German Politics

ISSN: 0964-4008 (Print) 1743-8993 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fgrp20

Life After the Bundestag: An Analysis of the Post-

Parliamentary Careers of German MPs

Maximilian Würfel

To cite this article: Maximilian Würfel (2017): Life After the Bundestag: An Analysis of the Post-
Parliamentary Careers of German MPs, German Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2017.1344642

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2017.1344642

Published online: 21 Jul 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 2

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fgrp20

Download by: [University of Florida] Date: 24 July 2017, At: 04:54

Life After the Bundestag: An Analysis of the Post-
Parliamentary Careers of German MPs

M A X I M I L I A N W Ü R F E L

Is the transition from the political sphere to highly paid and attractive private
and public sector positions a common phenomenon for legislators? If so,
which variables determine these career moves? To answer these questions, the
following variables are utilised: (1) the expertise gathered in certain committees,
(2) strong professional networks resulting from a high position in party and leg-
islature, (3) a business-friendly ideology, (4) the deteriorating party support and
networking base indicated by a failed re-nomination, and lastly (5) the political
success in winning elections. To comprehensively assess these factors, this study
makes use of a new dataset that comprises information on the political positions
as well as the professional status of 646 former German MPs who left the Bun-
destag between 1998 and 2009. Using probit regression analyses, it is shown that
a higher hierarchical position in parliament and party and acquired expertise
influence the probability of subsequently holding a more attractive private or
public sector position. Moreover, the way in which legislators leave parliament
– be it due to failed nomination, a scandal or failed re-election – serves as a
reliable predictor for the status of subsequent employment.

INTRODUCTION

Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder left the Bundestag in 2005 to become Chairman
of the Supervisory Board for the pipeline company Nord Stream, whose most recent
project he endorsed while still serving in government. Ronald Pofalla, Deputy Chair-
man of the Christian Democratic Union at the time, vehemently criticised Schröder’s
decision, explicitly accusing him of using the reputation of his former office for per-
sonal financial benefit, thereby showing a lack of political decency and damaging
the office itself (Borschel 2014). In 2015, Ronald Pofalla, having served as minister
in the office of the federal chancellor, has made a similar transition (“Vom Kanzleramt
in den Bahnvorstand” 2014). Are these two incidents outlying cases or is the transition
from the political sphere to highly paid private sector positions a common phenom-
enon? More precisely, what are the factors in legislative service that condition the
post-parliamentary career choice of ex-legislators and how strong are their effects?
To answer the question, this study makes use of a new dataset that comprises infor-
mation on the political record as well as the professional status of those former German
MPs who left the Bundestag between 1998 and 2009. The effects of the different inde-
pendent variables on the probability of subsequently holding a more attractive private
or public sector position are estimated using probit regression analyses. The paper
German Politics, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2017.1344642 # 2017 Association for the Study of German Politics
2 GERMAN POLITICS

proceeds by highlighting the relevance of the research, followed by an overview of the

current state of the scholarly debate, which will serve as a basis for the postulated
hypotheses. The empirical section begins with a discussion of the utilised variables fol-
lowed by a description of the data and methodology. The results are then presented as
probit estimates and marginal effects. Finally, the findings will be presented and
related back to the original hypotheses.

RELEVANCE

The analysis of post-parliamentary careers has an important societal value. Questions

arise about the quality of the legislature, the moral character of the legislators and the
way the legislative body is anchored in the broader society.
If politicians, while in parliament, already have ambitions to enter the private
sector, their performance might be influenced and conflicts of interest may arise,
affecting the quality of the legislative body itself. Moreover, it is ethically questionable
whether political representatives ought to use the legislative experience as a career
stepping stone. On the other hand, having marketable skills also increases the auton-
omy a politician has in relation to his or her party. Without any viable alternative
career options outside politics, parliamentarians might be overly dependent on their
party and its leaders. Hence, ‘tracing the career activities of legislators after they
have ceased being legislators is particularly useful in understanding the larger
society and a given legislature’s place in it’ (Hibbing 1999, 152).
It is thus puzzling that there is a pronounced gap in the existing literature when it
comes to the post-parliamentary careers of politicians.

LITERATURE OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Unfortunately, no existing studies comprehensively assess post-parliamentary careers

in connection with the legislative experience. Nevertheless, theoretical clues on which
to build the subsequent investigation can be found.
Although not concerned with parliamentarians per se, leadership studies provide a
first insight by illuminating the whereabouts of former elite politicians (Klein and
Höntzsch 2007; Anderson 2010; Theakston 2012). However, they only present excep-
tional career paths, are anecdotal in character, and do not link the legislative record
with the post-parliament employment patterns. Of more value to these studies are
the survey-based explorations of the whereabouts of former parliamentarians. The
studies by Kreiner (2007) as well as Edinger and Schwarz (2009), for example, inves-
tigate the political and professional careers of former Bundestag members. Theakston,
Gouge, and Honeyman (2007), on the other hand, focus on the general experience of
former British MPs and their feelings when leaving the parliament. Similarly, Best,
Edinger, and Vogel (2007) mainly address personal preferences and political satisfac-
tion. However, all of these studies fail to explore the factors that are decisive in deter-
mining the post-parliamentary career.
More relevant to this discussion, the studies by Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) and
Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) substantiate the finding that parliamentary service
has a positive effect on subsequent wages and increases the overall wealth of an
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 3
individual, because firms seem to benefit from having ex-politicians on their staff,
which is evidenced by an increase in stock value (Faccio 2006; Luechinger and
Moser 2012) and the number of procurement contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, and So
2008) they gain. Crucially, the increase in wealth does not affect every individual legis-
lator equally. The party ideology, the internal party politics and the manner in which
the legislator exited parliament appear to matter.
Having established that there is indeed a market for former politicians’ labour, the
main theoretical task is to determine the factors that could condition these transitions.
Unfortunately, the only available branch of literature that explores the connections
between the legislative experience and the post-parliamentary career path are studies
of the lobbying industry. These tend to focus on the question of whether it is the pol-
itical network or the acquired expertise which makes ex-legislators valuable as lobby-
ists but are quite divided on the subject.
Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011, 23), for example, find political connec-
tions to be the crucial factor for explaining why an MP becomes a lobbyist. These con-
nections determine the issue area a lobbyist is concerned with and the lobbyist’s value.
Notably, lobbyists who served in the US Congress or worked in the White House gain
larger premiums than their peers. In addition, contacts to serving politicians and the
party in power produce the highest pay-offs (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi
2011, 10, 27, 30). Using the concept of relational capital – i.e. ‘links of friendship
mutual trust or even politician-specific knowledge’ – Blanes I Vidal, Draca, and
Fons-Rosen (2012, 2732) find that lobbyists with connections to Senators – especially
to powerful ones – generate more revenue than their peers. Eggers (2010) concludes
that lobbyists are hired for their personal connections to sitting politicians as well as for
their ideological connections to sitting politicians. Ex-members of parliament provide
a distinct and durable network that lobbying firms use to gain access to the party in
power. Staffers in turn are hired both to signal the ideological position of the industry
and to convey ideological information (Eggers 2010, 5 – 6).
Salisbury et al. (1989) conclude the opposite. Both the lobbying firms and the lob-
byists themselves appear to especially value experience in the executive branch
because of the technical knowledge their experience conveys (Salisbury et al. 1989,
182). Parker, Parker, and Dabros (2013) in turn investigate the role of specialised
human capital in determining the lobbying employment of former Congressmen.
They find that on-the-job political training and special expertise are strongly associated
with post-parliamentary lobbying employment, while a broad set of skills and experi-
ences lowers the likelihood (Parker, Parker, and Dabros 2013, 442).
In conclusion, the answer as to whether it is the connections or the specialised
knowledge that makes ex-politicians more attractive to the lobbying industry
remains unclear. One can expect that those parliaments with a distinct business-rel-
evant expertise will be more likely to work in the lobbying industry than their peers.
But legislators that possess the strongest set of connections should be equally attractive
to the lobbying industry. Lastly, one can also assume that members of the current party
in government are more valuable to the lobbying industry than members of the
opposition.
As for the other potential influential factors, the literature gives only scarce infor-
mation. Although the distinct influence of the age of ex-parliamentarians remains
4 GERMAN POLITICS

