The Institutionalisation of Multi-Level Governance: The Committee of The Regions and Inter-Institutional Relations With The Commission

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: THE
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND INTER-INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS WITH

THE COMMISSION
1- INTRODUCTION
It is part of conventional wisdom that governance refers to patterns of governing,
which vary from country to country. The core objective of governance is to reach binding decisions; it
is about translating citizens’ divergent interests and preferences into effective policy choices1. Taking
into account the developments undergone by governance at European level and the increased
participation of subnational authorities and social actors in the Community’s decision making process,
the background to this paper will be set taking into consideration European governance and,
specifically, the multi-level governance approach.
The presentation continues with a brief justification of the establishment of the CoR.
It is argued that although there are several factors behind the creation of this body, the pressure exerted
by the Commission is undeniable. The creation of this advisory body, where subnational authorities
are formally represented at EU level, could be considered as the institutionalisation of MLG. It also
represented the formalization of the third tier within the institutional structure of the EU.
The hypothesis to be tested in this article is that the Commission’s interest in the CoR,
before it was established and afterwards, has assisted this body in finding its position within the EU’s
institutional framework, also improving its relevance in the decision making process. Therefore, the
close relationship between the Commission and the CoR is analysed in depth. In this respect, and due
to the interest of the Commission in the CoR, their relationship was structured for the first time in
1995 when the Commission adopted a Communication on relations with the CoR. The provisions of
the Communication were renewed in 2001 with the adoption of a joint declaration on closer
cooperation. Their last cooperation agreement was adopted in 2007.
2- MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
The term governance refers to the structured ways in which the divergent preferences
of interdependent actors are transformed into policy choices, as a result the multiple interests of
citizens become coordinated action, which is obeyed by these actors2. As regards European
governance, it is not easy to define this term considering the attention it has attracted in public debate.
A wide variety of issues are considered when studying European governance: the nature of the
1
Kohler-Koch, B and Eising, R. (2002), The transformation of governance in the European Union, (London/
New York, Routledge).
2
1
European multi-level polity, the democratic deficit of the EU, and the subsequent Europeanization of
national policy systems3. The thing that appears as a common feature, and brings together political
scientists studying the EU, is that the traditional methods of governance are being displaced and
authority is shared among a variety of actors. Member States retain an important role in European
governance, but they are no longer the only actors in decision-making4. Member States governments
can no longer claim that they represent the interests of their citizens. As Kohler-Koch has defined it,
the EC is a negotiating system, which contains Community institutions and social and economic
actors representing the interests of citizens. In this negotiating system Member States are no longer
the centre of decision making; Member States are seen as mediators, whose aim is to reach a common
decision among the competing interests and an as activators in reaching common policies.5 In this
regard, considering how governance is evolving at the European level, one of the approaches dealing
with this study is Multi-level governance.
The concept of multi-level governance (MLG) was first used by Marks to explain the
developments undergone by the EU’s structural policy as a consequence of the 1988 reform. Since
then, this concept has been used by different scholars in order to explain the evolution of the
Community’s decision making process6.
Marks7 suggested that intergovernmental and neofunctional theories of the EC were
inadequate because they were too narrow. According to him, these theories conceived the
institutional building of the EC in a unique dimension going from national state domination to
supranational domination. He argued that the debate between these theories was sterile because it did
not take into account the mobilisation and empowerment of subnational governments. Consequently,
Marks stated that MLG was emerging in the European Community; and it is characterised by decision
making across several nested tiers of government. He took into consideration the development of
structural policy to explain the process of authority reallocation, emphasising that the devolution of
authority not only shifted to the supranational level, but also to the subnational level.
The MLG approach has to be contextualised in the period when the SEA was
adopted. During this period, the Commission won support from national governments for a profound
reform of the European Regional Policy in 1988 in order to establish the single market. National
governments accepted the Commission’s proposal, where it was recognised that regional funds should
be administered through partnership between supranational actors, national governments and regional
or local actors. From the study of the partnership principle and the developments in the structural
3
Kohler-Koch, B. (2003), Linking the EU and National Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
4
Cini, M. (2005), European Union Politics, (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press).
5
6
Bache, I. and Flinders, M. Themes and Issues in Multi-level Governance, in Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (2004),
Multi-Level Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
7
Marks, G. Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, in Grafuny A. and Roshenthal, G. (1993),
The State of the European Community, (New York, Lynne Riener).
