Issue 4-5 (53-54), 2016
From economy to ideology: latest trends in Belarus
CONTENTS
1 This double issue offers its readers a wide
From economy to ideology:
latest trends in Belarus
1 class in Belarus, and from the assessment as to
Belarus-EU relations after
sanction suspension: can
we expect transformation?
3 Finally, Dr. Aliaksandr Filipau evaluates the
Belarus - EU: long bumpy
road towards visa
facilitation
7 situation should change in essence and considers
Dramatic decline of the
Belarusian middle class
– the first “victim” of the
10
New Trends in Ideology
Development in Belarus
(2011–2014)
Alena Daneika is an author of
analytical articles and reports for
different media and think tanks.
Topics covered include the political,
economic, and social situation in
Belarus and sometimes abroad. Since
2005 she is working as a freelance
journalist and political analyst at
Russian edition of Deutsche Welle
(started in 2005). Alena previously
worked for Radio France International
(Russian Service), “Eurobulletin”
Information edition of the Delegation
of the European Union to Belarus,
Radio Sweden, (Belarusian service),
Reporters Without Borders (RWB).
After a break we are presenting one more analytical
issue of the Bell, which traditionally provides
opinions of Belarusian political reviewers and
analysts on the events of the past few years and
trends in Belarus.
spectrum of topics: from the prospects in the
relations between the EU and Belarus after
lifting of sanctions to the search for the middle-
when Belarusians can expect visa-free travel
to the Schengen countries to an overview of
the ideological foundations of Aliaksandr
Lukashenka’s regime.
In the first article Alena Daneika discusses the
opportunities for the opening and democratisation
of Belarus after the EU lifted many of its sanctions.
The author does not see any reasons why the
this EU step as an attempt to maintain stability in
the context of larger geopolitical challenges.
In the second article Andrei Yeliseyeu shares
his point of view on the path towards visa-free
travel that he believes will be long and bumpy.
The regime has no major external incentives to
implement reforms required for visa-free travel,
so a realistic assessment of the situation leads to
Belarus-EU relations after sanction suspension:
can we expect transformation?
Alena Daneika
On 15 February 2016, the EU Council adopted
a decision to lift most of the sanctions against
Belarus. This means the abolition of visa
restrictions to 170 individuals and three legal
entities of Belarus. At the same time, the EU
continues to maintain the embargo on the
supply of arms to Belarus, and has extended
the sanctions against four people, whom EU
considers to be involved in the disappearance of
opposition politicians and a journalist in 1999–
2000, for 12 months. Is there any reason to believe
that relations between Minsk and Brussels will
transform?
conclude that the negotiations may take at least
half a decade.
With continuing economic stagnation in Belarus,
the shrinking of the middle-class can be observed.
In the third article Aliaksandr Aleshka identifies
the essential areas affected by economic recession
and a decrease in the purchasing power. Although
the middle class plays an important economic and
political role in Western countries, in Belarus,
according to the author, the middle class seeking
prosperity would rather look for alternative
sources of income than take action against the
regime.
ideological basis of the Lukashenka regime and
trends in the area of the formation of the state
ideology in 2011–2014. He notes that the regime
has always relied on the flexible ideological
content and the idea of modernisation, central a
while ago, has now been replaced with the idea
of mobilisation – both in terms of economics and
politics. The aim behind the idea of mobilisation
is to retain stability and the status quo in the
country.
We hope that this issue will be of interest to our
readers!
Vytautas Keršanskas, Editor
Thaw against the background of the well-known
cycle of EU-Belarus relations
The cyclic nature of relations between Minsk
and Brussels, which has evolved in the past two
decades, is associated with recurrent events
and the subsequent response to them. Electoral
company in Belarus – violations of election –
non-recognition of their results by international
structures – repressions against the opposition
– EU sanctions against Belarus – perturbation
of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and accusations of double standards – some
1

Analysts have lost
confidence in that the
current abolition of the EU
sanctions against Belarus
would break this vicious
circle.
The sanctions were
imposed on a narrow
circle of enterprises, while
visa bans – on a narrow
circle of people. All of this
did not prevent economic
and financial cooperation
in the past.
concessions to Minsk in the field of human rights
plus promises of further progress of liberalisation
– warming. And the cycle continues. Eventually,
analysts have lost confidence in that the current
abolition of the EU sanctions against Belarus
would break this vicious circle.
Timid hope for cooperation
As far as the lifting of sanctions is concerned,
it is hardly appropriate to talk about a radical
change in relations between Minsk and Brussels.
Rather, as political scientist Vyacheslav Pozdniak
believes, we should consider a greater or lesser
degree of pragmatic cooperation between Belarus
and EU countries, and above all in the economic
sphere. And this interaction does not necessarily
have to coincide with mutual understanding in
the political sphere.
For example, massive export of Belarusian oil
products to the Netherlands and the UK in
the past few years does not mean enhanced
cooperation of Belarus with these countries in
the sphere of politics. The relationship between
Minsk and other European capitals and the EU as
a whole can be built similarly in the future in spite
of intensifying contacts in the economic field.
As for “hostility” in bilateral political relations
between Minsk and some of the EU countries,
the situation is dynamic. According to Pozdniak,
it is not strictly linked to the economy, and
varies depending on the phase in the relations
with different countries. The sharper the level of
conflict and the degree of criticism – one-way
or reciprocal – the longer it takes to overcome
differences (for example, the conflict between
Belarus and Sweden over the “plush landing
force”).
Pozdniak concludes that today Minsk looks
at Brussels with a timid hope for cooperation.
The fact is that if there are developments at the
political level, this does not mean we should
expect breakthoughs in cooperation in the
financial sector.
Both Belarusian and foreign experts agree that
the lifting of EU sanctions against Belarus could
contribute to the growth of investments and
intensification of economic cooperation, but, for
example, in the financial sphere these hopes are
limited by certain scope and conditions. There are
technical and financial assistance programs for
the countries which have clearly indicated their
position in taking a course to accede the EU. But
Belarus is not one of such countries, and has to
settle for less.
So, one should not expect any breakthroughs in
the economic and financial cooperation from
the lifting of sanctions against Belarus by the
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
European Union, analysts say. The sanctions were
imposed on a narrow circle of enterprises, while
visa bans – on a narrow circle of people. All of
this did not prevent economic and financial
cooperation in the past.
As the senior analyst at Alpari, Vadim Iosub,
maintains, it would be a mistake for Minsk to
expect any credits from any European institutions
which would be comparable to the credits from
Russia, the IMF, and the Eurasian anti-crisis
fund, and, in theory, which could be spent as
you wish, for example, to replenish gold reserves
or to repay previously attracted foreign loans.
Moreover, it looks like now Minsk is looking for
loans to refinance the external debt, but European
institutions cannot provide those particular loans
by definition.
At best, Iosub believes, one could expect funding
from European financial institutions for purposes
such as border management, modernisation of
border crossing points, and fight against illegal
migration and drug trafficking. However, this is
narrowly targeted funding and for the purposes
that are of interest to the EU itself bordering
with Belarus. And we are talking of the amounts
in the regions of tens of millions of dollars, but
certainly not billions that Belarus could expect.
Yet, according to experts, at the moment Minsk
needs two, or, preferably three billion dollars
to pay the debts and to maintain the notorious
Belarus stability.
Will Brussels turn a blind eye?
Institutional changes are necessary to fulfil
the primary wish of the EU today – to conduct
electoral campaigns according to the OSCE
standards. But in the best case, what happens
is the “simulation of frenzied activity” as it has
been called since the Soviet era. The actions are
limited to endless reports of relevant agencies on
establishing commissions to discuss amendments
to the electoral legislation and other measures,
which – judging by the lack of results, – are aimed
at delaying the process, pushing away problems
rather than solving them.
Formally, Minsk pretends to be working on
the changes. Really, one can hardly expect
significant developments since the system of
power in Belarus rests on the currently existing
rules that give way to all levels of power only
to persons who knowingly support the current
power.
And if for some experts from the EU authorised
to monitor the situation in Belarus it is sufficient
to state in the report that Belarus is working on
the mistakes, it would be naive to believe that the
EU has no officials who are well aware of the real
situation in Belarus.
2

