Word Count: 4783

Why have right-wing populists

been more successful politically
than their left-wing counterparts in
Europe and America?

1
1 . Introduction

Until the start of the economic crisis of 2007, “populism” tended to be

identified as a political phenomenon endogenous to the organic crises of

the non-western democracies and linked to left-wing ideologies (Errejon,

2016a). However, especially after 2013, the coincidence of three

particular developments undermined that consolidated idea: first, the

abrupt rise of a front of right-wing populist forces within the context of the

organic crises of the European representative democracies. Second, the

notable but lower success of those left-wing populist forces that tried to

take advantage of that same juncture. Third, the crisis of the Latin

American left-wing populist forces that rose during the 15 years before. At

one side of the Atlantic, after a brief but accelerated period of time, the

populist strategy had ceased to be a remote phenomenon to become the

efficient engine of the rise of Europe’s xenophobic right and two left-wing

parties (Syriza and PODEMOS). At the other, after ten years of centrality,

it had passed from being the undefeatable strategy of the Latin American

left to the defining trait of a block of governments increasingly subject to

profound crises and new challenges.

By evaluating the most fundamental events and developments related to

this matter comprised between 2013 and 2017, this essay seeks to

explain the reasons and causes behind the abnormal superiority of

2
right-wing populism over left-wing populism in terms of political success

that distinguished this period of time.

2. The success of European Right Wing

Populism

Understanding why between 2013 and 2017 European Right Wing

Populism (ERWP) became more politically successful than its left wing

counterparts in Europe and Latin America is a task that requires, as a

starting point, a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the rise ERWP as

such. ​As Francisco Panizza states, all “​populist practices emerge out of

the failure of existing social and political institutions to confine and

regulate political subjects into a relatively stable social order​.” (Panizza,

2005a; p9). ​However, the analysis of the abrupt political eruption of these

movements in Europe, is still subject of multiple and intense debates​. ​In

order to identify appropriately the central reasons behind the rapid

increase in their political success, this essay evaluates two of the most

prominent interpretations: the historicist accounts of ERWP as an

epiphenomenon of profound historical changes, and the conceptions of its

rise as the consequence of a fruitful political strategy able to exploit

efficiently processes of organic crisis as the ones that European

representative democracies were undergoing.

3
2.1 The rise of ERWP: an epiphenomenon or the fruit of

an effective strategy?

One of the most prominent argumentations aiming to explain the rise of

right wing populism conceived it as an ​epiphenomenon of more complex

and profound conflicts of a historical character. These views, instead

combining an attention to the social developments that generated the

crises that the populist exploited and a focus in the strategies which used

to take advantage of them, they thinking about it as a political earthquake

produced by “t​ectonic shifts​” (Rose, 2016) precipitated by profound

historical developments. The case of authors as Paul Nolte result

particularly representative of this view; for him, the emergence of ERWP

“​represents [a political crisis] much deeper than a crisis of democracy, of

political parties or the legitimacy of institutions​”, “the epiphenomenon for a

crisis of modernity”, a crisis of “the Western world and its liberal orders” as

such (Nolte, 2016) The same logic of Nolte’s argumentation can be found

with an economistic's perspective in authors as Manuel Muñiz, who

formulate the same idea placing at the centre the idea of “underlying

structural rifts” at the economic base of society (Muñiz, 2016).

4
The cardinal limitation of these argumentations is that despite point

specific factors as the causes of the eruption of ERWP, they are unable to

explain the specific process that leads to these supposedly automatic

convulsions. They cannot explain on their own why these profound

historical conflicts had to express themselves precisely the eruption of

ERWP and not another events. ​Despite the emergence of ERWP was

conditioned by factors as the economic development of capitalism and the

historical crisis of modernity, its rise is not reducible to an epiphenomenon

of them, as if it was a “seismic” event driven by external historic forces.

The only way to understand the reasons behind their political success that

allowed them to rise is to break with these interpretations and embrace a

dual analysis that observes: First, how those crises created the bases for

its rise by observing to their causes. Second, how the discourse of ERWP

by simplifying “the political space by symbolically dividing society

between 'the people' (as the 'underdogs') and a constructed ‘other”.

(Panizza, 2005; p10)​ ​served to exploit this base effectively.

