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JCMS 2013 Volume 51. Number 4. pp. 789–805 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12023
The Presidents of the European Commission: Transactional or

Transforming Leaders?*
INGEBORG TÖMMEL
University of Osnabrück
Abstract
This article analyzes the leadership of three Commission Presidents: Jacques Delors, Jacques
Santer and Romano Prodi. It questions whether these Presidents performed as transactional or
transforming leaders – that is, whether they ‘mattered’ as forceful promoters of the European
project. Drawing on leadership theory, the article identifies three factors providing opportunities
and setting constraints, as decisive for exercising political leadership: the institutional setting, the
situational context and the personal qualities of the office holders. It analyzes to what extent these
factors, and the interplay among them, shape the leadership of the Commission Presidents, and
which of these factors are conditional for the exercise of transforming leadership. It concludes that
only Delors was able to act as a transforming leader, whereas Santer and Prodi mainly performed
as transactional leaders. These differences are explained by variations in the situational context and
the personal qualities of the incumbents and the interplay between all three factors determining
political leadership.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is a highly fragmented political system without a clear centre
for exercising leadership. It has no government or single institution where political power
is concentrated, let alone an individual leader comparable to a head of state or govern-
ment. Instead, a number of institutions and actors with different, yet overlapping respon-
sibilities reach political decisions collectively. As a consequence, many virtual leaders
dominate the European scene.
Among the leadership positions in the EU, that of Commission President is particu-
larly contradictory. On the one hand, the President is expected to act in the ‘general
interest’ of the Member States (Article 17(1) TEU-L). On the other hand, as the head
of an organization conceived as the motor of integration, he (or, perhaps in the future,
she) will seek to transcend Member States’ preferences and aspirations. Furthermore,
the President, although endowed with an eminent political function, is expected to act
in a rather technical manner as manager of the European project and neutral arbiter for
the Member States. Accordingly, the Commission President is not legitimized by direct
or indirect elections;1 yet he is in need of legitimacy, as his decisions and activities have
* An earlier version of this article was presented at ECSA-Canada in April 2012, at a panel entitled ‘Leadership in the
European Union’. I am grateful to those involved in discussions there, and particularly to the discussant of the panel, George
Ross, for his comments. Furthermore, I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers of JCMS for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
1
The Treaty of Lisbon provides that the EP elects the Commission President (Article 17(7) TEU-L); yet this election implies
a vote of consent on a candidate proposed by the Council.
© 2013 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA
790 Ingeborg Tömmel
far-reaching impacts on the citizens of Europe. In short, the Commission Presidency is

not designed to exercise political leadership (Kassim and Peterson, 2012); however,
without exercising such leadership, the incumbent is not able to fulfil the manifold
functions attributed to him. Furthermore, the President has to share leadership with
other important actors in the EU, in particular the heads of state or government of the
Member States. As a consequence, he is torn between the roles of an efficient and
effective policy manager and a forceful policy entrepreneur (Laffan, 1997). In terms of
leadership theory, his performance may vary from transactional to transforming (Burns,
1978, 2003).
The leadership of the Commission President is particularly constrained by the Member
States which, acting through the Council, take all major decisions regarding European
integration. There is a large body of literature dealing with the relationship between the
Council and the Commission. Scholars have extensively theorized whether the Commis-
sion or the Council take the lead in European integration, and a final consensus on this
issue has not emerged (for example, Moravcsik, 1998: Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998;
Pollack, 2003). However, this literature does not question the role that the Commission
Presidents might play in this process. On the other hand, when the Presidents are the subject
of analysis, most scholars use an inductive approach (for example, Cini, 1996, 2008;
Nugent, 1997; Peterson, 1999; Drake, 2000). This is not surprising since theories on
political leadership focus almost exclusively on national political leaders (for example,
Burns, 1978, 2003; Blondel, 1987; Barber, 1992; Elgie, 1995). As far as scholars of the EU
made use of these approaches, they analyzed just one Presidency (Endo, 1999) or focused
their comparisons mainly on leadership styles or models (Lord, 2002; Kassim and Peterson,
2012).
Against this background, this article examines the leadership of Commission Presi-
dents with an analytical framework that draws on theories of political leadership and
adapts them to the context of the EU. It questions whether and to what extent the
Presidents ‘matter’ in moulding the course and shape of European integration – that is,
whether they are able to act as transactional or transforming leaders (Burns, 1978,
2003). Furthermore, it questions the conditions and circumstances that shape the quality
of their leadership. According to leadership theory, three factors that provide opportu-
nities, but also set constraints, are decisive: the institutional setting, the situational
context and the personal qualities of the office holders (Blondel, 1987; Barber, 1992;
Elgie, 1995). The central question therefore is to what extent these factors, and also the
interplay among them, shape the exercise of leadership in the office of Commission
President, and which of these factors are conditional for the exercise of transforming
leadership.
