Journal of European Public Policy

ISSN: 1350-1763 (Print) 1466-4429 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20

European Union enlargement and integration

capacity: concepts, findings, and policy
implications

Tanja A. Börzel, Antoaneta Dimitrova & Frank Schimmelfennig

To cite this article: Tanja A. Börzel, Antoaneta Dimitrova & Frank Schimmelfennig (2017)
European Union enlargement and integration capacity: concepts, findings, and policy implications,
Journal of European Public Policy, 24:2, 157-176, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1265576

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1265576

Published online: 07 Feb 2017.

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JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY, 2017
VOL. 24, NO. 2, 157–176
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1265576

European Union enlargement and integration

capacity: concepts, findings, and policy implications
Tanja A. Börzela, Antoaneta Dimitrovab and Frank Schimmelfennigc
a
Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany; bFaculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden
University, The Hague, The Netherlands; cETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

ABSTRACT
This contribution introduces the concept of integration capacity and
summarizes our research on the European Union (EU)’s integration capacity in
Eastern enlargement. Integration capacity refers to the ability of the EU to
prepare non-members for membership (external integration capacity) and to
preserve its functioning and cohesion once they join (internal integration
capacity). In general, we find strong evidence for the EU’s external capacity to
prepare candidates for membership and for the EU’s internal institutional
capacity to integrate new member states. By contrast, the absence of a
membership perspective reduces external capacity, and sceptical publics
weaken internal capacity. In addition, our results support the centrality of
conditionality as a mode of integration. We conclude by highlighting the
policy implications of our research for future enlargement and relations with
associated states.

KEYWORDS Conditionality; enlargement; European Union; integration capacity.

Introduction
The tension between widening and deepening of integration has been part of
every enlargement of the European Union (EU), with no round more contro-
versial than the ‘big bang’ Eastern enlargement of 2004–2007. The Eastern
enlargement was commonly considered the most challenging expansion of
the Union. The number of applicants and the huge scale of the transformation
they underwent to become EU members required the mobilization of poli-
ticians, experts, civil society members and citizens across Europe to make it
a reality. Its completion signalled clearly the EU’s wish to overcome the con-
tinent’s Cold War division. Even before the Eastern enlargement was com-
pleted, however, criticism of its impact and doubts about the candidates’
readiness led many to speak of ‘enlargement fatigue’ (Rehn 2007). Commen-
tators and policy-makers warned that the EU had reached or already over-
reached the limits of its capacity to integrate additional member states.

CONTACT Frank Schimmelfennig frank.schimmelfennig@eup.gess.ethz.ch

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
158 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

Uncertainty and scepticism about the effects of such a big enlargement on the
institutions and processes of EU policy-making were high. The accession of
Bulgaria and Romania in particular triggered concerns that the new
member states were not sufficiently qualified and prepared for membership
and that the remaining candidates and aspirants were even less able to
meet the accession criteria.
When the discussion peaked in the mid-2000s, there was hardly enough
evidence for an assessment of the effects of Eastern enlargement on the
EU’s integration capacity. A decade later, however, we are able to provide a
systematic and broad-based evaluation of the different aspects of the
2004–2007 enlargement. This evaluation has been at the core of the colla-
borative research project ‘Maximizing the Integration Capacity of the Euro-
pean Union’ (MAXCAP).1 In this collection, we report key results covering EU
legislation, implementation, differentiated integration and public discourses,
as well as the political and economic effects of enlargement.
In this contribution, we introduce the core concept of the collection: inte-
gration capacity. In the context of enlargement, integration capacity refers to
the ability of the EU to prepare non-members for membership (external inte-
gration capacity) and to preserve its functioning and cohesion once they join
(internal integration capacity). We discuss the policy context in which the
concept originated, define its dimensions and measurement, and introduce
the main modes of integration the EU has at its disposal. Subsequently, we
present and discuss the main findings of the MAXCAP project and this collec-
tion. From these findings, we draw policy implications for strengthening the
EU’s integration capacity and adapting its enlargement strategy.
In contrast to widespread concerns expressed in academic and political
debates, our results generally show that the EU’s integration capacity has
been strong. Thanks to the efforts of domestic policy-makers and adminis-
trations in the candidate states empowered and supported by the EU’s effec-
tive accession conditionality and assistance, the new member states entered
the EU as increasingly competitive market economies. Credible accession con-
ditionality has had a positive impact on democracy, governance capacity and
economic transformation in the new member states; in addition, pre-accession
assistance has cushioned the shock of integrating transition economies into
the EU’s market. Accession conditionality has supported domestic insti-
tution-building to prepare the ground for the new member states’ surprisingly
good post-accession record of compliance with EU law. Finally, Eastern enlar-
gement has not had any systematic negative effects on the legislative capacity
of the EU or its legal system. Quite on the contrary, the speed of decision-
making has increased, and more rather than less legislation is being
adopted. The accession of 12 new member states has not led to a deterioration
of compliance with and implementation of EU law either; nor has it resulted in
a greater use of soft law and differentiated integration in the long run.
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 159

