Who Consults?

Expert Groups in the

European Union

Åse Gornitzka and Ulf Sverdrup

Working Paper
No. 12, August 2007

Working Papers can be downloaded from the ARENA homepage:

http://www.arena.uio.no
Abstract
The EU is frequently understood as a special kind of governance system
characterized by its strong degree of interpenetration of different levels of
government and a plethora of interactions between EU institutions,
administrations from national and subnational levels, as well as organized non-
state interests. Nowhere is this kind of multi-level governance as evident as in the
committees system of the EU. This article examines and explains a crucial
property of this system, the committees and experts groups organised by the
European Commission. Based on new data we answer some basic questions
related to this aspect of the EU multi-level system. What is the extent of the
expert consultative system? What is the distribution of expert groups? Are these
groups best understood as loose networks or do they constitute a stable, well-
established consultative system? We observe a proliferation over time and across
sectors of this mode of governance. The use of Expert group has developed into a
routinized practice of the European Commission and a great share of the Expert
groups has become permanent and lasting properties of the governance system.
Our data also shows that Expert groups are remarkably unevenly distributed
among different policy domains and areas. The high degree of sectoral
differentiation is accentuated by the fact that we observe weak horizontal
coordinating structures between the Directorates-General (DGs) in their use of
Expert groups. We argue that the heterogeneity in modes governance across
policy fields is partly a result of deliberate design attempts and differences in
policy tasks, but also to a large extent the result of different institutional and
organizational factors, such as legal and administrative capabilities, as well as the
gradual development of different routines and norms among the DGs for
connecting to their environment.

Reproduction of this text is subject to permission by the author.

© Arena 2007

2
Simple, but not so trivial questions
This article examines a crucial property of the European governance system. The EU is
frequently understood as a governance system characterized by its strong degree of
interpenetration of different levels of government, and a plethora of interactions
between EU institutions, national and sub-national administrations as well as organized
non-state interests. The ubiquity of different kinds of public policy networks or expert
groups for consultation, bargaining, deliberation and decision making is believed to be a
prominent feature of the European governance system (Eising & Kohler-Koch 1999;
Kohler-Koch 1997; Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006). Nowhere is this kind of multi-
level governance system as evident as in the numerous Expert groups and committees
of the EU. Such committees are in some sense the epitome of the European multi-level
governance system at work. EU committees encompass an array of bodies that vary
considerably in what they do, how they are organized, what role they play in EU
policy making and to what EU institution they are anchored. Several specific and
detailed studies have provided information and insights regarding the functions and
dynamics of these public policy networks (Beyers & Trondal 2004; Christiansen &
Larsson 2007; Egeberg et al 2003; Larsson & Murk 2007; Wessels 1997). Scholarly
attention has in particular been paid to the role of committees in overseeing the
execution of EU rules by the Commission (Dehousse 2003; Dogan 1997; Franchino
2000; Pollack 2003) and there have been attempts to assess the extent to which
committees and consultative organs affect the democratic quality of the European
Union (Joerges & Neyer 1997; Rhinard 2002; Vos 1997).1

The focus in this article is on the committees and groups organized by the European
Commission, i.e. its Expert groups. New data are now available that enables us to
examine more critically the use of such committees in the EU and answer some basic
questions related to this aspect of the EU multi-level system. What is the extent of the
expert consultative system? What is the distribution of Expert groups: Are Expert
groups distributed equally across different policy fields, or is this form of multi-level
governance concentrated in some specific policy fields? Are these groups best

3
understood as loose networks, in the sense that they are informal, flexible, dynamic,
temporary and ever changing, or are they part of a more formalized, organized,
routinized and well established consultation system? Previous studies have not given
clear answers to such question. For instance,2 Larsson and Trondal (2006) claim that not
even the European Commission itself have adequate knowledge of the scale and
activities of the Expert groups. In the absence of good data, scholars have been engaged
in making “guestimates”, ranging from 800 to 1300 groups (Larsson & Trondal 2006),
or vague statements like ‘there are probably more than 1,000 committees’ (van
Schendelen 1998). The new quantitative data also allows us to examine some
rudimentary hypotheses that can shed light on the pattern of distribution, and the
factors involved in creating, changing and maintaining this part of the EU governance
system. This paper is a first report from a larger and ongoing research project on the
role of the Expert groups in the EU, in which we will also examine the participation
and sociometrics of this consultative system (Gornitzka & Sverdrup 2007).

Our approach is consistent with two recent calls in the literature on European
governance. First, the call by Johan P. Olsen arguing that better understanding of the
levels and forms of European integration, requires the building of more detailed
knowledge about institutional variations across sectors (Olsen 2007). Secondly, the
recent calls for gradually changing the research focus from explorative and descriptive
case studies, to larger N studies and a stronger focus on empirical studies (Broscheid &
Coen 2007; Coen 2007; Franchino 2005). In addition to supporting such calls, we
believe that a systematic and structured cross-sector analysis of the consultative system
might contribute to provide meaning to the diverse and competing statements that are
being made about the qualities and functions of the EU governance system.

Our argument is that the Expert groups play an increasingly important role in the EU .
We can observe a proliferation across sectors of this mode of governance. We find that
the use of Expert group have developed into a routinized practice of the European
Commission in order for it to connect to its environment and bring together various

4
state and societal actors. Moreover, a great share of the Expert groups has become
permanent and lasting properties of the governance system. However, our data also
shows that the Expert groups are remarkably unevenly distributed along different policy
domains and areas. Distinct policy segments have different modes of connecting to their
environment. While some areas are clearly multi-level in their governance structure,
others are not. The high degree of sectoral differentiation is accentuated by the fact that
we observe weak horizontal coordinating structures between the Directorates-General
(DGs) in their use of Expert groups. We argue that the heterogeneity in modes
governance across policy fields is partly a result of deliberate design attempts and
differences in policy tasks, but also to a large extent the result of different institutional
and organizational factors, such as legal and administrative capabilities, as well as the
gradual development of different routines and norms for connecting to the
environment.

The article is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss two theoretical
perspectives that might explain the use of Expert groups in the EU and make some
notes on our data and methodology. We then present an empirical analysis of the
distribution of the Expert groups across time and discuss factors that can explain the
segmented pattern of consultation. Towards the end of the paper we show how our
observations are further strengthened by analyzing the degree of specialization and the
degree of institutionalization of the consultative system.