The article analyzes three recent Presidencies of the European Commission, those of
Jacques Delors, Romano Prodi and Jacques Santer. It highlights how these Presidents
bridged the tension between the institutional definition of the office and the wider
expectations directed to them, whether they were able to shape European integration
and to what extent they acted as transactional or transforming leaders. By comparing
these cases, it is the aim to generate insights into the conditions and circumstances that
enable or constrain political leadership and particularly the exercise of transforming
leadership in the office of Commission President. The three Presidencies were selected
because they are fairly recent, so that interviews on their performance could be
© 2013 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Presidents of the European Commission 791
conducted.2 Furthermore, during this period (1985–2004) the institutional setting for the
Presidents, in spite of some changes, was fairly stable, whereas the situational context
and also the personal qualities of the incumbents significantly varied. This constellation
allows comparisons that serve to identify the impact of each individual factor on the
exercise and quality of leadership, the interplay among these factors and, finally, the
constraints on the exercise of transforming leadership.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it presents a brief overview of theories of
political leadership, their core assumptions and basic findings. Drawing on these theories,
it elaborates an analytical framework for examining the leadership of the Commission
Presidents. In a second step, the article applies the analytical framework to the Presiden-
cies of Delors, Santer and Prodi, respectively. It highlights the successes and failures
of these Presidencies and analyzes the role that the three factors – institutional setting,
situational context and personal qualities – played in shaping their leadership. Further-
more, it elaborates on whether these Presidencies were characterized by transactional or
transforming leadership. The article concludes by comparing the three Presidencies; it
highlights the opportunities and constraints that are conditional for exercising transac-
tional or transforming leadership and the interdependence among institutional structure,
situational context and personal action.
I. Political Leadership: Theoretical Approaches

Research on political leadership refers mainly to leaders in national political systems
(Burns, 1978; Blondel, 1987). Particularly, heads of state or government are the focus of
both theoretical approaches and empirical studies (for example, Elgie, 1995). However, the
theoretical concepts thus generated may also apply, with certain variations, to forms of
shared leadership that are less politicized, as is the case with the Commission Presidents
(Endo, 1999). This section therefore summarizes the most important theoretical findings
on the exercise and quality of political leadership as well as the decisive factors shaping it.
‘Political leadership’ is generally defined as a relation between leaders and followers.3
Leadership is exercised ‘when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise [. . .]
institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and
satisfy the motives of followers’ (Burns, 1978, p. 18). Referring to national leaders, Burns
(1978, 2003) distinguishes between two types of leadership: transactional versus trans-
forming. He defines the former as the ‘basic, daily stuff of politics, the pursuit of change
in measured and often reluctant doses’. He goes on to explain: ‘The transactional leader
functioned as a broker and, especially when the stakes were low, his role could be
relatively minor, even automatic’ (Burns, 2003, p. 24). The latter form of leadership, by
contrast, implies bringing about fundamental changes: ‘Transformation means basic
2
For this study, the analytical framework was first elaborated, based on the relevant literature and the author’s knowledge of
the Commission. This framework then constituted the guideline for structured interviews with close collaborators and
counterparts of the Presidents. Six interviews were held in Brussels on the Presidencies of Delors, Santer and Prodi in
November 2006 and February 2007. The interviewees held the following positions (in parentheses is the subject of the
interview): member of the Cabinet Santer (Santer); member of the Cabinet Prodi (Prodi); member of the Cabinet of a
Commissioner (under Santer and Prodi) (Santer and Prodi); collaborator of Prodi (Prodi); member of the German Permanent
Representation (Delors, Santer and Prodi); and member of the Secretariat General of the Council (Delors, Santer and Prodi).
3
For a collection of definitions see Elgie (1995, p. 3).
alterations in entire systems [and] radical change in outward form or inner character’.
Accordingly, ‘it is change of this breadth and depth that is fostered by transforming
leadership’ (Burns, 2003, pp. 24–5).
In order to define when, why and under which conditions political leadership is
exercised, most theories draw on neo-institutionalism and behavioural approaches. They
thus capture and explain this multifaceted phenomenon by focusing on either the leaders
or the environment in which they act or, most often, the interaction between both.
Accordingly, scholars view institutional settings, personal qualities and the interplay
between them as the core determinants of the behaviour of political leaders (for example,
Blondel, 1987; Elgie, 1995). In addition to these two factors, scholars emphasize a third
one: so-called situational factors or contextual conditions (for example, Barber, 1992).
Institutional settings or structures ‘help to determine where power lies and what roles
political leaders have to play’ (Elgie, 1995, p. 205). They are defined, among other places,
in the constitutional order of the political system, but also through formal rules and
standard procedures of operation (Elgie, 1995, p. 203). Similarly, Blondel (1987, p. 149)
speaks of ‘institutions, set up by constitutions, laws or other “voluntary” decisions’.
Situational factors or contextual conditions are specified by distinguishing between a
‘power situation’ – for example, the support of external actors – and the ‘climate of
expectations’ – that is, the demands, attitudes and expectations of the followers (Barber,
1992, pp. 6–7). Other scholars distinguish between ‘long-term historical and social condi-
tions and short-term social, economic and political demands’ (Elgie, 1995, p. 8), or simply
assume ‘the situations they (the leaders) face’ to be essential (Blondel, 1987, p. 25).
The personal qualities of leaders are highly complex and therefore difficult to define.
Blondel (1987, pp. 134–47) specifies the following as most relevant: intelligence, deter-
mination, task orientation, ‘sociability’ and energy, while Elgie (1995, pp. 10–12) distin-
guishes between ambitions and styles. He subdivides ambitions into focus and scope of
aims; for styles he provides only examples, such as a malleable or uncompromising
behaviour.
Institutional settings, situational factors and personal qualities of the incumbents are
not fixed determinants; according to a given situation, they may provide resources and
opportunities to the incumbents, or set constraints. Thus a compromising character may be
a resource in a situation of shared leadership, but it can also form a constraint when
forceful action is required. Institutional settings are comparatively stable, whereas situ-
ational factors may significantly vary over time. However, situational factors may modify
the impact of institutional settings. The personal qualities of the incumbents are also
comparatively stable, yet favourable or restrictive situational factors may enhance or
weaken them. Occasionally, political leaders may even succeed in changing the institu-
tional setting to their advantage. Hence, there is a high degree of interplay between the
three factors shaping political leadership.
