justice ministry had significant competences in
transposition programming. It prepared detailed annual timetables working closely
with the foreign ministry and the ministry that led negotiations in a given field. A
close observer said,

‘The European content of the programme was prepared by the European state secretariat
but then the ministry of justice had to identify the real requirements – if some change was
necessary in a statue, governmental decree or ministerial regulation. These legislative
issues had to be decided and it was the task of the ministry of justice’.

The ministries of justice and foreign affairs regularly supplied detailed lists of
adaptation requirements to the PMO which ensured that EU-related tasks were
incorporated into semi-annual cabinet programmes. In substantive review, the
justice ministry had the right to screen all draft legislation for compatibility with
EU law. It also checked if transposition was full and correct. The cabinet adopted
a centralized approach to drafting cross-cutting transposition legislation, and the
justice ministry took the lead on preparing many horizontal laws. Transposition
work was subject to regular central monitoring. The ICEI committee held regular
review meetings. The foreign minister – in collaboration with the justice minister
– prepared quarterly reports to the cabinet on the status of accession negotiations
and domestic adaptations. If delays and problems were identified, the prime
minister or the PMO minister requested explanations. Further monitoring and
problem resolution was undertaken through regular working contacts between the
PMO and the ministry concerned.

Like Hungarian government, the Polish cabinet institutionalized an extensive

array of core executive rules, albeit only from early 2000. The position of central
monitor in EU transposition was assigned to the European Integration (KIE) and
its secretariat (UKIE) of a quasi-departmental status. Both these positions were
furnished with extensive authority and information rules. In transposition
planning, the UKIE maintained a rolling catalogue of all outstanding transposition
commitments. In preparing such transposition timetables, the KIE committee used
the constraints of the accession process to impose deadlines on ministers. The
UKIE secretariat checked – though less systematically – whether departments
addressed transposition tasks in their submissions for the cabinet legislative plans.
Its role extended to compatibility checks and active facilitation of transposition. In
some cases, where a ministry was not able to deliver on time, the UKIE took over
the drafting of major transposing measures. The KIE committee – and from 2002
the ZPKIE committee at deputy ministerial level – monitored progress in
transposition on a weekly basis. In addition, from 2002, a review of transposition
was introduced as a permanent point on the agenda of all cabinet meetings. In
monitoring legislative action at ministerial level, the UKIE developed a rigorous
system for collecting information on how transposition progressed. An official
from a line ministry thus described the monitoring system,
‘[we] sent the list of all legislative commitments to other sections in our ministry (…) on
Friday afternoon. They reported back to us by Tuesday and on Wednesday we could send
the file to the UKIE. Based on these files the UKIE prepared a report which presented at
the ZPKIE committee on Friday. After the ZPKIE approved it, the report was passed on
to cabinet ministers on Monday, and during the Tuesday cabinet meeting [UKIE
secretary] informed the prime minister which ministers were overdue with legislative
work’.

9
During the pre-accession period, the Czech cabinet developed core executive rules
for EU transposition, but the process was not straightforward and did not advance
as far as it did in Hungary and Poland. The position of central monitor in EU
transposition was assigned to three institutional actors – the deputy prime minister
for legislation, the EU compatibility unit in the Government Office and the
Government Committee for European Integration (GCEI). These positions were
furnished with authority and information rules. In transposition planning, the EU
compatibility unit was given the right to allocate competencies for transposition,
but the actual programming of necessary legislative actions remained in the hands
of departments. The latter formulated transposition plans without any input from
the core and logged them in a centralized database (ISAP) maintained in the
Government Office. The centre provided some input into programming on the
margins of annual legislative planning. The EU compatibility unit checked if all
commitments were included in cabinet legislative programmes and was consulted
if departments requested changes to programmed deadlines. The Czech core
gained prerogatives in EU-related legal review. The lawyers from the EU
compatibility unit controlled the quality of transposition by reviewing all drafts at
the key stages of intra-executive law preparation. The centre did not, however,
engage in the preparation of horizontal transposition measures as did the cores in
Hungary and Poland. As regards transposition monitoring, the EU compatibility
department prepared quarterly (and at times monthly) reports on the progress of
transposition. The reports were presented by the deputy prime minister for
legislation to the meetings of the GCEI committee and the full cabinet. If serious
delays were detected, ministers were asked to explain their case and, if necessary,
the cabinet passed formal resolutions requesting prompt action to be taken within
a fixed deadline. A minister said,
‘There was regular reporting to the government on the transposition of EU legislation.
There was a list of laggards which was discussed within the government and if one saw a
long list of [nontransposed] directives under the name of a certain minister, the prime
minister, in particular Zeman, became interested’.

