Beyers-2002-European Journal of Political Research

European Journal of Political Research 41: 585–612, 2002 585
Gaining and seeking access: The European adaptation of domestic

interest associations
JAN BEYERS
Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium and
ARENA, University of Oslo, Norway
Abstract. The multilevel governance literature on European politics argues that suprana-
tional governing arrangements have increased their autonomy vis-à-vis national govern-
ments. As private interests increasingly bypass national levels and become active in
transnational Euro-level policy networks, national governments are no longer the sole inter-
face between supranational and national levels. In contrast, the European Union might also
be conceptualised as a two-level interstate negotiation system, an approach assuming that
interests are formed and aggregated at the national level. Societal interests enter the fray
of European negotiations via national executives, and private interests bypassing the
national level are considered as a rather marginal, even irrelevant, phenomenon. In addi-
tion, both accounts expect different outcomes regarding which sorts of private interests –
diffuse or specific – seek and gain access to both domestic and European public actors. By
analysing the varying network strategies of domestic private actors, in particular interest
associations, this article explores some propositions held by these two approaches. After a
more comprehensive outline of some hypotheses, evidence collected among public and
private actors at both the domestic (Belgian) and European levels will be analysed. In
general, the results suggest that Euro-level networks of domestic interests are substantially
related to their structural location within the domestic realm, that network strategies tend
to be quite bureaucratic and that the sort of interest represented – diffuse or specific – has
a considerable effect on gaining and seeking access.
Introduction
As participation in Euro-level policy making becomes an increasingly impor-

tant activity for Member States, domestic political actors – public and private
– are supposed to adapt their political strategies and their modes of influenc-
ing policy outcomes. The objective of this article is to explore how domestic
private actors – in particular interest associations – cope with Europe, the
network strategies they develop and why some domestic private actors’ strate-
gies are more ‘Europeanised’ than others. The starting point is that Europe
affects domestic politics in such a way that domestic interest associations may
become increasingly integrated in Euro-level policy processes. However, it is
also suggested that the supposed Europeanisation of domestic interest asso-
© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
586 jan beyers
ciations may be substantially stimulated or constrained, on the one hand, by

the degree to which they are embedded in domestic policy networks and, on
the other, by the constituencies they represent.
Much research on European interest mobilisation has focused on
European peak associations, their linkages with European institutions and
their – mostly national – member associations, and the entrepreneurial role of
European institutions in the emergence of Euro-level interest associations
(Greenwood & Aspinwall 1998; Mazey & Richardson 1993). However, studies
of interest representation have remained somewhat biased towards an ex-
amination of Euro-level private actors – especially companies, lobby-firms or
peak associations (Tarrow 1995). Studies simultaneously focusing on the inter-
action between private and public actors cross-cutting the domestic and Euro-
pean arena are still somewhat uncommon (an exception is Pappi & Henning
1999). Moreover, despite the explosion of publications and research in this
field, leading scholars express rather opposite views – often based on frag-
mented small-N case studies within one sector (e.g., agriculture, social policy
or the environment) or related to one type of actors (e.g., business associa-
tions or environmental NGOs). Although these studies offer insight into the
policy process and are powerful hypothesis-generating devices, it remains dif-
ficult to derive from them a coherent picture of the role of associations. On
several important questions systematic and cumulative research is still in its
infancy. For instance, do national private actors use indirect (e.g., via domes-
tic governments) or direct (e.g., via the European Commission) routes to
Europe? Do the emergence and the impact of Euro-level associations lead to
a declining relevance of domestic policy-making processes? It is clear that
more systematic empirical testing across different political levels and kinds of
interest association is needed before a more general picture of how European
policies are made can be developed (Fairbrass & Jordon 2001: 515).
In order to investigate these issues, two theoretical views are contrasted.
On the one hand, Europe can be conceptualised as a system of multilevel gov-
ernance (hereafter ‘MLG’) (Coleman & Perl 1999; Ebbinghaus 1996; Marks
1996; Marks et al. 1996). On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalists
view Europe as a two-level interstate negotiation system (hereafter ‘LIG’)
(Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1999; Putnam 1988). These two theoretical views have
quite different implications for, first, the relevance of domestic politics and,
second, the interaction between public and private actors.
The intergovernmental perspective affirms the primacy and autonomy of
domestic executives in forming and aggregating interests, whereas the litera-
ture on MLG argues that domestic executives have lost their grip on the medi-
ation of societal interests. While MLG stresses the development of distinct and
autonomous European institutions, LIG claims that national executives main-

european adaptation of domestic interest associations 587
tain control over European policy making. Because national governments no

longer monopolise public policy making, as the MLG literature suggests, the
articulation and aggregation of interests take places at different policy levels
and, increasingly at the European level. Conversely, LIG argues that interests
are primarily articulated domestically and that national governments play a
key role in aggregating these societal interests. According to LIG, concen-
trated or specific societal interests matter; for various reasons, national gov-
ernments are biased against diffuse interests. An MLG perspective implies a
multiplication of governmental actors and a fragmentation of interconnected
competencies, which in turn increase the channels of access for interest asso-
ciations. It is by building policy networks beyond state borders that private
actors may improve their overall access to public policy making. However, the
MLG literature has remained (as will be shown in somewhat more detail
below) rather inconclusive on how domestic institutional factors stimulate or
inhibit the development of cross-border network strategies. One part of the
MLG literature predicts an enhanced mobilisation of diffuse interests, while
other MLG authors expect a bias against these sorts of interests.
The first two sections elaborate on these contending claims about the
alleged bias against diffuse interests and the Europeanisation of interest
representation. A brief review of the literature will establish some competing
hypotheses regarding the correlation between interest associations’ domestic
embededdness (i.e., their success in gaining access to domestic public actors)
and their Euro-level strategies (i.e., their seeking of access to Europe). The
third section outlines the research design that incorporates the notion of ‘mul-
tilevelness’. Then follows a description of the interest associations’ network
strategies and an exploration of how these strategies are related to the levels
of access different associations enjoy. Before this, however, two important
aspects – the notion of ‘access’ and the limitation of the study to Belgian
interest associations – are briefly clarified.
‘Access’ is defined as the channelling or exchange of policy-relevant infor-
mation through formal or informal networks with public actors. In this article,
‘access’ will be further specified. Interest associations may try to access dif-
ferent sorts of public actors – political parties, civil servants or particular insti-
tutions such as the Council of Ministers, the European Commission or the
European Parliament – or they may, given the multilevel nature of European
politics, spread or concentrate their efforts over different levels – domestic and
European. Interest associations can also be characterised by, on the one hand,
the extent to which they seek access to public actors and, on the other hand,
the extent to which they effectively succeed in obtaining access. Nonetheless,
it is important to stress that gaining access is not equal to having influence on
policy outcomes; access should be considered as a necessary, but not sufficient