II. Leadership of the Commission Presidents: An Analytical Framework

In applying these concepts of political leadership to the Commission Presidents, it is first
important to note that the incumbents are not political leaders in the strict sense. They are
not elected, they do not directly appeal or respond to the citizenry and they largely have
to perform a rather managerial function. Furthermore, they do not hold a power position
comparable to heads of state or government; instead, they share political power with the
College of Commissioners, the Council and, increasingly, the European Parliament (EP).
However, they also hold a leading political office as they are expected to promote
forcefully European integration. This section therefore elaborates an analytical framework
that matches this specific position of the Commission Presidents.
First, it is obvious that the Presidents do not have a clear relationship with followers.
They do not hold an elected office, and European citizens rarely take notice of them.
However, the concept of ‘followers’ might apply to the ‘entourage’ of the Presidents
(Blondel, 1987) – that is, the College of Commissioners and the civil service of the
Commission. Furthermore, it might apply to other EU institutions and actors. Particularly,
the governments of the Member States, but also the Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) and, occasionally, European citizens might constitute followers of an entrepre-
neurial Commission.
In applying Burns’ typology of leadership to the Commission Presidents, I define these
two types as follows. Transactional leadership is the sound management of daily affairs:
the regular launch of legislative and policy proposals, care for due implementation of
Council decisions, guidance to the College of Commissioners and the civil service, but
also the implementation of organizational changes – for example, the reform of the
Commission civil service. Transforming leadership, by contrast, is exercised when the
Presidents bring about profound transformations in European integration: transformations
of the EU’s institutional setting, its procedures of decision-making, a significant extension
of the policy portfolio or a significant role in Treaty reform.
Among the factors that shape the leadership of the Commission Presidents, the EU’s
institutional setting is of paramount importance (Endo, 1999; Kassim and Peterson,
2012). According to the treaties, the Commission as a body holds significant and some-
times even exclusive powers which determine also the position of its President (Article
17(1–2) TEU-L). The Commission has an exclusive right to propose legislation; it com-
mands far-reaching executive powers including the right to impose sanctions; and it
represents the Union in external affairs. Furthermore, the Commission commands con-
siderable resources, such as an extensive budget and, as compared to other EU bodies, a
large civil service.
Besides its constitutional powers, the Commission holds significant rights that it has
acquired over time through additional rules and procedural practices. It plays a leading
role throughout the whole process of European decision-making: it can pool information,
set the agenda, structure the process of decision-making and frame compromises. Its
monopoly in proposing legislation opens up manifold routes to direct and accelerate
European integration. In sum, the Commission’s power position emanates not only from
the treaties, but also from skilfully exercising procedural power (Tömmel, 2008; Kassim
and Peterson, 2012). However, the Commission does not have significant powers of
decision-making. These powers are incumbent upon the Council and, increasingly, the
EP. This often requires the Commission to take a compromising stance vis-à-vis these
bodies.
In addition to the powers of the Commission as a whole, the treaties define specific
competences of the President that were significantly expanded over time. While initially
defined as a primus inter pares, the President currently commands powers that clearly
elevate him above the College of Commissioners. Thus, the Treaty on European Union
stipulates (Article 17 (6) TEU-L): ‘The President of the Commission shall (a) lay down
guidelines within which the Commission is to work; (b) decide on the internal organisa-
tion of the Commission [. . .]; (c) appoint Vice-Presidents’. Furthermore, ‘a member of the
Commission shall resign if the President so requests’. However, these expanded powers,
added stepwise to the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, refer to the President’s
position vis-à-vis the College of Commissioners and the civil service. They hardly grant
the office holder strong leadership within the EU.
The EU’s institutional setting grants the office holder significant resources for a broad
scope of action; yet it sets also severe constraints. The institutional resources of the
Presidents result, first of all, from the formal powers of the Commission, its monopoly to
initiate legislation and its executive powers. Furthermore, the Commission Presidents may
rely on procedural powers that emanate from the skilful use of formal competences and
the establishment of corresponding rules and practices. In addition, the Presidents hold
significant rights that attribute them a leading role within the Commission. They thus may
shape to a certain extent their immediate ‘entourage’, the College of Commissioners and
the civil service. Finally, the Presidents command significant resources, such as a large
civil service as compared to other EU institutions and a considerable budget for policy
implementation.
The most serious institutional constraint that the Commission Presidents face lies in
their dependence on decision-making in the Council and, hence, on the governments of the
Member States. This dependence becomes particularly apparent in the relationship with the
governments of the large Member States, which themselves aspire to a leadership role in
the EU. Additional constraints result from the legislative and certain monitoring powers of
the EP which increased with every treaty reform since the adoption of the Single European
Act (SEA) in 1986. Finally, constraints may arise from the College of Commissioners.
Since the Presidents have neither the power to select the office holders4 nor to give them
instructions, their political support is not guaranteed. The most relevant resources and
constraints emanating from the institutional setting are summarized below:
• Resources: Monopoly of legislative initiative; executive powers; procedural power;
specific rights of the President; large civil service; large budget.
• Constraints: Dependency on decision-making in the Council and the EP; limited
competences of the Union; limited powers in decision-making; independent position of
the Commissioners.
Situational factors that might enable or constrain the Commission Presidents in
the exercise of political leadership are manifold. However, in following Barber (1992), the
focus here is on those factors which refer to the ‘power situation’ of the Presidents and the
‘climate of expectations’ surrounding them. More general and long-term socio-economic
or political factors are only occasionally taken into consideration.
