The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives

1
How far has the CFSP Europeanized the national
foreign policy objectives of Member States?
[Draft Paper please do note quote]

Paper prepared for the EUSA Twelfth Biennial Int ernat ional Conference,
Boston, MA, 3
r d
5
t h
March 2011

Nicholas Wright
School of Political, Social & International Studies,
University of East Anglia



Abstract:
This paper considers the degree to which national foreign policy objectives, as
opposed to structures and processes, can be said to have been Europeanized as a
consequence of the ongoing institutionalisation of foreign policy cooperation under
the auspices of the CFSP. Focusing particularly on France, Germany and the United
Kingdom, it argues that there are strong indications that some degree of
Europeanization has taken place. However, the traditional, top-down paradigm that
has predominated in the literature, which characterizes Europeanization in terms of
formal adaptation in response to pressures from the supranational level, is neither
adequate nor appropriate to account for the processes implied by the CFSP. Instead,
an alternative approach is followed that sees change, where it has occurred, as the
result of a bottom-up or uploading approach based on national projections of
policy preferences by Member States (e.g. Wong, 2005); and cross-loading (e.g.
Radaelli, 2003; Major, 2005a, b), whereby interactions between Member States
occurring both inside and outside the formal structures of CFSP, contribute to the
exchange and adoption of policy preferences and ideas at both national and European
levels. Moreover, it contends that as a policy arena embodied by a dense network of
interactions taking place continuously and at multiple levels, the CFSP creates an
ideal environment for such uploading and cross-loading to take place. The lack of
a supranational policy entrepreneur combined with the formal control exercised by
Member States over the policy-making process creates a space within which
individual states, particularly but not exclusively the larger, may promote and pursue
certain, nationally-based objectives, thereby enabling their Europeanization as a
consequence of their adoption by all.











The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
2
Introduction

This paper examines one of the key questions within the literature on European
foreign policy in recent years: the extent to which the national foreign policies of
Member States have been Europeanized as a consequence of their interaction with
and within the European Unions Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In
particular, it is interested in the degree to which national foreign policy objectives, as
opposed to structures and processes, have been subject to change, adaptation or
adjustment, often regarded as the primary characteristics of Europeanization.

The argument that will be made here is that there are strong indications that some
degree of Europeanization of national foreign policy objectives is taking place as a
result of interaction through the CFSP. However, the traditional, top-down paradigm
that has predominated in the literature, which characterizes Europeanization in terms
of formal adaptation in response to pressures from the supranational level, is neither
adequate nor appropriate to account for the processes implied by the CFSP. This is a
policy-making arena that is dynamic and multi-directional, operates on multiple levels
and, crucially, lacks a single, supranational policy entrepreneur or mechanisms to
enforce decisions, and, in formal terms at least, retains the character of an
intergovernmental institution dominated by Member States, symbolised by the ability
of each to exercise a veto.

Instead, an alternative approach is suggested that sees change, where it has occurred,
as the result of a bottom-up or uploading approach based on national projections of
policy preferences by Member States (e.g. Wong, 2005); and cross-loading (e.g.
Radaelli, 2003; Major, 2005a, b), whereby interactions between Member States
occurring both inside and outside the formal structures of CFSP, contribute to the
exchange and adoption of policy preferences and ideas at both national and European
levels. Moreover, it is argued that the nature of the CFSP and the policy arena it
represents, embodied by a dense network of interactions taking place continuously
and at multiple levels, creates an ideal environment for such uploading and cross-
loading to take place. Thus, the lack of a supranational policy entrepreneur combined
with the formal control exercised by Member States over the policy-making process
creates a space within which individual states, particularly but not exclusively the
larger, may promote and pursue certain, nationally-based objectives, thereby enabling
their Europeanization as a consequence of their adoption by all. In this sense, it is
suggested that agreement on a common policy is indicative of Europeanization in its
most basic sense, as without it the basis for any common action through the CFSP
does not exist.

To demonstrate this, this paper analyses the interaction of the three largest Member
States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the CFSP, drawing on official
documentation and evidence from interviews with officials within each states foreign
ministry and Permanent Representation in Brussels. It finds that there are a number of
examples of successful uploading and cross-loading, and discusses several of
these, categorizing them in terms of principles, relating to the management and scope
of CFSP, and issues, relating to particular areas of policy . The paper is divided into 4
sections. The first offers a brief contextualization of the question within the wider
research project of which it forms a part, and based on an analysis of the CFSP that
sees it as an arena best described in terms of intensive transgovernmentalism rather
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
3
than intergovernmentalism. The second discusses the literature on Europeanization,
presenting the rationale for an approach based on uploading and cross-loading
when considering the foreign policy sphere, and suggesting a framework within
which Europeanization of national foreign policy objectives might be judged. The
third seeks to test this by providing an analysis of Member State interaction with the
CFSP, and examples of the successful Europeanization of national policy objectives.
The final section offers some preliminary conclusions based on the above.

(I) Research context: the CFSP and the limits of intergovernmentalism

The question under consideration here is one of several being investigated within the
context of a wider doctoral research project examining the nature of the interaction
between France, Germany and the United Kingdom and the CFSP. A key assumption
of this research is that while the CFSP remains ostensibly intergovernmental in
nature, the incremental institutionalisation of foreign policy co-operation that is taking
place under its auspices, and which continues a process begun previously under
European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Smith, 2004), places increasing demands on
Member States to engage with it, if only to prevent decisions contrary to their
interests. Thus, while not supplanting national foreign policies, it does to some extent
act as a constraint, and the contention is that over the longer-term, this constraining
effect will increase.