588 jan beyers
condition for influence (Bouwen 2002). Here, it is assumed that developing

network strategies is an attempt to gain influence. Likewise, it is assumed that
interest associations with greater levels of access may possess an information
advantage over other actors, information that might be used in the develop-
ment of policy positions, the improvement of influence strategies or public
campaigning.
For practical reasons it was decided to limit the empirical study to one
Member State – namely, Belgium. Although a country study is not inevitably
an exploration of an outlier, it should be recognised that the degree of access
may vary according to national institutional features and, therefore, conclu-
sions are coloured by the characteristic features of the political system under
investigation. One could plausibly argue that the corporatist arrangement of
Belgian politics affects interest associations’ practices and, therefore, biases
the research outcome. However, from current writings it remains unclear
whether longstanding and well-established public-private interactions, as is the
case in corporatist systems, inhibit or enhance the Europeanisation of domes-
tic interest associations and so it is difficult to estimate beforehand how the
outcome will be biased. As this article deals with one corporatist polity, it is
indeed hard to derive comparative conclusions about how corporatism or
pluralism affects the Europeanisation of interest associations across different
Member States.
Despite these limitations, the focus on corporatist Belgium is not neces-
sarily a drawback since there are good reasons to consider it as a critical case
in itself. One question addressed in this article is whether or not peripheral or
weak groups take advantage of the multilevel nature of Europe and bypass
their national governments. Here corporatist polities are interesting cases
because such systems are characterised by a limited number of peak interest
associations recognised as legitimate interlocutors by state actors, and these
peak associations are often deeply involved in policy making and implemen-
tation. In this respect, the ideal-type corporatist system exemplifies a higher
within-case variance between those interests with institutionalised access and
those having no access at all (when compared to statist systems where public
actors enjoy a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis societal actors or pluralistic
systems where institutionalised policy networks are less marked).
In addition, Belgium can be considered, for a number of reasons, as fertile
ground for possible successful Europeanisation. Its political elite shares a con-
sensual pro-federalist Europeanist ideology (albeit to a varying degree), and
so potential suspicion towards Euro-level institutional actors should be low
(Beyers & Kerremans 2001). The notion of ‘national sovereignty’ is not deeply
rooted, and most public discourse surrounding national sovereignty is nega-
tive. As one of the founding members of the European Union, its politico-

administrative system has a longstanding familiarity with Euro-level policy

making. Furthermore, the institutional features of multilevel Belgium re-
semble some of those found in the European Union, and consequently, the
circumstances Belgian actors are confronted with at the European level match
their domestic experiences. They are used to multinational and multilinguis-
tic settings within their own domestic realm, and Euro-level decision-making
processes are geographically close to domestic decision-making centres. More-
over, societal interests in small Member States presumably have added reason
to Europeanise their strategies. The voting power of small Member States is
limited, and the chance that (in the Belgian case) five votes will block a deci-
sion is remote.
Diffuse and specific interests
The distinction between diffuse and specific interests relates to the con-
stituencies associations represent and upon which they rely for political
mobilisation (Dunleavy 1988; Olson 1971). First, there are the so-called ‘non-
producer interests’ or ‘public interest groups’ which lack a well delineated and
– in socioeconomic terms – concentrated constituency. They typically defend
so-called ‘diffuse interests’, interests that are linked to broad and general seg-
ments of society (e.g., consumers or women), to socioeconomic segments in
third countries (e.g., the Third World) or to future generations (e.g., the envi-
ronment). Typical Euro-level examples are environmental groups (e.g., the
European Environmental Bureau), consumers groups (e.g., the European
Community and Consumer Cooperatives) and solidarity associations or
distant issue movements (e.g., Liaison Committees of NGOs). Second, specific
interests, also called ‘socio-economic’ or ‘producer interest groups’, have a
clear-cut stake in the production process and, in general, they represent and
defend the interests of rather well circumscribed or more concentrated
constituencies. Euro-level examples are trade unions (e.g., the European
Federation of Metalworkers), employers unions (e.g., the European Centre of
Enterprises with Public Participation) and associations linked to a particular
sector (telecommunications, agriculture, small and medium enterprises – e.g.,
the Confederation of European Cigarette Manufacturers).
One political science hypothesis is that diffuse interests are difficult to
mobilise because individual constituents are randomly scattered in society and
do not necessary share a common social situation defined outside their control
(i.e., being a worker or an employer) (see Key 1952; Olson 1971: 127–128,
133–135). Therefore, the costs and benefits created by particular public poli-
cies are inherently difficult to calculate and dispersed for these constituencies.

590 jan beyers
Moreover, these groups are usually less capable of delivering selective incen-
tives to their members or supporters. As European policies basically concern
the deregulation of specific economic domains, concentrated, mostly producer
interests are better capable to deliver policy-relevant expertise; they are thus
more focused on, and adapted to, Europe (Scharpf 1996; Streeck 1996; but see
also Pollack 1997). Hence, it is generally to be expected that the European
network strategies of diffuse interests will be less elaborated (for evidence
supporting this view in Belgium, see Beyers 1998; Bursens 1998). Many spe-
cific interest associations are domestically well known (e.g., national trade
unions, employer unions or domestic agricultural peak associations) and, in
several European countries, their formal capacity as social partners gives them
a prominent position within domestic socioeconomic policy-making processes.
As the constituencies of these interests are linked to identifiable socioeco-
nomic situations, it is easier to mobilise members and supporters. Further-
more, the particular structure of their constituencies implies that associations
representing such specific interests have expertise or information that is
explicitly linked to well-circumscribed policy sectors or policy problems –
these interests are, compared to diffuse interests, less encompassing.
The inherent difficulty of mobilising interests, especially diffuse interests,
is theoretically less conventional and empirically less plausible than often
assumed (Green & Shapiro 1994: 72–97; Jordan 1996, 1998; Knoke 1990).
Nevertheless, the bias against diffuse interests is an important assumption in
the LIG literature à la Moravscik (Moravcsik 1993: 480–496, 1999: 35–50). As
will be depicted below, the MLG literature makes fewer assumptions about
the bias against diffuse interests; a more typical concern in this literature is
the empirical interest in the domestic institutional factors promoting or con-
straining the Europeanisation of societal interests. While a wider discussion of
the Olsonian theorem (Olson 1971) goes beyond the scope of this article, the
subsequent section makes the assumption that diffuse interests are inherently
more difficult to mobilise problematic by looking at some complexities of
collective action in a multilevel context.
Interests and multilevelness
A crucial difference between the MLG and LIG literatures concerns what
Coleman and Perl (1999: 701) call the ‘level of institutionalisation of supra-
national governing arrangements’. From an LIG perspective, both diffuse and
specific interests are formed at the domestic level and aggregated by national
governments who take these aggregated interests to the European level. The
capacity of supranational institutions such as the European Commission and