Numerous situational factors constitute opportunities for the exercise of leadership in
the office of Commission President. The most relevant factor is a positive attitude of the
governments of the Member States towards further integration. Such attitudes provide an
enormous window of opportunity for a proactive President. Most influential are the
4
However, the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the Council nominates Commissioners ‘by common accord with the President-
elect’ (Art. 17(7) TEU-L); this implies a veto right of the President.
attitudes of the large Member States, particularly Germany and France. Furthermore,
positive attitudes or explicit support of other actors and institutions that shape or influence
European decision-making impact as well on the Presidents’ leadership. This is true for
the EP and the Court, but also for the College of Commissioners and the civil service.
Finally, integration-oriented expectations of the wider public might also play a role.
Conversely, Commission Presidents may face major constraints from the situational
context. They encounter serious difficulties in exercising leadership if their ‘power
situation’ is weakened by a rather negative attitude of national governments, above all
the German-French tandem, towards further integration. Moreover, lacking support
from other EU institutions, particularly the EP, may form a serious constraint. Con-
straints emerge also from a heterogeneous College of Commissioners – for example,
when its members are high-ranking politicians with strong leadership aspirations – and
an unsupportive civil service. Finally, the wider public, although mostly in a passive
role, might occasionally express negative views on European integration through
elections and referendums, thus constraining a proactive leadership. The most relevant
opportunities and constraints emanating from situational factors are summarized as
follows:
• Opportunities: Positive attitude of national governments towards integration (particu-
larly France and Germany); support of other EU institutions; support of Commissioners
and civil service; positive expectations of the European public.
• Constraints: Negative attitude of national governments towards integration; lack of
support from other EU institutions; lack of support from Commissioners and civil
service; Euroscepticism of the European public.
The personal qualities that the Commission Presidents should command for exercising
leadership in the EU are numerous as well (Endo, 1999). In partly following Endo, the
focus here is not on general qualities, like intelligence, energy or ambition (Blondel,
1987), but only on the most salient capacities for leading this specific office. Thus the
commitment to promote European integration and the capacity to develop corresponding
visions and objectives is particularly relevant. Furthermore, in view of the EU’s system of
shared leadership, the Presidents should be capable to convince others of the envisioned
route and to build acceptable compromises. This in turn requires strategic and tactical
skills and the capacity to mobilize allies at the European level and in the Member States.
Finally, the Presidents should be capable of winning the support of the Commissioners
and the civil service. These qualities form an enormous asset for the exercise of leadership
in the office of Commission President. Conversely, Presidents lacking these qualities will
face major constraints.
The most important personal qualities of the Commission Presidents, which might
form assets or constraints for the exercise of political leadership, are summarized as
follows:
• Assets: Commitment to promote European integration; commitment to strengthen the
position of the Commission; visions and objectives about integration; capacity to
persuade; capacity to build compromises; strategic and tactical skills; capacity to mobi-
lize allies; capacity to win support within the Commission.
• Constraints: The lack of one or more of these personal qualities.
III. Commission Leadership, 1985–2004: Delors, Santer and Prodi

Using the analytical framework presented above, this section focuses on the actual
leadership of three Commission Presidents: Delors, Santer and Prodi. It questions how the
office holders make use of available resources and opportunities, and how they deal with
the omnipresent constraints. The analysis will highlight the achievements and failures of
the Presidents and assess how the institutional setting, situational factors and personal
qualities shaped their leadership as either transactional or transforming.
Jacques Delors
Delors took office as Commission President in 1985, after a long phase of stagnation in
EU affairs. Accordingly, the governments of the Member States faced enormous pressure
to implement reforms at both the European and national levels. The shift of French
President Mitterrand in 1984 towards a liberal, pro-European economic policy laid the
groundwork for achieving such reforms.5 Other Member States as well turned their
attention towards the EU as the appropriate level for solving pressing economic and
political problems. Not surprisingly, therefore, heads of state or government quickly
reached consensus on a candidate for the Presidency: Delors, known as a committed
European (Cini, 1996). Even though Delors had held important political functions in
France, he was not regarded as a particularly strong political leader (Cini, 1996). It was
rather for his task orientation, his intellectual capacities and his dynamism that he
appeared a suitable candidate. Furthermore, as former member of the EP and President of
its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, he was familiar with the Brussels
scene.
The most important achievements of Delors’ Presidency lay in the revival and com-
pletion of the single market and the first revision of the Treaties through the SEA (in force
1987).6 Furthermore, the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the projected economic
and monetary union formed a major success. Both these treaty reforms expanded the
realm and scope of EU policy-making and altered the inter-institutional power balance in
favour of the Commission and the EP. However, Delors’ presidency is also marked by
painful setbacks. Thus, he did not succeed in including the social dimension into the
European project or in implementing a major agricultural reform (Ross, 1995; Drake,
2000). These setbacks highlight the dwindling political support of national governments
for Delors’ activism in the later years of his tenure (Cini, 1996).
According to all written and oral sources, Delors had personal qualities that enabled
him to explicitly exercise leadership in his office.7 He acted as a committed European and
developed clear visions on future integration projects; accordingly, he defined detailed
objectives and identified the necessary steps in this direction. Consistently with his
commitment, he commanded the art of persuasion. As one interviewee put it: ‘He had the
power of the word’.8 He persuaded the governments of the Member States to implement
far-reaching integration steps. Where resistance emerged, he made use of his strategic and
5
This shift was initiated by Delors himself as French minister of finance, as he persuaded Mitterrand to liberalize the French
economic policy (Grant, 1994, pp. 46–8).