This, in turn, has implications for how Member States seek to engage with the CFSP,
their expectations from it and the degree of autonomy they can exercise in their
pursuit of national foreign policy objectives. The starting point for the arguments
presented here, therefore, is that the concept of intergovernmentalism is inadequate to
explain the CFSP. Instead, alternative explanations are required that are able to
account for the interactions both with and within it, along with its outputs and
impacts. The Europeanization of national foreign policy objectives, which this paper
contends is taking place, falls into this last category. It is necessary therefore to begin
with a brief analysis of the weaknesses of the intergovernmentalist analysis before
discussing alternative explanations better able to explain what is taking place within
CFSP. Two are identified here as being of particular relevance: intensive
transgovernmentalism and elite socialization.

While the CFSP retains some of the key features of an intergovernmental regime,
particularly in terms of formal decision-making and the ability of each Member State
to exercise a veto, the reality is far more complex. This represents the essential
compromise the Member States have been forced to make since the launch of EPC in
1970 between their wish for control over foreign policy co-operation and the need for
greater efficiency if meaningful and effective outputs are to be achieved
(Christiansen, 2006: 89). The nature of this compromise is evident in the frequent
references in the literature to how the CFSP has changed: Nuttall (2000: 275)
describes it as a halfway house, no longer purely intergovernmental but nor a
fully-fledged policy arm of the EU; in the context of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
Wessels (2001: 77) talks of it in terms of rationalized intergovernmentalism; for
Mller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002: 278), the CFSP has at no time been exclusively
intergovernmental; and Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006: 181) characterize it as
modified intergovernmentalism.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives


The intergovernmentalist analysis rests on three key assumptions: that states behave
rationally, i.e. courses of action will be evaluated and chosen on the basis of their
ultimate utility vis--vis the fulfilment of particular national interests; that
intergovernmental negotiations to achieve these interests will be determined
according to states relative power; and, particularly within liberal
intergovernmentalism, that national interests emerge as a consequence of domestic
political conflict i.e. they are formed at home and then defended or promoted
internationally (Moravcsik, 1993: 480-1). Within this context, these interests are
viewed as the key drivers of policy-making in the CFSP, and of its consequent
development. Decisions are taken under the shadow of the veto in a policy
environment deliberately set apart from supranational Community institutions.
Meanwhile reforms, such as those at Amsterdam and Nice, are the result of bargains
between key states, for example the traditional horse-trading that occurs in
intergovernmental conferences, or the compromise between France and the UK at St
Malo that facilitated the establishment of the ESDP in 1999. At the same time,
common actors such as the High Representative and the Council Secretariat have
been created or enhanced purely to reduce the transaction costs of co-operation, and
remain fully subordinate to the Member States interests. Finally, unlike the
Community pillar where the Commission can, and frequently does, act against
Member States deemed not to be complying with EU directives, within the CFSP
there are no enforcement mechanisms, and Community institutions have little or no
oversight (with the exception of aspects of the CFSP budget). In the absence of
compulsion, policy-making and implementation therefore depend on the political will
of Member States (Galloway, 1999: 213),
1
and the only real sanction that might be
faced for non-compliance would be a possible loss of reputation (Wagner, 2003: 577).

This analysis seems compelling when set against the CFSPs outputs, particularly in
situations of major international crisis. The inability of Member States to respond
meaningfully in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s and the Darfur crisis in 2003,
and the divisions that arose during the build-up to the Iraq War that same year, are
often cited as proof that a decision-making system based on unanimity is unable to
deliver either swift or meaningful action (Galloway, 1999: 211; Wagner, 2003: 588).
2

Instead, Howorth (2009: 18) argues that the agile leadership so vital for effective
crisis management is sacrificed for the achievement of policies based on consensus
and therefore the lowest common denominator. Meanwhile, Asle Toj (2008: 132)
contends that the CFSP has become a hostage to process, as unanimity inevitably
leads to an inherent conservatism as Member States cherry-pick those issues where
consensus for action of any kind can be achieved, while ignoring the rest.
Consequently, intervention in Darfur did not take place because of a lack of
consensus that Member States interests were affected sufficiently to merit action
(ibid: 135).
3
More generally, Cameron (1998: 66) notes that the tendency to take ad
hoc approaches in times of serious crisis (e.g. the Contact Group in the Balkans)
reinforces the perception that in matters of diplomacy and defence in the EU, larger

1
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 151) note that along with this lack of enforcement mechanism in the
Council of Ministers, the Secretariat keeps no systematic record of whether Member States have complied with
CFSP engagements.
2
Indeed, Meunier and Nicoladis (1999: 478) criticise the CFSP as little more than sporadic attempts to issue
common declarations in response to external crises.
3
In the context of discussions over possible intervention in Darfur, he cites one EU official who declared that it
was difficult to imagine a more suitable mission for the EU (Toj, 2008: 135).
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
!
states will continue to dominate and national interests will always take priority over
common ones. Finally, Wagner (2003: 588) cites the largely unused provisions for
QMV for decision-making on aspects of policy implementation as further evidence of
the half-hearted commitment by Member States to making CFSP more effective. As
one British official put it in an interview:

Member States, particularly the big ones, have spent 15 to 20 years trying
to make sure power dispersed and it is, hooray. Weve succeeded in what we
want and then we can complain about the fact it takes so long to take
decisions.
4


Pijpers (1991: 31) asserted that a truly common foreign and security policy would
emerge only where the Member States faced a major external threat or where their
interests coincided. Thus, rather than being idealized, the CFSP should better be
viewed as an updated version of old-style alliance diplomacy where the hard-headed
calculation of interests matters most. Proponents of the intergovernmental analysis
would contend that any consideration of the outputs and decision-making processes of
CFSP would concur with this assessment. Consequently, from the intergovernmental
perspective CFSP is best understood as an international regime designed to achieve
common gains from co-operation and an instrument through which Member States
can increase their international influence, as and when they choose. It should not,
however, be misinterpreted as an institution for the communitarization of foreign and
security policy (Wagner, 2003: 583).