Institutional changes
are necessary to fulfil
the primary wish of the
EU today – to conduct
electoral campaigns
according to the OSCE
standards. But in the best
case, what happens is the
“simulation of frenzied
activity” as it has been
called since the Soviet era.
Andrei Yeliseyeu is analytical
journalist at the BEL.BIZ Center of
Business Communication (Minsk,
Belarus), previously Research
Fellow at the Belarusian Institute for
Strategic Studies and international
correspondent at the European
Radio for Belarus. Andrei holds
B.A. in International Relations and
four Master’s degrees in the fields of
European and International Law,
Political Sciences, Historical Studies,
and Management from Belarus’ and
the Baltic States’ universities.
The current geopolitical situation – when Belarus
against the background of Russia no longer looks
like the last bastion of authoritarianism in Europe
and where Brussels is faced with the problem of
migrants flooding the European capital cities –
facilitates the condoning of human rights abuses
in Belarus, which currently no longer seem so
terrible.
With regard to the important point that
predetermines the lifting of sanctions – the
absence of political prisoners in Belarus – Minsk
here, perhaps, can give certain guarantees. At
least for some time. But not because the regime
has changed.
But, firstly, because the opposition is now weak
and is not able to raise a significant number of
Belarusians to protest. As a result, the authorities
do not see it as a threat, which forced them to
imprison the most consistent of their critics in the
first place.
Secondly, because of the upcoming political
campaign in the summer of 2016 when Belarus
Belarus - EU: long bumpy road towards visa
facilitation
Andrei Yeliseyeu
Disappointing Riga summit results
Since the official commencement of bilateral
talks over visa facilitation and readmission in
January 2014, three rounds of Belarus-EU nego-
tiations took place, the last one in March 2015.
Officials on both sides expected that the agree-
ments could be initialled during the Eastern
Partnership Summit in Riga in late May 2015.
However, these expectations did not come true.
Although none of the sides publicly shared the
reasons, unofficially the EU diplomats recog-
nised that the failure had to do with the condi-
tions for visa-free travel for the Belarusian hold-
ers of diplomatic passports covered by the Visa
Facilitation Agreement (VFA). Pending the Riga
summit, a few EU Member States allegedly re-
quested that, in order to allow a visa-free travel,
Belarusian diplomatic and service passports had
to be biometric. As long as the required legisla-
tion is not in place in Belarus, the negotiations
will not resume.
In an attempt to paint an optimistic picture of
the state of things, the EaP Summit Joint Dec-
laration in Riga reads that the Summit partici-
pants “welcome the progress achieved in the VFA/
RA negotiations with Belarus, as well as that
achieved towards the establishment of an EU-
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
will hold parliamentary elections. The campaign
does not herald any large-scale political actions
or any other shocks, which might fundamentally
threaten the Belarusian regime.
“Requirements” and “conditions” were replaced
with “expectations” and “wishes”
Thus, neither Minsk nor Brussels have any reason
to radically change anything in their relationship,
other than formalities, which, however, may be
important in the future.
It is important that the head of European
diplomacy, Federica Mogherini, commenting
on the abolition of EU sanctions, said that “the
decision to lift most sanctions does not mean that
we believe that the situation in Belarus has turned
from black to pink in one night”.
But the modality of the language of EU
documents dealing with relations between Minsk
and Brussels has changed. “Requirements” and
“conditions” were replaced with “expectations”
and “wishes”.
Belarus Mobility Partnership”.1 In fact, there is
not much to boast about both for Belarus and
the EU. After a decade-long story of failed at-
tempts to start and proceed with the visa facili-
tation negotiations between the EU and Belarus,
the long-awaited agreements, which were never
closer to becoming a reality than on the eve of
the Riga summit, were put on hold again.
Before that, it took two and a half years for the
Belarusian authorities to accept the invitation
of the European Commission in midyear 2011
to start on the VFA. The Belarusian side offered
two explanations of such delay, namely the EU
sanctions policy against the Belarusian officials
and the negative consequences of the hypotheti-
cal readmission agreement with the EU. Before
2010, it was the EU which deemed the start of
the visa facilitation process with Belarus prema-
ture. Until the change in approach in late 2010,
the EU institutions associated simplification of
visa procedures with the progress in political re-
forms and human rights.
1
Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership
Summit (Riga, 21-22 May 2015), www.enpi-info.
eu/library/sites/default/files/attachments/Riga%20
Declaration%20220515%20Final.pdf
3