Theoretical approaches and expectations

Expert groups are one of the three main types of committees organized by EU
institutions. Together with the Council Working Parties and Committees, and the
Comitology Committees they make up the EU’s committees system (Hayes-Renshaw
& Wallace 2006). Formally, an Expert group is a consultative entity comprised of
public- or private-sector experts and the Commission is in control over its
composition. Expert groups are composed of members from national governments,
academia and various interests groups. The main task of the groups is to advise the

5
Commission in the preparation of legislative proposals and policy initiatives as well as in
its tasks of monitoring and coordination or cooperation with the Member States.
Expert groups do not formally make political decisions, but feed the decision-making
processes by giving expert advice, providing scientific knowledge, sharing practical
experience and information and well as being forums for exchange of information. The
groups can be either permanent or temporary. The Commission creates its Expert
groups itself, which is also a characteristic that set them apart from both Comitology
and Council Committees. A Commission Expert group may be created in two different
ways, either by a Commission Decision or other legal act establishing the group, or by
a Commission service with the agreement of the Secretariat-General. Officially the
Expert groups' task is to assist the Commission as a whole, but in practice the Expert
groups that are run by the DGs that are most implicated with the relevant field.

In sum the Commission’s committees constitute a highly complex system that defies
any easy categorizations3 and does not have a well-articulated set of rule to regulate its
operations. Hence we can expect to see multiple factors that come into play in
creating, changing and maintaining this part of the EU governance system, some of
which are singled out for analysis in this article. Here we approach the issue of Expert
groups in the EU from two perspectives; one emphasizing the role of choice and
design, and one emphasizing the role of routines and institutional factors (March &
Olsen 1998; Olsen 1997; 2001; 2002; 2007).

Design Perspectives
From a design perspective, Expert groups are basically viewed as instruments for
increasing effectiveness in decision making. The European Commission is often faced
with tasks that have considerable technical, political, or legal uncertainty, and is
therefore in need of assistance. By using Expert groups, the European Commission is
able to extract knowledge, expertise and information from actors in its task
environments and potentially improve the quality of its decisions and reduce
uncertainty. The participants in these groups bring relevant topics to the discussions,

6
indicate potential risks, and sometimes suggest modes for easing transposition and
implementation. Expert groups can be used in direct linkage to decision making
situations, or as a tool for surveying and monitoring the environment. The setting up of
Expert groups can be regarded as a relatively risk free strategy when entering into new
or difficult territory. Typically one could expect that, the more uncertainty, the more
room for a problem solving logic based in expertise (Radaelli 1999). From this
perspective, it is assumed that the European Commission would design and shape its
Expert groups so that they fit tightly with its preferences and tasks. In addition, we
expect that the Expert groups are flexible and easily adaptable to new and changing
tasks and preferences. Once “mission is accomplished” the Expert groups would be
dismantled.

The policy task argument

It follows from this approach, that as long as we know and are able to identify the
nature of the policy problem facing the DGs we should be able to predict the
organizational solution to decision-making and thus the presence of Expert groups.
Although the idea is simple, defining and operationalizing the type of policy and nature
of the policy good is notoriously difficult (Lowi 1964). We take as a starting point the
distinction between regulatory versus distributive policies. This has had a recurring
significance for explaining the shape of EU decision-making arenas and the relative
power of EU institutions generally (Burns 2005; Majone 1994). The main idea we
pursue is an assumption that redistributive and provisional policies would be more
subjected to consultations than other policy types. The following underlying
mechanism creates the rationality for such a relationship.

When the Services are engaged in managing large resources they would have a
particularly strong informational needs stemming from their tasks to secure good design
of its redistributive policy, sound management of the funds, and to ensure proper
implementation. These needs cannot easily be fulfilled by internal sources of
information; hence the Commission services will pursue an extrovert information

7
strategy. Previous studies have also shown that the European Commission often uses
financial resources for stimulating cooperation with member states governments and to
mobilize sub-national and non-state actors in transnational networks around joint
problem-solving activities, particularly in areas like R&D, Trans-European Networks,
and in order to build a “People’s Europe”, that are aimed towards complementing
market integration (Laffan 1997). Majone, for instance, argues that the Commission
faces stronger constraints for its actions in distributive and redistributive policy areas
compared to regulatory policy (Majone 1994), and organizing Expert groups could be
seen as one way of overcoming such constraints. It has also been argued that the EU
distribution that takes place under the Common Agricultural policy has also been
particularly prone to control by Member States and affected interests (Burns 2005). In
order to find the concentration of Expert groups one should therefore “follow the
money”. In principle we should expect that policy areas or Commission Services that are
responsible for managing large sections of the budget would generate more Expert groups, than
Services that are in charge of managing less budgetary means (Hypothesis 1). In order to test
hypothesis 1, we separated different policies by their share of the EU budget in 2006.
In the EU most of the redistributive element of the budget is devoted to three policy
areas, that is, agriculture, regional policy as well as the various social cohesion programs.

Supply side argument

Another, but related, version of this model is to view the Expert groups, not as a result
of careful design by the European Commission, but rather as an instrument resulting
from specific supply side pressures. The more the EU gets involved in a policy area and
in particular in shaping policies, the more the actors tend to react by organizing in
order to promote, protest or defend their interests. And by doing so they demand
participation, compete for formulating problems and solutions, and engage themselves
in the production of new rules in consultative organs, like the Expert groups. Such
processes of growth in involvement, in turn, contribute to the creation of new
initiatives, and new areas of participation, and thereby a dynamics of steadily increasing
institutionalization (Stone Sweet et al. 2001). From this perspective, the emergence of

8
expert groups is seen as resulting from distinct pressures from different interest
organizations or national interests who perceive of the Expert groups as their
instrument for influencing and controlling EU decision making. We would expect a
close relationship between the profile of the expert group system, and the supply side
capacities. This kind of supply side mechanisms fits well with ideas of lobbying in the
EU (Broscheid & Coen 2007; Coen 2007; Mahoney 2004), and the observation made
by Broscheid and Coen (2007) on a independent effect of the number of interests
groups in a certain policy field and establishment of consultative fora in different DGs.
Their underlying argument is that the Commission creates the largest number of Expert
groups in areas overloaded by interests groups. In order to manage this overload, DGs
create Expert groups and privilege a limited set of actors who have access to them.
Hence we expect to find that the more interest groups are organized at the European level in a
policy area, the more the relevant DG will tend to create Expert groups (Hypothesis 2). In order
to test this claim we included data on interest groups gathered from the so-called
CONNECS base and compared this with the number of Expert Groups per DG.