Undermining this analysis, however, is its failure to account for the other processes
that both feed into and are generated by the interaction taking place within the CFSP,
in particular the increasing institutionalization and Brusselisation of foreign policy
co-operation (Smith, 2004; Allen, 1998), and the socialization of those involved at all
levels of policy- and decision-making. These have been necessitated, perpetuated and
legitimized by the day-to-day practices of political co-operation that have been taking
place since the creation of EPC, and have resulted in a process of natural social
integration: what Glarbo (1999: 650) terms the institutionalised imperative of
concertation. Thus, the co-ordination reflex, and the practices and norms of
behaviour among the Member States and their officials that it implies, demonstrate
the weakness in assuming that decision-making results only in outcomes that reflect
the relative power of Member States, the formal decision rule and a utilitarian
calculation of national interests (Lewis, 2000: 265). Instead, the possibility of the
veto needs to be balanced against the shared desire to find common positions that all
will endorse and implement (Galloway, 1999: 227). Moreover, the search for such
agreements is taking place continuously, iteratively, and within increasingly
institutionalized and socialized arenas (e.g. working groups, the PSC, Coreper, etc),
resulting in a process through which national interests are continually defined,
mediated and redefined, and not simply exported from national capitals.

The intensity this process of interaction implies, and the institutionalization that
underpins it, are captured through the concept of intensive transgovernmentalism
(Wallace and Wallace, 2005). Keohane and Nye (1977: 25) characterize
transgovernmentalism as a form of interaction between governmental elites within
specific policy areas (e.g. security) but on the basis that governments or states do not

4
Interview conducted with official in UK Foreign Office, London, January 2011
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
"
operate as necessarily coherent or unified actors.
5
Within the CFSP meanwhile,
Wallace and Wallace (2005: 87) argue that the Member States shared commitment to
extensive engagement, coupled with the density of their involvement and the fact that
CFSP has remained outside the Communitys institutional frameworks, indicates a
level of cooperation far greater and deeper than that allowed for in the
intergovernmental analysis.
6
The key features of such interaction are the involvement
of distinct circles of specialised national policy-makers (i.e. the working groups and
the PSC); the adoption of special arrangements for managing co-operation (i.e. the
PSC, the Council Secretariat and High Representative); the predominance of the
Council of Ministers (and involvement of the European Council in setting the overall
direction of policy); a highly restricted role for the European Commission; and the
active exclusion of both the European Parliament and European Court of Justice
(ibid.).
7


Piana (2002: 222) adds to this by emphasizing the role of middle-ranking and often
Brussels-based officials in the policy- and decision-making environment, while for
Howorth (2007: 66), this type of cooperation encapsulates the development of EU
security policy from the late 1990s, specifically the processes taking place between
ministries bilaterally and multilaterally, and involving specialised teams of officials,
regular communications etc. Wallace and Wallace (2005: 89), therefore, see in this a
potentially significant systemic change in the policy process as Member States
recognise the benefits of drawing certain areas of sensitive public policy within
collective regimes, but governed by institutional frameworks over which they retain
considerable influence and in which traditional supranational actors and oversight
are either marginalised or prevented. Intensive transgovernmentalism thus offers a
viable alternative explanation for the functioning of the CFSP that accounts for a
policy-making environment that remains separate from supranational institutions, and
yet allows for the complexity and density of structures, processes and relationships
that characterize policy co-operation.

Elite socialization, meanwhile, can be seen as both a driver and an expression of the
Europeanizing effects of CFSP (e.g. Wong, 2005), with its impact detectable in a
variety of ways. The most obvious (and important) of these is the prevalence of the
co-ordination reflex that has become a familiar part of national policy-making
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 160). It can also be identified in the interactions
between officials at the different levels in the Councils structures (e.g. Lewis, 1998,
2000; Egeberg, 1999; Quaglia et al., 2008). For example, in examining the identity
and role perceptions of national officials involved in working groups, Egeberg (1999:
470-1) argues that important secondary loyalties complementary to those evoked at
national level are created here, underpinned by a sense of collective and mutual
responsibility for reaching workable outcomes.
8
Lewis (1998) reaches similar
conclusions in his analysis of COREPER, while Juncos and Pomorska (2008: 500) have

5
In their broader analysis of complex interdependence, they identify multiple channels of communication as one
of its three main characteristics. Transgovernmental interaction between states represents one such channel,
alongside traditional inter-state and transnational communication (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 24-25).
6
They identify EMU and co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs as two other policy areas characterized by
intensive transgovernmentalism (Wallace and Wallace, 2005: 87-89).
7
Also included in this list are the opaqueness of the process, both to national parliaments and citizenry, and the
ability on occasion to deliver substantive joint policy (ibid: 88).
8
This theme is developed by Trondhal and Veggeland who argue that participants in EU-level committees have
several institutional affiliations and draw their cues for action from different sources (2003).
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
#
highlighted the importance of socialization in preventing deadlock in CFSP
committees following enlargement, arguing that they provide crucial arenas of
learning for both the formal and informal practices that facilitate decision-making.
More generally, it supports the conclusions of Quaglia et al. (2008: 150), who
characterize EU committees and working groups as hybrids: both formal,
intergovernmental decision-making arenas and informal fora for deliberation and
socialization.
9


Meanwhile, regarding the nature of the deliberations occurring in these formations,
Lewis (1998: 480) and Sjursen (2005: 13) both emphasise the importance of
communicative rationality. While accepting the intergovernmental argument of states
as rational actors, Sjursen (ibid.) contends that such rationality is not only about the
maximisation of interests; rather, it can be detected in arenas where they seek to
justify or explain their actions, and not simply engage in the exchange of threats or
promises. This, in turn, affects their perceptions of what type of problems they face,
and the appropriate way to resolve them, indicating a potential transformative
capacity within CFSP (ibid: 10), and supporting Smiths (2004: 11) argument of a
shift over time within EPC/CFSP from bargaining, focused on the satisfaction of
national interests, to problem-solving, which appeals to common or shared interests.