By contrast, the EU’s integration capacity is weak with respect to associated

states. EU external policies without a membership perspective do not produce
any systematic democratic or good governance effects. Deep economic inte-
gration without concomitant political integration and the employment of a
regime to anticipate and alleviate the potential large-scale negative conse-
quences of rule transfer is unlikely to be a successful recipe for transformation
and could even harm neighbouring countries.
As credible accession conditionality is crucial for the EU’s integration
capacity, the existence of increasing public opposition to future EU enlarge-
ment is a cause of major concern. The roots of this opposition are to be
found in citizens’ experience with enlargement as a process about which
they have not been informed or consulted. While such ‘voice’ has been a
major issue for citizens in the older member states, in newer member states
and candidate states the EU’s legitimacy also depends on its ability to
deliver economic growth and better governance.

Integration capacity
The policy context
The concept of ‘integration capacity’ originated in EU policy rather than aca-
demic discourse. It reflects a long-standing EU concern about potential detri-
mental effects of enlargement on the functioning of the EU and future
integration. Concerns about the Union’s integration capacity have been part
of the widening versus deepening debates that marked the wake of every
enlargement round (Preston 1995). The Eastern enlargement was, however,
seen as particularly challenging for the institutions, and even more so the pol-
icies of the Union, especially the Common Agricultural Policy and the struc-
tural funds (Avery and Cameron 1998: 140–1). The Copenhagen Criteria of
June 1993 are mostly known for defining the conditions that candidates
need to fulfil ahead of accession. However, they also contain a paragraph
stating that the ‘Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining
the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in
the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries’ (European
Council 1993: 13).
Ahead of the 2004–2007 enlargement, the problems anticipated by the
European Commission and the member states were addressed with extensive
policy adjustments, based on the Commission’s proposals and impact assess-
ment study in the Agenda 2000 (Bruszt and Langbein 2015; European Com-
mission 1997;). In addition, two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs)
negotiated treaty changes to prepare the institutions for decision-making
after enlargement, yet they did not prevent the member states’ ‘enlargement
fatigue’. Enlargement fatigue was mentioned first in the early 2000s and
160 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

seemed to reflect frustration with the difficulty of institutional reforms and the
failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, as well as misgivings about the
candidates.
The European Parliament and the European Council highlighted concerns
about the absorption capacity of the EU, particularly with regard to the risks of
undermining the integrity of the Single Market, the functioning of EU insti-
tutions, and citizens’ perceptions of enlargement (European Council 2006;
European Parliament 2006). The Commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn,
acknowledged these concerns, but stressed the EU was well prepared for
the completion of enlargement (Rehn 2006, 2007). In its 2006–2007 enlarge-
ment strategy (European Commission 2006), the Commission changed the
controversial term ‘absorption capacity’ to ‘integration capacity’. It also tried
to render the term more ‘functional’ (as opposed to ‘political’) and more pro-
cedural (rather than establishing new criteria).
The EU’s absorption capacity, or rather integration capacity, is determined by the
development of the EU’s policies and institutions, and by the transformation of
applicants into well-prepared Member States. The capacity of would-be
members to accede to the Union is rigorously assessed by the Commission on
the basis of strict conditionality. Integration capacity is about whether the EU
can take in new members at a given moment or in a given period, without jeopar-
dizing the political and policy objectives established by the Treaties. Hence, it is first
and foremost a functional concept. (European Commission 2006: 17; [emphasis
added])

As it had done in the Agenda 2000 impact study of enlargement, the Commis-
sion focused on the three main components: institutions; common policies;
and budget. In addition, the Commission expressed its commitment to
even more rigorous conditionality. Finally, the Commission emphasized the
need for ‘better communication’ of the benefits and challenges of enlarge-
ment – but as primarily a task for the member states (European Commission
2006: 23).
After the European Council endorsed the strategy, the explicit policy
debate on integration capacity subsided. Subsequent annual enlargement
strategies have referred to the 2006 consensus and have not questioned
the results of the discussion. The same is true for debates and resolutions
of the European Parliament, such as the recent resolution on the 2015
report on Turkey (European Parliament 2016). Yet much of the debate on
the EU’s integration capacity has been based on expectations rather than evi-
dence. It is the goal of this collection to provide such evidence.