the European Parliament to act autonomously remains weak, and the specific
institutional structure of the European Union limits extensive and indepen-
dent Euro-level mobilisation of domestic private actors. National governments
are implicated in two games – a domestic and a European game – and this
multiple embeddedness is supposed to strengthen their power (Moravcsik
1993: 507; Putnam 1988). In sum, governments, more in particular national
governments, govern Europe.
By contrast, the MLG perspective stipulates that Europe is ‘governed
without government’ (Kohler-Koch 1999: 15).1 MLG suggests an arrangement
whereby supranational institutions are substantially developed, have policy-
making autonomy and where competencies are increasingly dispersed over
and shared among multiple levels of government. This implies, first, that
national governments lose control over the aggregation of domestic societal
interests and, second, that Europe is characterised by multiple points of access
(Pollack 1997). It is argued that the European Commission and the European
Parliament are quite independent from the Member States and that the Euro-
pean Parliament has gained considerable influence during the last 15 years.
The entrepreneurial role of both European institutions, it is suggested, stimu-
lates the Europeanisation of societal interests and, in particular, the European
Parliament has boosted the increased involvement of diffuse interests. Not
only Euro-level opportunity structures trigger the Europeanisation of societal
interests. While a state-centred intergovernmental perspective supposes that
only governments play a two-level game, the MLG perspective claims that
societal interests have Euro-level preferences and, therefore, related to this,
develop Euro-level network strategies. Interest associations increasingly
bypass national levels; they play a two-level game by becoming active in
transnational Euro-level policy networks.
Yet matters are not that straightforward. Scholars using the MLG concept
agree that the autonomy of Euro-level institutions strongly stimulates the
Europeanisation of societal interests. However, although national govern-
ments no longer monopolise public policy making, they still continue to play
a key role, though not the key role as intergovernmentalists claim. Or, as
Coleman and Perl have indicated, a significant institutional development is
assumed ‘for both national and supranational levels’ (Coleman & Perl 1999:
701–703; see also Marks & McAdam 1996: 99–104). As interest associations’
political opportunities vary across Member States, a uniform system of Euro-
pean interest representation is unlikely to emerge. The Europeanisation of
interest associations’ network strategies will, therefore, not only be an adap-
tation to the new external environment created by the European Union, it will
also depend on domestic institutional factors, more specifically on the access
societal interests gain to domestic public actors. The relevance of these domes-

592 jan beyers
tic institutional factors is contested. Broadly speaking, there are two different
views: one that argues that a substantial institutionalised access to domestic
public actors enhances the development of European network strategies, and
another that claims that such a situation hinders the emergence of Euro-level
networks.
Some scholars argue that good levels of access domestically to government
decision makers does not stimulate the Europeanisation of societal interests,
not even where it is institutionalised. On the contrary, domestically marginal
groups tend in particular use the new opportunity structures provided by
European Union membership, and being well-embedded in domestic policy
networks does not stimulate actors to use Euro-level strategies. By deploying
Euro-level strategies, interest associations with less influence domestically try
to outflank national governments and realise policy outcomes they cannot
achieve through national forms of interest representation (Fairbrass & Jordon
2001: 514). In other words, European network strategies can compensate for
the lack of domestic access and may be pursued by societal interests that are
domestically weak. Marks and McAdam’s (1996) comparison of the European
adaptation of four social movements elaborates this view. They contend that
environmental NGOs and regionalist movements are relatively well organised
at the European level, while trade unions and the anti-nuclear movement are
less able to play the European game. This variation is partially explained as
arising from domestic institutional opportunities. Interest associations, such as
trade unions, with a long history of sustained interaction with domestic public
actors are less disposed to mobilise on a European scale.2 The fact that these
associations obtain easy, sometimes even institutionalised, access to domestic
public actors and that many of their policy preferences are addressed by
domestic measures (e.g., social policies) means that they tend to stick with
domestic policy networks. On the other hand, associations defending interests
for whom domestic public actors show less concern and who subsequently gain
less access find it easier to pursue an international strategy (e.g., environmen-
tal movements). Here, the so-called ‘boomerang pattern’ seems to occur – if
domestic associations fail to realise their goals domestically, then they start to
voice their concerns at the European level (see Keck & Sikkink 1998: 12).
While, according to this view, established domestic institutional patterns
inhibit the Europeanisation of domestically central actors and stimulate the
Europeanisation of weaker actors, such developments are not necessarily that
clearly determined. It is indeed plausible that institutional ‘stickiness’ implies
that changing practices is both difficult and unattractive. Yet it is equally plau-
sible that existing institutional patterns could help domestic interest associa-
tions adapt to a European policy-making environment (Pierson 2000: 492).
One can hypothesise that especially well-embedded domestic interest associ-

ations are better prepared as well as inclined to Europeanise their political

strategies. This would suggest that well-elaborated and institutionalised rela-
tions between state actors and interest associations carry over to the Euro-
pean level. As a result, Europe tends to reinforce existing patterns of domestic
interest representation. For instance, Eising writes that corporatist German
interest associations have more Europeanised their policy networks when
compared to British and French associations who enjoy much less institution-
alised domestic access (Eising 2001; see also Sidenius 1999). Kohler-Koch
argues that especially diffuse interests stay imprisoned at the national level,
that they lack the capacity for transnational interest representation and, as a
result, that European integration leads to a bias against this sort of domesti-
cally marginal interests (Kohler-Koch 1997: 3, 1999: 27).3
A common proposition in the literature is that the structural position of
interest associations within domestic polities – the level of access they have –
affects in some way or another their European network strategies – how they
seek access. In order to focus the empirical exploration, four different corre-
lates between gaining and seeking access are distinguished (see Table 1). The
first row in Table 1 refers to situations in which domestic private actors enjoy
substantial, persistent and even institutionalised access to domestic public
actors. Broadly speaking, their networks with domestic public actors already
exist, they do not have to be developed or reinvented. At best they just need
to be maintained. The second row indicates a situation in which domestic
access does not exist. The ability or inability to gain domestic access can have
two consequences for societal interests.
On the one hand, domestic access opportunities could have a positive effect
on the development of European network strategies – that is, the positive per-
sistence hypothesis (cell 1). The underlying idea is that private actors’ domes-
tic embeddedness offers them, for various reasons, some leeway. For instance,
private actors strongly embedded within domestic policy networks are able to
gather strategic information on Europe because of the contacts they already
have with officials (such as domestic civil servants taking part in Council
working groups or committees of the European Commission). It may be that
the persistent character of domestic networks – path-dependent networks that
exist by historical experience – makes it easier to extract resources in order
to invest in European networks, either directly (e.g., seeking access to the
European Commission) or indirectly (e.g., playing a preponderant role in
European associations). Finally, it could be hypothesised that actors neither
seek nor gain access (cell 4). Although this outcome may sound less plausible,
this case mirrors the positive persistence hypothesis. Actors lacking the social
capital generated within the domestic realm are less well placed to develop
Euro-level strategies.