2
policy, Marks developed the concept of MLG. He defined MLG as ‘a system of continuous
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers… that has pulled some previous
centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional
level’ (1993: 392). The term “multi-level”, refers to the interdependence of governments operating in
different levels and “governance” refers to the interdependence between governments and non
governmental actors at different levels.8 It could be said that ‘the departure point of multi-level
governance approach is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of
governments and the interaction of political actors across these levels’9.
Bache10 highlights that the main argument of multi-level governance is that
‘collective decision-making and the independent role of supranational institutions are eroding the
sovereignty of national governments in Europe’. As a consequence of this erosion of power, national
governments find it more difficult to control the activity of domestic actors in the international arena.
MLG does not neglect the importance of state executives; but the decision making competencies are
shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by the states11. In other words,
supranational actors have independent influence in policy making. According to this view the
political arenas where the decisions are taken, are interconnected rather than nested. They reject the
idea that the subnational arenas are nested within the national policy arena; consequently, subnational
actors participate in national and supranational arenas. Accordingly, it could be said that the State is
just another actor taking part in the decision making process. This perspective emphasises that the
central state still is a powerful actor in the EU decision making process, but is no longer the sole
mediator between the subnational and the supranational arenas. Other scholars have also suggested
that subnational actors are influenced by the decisions taken at the Community level and consequently
have mobilized to participate in decision making at the EU level by opening subnational lobbying
offices in Brussels. Accordingly in MLG, subnational actors are sometimes as important as central
governments and the EU institutions in the Community’s decision making process. In certain cases
central governments are not even able to act as gatekeepers between subnational actors and the EU. 12
Taking into account the establishment of this approach and its development, George13
has acknowledged that is not a surprise that MLG has been more extensively applied to the study of
8
Bache, I. and Flinders, M. Themes and Issues in Multi-level Governance, in Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (2004),
Multi-Level Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
9
Marks, G.; Nielsen, F.; Ray, L. and Salk, J. Competencies, Cracks and Conflicts. Regional Mobilization in the
European Union, in Marks, G.; Scharpf, F.W.; Schmitter, P.C. and Streeck, W. (1996), Governance in the
European Union, (London, Sage Publications Ltd.).
10
Bache, I. Theoretical Issues, in Bache, I. (1998), The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-
Level governance or Flexible Gatekeeping?, (Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press), page 22.
11
Marks, G.; Hooghe L. and Blank, K. (1996), European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric V. Multi-
level Governance, Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (3).
12
Sutcliffe, J. B. (2000), The 1999 reform of the structural fund regulations: multi-level governance or
renationalization?, Journal of European Public Policy 7 (2).
13
George, S. Multi-level Governance in the European Union, in Bache I. and Flinders, M. (2004), Multi-level
Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
3
the EU than to any other area of study. He also states that this approach has been criticised
extensively in its application. Several authors14 have found two main problems with Marks’s analysis
of MLG. On the one hand, the fact that relations between different levels of government are
increasing does not mean an effective challenge to centralized decision-making. In this respect it is
argued that Marks only referred to the participation of subnational governments in decision making
but not to the effect of this participation on decision making. On the other hand, they argue that
Marks avoided the term network in his analysis. These authors state that MLG describes the
changing structure of the European government, but it does not explain the variations to the previous
structure or the reasons why it has changed.
As regards these critics, other scholars consider them of varying validity. George
states that situating MLG in the context of the intergovernmental/ neofunctionalist debate allows us to
develop an understanding of MLG and to provide a definition of the term. This author believes that
MLG does not describe the EU, he argues that it is a theory to explain what kind of organisation the
EU is. Bache15 recognises that MLG has some merit in describing the policy making of the EU, but
also states that the evidence shows that national governments still operate as gatekeepers at various
stages of the decision-making process, not allowing a full emergence of real MLG. Consequently, it
could be argued that sometimes the consequence of this gatekeeping is a political arena characterised
by multi-level participation instead of MLG; in other words, subnational and supranational actors
participate in the process but do not influence significantly the decision making outcome. On the
other hand, Hooghe16 emphasises that ‘regions and local authorities increasingly participate in
European policy-making, and this participation often escapes the control of the traditional gatekeeper,
the national state executive’. She states that the European Cohesion Policy has become a matter of
European, national and subnational actors intermeshed through policy networks where the
differentiation between the three levels is blurred.
3- THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Considering MLG as the basis to explain the actual decision making process at the
EU; it needs to be emphasised that as part of the evolution suffered by the decision making process,
the Maastricht Treaty created the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Warleigh considers the creation
of the CoR as one of the most significant changes introduced by the TEU to transform the Community
14
Rhodes, R.A.W.; Bache, I. and George, S. Policy Networks and Policy-Making in the European Union: A
Critical Appraisal, in Hooghe, L. (1996), Cohesion Policy and European Integration. Building Multi-level
Governance, (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
15
Bache, I. Multi-Level governance or Flexible Gatekeeping?, in Bache, I. (1998), The Politics of European
Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level governance or Flexible Gatekeeping?, (Sheffield, Sheffield Academic
Press).
16
Hooghe, L. Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of the European Commission, in
Hooghe, L. (1996), Cohesion Policy and European Integration. Building Multi-level Governance, (Oxford,
Oxford University Press).
4
into the Union, ‘because it introduced a new group of elected actors into the formal decision making
system’.17 It could be said that the innovations brought by the TEU: the creation of the CoR, the
possibility of regional representatives participation at the Council of Ministers and the recognition of
the subsidiarity principle; together with the increasing decentralisation of Member States and the
increased participation of subnational actors at supranational level led to the emergence of the
analysis of European regionalism, which emphasised the establishment of a Third Level in the
European decision making.18 According to Jeffery the concept of Third Level in Europe had two
different meanings: on the one hand, in a strong sense it would refer to the political aspiration of
creating a Europe of the Regions, where a regional level of government would be created which
would have an active role in the European decision making alongside the supranational and the
national levels. On the other, in a weak sense, the concept of Third Level refers to the various
channels available to express subnational interests to supranational authorities19. Therefore, it could
be concluded that the creation of the CoR could be considered as the formalization of the Third Level
idea defended by the German länder during the 1980s. Their purpose was to establish an organism for
all the European regions, which would allow through cooperation among them to participate at the EU
independently from their national governments20.
As said before, there are several factors behind the creation of the CoR; but the
relevance of the Commission’s role in its establishment is undeniable. The Commission sought expert
advice and legitimisation through the establishment of the new consultative body. The pressure
exerted by powerful regional politicians on their national governments to participate at EU level
proved to be successful. Even the Council considered that the establishment of the CoR was a
valuable way to increase the transparency of the decision making21. Considering the new governing
patterns in Europe, where decisions are taken between several groups and tiers of actors, it could be
said that the establishment of the CoR reflects the institutionalisation of MLG. As a consequence,
since the establishment of the CoR, subnational actors have a formally recognised body to add to the
previously existing channels available to influence the Community’s decision making22.
17
Warleigh, A. (1999) The Committee of the Regions: Institutionalising Multi-level Governance?, (London,
Kogan Page Limited).
18
Ramon, R. (2004) ‘El Comite de las Regiones: el largo camino hacia la institutionalizacion de la Europa
multinivel’ in Morata, F. Gobernanza multinivel en la Union Europea, (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch), page 285.
19
Jeffery, C. (1997) The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe?,
(London, Frank Cass & Co Ltd).
20
Ramon, R. (2004) ‘El Comite de las Regiones: el largo camino hacia la institutionalizacion de la Europa
multinivel’ in Morata, F. Gobernanza multinivel en la Union Europea, (Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch), page 286.
21
22
5
4- THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND THE COMMISSION
Several authors, among them Tömmel, argue that new ways of governance emerged
(MLG) in Europe as a consequence of the Commission’s actions and strategies to implement and
formulate policies and also because of the subsequent reaction of the subnational tier and other
actors23. Accordingly, this author states that the Commission used several channels to influence the
regional policy-making and functioning in order to pursue its strategy of involving the subnational
level in European decision making. One of the channels used by the Commission was the inclusion of
regional governments in European decision making through the creation of advisory bodies, in
particular the CoR24.
The relationship between the CoR and the Commission is very strong. It could be
considered as the foundation of the CoR’s influence. The relevance of the CoR from the
Commission’s perspective lies in the fact that it helps to increase its legitimacy25. Therefore, it could
be said that the Commission sees the CoR as a useful body for its own purposes. In certain cases
when the Commission has a proposal that Member States and even the Parliament does not support it,
it is useful for the Commission to have the CoR on board. In these cases the Commission can argue
that the proposal is an issue that affects the subnational tier and that they have the support of the
CoR26. Since the establishment of the CoR, the Commission goes beyond what the Treaty of
Maastricht requires; by informing the Committee of the issues it is going to be consulted on; by
sending feedback on the CoR’s Opinions; by sending staff and commissioners to the CoR’s plenary
sessions. Not only did the Commission support the establishment of the CoR, but it still is one of the
main supporters of the body within the EU’s decision making system27.