Belarus is the only country
among the Eastern Part-
nership countries without
a functioning legislature
regulating the issuance of
biometric passports.
Two obstacles confirmed: missing biometry and
disagreements over readmission
Only in late 2015 public statements were made
by both sides regarding the VFA. In December
Gunnar Wiegand, a high European External Ac-
tion Service official, said that the visa facilita-
tion and readmission agreements with Belarus
were ready for signing.2 A few days later, Alena
Kupchyna, Belarusian deputy foreign minister,
responded by saying that Weigand’s words took
them by surprise. According to her, the package
deal of visa facilitation and readmission was far
from being ready for signing.
According to the comments of the Belarusian
side, one of the problems was indeed the EU re-
quirement for diplomatic and service passports.
Their holders include not only Foreign Ministry
officials, but also members of the government,
parliamentarians, and members of the superior
judiciary. Belarus is the only country among
the Eastern Partnership countries without a
functioning legislature regulating the issuance
of biometric passports. To compare, the initial
visa facilitation agreement between the EU and
Ukraine allows holders of diplomatic passports
visa-free travel to the EU, without the biometric
requirement. However, later VFA agreements
between the EU and Armenia, and EU and
Azerbaijan included provisions which require
that the diplomatic passports would meet cer-
tain security standards and be biometric. As
it follows from Kupchyna’s comment, another
obstacle to visa facilitation between the EU and
Belarus is disagreement over the text of the re-
admission agreement.
Disagreements over a transition period with-
in the readmission agreement
The EU links the VFA with the conclusion of the
readmission agreement, and both come in one
package. Readmission agreements hold recip-
rocal obligations of the EU and third countries
to facilitate the return of illegal residents to the
country of origin or transit. There is no problem
with admitting the country’s own citizens since
the state’s refusal to readmit its own citizens can
amount, according to the international human
rights law, to persecution. However, accord-
ing to the EU policy, readmission agreements
linked to the VFAs shall contain an obligation
to readmit the third-country nationals and state-
less persons who, under certain circumstances,
come to the EU territory through the territory
of the other contracting state. It means that un-
2
Belarus-EU visa facilitation agreement ready for signing.
Belarusian Telegraph Agency, 9 December 2015. Available
at http://eng.belta.by/politics/view/belarus-eu-visa-
facilitation-agreement-ready-for-signing-87541-2015/
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
der the standard readmission agreement Belar-
us would have to readmit on its territory, upon
the request by any of the EU Member States and
subject to no additional formalities, its own na-
tionals, third-country nationals and stateless
persons who do not fulfil the conditions of entry
to or presence in the requesting state.
The readmission agreements between the EU
and Ukraine, and the EU and Russia foresaw
two-year and three-year transition periods, re-
spectively. During this time, the clause on the
readmission of third-country nationals and
stateless persons did not function, allowing the
countries to complete technical preparations for
the readmission and to conclude additional re-
admission agreement with the countries of ori-
gin of irregular migration. It follows from the
official Minsk observation that the EU is not
ready to give Belarus a similar transition period
regarding the readmission of the third-country
nationals. It does not seem fair, however, to de-
prive Belarus of this transition period, given it
was earlier provided to Ukraine and Russia. It
must also be taken into account that the flows of
irregular migration through Belarus into the EU
are comparatively low.
Concerns of the Belarusian authorities relating
to the readmission agreement are easy to under-
stand. There is no obvious benefit for Belarus
associated with it, while financial costs linked to
the maintenance of the third-country nationals
in detention centres – until they are sent back to
their country of origin or the country of transit
– are apparent. However, as shown by the ear-
lier research,3 concerns voiced in 2012 by the
Belarus MFA spokesperson about “thousands, if
not tens of thousands of illegal migrants”4 who
will appear in Belarus as a result of the read-
mission agreement are obviously exaggerated.
The study projects that under the readmission
agreement Belarus will likely have to readmit up
to 100-200 third-country nationals and stateless
persons annually, given the volume of the ille-
gal migration flows through Belarus and their
characteristics.
In November 2013, in anticipation of the start
of the negotiation process over the VFA with
the European Union, Belarus concluded a re-
admission agreement with Russia. This agree-
3
Yeliseyeu A. Belarus-EU: The likely consequences of a
readmission agreement. BISS research paper, May 2013,
https://www.academia.edu/13669795/Belarus_-_EU_The_
likely_consequences_of_a_readmission_agreement
4
МИД уверен, что Беларусь придет к безвизовому
обмену с ЕС (“The Foreign Ministry is positive that Belarus
will eventually achieve a visa-free regime with the EU”).
TUT.BY media portal, http://news.tut.by/politics/277179.
html Note: the text version is abridged compared to the
original audio.
4
 Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016

Given that absolute ma-
jority of illegal transit mi-
grants come to Belarus
from Russia, the readmis-
sion agreement with the
eastern neighbour has
eased Belarus’ concerns
over the consequences
of the readmission agree-
ment with the EU.
ment, which contains Russia’s obligation to ac- with the EU could become a key instrument for
cept illegal transit migrants, entered into force Belarus to comply with the EU norms in the ar-
in September 2014. Given that absolute majority eas of freedom, security and justice.
of illegal transit migrants come to Belarus from
Russia, the readmission agreement with the So far, Belarus has clearly lagged behind all
eastern neighbour has eased Belarus’ concerns other EaP countries and Russia in its efforts to
over the consequences of the readmission agree- achieve visa-free regime with the EU. Since the
ment with the EU. VFA between the EU and Azerbaijan entered
Visa relations between the EU and the EaP into force in September 2014, Belarus has re-
countries mained the only country in the region without
the functioning VFA. Therefore, a standard visa
The way towards a visa-free regime with the EU fee for the nationals of Belarus continues to be
is a two-stage process for the Eastern Partner- EUR 60, meanwhile for the nationals of all other
ship countries, where the visa liberalisation dia- EaP countries it decreased to EUR 35 (see Table
logue follows the conclusion of visa facilitation 1 for details).
and readmission agreements. “Once these agree-
ments are concluded and effectively implemented, Table 1. Visa relations between the EaP countries,
the EU and the partner countries will take grad- Russia, and the EU.
ual steps towards visa-free regimes in due course Country Entry into Visa Standard fee for
on a case-by-case basis provided that conditions force of VFA liberalisation a Schengen visa
dialogue
for well-managed and secure mobility set out in
two-phase action plans for visa liberalisation are Azerbaijan September Not yet €35
in place”, the Joint Declaration of the 2011 East- 2014 started
ern Partnership Summit reads.5 Armenia January 2014 Not yet €35
started