Institutional Perspectives
An institutional perspective, by contrast, puts particular emphasis on the importance of
historical developments, path-dependencies and routines when explaining the patterns
of distribution of the Expert groups. It is assumed that the expert system in the EU, like
other institutions in political life, depends not only on satisfying current environmental
pressures and political concerns, but it also reflects an institution’s origin, history and
internal dynamics (March & Olsen 1998). Rather than seeing Expert groups as carefully
designed to meet specific tasks, the presence of Expert groups are regarded as reflecting
local rationality, sectoral specialization and differentiated traditions and histories for
relating to the environment. Changes and developments often occur through multiple
learning processes, but not always in consistent ways (March & Olsen 1998). Rather
than expecting a smooth and well planned distribution of Expert groups, a patchy
picture is expected. This argument folds in nicely with Kohler-Koch’s observation that
the EU is functionally segmented. She argues that the governance system in the EU is

9
to a large extent a result of processes of incrementally adding bits and pieces to the
functional responsibilities of the Community. The result of such processes is not close
co-operation to assure coherence, but instead patch-work policies in a highly
segmented system (Kohler-Koch 1997), as well as marked difference between DGs in
their mode of policy making (Christiansen 1997).

From this perspective, Expert groups are seen as mirroring the long term patterns of
interactions between sectorally specialized DGs and their equally specialized and
differentiated environments, as well as reflecting internal factors such as internal
capacity, age of certain policy domains as well as different norms, routines and
experiences from consultation and cooperation that has evolved across time. In
addition, it follows from this perspective that the use of Expert groups over time has
developed into a routinized activity with a high degree of institutionalization. With the
present data we cannot make a meaningful operationalization of historical path
dependency and local administrative cultures, yet, we incorporate into our analysis two
fundamental institutional conditions that determine an organization’s characteristics and
that can be expected to account for the differences in density of DGs set of Expert
groups according to an institutional perspective. First, we explore the significance of the
legal competencies that DGs operate under and, second, the importance of their
administrative capabilities.

The legal competence argument:

A common-sense interpretation we retrieve in some of the literature on EU
governance is that the density of Expert groups is to a large extent a function of the
allocation of competence in the EU. For instance, according to Nugent (2003:130-
131): “One factor making for variation is the degree of the importance of the policy
within the EU’s policy framework – it is hardly surprising, for example that there
should be many more agricultural advisory committees than there are educational
advisory committees.” If we define the degree of importance of a policy area, as the
legal competence of the EU in the specific area, we can consider this mechanism more

10
in detail. In a simple version of this story, we can expect this relationship to be linear:
the more exclusive legal competence for the EU, the more Expert groups (Hypothesis
3).
The underlying idea is that the level and intensity of activity of the Commission is
determined by the legal competence of the EU. Increased activity in turn triggers the
activation of expertise bodies. When competence is being transferred from the national
level to the European level, new opportunity structures are created at the European
level, and new patterns of consultation emerge. The competence attributed to different
policy areas is the fundamental legal parameters within which the DGs operate,
independently of the budgetary means at the Commission’s disposal for pursuing its
policies. These competencies are unevenly distributed over the DGs’ activity areas and
have accrued to the European level in different points in the history of European
integration. In order to operationalize this variable we have coded the policy fields
according to treaty competence, ranging from 1 to 4. The treaties differentiate between
areas of exclusive competence for the EU (coded as 1), areas of shared competence
(coded as 2), areas where the EU have coordinating competences (coded 3), areas of
supporting and complimentary competences (coded 4).4

The administrative capability argument:

From an institutional perspective we also expect that the administrative capacity of DGs
should feature as a possible explanation for the variation in the use of Expert groups.
The European Commission is a small administration with staff and limited
administrative capabilities and number of staff, particularly if compared with the size of
national governments. Still, there has been a continuous growth of new tasks that has
been delegated to the European Commission and there has been a de facto extension of
the basis for Community action. The levels of expectation regarding its ability to
manage new responsibilities and deliver the results have also increased. Balancing task
expansion with limited administrative resources has been an enduring theme in
European governance. The Expert groups can be seen as a form of outsourcing and
coping with limited administrative capabilities. Participants in the Expert groups can

11
increase the capability of the European Commission in developing policies and
monitoring implementation, by bringing in their administrative resources, provide
information, knowledge and expertise. Compared to establishing permanent, specialized
organizations capable of fact-finding, rule-making and/or enforcement, for instance
through establishing European Agencies or Commission Joint Research Centers, using
Expert groups incurs less cost for Community budgets. Although expenses are
reimbursed by the Commission, participating experts are unpaid. Consequently, the
existence of Expert groups does not require long term budgetary commitments. It
follows, from such a perspective, that we should expect a relationship between internal
administrative resources and the use of Expert groups. The less internal administrative
staff the DG has at its disposal, the more Expert groups it will create (Hypothesis 4). In
order to test this hypothesis we have gathered data on size and distribution of the
European Commission staff.

Data and methodology

The empirical analysis presented in this article relies data from our data base of
Commission Expert groups. Our data base provides information on key properties of
these groups such as the lead services in the Commission, policy area and composition
of the group in general terms as well as the group's tasks and missions and their formal
status. It classifies the participants in broad categories (scientists, academics,
practitioners, industry, NGOs) but it does not contain any information on individual
experts. Nor does it contain information on the number of meetings and participation
rates of the Expert groups. When constructing the data base we have used the
European Commission’s register of Expert groups. Information was downloaded from
the register, coded and entered in our data base in January 2007.5

The register’s reliability as a source of information on Expert groups is underpinned by

the formal rules of the register. The register is partly a result of a commitment made by
the Commission President Barroso, to the European Parliament in November 2004 to
increase the transparency of the Commission’s operations and give a public overview of

12
the advisory bodies that assist it in preparing legislative proposals and policy initiatives.
According to ‘Framework Agreement on relations between the European parliament
and the European Commission’ (art 16) “The Commission shall inform Parliament of
the list of its Expert groups set up in order to assist the Commission in the exercise of
its right of initiative. That list shall be updated on a regular basis and made public.”6
The importance attached to the registry, illustrated by its codification in the framework
agreement, in securing a constructive dialogue and flow of information between the
European Commission and the European Parliament, increases the reliability of the
data. The Commission is formally obliged to enter reliable information and to update
the register and these functions are performed by permanent staff in the Secretariat
General. The unit responsible for the register of Expert groups was consulted in the
creation of our data base.