Executive Rules After Accession

In Hungary, the justice and foreign affairs ministries have continued to act as
central coordinators after EU accession, but their competences have been
somewhat reduced. The justice ministry has less authority in transposition
planning. It has stopped preparing central transposition programmes. It now
monitors the EU’s Official Journal and prepares a weekly newsletter listing all EU
measures and ministers responsible, but departments bear the primary
responsibility for programming transposition. They are required to prepare a
detailed transposition workplan for each new EU measure, agree it inside the
cabinet, and log it into a centralized database maintained by the justice ministry.
The core has kept, however, its watchdog function with regard to semi-annual
cabinet work programmes. Regular central monitoring has continued, albeit in a
less intrusive form. The justice ministry uses the central transposition database to
monitor the transposition record of other ministers and generates reports on
delayed measures. An agriculture ministry official said,

‘The Ministry of Justice monitors deadlines at a general level – they collect the data from
the transposition database and send it to use in the form of a table’.

10
The ICEI committee provides the main forum for progress review, but it focuses
more on identifying problems, in particular infringement cases, than on regular
taking stock of transposition progress. If serious problems are identified, the
committee can refer issues for a decision to the meeting of the state secretaries at
the PMO or the cabinet. The practice of regular reporting to the full cabinet was
abandoned after accession, though from 2007 some ad hoc reporting was
resumed. The decline in the strength of the core has perhaps been least
pronounced in the area of substantive and legal review. The justice ministry has
published detailed guidelines on how transposition should be handled in technical
terms. It has also continued to take the lead on drafting horizontal legislation and
to receive drafts for verification. Its EU harmonization section continues to check
if proposals correctly and fully transpose the required EU measures.

As in Hungary, the competences of the Polish core have declined after EU

accession. In transposition planning, the UKIE has adopted a less ‘hands-on’
approach. It monitors the EU’s Official Journal and distributes a weekly digest of
all new EU measures allocating transposition competences and proposing
deadlines for approval by the KERM and cabinet. But the key responsibility for
transposition programming belongs to the ministers and departments. Once a new
EU measure is published, they prepare detailed transposition work plans which
are logged into the central database maintained by the UKIE. The UKIE has
continued to provide comments in the process of cabinet legislative planning,
though less actively. It typically sends a list of all outstanding transposition
commitments to the PM Chancellery who then passes it on to individual ministers
and departments for information. In substantive review, the UKIE has continued
to screen all legislation for EU compatibility and to check the correctness and
completeness of transposition. But the UKIE lawyers no longer engage in legal
drafting and do not actively participate in legislative work at ministry level. The
elaborate process of week-to-week progress monitoring has been largely
dismantled. Progress reviews are undertaken once a month at the meetings of the
KERM committee (formerly ZPKIE), but focus mainly on a few problem cases
rather than on a detailed review of legislative works. There are not longer regular
reports to the full cabinet. A ministry official said,

‘Some time ago the UKIE conducted very detailed monitoring, thick files were discussed
every month regarding the transposition record of all ministries (...) But things have
changed in the last two years. A decision was taken to focus only on the most important
issues’.