Dimensions of integration capacity

In the context of enlargement, we define integration capacity as the ability of
the EU to expand its membership successfully, i.e., to turn non-member states
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 161

into member states while maintaining the cohesion and functioning of the EU.
According to this definition, integration capacity has two faces: external and
internal integration capacity. External integration capacity is about turning
non-member states into member states. It refers to the ability of the EU to
associate states more closely and support them to be ready for membership.
Internal integration capacity is about maintaining the cohesion and function-
ing of the EU. It refers to the ability of the EU to prepare itself for enlargement.
Both dimensions of integration capacity are closely linked. For one, external
integration capacity affects internal integration capacity. The better prepared
new member states are, the less likely they are to disrupt the cohesion and
functioning of the EU. In addition, internal integration capacity affects external
integration capacity. The more successfully the EU integrates new members
and maintains its cohesion and functioning, the more credible its promise is
for aspiring members.
Both internal and external integration capacity can be divided into further
sub-dimensions (see Figure 1). Institutional integration capacity refers to the
ability of EU institutions to absorb an increase in the number and heterogen-
eity of member states. In the context of Eastern enlargement, there have been
strong academic as well as public concerns that such a large intake of new
member states might overburden the EU’s institutions and policies –
especially because most of the new member states were comparatively
poor and had only recently transitioned from communist political and econ-
omic systems. It was widely expected that Eastern enlargement would create
new coalitions and conflicts in the EU, slow down or even paralyse EU
decision-making, and decrease EU legislative production (cf. König 2007;
Leuffen and Hertz 2010; Toshkov 2017). Based on previous experience with
EU enlargements, a large number of relatively poor new member states was
further likely to give a boost to differentiated integration and thus weaken

Figure 1. The dimensions of integration capacity.

162 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

the legal unity of the EU (cf. Andersen and Sitter 2006; Schimmelfennig and
Winzen 2017). Finally, concerns about the implementation of EU law ran
high. New member states with distinct policy preferences and comparatively
weak governance capacity might either be unwilling to comply with EU
decisions or unable to effectively implement and apply EU law domestically
(cf. Falkner et al. 2008; Dimitrova 2010; Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017; Zhelyaz-
kova et al. 2017).
In addition to the workings of EU institutions and the EU policy-making
process, internal integration capacity depends on agreement in the domestic
political arena. The consent of successive governments from different parts of
the political spectrum in each member state is a first requirement. In their
turn, negotiating governments are first and foremost dependent on parlia-
mentary approval, which ultimately depends on public support. Support for
enlargement can refer to support for the process itself, for specific candidate
states and for the EU as a whole (Toshkov et al. 2014; Dimitrova and Kortenska
2017). Concerns about enlargement and accompanying migration have
become grist to the mill of Eurosceptic parties and movements across
Europe, as illustrated by the results of the 2005 referendums on the Consti-
tutional Treaty and the 2016 referendum on the Association treaty with
Ukraine in the Netherlands (Toshkov and Kortenska 2015; Dimitrova and Kor-
tenska 2016).
The core criteria for external integration capacity are the Copenhagen Cri-
teria of eligibility to EU membership, agreed in June 1993. The political criteria
are composed of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities. These criteria were considered necessary conditions
for membership and particularly relevant because of the non-democratic
legacies of all Eastern European countries and the potential for ethnic conflict
in the region. The required ‘ability to take on the obligations of membership’
refers to the adoption of the acquis and the administrative reforms required
for its successful implementation. They include the legislative alignment of
candidate countries with the EU’s acquis and ‘the administrative and insti-
tutional capacity to effectively implement’ it domestically.2 Given the recent
transformation of the Eastern European states, this was again a major
concern in Eastern enlargement (cf. Dimitrova 2002; Bruszt and Langbein
2017). Owing to Eastern Europe’s legacy of centrally administered and pro-
tected economies and weak state capacities to support the integration into
transnational markets, the same is true of the economic accession criteria,
‘the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union’.
The external and internal dimensions of integration capacity are the
subject of the articles in this collection. Toshkov (2017) examines the evidence
on the EU’s post-enlargement decision-making capacity; Schimmelfennig and
Winzen (2017) look at the development of differentiated integration in EU
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 163

primary and secondary law. Implementation is the subject of two articles.

Börzel and Sedelmeier (2017) and Zhelyazkova et al. (2017) analyse compli-
ance with EU law. Dimitrova and Kortenska (2017) study the citizen discourses
on enlargement. With regard to external integration capacity, Börzel and
Schimmelfennig (2017) review the EU’s impact on the political and administra-
tive criteria for membership, whereas Bruszt and Langbein (2017) concentrate
on the economic integration of Eastern Europe.