6
Interviews 1 and 2. See also Drake (1995, 2000); Endo (1999); Lord (2002).
7
Interviews 1 and 2; Endo (1999); Drake (2000); Boucher (2006, pp. 230–9).
8
Interview 2, translation by author.
tactical skills. This applies particularly to the meetings of the European Council, where he
often launched decisive policy proposals. When he could not directly achieve his goals, he
acted extremely skilfully in proposing and building compromises.9 Delors proved his
strategic and tactical skills also in other situations – for example, in the process of
agenda-setting at the European level (Ross, 1995), or in the inclusion or, if more advan-
tageous, the bypassing of the College of Commissioners and the Ecofin Council (Van
Assche, 2005). He made optimal use of the Commission civil service with its large
information resources and systematically transformed it into a support structure for his
purposes by filling high-ranking positions with friends or followers.10 He also succeeded
in satisfying the civil service by significantly increasing the budget of the EU (Laffan,
1997). Furthermore, he transformed his Cabinet into an extremely active body for elabor-
ating and promoting innovative integration projects (Ross, 1995). Finally, he built strong
alliances with other European institutions, in particular the EP.11 As no other Commission
President before him, he addressed the public through numerous speeches, thus mobiliz-
ing further support for the European project.12 ‘He eventually became as visible to the
public as most national leaders of the time’ (Drake, 2000, p. 13).
However, Delors’ successes were also enabled by an extremely favourable situational
context. He held the Presidency during a phase where Member States were more than ever
prepared to accept major integration steps.13 In particular, the project of the single market
appeared to benefit all partners, so that agreement in the Council was comparatively easy
to achieve. His Presidency was strongly backed by both the French and the German heads
of state or government, Mitterrand and Kohl, although for different reasons.14 Even
Margaret Thatcher accepted Delors for his commitment to market liberalization.15 In
addition, the end of the cold war created a euphoric atmosphere, and European integration
was seen as a major tool for stabilizing the transformation states of central and eastern
Europe. Thus both his ‘power situation’ and the ‘climate of expectations’ were particularly
favourable. Furthermore, Delors ‘had luck’ with his College of Commissioners.16 Only
when an over-ambitious Delors went on to propose a social dimension for the EU and to
promote integration in other, non-market-related policy areas did this strong support
dwindle away. Member States became increasingly concerned about their sovereignty.
Furthermore, the referendums in Denmark and France on the Treaty of Maastricht and an
increasingly suspicious attitude of the public towards European integration made national
governments more cautious. Thus, the last years of Delors’ Presidency were clearly
marked by a mismatch between his ambitions and an increasingly unfavourable situational
context (Ross, 1995; Cini, 1996; Drake, 2000; Lord, 2002).
Favourable situational factors together with his personal qualities enabled Delors even
to alleviate or circumvent certain constraints emanating from the institutional setting of
the EU. Thus the introduction of institutional innovations that he had proposed, such as
9
Interview 1.
10
Interview 1.
11
Interview 2.
12
See, for example, his famous speech to the British Trade Union Congress in 1988, where he promised social regulation
in the EU. Thatcher responded by a speech in Bruges, where she rejected any commitment of the EU in social affairs.
13
Interview 2.
14
Interviews 1 and 2.
15
Interview 1.
16
majority-voting in the Council and co-decision for the EP, helped to contain veto players
among the Member States and to secure continuous support by the MEPs. Together with
the expansion of the EU’s competences, this shifted the power balance in favour of the
Commission. In the negotiations on monetary union, Delors bypassed the Council and
allied with the governors of national central banks (Verdun, 1999). Through alliances with
other institutions and actors (for example, the European Round Table of Industrialists) he
further constrained the Council’s freedom of decision. Finally, by strongly advocating
integration, including a social dimension, Delors presented himself to the European public
as a political leader.
On the whole, the Presidency of Jacques Delors is marked by a strong and, for a large
part, transforming leadership, based on a set of personal qualities suitable for the office,
an extraordinarily favourable situational context and a temporarily successful alleviation
of the constraints inherent to the EU’s institutional setting. After a long phase of stagna-
tion, Delors forcefully revived and promoted European integration. Furthermore, he
brought about fundamental transformations of the EU’s institutional setting, its pro-
cedures of decision-making and the overall course of integration. However, during the last
phase of his office, Delors was less successful as his ambitions no longer matched the
changing situational context: dwindling support from national governments, who feared
an encroachment on their powers; growing popular dissent with further integration steps;
and general integration fatigue.
Jacques Santer
When Jacques Santer assumed office in 1995, the situational context for exercising
leadership was much more adverse (Lord, 2002). The project of monetary union, although
formally adopted, remained highly contested among politicians and, more so, the public.
The euphoria at the end of the cold war had vanished; the transformation process of central
and eastern European states formed an enormous challenge. It appeared inevitable to offer
these countries a perspective of accession, yet the path towards this end remained unclear.
In this situation, Member States faced difficulties in finding a suitable candidate for the
office of Commission President as they preferred a personality who would be ‘complai-
sant’ to them.17 After the rejection of two more ambitious candidates,18 a compromise was
finally reached by nominating Jacques Santer, then prime minister of Luxembourg, who
was known for his conciliatory nature. However, Santer’s taking office was obfuscated
because the EP meanwhile had acquired the right to give a vote of consent to the incoming
Commission as a whole. The EP used this competence to the maximum by examining the
qualification of single Commissioners for office and threatening to withhold its vote of
consent. Santer finally settled the conflict by offering concessions to the EP, particularly
the reallocation of portfolios among the Commissioners. However, these concessions
weakened the position of the Commission and its President vis-à-vis the EP from the very
beginning (Cini, 1996, pp. 204–9).