Distribution of Expert groups

The growth of Expert groups

Our analysis shows that there were 1237 Expert groups organized by the European
Commission in January 2007. This is a high number and it is clearly in the upper range
of previous estimates. The expert group system is without doubt a considerable
supplementary administrative resource of the European Commission. In fact, there is
about one expert group per eight persons working as an official in the European
Commission.7 By comparison there are 250 Comitology Committees and 162 Council
committees/working parties8, hence Commission Expert groups far outnumber the
other parts the EU committee system.

There has been a significant increase in the number of Expert groups across time. In
1975 it was reported that there were 537 groups, in 1990 the number had increased to
602 (Wessels 1998), and by 2000 the number had reached 851 (Larsson 2003). These
measures indicate a gradual and steady growth during the twenty five year period, as
new competences and tasks have been added to the European Commission and the

13
European Union. It is noteworthy that this gradual growth has been replaced by a more
rapid and radical increase since 2000. In this period the number of Expert groups has
increased by more than forty per cent.9 The large number and the strong growth of the
use of Expert groups in the European Commission contribute to make this mode of
interaction a significant element of the European governance structure, and a routinized
and rather standardized mode of consultation. The extensive consultative structure also
contribute to give an impression of the European Commission as an open, extrovert
and accessible administrative body, which is engaged in numerous consultations with a
huge number of actors from multiple levels of governance.

Uneven distribution across policy domains and Commission Services

Although we observe extensive presence of Expert groups in the European
Commission there are significant differences in the extent of consultation in different
policy areas. In fact, we observe in the EU, as observed in studies of public
administration in the member states, that different polities and policies also elicit
different types of participation and generate different patterns of interaction (Dahl 1961;
Lowi 1964). In our data, we find three clear patterns regarding the distribution of the
Expert groups.

Firstly, the Expert groups are primarily operating in the EU public policy domains
(Table 1). There are hardly any Expert groups in the field of internal administrative
services, and there are few Expert groups that are engaged with the general services.
Hence, the DGs related to administrative affairs, budget and financial control, and the
General Services such as the Legal Service, General Secretariat and Press and
Communication, which are typically regarded as horizontally coordinating Directorates
General and Services in the EU (Stevens & Stevens 2001), score low on coordination
and co-operation with external experts. We also observe that very few (less than five
percent) of the total numbers of Expert groups are related to external relations policies.

14
Table 1 Commission Expert groups according to policy domain. N=1237

Cumulative
Frequency Valid Percent Percent
Valid Policies 1076 87,0 87,0
General Services 99 8,0 95,0
External relations 54 4,4 99,4
Internal Services 8 ,6 100,0
Total 1237 100,0

Secondly, the distribution of Expert groups is biased and unevenly distributed across the
different DGs (Figure 1). More than 75 per cent of all the Expert groups in the
Commission are related to ten DGs. The data falls into three broad categories: DGs
organizing many, (more than 70 Expert groups), DGs in the mid section (between 70-
20), and the ones with few (less than 20). Within the first group we find three “super
users”, consisting of DG Research, DG Environment and DG Enterprise, all having
120 or more Expert groups. Taken together these three organize approximately 30
percent of all Expert groups. In addition, DG Taxation and Customs, DG Energy and
Transport, DG Health and Consumer Protection, Eurostat and DG Education and
Culture all have more than 70 Expert groups each. In the second category we find the
DGs that are responsible for what we might label ‘classic’ European affairs, such as
economic and social policy, agriculture policy, internal market, fishery and regional
policy. This biased distribution of Expert groups clearly indicates strong sectoral
differentiation between different DGs in their mode of governance. While extensive
use of consultation with Expert groups is a prominent characteristic of some policy
areas, like research, environment, energy and transport, this mode of governance is
much more rarely found in areas, like trade, competition, economic and financial
affairs.

15
Figure 1 Commission Expert groups across service and time.

RTD

ENV

ENTR

TAXUD

TREN

SANCO

ESTAT

EAC

AGRI

EMPL

REGIO

MARKT

INFSO

JLS (JAI)

DEV

FISH

RELEX (EX DG 1A)

ECFIN

COMP

TRADE

AIDCO (EX DG1B)

ELARG

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

2000 2007

Source: Own data from 2007, data on 2000 based on Larsson (2003). Some Services with less than five
Expert groups are excluded.

A third striking feature regarding the distribution of the Expert groups is the changes in
the number of Expert groups across time.10 As illustrated by Figure 1, the overall trend
is that there are more Expert groups attached most of the various DGs now than seven
years ago. Very few DGs are deviating from this pattern. In 2007 the median value was
27 Expert groups per Service, compared to 19 in 2000. During a seven year period the
number of DGs with more than 80 Expert groups has increased by more than a
hundred percent, and four of the DGs have more than doubled their number of Expert
groups. The DGs that have the highest number in 2000 still remain at the top in 2007
and we still observe considerable variation between the various DGs. But there is also a
clear move towards less differentiated distribution, indicating that this method of
consultation and interaction between the Commission and its environment is becoming
more widespread and standardized.

16
Explaining uneven distribution
What we have seen here is a strong sectoral differentiation in the DGs use of Expert
groups. Why are there more Expert groups in some policy domains? What are the
relevant dimensions of the policy sectors and political organization that make such a
difference for the way in which the Commission relates to external expertise? Let us
now assess how and to what extent the four hypothesis can help to explain this pattern.