594 jan beyers
Table 1. Seeking and getting access, hypotheses
Actors’ network strategies, seeking access to Europe
Extensive European network Limited European

strategies network strategies
Domestic 1. Actors’ domestic access 2. Actors stay where they

access relates to an extensive are, their European
deployment of Euro-level efforts are inhibited by
networks domestic institutional
persistence
Æ Positive Persistence Æ Negative Persistence
Hypothesis Hypothesis
Actors gain No domestic 3. Actors seek to compensate 4. Actors stay largely

access at the European level (i.e., disconnected
the so-called ‘boomerang
effect’)
Æ Compensation Hypothesis Æ Reversed Positive
Persistence Hypothesis
On the other hand, a competing hypothesis, the so-called ‘negative persis-

tence hypothesis’, considers extensive domestic access as a constraining factor
(cell 2). In order to realise their goals, domestic actors have historically relied
upon domestic public actors. Therefore, actors strongly involved in, and depen-
dent upon, domestic policy networks are not stimulated to develop European
networks. Thus a strong dependence on domestic public actors constrains
Euro-level mobilisation. Finally, there is the possibility that domestic interest
associations do not easily gain access to domestic policy makers (cell 3). Gov-
ernment decision makers show no, or only a limited, interest in interest asso-
ciations and subsequently these associations start to seek access to European
institutions in order to try to realise objectives which are hard to realise
domestically. In sum, private actors with no or only limited domestic access
are more oriented to Europe since they compensate for the lack of access at
the national level.
Research design
Multilevelness implies, first of all, that actors may become involved in policy
processes situated at different levels – a domestic policy process and a Euro-
pean policy process – and, second, that policy outcomes at different levels are

interdependent; policies at one level affect policies elsewhere. Therefore, it is

reasonable to assume that interest associations, in one way or another, try to
seek access at different levels simultaneously. Another feature of multilevel-
ness is that actors can be both subject and object of influence attempts by other
actors. Actors try to access formal decision makers, but they are also often a
channel or an instrument through which others try to disseminate their con-
cerns (Greenwood 1997: 50). The latter is particularly the case for national
public actors and European private actors. For instance, domestic politicians
try to achieve their own policy objectives through involvement in the Council
of Ministers, but at the same time domestic interest associations try to realise
their preferences by lobbying national executives. European peak associations
try to realise particular European objectives by using strategies designed to
influence European institutions, but at the same time they are also channels
through which various national interest associations funnel their interests.
This notion of multilevelness and political interdependence has resulted in
a research design resembling the design reported in Pappi and Henning, and
building upon insights developed by Laumann, Knoke and Pappi (Knoke et
al. 1996; Laumann & Knoke 1987; Pappi & Henning 1999: 262–264). Two levels
of governance are distinguished: the European level and the Belgian level.
Departing from domestic interest associations one can distinguish grosso
modo three possible influence routes: a route via domestic public actors; an
indirect supranational route via Euro-level interest associations; and a direct
supranational route via Euro-level public actors. These routes are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, and perhaps several actors will try to combine them.4
In terms of sampling, this conception leads to four sub-samples or categories:
domestic public actors, domestic private actors, European public actors and
European private actors. Domestic private actors, domestic public actors and
European private actors may approach European public actors. Domestic
private actors attempt to have an impact on Europe via networks with domes-
tic public actors, and/or they make use of Euro-level interest associations to
which they belong. Furthermore, the research design not only concentrates on
private actors’ reporting of networks, but also includes networks initiated by
public actors towards private actors (see the dotted arrows in Figure 1).
For practical reasons it was decided to limit the sampling of actors to
domestic private and public actors in one Member State (Belgium) and the
European Union level. For this, a positional sampling procedure relying on
various public sources and databases listing actors (e.g., the Directory of EU
Information Sources, Landmark’s European Public Affairs Directory, etc.) that
were potentially consequential – not necessarily involved or influential actors
– for shaping European policies in the first pillar was used.5 Qualitative and
quantitative information collected before the fieldwork yielded an a priori

596 jan beyers
Domestic public Domestic private

actors actors
European public European private

actors actors
Figure 1. Routes in the European multilevel system.
classification of observations into diffuse interests and specific interests. An

open-ended question probing into the association’s programme and activities,
a quantitative measure of the association’s scope of policy interest and infor-
mation on the association’s members were used for validating this a priori
coding. Respondents of the selected associations and institutions were con-
tacted and interviewed face-to-face with the help of a standardised question-
naire in 1999. In each case, a key official with substantial experience of, and
involvement in, the organisation and its political activities (such as the public
affairs manager or the director) was interviewed. The interviews focused on
the actor’s policy interests, involvement in policy development, opinions and
ideas about political action in general and domestic and European policy net-
works. A total of 343 respondents at the Belgian and the European level was
interviewed (see Table 2).
Interviews probed the actors’ actual involvement in three salient policy
events which interviewees selected out of a list of 29 events.6 Each event could
be linked with recent important policy debates (all first pillar) and, with the
exception of three events, all referred to policy proposals initiated by the
European Commission. For each event, the networks actors initiated with
other categories of actors were assessed. Beforehand, these 29 events were
chosen independently from the sample of actors, and this prior selection was
based on systematic screening of multiple resources (i.e., newspapers, event
datasets) (Reising et al. 1997; Van Aelst & Walgrave 1999) and various expert
interviews. Because evidence would be collected by means of interviews, the
events took place in the period between 1993 and 1998; a reconstruction of
actors’ involvement should be limited in time due to the phenomenon of tem-
poral distortion. During the interviews these events were presented in the
form of a list containing 29 different policy options. In order to avoid biased
responses, events were presented in a nontechnical and comprehensive
manner; the use of technical and specialised judicial idiom, or so-called ‘Euro-

Table 2. Sample, diffuse and specific interests
Sample Response Response

N N %
Private actors
Belgian specific interests 43 39 91
Belgian diffuse interests 74 67 91
European specific interests 42 40 95
European diffuse interests 40 35 88
Public actors
Belgian political actors (party officials 45 37 82
& Members of Parliament)
Belgian administrative actors 49 43 88
European political actors (party 45 25 56
officials & MEPs)
European administrative actors 65 57 88
(European Commission, etc.)
Total 403 343 85
speak’, could have skewed responses in favour of the more involved and impli-
cated actors.
The evidence reported here concerns different actor-event interactions by
respondents representing Belgian interest associations or public actors (such
as ministerial deparments and elected officials). In observational terms, this
means 478 Belgian evaluations: 278 by private actors and 200 by public actors.
The analysis in the next section starts with a univariate description of the net-
works actors initiated in response to these selected policy events. Subse-
quently, the way actors combine different network types is studied. Based on
the results of this analysis, it can be concluded that ‘Europeanisation’ does not
necessarily follow from weak domestic policy networks. On the contrary, the
analysis supports the contention that domestic networking is given priority
over seeking access to Europe. Finally, how actors’ network strategies relate
to the access they gain and their constituency is explored.
Evidence
How domestic political actors seek access
Interviewees were asked to indicate their network strategies for each of the
selected events. First, a description of policy network was presented, namely:

598 jan beyers
In order to impact on policies organisations often consult other actors. In

such contacts, exchange of information is vital. We define ‘information’
fairly broadly. It may include advice on the best political strategy to be
used, knowledge about others’ strategy, as well as a range of sometimes
confidential technical and scientific findings.
Then a list of 15 actors was presented and interviewees were asked to mention
whether or not they had sought such contact with one of the actors on the list.
Table 3 shows the percentages with which different potential partners were
mentioned. A distinction is made between, on the one hand, diffuse and spe-
cific interests and, on the other hand, between political (politicians and party
officials) and administrative actors (cabinets and civil servants). The higher
the percentage, the more networks were initiated with one of the categories
presented in the first column. The discussion of the results will be confined
to three potential routes: networking with domestic governmental actors,
networking with European associations, and networking with the European
Commission or the European Parliament.
Domestic networks with other domestic interest associations are the most
frequently named contacts. Both diffuse and specific interest associations ini-
tiate many networks with other associations at the domestic level. Only a very
small group tries to influence policy outcomes on their own; the general rule
is that private actors act collectively within domestic networks, alliances or
coalitions. It is worth noting that domestic private actors who try to impact
upon European policy making first seek access to domestic governmental
actors. Such a strategy seems to be appropriate as representatives of domes-
tic – federal or subnational – governments negotiate, decide and vote in the
Council of Ministers. Both public and private actors (45 to 80 per cent) report
numerous networks with cabinet officials and civil servants. Networks with
Belgian subnational governments occur less often – a result that cannot be
attributed fully to the associations’ substantive concerns. Indeed many sub-
stantive interests fall into the competence sphere of the Belgian regional
governments. However, the observed difference might also be related to the
formal responsibility of the federal government to coordinate, determine and
fine-tune the Belgian policy position in the Council of Ministers (Kerremans
2000; Kerremans & Beyers 1998).
Some additional observations, not reported in Table 3, lead to the conclu-
sion that, even though domestic networks prevail, not every domestic actor is
seen as equally important and European networks have a fairly strong repu-
tation among domestic associations. Networks with federal officials are seen
as influential (74 per cent) and, in comparison to networks with political actors
(parties and Members of Parliament), subnational officials enjoy a much lower

Table 3. A repertoire of seeking access to multilevel networks
Guttmanscale
H = 0.41,
Belgian actors’ reported networks Rho = 0.79
(N = 478) Private actors
(N = 278)
Categories presented during BSPE1 BDIF2 BADM3 BPOL4
the interview N = 104 N = 174 N = 113 N = 87 Range HI
Associations
at the Belgian level 60.6 69.0 50.5 56.3 1 0.57
in other Member States 5.8 21.3 3.9 17.6 8 0.35
Euro-level associations 37.5 42.5 15.7 30.6 3 0.32
Belgian political actors
(party officials & Members
of Parliament) 20.2 44.3 33.7 42.4 6 0.41
Cabinets and civil servants
sub-national governmental
actors 37.5 35.1 62.4 41.2 5 0.34
federal governmental
actors 47.1 44.3 85.1 44.7 2 0.51
the Belgian Permanent
Representative 11.5 11.0 62.4 8.2 9 0.46
European institutions
the European Commission 27.9 9.8 43.6 14.1 7 0.32
the European Parliament 36.5 37.9 29.7 48.2 4 0.38
Permanent Representatives
– other Member States 2.9 3.5 22.8 8.2 11 0.53
the Committee of the
Regions 4.8 1.2 3.0 7.1 12 0.44
the Economic and Social
Committee 15.4 3.5 5.0 4.7 10 0.51
Notes: 1 Belgian specific interests; 2 Belgian diffuse interests; 3 Belgian administrative elite;
4
Belgian Members of Parliament, federal and sub-national, including party officials. The
first four columns give the frequency (in per cent) that an initiated network with category
was reported with regard to the selected events. The last two columns show the outcome
of a Guttmanscale analysis by using Loevinger’s H.
reputation for influence (31 and 46 per cent, respectively). Moreover, networks
with the European Commission, the European Parliament and European
associations are seen as quite influential by Belgian interest associations (72,
65 and 78 per cent, respectively).
The fact that Euro-level actors enjoy such a strong reputation sounds
plausible. Strategies that exclusively concentrate on Council decision-making

600 jan beyers
processes, via national governmental actors, are possibly somewhat one-sided

and probably less successful. Council decision making is only one of the many
stages in the policy-making process in which other institutions (in particular,
the European Parliament and the European Commission) play a formative
role, often at an early stage. European associations are consulted extensively
by European public actors (not shown in Table 3) and, as a result, they may
possess expertise domestic officials and politicians do not have. In addition,
Belgian private actors tend not to invest all their energy in Council decision
making since Belgium, with its five votes, is unlikely to have a dominant voice
there.
Second, domestic private actors may become members of Euro-level asso-
ciations and cultivate their networks with them. About 75 per cent of the asso-
ciations interviewed belong to European interest associations. In general,
European forms of interest representation are seen as very important: 79 per
cent of the interviewees consider the formation of alliances and coalitions at
the European level as an influence-generating strategy. Therefore, it comes as
no surprise that contacts with Euro-level associations are regularly reported;
specific interests initiated more contacts with these actors than they did with
domestic politicians. The relevance of European associations for domestic
associations also relates to the position of European associations within Euro-
networks (again, not shown in Table 3). In general, European associations ini-
tiate many contacts with other European associations, with the European
Commission and with the European Parliament (50 to 75 per cent of the eval-
uations). Furthermore, interviewees from the European Commission and,
especially, the European Parliament report, to a variable degree, frequent con-
tacts with European interest associations (between 50 to 65 per cent of the
evaluations). Thus, a domestic association wanting to stay informed about
European trends has more chance of obtaining answers from Euro-level inter-
est associations than from domestic politicians.
Third, domestic interest associations can try to network with the European
Commission and the European Parliament directly. The added value of such
an approach is that actors may become involved in policy making at earlier
stages of the process. Qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and
the co-decision powers of the European Parliament may diminish the rele-
vance of influence attempts that are targetted towards domestic public actors.
As European elections are basically domestic contests, Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament (MEPs) are relatively well known among domestic interest
associations. Moreover, for their re-election as MEP, or if they intend to con-
tinue their political careers domestically, MEPs depend upon a domestic elec-
torate and nomination by domestic parties. Therefore, sustained networks

within the domestic political arena are vital for most MEPs and it is likely that
national interest associations are easily heard among MEPs.
The data illustrate these expectations quite well (see Table 3) – especially
the networks of specific interest associations that are intensively focused on
Europe. They report more networks with the European Commission (28 per
cent) and the European Parliament (36 per cent) than with national political
actors (party officials and Members of Parliament). Moreover, the results
support the notion that domestic groups approach the European Parliament
more readily than the European Commission, a finding that especially applies
to diffuse interest associations. The idea that MEPs themselves quite often rely
on a domestic route is supported by other evidence not presented in Table 3.
MEPs ties with national associations are well developed, and the evidence sug-
gests a close connection between MEPs and their domestic constituency. Some
MEPs even considered the European level to be of marginal concern, or, as
one put it rather bluntly during one of the interviews; ‘My work is in the [the
national capital] and not in Brussels or in Strasbourg.’ However, this single
quote does not imply that all MEPs see their mandate as an offshoot of
national politics; it only illustrates the strong affiliation between MEPs and
their domestic bases. Many MEPs combine this affiliation with Euro-level
activities and intensively consult with European associations, an observation
that runs parallel with the Euro-level interest groups’ responses.
A repertoire of seeking access to multilevel networks
The previous description points first to the importance of domestic bureau-

cratic networks with, especially federal, ministries; second to the importance
attached to networking with other domestic and European associations; and,
third, somewhat to a lesser extent, to the importance of Euro-level institutions
such as the European Parliament and the European Commission. However,
the description as such does not reveal very much about the structure of the
overall network strategy of associations. The univariate description implicitly
assumed that private actors systematically tend to use some network strate-
gies (e.g., easy, conventional, cheap or influential activities) more readily than
others (e.g., difficult, unconventional, expensive or non-influential activities).
If true, it can be hypothesised that an actor’s overall network choice is affected
by a latent and stable continuum, which is formed independently of the
particular issue in which the actor happens to be involved. Such a stable
behavioural pattern can be interpreted as a Guttmanscale substantiating an
underlying logic among categories of networks.7 In terms of responses it means
that a positive answer to a difficult question (e.g., ‘Did you initiate networks