Santer defined his task as ‘doing less, but doing it better’ (Cini, 2008, pp. 117–18). He
had no intention of launching spectacular integration steps; rather, he attempted to
17
18
German Chancellor Kohl vetoed former Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers, while British Prime Minister Major rejected
Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene.
consolidate the status quo.19 Accordingly, he focused on issues that had been neglected
under Delors: the reform of the Commission civil service and the improvement of its
management capacities.20 This was a pragmatic choice in view of a fundamentally
changed environment for European integration. However, despite these rather modest
aspirations, Santer was confronted with huge challenges: the implementation of monetary
union, the treaty revision of Amsterdam and the preparation for eastern enlargement.21
Thus, the most demanding tasks of his Presidency were not chosen by Santer himself, but
were given by the situational context: external challenges, earlier commitments and the
expectations of the Member States.
The achievements of Santer’s Presidency lay in mastering these challenges by steadily
acting behind the scenes.22 The institutions and regulations for monetary union were set up
in due time. The Agenda 2000, a document elaborated by the Commission, set out a path
towards eastern enlargement in concrete terms (European Commission, 1997). Finally, a
thorough reform of the Commission civil service was prepared and partly implemented
against fierce resistance from the staff (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011, pp. 44–55). However,
Santer had hardly any influence on the Treaty of Amsterdam; as far as it entailed inno-
vations – for example, the Employment Chapter or the concept of ‘enhanced co-operation’
– they were designed earlier by Delors or the explicit preferences of national governments.
In 1999, Santer’s Presidency had to endure a major blow when the Commission was
accused of mismanagement and corruption (Cini, 2008, p. 119). These accusations
referred mainly to the French Commissioner Edith Cresson and the Directorate General
under her responsibility, but also to the Commission administration in general. Since the
French government refused to recall its Commissioner, Santer decided that the Commis-
sion as a whole should resign. His tenure thus ended in March 1999 before the regular end
of the term.23
As Commission President, Santer did not exhibit the personal qualities of a proactive
leader; ‘he did not focus on change’.24 Like Delors, he was a committed European, but he
did not envision specific projects for integration;25 even more, ‘he demonstrated a distinc-
tive lack of vision’ (Cini, 2008, p. 119). His activities were not guided by clear strategic
or tactical options; his behaviour was rather defensive. His most outstanding skills lay in
building compromises, first and foremost internally within the College of Commission-
ers.26 This was not easy since he was confronted with a heterogeneous College, consisting
of ambitious personalities (Peterson, 1999; Van Miert, 2000). Hence, achievements of the
Santer Commission were more often the work of individual Commissioners than of the
President himself. Santer also sought a consensual relationship with the EP. However,
when accusations of mismanagement and even corruption were raised, the EP saw a
window of opportunity to enhance its own profile in the eyes of the public. With the
collective resignation of the College of Commissioners, Santer intended to prevent a vote
19
Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 5.
20
Interview 5. See also Cini (1996); Laffan (1997); Peterson (1999).
21
Interviews 3 and 5.
22
Interviews 3 and 5. See also Laffan (1997); Peterson (1999); Lord (2002).
23
Interviews 3 and 5. See also Van Miert (2000, pp. 353–63).
24
25
Interview 2.
26
Interviews 1, 2 and 3.
of censure by the EP and further damage to the Commission. However, this respectable
decision was not honoured; on the contrary, it was interpreted as a lack of political
leadership.27
The situational context of Santer’s Presidency was much more unfavourable than that
of Delors. The initial euphoria at the end of the cold war was followed by disillusionment.
Accordingly, national governments lent Santer only half-hearted support. Already his
nomination constituted a weak compromise after other, more assertive candidates had
been vetoed in the Council. During his office, Santer lacked specific backing from the
powerful Member States of the EU, particularly the German-French tandem. Nor could
his country of origin, Luxembourg, provide effective support as it is not a major power; at
best, it plays an impartial role in conflict situations. Furthermore, Santer lacked the
support of the EP. Even the civil service only reluctantly followed him; in particular the
Directors General often refused support.28 In short, his ‘power situation’ was weak. After
the Delors era, the ‘climate of expectations’ for European ventures had changed as well.
National governments no longer welcomed forceful integration steps; instead, they pre-
ferred a Commission President who would not interfere in their affairs.29 Among the
public, Euroscepticism proliferated.
Santer was also not able to exploit the resources of the EU’s institutional setting to his
advantage; instead he was clearly subject to its constraints. He did not play a major role
vis-à-vis the Council, nor could he win the EP as an ally.30 The projected reform of the civil
service created unrest among the staff so that support from this side remained weak as
well.31
On the whole, Jacques Santer’s Presidency is mainly characterized by transactional
leadership. He succeeded in completing envisioned or already initiated integration steps
in due time and without major setbacks; yet these steps did not result in spectacular
systemic change, major reforms of the institutions or improvements of the Commis-
sion’s role in the Union. Instead of attempting to alter the institutional setting of the
EU, Santer concentrated his efforts on the internal management and reform of the Com-
mission. The mismanagement affair further weakened his position as it mobilized the
ubiquitous suspicion against the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’. Thus a coincidence of an unfa-
vourable situational context and rather moderate personal qualities resulted in a defen-
sive manner of exercising leadership that did not challenge the institutional setting of
the EU.