The moderate strength of the Czech core executive persisted after EU accession
with some evidence of decline. At the level of position rules, the deputy prime
minister for legislation and the EU compatibility unit in the Government Office
have continued as central coordinators of EU transposition inside the government.
The GCEI committee has persisted (as Committee for the European Union), but
its role in EU transposition has decreased. Its function was taken over by a
monthly meeting of administrative coordinators from all ministries at the
Government Office. In transposition planning, the EU compatibility unit has
continued to allocate transposition competencies among departments.
Transposition work plans are still developed by individual ministries and
uploaded to the ISAP database. As was the practice before accession, the EU
compatibility unit checks if legislative programmes include all necessary

11
transposition measures. As regards substantive review, the EU compatibility unit
continues to review all legislation for compatibility with the EU law and to check
if transposition is full and correct. Monitoring at the GCEI committee has given
way to less frequent reviews at monthly meetings of administrative coordinators
at the Government Office. Rather than mobilize ministries to deal with delays,
these meetings have been largely technical and have focused on verifying the
information contained in the ISAP database. The EU compatibility unit has
continued to prepare quarterly reports to the cabinet on transposition progress.
The latter are discussed and if necessary remedial action is mandated through
cabinet resolutions. Regular reminders of delays or other problems are now rare,
and more emphasis is placed on the quarterly reports to the cabinet.

Core Executives and External Incentives

The analysis of the evolution of institutional rules for coordination of EU

transposition in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic reveals, as expected, a
strong correlation between the size of incentives for transposition and the strength
of the domestic core executives. See Table 3. Before EU accession, i.e. at a time
when incentives for transposition were high, all the three countries established
positions of central monitors for coordinating EU transposition. The task was
delegated to the Ministry of Justice in Hungary, the KIE committee and UKIE
secretariat in Poland and the deputy prime minister for legislation in the Czech
Republic. The monitors were furnished with specific authority and information
competencies. All of them had the right to monitor progress in rule adoption at
ministry level. Ministers were required to submit regular reports on their
transposition records which were double-checked by the core executive. All
acquired competences to review domestic legislation for compatibility with EU
law and check if transposition was full and complete. In addition, the cores in
Hungary and Poland (but not in the Czech Republic) won extensive powers to
programme transposition across the government and take a lead on the preparation
of horizontal transposing legislation.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The strength of the core executives declined after EU accession when the
incentives for transposition subsided. This was most apparent at the level of
authority and information rules. In all of the three countries, core executives
abandoned the type of close monitoring of transposition progress which was
characteristic for the pre-accession period. Regular reporting to the cabinet
became less frequent, and review sessions moved from political to administrative
fora. Instead of regular directive-by-directive verification of transposition, the
central monitors have begun to focus chiefly on problematic issues, in particular
infringement cases. In the two countries – Hungary and Poland – where the
central monitors had a strong role in transposition programming, there has been a
noticeable shift to a much more hands-off approach. Ministers and departments
are now responsible for preparing their own work plans for transposition. The
core’s role is limited to distributing information on new EU legislation and
maintaining centralized database of transposition tasks. In one country – Poland –
where during pre-accession the centre acquired special powers to draft significant
EU-related legislation, this practice was discontinued.

12
The correlation between incentives for transposition and domestic institutional
change may be reinforced by process–tracing evidence. In the pre-accession
period national ministers and officials were clearly aware that the highly valued
prize of EU accession could not be achieved without some centralization of
lawmaking inside the cabinet. When describing the reasons for the overhaul of EU
coordination in 1999, a Czech minister said,

‘It was necessary to adopt the new rules for [three] reasons. First, we had to coordinate
the work of sixteen ministries responsible for drafting legislation. Second, requests and
pressure from Brussels were increasing all the time. Third, we did not comply with some
of the transposition deadlines’.