unclear, it certainly has an effect on their career options (Prewitt and Nowlin 1969,
305; Frantzich 1978, 259; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993). Moreover, the influence of
gender on political success should be accounted for too. On the one hand, the
German quota for female representation in the Bundestag seems to have successfully
reduced male overrepresentation (Brockmann 2012, 730). On the other hand, follow-
ing McKay (2004, 2011), Zamfirache (2010) or Davidson-Schmich and Kürschner
(2011, 33), a negative impact of being female for obtaining high positions in the pol-
itical sphere should be expected.
For the impact of distinct legislative positions, it can be assumed that a lack of insti-
tutional power is associated with an increased likelihood to leave the parliament, but no
further implications can be drawn on the basis of the existing literature. Frantzich
(1978, 264), Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994), Hall and van Houweling (1995) and
Moore and Hibbing (1998) conclude that holding a committee chair position or the
expectation of acquiring one in the upcoming legislative period, as well as being a
member of the majority party, are major reasons for continuing legislative service.
However, Schansberg (1994, 454) as well as Kiewiet and Zeng (1993, 928) do not
find supporting evidence.
Unlike the abovementioned political factors, there is no disagreement when it
comes to the influence of scandals on a legislator’s political career. Schansberg
(1994, 454), Kiewiet and Zeng (1993, 938) as well as Hall and van Houweling
(1995, 132) find that being involved in a scandal is associated with a higher likeli-
hood of retirement. The effects on a career in the private sector, however, remain
unclear.

HYPOTHESES

Relational Capital
Although there is scholarly disagreement, the surveys conducted by Bertrand, Bombar-
dini, and Trebbi (2011), Blanes I Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012) as well as the
study Klein and Höntzsch (2007, 2) conclude that the primary value of ex-legislators
for the lobbying industry lies in their connections to other office holders. This assump-
tion is backed by Edinger and Schwarz (2009, 32), who find high-level politicians to be
more attractive for lobbying firms due to their extensive networks. A higher standing in
both the institutional hierarchy and the party is expected to be a signal of a larger than
average political network. Naturally, a functioning political network is also a necessary
condition for subsequent appointments to a higher public office.
H1: The higher the former standing in the legislative or party hierarchy, the more
likely the parliamentarian is to work in a more attractive private sector position
or to hold a more attractive public office after leaving the parliament.
H2: If a parliamentarian is a member of the party currently in power, the parlia-
mentarian is more likely to work in a more attractive private sector position after
leaving the parliament.
Due to the decentralised nature of the German party landscape, only parliamentarians
who have the strong backing of their local party are nominated. A failed nomination
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 5
consequently shows a lack of such support and a poorly functioning political network.
As shown above, a functioning political network in turn is one reason why politicians
are hired by the private sector. Without that network, their value decreases. Self-evi-
dently, one also needs a functioning partisan network to be appointed to a public office.
H3: Parliamentarians who left the parliament due to a failed nomination are less
likely than their peers to work in a more attractive private sector position or to
hold a more attractive public office after leaving the parliament.
Losing an election, on the other hand, shows that a politician is unsuccessful and one
would expect that only the successful politicians are rewarded with attractive offices.
Moreover, Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005, 365) speculate that ‘leaving as a loser
may preclude a Member of Congress from pursuing some other offices’.
H4: Parliamentarians who lost in an election are less likely than their peers to
hold a more attractive public office after they have left the parliament.
In contrast to the private sector, holding public office means being in the spotlight of
media attention. Building on Kiewiet and Zeng (1993), Schansberg (1994) and Hall
and van Houweling (1995), it is assumed that once the moral character of a politician
is in doubt and the person has resigned due to a scandal, the individual is less likely to
hold other prestigious political offices afterwards.
H5: Parliamentarians who resigned due to a scandal are less likely than their
peers to hold a more attractive public office after leaving the parliament.

Knowledge
Parker, Parker, and Dabros (2013, 444) find that specialised legislative training, in the
form of membership in particular committees, points ex-legislators in the direction of
lobbying because this expertise is in-demand and easily transferable to the private
sector. According to Edinger and Schwarz (2009, 28), legislators who served in the
economic committee are more likely to choose a new career path after having
served in the Bundestag. This finding is substantiated by Klein and Höntzsch (2007, 3),
who find that former politicians who engage in any sort of lobbying are active in the
same area as their former political domain.
H6: Parliamentarians who served in a business-relevant committee are more
likely than their peers to subsequently work in a more attractive private sector
position after they have left the parliament.

Ideology
Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) find that parliamentary service did indeed increase the
overall lifetime income of Conservative members of the House of Commons via access
to directorships and consulting contracts, but there was no effect for ex-members of the
House who were Labour politicians. This trend is further confirmed by a survey con-
ducted by Theakston, Gouge, and Honeyman (2007, 20), who find that ‘three times as
many Conservative ex-MPs reported using personal contacts and networking with
associates or friends to find employment than Labour ex-MPs’. As for the mechanism
behind this dynamic, it can be assumed that Tory ex-legislators find it easier to obtain
6 GERMAN POLITICS

employment in the private sector than Labour politicians due to the business-friendly
background and supporter network of the Conservative party. In Germany, however,
Edinger and Schwarz (2009, 39) find that party affiliation is valuable as a placement
service in only a minority of cases.
H7: Parliamentarians who are members of a party with business-friendly orien-
tations and affiliations are more likely than their peers to work in a more attrac-
tive private sector position after leaving the parliament.