The Commission’s need to structure its relationship further than what was stated in
the Treaty led the Commission to adopt a Communication on relations with the CoR on the 18th of
April 199528. The provisions of this document were renewed at the CoR’s 40th plenary session held in
September 2001 where a Joint Declaration on closer cooperation between the President of the
European Commission and the President of the Committee of the Regions was signed. Both the
European Commission and the CoR were interested in going further in their cooperation agreement by
attaching a protocol to the joint declaration, whose implementing provisions replaced the ones set in
23
Tömmel, I. (1998) ‘Transformation of Governance: The European Commission’s Strategy for Creating a
‘Europe of the Regions’’, Regional and Federal Studies 8(2).
24
Tömmel, I. (1998) ‘Transformation of Governance: The European Commission’s Strategy for Creating a
‘Europe of the Regions’’, Regional and Federal Studies 8(2).
25
26
Information obtained in the interview held with Robert Collins, coodinateur of the Irish national delegation in
the CoR on the 28 of April 2009.
27
28
Huici Sancho, L (2003) El Comité de las Regiones: su función en el proceso de integración europea,
(Barcelona, Publicacions de la Universitat de Barcelona).
6
the Commission’s Communication of April 199529. Nowadays, after further negotiation among the
CoR and the Commission (revised in 2005), a new Protocol governing arrangements for cooperation
between the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions was adopted between the
President of the CoR (Peter Straub) and the President of the Commission (Jose Manuel Barroso) on
the 5th of June 2007, which replaces the protocol adopted on the 21st of September 200130. In this
protocol, the CoR together with its consultative competences has gained specific political
competences (explained below)31.
The objectives of the Commission and CoR cooperation agreement are: to strengthen
the CoR’s consultative role by improving the planning of its work and providing for better follow-up
reports; to facilitate dialogue with local authorities; to ensure better implementation of the subsidiarity
principle; to support the EU’s external action by improving dialogue with the local level of third
countries; and to build up communication to bring Europe closer to the people32.
On 21 April 1995, Mrs Wulf-Mathies Commissioner for Regional Policy and
Relations with the CoR delivered a speech at the CoR's 7th Plenary Session33. In this speech she stated
that the Commission had decided on several measures to improve cooperation with the CoR, one
being the Commission’s compromise to consult the CoR not only in the areas envisaged by the
Treaty, also when the subject in question would affect regional and/or local interests34. It is
interesting to note that the Commission decided not to restrict itself to requesting the CoR’s opinion
only in the fields where consultation was mandatory according to the Treaty. Consequently, when the
matter at stake is affected by one of the following three criteria, the Commission can request the
opinion of the CoR (optional opinion) when it considers it appropriate: firstly, when the matter at
stake affects the regulatory or implementation powers of subnational entities; secondly, where the
planned legislative provisions will have direct effect on the operation of local or regional authorities;
and thirdly, where Community measures will have different economic effects in different regions,
29
Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (2001) Cooperation agreement between the European
Commission and the Committee of the Regions (online) available:
http://www.ena.lu/cooperation_agreement_european_commission_committee_regions_20_september_2001-
020003713.html
30
Committee of the Regions (2007) Addendum to the Protocol on the cooperation agreements between the
Committee of the Regions and the European Commission (online) available: www.cor.europa.eu .
31
Domorek, E. (2009) ‘The Committee of the Regions: in Search of Identity’, Regional and Federal Studies
19(2).
32
Committee of the Regions and the European Commission (online) available: www.cor.europa.eu (accessed on
the 9/7/2009).
33
Committee of the Regions (1995) Minutes of the 7th Plenary sesión of the Comittee of the Regions held on 20
and 21 April 1995 at the Espace Leopold (European Parliament) CdR 149/95. Appendix II to the Minutes,
Speech delivered by Mrs Monika Wulf-Mathies Commissioner for Regional Policy and relations with the
Committee of the Regions.