Task matching – policy type argument

Our data shows that the Services that are engaged in redistribution do not have a high
number of Expert groups. As we can see from Figure 2, the DGs that are most involved
in redistributive polices, DG Agriculture, DG Regional Policy, DG Employment and
Social Affairs, and DG Research, which together account for more than 85 per cent of
the total EU budget, have only about 25 per cent of the total number of Expert groups,
of which DG Research accounts for half of these. We can therefore conclude that our
hypothesis 1 is not supported.

Figure 2 Relationship between EU budget per Service and number of Expert groups per Service.

60000

50000

Budget 40000
in
mill.
euro
30000

20000

10000

0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Number of Expert Groups

17
However, the lack of support for our hypothesis could in fact be a misspecification of
the nature of the policy task. When we fail to see the effect of distributive policy, it
should not lead us to dismiss the idea that the nature of the policy domain significantly
affects the pattern of expert group distribution.

In particular one could argue that the Commission’s choice for establishing a group is
conditioned by the technical versus the political nature of the task, rather than whether
or not the DGs are tackling redistributional or regulatory problems. One could also
argue that varying intensity of political conflict in policy-specific interest constellations
impinges on the capacity for the Commission to act (Scharpf 1999), and that
international cooperation and integration are easier to achieve in fields seen as being
technical with low intensity in political conflict. Technical issues typically require
expertise, and expertise tend to subordinate national boundaries to shared professional
concerns and epistemic communities (Haas 1992; March & Olsen 1998). The literature
on international co-ordination has showed the crucial role of experts in political
integration and transnational governance in general, and in the EU in particular. It can
be argued that regulatory policy rather than redistributive policy is based on knowledge
as a resource and aims at efficiency rather than fair distribution. Consequently
regulatory policy areas sit better in the realm of technocracy and the world of Expert
groups, that is relatively insulated from political conflict (Radaelli 1999)11.

Although we recognize the significance of this distinction for explaining the variation
in forms of consultation, we find it hard to operationalize and use policy type as an
independent variable. First, coding the policy types according to its degree of technical
specialization requires detailed knowledge of the activities of each expert group, which
is unavailable in our data base. Using DG types as proxy for “type of task” is inadequate
in this respect. Second, additional substantive challenges are posed by the fact that what
is regarded as technical versus political issues changes over time. Politically salient issues
can be decentralized into technical arenas in order to avoid politically sensitive conflicts.
Sometimes policy labels shift as a result of deliberate choice, for instance when an issue

18
is being “decentralized” to a technical level in order to avoid political conflicts (Olsen
1983:208-209), or the other way around, when a rather technical issue becomes highly
politicized, for instance regarding stem-cell research in the EU 7th Framework Program,
or statistical measures in the case of EMU. In other instances, the label attached to a
policy can change rapidly as a result of external events or sudden crisis, like in the case
of BSE and Creutzfeld-Jacobs disease. Studies of EU committee governance, in
particular working groups under the Council (Fouilleux et al 2005), also report that this
distinction is continuously blurred and putative technical working groups are heavily
involved in dynamic processes of politization and depolitization of public policy issues.
If this is indeed the case, the distinction between technical versus political policy
domains cannot be used as an independent variable for explaining the variation in the
presence of expert group.

Supply side argument

As we see from figure 3, the strong correlation between the number of interest groups
and density of Expert groups gives support to supply side explanations. Nevertheless,
we are uncertain how plausible it is to make conclusions about the causal mechanism of
interest groups overload based on this significant correlation.

An alternative argument would be to say that it is the general level of Union activity
that generates both the presence of interest groups and expert group density in different
policy domains. It should also be noted that a large share of Commission Expert groups
do not include interest group participation (Gornitzka & Sverdrup 2007) and therefore
their creation can hardly be seen as the Commission’s means for managing interest
group overload. Rather it might be the case that the creation of Expert groups creates
participatory overload as it opens up a “can of worms” of potential participants that are
deemed relevant and legitimate, from 27 member states and their respective national
administrations, regional authorities, candidate countries, EEA-members, interests
groups and academics. Furthermore there are some important DGs that deviate from
the overall pattern. For DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs and Eurostat and DG

19
Regional policy this correlation is not present. Rather than seeing the proliferation of
interest group organizations as the main trigger of establishment of Expert groups, we
would argue that number of interest groups at the European level reflects more general
sectoral differences in political organization in Europe, as well as the fact that some
policy areas are considered more receptive for influence and inputs than others.

Figure 3: Relationship between number of interest groups and Expert groups in different
policy fields

Number
of
interest
groups

Number of expert groups

Legal competence argument:

In Figure 4 we present a scatter plot of the distribution of competences and the number
of Expert groups. As we can see, our data does not support the argument of a linear
relationship, where increased EU competence in a policy field would lead to increased
involvement of Expert groups. In fact, we observe that most of the Expert groups are
operating in policy areas where competences are shared. The number of Expert groups
is rather low in policy areas of exclusive EU competence, like agriculture and fishery
policy. We also find relatively few Expert groups in DGs where primacy is given to
market building and legal aspects, trade, competition and internal market issues (cf. also
Table 4). This supports the argument that consultations have not developed in

20
traditional areas of EU integration where the DGs can operate with high European
legal capacity for action and correspondingly low national capacity (Scharpf 1999).
These are all areas where the Commission DGs act in a management role with the day-
to-day operation of policy areas where the European level has replaced the nation state
level (Shore 2000). The uneven integration (Olsen 2007) is reflected in an uneven
distribution of consultations across levels of governance.

It follows from this discussion that there is no simple linear relationship between the
quality of EU legal competence and the number of Expert groups. If there is a
relationship between legal competence and the density of Expert groups in policy fields,
it seems to be more like a hump shaped curve. This observation is consistent with a
view of the Commission as the defender of the Treaty and an organization that seeks to
maximize its autonomy within the conditions set by the Treaty. In areas of exclusive
competencies the DGs can operate as a relatively independent actor in its day-to-day
operations, whereas areas of mixed competencies are the realm of multi level policy
making and implementation where the Commission practices would involve the joint
exercise of coordination and authority. These areas have developed issue specific
constituencies across multiple levels, involving multiple types of actors (Eising &
Kohler-Koch 1999). At the other end of the scale, i.e. areas where there is very limited
or no Treaty basis for Commission action, there is no room for a structured interaction
between levels of governance organized by the Commission.