EXPECTATIONS

Before turning to the operationalisation, it is important to address the career expec-

tations of the MPs themselves. First of all, the vast majority of MPs appear to be gen-
uinely motivated by political ambitions, as evidenced by the fact that they continue to
be politically active even long after they left the parliament (Kreiner 2007, 273;
Edinger and Schwarz 2009, 52). Hence it is safe to say that most politicians want to
become MPs to advance their political career. Apart from this general dynamic, the
individual ambition seems to depend on their pre-parliamentary jobs. According to
Edinger and Schwarz (2009, 30), most employees change their profession after
having served in the parliament because they want to make use of their new skills
and may find their pre-parliamentary jobs unsatisfying. This group might indeed see
political service as a stepping stone for their future careers. Self-employed persons,
on the other hand, usually continue working in their profession during their service
in parliament and might perceive the political career as an enhancement for their
own professional position. Lastly, civil servants predominantly go back to their old
occupation (Edinger and Schwarz 2009, 30).
In general, there is a dynamic development of career goals and expectations at
hand. Those who are able to become successful as politicians are also more likely to
make a successful transition to an attractive position in the private sector.

OPERATIONALISATION – OVERVIEW OF THE VARIABLES

Post-Parliament Employment
The dependent variable post-parliamentary employment is coded by the sector, public
or private, and whether or not the position is more attractive than a simple legislative
mandate.
The paper opts for an analytical distinction between sectors because of their dis-
tinct underlying dynamics. In terms of the private sector, it is sensible to assume
that a segment of the knowledge and connections parliamentarians acquire throughout
their career might be valued as an asset, thus influencing the chances of a transition.
Concerning public office, the relationship should be more intimate. In contrast to the
private sector, not only a part, but the full scope of the political career resources
should be a deciding factor for a new position. The resources that make a parliamen-
tarian successful (e.g. party networks, thematic knowledge as well as insights about the
workings of an institution) should be nearly completely transferable to another political
institution (Borchert and Stolz 2003, 153). Moreover, in contrast to executives in the
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 7
private sector, employers in the public sector share similar experiences and socialisa-
tions to a parliamentarian and there might even be some interwoven or overlapping
staff structures. This should all work in the favour of a successful transition for parlia-
mentarians (Borchert and Stolz 2003, 169). Lastly, according to Borchert and Stolz
(2003, 168), political institutions might even be incentivised to allocate an attractive
office to an established politician, which again adds credit to the assumption that a suc-
cessful parliamentarian seems to have the necessary career resources to transfer to an
attractive public office.
Unfortunately, in Germany there is distinct secrecy among the ex-politicians them-
selves when it comes to their post-political careers (Klein and Höntzsch 2007, 11). In
addition, there is no requirement to disclose this information in any way. Hence, it is
not possible to get comprehensive information on individual salaries; nor is it feasible
to survey all the ex-legislators from three legislative periods since legislative surveys
generally suffer from low response rates. To circumvent this lack of information, this
study opts for an evaluation of the attractiveness of post-parliamentary positions as the
main variable. More specifically, it is evaluated whether an ex-parliamentarian has
held a position within the first five years after leaving the legislature that was more
attractive than the simple mandate. Politicians can only have one (more attractive) pos-
ition at the same time and the most attractive position is decisive.
The concept of attractiveness encompasses the estimated salary as well as the
social prestige that is credited to a position. Following the findings of Edinger and
Schwarz (2009, 21), who argue that positions like mayoralties and county commis-
sioners (Landrat) are attractive because they offer greater scope for action and
policy discretion, positions in the state-level executive as well as mayoralties of
bigger cities are coded as more attractive than the Bundestag mandate. Other non-
executive positions in parliaments, on the other hand, either on the state or EU
level, are considered equally attractive because they do not offer more policy discre-
tion and have a similar salary. Non-political public positions are more complicated
to evaluate. The positions of attorneys and judges are coded as equally attractive as
the mandate because of the overall high income but less opportunities for influence.
Judgeships and attorneyships of international courts and high federal courts,
however, do offer both a high income and ample scope for influence and are hence
coded as more attractive.
When it comes to positions in the private sector, evaluation is still more compli-
cated. However, some sensible indications can be developed to guide the evaluation.
Senior positions in companies and consultancies that are at least active nationwide
are coded as more attractive than the mandate because these jobs are usually better
paid than the legislative mandate. Retirement is coded as a less attractive private pos-
ition, with the underlying assumption that an attractive job offer is generally not
declined for reasons of retirement. And lastly, if no information on their whereabouts
was detectable, it is assumed that the individual either retired or is in a less attractive
private sector position, which counts as the same.
As there is considerable room for error due to the interpretative estimation, the final
categorisations were checked with three outside coders, considered politically knowl-
edgeable and well informed. Firstly, a list of ambiguous cases was compiled and they
were asked to code according to their own judgement. The coding in which a consensus
8 GERMAN POLITICS

was reached was then used to establish the most common evaluation for the analysis. In
addition a random sample was created to assure a satisfactory degree of inter-coder
reliability. For the random sample of the three coders a coding agreement of 85 per
cent, 75 per cent and 87 per cent has been established, which ensures a satisfactory
degree of reliability.

Institutional Standing
The variable institutional standing is operationalised by two different dummies – one
for executive positions, comprising the offices minister and junior minister (Staatssek-
retär), and the other for legislative positions, including the president of the parliament
and chair/vice-chairs of the committees.
The legislative experience shows that many high-level politicians who stepped
down or had to resign from office remained in the parliament as regular Mitglied
des Bundestages (MdB) for the next legislative period. The reasons behind this
phenomenon might be the public attention a fast transition would cause or the extra
time needed for acquiring a new position. It is thus sensible to code an ex-parliamen-
tarian as having had the particular institutional position if it was mentioned that they
held the specific position in either one of the last two legislative periods before their
exit.

Party Standing
The variable party standing is operationalised by a dummy that captures the member-
ship of individual MPs in the party presidium or executive.
Although the party presidium is formally distinguished from the party executive,
the presidium is in fact a part of it and serves as an executive within the executive.
Because of the overlap in personnel, the functional congruence and the limited
number of observations, membership in the executive and the presidium are subsumed
under one variable. The variable hence consists of the party leader, the deputies, the
secretary general, the parliamentary party leader, the treasurer and a varying number
of elected members. Because the position of the parliamentary whip is one of the
highest positions inside the party, this office will be included in the variable, although
technically it is not a part of the party executive. The president and vice-president of
the Bundestag, on the other hand, are not included in the coding because they are
already coded within a different variable.
The corresponding dummy variable is coded according to the institutional standing
variable.