2.2 The manipulation of the crises of the European

democratic systems

To become politically successful, ERWP exploited the two main factors

behind the European organic crises: the erosion of the non-adversarial

5
model of democracy installed during the times of neoliberal hegemony

(Porta and Lago, 2016), and the effects of the economic crisis of 2007

(Errejón, 2016a). On the one hand, ​ERWP exploited the economic crisis

by capitalising the representation of the demands that it made emerge

within the social sectors that suffered its consequences; specially the

working class and the new middle classes. As Villacañas explains, in

Europe, the response to the global economic crisis involved “​the

disarticulation of complete chains of institutions​” through neoliberal

austerity programs. These programs set the basis for the growth of

ERWPs because “​reduced drastically the capacity [of the political

establishments that implemented them] to satisfy social demands​”,

making “​even more possible the dichotomisation of the political scenario

in a populist way​” (Villacanas, 2015; p63) because gave to the populist

forces more demands to articulate against the system. On the other hand,

they exploited the neoliberal erosion of representative democracy in

Europe (Tanuro, 2017) by benefiting from its increasing inability “​to

provide distinctive forms of identifications around possible alternatives (...)

in a context where the dominant discourse proclaims that there is no

alternative to the current neoliberal form of globalisation​” (Mouffe, 2005;

p55). The combination between a decreasing capacity of the system to

satisfy social demands, and an increasing number of unsatisfied demands

due to the economic crisis, paved the way for their success. However, by

themselves, these factors were certainly insufficient.

6
2.3 The effectiveness of the populist discourse

While the previously mentioned developments ​“created the terrain for the

flourishing of right-wing populism​” (ibid), these two cannot explain their

rise by themselves, not even if other factors, as the impact of the

migratory crisis triggered by the conflicts in Syriza and Libya are added to

the list. To understand in depth the rise of these forces is necessary to

combine the evaluation of these factors with a careful attention in the

discursive strategies of these forces, as their success is the consequence

of both elements. As Laclau explains, the defining characteristic of

populism is the mode of construction of the political of its discourse

(Laclau, 2005; p6). This discourse is distinguished by two characteristics:

first, the dichotomisation of the social camp between “​the people​” and ​“the

political establishment”/” the political cast”/” the elites​”; second, the

articulation of social demands with an ​“equivalential rationale​”

(Stavrakakis, 2014; p128) using the common opposition to the

establishment as a linking force.

Figure 1 represents graphically the specific configuration of this discourse,

using Front National (FN) as a case study. The french ERWP party

vertebrates its discourse around the dichotomy between “the people​” that

claims to represent (e.g. “i​n the name of the people” - was its slogan for

7
2017 presidential elections; see figure 2) and the political establishment

that claims to confront. Within their discourse, the ​“oubliées​” - those

forgotten - are the image evoked to represent the social majority as a

whole ​(​Fernández, 2017), and the charismatic leader, Marine Le Pen, is

portrayed their representative and the incarnation of the nation as such

(see Figure 3, where FN says implicitly that choosing Le Pen is “​Choosing

France”​). As an opposition, the discourse points the establishment as their

contrary, and refers to the organic parties (Partit Socialiste Français, PSF;

La Republique en Marche, LRM ; Les Republicains, LR) as their

incarnation (see Figure 1). It is important to note that the identity of “the

people” that they construct is not constituted by vague appeals to

universality, neither by constant repetitions of references to the dichotomy

between “​the people​” and “​the establishment​” in abstract terms, that

would not make them politically successful because would not have a

substantial constitutive force. The popular identity constructed is built by

“​establishing ‘chains of equivalence’ among heterogeneous frustrated

subjects, identities, demands and interests by highlighting their opposition

to a common ‘other” ​(Stavrakakis, 2014; p129)​. For example, being D1

the demand of “The people” against “the establishment”, D1 is made

equivalent to D2 (e.g. ​the demand for social mobility of the middle

classes) and D3 (e.g. ​the demand of the working class to stop neoliberal

labour reforms) ​by using their common opposition to the establishment as

a link. As Laclau explains, “​this leads one demand [D1] to become the

signifier of the whole chain​” (Laclau, 2005; p131) when it becomes the

8
universal representation of all the particular struggles (D1h). Thanks to

this discourse the populist forces became highly politically successful by

becoming able to articulating very plural demands “ redefining the political

frontiers and constituting new identities” (Panizza, 2005; p9).