602 jan beyers
with a non-Belgian Permanent Representation?’) should be associated with

a positive answer to a more easy one (e.g., ‘Did you initiate networks with
national interest groups?’). A positive response on easy items, however, should
not lead by definition to a positive answer on difficult items.
A score on this scale indicates network extensiveness in relation to two ele-
ments – namely, network diversity and the extent to which networks crosscut
different policy levels. The higher the score, the more a respondent tried to
initiate networks crosscutting different levels with different sorts of potential
partners. In other words, a high score is typical for actors very active in mul-
tilevel networking. A low score indicates that actors were not very active in
terms of networking or that initiatives were confined to the domestic realm
and/or, eventually, the more ‘easy’ European network partners (e.g., the Euro-
pean Parliament and Euro-level associations). Examples of less obvious
networks are the Belgian Permanent Representation, other Permanent
Representations and the European Commission. Those who have initiated
contacts with these actors generally have a higher scale score (i.e., their net-
working efforts have become substantially Europeanised). Contacts with the
European Parliament or European associations are comparatively easier to
establish. To put it differently, a domestic actor who does not target the Euro-
pean Parliament or European associations will not go on to make contact with
Permanent Representations or the European Commission. The data also rein-
force the peripheral position of domestic political actors, Members of Parlia-
ment and political parties. Contacts with these actors come after contacts with
domestic bureaucrats, other domestic associations, Euro-level associations and
the European Parliament; contacts with these actors are ranked higher, both
in terms of contacts initiated and their reputation for influence.
These observations about the domestic political elite, on the one hand, and
the European Parliament and European associations, on the other, might lead
to the conclusion that domestic policy networks are declining in importance.
Yet, contacts between domestic actors and MEPs are, given the strong domes-
tic ties of MEPs, often contacts with ‘national MEPs’ instead of fully-fledged
crosscutting networks. It is more accurate to say that Europeanisation has a
variable impact on national networks. In general, networking among domes-
tic interest associations seems to prevail and seeking access to national gov-
ernment officials is crucial, whereas networks with domestic politicians seem,
compared with MEPs and European associations, to have less value. Despite
the importance of European associations and MEPs, most networks are still
primarily formed domestically. The cumulative feature of the Guttmanscale
implies that, in general, domestic networks are activated first and this domes-
tic mobilisation takes place before actors start to develop policy networks cross
national borders. This finding suggests that the European networks which

domestic associations report are perhaps a function of the private actors’

domestic embeddedness.
Gaining access and seeking access
The evidence provided so far supports the view that domestic networking
comes before access to Europe is sought. However, the story does not end
here. Further controls are needed for, first, the actors’ institutional embed-
dedness or their ability to gain access and, second, for the type of interest they
represent. Are actors’ multilevel network strategies – seeking access – affected
by their structural ability to gain access and is this association moderated by
the distinction between diffuse and specific interest associations? First, this
section outlines how ‘gaining access’ is operationalised, then it illustrates how
gaining and seeking access differs between diffuse and specific interest asso-
ciations and, finally, it assesses whether and how much the correlation between
gaining access and seeking access differs between specific and diffuse interest
associations.
In order to assess the extent to which associations obtain access, the respon-
dents in the public institutions who were the targets of association activity
were asked to screen a list naming all associations included in the sample. The
wording of the question was similar to the wording of the question related to
the network strategies of associations, but with some modifications. To begin
with, the questions were not confined to a specific policy event; they referred
to what the respondents saw as regular communication networks during the
past five years. Therefore, respondents were first asked to eliminate those
actors with whom they have never, seldom or only very rarely discussed Euro-
pean policies. Subsequently, the screening continued for the remaining asso-
ciations with respondents being asked to indicate whether they themselves
called on others for policy related information, whether others called on them
or whether the initiative rested with both. The analyses reported here are con-
fined to the first item (i.e., the demand for policy-relevant information). As a
result, every association in the sample could be assigned a score correspond-
ing to the number of public officials giving access to this association (i.e., the
extent to which the association obtains access). This score corresponds to what
network analysts call the ‘indegree’ (Wasserman & Faust 1998).
Two different scores can be derived from these measures. The first index
is rather straightforward and refers to the access private actors have at the
domestic level. The second score is more complex since it includes a notion of
multilevelness – the indirect access domestic actors gain to Europe via their
membership of Euro-level associations. As indicated earlier, 75 per cent of
Belgian interest associations belong to a European association. Using the

604 jan beyers
evidence collected from the respondents at the European level, every respon-
dent from a Belgian association was assigned a score corresponding to its
‘European access’. For instance, the access COPA (Comité des Organisations
Professionelles Agricoles) – the Euro-level agricultural peak association – gets
a score of 43 and consequently the ‘European access’ of the Boerenbond, the
Belgian member of COPA, is 43.
Are diffuse and specific interest associations different in terms of multi-
level networks and the access they obtain from public actors? Previous empir-
ical research and much of the theoretical literature suggest that, in comparison
to other types of association, Euro-level mobilisation of diffuse interest asso-
ciations started later, that their European socialisation experiences are more
recent and that, as a result, their European activities are likely to be less elab-
orate. The evidence presented in the first row of Table 4 does not support this
contention. There are some minor differences (specific interests appear to be
a bit more active in terms of multilevel networking) but, on average, these
differences are statistically not very substantial.
However, there are other substantial and significant differences between
specific and diffuse interests. Belgian policy makers are not very interested in
domestic diffuse interest associations; they initiate substantially more contacts
with specific interest associations (see the second row of Table 4).8 The domes-
tic diffuse interest associations’ peripheral position also resonates in the lower
embeddedness of the European associations to which they belong. In general,
domestic diffuse interest associations belong to European associations that are
not offered much access by European public officials and representatives (see
the third row of Table 4). Moreover, it seems that, once one controls for the
distinction between diffuse and specific interests, there is a substantial corre-
Table 4. Access, multilevel networks, diffuse and specific interest (Belgian private actors):
averages (standardised z-scores), standard deviation (s) and F-test for differences between
the means
Difference
Specific interest Diffuse interest between
means
x s x s df = 1
Multilevel networks (N = 278 ¥ -0.04 1.03 0.02 0.98 F = 0.24

the involvement in events) (p = 0.6264)
Domestic access (N = 106 0.45 1.05 -0.26 0.88 F = 13.87
private actors) (p = 0.0003)
European access (N = 106 0.35 1.27 -0.21 0.74 F = 8.25
private actors) (p = 0.0049)