Member of a Business-relevant Committee

This variable corresponds to the idea of the special expertise a parliamentarian gains
via their membership of special issue committees. However, committees such as
those for the budget or foreign affairs are known to be highly prestigious and are
thus rather associated with the mechanism of relational capital (Zetting 2008, 12).
To get a balanced view two variables are introduced. One is for the five committees
with the highest member counts (Budget, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Labour and Trans-
port), which serves as a proxy for their importance. The other is for the explicitly
business-relevant committees (Economic and Finance). The corresponding dummy
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 9
variable is coded according to the institutional standing variable. Moreover, solely full
membership counts for the coding, not substitute membership.

Age
Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005, 264) concluded that leaving Congress voluntarily
at an older age is associated with lower wages in subsequent private sector employment
as the behaviour is perceived as a signal of ‘slowing down’ or becoming a ‘lame duck’.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the effect will not only lower the wages, but
also reduce the chances for subsequent employment in the private sector in general.
However, this effect should only be significant for older ex-legislators and not for
young and middle-aged legislators.

Education
Not only for the pre-parliamentary, but also for the post-parliamentary career, the indi-
vidual educational background should be an important determinant. To capture this
effect, a dummy variable is introduced, measuring if the former MP holds a university
degree (Table 1).

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Case Selection
The choice for ex-parliamentarians of the German Bundestag is justified both theoreti-
cally and empirically. There are no existing studies that investigate the whereabouts of
former German politicians in connection with their parliamentary activity. There are
also no laws or regulations in place which would prohibit former parliamentarians

TABLE 1
LIST OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variables Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Min Max

Scandal 646 0.04 0.19 0 1

Failed nomination 646 0.07 0.26 0 1
Failed election 646 0.30 0.46 0 1
Executive position 646 0.11 0.31 0 1
Legislative position 646 0.13 0.34 0 1
Membership party executive 646 0.21 0.41 0 1
Membership important committee 646 0.40 0.49 0 1
Membership business committee 646 0.12 0.33 0 1
Liberals 646 0.06 0.24 0 1
Christian Socialists 646 0.06 0.23 0 1
Social Democrats 646 0.44 0.50 0 1
Greens 646 0.08 0.27 0 1
The Left 646 0.08 0.27 0 1
Gender 646 0.31 0.46 0 1
Age 646 65.53 9.41 31 86
Age2 646 4382.88 1169.28 961 7396
Terms served 646 3.26 1.99 0 1
Party in power 646 0.60 0.49 1 10
Higher education 646 0.58 0.49 0 1
10 GERMAN POLITICS

in the Bundestag from pursuing a career in the private sector. This renders Germany a
sensible case for analysis (Klein and Höntzsch 2007, 9).
Online publications of local newspapers are essential to learning the whereabouts
of former parliamentarians, but the availability of these publications is quite limited.
Prior to 1998, internet publishing was not common in Germany. Given this constraint,
the period in question will be narrowed to three legislative cycles of the German Bun-
destag from 1998 until 2009. Moreover, the legislative period 2009– 13 had to be
excluded, as many of the former politicians have not made the transition to post-par-
liamentary employment at the time this study was undertaken.

Data
In line with the research question, the unit of analysis is the individual parliamentarian,
which corresponds to 646 observations across three different legislative periods from
1998 until 2009. In two instances, parliamentarians appeared twice in the sample,
leaving and re-entering the Bundestag. The first case of an exit is kept in the
dataset, the second excluded.
This sample includes governments led by a Social Democrat – Green coalition and
a Christian Democrat – Social Democrat coalition. It also includes two government
transition periods: these are the 2005 transition from rule by the Social Democrat –
Green coalition to the Christian Democrat – Social Democrat coalition and the 2009
transition from rule by the Christian Democrat –Social Democrat coalition to the
Christian Democrat – Liberal coalition.1
Out of the sample, 12.2 per cent of parliamentarians held a more attractive private
sector position after leaving the parliament, whereas 10.4 per cent transitioned to a
more attractive public position. Prima facie, this picture seems to prove that the
majority of the legislators achieve the peak of their career in the Bundestag and do
not make use of the institution as a stepping stone for a successful career outside poli-
tics. On the other hand, this result also verifies that there is demand for former poli-
ticians in the German economy.
The data was collected via Google searches and LexisNexis queries for the inde-
pendent variables of failed nomination, scandal, lost election and for the dependent
variables of private sector employment and public office. The data on educational
background was taken from Bailer and Ohmura (2013). The study relies on a
dataset by Bergman (2014) for information on institutional standing and biographical
data. The information on party standing was gathered using party archives (Vorstand
der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005,

TABLE 2
LIST OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Dependent Variables Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Min Max % of Sample

More attractive post- 646 0.12 0.33 0 1 12.2

parliamentary private sector employment
More attractive post- 646 0.10 0.31 0 1 10.4
parliamentary public office
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 11
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variables No. of cases %

More attractive private sector position 79 12.23

More attractive public office 67 10.37
Scandal 24 3.72
Retired 144 22.29
Failed nomination 46 7.12
Failed election 193 29.88
Executive position 70 10.84
Legislative position 84 13.00
Membership party executive 134 20.74
Membership important committee 260 40.25
Membership business committee 79 12.23
Liberals 40 6.19
Christian Socialists 36 5.57
Christian Democrats 181 28.02
Greens 51 7.89
The Left 51 7.89
Social Democrats 286 44.27
Gender 443 68.58
Party in power 389 60.22
Higher education 377 58.36

2007, 2009). Finally, a dataset by Manow (2014) on membership in committees is used

(Tables 2 and 3).

Methodology
Simple probit regressions are used because the dependent variable is dichotomous. In
accordance with the hypotheses, models with the dependent dummy variable private
sector employment and public office and the respective independent and control vari-
ables are estimated. Because a retired parliamentarian cannot have both a more attrac-
tive private and public sector job at the same time, subsamples in which the other
dependent variable is zero are used.
The corresponding marginal effects of the variables are computed, as the coeffi-
cients in probit models cannot be interpreted on their own (Table 4, Figures 1 and 2).