Explaining the reasons for empowering the central actors during the pre-
accession, a Hungarian minister said,

‘More generally (…) [the bureaucrats] did not want to do it. So they sent the bill for
consultation with this and that ministry. They tried to postpone. And sometimes we had
to change the priority, as it happened after we replaced (…) the agriculture minister.
(…) And they were not able to manage so quickly and professionally, so we had to set
up a working group inside the PMO. We took some advisors from the outside. The
prime minister participated in these meetings. We also invited the state secretary from
that ministry and tried to revitalize the process’.

Similarly, after the accession, national decision-makers explicitly linked the

gradual decentralization of law-making with the lower priority of EU
transposition. A Czech junior minister said, ‘We are no more pushed by
accession. We have joined the EU and so [transposition] is no longer such a
pressing issue’. A Polish official concurred,

‘In the initial phase, we had close monitoring – this was just before and just after the
accession. This process had a dynamic of its own, things moved very quickly (…). But
then accession occurred and we decided that we should loosen the central monitoring
process, in particular at committee level. (…) In the old days, a failure to submit a bill
was considered a major transgression, questions were asked, prime minister became
involved. (…) But later, less and less attention was paid to such issues, and the system
was relaxed.’

Core Executives and Constitutional Rules

In line with the expectations outlined above, the Hungarian cabinet established the
strongest core executive for coordinating EU transposition. The emergence of the
position, authority and information rules for coordinating EU transposition in
Hungary was facilitated by an extensive array of pre-existing rules attached to the
position of foreign affairs ministry, justice ministry and the PMO. The emergence
of centralized rules for EU transposition was thus a natural extension of a long-
standing authority of central cabinet actors in policy coordination. Centralization
was facilitated by the nature of governing coalitions. The mixed electoral system
has contributed to the emergence of two fairly stable electoral blocks organized
around two dominant parties – Fidesz on the right and MSZP on the left of the
political spectrum. The low degree of intracoalition conflict ensured that the shift
of powers to the core executive was fairly uncontested. The combination of broad
constitutional prerogatives and stable coalition politics also meant that there was a
good ‘fit’ between pre-accession arrangements and cabinet traditions in Hungary

13
which enhanced the ‘stickiness’ of new institutions. The decline of core executive
powers after the accession was, therefore, fairly moderate.

Polish cabinets also developed a strong core executive. The process was, however,
more turbulent. The reinforcement took place late in the pre-accession period, in
mid 2000, when the head of the UKIE and prime minister Buzek pushed for more
planning and monitoring powers to be delegated to the core executive. The new
institutions were also established largely in parallel to standard governmental
processes (such as cabinet legislative planning) with which they were only loosely
coupled. The constitutional rules contributed to this pattern. For one thing, Poland
had a weaker tradition of cabinet centralization than Hungary. It was only in 1996
that extensive reforms were undertaken to reinforce the powers of prime minister
and improve cabinet coordination. Hence, unlike their Hungarian counterparts,
Polish decision-makers could not rely on a rich repertoire of position, authority
and information rules. Moreover, the proportional electoral system contributed to
relatively more polarized governing coalitions which made the centralization of
lawmaking authority more difficult, in particular under the AWS-UW cabinet (cf.
Zubek 2005). The relative incompatibility of the strong core with the underlying
party dynamics also meant that, once the external incentives for transposition had
declined, the centralized arrangements unravelled to a much larger extent than in
Hungary.

As predicted, the reinforcement of the core executive was least pronounced in the
Czech Republic. The core acquired no competences in transposition programming
and played no role in the drafting of horizontal measures. The depth of change
was constrained by a strong tradition of ministerial government (Kabele and
Linek 2004). Since the break-up of Czechoslovakia, policymaking in the Czech
Republic had been firmly in the hands of departments, prime ministerial powers
had been limited and the Government Office had provided only technical support
to the cabinet. Given a proportional electoral system, Czech governing coalitions
tended to be conflictual and minority cabinets were frequent. Consequently, any
centralization had to be of gradual character and stay within the constitutional
constraints of ministerial autonomy. After accession, the Czech Republic saw only
a small decline in the strength of its core executive. This is hardly surprising. The
Czech constitutional conditions prevented a major upgrading of the core and the
post-accession adjustment was relatively limited.