Visa liberalisation dialogues are built upon Visa Belarus – – €60

Liberalisation Action Plans (VLAP), which in- Georgia March 2011 Commenced €35
clude four blocks of benchmarks related to doc- in June 2012;
the VLAP
ument security, including biometrics; border presented
management, migration and asylum; public or- in February
2013
der and security; and external relations and fun-
damental rights. During the first VLAP phase, Moldova January 2008 Commenced Visa-free regime
in May 2010,
which focuses on the legislative and policy the VLAP
framework, a country is supposed to adopt and/ presented in
January 2011
or amend the existing legislation, which governs
Visa-free
the issuance of biometric passports, adopt the regime
integrated border management, ensure effective introduced in
May 2014
fight against organised crime, establish a joint
independent anti-corruption institution, etc. Russia June 2007 Joint steps €35
agreed in
December
As part of VLAP, a country is expected to ratify 2011

a number of the United Nations and European
Council conventions and intensify cooperation
with various regional and international organ-
isations, including Europol, Frontex, the Inter-
national Organization on Migration, the OSCE,
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
During the second VLAP phase, effective imple-
mentation of the adopted legislative and policy
measures is monitored by the European Com-
mission.
In the absence of bilateral contractual relation-
ship with the EU6, visa liberalisation process
5
Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit,
Warsaw, 29-30 September 2011, p. 4, http://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/
documents/warsaw_summit_declaration_en.pdf
6
Neither the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement nor
the Interim Agreement was concluded and ratified due
to the deterioration of the situation concerning civil and
political rights in Belarus in 1996.
Ukraine January 2008 Commenced €35
in October
2008; the
VLAP
presented in
October 2010
Despite backlogs in the visa arrangements with
the EU from legal point of view Belarus, some-
what paradoxically, is in the lead among the EaP
countries by the total number of Schengen vi-
sas issued per capita (see Table 2). In fact, Be-
larus leads in the relative number of Schengen
visas issued per capita among all 140 countries,
which are subject to visa requirements for the
EU territory. According to the 2014 statistics, 93
Schengen visas were issued per 1,000 citizens in
Belarus. To compare, in Russia and Ukraine this
rate in 2014 stood at 40 and 30 Schengen visas
per 1,000 citizens, respectively.
The share of multiple-entry visas in the overall
number of Schengen visas issued in Belarus is
5
 Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016

also rather high (51.2%). Besides, Belarus has logue. In case of Georgia and Moldova, it was
the lowest refusal rate in the world, which stood the 15 and 26 months respectively (see Table 1).
Belarus leads in the rela- at 0.26% in 2014. In Russia, Ukraine and Geor- One can reasonably expect that, if the VFA be-
tive number of Schengen gia the refusal rate was registered at 0.9%, 2.0% tween the EU and Belarus enters into force in
visas issued per capita and 12.7% respectively. 2016, the VLAP will likely be presented to Be-
among all 140 countries, larus in 2017 at best. As far as the implementa-
which are subject to visa Table 2. Schengen visas issued in 2014 in the tion of the VLAP is concerned, for Moldova it
requirements for the EU EaP countries (except Moldova) and Russia. took three additional years, while the first VLAP
territory. phase for Ukraine lasted for four years. There is
Country Number Number Total no guarantee that the Belarusian authorities will
of issued of visas population be as quick in meeting the VLAP benchmarks as
visas issued Moldova or even Ukraine were.
per 1,000
citizens
It is worth mentioning that the military conflict
Azerbaijan 69,967 7.4 9.5m
in Donbas has hampered progress towards visa-
free regime for both Russia and Ukraine and,
Armenia 46,757 15.6 3.0m
indirectly, for Belarus too. Russia-EU relations
Belarus 879,808 92.6 9.5m
have deteriorated considerably following the
Georgia 80,967 18 4.5m annexation of Crimea and the inimical Rus-
sia’s policy towards Ukraine, thus making the
Russia 5,702,624 39.9 142.9m prospects of EU-Russia visa-free regime look
Ukraine 1,351,757 29.6 45.6m very gloomy. The growing number of displaced
persons in Ukraine and considerable deteriora-
Source: The author’s compilation on the basis of tion in economic well-being of Ukrainians has
the European Commission’s visa statistics.7 caused more immigration worries in the EU.
Almost 5% of all INDICATE THE SOURCE There is no social pressure on the Belarusian
HERE PLEASE government to intensify its work on visa facili-
tation and visa liberalisation with the EU, which
Schengen visas issued globally (15.7 million in otherwise would have been expected had the
2014) are granted in Belarus. This makes Be- nationals of Russia and Ukraine been not sub-
larus the fourth country in the world after Rus- ject to visa requirements for the EU anymore.
sia, Ukraine, and China in terms of the absolute
number of granted Schengen visas (see Table 3). In 2014, the leading Belarusian and interna-
tional migration experts representing academic
Table 3. Leaders in the number of issued institutions, NGOs, governmental bodies and
Schengen visas in 2014. international organisations based in Belarus
were asked, how soon the visa regime between
Country Number of Share of the Number the EU and Belarus would likely be abolished.
issued visas total number of of visas Most of the experts surveyed (11 out of 16) be-
Schengen visas issued
issued globally per 1,000 lieved this would likely happen in 7–10 years,
(in %) citizens while four respondents considered this feasible
Russia 5,702,624 36.4% 39.9 within a shorter perspective of 4–6 years.8 Given
China 1,742,013 11.1% 1.3 the current state of affairs in visa relations be-
Ukraine 1,351,757 8.6% 29.6 tween the EU and Belarus, this seems to be a
Belarus 879,808 5.6% 92.6 fairly reasonable forecast.
Turkey 770,342 4.9% 9.9
India 529,367 3.4% 0.41

Source: The author’s compilation on the basis of

the European Commission’s visa statistics.
What will come next for Belarus after the long-
awaited launch of the VFA