RESULTS 2

Relational Capital
The expected positive influence of the relational capital variables has been confirmed
but needs to be qualified. Both the fully specified as well as the specific model show
that having held an executive position in either one of the last two legislative terms
of one’s parliamentary service increases the chances of subsequently holding a more
attractive higher-level private sector position by 18.8 per cent and 17.7 per cent
respectively, ceteris paribus.
Whereas only former executive positions seem to advance a career in the private
sector, subsequent attractive public offices are positively correlated with previous
12 GERMAN POLITICS

TABLE 4
PROBIT ESTIMATES

Private - Private - Public - Private - Private -

Variables Full Standing Standing Committee Party

Failed nomination 20.572 20.568 21.186∗

(1.59) (1.64) (2.23)
Failed election 20.903∗∗
(4.17)
Executive position 0.763∗∗ 0.780∗∗ 0.287
(3.65) (3.99) (1.06)
Legislative position 0.119 0.055 0.780∗∗
(0.55) (0.26) (3.45)
Membership party executive 0.253 0.152 0.742∗∗
(1.31) (0.85) (4.01)
Membership important committee 20.024 20.139
(0.16) (0.96)
Membership business committee 0.797∗∗ 0.760∗∗
(4.30) (4.35)
FDP 20.560 20.613
(1.38) (1.56)
CSU 20.286 20.341
(0.82) (1.03)
SPD 20.039 0.035
(0.16) (0.16)
Grüne 0.288 0.359
(0.93) (1.28)
Gender 20.458∗ 20.479∗∗ 20.746∗∗ 20.387∗ 20.430∗
(2.48) (2.81) (3.52) (2.30) (2.48)
Age 20.044 20.042 0.173 20.065 20.024
(0.55) (0.57) (1.84) (0.89) (0.32)
Age2 0.000 0.000 20.002∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.36) (0.33) (2.28) (0.64) (0.06)
Terms served 0.087∗ 0.105∗∗ 20.055 0.159∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(2.03) (2.64) (1.04) (4.26) (3.35)
Party in power 20.233 0.009 20.280 0.013 20.252
(0.94) (0.06) (1.61) (0.09) (1.09)
Higher education 0.155 0.157 0.756∗∗ 0.265 0.306∗
(1.00) (1.06) (3.73) (1.82) (2.10)
Constant 0.434 0.339 24.841 0.796 0.024
(0.18) (0.15) (1.72) (0.36) (0.01)
Number of observations 531 579 546 579 531
∗
p , 0.05; ∗∗ p , 0.01.

legislative positions. Having held a high legislative position in either one of the last two
legislative terms of one’s parliamentary service increases the chances of subsequently
holding a more attractive public office by 23.9 per cent, holding all other continuous
variables constant at their mean and the dichotomous and ordinal variables constant
at their mode. This effect is significant at the 1 per cent level.
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that there is no shortage of telling examples
of transition from high executive office to an attractive private sector position.
However, some of these transitions appear indecent. Ulrich Klinkert, for one, formerly
a junior minister in the Ministry for Environmental Protection, transitioned to Vatten-
fall, a European energy provider. Another prominent example is Matthias Berninger,
who served as a junior minister for the Greens in the Federal Ministry for Consumer
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 13
FIGURE 1
MARGINAL EFFECTS PRIVATE SECTOR

FIGURE 2
MARGINAL EFFECTS PUBLIC OFFICE
14 GERMAN POLITICS

Protection, Food and Agriculture. Berninger later switched from the Bundestag to the
European headquarter of Mars (food industry), chairing the department for health and
nutritional issues (Klein and Höntzsch 2007, 6). But these transfers are not only con-
fined to the ranks of junior ministers. Ex-minister of the interior Otto Schily, for
example, held positions on supervisory boards of companies that produced biometric
applications, the same applications he pushed for during his time as a minister
(Klein and Höntzsch 2007, 5). Undoubtedly, these transitions do seem unethical.
But as long as there is no law in place that introduces a period of restriction, it is
only logical that individuals will capitalise on their network and expertise and,
while there is no breach of secrecy, these transitions may seem immoral at best.
Whereas only prior executive positions seem to advance careers in the private
sector, subsequent attractive public offices are positively correlated with previous leg-
islative positions. Having held a legislative position in either one of the last two leg-
islative terms of one’s parliamentary service increases the chances of subsequently
holding a more attractive public office by 23.9 per cent, holding all other continuous
variables constant at their mean and the dichotomous and ordinal variables constant
at their mode. This effect is significant at the 1 per cent level. An example of this
dynamic is Peter Harry Carstensen, who served as the chair of the committee of agri-
culture and later became the prime minister of Schleswig-Holstein.
If the subsequent position in the private sector was only a function of a self-selec-
tion – i.e. being successful in politics and being successful in the private sector – the
position per se would not matter. Both legislative and executive positions are clearly
held by successful individuals. However, only parliamentarians who have held an
executive position have a significantly increased chance to transition to an attractive
private sector position. Therefore, executive experience – besides any self-selection
mechanism that might be at play – makes the individuals more attractive to the
private sector. This result is in line with Salisbury et al. (1989) as well as Bertrand,
Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011, 27), who found that lobbyists who worked in the
White House gained the highest salary premiums. The reason for this dynamic could
be explained by both a better personal network and a specific skill set.
The mechanism behind the effect of legislative office on subsequent political
careers, however, could be similar to a ceiling effect. Politicians in the high executive
positions have reached the top rung in their career in terms of political power and pres-
tige. As a result, they try to either stay in their position or make the transition to the
private sector. The private sector is attractive because even though it may have less
prestige and power, it offers a higher salary. Politicians in high legislative positions,
on the other hand, are either the most successful members of an opposition party or
second in line in the hierarchy of a governing party. These parliamentarians are
clearly successful and ambitious but have not reached the top political level. Conse-
quently, because they still have room to move up, they are more likely to stay in poli-
tics and aim for the highest public office than to transition to the private sector.
As for the party hierarchy, the positive relation, although present, is limited to the
political sphere. Membership in the party executive does not seem to influence the
chance to subsequently hold a more attractive private sector position in either the
fully specified model or in the model on relational capital. Unlike institutional stand-
ing, membership in the party executive does not seem to provide the expertise or
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 15
network that is valued by the private sector. Therefore, this result gives additional
credit to the expectation that the executive expertise, as opposed to connections,
makes ex-parliamentarians valuable to the private sector. For the allocation of attrac-
tive public offices, on the other hand, political connections to the party are highly
relevant. Having been a member of the party executive in either one of the last two
legislative terms of parliamentary service increases the chances of subsequently
holding a more attractive public office by 22.7 per cent. This effect is significant at
the 1 per cent level. Angelika Volquartz, for example, was a member of the party
executive of the CDU and then became the mayor of Kiel, a state capital.
As with the legislative positions, a high standing in the party hierarchy does not
affect whether a legislator is able to get a high position in the executive. Consequently,
those individuals, while very successful and well-connected, have not yet reached the
highest political level. Thus, they are also more likely to stay in politics and aim for
public office rather than transitioning into the private sector.
Another line of argument claims that individual agency and expertise, rather than
connections, condition parliamentarians’ transitions into the private sector. In both the
original and the fully specified models, the membership of the party in power was not
significantly associated with an increased likelihood for a more attractive subsequent
private sector position. This result shows that personal experience and skills, as
opposed to networking opportunities in the party, enable politicians to make an
optimal transition to the private sector. Further confirming the role of personal exper-
tise over connections are the findings that are linked to the concept of a deteriorating
network. Exiting the legislature due to a failed nomination, for example, has no expla-
natory value for the private sector in either the fully specified or the specific models.
Again, this relationship is different for the public sector. Indeed, leaving the service
due to a failed internal nomination decreases the chances of subsequently holding a
more attractive public office by 36.3 per cent. A failed nomination is hence a crucial
factor in determining the chances for subsequent employment in a more attractive
public office. Intuitively, this result makes sense because a failed nomination seems
to be an indicator of a weak supporter network. However, unlike in the private
sector, a strong supporter network in the party is necessary to secure an attractive
public office.
Interestingly, not only a failed nomination, but also an exit due to a failure to be re-
elected decreases the chances of subsequently holding a more attractive public office
by a substantial 27.6 per cent. Therefore, only successful politicians seem to be
awarded the most attractive offices. Losing an election is a sign of failure.
As with the failed nomination and re-election scenarios, there is a strong relation-
ship between involvement in a scandal and subsequent success in the public sector. In
fact, there is no individual who left the parliament due to a scandal and held a more
attractive public office afterwards. The media and public pressures seem to prevent
any attempts to stay in the political spotlight. It should be noted, however, that there
are cases in which the political comeback after a scandal has been successfully
made after some time. Cem Oezdemir for example, the current co-chair of the
German Greens, who left the Bundestag in 2002 because he accepted personal credit
from a lobbyist and used bonus miles privately, returned to the Bundestag in 2013
(Fried, 2010). Crucially, however, these comebacks occurred after a period of five
16 GERMAN POLITICS