CONCLUSION

This article offers some important lessons for the study of Europeanization of
national executives and EU transposition. The first lesson is that a centralization
of cabinet law-making for EU transposition is a contingent, rather than inevitable,
effect of European integration. The extent to which national cabinets centralize
authority at the centre depends on both external and domestic conditions. The
study has shown that the size of benefits for high transposition is a critical factor
determining the probability of institutional change. High incentives encourage
entrepreneurship and rule-making, while low incentives discourage institutional
innovation. The effect of incentives is mediated by constitutional traditions. Since
centralization is contingent, it may also be transient. Dramatic shifts in the
incentive structures, domestic capacities or constitutional rules may over time lead
to changes in the degree of centralization of cabinet structures for coordinating

14
EU transposition. In brief, the centralization of EU-related law-making is neither
an assured, nor constant effect of European integration.

The second, and related, lesson is that, in contrast to the existing studies on
national coordination of EU transposition, this analysis reveals evidence of both
convergence and divergence in how national cabinets respond to EU transposition
(Kaeding 2006; but see Dimitrakopoulos 2008). Similarities in institutional design
have been found chiefly at the level of position rules – in all three countries,
cabinets have established centralized units and committees responsible for
coordinating EU transposition. Dissimilarities in core executive
institutionalization have been most marked at the level of authority and
information rules. The article shows that central coordinators have been assigned
different prerogatives in different countries and at different times. This more
variegated picture of national adaptation is, in part, the result of applying a fine-
grained framework to the study of institutional design. But, perhaps more
importantly, these findings suggest that an expectation of prominent convergence
may be ill-founded. If national adaptation is critically shaped by incentives for
transposition and constitutional rules, then the patterns of cabinet adaptation to
EU transposition are likely to remain idiosyncratic and any evidence of
convergence may be short-lived.

The third – and perhaps most intriguing – lesson is that the degree of
centralization of cabinet lawmaking may be related to the quality of national
transposition with EU law. The existing literature on EU transposition has so far
given limited consideration to cabinet institutions as an explanation for variation
in national transposition records (Falkner et al. 2005; Schimmelfenning and
Sedelmeier 2005; but see Steunenberg 2006). Meanwhile, this analysis suggests
that, even if ministerial incentives for transposition are low due to negative cost-
benefit calculations, cabinets can achieve higher transposition by reinforcing the
core executive. The strength of the core executive will, however, have a much
lesser effect on domestic transposition where the ministerial incentives for good
transposition are generally positive. Such insights offer an interesting hypothesis
to be tested in future research on national cabinets and EU transposition.

Acknowledgments

The financial support from the Ernst & Young Better Government programme is
gratefully acknowledged. The author would like to thank Agnieszka Cielen,
Krisztina Jager and Vlastimil Necas who have provided invaluable research
support. Special thanks to Martin Lodge and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling for
offering critical comments on an earlier version of the paper.