For Glarbo (1999: 644), this demonstrates the reality of foreign policy co-operation as
a continuous communicative process exerting a significant social effect on
participants over time. This, in turn, encourages the creation of like-minded actors
with a stake in the overall success of the system (Lewis, 2000: 274), and consequently
challenges the intergovernmental assumption that there are no agents committed to
making the system work (Peters, 1997: 27). In this regard, a British official
highlighted the difference between the CFSPs Political and Security Committee and
the North Atlantic Council, NATOs governing political body:

I think the PSC has moresense of a kind of complicity. And its that sense
of complicity which helps create consensus and the sense that people in the
room, part of their job is to make this room work and Im not sure that [the]
NAC always has that.
10


Similarly, a German official based in Brussels described the nature of his role and
those of his colleagues in his CFSP working group:

[T]he European thing about it is that, its not that I feel I wear the German
coloursand its against the guys with the UK colours or the Cypriot colours,
and its about who wins. Here, you would do a pretty lousy job if you thought
like thatYou belong to 2 teamsand both are practically equally
important.
11


Taken together, the concepts of intensive transgovernmentalism and elite socialization
thus offer potentially interesting alternative analytical frameworks that make sense of

9
EU committees are hybrids between formal institutions for decision-making, generally based on
intergovernmental bargaining and power politics, and informal fora for deliberation and socialization (Quaglia et
al., 2008: 150).
10
Interview conducted with official in UK Foreign Office, London, January 2011.
11
Interview conducted with official in German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
$
the inherent dynamism within the CFSP and provide a basis for understanding how
and why a process of Europeanization can take place through it.

(II) Applying Europeanization to the CFSP

Europeanization is concerned with the impact of the European Union on politics,
policy and policy-making within Member States, and with understanding the nature
and extent of any change that occurs within national administrations as a consequence
of integration in essence, the degree to which Europe matters as a factor in
domestic change (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2002: 16). However, there is considerable
debate among scholars as to either its utility or definition, with Claudia Major (2005:
175) and Bache and Jordan (2008: 17) among others noting that as a concept it is
contested. Wong (2005: 135) considers it ill-defined while for Radaelli and
Pasquier (2005: 35) it is a set of contested discourses and narratives about the impact
of European integration on domestic political change. This serves to underline
Bulmers suggestion that rather than considering Europeanization as a theory of
integration, it should instead be seen as a phenomenon that a range of approaches
have sought to explain (2007: 47). Moumoutzis (2011: 18) makes a similar point.

Part of the difficulty lies in the starting point that is adopted when seeking to define
Europeanization as a concept. For some time, the predominant view within the
literature was to see it as a top-down process based on the premise that the EU is the
principal cause of domestic change, and with Europeanization describing the level of
penetration of the European level into the domestic (Major, 2005: 176). This builds
on the definition offered by Ladrech (1994: 69) of Europeanization as an incremental
process re-orienting the direction and shape of [national] politics whereby the
dynamics of EU policy and policy-making become part of the organizational logic
of national administrations.
12


The key principle underlying this process is that change at the national level is
dependent on the level of pressure on Member States to adapt to European rules or
policies, presented in terms of the goodness-of-fit or misfit between the two, with
the pressure for change increasing the more pronounced the degree of such misfit is
(Risse et al., 2001: 7). This approach is contested however. Radaelli (2003: 46)
argues that adaptational pressure is not a necessary condition for Europeanization to
stimulate domestic change, contending that national actors may actually seek to
exploit European policies in situations where they are engaged in domestic policy
reforms, and where existing arrangements are in fact compatible with EU-level
initiatives. Laffan (2007: 138) re-iterates this point, noting that change may be the
result of systemic or political change at the domestic level.
13


Linked to this has been a debate over whether such change results in convergence and
harmonization in the domestic administrative arrangements of the Member States.

12
Radaelli (2003: 30) offers a broader definition of Europeanization as: [p]rocesses of a) construction, b)
diffusion, and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of
doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public
policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and
public policies.
13
Echoing Radaelli, she points out, for example, that national executives can use the EU system to engage in 2-
level games that enable them to reinforce their autonomy from national parliaments (Laffan, 2007: 138).
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
%
For example, Rometsch and Wessels (1996: 239) offer a theory of institutional
fusion that assumes that interaction between the domestic and EU levels will lead to
mutual interdependence and the eventual convergence of Member States around
optimal approaches to reacting and adapting to the Union. Meanwhile Mny et al.
(1996: 8), posit a convergence process whereby common norms of action have
developed that are beyond the control of individual states but have a huge influence
on how public policy actors behave.