Modes of integration capacity

Modes refer to the ‘how’ of internal and external integration capacity. How
does the EU make non-member states fit for membership by helping them
meet the political, administrative and economic criteria for accession? And
how does it maintain cohesion, support and the functioning of its institutions
after enlargement? The Europeanization literature has identified a variety of
modes by which the EU can directly affect both member and non-member
states and bring about compliance with its rules and practices (see, inter
alia, Börzel and Risse 2012; Cowles et al. 2001; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig
2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). These modes differ with
regard to the underlying mechanism of influence the EU uses. Here, we dis-
tinguish enforcement, conditionality, dialogue and assistance.
Enforcement is based on legal obligation and coercion. This is the typical
mode of integration among the member states of the EU, which consent to
be legally bound by the decisions of EU institutions and by EU law. Enforce-
ment operates mainly through the monitoring procedures of the Commission,
and the judicial decisions of the Court. Enforcement capacity is inversely
related to the voting power of individual member states and the room for
manoeuvre they retain in avoiding monitoring and sanctioning. The enforce-
ment mode does not normally apply to non-member states unless they agree
to the dynamic adaptation of national laws to EU law and the judicial authority
of the European Court, as in the European Economic Area and the Schengen
Area.
By contrast, conditionality is based on negotiations and bargaining power
rather than legal obligation. It is the typical mode of integration between
the EU and non-member states. In the mode of conditionality, the EU offers
rewards to non-member states that adopt and comply with its rules – and
withholds or withdraws such rewards in case of rejection or non-compliance
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 12–17). The success of conditionality
depends, first, on the size of the EU’s rewards – and how they relate to the
costs that non-member states incur by complying with EU policy. The
highest reward the EU has on offer is membership – on the condition that can-
didates meet the political, administrative and economic accession criteria. In
addition, the success of conditionality depends on the credibility of the
164 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

conditional rewards: the certainty that membership will be granted if con-

ditions are met and withheld otherwise. The credibility of the threat to with-
hold or withdraw membership generally increases with the EU’s bargaining
power vis-à-vis non-member states. The credibility of the promise to admit
complying states depends, in turn, on intergovernmental consensus, includ-
ing ratification of accession treaties, and/or the impartiality and independence
of the decision-making process. After accession, conditionality as a mode of
integration recedes into the background, with some limited elements appli-
cable to new member states seeking access to the eurozone and the Schen-
gen Area.
Enforcement and conditionality are flanked by assistance and dialogue.
Assistance is designed to provide states with the expertise and the technical
and financial means to comply. When compliance is a matter of capacity
rather than will, assistance helps states with meeting the requirements of
EU membership. In addition, assistance can lower the costs of compliance
and thereby facilitate both conditionality and enforcement. By contrast, in dia-
logue mode, the EU strives to persuade governments and other political actors
to adopt and comply with its rules. Dialogue intends to convince both non-
members and members of the merits of a given policy or the appropriateness
of agreeing with and abiding by the rules. It is based on the legitimacy and
authority of the EU rather than the rewards and assistance it has on offer.

Measuring integration capacity

In order to measure the EU’s integration capacity, the contributions to the
collection generally start from an empirical standard of EU integration based
on the performance of the old member states or new members of previous
enlargement rounds. We consider an empirical benchmark to be more
adequate for assessing the impact of enlargement on EU institutions and
the impact of the EU on non-member states than some ideal level or norma-
tive standard of EU policy-making and the Copenhagen criteria.
The analysis of decision-making capacity starts from pre-accession levels of
legislative output and duration (Toshkov 2017). To assess the differentiated
integration of the new member states, the analysis of differentiated inte-
gration compares the exemptions and discriminations of the new member
states with normal levels of differentiation among the member states and
the Southern member states in particular (Schimmelfennig and Winzen
2017). The same is true for Tanja A. Börzel and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2017),
who compare data on infringement proceedings for old and new member
states across different enlargement rounds. Asya Zhelyazkova et al. (2017)
compare old and new member states for notifications and for reports on
the legal conformity and application of EU law. To analyse the EU’s political
and administrative external integration capacity, Tanja A. Börzel and Frank
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 165