lation between the domestic and European access of respondents from

interest associations (r = 0.55, p = 0.0001). To put it differently, the evidence
suggests that a positive relation exists between the access actors obtain domes-
tically and the European opportunities they enjoy.
What effect does obtaining access have on seeking access to Europe (i.e.,
multilevel networking) (see Table 5)? On the basis of 281 reported event-actor
interactions, a moderate positive association was observed of domestic (r =
0.29, p = 0.0001) and European access (r = 0.21, p = 0.0005) with the actor’s
multi-level networking. Although small, the difference between the correla-
tions suggests that domestic access might be somewhat more salient than
European access; above all, higher levels of domestic access lead to a more
Europeanised multilevel network strategy. The results become even more
interesting when probing into differences between diffuse and specific inter-
est associations. The European access of domestic diffuse interest associations,
although rather low, does not affect their European networking (r = -0.01,
p = 0.9682). In other words, the attention diffuse interest associations receive
from European policy makers does not affect their use of European multilevel
networks. Among diffuse interests, domestic access has a rather moderate pos-
itive correlation (r = 0.23, p = 0.0018). A higher level of domestic access causes
only a slight increase in use of their multilevel networks. The impact of access
is remarkably different for the domestic specific interest associations; there, a
substantial correlation is observed for both European (r = 0.46, p = 0.0001)
and, especially, domestic access (r = 0.45, p = 0.0001).
To summarise, an openness of domestic and European public actors leads
to a considerable growth of multilevel network strategies among specific
domestic interest associations. So, it is particularly for specific interests that
the persistence hypothesis can be substantiated and that the compensation
hypothesis can be rejected. On average, well-connected domestic specific
Table 5. Correlates of access with multilevel networks for specific and diffuse interests
(Belgian private actors)
Belgian diffuse
All Belgian Belgian specific interests
private actors interests (N = 67 actors,
(N = 106, N = 278 (N = 39, N = 104 N = 174
involvements) involvements) involvements)
Domestic access 0.29 0.45 0.23

p = 0.0001 p = 0.0001 p = 0.0018
European access 0.21 0.46 -0.00
p = 0.0005 p = 0.0001 p = 0.9682

606 jan beyers
interests deploy extensive European strategies, while those enjoying no

domestic access do not seek access to Europe. The results are somewhat dif-
ferent for diffuse interests. The data suggest that, in general, interests with
weak connections do not necessarily try to compensate for their weakness by
seeking greater access to Europe. Their domestic position is, in terms of access,
weaker compared to that of specific interest associations; for them, obtaining
access to domestic public actors is much more difficult. Important here is that
higher levels of domestic access result, only to a very small degree, in a more
multilevel networking efforts. Thus, their European strategies develop, on
average, more or less autonomously or independently from the access they
have domestically.
Discussion and conclusion
This article focused on domestic actors and on whether their European net-
works should be seen as building on the strength of their domestic networks
(the persistence hypothesis) or as compensating for the lack of domestic access
(the compensation hypothesis). Furthermore, it examined the extent to which
two different types of interest – diffuse and specific – enjoy differential access
and make use of European multilevel networks.
First, a dominant domestic, bureaucratic and somewhat depoliticised
strategy was observed. Domestic political actors – Members of Parliament
and party officials – are less prominent; the evidence even suggests that they
are somewhat peripheral when it comes to European policy making. Most
network initiatives are directed towards officials and personal associates of
ministers negotiating and voting in the Council of Ministers. Second, networks
with European associations are activated – a finding related to the fact that
these are, to a variable degree, important interlocutors of the European Com-
mission and the European Parliament. Third, domestic associations target
supranational institutions, in particular the European Commission and the
European Parliament. Other Euro-level or transnational networks are far less
prominent in the actors’ network repertoire.
Other, more compelling, conclusions related to the role of institutional
stickiness may be drawn from this study. Notions such as ‘multilevelness’ and
‘governance’ suggest that policies originate within policy networks wherein
competencies and responsibilities are shared instead of divided. In such a
context it is hard, if not to say impossible, to evaluate influence attempts in
terms of effective impact on concrete policy outcomes. Given the panoply of
potentially important actors and their overlapping competencies, actors are
encouraged to pursue a multilevel strategy and to spread their efforts over dif-
ferent access routes. The evidence presented in this article shows that many

actors are indeed trying to diversify their strategies, but also that many are not
successful in this. Most actors start to push their interests domestically and
only after these networks are established do they extend their networks to the
European level, beginning with European associations and the European
Parliament. Why is this happening?
The research results support the idea that domestic structural conditions
have a considerable impact on policy-making processes at the European level.
Neither the intergovernmentalist hypothesis (namely, that societal interest
associations are generally not mobilising at the European level) nor the MLG
idea of a boomerang pattern are substantiated by the data. The hypothesis that
access is affected by the constituencies – diffuse or specific – an association
represents is clearly substantiated by the research outcomes. Specific interest
associations obtain more domestic access than diffuse interests and this in turn
affects the construction of Euro-level networks positively. The relationship
between networks beyond national borders and domestic embeddedness is
considerable for specific interests; among the diffuse interests, only a very
weak relationship was found.
How can we contextualise and understand these findings in a more causal
way? One interpretation would place domestic access prior to the develop-
ment of a European strategy; another interpretation would consider domestic
access to be an outcome of a deliberate European strategy. However, based
only on a correlation, it is difficult to make causal inferences. Therefore,
some general thoughts that might function as a starting-point for subsequent
research are presented, thoughts which elaborate on the rejected proposition
that extensive multilevel networks are related to weak domestic public-private
interactions.
Domestic private actors with an extensive European strategy may be
appealing for domestic policy-making elites. Indeed, networks with European
institutions and associations may provide domestic associations with expertise
– expertise domestic policy makers need. Moreover, domestic associations can
make use of their European expertise domestically (e.g., by influencing or con-
straining the implementation of directives). However, this argument is not
very satisfactory. Although domestic diffuse interest associations tend to be
connected to weakly embedded European associations, there are still quite
some domestic diffuse interests which employ a multilevel strategy. Further-
more, for both diffuse and specific interests a correlation between weak Euro-
pean access and weak domestic access was observed. In addition, the data
suggest that diffuse interests’ multilevel efforts are not substantially weaker
than those of specific interests. So, it is not plausible that specific interest asso-
ciations appeal to domestic policy makers because of their European network
strategies.

608 jan beyers
An argument that posits an opposite path of causation is more convincing.

The domestic access of specific interests is mainly related to the robust in-
stitutionalised and neo-corporatist connections they seem to have with
domestic public decision makers. Although one could argue that traditional
neo-corporatism has decreased, public officials still contact those who histor-
ically played an important role in domestic social-economic and political set-
tings. Diffuse interests enjoy less formal and institutional opportunities, and
some have no such opportunities at all. In this institutionalised neo-corporatist
setting, the strategic and policy-relevant expertise which actors possess, is,
although not completely irrelevant, not a necessary condition for obtaining
access. Factors such as reputation, formal position and historical experiences
affect access to these networks. These institutionalised networks simply exist:
they do not have to be developed or reinvented and, at best, they just need to
be maintained. It is clear that the actors’ domestic access stimulates their
efforts to seek access to Europe and, in some sense, the conclusion resembles
what Wessels (1999: 119) calls ‘national corporatism at the transnational level’.
Associations with privileged access at the domestic level have the opportunity
to invest in Euro-level networking. Although Europe could be an alternative
arena for associations without such elaborate domestic opportunities, these
peripheral domestic actors give priority to the consolidation of their domes-
tic basis. In general, they do not seem to bypass national governments in order
to compensate for their domestic weakness.
Acknowledgements
This research was sponsored by a research grant from the FWO-Flanders

(G.0160.98). An earlier version of this article was presented at a research
seminar at the Mannheim Center for European Social Research (MZES), 16
February 2001 and at the Politicologenetmaal, Nederlandse Kring voor de
Wetenschap der Politiek, 14 June 2001. I owe much to the comments and sug-
gestions of Bart Kerremans and Caroline Steensels (my two nearest colleagues
working on European affairs in Leuven) and the suggestions made by Pieter
Bouwen,Thomas Conzelmann and Fried Swenden. I would also like to express
my gratitude towards the many respondents involved in interest groups and
government institutions at both the Belgian and the European level for their
willingness to participate in this research.