The prevalence of such convergence is contested, however (Bulmer, 2007: 55). For
example, in his study of the extent of Europeanization in French and Dutch
administrations, Harmsen (1999: 84) accepts that the diffusion of common norms may
be occurring, but sees no clear link to any systematic process of domestic institutional
change. Indeed, he suggests that an intractable logic of differentiation exists
between Member States (ibid: 106). This is supported by Cowles et al. (2001: 232,
236), whose series of case studies found that convergence was largely confined to
policy and that Europeanization does not cause the homogenization of domestic
structures. More generally, this reflects Radaellis argument that Europeanization
should not be confused with either harmonization, or notions of convergence and
divergence. While these are potential consequences, Europeanization itself is a
process, and as such must be considered separately from its possible outcomes (2003:
33).

The top-down conceptualization is increasingly challenged by those, such as Kassim
and Stevens (2009) in their study of European Air Transport policy, who advocate an
alternative approach that seeks to establish that if and where change occurs, it has
done so as specifically as a result of the EU, and not as a consequence of other causes,
for example globalization or the actions of other states. While by their own admission
this bottom-up approach represents more a running critique of the top-down
approach than a theoretical framework in its own right (2009: 5), its significance lies
crucially, in that it challenges the uni-directional nature of the latter, which Radaelli
(2003: 51) believes runs the risk of leading to a managerial chain-of-command
logic, and which seems to start from the assumption that the EU is the cause of
domestic change (Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 13).

Instead, it must be established that domestic change can be clearly attributed to EU
action rather than other causes, for example the impact of the wider international
context, something which the existing literature frequently overlooks (ibid: 4).
Kassim and Stevens suggest, indeed, that the literature on the EU is curiously
introspective with scholars focusing predominantly on developments inside the
Union, whilst neglecting the impact of the international environment on policy-
making in the EU, but also its impact on the wider world (ibid: 259). Consequently,
such a bottom-up analysis must begin by considering the pre-existing policy and
policy-making arrangements within the Member States, and only after this should
developments at the EU-level be considered (ibid: 15). The advantage of this
approach lies in its greater sensitivity to questions of time when a decision was
made; timing the sequencing of decisions; and tempo the speed of decisions. This
makes it possible to establish much more clearly what the impact of the EU on the
domestic level is, whilst recognising that EU inputs are themselves influenced by
those from the national level, and that change is continuous, iterative and complex
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
1&
(Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 15).
14
Indeed, Kassim and Stevens (ibid: 14) and
Radaelli (2003: 48) argue that an important weakness in the top-down approach is
that it is insensitive to these factors.
15


Given this, such an approach offers an interesting alternative analytical framework
when we consider Europeanization in the context of the CFSP. To date, studies of
Europeanization have tended to focus predominantly on areas that operate under the
auspices of the Community Pillar, and much less consideration has been given to
Europeanization within ostensibly intergovernmental arena such as CFSP or JHA.
Although there are some notable exceptions including Tonra (2001), Wong (2005,
2007) and Major (2005), this reflects the difficulty of applying the same assumptions
that underpin the top-down conceptualization. Thus, while integration in the mainly
economic and social policy areas dealt with within the 1
st
Pillar has a clear driver or
entrepreneur in the form of the European Commission, and while directives and
regulatory frameworks established within the supranational environment can be
enforced and hence their impact more clearly measured there is no equivalent
formal and institutional catalyst for co-operation apparent within the CFSP. Instead,
it is the Member States who remain the primary drivers of co-operation, aided in this
by the 6-monthly rotating Presidency, and conceivably representing 27 potential
alternative policy entrepreneurs, with a 28
th
in the form of the High Representative,
depending on the situation or policy area being considered.
16


Equally, the CFSP is governed by treaties rather than legislation (Major, 2005: 183;
Wong, 2007: 333), so it is therefore much more difficult to pinpoint EU influences
that may be the cause of changes in national policy or policy-making structures.
Moreover, given that the EU does not prescribe a particular CFSP model to which
Member States must adapt, notions of fit/misfit are harder to apply. Instead, the
horizontal pattern of Europeanization proposed by Radaelli (2003: 41), which does
not involve the pressure to conform to set models but occurs due to patterns of
socialization, seems more apt,
17
an argument that Wong (2007: 333) also makes.
For Major (2005: 180), this is the concept of learning as the predominant carrier of
change,
18
with Europeanization therefore about a process of exchange of good or
best practice between governments, which is voluntary and non-hierarchical in
nature, and facilitated by the arena provided by the CFSP (ibid: 186).
19
Finally, CFSP

14
See also for example: Goetz, K. H. (2000) European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of
an Effect, West European Politics, 23 (4), pp. 211-231.
15
Radaelli (2003) designates three key tests in order to determine whether or not the EU is responsible for a
particular change; (i) a sequencing test i.e. did action by the EU pre-date the domestic change; (ii) a
counterfactual test show that change would not have occurred without the EU action; and (iii) an alternative
hypothesis test i.e. no other factor could have brought about change (cited in Kassim and Stevens, 2009: 267).
16
This is not to dismiss the role of the High Representative for the CFSP now the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs under the Lisbon Treaty. However, the High Representative was given neither the power to
initiate policies nor the resources in terms of staff etc that the Commission enjoys in the 1
st
Pillar (see Michael
Smith, 2004: 228-230). Thus, prior to Lisbon, the significance of the High Representative as an actor and policy
entrepreneur owed as much to the personal qualities of Javier Solana, the only holder of the office, as the formal
powers bestowed upon him.
17
See also Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004.
18
The literature on Europeanization identifies two forms of learning: single-loop, which occurs when actors
adjust only the means or strategies they employ to achieve their goals or preferences; and double-loop or
complex learning, when situations lead actors to re-evaluate and change their goals or preferences. The latter
occurs more rarely and usually following a crisis or critical policy failure (Risse et al., 2001:12).
19
In this sense, it might be compared to the processes that occur through the Open Method of Co-ordination.
Through this, adaptation is not a reaction to the imposition of a particular structure or approach by Brussels, but
rather is a consequence of benchmarking, networking and exchange of best practice that produces guidelines rather
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
11
offers just one of several venues through which Member States may pursue foreign
policy co-operation.