15
Table 1. Governments, Prime Ministers and Party Composition in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic

Country Parliamentary Term Prime Minister Party Composition Minority/Majority

Czech Republic 1998-2002 Milos Zeman (1998-2002) CSSD Minority
2002-2006 Vladimir Spidla (2002-2004) CSSD, KDU-CSL, US-DEU Majority
Stanislav Gross (2004-2005) CSSD, KDU-CSL, US-DEU Majority
Jiri Paroubek (2005-2006) CSSD, KDU-CSL, US-DEU Majority
2006- Mirek Topolanek I (2006-2007) - Caretaker
Mirek Topolanek II (2007- ) ODS, KDU-CSL, SZ Minority
Hungary 1998-2002 Viktor Orban (1998-2002) FIDESZ, FKGP, MDF Majority
2002-2006 Peter Medgyessy (2002-2004) MSZP, SZDSZ Majority
Ferenc Gyurcsany I (2004-2006) MSZP, SZDSZ Majority
2006- Ferenc Gyurcsany II (2006- ) MSZP, SZDSZ Majority
Poland 1997-2001 Jerzy Buzek I (1997-2000) AWS, UW Majority
Jerzy Buzek II (2000-2001) AWS Minority
2001-2005 Leszek Miller I (2001-2003) SLD-UP-PSL Majority
Leszek Miller II (2003-2004) SLD-UP Minority
Marek Belka (2004-2005) SLD-UP Minority
2005-2007 Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (2005-2006) PiS (+LPR-Samoobrona from July 06) Minority (Majority from July 06)
Jaroslaw Kaczynski (2006-2007) PiS-LPR-Samoobrona Majority
2007- Dinal Tusk (2007- ) PO-PSL Majority
Source: own compilation

16
Table 2. Analytical Framework: Cabinet Rules and EU Transposition

Position Rules Authority Rules Information Rules

Transposition Planning

Is there a hierarchical or collective monitor
responsible for transposition planning inside the
executive?

Can the monitor programme transposition?
Does the authority monitor transposition
commitments?

Can the monitor check if all transposition
commitments are included in ministerial work plans?
Does the authority circulate this information widely?

Can the monitor ensure that departments take
account of EU deadlines when planning their work?

Substantive Review

Is there a hierarchical or collective monitor
responsible for reviewing the correctness and
completeness of transposition inside the executive?

Does the monitor have the authority to ensure that
Does the monitor receive all transposing measures
transposing measures are correct and complete? for review?

Can the monitor take a lead in preparing
transposition measures?

Does the monitor have the authority to have its views
accepted?

Deadline Monitoring

Is there a hierarchical or collective monitor
responsible for monitoring transposition deadlines
inside the executive?
Source: own compilation

Can the monitor request regular reports on progress
in transposition work?

Does the monitor have the authority to take remedial
action if problems are identified?

Does the monitor gate-keep notifications to the
European Commission?

Is non-departmental information on transposition
progress available to the monitor?

Are reports provided to the cabinet and the prime
minister?

17
Table 3. Core Executives in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic

Functions Cabinet Rules Poland Hungary Czech Republic

Before After Before After Before After
Accession Accession Accession Accession Accession Accession
Monitor exists + + + + -/+ -/+
Transposition Planning Monitor programmes transposition + -/+ + -/+ - -
Monitor reviews legislative plans -/+ - + + -/+ -/+
Monitor exists + + + + + +
Substantive Review Monitor ensures correctness + + + + + +
Monitor drafts horozontal measures + - + + - -
Monitor exists + + + + + -/+
Deadline Monitoring Monitor reviews progress regularly + -/+ + -/+ -/+ -
Monitor reports to PM/cabinet + - + - + -/+
Source: own compilation