9
10
2.4 The specificities of exclusionary populism

However, while the basic populist logic was key for their political success,

it would not by itself enough to make them more successful than the

populist left (at least the European) because they also used those logics.

To understand ERWP success is necessary to understand as well its

distinguishing characteristic: the extension of the logics of the populist

discourse to cultural, ethnic, national and religious grounds (Greven,

2016). ERWP forces do not only juxtapose “the people” against the

establishment but also against cultural, religious or national minorities that

depict as inherently antagonistic to France. While this antagonism against

socio-cultural minorities has been a capital part of the discourse of the

traditional extreme right since decades, in this case one finds two

distinctiveness that makes it a key of ERWP’s political success. First, that

employ the equivalential rationale explained in the previous section to

unite very different demands through this antagonism, using their

opposition to the interests of cultural minorities as a link (See Figure 4,

connecting the cultural antagonism with the demands of native people to

be able to create a family). Second, that establish a connection between

the xenophobic antagonism with the central antagonism (“the people” vs

“the elites” by arguing that the system has been kidnapped by “ ​a liberal,

cosmopolitan elite« ready to sell out the country to foreign interests​” (

Greven, 2016 )

11
3. The limited growth of Left Wing populism
in Europe

During the period of time analysed in this essay, ERWP forces were not

the only political outsiders that aimed to exploit the potentialities of the

organic crisis of European neoliberal democracies. The emergence of

this ​reactionary international matched with the rise of two shapes

European Left-Wing Populism (ELWP): Syriza in Greece and PODEMOS

in Spain. Both forces adopted a populist discourse, as the posters shown

12
in Figure 5 evidence. However, their populist discourse renounced to

construct cultural antagonisms against minorities, limiting itself to the

antagonism against the elites. The success of these forces was limited but

notable. On the one hand, Syriza won two times the Greek presidential

elections, making Tsipras president of the country since 2015 (Nardelli,

2015). On the other, PODEMOS, together with its regional allies, was able

to win the local elections in key major cities, enter to all the regional

parliaments, and gain 71 MPs in its first national elections. ​However,

despite their conquests represent the most successful advances of the

European left in decades, their political success was much more modest

than the one of the ERWP forces; especially if one takes into

consideration not only their conquests but also their defeats, that

constrained critically ELWP possibilities in the long run much more than

ERWP defeats did. First, because Syriza ended up being forced to

capitulate against the Troika institutions and accept new austerity reforms;

and this political humiliation discredited in the long run in an irreversible

way. second, because PODEMOS was unable to overtake the Socialist

Party, a task that even Iglesias defined as “​a vital goal​” and “​an essential

pre-condition for political change in Spain​” (Iglesias, 2015). To

understand why Syriza and PODEMOS suffered these defeats and how

these decreased their ability to conquer political power it is necessary to

examine critically three intersecting factors: their solitude at at an

international level; the lack of compromise with the populist strategy and

the erroneous analysis of the juncture that they made.

13
3.1 Two oasis in the desert of the European Left

Syriza and Podemos remained alone in their support of the populist

strategy during the whole period, and this certainly difficult their political

action. The French left became the sole exception when it dissolved

14
transformed the “​Front Gauche​” (Left’s Front) into “​La France Insoumise​”

(Unbowed France) in 2017, adopting a genuinely populist discourse

(Bompard, 2018). However, by 2017, Syriza had already abandoned the

populist strategy and PODEMOS had returned partially to the old

traditions of the left. (Elorduy, 2018). While their solitude was not the sole

cause of their limited success, it constrained its ability to conquer power

substantially. ERWP forces built their own front to support themselves

internationally and the triumphs of each force impulsed the rest of

movements. Podemos and Syriza lacked even of a strong platform

beyond the group in the European Parliament of the traditional left (the

GUE-NGL), and their solitude made the defeats of one affect remarkable

to the other.