All these factors together challenge the notion of Europeanization as it is applied
within the Community Pillar in terms of definition, effect and impact. In this context,
therefore, the possibilities offered of a bottom-up analytical approach become clear.
Indeed, Wong (2007: 330) argues that such an approach is necessitated given the
nature of decision-making within the CFSP, and the difficulty of relating
substantive policy change in this area specifically to the EU. Major (2005: 184)
makes a similar point, noting that the circumstances in which policy is made mean
that it cannot be assumed that any incentives for change will originate directly or at all
from the EU level. The challenge, therefore, is whether Europeanization can be
isolated as a cause of change, or if other particularly external factors must be
considered, for example the aforementioned importance in this field of other venues
for foreign and security policy decision-making such as NATO.

It is suggested here, therefore, that the notion of Europeanization can be usefully
applied when discussing the relationship between national foreign policy objectives
and the CFSP, on the following basis: first, the CFSP represents an arena where each
Member State has the potential to act as a policy entrepreneur, although in practise
some will do so more than others,
20
and consequently when a Member State
determines that it has a particular foreign policy objective that it wishes to pursue, it
will seek to upload or project this to the European level in other words, it is the
Member States who drive the process; second, change or adaptation, if and where it
occurs, is likely to be informal and take place through and as a consequence of the
negotiations that take place within the multi-level structures of the CFSP and also
between national administrations there is no formal demand or requirement to
adapt; third, given the formally intergovernmental nature of CFSP where the vast
majority of decisions remain subject to the unanimity rule, a national objective can be
assumed to have been successfully uploaded and therefore Europeanized once it
has been agreed to by all Member States; fourth, that these reflect the earlier argument
that the concepts of intensive transgovernmentalism and socialisation are best able to
explain the nature of the CFSP and the interactions that occur with and within it. In
the final part of this paper, these assumptions will be tested by identifying cases
where particular national foreign policy objectives of three Member States France,
Germany and the United Kingdom might be deemed to have been Europeanized.

(III) The Europeanization of French, German and British foreign policy
objectives

A brief examination of organisational and processual change and adaptation reveals
ample evidence of a Europeanizing effect as a consequence of four decades of
foreign policy cooperation through EPC and CFSP. The institution of the Gymnich
meetings is often cited as one example (e.g. Glarbo, 1999), while the creation of a

than legislation, and in which the EU acts as a facilitator or bourse for policy transfer (Bulmer, 2007: 52).
The impact is therefore more subtle, involving ideational convergence (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 38).
20
It is important to note, though, that determining which Member States are likely to actively pursue foreign
policy objectives within the CFSP cannot be based on the size of the state, with big assumed to be more active than
small; or on longevity of membership, with older assumed to be more active than newer.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
12
network of European Correspondents who sit within each foreign ministry and are
responsible for the day-to-day management of the CFSP represents another form of
adaptation to the demands this cooperation places on Member States. It is interesting
to note, though, that while each has a European Correspondent, their precise duties
and job description vary from state to state,
21
supporting Harmsens (1999) argument
that adaptation should not be equated with convergence. More recently, the creation
of the Political and Security Committee represents a successful push particularly by
states such as Britain and France to have a permanent, Brussels-based body
overseeing the day-to-day running of CFSP and ESDP policy. Moreover, although
Frances wish that this body be staffed by senior Ambassadorial-level diplomats
differed with the UKs desire for lower-level representation, the determination that it
would be the Member States who remained in control of developments in this field
continued was shared (Duke, 2005: 15-16).

Looking at the some of the specific arrangements within each state, there are again a
number of examples of a Europeanizing effect on the organisational centres of
foreign policy-making. Thus, when the UK joined EPC, the Foreign Office was
required to create the specific post of Political Director to enable Britain to participate
fully in meetings of the Political Committee, the precursor to todays PSC (Duke,
2005: 7). In recent years in France, meanwhile, a Strategic Affairs Unit (Direction des
Affaires Stratgiques) has been created to act as the interface between the Foreign
Ministry and Defence Ministry. Located within the Quai dOrsay, this provides a
Paris-based centre of expertise for inputs for CSDP bringing together diplomats and
core military personnel.
22


Moreover, in the last 12 months there has been a significant reorganisation within the
Quai dOrsay that has seen a merger of the CFSP Service with the European External
Relations Department which dealt, among other issues, with enlargement. This is
intended to mirror the changes that have taken place in Brussels as a consequence of
the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the External Action Service, and so far is unique
among Member States.
23
Finally, Germany has also sought to reorganise and improve
its internal governmental communication and coordination processes vis--vis CFSP,
particularly to better involve the Ministries of Interior, Justice and Economic
Development in the inter-departmental discussions that have traditionally involved the
Foreign and Defence Ministries, although these efforts have been less systematic or
formalized than the French.
24
These changes represent a clear desire on the part of
each state to improve its ability to engage with and influence policy-making within
the CFSP.