years and not immediately. Only when media and public attention has withered does a
return to the elite political level seem possible. In addition, whereas the type of
scandal is irrelevant for the public sector, the reason why parliamentarians left the
parliament does play a role for the private sector. A closer look at the sample
reveals that financial scandals are easily forgiven by the private sector. Several
cases can be found of politicians who, after dropping out due to financial impropriety,
subsequently acquired an attractive private sector position. For example, Bernd Wilz,
a former CDU parliamentarian, was involved in a lobby affair but nevertheless
became the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the European trading company Silas
AG. In marked contrast, politicians involved in grave and morally reprehensible scan-
dals, such as recipients of child pornography, are not found to successfully transition
to the private sector.
The findings in their entirety also corroborate the postulated differences between
the private and public spheres. The potential career resources acquired in the Bundes-
tag, formalised by a high standing in the party hierarchy and an absence of lost nomi-
nations, scandals and elections, appear to be transferable to the public sphere in general
and thus allow for transitions to more attractive public office. Hence, except for the
aforementioned executive experience, the resources that make a parliamentarian suc-
cessful also make them successful in the public sphere. On the other hand, in line with
expectations, only a part of the overall career resources (i.e. executive experience and
specialised economic and finance knowledge and networks) seem to be valued by the
private sector.

Knowledge
For the postulated relationship between the expertise gained by service in business-
relevant committees and subsequent employment opportunities in the private
sector, the results are straightforward. Membership in either the economic or
finance committee increases the chances for a more attractive private sector pos-
ition by 18.0 per cent, a finding corroborated by both the specific and fully speci-
fied models.
The question now arises as to whether the increased chances are a function of the
specific expertise which is gathered by working in these committees or whether it is a
matter of prestige and resultant connections. To answer this question, a closer look at
the sample is necessary. Interestingly, the former members of the economic, finance
and foreign affairs committees who succeeded in acquiring more attractive private
sector employment predominantly work as consultants. However, noticeably more
ex-members of the economic and finance committees start working as lobbyists
after their parliamentary service. For example, Hansgeorg Hauser, a former member
of the finance committee, later became chief lobbyist for the Commerzbank. Similarly,
Rainer Wend, a member of the economic committee, worked afterwards as a chief lob-
byist for the German Post.
Being a member of the foreign affairs committee seems to be mainly a sign of high
prestige and a functioning professional network, as no special knowledge transfer from
the public to the private sector occurs. Membership in the economic and finance com-
mittees, on the other hand, does seem to provide valuable special knowledge.
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 17
Successful lobbying requires detailed knowledge of the workings and stakeholders of
the targeted institution.

Ideology
Having a business-friendly ideology might induce an ex-parliamentarian to choose the
private sector over the public sector for a subsequent career. Such an ideological
leaning can also suggest that a personal network has already been built up with
private sector actors through social circles. On the other hand, being a member of a
business-friendly party could allow ex-politicians, regardless of their ideological
stance, to make use of the network provided by the party. Both Eggers and Hainmueller
(2009) as well as Theakston, Gouge, and Honeyman (2007) found that the British Con-
servative party via business connections facilitated its members’ transition to highly
paid private sector positions such as directorships and consultancies.
But the expected positive relation between a business-friendly ideology and sub-
sequent employment in the private sector is not substantiated in these findings. Surpris-
ingly, even membership in the liberal and business-friendly FDP (Freie Demokratische
Partei), did not increase the likelihood of a more attractive private sector position.
Apparently, all established parties with government experience seem to have some
connections to the private sector, but none of them are so privileged that they could
help their members advance their career by themselves. Membership in Die Linke,
however, is perfectly negatively correlated. Members of Die Linke often have an
anti-capitalist stance and a corresponding professional background. Moreover, it
would be a bad signal to customers and industry if a company would hire a member
of a party that is openly opposed to the social market economy. Again, this result
seems to corroborate the finding that it is personal skill and not networks that is
crucial in determining the career opportunities of individual parliamentarians.