21
Figure 4 Relationship between legal competences and the number of Expert groups. (1= exclusive,
2=shared, 3=coordinating, 4=supporting/complementary)

140

120

100

Number of Expert groups

80

60

40

20

0
4 3 2 1
Competences

The administrative capability argument:

In Figure 5 we present a scatter plot of the relationship between the administrative
resources of a DG, defined as the size of the administrative staff, and the number of
Expert groups at its disposal. As we can see from the plot, we observe a relationship,
but its direction is opposite to what we expected. The more internal administrative
capacities a DG has at its disposal, the more Expert groups it will create. Rather than
being a substitute for own administrative resources, the use of Expert groups is
supplementing own capacities. This is not consistent with a view that DGs
systematically will pursue a “self-reliance” strategy and only organize multi-level
administrative structure to compensate for lack of in-house administrative capacity.
Rather it seems so that internal administrative capacity is a prerequisite for organizing a
large number of Expert groups. None (with one exception) of the DGs with a dense set
of Expert groups (i.e., with more than 70 groups) have less than 500 hundred officials.

22
This observation suggests that Expert groups are perhaps best seen as a tool for
extending the DGs’ capacity for action, and not limiting the DGs’ autonomy vis-à-vis
member states and interest groups.

Figure 5: Relationship between administrative capabilities in the Commission DGs and the number of
Expert groups. N=1233

1200

1000

800
Staff size

600

400

200

0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Number of Expert groups

Note: DG for Translation and the Joint Research Centres are excluded

However, we also see different types of relationship between internal administrative

staff and the use of external Expert groups. In the lower right section, low degree of
internal resources but a high degree of Expert groups, we find DG Environment and
DG Taxation and Customs. In these policy areas the outsourcing hypotheses seems to
fit the data very well. In the upper right section we find the policy areas that are
mobilizing many internal resources and many external resources. Unsurprisingly we
find policy areas that have increased in importance during the last few years and areas
that are of crucial importance to the current EU agenda, such as DG Research, DG
Energy and Transport. In the upper left section we find the DGs with a relatively high
level of internal resources and relatively few Expert groups, like DG Agriculture, DG

23
Information Society and DG External Relations. In the lower left quadrant, we find
policy areas that have relatively few internal resources and that make use of few external
resources, including DG Justice and Home Affairs, DG Development and DG Fish and
Maritime. In the centre and almost on the trend line we find DGs related to traditional
EU activities like regional policy, employment as well as health and consumer affairs.

Strong sectoral specialization and weak horizontal

coordination
So far our analysis has clearly documented the heterogeneity and functional
specialization of the expert group system, and how this system has developed according
to logic of sectoral specialization. We have identified dimensions of the policy types and
institutional characteristics that can account for some of this heterogeneity. We argue
from this that we have pin-pointed a part of the EU governance system where
centrifugal forces are at play. The sectoral differentiation we have observed speaks
directly to an enduring tension in the organization of governments between
specialization and horizontal coordination (Gulick 1937). In a purely functionally
differentiated decision-making structure, the internal specialization is matched by highly
specialized external contacts and there are few horizontally integrating forces and
structures that ensure cross-sectoral coordination. Our findings fit well with the EU
administrative history, where the organization has been based primarily upon the
sectoral and functional principle, that is on the purpose and nature of the subject area
(Egeberg 2006). We observe this strong sectoral and functional differentiation
throughout the whole EU governance system, in the Commission Services, in the
Council secretariat, in the various Council configurations, as well in the European
Parliament, with its functionally differentiated standing committees. In this respect our
findings confirm that Expert groups are contributing to this sectoral and functional
specialization.

24
However, in order to move our analysis further we also want to examine the degree of
horizontal coordination and the degree of institutionalization. An indicator of cross-
sectoral coordination in relation to the Expert groups is if we find that the various
Expert groups are associated with other DGs apart from its host DG. If so, expertise
provided by a group in one field is more likely to be used to influence policy making
processes also in other fields and DGs, and possibly also contribute to increase the
likelihood for developing cross-sectoral politics in the Commission. The extent to
which Expert groups are set up in collaboration with other DGs and report back to
different DGs is therefore also a measure of the (horizontal) permeability of
organizational boundaries between the various Commission services.

We observe (Table 2) that only a small fraction of the Expert groups are formally linked
to other DGs then their host Service. Four out of five of the Expert groups have a
single DG ownership, and do not have any other associated DG. Moreover, in cases
where there is coordination across DGs, the number of DGs that are associated is very
limited. Of the Expert groups that are associated with other DGs in addition to their
host DG, a majority is linked to one or two DGs; leaving the total number of more
broadly, cross-sectorally anchored Expert groups to only 85. We can therefore
conclude that the Commission Expert groups are not a key part of the horizontal
coordinating mechanisms of the Commission. The sectoral and functional
differentiation, which is a hallmark of the administrative history of the Commission
(Cram 1994; 1997; Egeberg 2006; Stevens & Stevens 2001), seems to be further
accentuated by the practice of interacting with extramural expertise structures through
Expert groups.

25
Table 2 Cross sectoral coordination of Expert Groups. Number of Commission Expert groups associated with other DGs in addition
to their host DG

… of which … of which … of which

No Yes DG DGs more DGs
Valid N 1006 231 96 54 85
Per cent 81 19 8 4 7

A high degree of stability and institutionalization

Growth and distribution across policy domains and DGs bear witness of how
widespread this consultative system has become. However, this does not necessarily
imply that these are stable and predictable structures that are unsusceptible to short term
fluctuations and shifts in attention and legitimacy or governance fads. What is this
system’s degree of institutionalization?

The more formal and permanent a group is, the more it is institutionalized. Our data
allows us to measure the degree of institutionalization in two ways. Firstly, we make a
distinction between Expert groups that are formal and informal. Formal Expert groups
are established by a Commission decision or other legal acts, while informal groups are
established by the DGs themselves in agreement with the Secretariat General and
without reference to such a formal legal act. In principle, formal groups can be regarded
as more institutionalized than informal groups. Secondly, we make a distinction
between temporary and permanent groups. Expert groups that are either explicitly
defined as permanent, and groups that have been in operation for more than five years,
are coded as permanent groups. The rest of the groups are coded as temporary.