Schimmelfennig (2017) use data on the democratic quality and governance

effectiveness of EU member states and Eastern European non-member
states and examine whether and under which conditions Eastern European
countries have approximated the EU standard over time. In evaluating the
economic external integration capacity, László Bruszt and Julia Langbein
(2017) start from the deep mode of integration prevalent among (prospective)
member states and compare it to other modes used in countries lacking a
membership perspective. Finally, based on original data from two older and
two recent member states Antoaneta Dimitrova and Elitsa Kortenska (2017)
use Q methodology to capture and analyse citizen perceptions of enlarge-
ment and identify enabling, constraining and conditional discourses.
Implicit in these comparisons is the assumption that the Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs) have been a particularly testing group for the EU’s
integration capacity. Not only were the numbers challenging – never before
has the EU admitted so many new member states in a single round – the
Eastern new member states also started their accession process with a
unique common historical legacy: their Soviet Communist past required
them to go through a double and, in some cases, triple transformation: from
Communist party dictatorship to liberal democracy; from socialist planned
economies to capitalist market economies; and from multinational states (in
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union) to independent statehood
(Offe 1991). By contrast, the Southern European states only had to master a pol-
itical transformation before joining the European Community. The acquis com-
munautaire was much smaller and there was no accession conditionality (cf.
Börzel 2009). Finally, the Eastern candidates had weaker administrative
capacities than the old member states or previous accession countries. Most
contributions to the collection therefore test or control for these features of
the Eastern new member states in their explanations of EU integration capacity.

Results
In this section, we summarize the main descriptive and explanatory results
regarding the EU’s integration capacity. Descriptively, we find strong evidence
for the EU’s external capacity to prepare candidates for membership and for
the EU’s internal institutional capacity to integrate new member states. By
contrast, the absence of a membership perspective reduces external capacity,
and sceptical publics weaken internal capacity. In addition, our results support
the centrality of conditionality as a mode of integration capacity.

Transformative power, resilient institutions, and sceptical publics

Our empirical findings testify to the considerable external transformative
power of the EU and its strong internal institutional resilience. At the same
166 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

time, they reveal a gap between institutional performance, on the one hand,
and public opinion, on the other.
Eastern Europe has made significant political, administrative and economic
progress in the accession period. The region has moved closer to Western
European standards without, however, closing the East–West gap or overcom-
ing traditional differences in political and economic development among the
Central, South-eastern and post-Soviet sub-regions of Eastern Europe (Börzel
and Schimmelfennig 2017).
Wealth has increased in Central and Eastern Europe, but the catching-up
process has been uneven. While the fastest developing CEECs have similar
production profiles as Germany in terms of the technological sophistication
of their exports, their catch-up process was based primarily on the availability
of cheap, but highly skilled labour, preventing considerable convergence with
the core countries at the level of consumption (Bruszt and Langbein 2017; cf.
Bruszt and Vukov forthcoming). Pre-accession assistance programmes helped
to prevent economic collapse after communism and cushioned some of the
effects of the 2008 crisis, while the EU’s cohesion funds contributed to the
new members’ wealth (Jacoby 2014). At the same time, the latter have also
created new opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi
2014).
In general, the contributions to the collection demonstrate that the EU’s
external integration capacity has played an important part in the catching-
up process of the region and has successfully contributed to preparing the
candidates for membership. Börzel and Schimmelfennig (2017) show that
EU accession conditionality has had a positive impact on democracy, and
even more on the governance effectiveness of non-member states. Bruszt
and Langbein (2017) describe how the ‘deep’ mode of economic integration
combining market opening and regulatory transfer with substantial economic
assistance facilitated the Eastern candidates’ transition to membership, miti-
gated the economic hardships of integrating with the EU market, and contrib-
uted to decreasing inter-state economic disparities between old and new
member states. At the same time, both articles claim, however, that political
and economic integration capacity have been limited ever since the candi-
dates became members. Politically, the EU’s impact on their democratic devel-
opment has been weaker after accession and the EU has been unable to
prevent the democratic backsliding of some of its new member states
(Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017). Economically, the EU has been unable
to counter the growing intra-state disparities within the new member states
(Medve-Bálint and Bohle 2016; Bruszt and Langbein 2017), which undermines
the support for future enlargements and European integration more generally
(cf. Boda and Medve-Bálint 2014).
The internal institutional integration capacity of the EU has proven strong
in the aftermath of Eastern enlargement. The EU’s new member states have
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 167