34
Huici Sancho, L (2003) El Comite de las Regiones: su function en el proceso de integracion europea,
7
affecting the economic and social cohesion of the EU35. The cooperation protocol adopted in 2007
added other criteria to this list, when the measure relates to informing the European public and raising
their awareness of EU policies36. Together with the mandatory and optional opinions, following the
adoption of the 2001 protocol, there is a third category of opinions, which contains ‘outlook reports’
and ‘outlook opinions’. According to the 2001 protocol, the Commission shall encourage the CoR to
draw strategic documents reviewing topics that the Commission considers important. These strategic
documents, ‘outlook reports’, would explore in depth, topics where the CoR has appropriate
information resources. Similarly, the Commission may request that the CoR draws up ‘outlook
opinions’ in areas where the Commission considers that the CoR has relevant competence, knowledge
and expertise37. In the 2007 cooperation protocol these ‘outlook opinions’ are better regulated;
accordingly, the request for outlook opinions should be accompanied by a specific mandate,
appropriate deadlines and a coherent framework for action38. According to Collins, when the
Commission requests that the CoR forwards an outlook opinion, this is done before the drafting of the
Commission’s legislative proposal. Therefore, outlook opinions could be considered as the CoR’s
most powerful formally recognised channel to ‘set’ the Commission’s agenda or to influence the
drafting of the proposal39. The Commission can also request that CoR to takes part in studies looking
at the impact of certain proposals and, in exceptional circumstances, can request that the CoR
participates in impact reports on certain Directives40.
The Commission and the CoR develop their cooperation with the adoption of
different measures. One of the measures adopted is the forwarding of the Commission’s annual work
programme stating in what matters the CoR is going to be consulted; allowing the CoR's bureau to
programme their own workload and to share the work among the different commissions within the
CoR. This working method has been consolidated over time becoming one of the fundamental factors
35
Europa (1995) Closer Cooperation with the Committee of the Regions (press release), 19/04/1995, available:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/95/392&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en .
36
the 9/7/2009).
37
020003713.html.
38
the 9/7/2009).
39
Information obtained in the interview held with Robert Collins, coodinateur of the Irish national delegation in
the CoR on the 28 of April 2009.
40
the 9/7/2009).
8
of the CoR's consultative function41. It needs to be clarified that nowadays the CoR tries to influence
the Commission's annual working programme. By doing this, they are trying to extend their influence
by trying to shape the topics on which the Commission might draft legislative proposals42.
The fact that the Commission participates directly in the CoR’s work is another
measure adopted to develop their cooperation. In this respect, the Commission’s participation has
increased over time. The initial participation foreseen was the participation of Commissioners and
their departments in the CoR’s Plenary Sessions43. Nowadays, the Commission has requested the
possibility of explaining to regional and local representatives several of its main initiatives44. Two
types of participation can be distinguished: the participation of the Commission President and
Commissioners and the participation of the Commission’s departments. On the one hand, normally
the Commissioner responsible for relations with the CoR participates at the Plenary Sessions. Once a
year, a meeting organised between the President of the CoR and the President of the Commission or
the Vice-president in charge with relations with the CoR to examine their priorities and topics of
common interest and to review the application of the cooperation protocol45. The purpose of this
meeting is to determine topics on which political cooperation between the CoR and the Commission
could develop further. These topics should be top matters on the European agenda. The meeting
between the two Presidents is prepared in a previous meeting of the Secretaries General46. As regards
the participation of the Commission’s departments in the working of the CoR, the Cooperation
Agreement implies that the Commission officials responsible for working with the CoR should
participate as much as possible in the meetings they are invited to, setting out the Commission’s
proposal and taking into consideration the position expressed by the members of the CoR47. The good
41
(Barcelona, Publicacions de la Universitat de Barcelona), page 248.
42
Information obtained in the interview held with Mr Michael Hager, on the 29/4/2009. Mr Hager is a member
of cabinet of Vice-president of the Commission Margot Wallstrom in charge of Institutional Relations and
Communication. Among other things Mr Hager is in charge of the relations of the Commission with the CoR.
43
44
(Barcelona, Publicacions de la Universitat de Barcelona), page 248.
45
020003713.html .
46
the 9/7/2009), page 2 paragraph 3.
47
020003713.html .