Our analysis shows that (Table 3) ¾ of the Commission’s Expert Groups are informal
and half are temporal. In some sense we can view the expert group system as a rather
flexible part of the administrative space where groups can be established and dismantled
without going through elaborate formal decision-making procedures, and therefore
contribute to create a dynamic, flexible and adaptive administrative system. However,

26
our findings also show that a considerable part of this system has become
institutionalized and is an important element of a routinized and rather stable
administrative structure. The close to 400 Expert groups that have become a permanent
fixture of the EU without having been created by a formal legal act together with the
number of formal Expert groups are indications of a rather high degree of
institutionalization of the expert group system.

Table 3 Commission Expert groups by type and status. N=1237

Status P/T
Temporary Permanent Total
Type Informal Count 557 389 946
F/I % 88,6 % 64,0% 76,5%
Formal Count 72 219 291
% 11,5 % 36,0 % 23,5%
Total Count 629 608 1237
% 100 % 100 % 100,0%

Most DGs balance between temporariness and permanence in their consultative system.
Yet some DGs organize a strikingly stable set of Expert groups, this is especially the case
for Eurostat, DG Agriculture and DG Fisheries. At the other end of the scale we find
DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs and DG Information Society whose
expertise system is predominantly temporary.

In sum, we find some striking and robust findings about the distribution, and the
degree of institutionalization of the Expert groups. The high number of Expert groups
clearly shows that multi-level consultation is an important feature of the European
governance system, and our data also shows that this mode is becoming a gradually
even more important across time. Table 4 provides an overview of the distribution of
the groups and the degree of institutionalization. The obvious conclusion of these
findings is that the extent and quality of the EU multi-level governance is radically
different across different functional policy areas. While multi-level consultation is a
dominating and routinized feature of some policy areas and in some Services, it is a

27
rather rare event or used as a much more flexible tool in other policy areas and
Services.

Table 4 Distribution of Expert groups and their institutionalization (Number of EGs per DG, and
percentage of permanent EGs in parenthesis)
Number of Expert groups
Few Medium Many
(Less than 20) (21-70) (71 or more)
Degree of Low RELEX (11, 0,27) INFSO (38, 0,24) RTD (129, 0.25)
institutionalization (0-33,3%) TRADE (7, 0,29) TAXUD (95, 0,16)
COMP (7, 0,29)
BUDG (3, 0,33)
ELARG (1, 0)
DGT (1, 0)

Medium BEPA (5, 0,40) EMPL (62, 0,48) ENV (127, 0.43)
(33,4-66,6%) SG (4, 0,50) REGIO (58, 0,40) ENTR (120, 0,43)
JLS (33, 0, 39) TREN (94, 0, 51)
DEV (30, 0,40) EAC (71, 0,37)

High ECFIN (10, 0,80) AGRI (64, 0,94) SANCO (89, 0,76)
(66,7 -100 (%) OLAF (5, 0,80) MARKT (51, 0,53) ESTAT (85, 0,99)
AIDCO (5, 1,0) FISH (25, 0,84)
JRC (3, 1,0)
ADMIN (3, 0,67)
COMM (1, 1)

The pattern we see in Table 4 has both unsurprising and puzzling traits. The position of
internal administrative DGs in the left column does not represent much of a theoretical
puzzle to be solved. The fact that we find DG Trade and DG Competition in this
group on the other hand, is not that self-evident. In the middle column we find many
of the main traditional areas subject to European integration and with relatively high

28
level of capacity to act at a European level, in particular agriculture, internal market and
regional policy. We also see that many of the policy areas associated with “New
Europe” or the European Knowledge Economy, such as research and education, place
themselves in the right column, along with high attention areas, such as energy and
environmental policy. The degree of institutionalization on the other hand also pairs
policy areas that usually are not thought of as having much in common – such as
taxation and research policy. Placing the policy areas in a two-dimensional space, points
us in the direction that both the nature of the policy area and institutional differences
are factors that encourage, facilitate and restrain the Commission’s use of Expert groups

Conclusions
Our analysis substantiates the idea that the European Union should be understood as a
governance system, characterized by interpenetration of different levels of government
and non-state actors. We see this in the ubiquity of Expert groups at the European
level. The Commission’s 1237 Expert groups are a key element in the multi-level
European administrative space, outnumbering by far other types of committees in the
EU system. Over time this particular mode of consultation has become more
widespread and institutionalized. The number of Expert groups has increased
considerably, especially after 2000. Although the formal rules system regulating the
creation and operation of Expert groups is weak this has become a standard way for a
large part of the DGs to interact with their environment. We also see some
convergence in consultative system(s) in the various DGs, as all, with the exception of
two, have increased the number of Expert groups they organize. While ¾ of the Expert
groups are informal, half of them are permanent. These findings clearly support the
claim that the EU can be understood as a relatively stable multi-level governance
system.

The density and durability of the population of Expert groups, on the other hand vary
considerably between different Commission services. Some DGs are clearly engaged in
governance of this kind, while other DGs are not involved in this mode of governance.

29
As to the factors that can explain the observed heterogeneity in the organization of
Expert groups across policy fields we find some support for the design perspective. On
the one hand, parts of the Commission set of Expert groups are deliberate attempts to
match information systems and consultation to policy tasks. This is especially the case
when we differentiate between internal/general services and sectorally oriented DGs.
Most of the Expert groups are found in areas of substantive European policy areas,
especially in task areas related to research, environment and enterprise policy. In issue
areas related to internal administration, general services, and external relations, there are
few - if any - Expert groups. The distinction between regulatory versus distributive
policy can also account for some of the heterogeneity in the Commission’s use of
Expert groups – contrary to our expectations distributive policies do not entail more
use of Expert groups. We also find that external pressures in terms of number of interest
groups are significantly correlated with the Commission’s DG propensity to establish
Expert groups. Moreover much of the variation results from different institutional and
organizational factors such as legal and administrative capabilities, as well as the gradual
development of different routines and norms for connecting to the environment.
Experts groups are typically established and drawn into the policy process in policy
areas where legal competence is shared between the European and national level of
governance. And the density of organized Expert groups is highest in the policy areas
where administrative and policy making capacity has been amassed in the Commission.