Additional Findings
Being a female parliamentarian decreases the chances of subsequently holding a
more attractive public office by a substantial 22.8 per cent at a significance level
of 1 per cent. Moreover, depending on the specific model, it also decreases the
chances of subsequently holding a more attractive private sector position by
between 10.9 per cent and 11.3 per cent, at a significance level of 1 – 5 per cent.
Consequently, despite the continuously increasing number of women in the Bundes-
tag, there seems to be a significant disadvantage for women when they try to gain
higher public office.
This disadvantage might be due to the special obstacles for women with children,
impermeable male networks at the higher levels of the party hierarchies, or market
dynamics building on information asymmetries (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, 8,
35). Whatever the reason, the female quota in Germany does not help to equalise
the chances of men and women when it comes to the attainment of higher political
office. Therefore, it is certainly worthwhile pursuing further research to identify sys-
temic structural factors within the party system or the institutional arrangement, socio-
logical disadvantages or psychological problems that hinder women from gaining
attractive public office.
18 GERMAN POLITICS

The findings for the impact of the number of terms served on the probability of sub-
sequently holding a more attractive position in either the public or private sector are
unsurprising. Increased political experience raises the chances for attractive sub-
sequent employment because with experience comes valuable knowledge and an
increased personal network.
Furthermore, educational background is only significant for the chances for high
public office. This finding is surprising because the overall level of education among
parliamentarians is very high in comparison to the general public: 58 per cent of the
MdBs in the sample held a university degree. The result could be attributed to the
fact that a high academic degree is highly valued by the German public and thus
increases the chances of election to public office. For the private sector, on the other
hand, political office might supersede educational background as a qualification for
subsequent employment, rendering the effect of educational background insignificant.
In consequence, it would be worthwhile to evaluate whether this finding is a mere stat-
istical artefact or indeed an expression of an underlying dynamic.

CONCLUSION

This study explored the factors in the legislative service that condition the post-parlia-
mentary career choices of ex-legislators and their effects. It was found that having held
an executive position and having been a member of the economic or finance committee
significantly increases the chances for a subsequent more attractive position in the
private sector. As for the public sector, a high legislative and party position increases
the chances for subsequent more attractive public office. Leaving public service due to
a failed nomination, failure to be re-elected or a scandal, on the other hand, signifi-
cantly diminishes the chances of subsequently holding a more attractive office.
Concerning the ethical dimension of the research, the following has to be noted.
The finding that former members of the executive have an increased chance to sub-
sequently hold a more attractive private sector position is ethically inoffensive. It
simply shows that people who are successful in politics are also successful elsewhere.
Questions arise, however, when former elite politicians are hired for their insider
knowledge and political networks. Because this study was concerned with quantitative
correlations, it is beyond its scope to prove or disprove any causal relations among
these considerations. The finding for the former members of the economic and
finance committees who ended up in the lobbying industry nevertheless suggests
that there are indeed politicians who are employed by private interests because of
their connections to serving politicians. This model of hiring certainly runs counter
to the public interest.
For the parliament and parliamentary careers, the results indicate the following. In
general, politicians in Germany seem to enter the Bundestag because they want to
make a political career. The parliament thus seems to attract genuinely politically
motivated individuals, who understand politics as their primary occupation and not
as a mean to an end outside politics. In theory this should ensure the high professional
quality of the legislature, without latent conflicts of interest due to ambitions in the
private sector.
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 19
Questions arise, however, concerning the aforementioned former members of the
economic and finance committee. If members of these committees are hired by the
private sector not only because of their knowledge but also because of their connec-
tions to active politicians in these bodies, then there could be a conflict of interest.
This conflict harms the neutrality of the legislature as it allows private interest
groups to get privileged access and influence in the decision-making process of the
parliament.
The next interesting finding is that there seems to be a double standard concerning
scandalous behaviour. While the political sphere is unforgiving no matter what scandal
caused the exit from legislative service, the private sector distinguishes between finan-
cial scandals and the rest. Parliamentarians who have shown a lack integrity because
they were involved in fraud or accepted side payments are still able to secure attractive
positions in the private sector.
A critical finding for the political sphere in turn is that female legislators seem to
have a decreased chance when it comes to the acquisition of attractive offices. In
general, however, the results of this study show that it is personal experience and
skills that enable politicians to make the transition to the private sector. Because
there is no significant correlation of the party in power and the chances for an attractive
private sector position, the transitions are morally unobjectionable. The party network
seems to be confined to the political sphere and does not actively help its members to
an easy transition to the private sector.
As for the further research, two directions are suggested. First of all, the existing
sample could be extended by including additional legislative periods of the German
Bundestag or by using data from other countries.
The other option would be a qualitative investigation of the mechanisms at play.
Lastly, it might also be worthwhile to investigate the gender gap more thoroughly.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

The utilised datasets are not publicly accessible. However, all datasets, including the
newly created one, can be provided by the author upon request.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maximilian Würfel received a BA in Philosophy and Islamic Science at Albert-

Ludwigs-University Freiburg, Germany and studied political science at the University
of Edinburgh in Scotland before transitioning to the ETH Zurich, Switzerland for his
graduate studies. At the time the study was executed, the author was enrolled at the
ETH Zurich in the graduate programme Master in Comparative and International
Studies. The research was conducted at the chair of Global Governance under Pro-
fessor Stefanie Bailer and later presented at the 2nd General Conference of the
ECPR Standing Group on Parliaments in Vienna. Currently, the author no longer
20 GERMAN POLITICS

has any affiliations whatsoever to any academic institution or university and works in
the private sector.

NOTES

1. For the exact periods of government see below: 17 November 1994– 26 October 1998: Cabinet Kohl V
(Christian Democrats–Liberals); 27 October 1998– 22 October 2002: Cabinet Schröder I (Social Demo-
crats–Greens); 22 October 2002– 18. October 2005: Cabinet Schröder II (Social Democrats-Greens); 22
November 2005– 28 October 2009: Cabinet Merkel I (Christian Democrats –Social Democrats); 28
October 2009–22 October 2013: Cabinet Merkel II (Christian Democrats– Liberals).
2. As for the robustness of the results, I checked for multicollinearity, used logit instead of probit esti-
mations, calculated the average marginal effects and used alternative operationalisations. According
to these tests, the variables that are proxies for a deteriorating network do indeed influence the
chances for a subsequent employment but their distinct effect depends on the mode of operationalisation
and analysis. The variables that are signifiers for a high institutional and party standing, however, are
robust across different models and operationalisation. As for the influence of business-friendly ideology,
the evidence is mixed.

REFERENCES

Anderson, L. 2010. “The Ex-Presidents.” Journal of Democracy 21 (2): 64– 78.