In Ukraine, it took ten months between the mo-

ment when the VFA came into force and the
commencement of the visa liberalisation dia-
7
See the 2014 visa statistics file on the webpage of EC DG
on Migration and Home Affairs at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-
policy/index_en.htm#stats
8
Yeliseyeu A. Migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern
Europe: the present situation and the possible future. The
perspective of Belarus. In Forecasting migration between the
EU, V4 and Eastern Europe. Impact of visa abolition. Ed. By
Jaroszewicz M. and Lesinska M. Warsaw, July 2014, Center
for Eastern Studies, https://www.academia.edu/13662088/
Migration_between_the_EU_V4_and_Belarus_the_pres-
ent_situation_and_the_possible_future
6

Aliaksandr Aleshka is a PhD
candidate at the Graduate School for
Social Research in Warsaw (Polish
Academy of Sciences). He graduated
from the Center for East European
Studies (University of Warsaw) and
the Department of International
Relations of the Belarusian State
University in Minsk.
Dramatic decline of the Belarusian middle class
– the first “victim” of the aggravating economic
crisis
Aliaksandr Aleshka
Part I. Size and structure of the Belarusian
middle class
a) Unstable character of the Belarusian middle
class
Since the early 90s, the social structure of the
Belarusian society has been quite unstable.
Generally, Belarus has failed to achieve any
serious progress in establishing a steady social
structure after the collapse of the USSR. That
is why the Belarusian middle class should not
be perceived as a well-established permanent
social group, but rather as a very unstable
group, whose size is wholly determined by the
current economic situation in the country. The
present-day Belarusian middle class emerged
after 2001, during the period of high growth of
the Belarusian economy (driven by oil profits).
The development of social group was repeatedly
challenged by several economic crises (2008–
2009; 2011; 2014–2016) which had the most
negative effect on the size and status of the
middle class in this country.
b) Possible size of the Belarusian middle class
According to the common understanding,
the middle class is a social group, which has
comparably high sustainable income that allows
members of the group to maintain a high living
standard (access to high-quality imported
consumer products, cars, real estate, tourism
and medical services, etc.). In Belarus, there is a
serious difference between those who perceive
themselves as “middle class” and those who can
really be classified as members of the middle
class. For example, social surveys show that about
75% of the population of Belarus perceive their
income as “moderate/average” (neither poor nor
rich), but a large majority of these people cannot
be qualified as the true middle class because their
income is low.
It seems that the necessary level of income to
ensure a modest middle class lifestyle in Belarus
may be within the regions of at least USD 700–
800 (per capita per month). However, this sum
of money may not guarantee access to the basic
attributes of the middle class lifestyle (access to
imported goods, tourism and entertainment
services, a car, etc.). It does not seem that people
with lower monthly income can be qualified as
part of the middle class as the level of prices in
Belarus is quite high.
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
According to the official Belarusian statistics, in
November 2015, the monthly income of 11.1%
of the working Belarusians was over BYR 10
million (over USD 480, exchange rate for March
2016)1. The monthly income of another 10% of
the population was BYR 8–10 million (USD 390–
480). The monthly income of the further 19.3%
of the population was BYR 6–8 million (USD
290–390). These most “affluent” groups account
for about 40% of the Belarusian population, the
income of the remaining 60% of the people is
less than USD 290. It is important to remember
that the official Belarusian statistics tends to
exaggerate the income of Belarusians, so the real
income of the population could be 20–30% lower.
This statistics shows that currently, only 11% of
the Belarusians can be conditionally attributed
to the middle class (people with monthly income
higher than BYR 10 million), but even their
monthly income today does not come to USD
700–800, which means they cannot afford the
basic attributes of the middle class lifestyle. Thus,
the real current size of the Belarusian middle class
may be lower than 10% of population, which is a
really poor indicator.
Before the economic crisis of 2014–2016, about
30–35% of the Belarusian population could
belong to the middle class, but after several
devaluations of the Belarusian currency, two-
thirds of these people were pushed out to the
lower class. Despite lower salaries, these people
may continue to enjoy their typical middle class
lifestyle as they still have some savings, but these
savings are gradually decreasing. It means that
under the conditions of prolonged economic
crisis in Belarus, a significant part of the former
middle class Belarusians will have to give up their
middle class lifestyle as their income is decreasing
and they will run out of savings.
c) Structure of the Belarusian middle class
The Belarusian middle class is mainly composed
of the following categories of people:
1. Owners of small and medium-sized
businesses and individual entrepreneurs.
1
http://www.belstat.gov.by/ofitsialnaya-statistika/
solialnaya-sfera/trud/operativnaya-informatsiya_8/
raspredelenie-chislennosti-rabotnikov-po-razmer_2/
7