9
relationship between the Commission and the CoR has led to the joint organization of, and
participation in, seminars, hearings and conferences on matters of common interest48. As a
consequence, the development of joint activities has been recognised as one of the collaboration
modes between the Commission and the CoR in the cooperation protocol signed in 2001. According
to this protocol, the Commission and the CoR have decided to go further in their collaboration in
order to improve the impact of the activities undertaken by their services in the context of inter-
regional and trans-European cooperation and the programmes related to cohesion policy49.
Finally, the Commission has committed itself to providing follow-up reports to CoR
opinions, although this obligation is not recognised by the Treaty. According to the speech given by
Commissioner Wulf-Mathies at the Committee’s Plenary Session in 1995, the Commission would
forward a written report on steps taken by the Commission on the CoR’s recommendations50. In the
protocol adopted in 2001, the Commission agrees to forward substantive replies to the CoR,
explaining why the recommendations of the opinions have or have not been considered, in order that
the CoR can prepare impact assessments of its work. It continues by stating that the recommendations
accepted by the Commission shall be incorporated in its amended proposal51.
In the 2007 cooperation agreement, three particular roles specific to the CoR are
recognised: the CoR is considered an intermediary for local authorities; therefore the Commission
recognises the role played by the CoR as a link between the EU institutions and subnational
authorities. The Commission also believes that the CoR should play a particular role in the
implementation of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. Accordingly, it is stated that the
CoR’s work should evolve in collaboration with the Commission to create a subsidiarity culture,
based in MLG, where decisions are taken at the closest level to the citizen, by the most appropriate
means and where they can most effectively achieve their objective. Lastly, the Commission
the 9/7/2009).
48
020003713.html .
49
020003713.html .
the 9/7/2009).
50
51
020003713.html .
10
recognises that the CoR may play a relevant role in the external dimension of the EU. As a
consequence, the CoR, at the request of the Commission, should develop activities in several spheres
of external EU action where subnational authorities have recognised powers. In this role, the CoR’s
cooperation with the Commission would focus in areas such as: supporting the enlargement process
and participating in pre-accession policy; supporting the neighbourhood policy; promoting
subnational democracy in third countries; promoting decentralised cooperation and cross-border
cooperation52.
5- CONCLUSIONS
If we have a look at the CoR’s work impact reports, we can clearly see the relevance
of the cooperation agreements with the Commission and how these agreements have helped the CoR
to develop its participation in the decision-making process, and to find its place in the Community’s
institutional framework. According to the 1999 impact report, an important objective of that term was
to integrate the CoR into the European institutional framework53. In this regard, the CoR considered
that political discussions with the Commission should increase and to step up this form cooperation
the CoR was to adopt resolutions on the Commission’s annual work programme. Considering the
CoR’s impact reports of the following years, it is clear that the Committee’s position in the
Community’s institutional framework has evolved satisfactorily. In 2003, the CoR considered that it
had succeeded in being recognised as the representative of local and regional authorities in the inter-
institutional play54. This was achieved through various approaches; such as, the adoption of opinions
on Commission proposals, the new outlook reports, and participating in public discussions and in the
Community’s policy formatio process. In the report of 2004, the CoR recognises that the
relationships with the three institutions are at different levels of development; but nonetheless, these
relationships are evolving55. As regards the cooperation with the Commission, it comprises legislative
programming, legislative and non-legislative programming, pre-legislative consultation and the
follow-up reports of the Commission to the CoR opinions. Considering the CoR’s work impact
reports, it could be said that the CoR has succeeded in finding its place within the Community’s
institutional framework, taking into account that in 1999 this was the objective to attain and by 2004
the CoR recognises that relations with the three institutions are at different levels of development. It
could be said that, as the relations of the CoR with the Commission are the only ones formalised in
52
Committee of the Regions and the European Commission (online) available: www.cor.europa.eu
53
Committee of the Regions (2000) Update on Committee of the Regions work, 45th Meeting of the Bureau of
the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, 4 February 1999), CdR 439/99 (online) available : www.cor.europa.eu
54
Committee of the Regions (2003) Impact report on the work of the Committee of the Regions in 2001 and
first half of 2002, 71st Meeting of the Bureau of the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, 2 June 2003), CdR
134/2003 (online) available: www.cor.europa.eu
55
Committee of the Regions (2005, CoR Impact Assessment report 2004, 86th Committee of the Regions
Bureau meeting, (Brussels, 29 March 2005), CdR 62/2005 (online) available: www.cor.europa.eu
11
the Cooperation Protocol, the other EU institutions are following the path established by the
Commission and that is the reason why the CoR relations with the three institutions are developing at
different levels.