Bailer, S., and T. Ohmura. 2013. “Parliamentary Career Stages and their Influence of
Legislative Performance.” Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association.
Bergman, T. 2014. Dataset on German MPs. Not published.
Bertrand, M., M. Bombardini, and F. Trebbi. 2011. “Is it Whom you Know or What
you Know: An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process.” Working Paper
16765.
Best, H., M. Edinger, and L. Vogel. 2007. “Deutsche Abgeordnetenbefragung: Ergeb-
nisse der Befragung ehemaliger Abgeordneter.” Sonderforschungsbereich 580/
Teilprojekt A3.
Blanes I Vidal, J., M. Draca, and C. Fons-Rosen. 2012. “Revolving Door Lobbyists.”
American Economic Review 102 (7): 3731– 3748.
Borchert, J., and K. Stolz. 2003. “Die Bekämpfung der Unsicherheit: Politikerkarrieren
und Karrierepolitik in derBundesrepublik Deutschland.” Politische Vierteljah-
resschrift 44 (2): 148 –173.
Borschel, C. 2014. “Vertrauen gründlich zerstört” Pofalla kritisierte Schröder für
Wechsel in die Wirtschaft.” Express, January 4. http://www.express.de/politik-
wirtschaft/-vertrauen-gruendlich-zerstoert–pofalla-kritisierte-schroeder-fuer-wec
hsel-in-die-wirtschaft,2184,25791838.html.
Brockmann, H. 2012. “Frauen und Mütter im Deutschen Bundestag: Eine explorative
Längsschnittstudie.” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 43 (4): 727– 738.
Davidson-Schmich, L. K., and I. Kürschner. 2011. “Stößt die Frauenquote an ihre
Grenzen: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahl 2009.” Zeitschrift für Parla-
mentsfragen 42 (1): 25– 34.
Diermeier, D., M. Keane, and A. Merlo. 2005. “A Political Economy Model of
Congressional Careers.” American Economic Review 95 (1): 347– 373.
Edinger, M., and B. Schwarz. 2009. “Leben nach dem Mandat: Eine Studie zu ehema-
ligen Abgeordneten.” Sonderforschungsbereich 580 (35): 1-83.
LIFE AFTER THE BUNDESTAG 21
Eggers, A. C. 2010. “The Partisan Revolving Door.” Working Paper.
Eggers, A. C., and J. Hainmueller. 2009. “MPs for Sale: Returns to Office in Postwar
British Politics.” American Political Science Review 103 (4): 513– 533.
Faccio, M. 2006. “Politically Connected Firms.” American Economic Review 96 (1):
369– 386.
Frantzich, S. E. 1978. “De-Recruitment: The Other Side of the Congressional
Equation.” The Western Political Quarterly 31 (1): 105– 126.
Fried, N. 2010. “Grünen-Politiker Cem Özdemir: Rückkehr ins Rampenlicht.” Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, May 15. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/gruenen-
politiker-cem-oezdemir-rueckkehr-ins-rampenlicht-1.187476.
Goldman, E., J. Rocholl, and J. So. 2008. “Political Connections and the Allocation of
Procurement Contracts.” Accessed September 28. http://www.dgf2008.de/
content/paper/Procurement_September_2008.pdf.
Groseclose, T., and K. Krehbiel. 1994. “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks, and Stra-
tegic Retirements from the 102d House.” American Journal of Political Science
38 (1): 75– 99.
Hall, R. L., and R. P. van Houweling. 1995. “Avarice and Ambition in Congress:
Representatives” Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House.” American
Political Science Review 89 (1): 121 – 136.
Hibbing, J. R. 1999. “Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 24 (2): 149– 171.
Iversen, T., and F. Rosenbluth. 2010. “Gender and Political Careers: A Comparative
Labor Market Analysis of Female Representation.” In Women, Work, and Politics:
The Political Economy of Gender Inequality, 134– 161. New Haven, CT and
London: Yale University Press.
Kiewiet, D. R., and L. Zeng. 1993. “An Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions,
1947 – 1986.” American Political Science Review 87 (4): 928– 941.
Klein, H., and T. Höntzsch. 2007. Fliegende Wechsel – die Drehtür Kreist: Zwei Jahre
Danach – Was Macht die Ex-Regierung Schröder II Heute. Köln: Lobby Control.
Kreiner, M. 2007. “Amt auf Zeit: Eine explorative Studie zum beruflichen und
politischen Verbleib ehemaliger Bundestagsabgeordneter.” Zeitschrift für Parla-
mentsfragen 38: 261 – 276.
Luechinger, S., and C. Moser. 2012. “The Value of the Revolving Door: Political
Appointees and the Stock Market.” KOF Working Papers 310.
Manow, P. 2014. Dataset on German MPs. Not published.
McKay, J. 2004. “Women in German Politics: Still Jobs for the Boys?” German Poli-
tics 13 (1): 56– 80.
McKay, J. 2011. “Having it All: Women MPs and Motherhood in Germany and the
UK.” Parliamentary Affairs 64 (4): 714– 736.
Moore, M. K., and J. R. Hibbing. 1998. “Situational Dissatisfaction in Congress:
Explaining Voluntary Departures.” The Journal of Politics 60 (4): 1088– 1107.
Parker, G. R., S. L. Parker, and M. S. Dabros. 2013. “The Labor Market for Politicians:
Why Ex-Legislators Gravitate to Lobbying.” Business and Society 52 (3):
427– 450.
Prewitt, K., and W. Nowlin. 1969. “Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent
Politicians.” The Western Political Quarterly 22 (2): 298 – 308.
22 GERMAN POLITICS

Salisbury, R. H., P. Johnson, J. P. Heinz, E. O. Laumann, and R. L. Nelson. 1989.

“Who you Know versus What you Know: The Uses of Government Experience
for Washington Lobbyists.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (1):
175– 195.
Schansberg, E. 1994. “Moving Out of the House: An Analysis of Congressional Quits.”
Economic Inquiry 32 (3): 445– 456.
Theakston, K. 2012. “Life after Political Death: Former Leaders in Western Democra-
cies.” Representation 48 (2): 139– 149.
Theakston, K., E. Gouge, and V. Honeyman. 2007. Life After Losing or Leaving: The
Experience of Former Members of Parliament - A Report for the Association of
Former Members of Parliament. Leeds: University of Leeds.
“Vom Kanzleramt in den Bahn-Vorstand: So lästerte Pofalla früher über schnelle
Wechsel.” 2014. Focus Online, January 4. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/
vom-kanzleramt-in-den-bahn-vorstand-lobbyismus-so-laesterte-pofalla-frueher-
ueber-wechsel-in-die-wirtschaft_id_3518018
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 1995. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 93/94. Bonn: Cicero Werbeagentur.
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 1996. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 95/96. Hambur: KNSK.
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 1999. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 97/98. Bonn: Cicero Werbeagentur.
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 2001. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 99/00. Bonn: Cicero Werbeagentur.
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 2003. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 01/02. Bonn: Cicero Werbeagentur.
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 2005. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 03/04. Bonn: Cicero Werbeagentur.
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 2007. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 05/06. Bonn: Cicero Werbeagentur.
Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. 2009. Jahrbuch der Sozialde-
mokratischen Partei Deutschlands 07/08. Bonn: Cicero Werbeagentur.
Zamfirache, I. 2010. “Women and Politics: The glass Ceiling.” Journal of Compara-
tive Research in Anthropology and Sociology 1 (1): 175 – 185.
Zetting, M. 2008. “Der Haushalts- und der Europaausschuss im Deutschen Bundestag:
Eine vergleichende Leistungsanalyse.” Ph.D diss., Freien Universität Berlin.