3.2 The fragility of ELWP’s discourse

Despite their loneliness at an international reduced significantly their

possibilities of success, from the point of view of the laclausian theorists,

the major mistakes of these forces are related with their lack of discourse

coherence and their weak compromise with the populist strategy. They

emphasise the reticencies that Syriza and Podemos had to abandon their

left-wing lineages and embrace the populist strategy in depth (Errejon,

2016b) by focusing in specific events to explain it. In Podemos, the best

examples can be found in the isolation of the populist faction after the

elections of December 2015 and the coalition with Izquierda Unida (a

15
coalition leaded by the Spanish Communist Party). In Syriza, initially the

problem was the resistance to abandon the classical discourse of the

radical left (Stavrakakis, 2014). In the second half, the problem was

distinct: the abandonment of any sort of antagonism after the capitulation

against the EU, that transformed it in another traditional force.

ELWP’s reticences to adopt the populist strategy resulted extremely

harmful also for PODEMOS, limiting its successfulness at various levels.

At a national level, the constant returns to the traditional leftist discourse

limited PODEMOS’ power to seduce very heterogeneous sectors of

society according to their particular demands and not because their

political identities in terms of right and left (Cano, 2016). Besides, it made

it abandon progressively key parts of the populist strategy. For example,

restoring the tendency of the party to think about itself as a complete

outsider against all past consensus, or rejecting the dispute of a new

sense of order against social anomie. As Laclau explained “​when people

are confronted with radical anomie, the need for some kind of order

becomes more important than the actual ontic order that brings it about​”

(Laclau, 2005; p88), and the dispute of it is a central part the populist

strategy ​(Errejon, 2016b). However, the majority of PODEMOS leaders

saw this as a “moderation” and decided to abandon that central part of the

populist strategy. Besides, at an internal level, all these discussions about

the degree of populism that PODEMOS should be increasingly divided the

party between the faction of the General Secretary Pablo Iglesias and the

16
faction leaded by the political secretary Iñigo Errejón. The escalation of

internal conflicts produced scandals and polemics that made PODEMOS

more known for its internal disputes than for its political discourse in

multiple occasions, especially after 2016 (Lago, 2016).

3.3 An erroneous analysis of the real balance of forces

In comparison with the strong embracement of the populist discourse

made by the right wing forces (and the expansion it made of it in cultural

terms) and the heavy international weight of the ​reactionary internationa​l,

Syriza and PODEMOS, internationally alone and strategically

inconsistent, had a lower effectiveness in the siege of power than their

right-wing counterparts. However, this was also caused by another

fundamental factor: their underestimation of the force of their adversaries

and the robust health of their systems.

On the one hand, Syriza overdimensioned the power of the greek state,

ignoring that it was actually “​trapped in a crypto-colonial relationship with

the European gaze​” (Stavrakakis, 2018) that disallowed tit to deliver on its

promises without the victory of ELWP in other countries. On the other,

PODEMOS made four fundamental mistakes: First, they undervalued the

regime to discredit them through media campaigns. Secondly, they

underrated the resistance of the Socialist Party, that showed to have a

17
solid political floor. Third, they ignored the possibility of a fourth

competitor: The party Ciudadanos, which emerged thanks to a strong

support of the media after the appearance of PODEMOS, capitalised

many social demands against the establishment that they aimed to

monopolize. Fourth, they did not consider the impact of the redivivus of

the Catalonian conflict, that made them suffer strong defeats in the

Catalonian elections of 2015 and 2017. All this tactical and strategic

errors, less common within the ERWP, had a high cost that reduced its

ability to conquer power that consolidated its inferiority.

4. The crises of Latin American Left-Wing

Populism

While the reasons that made ELWP less successful than ERWP are key

to understand the superior success of ERWP over global left-wing

populism, it is fundamental as well to take into consideration the factors

that, at the other side of the Atlantic ocean, provoked a profound crisis in

the ability of Latin American Left-Wing Populism (LALWP) to expand its

power and defend its conquests. The populist block leaded by Correa in

Ecuador, Chavez in Venezuela, the Kirchner in Argentina, Morales in

Bolivia, Lugo in Paraguay and the Ample Front in Uruguay were the major

exponent of global populism during a whole decade: without its crisis,

18
ERWP would have never been seen as superiorly successful than global

left-wing populism.