Considering the evolution of the cooperation agreements between the Commission
and the CoR since the first Communication in 1995 until the actual 2007 Cooperation Protocol; it
could be said that the Commission has always been a strong supporter of the CoR. Over time, more
and more measures have been put in place in order to ensure that the CoR’s point of view is taken on
board from an early stage in the decision making process. 56 Considering the Commission’s follow-up
reports on the CoR opinions for the last two years, we can see that the Commission has requested
several Outlook Opinions from the CoR, reflecting how the Commission has applied the Cooperation
Protocol reached with the CoR, and not just seeing it as a formality between the Commission and the
CoR. It should be noted that it is very important for the CoR to be requested to provide for these
Outlook Opinions considering that they are drawn up before the legislative process is initiated;
therefore the CoR finds itself in a position where it can really influence the Commission’s legislative
proposal. Reflecting the inherent potential for the CoR to be involved at a very early stage in the
Community’s legislative process57.
Due to the compromises acquired by the CoR in their relations the Commission has
undergone several modifications in its own organizational structure. From an administrative
perspective: on the one hand, the Secretariat General has undergone the creation of a unit which
coordinates the work of the units in the Commission DGs and the respective commissions (according
to the matter) of the CoR; and on the other, within each Directorat General a member in charge of
coordinating the activities related with the CoR has been designated58.
The Commission’s positive approach towards the CoR was also reflected in the
White Paper on European Governance. According to this paper, the principles to be followed in order
to achieve good governance in Europe are the following ones: openness, participation, accountability,
effectiveness and coherence. In this last principle the Commission refers explicitly to the increased
involvement of local and regional authorities in EU policies. The White Paper continues by stating
that the application of these five principles reinforces the principles of proportionality and
subsidiarity, which have been expressly cited in the 2007 cooperation protocol between the
Commission and the CoR59. In a recent Opinion60, the CoR states that MLG ensures that these
56
Information obtained from the interview held with Simona Ardovino, administrator within the CoR’s
Commission for Constitutional Affairs, European Governance and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
(CONST) on the 28 of April 2009.
57
32-39 Rapport, Suivi Accorde par la Comisión aux avis du Comité des Regions (2007-2009), (online)
available: www.cor.europa.eu
58
Domorek, E. (2009) ‘The Committee of the Regions: in Search of Identity’, Regional and Federal Studies 19(2).
59
European Commission (2001) European Governance A White Paper Doc. COM(2001) 428 final, 25/7/2001.
12
principles underpinning good governance are implemented, maintained and enhanced. The CoR
provides for a definition of MLG as ‘coordinated action by the EU, the Member States and local and
regional authorities, based on partnership and aimed at drawing up and implementing EU policies’61.
It continues by stating that MLG and the principle of subsidiarity are indissociable; clarifying that
subsidiarity refers to the different tiers of government, whereas MLG emphasises their interaction.
The good relationship between the Commission and the CoR does not mean that there
are not important differences between them, mainly centred on issues that could pose a threat to the
Commission’s institutional position62. In this respect, the CoR’s request to become a Community
institution, its request to have the right to address oral and written questions to the Commission, or its
proposal to participate at the Community’s legislation initiation (Commission’s exclusive
competence), did not receive any support from the Commission63. Therefore, it could be said that the
Commission supports the CoR’s advisory role but as regards strengthening the Committee’s
institutional position, the Commission seems favourable as long as the CoR remains within the limits
of the Commission’s interests64.
Therefore, it could be concluded that from the good relationship of the Commission
and the CoR; and from the formalisation of their relationship in cooperation agreements which have
developed and implemented effectively during this time, the CoR has been gaining influence and
recognition in the EU’s decision making process and the institutional framework.
Arantza Lasuen Gallastegui

PhD in Politics and Public Administration
University of Limerick
Ireland
Funded by the Basque Government
60
Committee of the Regions (2009) Own initiative opinion, White Paper on Multi-level Governance, 80th
Plenary Session, 17 and 18 June 2009. CdR 89/2009
61
Committee of the Regions (2009) Own initiative opinion, White Paper on Multi-level Governance, 80th
Plenary Session, 17 and 18 June 2009. CdR 89/2009
62
63
Committee of the Regions (2002) Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on More democracy, transparency
and efficiency in the European Union, 21 November 2001. CdR 120/2002.