18
REFERENCES

Andeweg, R. 1997. ‘Collegiality and Collectivity: Cabinets, Cabinet Committees and Cabinet
Ministers’, in Weller, P., H. Bakvis and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds), The Hollow Crown:
Countervailing Trends in Core Executive. London: Macmillan, pp. 58-83.
Andeweg, R. 2000. ‘Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process Between Cabinet
and Ministers’, European Journal of Political Research 37, 3, 377-95.
Börzel, T. A. 2001. ‘Non-Compliance in the European Union: Pathology or Statistical
Arefact?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 5, 803-24.
Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. 2003. ‘Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe’, in
Featherstone, K. and C.M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: OUP,
pp. 57-80.
Brusis, M. 2006. ‘Hungary: A Core Supreme’, in Dimitrov, V. T., K. H. Goetz and H.
Wollmann (eds), Governing after Communism: Institutions and Policy-making. Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 49-82.
Bulmer, S. and M. Burch. 1998. ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and
European Union’, Public Administration, 76, 4, 601–28.
Bulmer, S. and M. Burch. 2005. ‘The Europeanization of UK government: from Quiet
Revolution to Explicit Step-change?’, Public Administration, 83, 4, 861-90.
Dimitrakopoulos, D. G. 2001a. ‘The Transposition of EU Law: “Post-Decisional Politics”
and Institutional Autonomy’, European Law Journal, 7, 4, 442-58.
Dimitrakopoulos, D. G. 2001b. ‘Learning and Steering: Changing Implementation Patterns
and the Greek Central Government’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 4, 604-622.
Dimitrakopoulos, D. G. 2008. The Power of the Centre: Central Governments and the
Macro-Implementation of EU Public Policy, Manchester: MUP.
Dimitrov, V. T., K. H. Goetz and H. Wollmann. 2006. Governing after Communism:
Institutions and Policy-making, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Dimitrov, V.T. and R. Zubek. 2006. ‘The Czech Republic: A Core Neglected’, in Dimitrov,
V. T., K. H. Goetz and H. Wollmann (eds), Governing after Communism: Institutions
and Policy. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 129-58.
Dimitrova, A. and D. Toshkov. 2007. ‘The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy
in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In?’, West European Politics, 30, 5, 961-
86.
Dunleavy, P. and R. A. W. Rhodes. 1990. ‘Core Executive Studies in Britain’, Public
Administration, 68, 3-28.
Elgie, R. 1997. ‘Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executives
Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-presidential Regimes’, Political Studies, 45,
2, 217-31.
European Commission. 2003. Report on the results of the negotiations on the accession of
Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the
Czech Republic and Slovenia to the European Union. Brussels: Enlargement DG.
European Commission. 2004. Recommendation from the Commission on the Transposition
into National Law of Directives Affecting the Internal Market. Brussels, 12.7.2004,
SEC(2004) 918 final.
Falkner, G., M. Hartlapp, S. Leiber and O. Treib. 2004. ‘Non-Compliance with EU Directives
in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?’ West European Politics, 27, 3,
452–73.
Falkner, G., O. Treib, M. Hartlapp and S. Leiber. 2005. Complying with Europe? The Impact
of EU Minimum Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States, Cambridge: CUP.
Falkner, G., O. Treib and E. Holzleithner. 2008. Compliance in the Enlarged European
Union: Living Rights and Dead Letters?, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Fink-Hafner, D. 2007. ‘Europeanization in Managing EU Affairs: Between Divergence and
Convergence. A Comparative Study of Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia’, Public
Administration, 85, 3, 805-28.