Social surveys show that
about 75% of the popu-
lation of Belarus perceive
their income as “mod-
erate/average” (neither
poor nor rich), but a large
majority of these people
cannot be qualified as the
true middle class because
their income is low.
2. Highly-qualified employees of medium-
sized and large businesses.
3. Highly-paid functionaries and specialists
employed in the state sector.
These three categories of people make the middle
class in Belarus and their share could be up to 10%
of the population. Under the conditions of the
growing economic crisis, however, all these three
categories of people will face dramatic economic
challenges. It is highly possible that many of them
may become insolvent, lose jobs or lose a large
part of their income.
Part II. Economic challenges for the Belarusian
middle class
The future of the Belarusian middle class is
completely dependent on the duration of the
ongoing economic crisis. If the crisis lasts for two-
three years or more, it will exhaust the sources
of income of the largest part of the prosperous
Belarusians. The following economic trends will
have the greatest negative effect on the sources of
income of today’s representatives of the Belarusian
middle class (small- and medium-sized business
entrepreneurs as well as highly-paid employees
from the private and state sectors):
1. Dramatic decline in consumption
A serious decline in consumption will affect
the entire private sector of the Belarusian
economy, which is directly dependent on the
level of consumer spending in Belarus. Under the
conditions of the crisis, people will have to change
their consumption habits, limit their purchases of
food and staple products. It means that income of
tens of thousands of entrepreneurs and owners of
small- and medium-sized businesses will decline
dramatically.
2. Accelerating impoverishment of the population
Following the devaluation, the Belarusian
population (both lower middle class and middle
class) continues to get poorer, pay is cut, and the
unemployment and inflation are high. This trend
will force a large part of the Belarusian middle
class to become the lower middle class, while
many of those who enjoy the lifestyle of the lower
middle class will become part of the underclass.
3. Serious increase in unemployment
The Belarusian economy is already facing a huge
problem of unprecedentedly high unemployment.
Even successful private companies start to
implement significant layoffs of their highly-
qualified employees.
4. Destabilisation of the financial system
The income of the Belarusian middle class is
further affected by the ongoing devaluation of the
Belarusian currency. Furthermore, entrepreneurs
have practically no access to affordable credits for
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
development of their businesses.
5. Problems in the Russian market
The economic crisis in Russia brings huge
challenges to Belarusian producers who are
totally dependent on the Russian market (such
companies are forced to cut salaries and layoff
their employees). Moreover, there are increasing
problems in the Russian labour market, so fewer
Belarusian seasonal workers are able to find jobs
in Russia.
Part III. Consequences of the growing economic
crisis for the Belarusian middle class
a) Consequences for individual entrepreneurs and
owners of small and medium-sized businesses.
The growing economic crisis already has an
impact on practically all types of businesses in
Belarus, as a result incomes of their owners and
employees decrease. The following important
spheres of the Belarusian business may be worst
affected by the crisis:
1. Real estate
It is highly possible that the price for the purchase
and lease of real estate (both residential and
commercial) in Belarus will significantly decrease
in the near future. It is important to remember
that the main asset of the Belarusian middle
class is their real estate investments. As a result,
the falling prices for apartments in Belarus
will seriously reduce the real value of the assets
accumulated by the prosperous Belarusians.
2. Various services connected to the sphere of
entertainment
Such service-oriented businesses as tourism, cafes
and restaurants, various types of entertainment
and other similar services will be severely affected
by the growing crisis. The increasing lack of cash
will force Belarusian customers cut their spending
on all “non-critical” services. The owners and
employees of the Belarusian services industry will
lose a serious part of their incomes and this will
compromise their middle class status.
3. Import and distribution companies
The risk of next devaluation and the decline
in consumption in Belarus will result in
serious problems for the numerous import and
distribution companies in this country. The
demand for high-quality imported products will
continue to decline, so many of these companies
will have to considerably limit their operations.
4. Retail trade
A very large number of owners of small and
medium-sized enterprises is involved in a
variety of retail trade, which is always negatively
affected by any kind of problems with the level
of consumption in the country. In addition, the
retailers continue to face numerous problems
8

The aggravating eco-
nomic crisis in Belarus
will have even stronger
impact on the status and
size of the Belarusian
middle class. The number
of people with relatively
high income in Belarus
will further shrink.
It is highly improbable
that the Belarusian mid-
dle class will start any ma-
jor political and economic
protests in this country.
There may be numerous
protests of individual en-
trepreneurs, but it is very
doubtful that they will
trigger massive protests
of the middle class.
with taxation, high rents and certificates for their
goods. As a result of the growing crisis, a large
part of these people may become insolvent or
suspend their operations.
5. Logistics and transport services.
A significant decline of the Russian import from
the EU has negatively affected the situation of
Belarusian logistics companies. The volume
of transported goods continues to decline and
revenues of these companies are decreasing.
b) Consequences for highly-qualified employees
at the medium-sized and large businesses
The growing economic crisis will negatively
impact large and medium-sized enterprises. The
owners of these businesses will likely respond to
the crisis by optimising their expenditures through
significant pay cuts and massive redundancies.
Numerous Belarusian highly-qualified employees
therefore risk to lose their jobs or to receive
smaller salaries. As a result their middle class
status will be compromised. The following large
businesses may be the most vulnerable:
1. Construction companies
This sphere of business employs a very large
number of people with the above-average salaries.
It is highly possible that the construction sphere
will continue to decline resulting in massive
redundancies and pay cuts.
2. Banking and financial institutions
In recent years, the Belarusian banks and other
financial institutions have been on the rise.
However, under the conditions of the crisis,
they will have huge problems with liquidity and
income resulting in broad layoffs and pay cuts.
3. Telecommunications
Due to the ongoing devaluation of the Belarusian
currency, there is a serious decline of real income
of the Belarusian telecommunication companies.
They incur costs in foreign currencies and there
is no way for them to compensate their post-
devaluation losses. These companies will have to
implement serious pay cuts.
4. All the rest of the large and medium-sized
companies
In general, the worsening situation in the labour
market will provide all large and medium-sized
businesses with an excuse to cut salaries for
the majority of their employees. In view of the
growing unemployment in Belarus, the employees
will accept the pay cuts as there will be very few
alternatives for them on the declining labour
market of the country.
c) Consequences for highly-paid functionaries
and specialists employed in the state sector.
It is questionable whether the Belarusian
government will have any additional resources
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
for further increase of salaries for state employees.
It means that the income of high-ranking state
employees will be “frozen” and will continue to be
reduced by the ongoing devaluation and inflation.
As a result of the growing crisis, most of state
employees with comparably high salaries may no
longer afford the basic attributes of the middle
class status.
Conclusions:
1. The aggravating economic crisis in Belarus
will have even stronger impact on the status and
size of the Belarusian middle class. The number
of people with relatively high income in Belarus
will further shrink. Since 2014, the size of the
Belarusian middle class has been reduced two
or even three times and less than 10% of the
population continue to have income above the
reference USD 700–800 per month. Before 2014,
about 30–35% of the Belarusian population
could enjoy the middle class income. Most of
these people still have some savings, which are
gradually decreasing.
2. In the nearest months, the economic crisis will
reduce the income of the core of the Belarusian
middle class – individual entrepreneurs, owners
of small and medium-sized enterprises and
highly-paid employees of large Belarusian
companies. It is possible that the consequences of
the ongoing crisis will be so serious that the size
of the Belarusian middle class will shrink below
the current 10%.
3. It is highly improbable that the Belarusian
middle class will start any major political and
economic protests in this country. There may be
numerous protests of individual entrepreneurs,
but it is very doubtful that they will trigger
massive protests of the middle class. The main
exit strategy for the declining middle class in
Belarus will be a search for alternative sources of
income, emigration, relocation of assets abroad
and dramatic reduction in spending.
9