64
Domorek, E. (2009) ‘The Committee of the Regions: in Search of Identity’, Regional and Federal Studies
19(2).
13
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
BOOKS:
1. Bache, I. (1998) The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-
Level Governance or Flexible Gatekeeping? (Sheffield, Sheffield Academic
Press).
2. Bache, I. And Flinders M. (2004) Multi-Level Governance (Oxford, Oxford
University Press).
3. Cini, M. (2005), European Union Politics, (Oxford and New York, Oxford
University Press.
4. Grafuny, A. And Roshental, G. (1993) The State of the European Community
(New York, Lynne Riener).
5. Hooghe L. (1996) Cohesion Policy and European Integration. Building
Multi-level Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
6. Huici Sancho L. (2003) El Comite de las Regiones: su funcion en el proceso
de integracion europea (Barcelona, Publicacions de la Universitat de
Barcelona).
7. Jeffery, C. (1997) The Regional Dimension of the European Union. Towards
a Third Level in Europe? (London Frank Cass &Co Ltd).
8. Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. (2002), The transformation of governance in
the European Union, (London/ New York, Routledge).
9. Kohler-Koch, B. (2003), Linking the EU and National Governance, (Oxford,
Oxford University Press).
10. Marks, G.; Scharpf, F.W.; Schmitter, P.C. and Streck, W. (1996) Governance
in the European Union (London, Sage Publications Ltd).
11. Morata, F. (2004) Gobernanza multinivel en la Union Europea (Valencia
Tirant lo Blanch).
12. Warleigh, A. (1999) The Committee of the Regions: Institutionalising Multi-
Level Governance? (London, Kogan Page Limited).
JOURNALS:
1. Domorek, E. (2009) ‘The Committee of the Regions: in Search of Identity’,
Regional and Federal Studies 19(1), p 143-163.
2. Marks, G.; Hooghe, L. And Blank K. (1996) ‘European Integration from the
1980s: State-Centric Vs Multi-Level Governance’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 34(3), p 341-378.
14
3. Sutcliffe, J.B. (2000) ‘The 1999 reform of the structural fund regulations:
multi-level governance or renationalization’, Journal of European Public
Policy 7(2), p 341-378.
4. T mmel, I. (1998) ‘Transformation of Governance: The European
Commission’s Strategy for Creating a ‘Europe of the Regions’’, Regional and
Federal Studies 8(2), p 52-80.
OTHER DOCUMENTS:
1. Minutes of the 7th Plenary Session of the Committee of the Regions held on
20 and 21 April 1995. Speech delivered by Mrs Monika Wulf-Mathies
Commissioner for Regional Policy and relations with the Committee of the
Regions. CdR 149/95. Appendix II to the Minutes.
2. Cooperation agreement between the European Commission and the
Committee of the Regions (20 September 2001).
http://www.ena.lu/cooperation_agreement_european_commission_committee
_regions_20_september_2001-020003713.html (accessed on the 9/7/2009).
3. Addendum to the Protocol on the cooperation agreements between the
Committee of the Regions and the European Commission (5/6/2007).
www.cor.europa.eu
4. Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2002 on More
democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union. CdR
120/2002.
5. Own initiative opinion of the Committee 2of the Regions on the Committee
of the Regions’ White Paper on Multilevel Governance 17 and 18 June 2009.
CdR 89/2009.
6. Commission of the European Communities (2001) European Governance, A
White Paper, COM (2001) 4228 final, 25/7/2001.
7. Europa (1995) Closer Cooperation with the Committee of the Regions (press
release), 19/04/1995.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/95/392&format=
HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
8. Committee of the Regions (2000) Update on Committee of the Regions work,
45th Meeting of the Bureau of the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, 4
February 1999), CdR 439/99 (online) available : www.cor.europa.eu
9. Committee of the Regions (2003), Impact report on the work of the
Committee of the Regions in 2001 and first half of 2002, 71st Meeting of the
15
Bureau of the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, 2 June 2003), CdR
10. Committee of the Regions (2005, CoR Impact Assessment report 2004, 86th
Committee of the Regions Bureau meeting, (Brussels, 29 March 2005), CdR
11. 32-39 Rapport, Suivi Accorde par la Comisión aux avis du Comité des
Regions (2007-2009), (online) available: www.cor.europa.eu
16

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THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: THE

COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND INTER-INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS WITH

3- THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Arantza Lasuen Gallastegui

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