not disrupted the EU’s political and legal system, but have integrated them-
selves successfully. Decision-making, implementation and legal unity have
generally not suffered from the massive enlargement of the mid-2000s.
Against widely shared pre-accession concerns and selective post-accession
analyses, Eastern enlargement has not led to institutional gridlock and loss
of decision-making capacity. Neither the speed nor the volume of legislative
production has suffered systematically from Eastern enlargement (Toshkov
2017). The differentiated integration of the new member states (their legal
exemptions and legal discrimination) has converged towards normal levels
of differentiation among the EU member states. Treaty-based differentiation
has declined over time, while legislative differentiation has remained low.
When compared to the Southern member states, which are most similar econ-
omically and in governance capacity, the differentiated integration of the new
member states has even fallen short of what was to be expected. The main
remaining divide, the one between eurozone members and non-members,
cuts across new and old member states (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2017).
Eastern enlargement has not led to a deterioration of compliance with and
implementation of EU law either. Comparing EU enlargement rounds, Börzel
and Sedelmeier (2017) find that only in the Southern enlargement in the
1980s did the new member states have inferior compliance rates than old
member states. This result makes the good compliance record of the
Eastern new member states even more remarkable, given similar legacies of
authoritarianism. In their study covering both legal and practical implemen-
tation, Zhelyazkova et al. (2017) confirm the finding that the new member
states perform well in the legal transposition of EU law into the domestic
realm. They also show that efficient transposition does not come at the
price of weak practical implementation. While the new member states lose
their edge further down the implementation chain, they do not lag behind
the older member states. The new member states, hence, do not generally
constitute a ‘world of dead letters’ except for the area of social policy that
Falkner et al. (2008) examined. The descriptive empirical assessment is thus
highly consistent across the sub-dimensions of institutional integration
capacity: the performance of EU institutions and processes has not systema-
tically suffered as a result of Eastern enlargement.
This assessment of EU integration capacity appears to stand in stark con-
trast, however, to public opinion about enlargement (Toshkov et al. 2014;
Dimitrova and Kortenska 2017). Since the 2004 enlargement, there has
been a downward trend in public agreement to future enlargements of the
EU. Whereas respondents in the new member states are still positive about
enlargement, there is no public majority in favour of (future) enlargement
in the EU in general. In the public mind, especially in Western Europe,
Eastern enlargement appears to be less tied to the successful economic and
political transformation of Eastern Europe than to migration and perceived
168 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

economic threat, especially job losses. Looking into specific arguments and
responses which constrain or enable enlargement, however, Dimitrova and
Kortenska (2017) show that discourses on enlargement within and across
member states are actually more in line with official EU enlargement policy.
Shared EU values and the benefits of enlargement are core themes present
in all countries of their sample. A rules-based enlargement process, which pro-
gresses incrementally based on objective assessments and progress in
reforms finds support in both East and West. Eastern Europeans want enlarge-
ment to promote good governance; Western scepticism is often linked to the
perception that the enlargement process has lacked transparency and consul-
tation with citizens. There are also those who reject enlargement firmly and
unequivocally with arguments uniting opposition to enlargement and Euro-
pean integration altogether. This last group of discourses uniting sceptical
voters represents the most serious threat to integration capacity today,
given the increasing use of referenda to challenge European integration
throughout Europe.

Effective conditionality, stable enforcement and superable legacies

How can we explain that both the external and the internal, institutional inte-
gration capacity of the EU have proven strong overall in Eastern enlargement
– even though the starting conditions of the Eastern candidates were more
difficult than those of earlier newcomers? Our findings suggest that EU con-
ditionality has proven instrumental in supporting the transformations of the
Eastern new member states. Conditionality has not only been the basis of
the EU’s external integration capacity in the pre-accession period, but has
also encouraged domestic actors to create institutions that have had enduring
effects in the post-accession period, and therefore contributed to internal
integration capacity. Pre-accession wealth deficits, low, state capacities and
communist legacies have had a weaker impact on the enlargement outcomes
than both theoretical considerations and popular concerns suggested.
Ahead of membership, the EU used accession conditionality to promote its
liberal-democratic political conditions, expand its internal market and transfer
its regulatory rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The analysis of
Börzel and Schimmelfennig (2017) corroborates the hypothesis that condi-
tionality is the more effective, the more sizable and more credible the EU’s
rewards for meeting its conditions. We observe a consistently positive
impact on democracy and governance effectiveness in those non-member
countries, which were offered membership conditionally by the EU. High-
credibility membership incentives have a stronger impact than low-credibility
membership incentives. No such systematic effect obtains if the EU offers less
than membership. The EU’s political external integration capacity thus
depends on its willingness to enlarge.
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 169