It is possible, meanwhile, to identify regular and concerted attempts by each of the
three states to upload and Europeanize particular national foreign policy objectives.
For the purposes of this paper, these can be divided into two categories, although they
are frequently interlinked: the first can be termed the principles governing policy-
making, relating particularly to what each perceives as the purpose, utility and scope
of the CFSP; the second comprises particular policy issues, for example the EUs

21
Interview conducted with official in the UK Foreign Office, London, January 2011.
22
Interview conducted with official in French Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010, and official in
the French Foreign Ministry, February 2011
23
This new department costs of 12-15 officials, led by the European Correspondent. Interview conducted with
official in the French Foreign Ministry, February 2011.
24
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
13
approach to the issue of Irans nuclear development programme or the development
of the EUs crisis management capabilities, particularly with the creation of EU Battle
Groups. A number of these will now be analysed in more detail.

(a) Policy Principles

Of the key principles to emerge from the interviews with officials from the three
Member States, it was unremarkable that the potential for the European level to serve
as a multiplier of national influence was a priority, although the French and British
perceived this differently to the Germans. Equally, the British emphasized the need
for EU capabilities in security and defence to be complementary to those of NATO.
However, two others also stood out: financial and budgetary constraint and the
promotion of a politics first approach to crisis management. (It should be noted that
these are not exclusive to the Member States in question, but rather were emphasised
by the national officials as being objectives they sought to promote.)

While perhaps somewhat prosaic, the issue of financial and budgetary constraint was
raised by officials from all three countries as being of concern. For the Germans, it
was particularly an issue where common funding of CSDP missions was being
considered. Their chief concern was to ensure that such funding was agreed only if it
is operationally necessary but there cannot be automaticity.
25
Indeed, in the 2006
review of Athena, the mechanism for administering the common costs of such
operations, there was a feeling among German officials that they had been very
successful in promoting German aims based on an agreement negotiated previously
with the British and Dutch, which then formed the basis of the ultimate compromise.
26

A French official also emphasised the German concern over budgets for ESDP
missions.
27


More generally, French and German officials considered this to be one of the over-
riding concerns for the UK, with one German interviewee describing the British as
being much more demanding than the Germans on this.
28
British officials concurred
that financing was important, but set this within a wider context of wanting the EU to
be more effective.
29
A recent example of the British determination to upload this
particular principle relates to their demand that the budget for the EULEX Kosovo
mission, although previously agreed at both working group and PSC level, be re-
opened in an attempt to find further savings. In a session on 29 September 2010
considering the mission, the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons
minuted the following submission by David Liddington, UK Minister for Europe:

"The UK also secured agreement that the operational need for some of the
mission's larger proposed capital spending will be reviewed again at the
relevant policy committee before final commitments are made in these areas,
providing an opportunity to further review costs. This is a departure from
previous financial processes, but something the UK has been insistent on to
ensure that financial decisions are scrutinised more thoroughly, in line with

25
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
26
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
27
Interview conducted with official in the French Foreign Ministry, February 2011.
28
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
29
Interview conducted with official in the UK Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
1
policy requirements. The UK continues to argue strongly that the mission
must deliver value for money, particularly as the largest civilian CSDP
mission. Further, the UK has stressed the importance of effective budget
management and accurate forecasting to mitigate the risk of another
underspend."
30


As a German official based in Brussels involved in the discussions argued, however,
while British demands were accepted on this occasion, there was a clear concern to
avoid this setting a precedent:

[F]or the first time ever I understand, there was a debate in Parliament on an
individual CFSP mission on EULEX Kosovo The UK Perm Rep needed to
show for national consumption that they had done everything whatsoever to
cut down the budget of the EULEX Kosovo, so were at the moment re-
opening the whole matter which is unprecedented [But] I think later on in
discussion we will not accept this as a precedentbecause if we do this every
time, this is completely destroying our CFSP.
31


The politics first approach, meanwhile, can be ascribed in particular to Germany.
For obvious historical reasons, Germanys approach CFSP and CSDP has been based
on a number of clear principles or red lines that continue to provide the framework
for their engagement. These include the supremacy of the Bundestag in decisions
relating to military deployments, and the requirement that neither civilian nor police
deployments are ever placed under military command.
32
These feed into a more
general principle that military deployments can only be considered once all political
means have been exhausted, a stance that sometimes brings them into conflict with
France. As one German Foreign Ministry official put it: France very quickly looks to
military means for us, these are only as the last resort. A British official made a
similar point: [The French] default setting for almost any given problem in the world
is to send an ESDP mission.
33


German willingness to insist on the politics first approach was demonstrated in
discussions over the deployment of an EU Battle Group to Eastern Congo in 2008.
While France and the UK both agreed to the deployment, the UK had declined to
contribute due to its commitments in Afghanistan, thereby removing it from the
discussion. Germany rejected the proposal, however and we would have said no
even if the UK had said yes arguing that the political route had not yet been fully
explored, and that the deployment of an EU force would take the pressure off
Congolese President Laurent Kabila to negotiate with Rwandan President Paul
Kagame. At the same time, they argued that for the EU to become engaged in an area
where the UN had deployed would seriously undermine the credibility of the latter, a
possibility the Germans were not willing to entertain. In the event, with a possible EU
deployment off the table, Kabila and Kagame did negotiate.
34



30
European Scrutiny Committee, House of Commons, 29 September 2010 European Security and Defence
Policy: EULEX Kosovo (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-
iii/428iii03.htm) (Accessed: 25 February 2011) (my italics)
31
Interview conducted with official in the German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010.
32
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
33
Interview conducted with official in the UK Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
34
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
1!
(b) Policy Issues