Notes
1. It has to be admitted that MLG is not a full-fledged theory; rather the MLG literature
is an amalgam of existing, sometimes contradictory, theoretical statements (Fairbrass
& Jordon 2001). Nonetheless, as a descriptive argument about day-to-day European
politics it functions as a useful alternative heuristic device to the liberal intergovern-
mentalist approach which has been primarily focused on major treaty reforms. The MLG
literature also incorporates some propositions (e.g., the boomerang hypothesis of Keck
and Sikkink) which resonates in writings going beyond Europe, especially writings on
transnational relations (Keck & Sikkink 1998; see also Risse-Kappen 1997).
2. Other studies have pointed to similar domestic institutional constraints. Coen, for
instance, concluded in a study on firm lobbying that the national level remains an impor-
tant point of reference (Coen 1998: 97–98). On the one hand, he observed that those firms
with a domestic background featured by strongly institutionalised and neo-corporatist
private-public interactions (e.g., France, Italy and Germany) need more time to learn that
the preponderance of the national route is diminishing. Their stickiness to the national
system is so salient that they do not easily see the opportunities offered by the new, and
certainly less corporatist, setting that is the European Union. On the other hand, Coen
claims that firms in more pluralistic settings (e.g., the United Kingdom and the United
States) adapt more swiftly to European opportunities. Such firms are more familiar with
systems characterised by a multitude of access possibilities and a proliferation of veto-
points so that they learn faster the opportunities offered by the European level. In
another study, Green-Cowles illustrates that less elaborated access to domestic public
actors stimulates firms to seek Euro-level access, or: ‘A dissatisfaction with the national
route of European policy making provided incentives for European big business to organ-
ise politically at the European level’ (Green-Cowles 1998: 112).
3. Although this perspective may seem to confirm the LIG bias against diffuse interests,
there are substantial differences with the LIG model. The perspective described in this
paragraph does not argue, as liberal intergovernmentalists do, that interest associations
will, in general, not Europeanise. It rather claims that some societal interests, and espe-
cially those which are well embedded domestically, will Europeanise. Thus, it is not nec-
essarily an argument underscoring the Olsonian theorem; on the contrary, it is expected
that if diffuse interests would gain much access domestically, they would Europeanise
more easily. In this sense the MLG approach, as specified here, fits much more into an
institutional explanatory logic than into a utilitarian one.
4. Of course this is a rough and schematic simplification. Other potential routes are direct
networks of national private actors with other Member States’ governments. Eventually
national associations might involve Euro-level peak associations in their efforts to impact
upon other Member States governments’ policy positions. National governmental actors
could try to channel their interests via European peak associations. Yet, the data show
that these routes are hardly used by national actors and, concomitantly, they are not taken
into account here.
5. In order to avoid a biased sample with only big, resourceful and well-known (especially
socioeconomic) actors, 26 policy-sectors that may involve different actors were delineated
beforehand. For every domain, at least five actors were sampled independently from
resources they owe or the influence reputation they generally enjoy in public political
discourses. The final result is a sample with a high variance of different respondents,
maybe higher than in samples that primarily focus on actors that are deemed to be con-

610 jan beyers
sequential (i.e., so-called ‘reputational’ or ‘snowball’ sampling). It was only during the
fieldwork itself that some reputational and snowball techniques were employed in order
to complete the sample. That the prior selection of respondents was valid can be inferred
from the fact that no extra respondents were added at the Belgian level. At the Euro-
pean level, it was decided to add 8 actors to the sample.
6. The instruction was worded as follows: ‘Please read the list and put a circle round every
event in which you had an interest’ and then, if the respondent had selected more than
three events, ‘If you have circled more than three events, please select the three most impor-
tant ones’.
7. It is plausible, given the H-values and the reliability coefficients, to consider the various
networks that are mentioned in Table 3 as a continuum that approximates the require-
ments of a Guttmanscale (Swanborn 1982). Analyses were carried out using Mokken
Scale Analysis for Polytomous Items (MSP) software.
8. The inferior access of diffuse interest associations is confirmed by other findings that are,
for the sake of brevity, not reported here. In general, the influence reputation diffuse
interests enjoy and the resources assigned to them by public actors point to a peripheral
structural position.
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European Journal of Political Research 41: 585–612, 2002 585

Gaining and seeking access: The European adaptation of domestic

As participation in Euro-level policy making becomes an increasingly impor-

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

ciations may be substantially stimulated or constrained, on the one hand, by

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

tain control over European policy making. Because national governments no

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

condition for influence (Bouwen 2002). Here, it is assumed that developing

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

administrative system has a longstanding familiarity with Euro-level policy

Diffuse and specific interests

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

Interests and multilevelness

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

ations are better prepared as well as inclined to Europeanise their political

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

Table 1. Seeking and getting access, hypotheses

Actors’ network strategies, seeking access to Europe

Extensive European network Limited European

Domestic 1. Actors’ domestic access 2. Actors stay where they

Actors gain No domestic 3. Actors seek to compensate 4. Actors stay largely

On the other hand, a competing hypothesis, the so-called ‘negative persis-

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

interdependent; policies at one level affect policies elsewhere. Therefore, it is

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

Domestic public Domestic private

European public European private

Figure 1. Routes in the European multilevel system.

classification of observations into diffuse interests and specific interests. An

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

Table 2. Sample, diffuse and specific interests

Sample Response Response

How domestic political actors seek access

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In order to impact on policies organisations often consult other actors. In

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

Table 3. A repertoire of seeking access to multilevel networks

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

processes, via national governmental actors, are possibly somewhat one-sided

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

A repertoire of seeking access to multilevel networks

The previous description points first to the importance of domestic bureau-

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

with a non-Belgian Permanent Representation?’) should be associated with

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

domestic associations report are perhaps a function of the private actors’

Gaining access and seeking access

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

Multilevel networks (N = 278 ¥ -0.04 1.03 0.02 0.98 F = 0.24

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

lation between the domestic and European access of respondents from

Domestic access 0.29 0.45 0.23

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

interests deploy extensive European strategies, while those enjoying no

Discussion and conclusion

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

An argument that posits an opposite path of causation is more convincing.

This research was sponsored by a research grant from the FWO-Flanders

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002

© European Consortium for Political Research 2002