19
Fiorina, M.P. and K. Shepsle. 1989. ‘Formal Theories of Leadership: Agents, Agenda-Setters
and Entrepreneurs’, in Jones, B.D. (ed.), Leadership and Politics: New Perspectives in
Political Science. Kansas: University of Kansas Press.
Frohlich, N., J.A. Oppenheimer and O.R. Young. 1971. Political Leadership and Collective
Goods, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Goetz, K.H. 2000. ‘European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an
Effect?’, in Goetz, K. and S. Hix (eds), Europeanised politics?: European integration
and national political systems. Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
Goetz, K.H. 2005. ‘The New Member States and the EU: Responding to Europe’, in Bulmer,
S. and C. Lequesne (eds), The Member States and of the European Union. Oxford: OUP.
Goetz, K.H. and J-H. Meyer-Sahling. 2008. ‘The Europeanisation of National Political
Systems: Parliaments and Executives’, Living Review in European Governance, 3, 2,
http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2008-2.
Hallerberg, M. 2004. Domestic Budgets in a United Europe: Fiscal Governance from the End
of Bretton Woods to EMU, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Haverland, M. and M. Romeijn. 2007. ‘Do Member States Make European Policies Work?
Analysing the EU Transposition Deficit’, Public Administration, 85, 3, 757–78.
Heritier, A., C. Knill and S. Mingers. 1996. Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory
Competition and the Transformation of the State. Britain, France, Germany, Berlin: De
Gruyer.
Kabele, J. and L. Linek. 2004. ‘Decision-making of the Czech Cabinet, EU Accession and
Legislative Planning Between 1998 and 2004’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint
Sessions, Uppsala, Sweden, April 13-18, 2004.
Kassim, H., B.G. Peters and V. Wright. 2000. The National Coordination of EU Policy: The
Domestic Level, Oxford: OUP.
Kaeding, M. 2006. ‘Determinants of Transposition Delay in the European Union’, Journal of
Public Policy, 26, 3, 229-53.
Kaeding, M. 2007. ‘Administrative Convergence Actually – An Assessment of the European
Commission’s Best Practices for Transposition of EU Legislation in France, Germany,
Italy, Sweden and Greece’, European Intergration, 29, 4, 425-45.
Laffan, B. 2006. ‘Managing Europe from home in Dublin, Athens and Helsinki: a
comparative analysis’, West European Politics, 29, 4, 687-708.
Laffan, B. 2007. ‘Core Executives’, in Graziano, P. and M. Vink (eds), Europeanization:
New Research Agenda. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Laffan, B. and J. O’Mahony. 2007. ‘Managing Europe from an Irish Perspective: Critical
Junctures and the Increasing Formalization of the Core Executive in Ireland’, Public
Administration, 85, 1, 167-88.
Lijphart, A. 1971. ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, American Political
Science Review, 65, 3, 682-93.
Lippert, B. and G. Umbach. 2005. The Pressure of Europeanization: From Post-Communist
State Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System, Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft.
Mendrinou, M. 1996. ‘Non-Compliance and the European Commission's Role in Integration’,
Journal of European Public Policy, 3, 1, 1-22.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, Cambridge: CUP.
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Rhodes, R. A. W. 1995. ‘From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive’, in R. A. W.
Rhodes and P. Dunleavy (eds), Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive. New York:
St Martin's Press.
Schiemann, J.W. 2004. ‘Hungary: The Emergence of Chancellor Democracy’, The Journal of
Legislative Studies, 10, 2/3, 128-41.
Schimmelfennig, F. and U. Sedelmeier (eds). (2005). Europeanization of Central and Eastern
Europe, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

20
Sedelmeier, U. 2007. ‘After Conditionality: Post-Accession Compliance with EU Law in East
Central Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15, 6, 806-25.
Siedentopf, H. and J. Ziller. 1998. Making European Policies Work: The Implementation of
Community Legislation in the Member States, London: Sage.
Sproule-Jones, M. 1993. Governments at Work: Canadian Parliamentary Federalism and Its
Public Policy Effects. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Steunenberg, B. 2006. ‘Turning Swift Policymaking into Deadlock and Delay: National
Policy Coordination and the Transposition of EU Directives’, European Union Politics,
7, 3, 293-319.
Steunenberg, B. and A. Dimitrova. 2007. ‘Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The
Limits of Conditionality’, European Integration Online Papers, 11, 5,
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2007-005a.htm.
Tallberg, J. 2003. European Governance and Supranational Institutions, London and New
York: Routledge.
Thomson, R., R. Torenvlied and J. Arregui. 2007. ‘The Paradox of Compliance:
Infringements and Delays in Transposing European Union Directives’, British Journal of
Political Science, 37, 4, 685–709.
Vassiliou, G. (ed.). 2007. The Accession Story: The EU From Fifteen to Twenty-Five
Countries, Oxford: OUP.
Zubek, R. 2005. ‘Complying with Transposition Commitments in Poland: Collective
Dilemmas, Core Executive and Legislative Outcomes’, West European Politics, 28, 3,
592-619.
Zubek, R. 2008. Core Executive and Europeanization in Central Europe, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.

21