The second category comprises policy issues. Again, there are a number of occasions
when France, Germany and the United Kingdom can be seen to have successfully
uploaded particular national objectives. Some prime examples are in the fields of
security and defence, with each state focused on the need to improve the EUs
effectiveness in these areas. Thus, the development of EU Battle Groups, regarded as
essential both in terms of increasing the numbers of deployable troops available for
EU crisis management operations, but also as a tool of force transformation as the key
to greater European capabilities, lay at the heart of the original paper submitted jointly
by the three states proposing their creation.
35
Similarly, the initiatives that lead to the
launching of the European Defence Agency and the mechanism for Permanent
Structured Cooperation in Defence incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty were based on
positions shared and then agreed by the states. Indeed, officials from each state all
remarked that where they were able to act in concert, their ability to achieve particular
policy outcomes was greatly enhanced. As one noted: if the big 3 can agree, the
chances of success are very high.
36


One of the most successful examples of the uploading of national foreign policy
objectives has been the EUs response to the Iranian nuclear programme. This has
taken the form of the E3-led format for negotiations with Iran supported by a
comprehensive range of sanctions. While this has yet to produce concrete outcomes in
terms of an agreement, it has shown the ability of the three states not only to lead on a
significant EU-level policy, but to do so in an official and formalised forum with the
acceptance or at least quiescence of the other Member States. Underpinning this, as
one European Correspondent noted, has been a high level of bi- and tri-lateral
coordination and consultation, whether before full meetings of the E3+3 (including
the USA, Russia and China), or before formal Council meetings.
37
However, while
this has helped ensure contentious issues are addressed and that joint positions are
presented, the concern remains that such a Directoire will be perceived as the big
ones trying to bully the small ones, something is of particular concern to Germany.
38


Of over-riding important for France and the UK in this process has been to ensure that
the EUs response has been in lock-step with that of the UN Security Council. One
German official presented it thus:

The UK and France do see themselves as different from everybody else to the
extent that they feel as Permanent Members of the Security Council, when it
comes to implementing UN-based sanctions they have a particular
responsibility to make sure that the EU is not moving an inch off what the
Security Council ask us to do.
39


Consequently, as an official in the RELEX Group (the body responsible for drafting
the sanctions) noted, this has resulted in the EU adopting even tougher EU-level
sanctions than those agreed by the Security Council, as shown by the June 2010

35
Interview conducted with Dr Claudia Major, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, January 2011.
36
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
37
Interview conducted with official, January 2011.
38
Interview conducted with official in the German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010
39
Interview conducted with official in the German Permanent Representation, Brussels, November 2010.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
1"
European Council instruction to the Foreign Affairs Council to draw up additional,
autonomous EU measures to target the Iranian leadership.
40


However, while the E3 leadership framework may represent a positive achievement in
terms of creating a clear set of policies and responses to Iran, and therefore success in
uploading British, French and German objectives in seeking to ensure that the
prevention of nuclear proliferation in the European neighbourhood was a clear
policy priority at EU level, how far it has succeeded in achieving this aim remains
questionable. The E3+3 format was born out of a policy vacuum based on the
inability and unwillingness of the United States and Iran to engage in direct
negotiations, and were that situation to change, the E3+3 would become futile, it
would dissolve and things would be managed by the Americans.
41
Indeed, David
Miliband, the former UK Foreign Secretary, was quite blunt:

We spent more time in stasis on the Iran dossier than we did in action
because there was [sic] the UN blockages, long interminable waitings for the
Iranians to negotiate thingsI think over the 10 yearsyou would say the E3
were important on that. They werent necessarily always right, but they were
important.
42


A mixed picture emerges, therefore. There is evidence that these three states have
been able to Europeanize particular national foreign policy objectives, and that when
they act in concert they can be highly effective in setting policy agendas and the
direction of travel. There remain limitations however, particularly in terms of the
EUs wider influence in terms of dealing with issues such as the Iranian nuclear
programme, once a French, German and British priority has been successfully
uploaded. Finally, it must be remembered that however proactive Member States seek
to be in their interactions with the CFSP, as an arena it remains predominantly
reactive in terms of its outputs.


Conclusion

This paper has set out to examine the extent to which France, Germany and the
United Kingdom have been able to upload national foreign policy objectives to the
CFSP, arguing that within a policy-making environment based on unanimity, their
acceptance or approval by other Member States can be equated to a form of
Europeanization. It has identified two types of such uploading, categorizing them
in terms of policy principles and policy issues, and offered examples where such
Europeanization has been achieved, including financial constraints on CSDP
missions, the pursuit of political solutions as far as possible before considering the
deployment of military operations, and the E3-led policy on Iran.

40
Interview with RELEX Group official, Brussels, November 2010. Point 4, Annex II of The European Council
Conclusions, 17 June 2010, stated: The European Councilinvites the Foreign Affairs Council to adopt at its
next session measures implementing those contained in the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 as well as
accompanying measures, with a view to supporting the resolution of all outstanding concerns regarding Iran's
development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, through negotiation.
(http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council_conclusion_17_june_en.pdf) (Accessed: 25 February 2011)
41
Interview conducted with official in the German Foreign Ministry, January 2011.
42
Interview conducted in London, December 2010.
The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
1#

The conclusions, though, are preliminary and only indicative, requiring further testing
and corroboration to establish how far each state was able to influence the 6 monthly
rotating Presidencies; whether a deeper process of change or adaptation might be at
work relating to how long these particular national objectives have been prioritized;
and the extent to which these objectives themselves have been subject to alteration
over time. Furthermore, it would be interesting and instructive to see the extent to
which other Member States shared such priorities, and therefore actively supported
their adoption at European level, and how far they merely acquiesced in their
acceptance, knowing there would be little cost from their approval. Such
investigation would support a more refined understanding of Europeanization in the
context of the CFSP, and the extent to which foreign policy cooperation has
influenced Member States.

Nicholas Wright
University of East Anglia
nick.wright@uea.ac.uk

The Europeanization of Member States foreign policy objectives
1$
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