Bruszt and Langbein (2017) argue that the EU’s economic external inte-
gration capacity not only depends on conditionality, but requires a combi-
nation of membership incentives and pre-accession assistance. Weak
conditionality in the conventional trade agreements that the EU has con-
cluded with neighbouring countries results in shallow economic integration,
which benefits rent-seeking élites in partner countries rather than transform-
ing their economies. By contrast, accession conditionality has a transformative
impact on the candidate economies. It produces strong economic compe-
tition and painful adjustment processes. The EU provided comprehensive
assistance supporting the adjustment to common market rules in order to
mitigate existing economic crises and alleviate the negative consequences
of rule transfer. This assistance to a certain extent compensated the candidate
countries for the loss of traditional state instruments to protect domestic
industries against competition (e.g., tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade).
Bruszt and Langbein emphasize that EU assistance was not a development
programme, but complementary to the dominant conditionality mode of inte-
gration. Yet the prospect of membership created sufficient interdependence
to motivate the old member states to protect the future new members from
economic breakdown.
To some extent, pre-accession conditionality continues to affect internal
integration capacity in the post-accession period. We find that a number of
widely used explanatory factors of compliance and policy implementation,
including state power, adjustment costs, political preferences, veto players
and general administrative capacities, do not explain the variation in post-
accession compliance across enlargement rounds (Börzel and Sedelmeier
2017) and across member states after the Eastern enlargement (Zhelyazkova
et al. 2017). According to these factors, the Eastern member states should
have complied worse rather than better than the old member states. Börzel
and Sedelmeier (2017) explain the surprisingly positive compliance record
of the new member states with the enduring institutional and attitudinal
effects of their pre-accession conditionality (that had been absent in previous
enlargement rounds). In particular, the new member states had created
specialized procedures and administrative capacities to adopt EU law
quickly and reliably, which continued to exist after accession. Moreover, pol-
itical élites in the Eastern member states regard a good compliance record as
part and parcel of a pro-EU attitude (Sedelmeier 2016). The major exception
are implementation problems in the area of social policy, which Zhelyazkova
et al. (2017) attribute to the weak capacity of the new member states in this
particular sector (see also Falkner et al. 2008).
In addition to enduring effects of pre-accession conditionality, post-acces-
sion enforcement has contributed to the strong institutional integration
capacity of the EU. Dimiter Toshkov (2017) explains the smooth adaptation
of the EU’s decision-making system to Eastern enlargement with the fact
170 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

that the new member states have fallen in line with existing cleavages and
coalitions among the existing EU members. Only in few policy areas, such
as environmental and – more recently – migration and asylum policy, have
the new member states had distinct preferences from the older member
states and acted as a cohesive group. Even in these cases, their legislative
clout has been limited, however. In addition, institutional, procedural and
organizational reforms have helped the EU in preserving its institutional
capacity.
The normalization of the new members’ differentiated integration can be
attributed to the strength of the EU’s legal system, too (Schimmelfennig
and Winzen 2017). Its principles favour the unity of European law and con-
strain the use of differentiation in the context of enlargement. Therefore, dif-
ferentiated integration introduced in enlargement negotiations is mostly
temporary, in the form of limited derogations and temporary exemptions.
As a result, the Eastern new member states have quickly reached normal
levels of differentiation among the member states; discriminatory differen-
tiation has been limited and all but disappeared over time; and the new
member states exhibit little variation in the extent of exemptions and deroga-
tions. As in the case of compliance and implementation, we could not confirm
the theoretical and empirical expectation that the integration of the Eastern
new member states would be highly differentiated because of their relative
poverty and weak state capacities.
Finally, we can often explain variation in institutional integration capacity
by variation in the EU’s political and economic integration, legal system and
enforcement mechanisms. For instance, Zhelyazkova et al. (2017) partly attri-
bute the deficient implementation of social policy regulation in the new
member states to the comparatively weak legalization of this issue-area of
EU policy. Schimmelfennig and Winzen (2017) show that the integration of
the new member states is more differentiated in the area of core state
powers (like monetary union and internal security policies), for which the
treaty base is also more differentiated. Likewise, Börzel and Schimmelfennig
(2017) argue that the weak political integration capacity of the EU after acces-
sion may well be owing to the weakness of the EU’s acquis and enforcement
mechanisms in the area of human rights and democracy.

Policy implications
We conclude by pointing out several policy implications of our research for
the EU’s integration capacity, future enlargement and the integration of
new member states. It is a core lesson of our research that the EU’s external
integration capacity depends on a membership perspective for non-candi-
date countries and a credible accession offer for candidate countries. For
non-candidate countries with membership aspirations, such as the three
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 171

associated Eastern partnership countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), the