LALWP rose to power between 1996 and 2006, exploiting the organic

crises of Latin American neoliberalism after the second half of the 1990s

(Sader, 2009). Between their rise and 2013, they underwent serious

junctural crises; for example, during of 2002 in Venezuela, 2008 in Bolivia

or 2010 in Ecuador. However, while this period was not absent of

contradictions, punctual defeats and substantial limitations, it was

certainly a time of “​ascending hegemonic construction​” (Linera, 2008),

when they expanded the conquered, consolidated robust hegemonies

and leaded radical changes and transformations (Sader, 2009).

The 2013-17 period represents the end of that phase of political

expansion and hegemonic vigour, being followed by abrupt and profound

crises, defeats and increasing challenges that represents "the end of a

progressive cycle in Latin America" (Arkonada, 2016). The defeat of

Kirchnerism in Argentina by electoral means, and the overthrown of Dilma

in Brazil by a political coup are the most pronounced expression of these

defeats, but not the sole ones. To them, one must add the defeat of

Chavism in the legislative elections of Venezuela in 2015 and the

escalation of social unrest and political violence that followed it until late

2016; the defeat of Morales in the Bolivian referendum of 2013, and the

internal fragmentation of the movement in Ecuador. However, to

19
understand why their ability to conquer and defend power decreased

critically, it is not enough to know these events: it is necessary to explain

their causes. This essay evaluates three different argumentations that

have tried to explain LALWP’s crises 1) The argument of the “crisis of

leadership” 2) The argumentation in economic terms 3) the conception of

the crisis as a product of the strategical reorganisation of the opposition.

4.1 The crisis of leadership

T​he “​affective investment” (Stavrakakis, 2014) of the popular will over the

figure of the leader was a central part of the left-wing populist strategy;

where “​the leader is portrayed not as a mere representative but as the

incarnation of the people as such​” (Villacañas, 2015). ​C​havez’s iconic

phrase “​I am not me anymore, i feel myself incarnated in you the

Venezuelan people​” ( quoted in Barrera, 2012) represents a clear

example. As defeats suffered by LALWP between 2013 and 2017

matched difficult changes of leadership that brought complex challenges

for them, a prominent argumentation about the origins of the crisis

emphasises the “​crises of leadership​” as its central cause. This is the

case for example of authors as Enrique Krauze, who argue that despite

this leadership model resulted effective in the short run, it became

counterproductive when leadership changes had to occur (Krauze, 2016)

20
Certainly, his argumentation is partially true: the death of Chavez left a

sense of orphanage for the Chavistas until the leadership of Maduro was

consolidated. In Bolivia, the first defeat in 10 years took place trying to

expand the term limits of the presidency in 2013 referendum, in Argentina

the defeat came after term limits disabled Cristina Kirchner to be the

candidate a third time, and the internal divisions in Ecuador grew as the

2017 change of leadership became nearer. The overdependence on

these leaderships made LALWP less pollitically succesful in the short run.

However, without denying the importance of this factor, it is important to

understand that by itself has been the central question. These crises were

not key by themselves but solely as a force that increased the tensions of

conflicts produced by other economic and political factors.

4.2 The role of economic factors

Despite these leadership crises detrimentally affected LALWP

movements, their instability was already structural in economic terms.

The economic crisis of 2007 was especially damaging for LALWP´s

political successfulness because ruined its income distribution plans. As

these were based in an extractionist model thought for times of high

21
commodity prices, when the arrival of the economic crisis shrank the

international demand of commodities this strategy started to collapse

(Teran, 2018). This was particularly devastating for those countries as

Venezuela whose economy was constructed around the extraction of one

sole commodity (Monedero, 2017), producing an economic instability that

for example made Maduro less effective in the conquer of power at the

elections of 2015. Beyond LALWP governments have always been forced

to resist to the convulsive effects of planned shortages (Curcio, 2016),

artificial inflation made with the manipulation of exchange rates

(Arkonada, 2018) or economic blockades (Serrano, 2017). However,

under the juncture of the economic crisis, the impact of these were

multiplied because could not be countered with income distribution plans

and these decreased their ability to defend their conquests.

4.3 Assessing the impact of the strategic reorganisation

of the right

While is important to value the role of economic factors, it is important to

avoid falling in economistic argumentations obscuring the role of the

profound effort of the opposition to reorganise its strategy and reformulate

their tactics, which resulted highly effective. These reorganisations

22
harmed LALWP's ability to conquer more political power in countries as

Uruguay, diminished the capacity to defend the conquered one in others

as Bolivia, lead to profound crises in nations as Venezuela, and even

produced radical defeats in states as Argentina. It is fundamental to value

this factor because without these reorganisations the oppositions would

have not been able to exploit, first, the leadership crises, and second, the

the economic crisis.