Romano Prodi
After the resignation of Jacques Santer, an agreement on the nomination of Romano Prodi
as the next President of the Commission was quickly reached (Cini, 2008, p. 120). This,
however, does not mean that he was viewed a strong candidate. As former prime minister
of Italy he was highly esteemed in Brussels, in particular because he had succeeded in
27
Interview 2.
28
Interview 1.
29
Interview 2.
30
Interview 2.
31
Interview 1.
leading Italy into the eurozone and in implementing the necessary austerity measures at
home.32 Yet his nomination was also a compromise among the Member States.33 Prodi had
long experience in leading political offices,34 but the Brussels scene was not familiar to
him. Accordingly, the beginning of his tenure was marked by numerous faux pas, even
though he was welcomed with great expectations. In contrast to the case of Santer, Prodi’s
College of Commissioners was accepted by the EP with no reservations. Thus at the
beginning of Prodi’s tenure the situational context appeared fairly favourable.
The most important achievements of Prodi’s Presidency consist in managing the
envisioned integration steps and reforms with success, though not without obstacles.35 In
the process of treaty reform, first the negotiation of the Nice Treaty and later the elabor-
ation of a Constitutional Treaty, Prodi did not succeed in playing a major role. On the
contrary, national governments clearly rejected his proposals, not for substantive reasons,
but as a matter of principle; they denied him any competences in treaty amendments.36
Prodi was more successful internally. Under his Presidency, the first major reform of the
Commission civil service was implemented (Schön-Quinlivan, 2011). The reform resulted
in improving the efficiency and management capacities of the civil service and, most
importantly, in reorganizing the procedures for financial control.37 The elaboration of the
White Paper on European Governance (European Commission, 2001) was an important
step in reconfirming the role of the Commission. This, however, did not enhance its
position, but only defended the status quo (Cini, 2008, p. 122). Prodi’s Presidency is not
marked by major setbacks, yet in specific cases the Commission lost influence to the
Member States. This became particularly obvious in monetary affairs, where the Com-
mission had to give in to the Council in the conflict about sanctions against Member States
who violated the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (Cini, 2008, p. 122).
The personal qualities that Prodi exhibited as Commission President were mixed: on
the one hand, he had the ambitions of a political leader; on the other hand, he lacked the
capacities to achieve what he envisioned.38 Like his predecessors, he was a committed
European. Furthermore, he had many visions about the way forward in European inte-
gration, but he could not convince the Member States or other important actors of his
ideas. In the beginning of his tenure, he believed he held a clear leadership position that
allowed him to define the direction of integration.39 Thus during his first days in Brussels,
he claimed that the Commission was the government of Europe. Not surprisingly, such
claims were clearly rejected by national leaders, and Prodi quickly lost the credit that he
initially enjoyed. This made him more cautious in his communiqués, but the underlying
political ambitions did not significantly change.40 His many improvident statements – for
example, that the Stability and Growth Pact was ‘stupid’ – prove that he was not endowed
with particularly astute strategic and tactical skills, at least not at the European level
32
Interview 2.
33
Interview 1.
34
Before his Italian premiership, Prodi had held several positions as minister and president of IRI, a large Italian state
holding.
35
Interview 6.
36
Interviews 2, 4 and 6. See also Cini (2008, pp. 121–2). Prodi’s lack of success in this regard stands in sharp contrast to
Delors’ role in treaty revisions. He claimed to have written 80 per cent of the SEA.
37
Interview 2.
38
Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.
39
Interview 3.
40
Interview 6.
(Cini, 2008, p. 122). This in turn meant that he was not able to mobilize political support
from national governments or from the Commission or other European institutions.
Mobilizing support was also constrained by Prodi’s ‘inability to communicate effectively
[. . .] to get his message across’.41 In the eyes of the European public, he was hardly visible
as a European leader.
The situational context of Prodi’s Presidency, although in the beginning seemingly
favourable, was in fact worse than that of Santer. An integration fatigue had seized the
Member States and, more so, the citizens of Europe. At the same time, the implementation
of unpopular projects was inevitable: the completion of monetary union and eastern
enlargement as well as a fundamental reform of the treaties. However, despite these
challenges, national governments did not wish the Commission President to take forceful
action in these areas (Kassim and Peterson, 2012, p. 14). On the contrary, they watched
Prodi’s activities suspiciously and refused to lend support to his policy proposals. The
only project of Prodi’s tenure that the Member States welcomed was the reform of the
Commission civil service.
Prodi not only lacked the general support of the Member States. In particular, he lacked
what Commission Presidents normally enjoy: the support of the government of their
country of origin. Italy’s prime minister at the time, Berlusconi, was his most fervent rival
in domestic politics and no less so at the European level.42 Berlusconi’s anti-European
attitude fuelled this rivalry. Unfortunately, Prodi could also not count on internal support:
his College of Commissioners consisted of highly qualified but individualistic personali-
ties who often pursued their particular objectives instead of co-operating with the Presi-
dent.43 The civil service was also not particularly co-operative since the implementation of
the administrative reform created much unrest and discontent among the staff.44 Thus
Prodi’s ‘power situation’ was weak and turned even weaker during his tenure; the same
applies to the ‘climate of expectations’. In light of the unfavourable situational context and
Prodi’s rather unbalanced personal qualities, it is obvious that he could not exploit the
institutional setting of the EU to his advantage. On the contrary, national governments
recurrently demonstrated that they were the leaders in European integration, and this
reinforced the institutional constraints.