Dr. Aliaksandr Filipau was born
in 1983 in Minsk, Belarus. In 2005
he graduated from the Faculty of
History at the Belarusian State
University. Currently he is the Dean
of the Faculty of Extended Education
at the Belarusian State University of
Culture and Arts and an expert at
NGO “Liberal Club”.
New Trends in Ideology Development in Belarus
(2011–2014)
Dr. Aliaksandr Filipau
The ideology of the regime of Aliaksandr
Lukashenka is a subject of numerous discussions
among experts and scholars who specialise in
Belarusian studies. Such discussions have become
more intensive with the recent political and
economic changes in the country, especially the
creation of the Eurasian Union, events in Ukraine,
deterioration of the relations between Russia and
the West, and further decline of the Belarusian
economy. The present article deals with the main
changes which have occurred in the ideology and
ideological work in Belarus during the fourth
presidential term of Lukashenka.
Strengthening the “ideological vertical”
Ideology and ideological work are considered
some of the main areas of the activities of all
agencies in Belarus and the criteria for measuring
the officials in charge of all public agencies.
Nevertheless, compared to the early 2000s, when
the ideology itself occupied a significant place in
the Belarusian public media, the period of 2011–
2014 saw much less attention of the authorities
to ideology as a set of ideas. However, some
important changes in the organisation of the
ideological work have taken place.
The changes were influenced by the so-called
optimisation of the public administration system
in 2013. Two main legislative documents should
be mentioned in this respect:
The Decree of the President of the Republic of
Belarus No 168 dated 12 April 2013.
The Decree of the President of the Republic of
Belarus No 264 dated 6 June 2013.
The first Decree “On certain measures
of optimisation of the system of public
administration agencies and other state agencies,
as well as the number of their employees”
significantly strengthened the so-called
“ideological vertical” due to the unification of
the departments responsible for ideological
work, administration of culture and youth
affairs. In spite of the external simplicity of this
step, the unification has had serious political
implications. The “ideological vertical” headed
by Usevalad Yancheuski, the assistant to the
President and Head of the Main Ideological
Department of the President’s Administration,
completely took over youth affairs and cultural
policy on local and middle levels of the public
administration system. He also assumed control
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
over human resource management and finance
allocations in these areas.1 The unification itself
resulted from conflicts between different groups
inside the Belarusian nomenclature, which led
to significant strengthening of Yancheuski’s
positions. Moreover, the “ideological vertical”
and its patron-client relations were among
the few areas in the public administration
system, which did not suffer from personnel
cuts in 2013.2 Changes among high-ranking
officials in the Ministry of Communications
and Informatisation in February 2014 were also
Yancheusky’s great success and allowed him to
strengthen his influence in this important area.
The appointment of Igor Buzovsky, the former
head of the Belarusian Republican Youth Union,
as the Deputy Head of the Administration of the
President, was also beneficial for Yancheuski.
Finally, the resignation of Natalya Petkevich, who
is considered one of the main competitors of the
head of the “ideological vertical”, again played into
the hands of Yancheuski. The only considerable
failure which can be mentioned was the loss of
control over the Information-Analytical Centre
of the President’s Administration.
The second Decree “On certain issues of the
activities of the Administration of the President
of the Republic of Belarus” preserved the existing
structure and functions of the “ideological
vertical” inside the President’s Administration.
Moreover, no significant changes among high-
ranking officials in the “ideological vertical” were
introduced in this period.
Ideology without ideas
One of the main reasons of this special attitude to
the ideological vertical, which in many respects
can be compared with the attitude to security
forces, is that the main task of the ideological
hierarchy is not to promote ideas as they are, but
to control public sentiments and resolve current
problems via social and economic regulations.
1
Розенбаум А. «Размывание» вертикали власти как
один из результатов реформы государственного
управления. Аналитическая записка «Либерального
клуба» №31/2013. – Режим доступа: http://liberalclub.
biz/?p=13895#more-13895
2
Burov, N. The Administration of the President: personnel
shuffling does not change anything while the trumps are
still in the former hands // Belarusian Yearbook 2013. –
Minsk : I.P. Logvinov, 2014. – P. 11-18.
10

One of the main reasons
of this special attitude to
the ideological vertical,
which in many respects
can be compared with the
attitude to security forces,
is that the main task of
the ideological hierarchy
is not to promote ideas
as they are, but to control
public sentiments and re-
solve current problems
via social and economic
regulations.
An elaborate mechanism for manipulating this
process has been developed during the past
twenty years. This mechanism has become much
more in-demand due to the profound changes
in the social and economic situation in Belarus.
These changes influenced the set of ideas which
are promoted within the official governmental
policy in Belarus.
In spite of issuing different books, such as The
Belarusian Path (2010, 2012)3 and numerous
editions on the ideology of the Belarusian
state, the President himself admitted that none
of them could serve as a compendium of the
national idea. In general, it is almost impossible
to formulate any clear set of ideas which are
undoubtedly a part of this ideology. The content
analysis of the President’s speeches in 2009–2014
reveals that there is not a single sustainable idea
of Lukashenka, except the idea of his unlimited
presidency and power. Two recurring minor
ideas found within the analysis of his speeches are
the priority of agriculture above other sectors of
economy and the necessity to protect children.4
On all other issues, the ideology in Belarus is
extremely flexible and is able to promote any idea
which will be adopted by the society due to the
current political situation.
The main reason of this situation is that the
President and, generally, the elite groups in
the country deny the concept of following any
particular idea, whether it be a communist or
capitalist, nationalist or totally pro-Russian etc.
Flexibility in ideology reflects in the flexibility
of the national policy based on a very limited
number of tasks of the public administration
apparatus in Belarus: preserving the power of the
current President and his milieu.
During recent years, the legitimacy of the
ruling government has been boosted due to the
effectiveness of provision of public goods, i.e. due
to the system of the so-called social contracts5,
which are a common phenomenon in the modern
world.6 The essence of the social contract system
3
Белорусский путь / под ред. О.В.Пролесковского. –
Мн., 2010 (2012). - http://www.elib.bsu.by/bitstream/1234
56789/31291/1Белорусский%20путь%%202010.pdf – 416
p.
4
Реформа системы государственного управления
в Беларуси // http://liberalclub.biz/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/LC_Public_administration_reform_2014.
pdf
5
See the research conducted by the Belarusian Institute of
Strategic Studies: Социальные контракты в современной
Беларуси. Под ред. К.Гайдука, Е.Раковой, В. Силицкого
– http://www.research.by/webroot/delivery/files/books/
socialcontract2010r.pdf
6
See, for example: Legitimacy in the Modern World //
American Behavioral Scientist. – November 2009 53. P.
279-288.
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
lies in the amount of wealth, such as public goods,
which improve the quality of life of the general
populace.7 During the first decade of the 21st
century, the core of the state ideology discourse
centred on the gradual increase of people’s welfare
(the famous formula was “a cup–pork rind–a
foreign-made car–a flat in Minsk”).8 It is necessary
to emphasise that preserving people’s welfare has
never a steadfast idea. The state ideology, both
from the point of view of the system of ideological
work as a mechanism of control over the public
sentiments and the set of vague ideas has always
stipulated the possibility of significant narrowing
of the state social policy.
Nevertheless, in 2011–2014, due to the emerging
crisis of the Belarusian model of development, the
Administration of the President (AP) (as the main
political and ideological centre of the country) had
to propose an ideological response which would
be accepted by the society. In 2012, the AP tried
to compensate the abandoning of the socially-
oriented model with a new idea or motto which
would hide the real meaning of the processes
of transition to fully-fledged state-oligarchic
capitalism or at least see a dramatic shrinking
in social policy of the state.9 In 2012–2013, such
an idea/motto was conceived in the concept of
modernisation, which for a short period of time
became a universal remedy for all problems in
the development of the Belarusian society. In
spite of the domination of this concept in the
Belarusian public media in this period, the idea of
modernisation was rather vague. In the economic
sphere it was understood mainly as the re-
equipment and rehabilitation of enterprises, while
in the political sphere vague discussions about a
kind of political system/state apparatus reform
were initiated.10 Predictably, no significant results
were achieved. The modernisation of economy
failed and resulted in numerous corruption
scandals, while the consequences of the political
reform were reduced to public administration
personnel cuts and the decrease in the effectiveness
of the state apparatus.11 As a result, the concept of
modernisation was gradually eliminated from the
Belarusian public media space in 2014.
7
Ibid.
8
In Belarusian: «чарка – шкварка – iнамарка – кватэра
ў Мiнске»
9
Burov, N. The Administration of the President: Between
Scylla of the socially oriented economy and Charybdis of
the “wild” oligarchy // Belarusian Yearbook 2012. – Minsk,
2013. – P.13-19.
10
According to the author’s analysis of the
“Информационный бюллетень Администрации
Президента Республики Беларусь” for the years 2012-
2013.
11
Реформа системы государственного управления
в Беларуси // http://liberalclub.biz/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/LC_Public_administration_reform_2014.
pdf
11