EU should signal that they have an accession perspective – even if distant.
Moreover, both for the three associated countries, as well as current candi-
dates, conditionality needs to be complemented with capacity building for
managing developmental problems resulting from EU rule transfer, as to
avoid economic – and, ultimately political – destabilization (cf. Bruszt and
Langbein 2017).
With respect to current enlargement candidates such as Serbia or Monte-
negro, the EU needs to strengthen the credibility of the accession process and
conditionality. For the citizens of the member states, this means strict but fair
conditionality, as embedded in the revised Commission enlargement strategy,
as several discourses suggest that citizens may be more favourable to enlar-
gement based on objective criteria and transparent assessments.3 To make
the promise of accession more credible for the candidate states, however,
the EU needs to address more openly the issue of enlargement in the dom-
estic political arena. Public opinion in the member states has become increas-
ingly unfavourable to enlargement (Toshkov et al. 2014) and the lack of
political debate about future accessions seems to be one of citizens’ main con-
cerns. Élite communication on enlargement has focused too much on material
costs and benefits, whereas existing pro-European discourses based on
common values, ideals and identities have remained in the background. We
have identified enabling discourses based on values or security that politicians
in favour of enlargement could use to communicate with citizens (Dimitrova
and Kortenska 2017). If, however, domestic élites in the member states do not
make the case for accepting candidates that make progress in negotiations,
the possibility of a future popular rejection of accession treaties presents a
real threat to the credibility of enlargement and conditionality (Dimitrova
and Kortenska 2016).
Credibility needs further strengthening in the post-accession period, too.
Accession conditionality helped improve democracy and governance effec-
tiveness in Eastern Europe. Yet, after joining the EU, some governments have
attempted to limit individual freedoms and undermine the independence of
the judiciary to consolidate their power. The EU’s capacity to promote and
protect democracy and governance effectiveness weakens once candidate
countries become members. The current Article 7 sanctions are too blunt
and – given the near unanimity requirement – not sufficiently credible (Sedel-
meier 2014; van Hüllen and Börzel 2015). Whether the newly established rule-
of-law mechanism will be effective remains to be seen (Blauberger and
Kelemen 2016; Sedelmeier 2016). Some even warn that EU interventions
against democratic backsliding could backfire, bolstering public support for
targeted governments and their authoritarian policies (Schlipphak and Treib
2016). Accession conditionality derives its strength from clear legal foun-
dations, an apolitical, technocratic assessment mechanism, and credible
172 T. A. BÖRZEL ET AL.

promises and threats. Post-accession conditionality could build on the same

model and combine the codification of a democracy acquis, impartial assess-
ment (e.g., by the Venice Commission), and a range of limited, preferably finan-
cial sanctions (cf. Blauberger and Kelemen 2016; Schlipphak and Treib 2016).
As discussed above, the lack of substantial economic convergence
between old and new member states and the persistent or, in some cases,
even growing social inequality within the new member states may be under-
mining public support for both democracy and European integration (Àgh
2014). One remedy could be for the EU’s market rules to allow for more flexi-
bility, allowing new member states to widen the circle of beneficiaries of their
foreign direct investment (FDI)-led growth (Bruszt and Vukov forthcoming).
The combination of a credible membership perspective, conditionality and
assistance unites our policy implications. Our research strongly suggests that
all three conditions are necessary for EU integration capacity. The absence of
any is bound to create imbalances and ineffectiveness. To be sure, even their
combination is no guarantee for success, which ultimately depends on dom-
estic conditions and developments in both member and non-member states –
but it is the best the EU can do promote and facilitate future enlargement.

Notes
1. MAXCAP has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework
Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under
grant agreement no 320115. For further information, please consult www.
maxcap-project.eu.
2. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_
en.htm (accessed 5 September 2016).
3. These expectations can be interpreted as support for the EU’s revised enlarge-
ment strategy. According to the revised strategy, negotiation chapters 23 (Judi-
ciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) are
opened first and remain open until the end of the negotiations to emphasize
their central importance for accession. Moreover, clear benchmarks have been
introduced to address concerns about reform implementation and possible
backsliding (European Commission 2011, 2014).

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Julia Langbein, Ulrich Sedelmeier, Thomas Winzen and
Asya Zhelyazkova for valuable comments on previous versions of this contribution and
Laura Milchmeyer for her editorial assistance.

Funding
Research for this paper has been supported by the FP7 programme of the EU (project
“Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union: Lessons and prospects for
enlargement and beyond” [MAXCAP]) under grant agreement number 320115.
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 173

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Tanja A. Börzel is professor of political science and Director of the Centre for European
Integration and the Center of Excellence ‘The EU and its Citizens’ at the Otto Suhr Insti-
tute for Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin.
Antoaneta L. Dimitrova is associate professor at the Faculty of Governance and Global
Affairs at Leiden University, and acting director of the Central and Eastern European
Studies Centre.
Frank Schimmelfennig is professor of European politics at ETH Zurich, Center for Com-
parative and International Studies.

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