A main pattern we observe is that Expert groups contribute to the sectoral

differentiation of EU decision making, amplifying the sectoral organization of the
European administrative space. Cross-sectoral coordination of expert group activities is
at a very low level. The world of Expert groups unveils the Commission as a multi-
organization that is part of structured multi-level governance within sectorally defined
boundaries. This underlines the significance of the basic organizational structure of the
Commission, its institutional traditions and routines, as well as the legal parameters and
administrative capacity of the various DGs for the way in which European multilevel
governance is structured.

30
We therefore argue that the EU is best understood as a functionally differentiated
system with very different modus operandi. Different policy areas form issue and policy
specific constituencies that evolve according to different logics. We have described the
empirical variance in the Commission’s expert group system and pointed to causal
mechanisms and differentiating factors that can account for these differences. The
findings underline the need to do justice to the heterogeneity of European multi-level
governance in the study of European integration and its institutions and to specify the
institutional conditions and actor constellation involved in governing Europe.

31
Acknowledgements
Draft versions of this article have been presented at the Arena seminar 8 May 2007 and
at the CONNEX Conference: Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of
Executive Politics in Europe, Barcelona 7-9th June 2007. We would like to thank
Michael Bauer, Jeff Checkel, Thomas Christiansen, Pieter de Wilde, Morten Egeberg,
Johan P. Olsen and participants at the ARENA seminar and Connex workshop for
helpful comments.

Notes
1
Note that these studies are focusing specifically on Comitology Committees.
2
To our knowledge, the most comprehensive overview hitherto is provided by a Swedish governmental report prepared by
Torbjörn Larsson (2003).
3
See Larsson (2007) for a discussion of the defining characteristics of Commission’s expert advisory groups.
4
For reasons of simplicity we here use the terms found in the unratified Draft Constitutional Treaty.
5
It does not cover all expert groups and committees that are linked to the Commission. The following broad categories of entities are
excluded from the Commission’ register and thus also from our data base: 1) independent experts charged with assisting the
Commission in the implementation of framework programmes for research and development; 2) Sectoral and cross-industry social
dialogue committees, whose work is particularly aimed at the conclusion of agreements implemented by the Council or autonomous
agreements implemented by the social partners themselves and at adopting frameworks for action. There were about 70 such
committees in 2004; 3) Comitology committees which are established by the legislator to assist the Commission in policy areas where
the Commission is empowered to implement legislation (about 250 such committees in 2004). 4) Joint entities arising from
international agreements (a total of 170 joint entities in 2004). These entities differ from expert groups in terms of their creation and
competence: they are created in accordance with methods laid down in international agreements and their role is to supervise their
implementationhttp://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/faq/faq.cfm?aide=2
6
See full agreement here: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/docs/framework_agreement_ep-
ec_en.pdf
7
Data on the European Commission was found in the Statistical Bulletin of Commission staff
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/bs_dg_category_en.pdf
8
Data for Comitology Committees from 2006 and for Council Committees from 2005, in addition there were 121 sub-groups under
the Council working parties and committees Hayes-Renshaw F, Wallace H. 2006. The Council of Ministers. Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan
9
Since there is uncertainty attached to the accuracy of the data from the years prior to the establishment of the register, some of this
increase might reflect more rigorous methods for reporting.
10
As noted earlier, there is some uncertainty regarding the accuracy of the measure from 2000.
11
A similar argument is voiced in theory by Broscheid and Coen as they expect to see more expert groups in regulatory policies as the
nature of the policy good in these policy areas are affecting limited sets of societal actors in combination with high demand for
technical information. However, they fail to find support for this hypothesis in their data on expert fora creation, rather they find
(insignificantly) more Expert Groups in distributive policy domains (Broscheid A, Coen D. 2007. Lobbying activity and fora creation
in the EU: empirically exploring the nature of the policy good. Journal of European Public Policy 14:346-65.

32
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Appendix

Service Service Expert g Budget Connecs Legal Staff

(N) 2006 mill Eur (web side)
Personnel and Administration ADMIN 3 660 0 1 670
Agriculture and Rural Development AGRI 64 54455 30 1 887
Europe Aid AIDCO 5 0,1 0 2 583
Bureau of European Policy Advisors BEPA 5 0,1 0 1 25
Budget BUDG 3 1160 0 1 382
Directorate General for Communication COMM 1 205 0 1 492
Competition COMP 7 99 0 1 593
Directorate General for Development DEV 30 1301 1 2 245
Directorate General for Translation DGT 1 0 0 1 2113
Education and Culture EAC 71 1008 12 4 482
Economic and Financial Affairs ECFIN 10 468 0 1 441
Enlargement ELARG 1 2205 0 2 226
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities EMPL 62 11934 36 3 559
Enterprise and Industry ENTR 120 400 23 4 727
Environment ENV 127 346 17 2 492
Eurostat ESTAT 85 133 0 2 578
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs FISH 25 1074 1 1 250
Information Society and Media INFSO 38 1425 2 3 820
Justice, Freedom and Security JLS 33 605 0 4 328
Joint Research Centre JRC 3 0 1710
Internal Market and Services MARKT 51 75 1 1 376
European Anti-Fraud Office OLAF 5 66 0 1 290
Regional Policy REGIO 58 28629 1 2 523
External Relations RELEX 11 3476 1 4 651
Research RTD 129 3526 0 2 1150
Health and Consumer Protection SANCO 89 559 3 2 625
Secretariat General/Legal Service SG 4 0 0 1 778
Taxation and Customs Union TAXUD 95 130 0 3 354
Trade TRADE 7 83 1 1 398
Energy and Transport TREN 94 1462 4 3 863
Directorate General Informatics DIGIT 0 0 0 1 359
Humanitarian Aid ECHO 0 515 0 2 154
European Personnel Selection Office EPSO 0 0 0 1 106
Internal Audit Service IAS 0 12 0 1 71
Office for Infrastructure and Logistics in Brussels OIB 0 0 0 1 415
Office for Infrastructure and Logistics in Luxembourg OIL 0 0 0 1 160
Publications Office OPOCE 0 0 0 1 595
Paymasters Office PMO 0 0 0 1 234
Directorate General for Interpretation SCIS 0 0 0 1 667
Legal Service SJ 0 215 0 1 321
Total 1237 116226,2 133 21693

36
37