The strategic reorganisation of the opposition focused in two missions. On

the one side, the adaptation to the social and cultural changes produced

under the Populist Decade For example, in Bolivia, assuming the

empowerment of the indigenous communities, the opposition relaxed the

anti-indigenous tone and changed its secessionist strategy for a national

discourse (Linera, 2018) and in Argentina, the project of Mauricio Macri

accepted that social changes as the legalisation of the gay marriage had

become socially accepted, and renewed the social principles of the

discourse of the right. The opposition assumed that their countries had

changed and this made them more effective in countering Populist’s ability

to conquer power.

The opposition assumed not only the cultural and social changes but also

the economic ones. It observed how the income distribution plans

changed the class structure of these countries not only by reducing the

levels of poverty but also by creating a new middle class. Once they

23
observed that the interests of this class were becoming autonomous to

the interests of the popular classes, they reformulated their discourse and

their strategy to try to seduce this new middle class (Linera, 2018) to join

their block against the populists, and diminish even further Populist’s

ability to conquer and defend power, The metamorphosis of the

Argentinean opposition represents the clearest example of this change:

Macri did not only win the elections of 2015 because of the internal

divisions of the peronist, as authors as Grimson ​argue (Grimson, 2015).

They won primarily because they adapted resiliently their strategy to the

changes experienced by the country since 2003. Their project was not

centred in past disputes but in the struggle to capitalise the social

aspirations of the new middle class (Natanson, 2015) by trying to dispute

the sense of what “progress” meant and depicting the Kirchnerist project

as stagnated (Cadahia, 2015). Even the name of his coalition,

“C​ambiemos​” ( “Let’s change”) reproduced this logic.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the reasons that made right-wing populist movements more

successful in the conquest of power than their left-wing counterparts

during the period of time comprised between 2013 and 2017, have to be

explained in two blocks. The first block of reasons would be composed by

24
those factors explaining the superiority of European Right-Wing Populism

(ERWP) over European Left-Wing Populism (ELWP) to exploit the political

potentialities offered by the organic crises that European representative

democracies were undergoing. The second block would be composed by

those factors explaining how the end of “the political cycle of ascending

hegemonic construction” (Linera, 2008) that Latin American left-wing

populism underwent between 1998 and 2013 accentuated the prominence

of the political conquests of European Right-Wing Populism.

To understand the first block of reasons, it is necessary to take into

consideration two subsets of factors. A first subset includes the reasons

that explain ERWP’s political strengths and compose the base of its

political success: the existence of an scenario of organic crisis produced

by the erosion of representative democracy under neoliberalism and the

impact of the economic crisis that served as a base for its rise; the use of

the populist discourse to capitalise the demands that these crises made

emerge, and that the system found unable to satisfy; moreover, the

extension of the populist antagonist discourse with an equivalential

rationale to cultural, national, religious and ethnic grounds. The second

subset collects the reasons that explain the comparative inferiority of

ELWP: these include non-central factors as the solitude of Syriza and

Podemos (later the loneliness of Podemos and La France Insoumise), but

also central ones as the lack of consistency and compromise with the

25
populist strategy or the errors that they made in their analysis of the

political scenarios that they confronted.

To understand the second block of reasons it is necessary to keep in mind

that until 2013 LALWP experiences were the quintessence of populism at

a global level. Without the emergence of a transnational crises of Latin

American Left-wing populism the superiority of ERWP over ELWP, by

itself, would have not been able to make reactionary populism more

politically successful than progressive populism, at least at a global level.

However, to understand the crisis of LALWP it is fundamental to remind

that the causes of these crises are autonomous to the other

developments. These crises need to be explained in relation to three

factors: first, the impact of the economic plans over their economics;

second, the strategic reorganisation of the right; third, the crises of

leadership produced by constitutional term limits and the death of Hugo

Chavez. Together, they opened a regressive cycle for Latin American

Left-wing Populism that made Right-Wing populism, at a global scale,

comparatively more successful in political terms.

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