On the whole, Prodi’s Presidency was marked by a mismatch between the incum-
bent’s far-reaching ambitions and the constraints emanating from the institutional setting
and situational context. Thus Prodi could not invert the situational, let alone the insti-
tutional, context to his advantage. He disposed of strong leadership capacities for a
national arena, but not of those required in the EU’s system of shared leadership. In
particular, he lacked the strategic and tactical skills to mobilize support for his ambitions
and to build compromises among various institutional actors. Nevertheless, he succeeded
in steadily implementing the envisioned or already initiated integration steps and in
implementing the reform of the Commission civil service, which, however, meant losing
the support of his ‘entourage’. His leadership therefore can be characterized as mainly
transactional.
41
Cini (2008, p. 122); Interviews 1, 4 and 6.
42
Interviews 2, 4, and 6.
43
Interview 4.
44
Interview 1. See also Schön-Quinlivan (2011).
Conclusions
When drawing conclusions on the three Presidencies, important differences, but also
certain congruities, come to the fore. While Delors acted for a large part of his Presidency
as transforming leader, Santer and Prodi mainly performed as transactional leaders. While
Delors succeeded in shaping the Council’s decisions, Santer and Prodi adapted to the will
and expectations of the Member States – Santer because he was committed to do so, Prodi
rather against his intentions. However, all three Presidents successfully fulfilled the
management tasks attributed to the Commission. We therefore may conclude that exer-
cising these tasks is not particularly constrained; transactional leadership corresponds to
the definition of the office.
What then are the constraints for exercising transforming leadership in the office of
Commission President? Comparing the three Presidencies in light of our analytical frame-
work, we can first state that the EU’s institutional setting provides to all Presidents the
same resources and constraints. However, variation resides in the situational factors
and the personal qualities of the incumbents. If the situational factors are favourable –
above all, if national governments welcome further integration steps – and the incumbent
disposes of the necessary personal qualities, transforming leadership is possible. A proac-
tive personality will use such a window of opportunity, as the case of Delors proves. Even
more, under these circumstances a proactive President is able to transcend or offset the
constraints emanating from the institutional setting of the EU and to use the institutional
resources to the maximum. On the other hand, if the situational context is unfavourable
and the incumbent lacks certain personal capacities, transforming leadership is out of
reach. Both Santer and Prodi faced an unfavourable context, while their personal qualities
were not such as to transform the resulting constraints.
However, the interrelation among institutional setting, situational factors and personal
qualities is more complex. First, if a President has the necessary personal qualities, but the
situational context is unfavourable, transforming leadership is difficult to exercise. The
last years of Delors’ Presidency reflect this situation. In these years, Delors could no
longer actively mould European integration; at best, he achieved some decent results.
Furthermore, a Commission President who disposes only partly of the personal qualities
required for the office may contribute to worsen the situational context. Thus Santer’s
conciliatory nature was an asset in face of a reluctant Council and a heterogeneous College
of Commissioners; yet during the mismanagement affair it resulted in weak leadership
and thus aggravated situational constraints. On the other hand, Prodi’s ambitious leader-
ship, in combination with limited strategic and tactical skills, caused strong headwinds
from the Council and ultimately resulted also in a worsening situational context. We
therefore may conclude that both an over-ambitious as well as a weak leader in the office
of Commission President can impair situational factors. In addition, these constellations
tend to aggravate the EU’s institutional constraints.
This in turn implies that the three categories that we distinguished for analytical
purposes are highly interdependent; in practice, the interplay among them determines the
extent and nature of political leadership. In our case studies, both the situational context
and the personal capacities of the Commission Presidents were not simply given. Thus
Delors’ personal capacities co-evolved together with an increasingly favourable situ-
ational context; this in turn alleviated the EU’s institutional constraints – at least for a
certain period of time. Prodi’s ambitions and capacities to lead were increasingly discour-
aged by national leaders, resulting in a deteriorating situational environment and ulti-
mately in insuperable institutional constraints. Even Santer’s leadership capacities rapidly
declined in face of a deteriorating situational context in the course of the mismanagement
affair, and the institutional constraints increased accordingly. Hence the Presidents’ per-
sonal capacities improve or deteriorate in combination with a favourable or unfavourable
situational context and, accordingly, the institutional constraints increase or decrease.
Our analysis highlighted the conditions and circumstances that allow for or constrain
transactional and transforming leadership in the office of Commission President. Such an
analysis not only serves to analyze entire Presidencies, as it was done here. On the
contrary, our analytical framework, and the hypotheses it allows to generate, can and
should be applied to more detailed comparative analyses of different phases in a Presi-
dency, or of specific types of activity across different Presidencies. Such analyses might
bring to light that transforming leadership, although mostly out of reach for a whole
Presidency, might still be exercised in single issue areas or policy domains, or in specific
situations.
Further research is needed in order to elaborate on the interplay among institutional
structure, situational factors and personal qualities as factors shaping the exercise of
political leadership in the office of Commission President. Additional insights into the
complex relationship between structure, context and action in the EU might be gained by
analyses not only of Commission Presidencies, but also other leading positions in the EU,
and comparisons among them.
Correspondence:
Ingeborg Tömmel
Jean Monnet Chair in European Politics and Policies
Universität Osnabrück
Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften
49069 Osnabrück
email: itoemmel@uni-osnabrueck.de
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JCMS 2013 Volume 51. Number 4. pp. 789–805 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12023

The Presidents of the European Commission: Transactional or

far-reaching impacts on the citizens of Europe. In short, the Commission Presidency is

I. Political Leadership: Theoretical Approaches

II. Leadership of the Commission Presidents: An Analytical Framework

III. Commission Leadership, 1985–2004: Delors, Santer and Prodi

Drake, H. (2000) Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European Leader (London: Routledge).

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