Two recurring minor ideas
found within the analysis
of his speeches are the pri-
ority of agriculture above
other sectors of economy
and the necessity to pro-
tect children. in the state media publications, and in views
The period of 2011–2014
saw changes in ideol-
ogy and ideological work
which can hardly be iden-
tified.
This publication has been produced with
the financial support from:
CONTACTS:
Vytautas Keršanskas
Phone: +370 5 2705993
Fax: +370 5 2736953
Email.: vytautas.kersanskas@eesc.lt
EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE
The frames of new social contracts
With the decline of the idea of modernisation,
discussions about the necessity to abandon
the overly socially-oriented policy in Belarus
(undoubtedly by preserving its description
as “a socially-oriented model”) became more
active in 2014. Such discussions appeared in
speeches of public officials at different levels,
of pro-governmental experts. Usually, these
discussions focused on certain particular issues,
but the analysis of the statements from all such
sources reveals the general idea promoted by
the Belarusian government, the best word for
expressing the essence of it being the word
“mobilisation”.
Unlike the concept “modernisation”, the concept
“mobilisation” is not frequently used by the
Belarusian officials. Nevertheless, the essence of
the concept increasingly dominates the country’s
public media. The same as with modernisation,
mobilisation encompasses both economic and
political spheres. In the economic sphere it is
shrinking of the state’s social policy and decline
in people’s standard of living. In the political
sphere it is further limitation of people’s rights
and freedoms and an increase in the degree of
the state’s regulation and control over all kinds
of people’s activities.
The concept of mobilisation has a solid ground
in the Belarusian society. Numerous studies
reveal that despite the popular stereotype about
the permanent interconnection between people’s
revenues and the President Lukashenka’s
political rating12, the society is ready to continue
with the social contract on condition of
significant increase in social welfare.13 Several
explanations for this phenomenon can be
offered. Some of them emphasise the specific
Belarusian mentality14, others point out to an
elaborate system of informal relations within the
12
Some experts, for example, Yury Drakohrust, believe
that this interconnection is not so permanent, direct
and strong as it is generally considered: Дракохруст, Ю.
Приключения рейтинга: обвал или отскок? - http://
news.tut.by/politics/430475.html; Дракохруст, Ю.
Опровержение Гераклита? - http://nmnby.eu/news/
analytics/5110.html
13
See, for example, Пикулик А., Артеменко Е.
«Социальный контракт»: двойная стратегия. - http://
belinstitute.eu/sites/biss.newmediahost.info/files/attached-
files/BISS_SA03_2014ru.pdf
14
Фабрикант, М., Царик, Ю. Белорусский народ как
реальность. Особенности и проблемы национальной
самоидентификации белорусов // Беларуская думка. –
№8. – август 2009. – С. 62-67.
The content of the articles is the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies
of the supporters and coordinators.
Issue 4-5 (53,54), 2016
Belarusian society, including the “black market”,
illegal revenues, smuggling, etc.15
Irrespective of the explanation, the phenomenon
itself is absolutely clear to the Belarusian
authorities. To a certain extent, they are aware
of their popularity and image among people.
Different explanations can be proposed as an
excuse for significant and essential changes in the
social contracts, including the events in Ukraine,
the economic crisis in Russia, the world plot against
Belarus, the expansion of the “Russian world,” etc.
The peculiar feature of such explanations is their
temporal character, which is loosely connected
to real political changes and inclinations of the
Belarusian authorities. At any moment when it
is politically suitable, these explanations could
be replaced with their antipodes. Moreover, if the
country’s economy continues to deteriorate, less
attention will be paid to the ideological legitimacy
of the policy. Even a traditional political analysis
presumes that ineffective legitimacy can lead to
maintaining dictatorship.16 In Belarus, which has
sufficient economic resources (potash export,
oil refineries, transit) to maintain the standard
of living of security personnel, the authorities
care more about the ideology as a mechanism of
control over people’s sentiments than as a set of
any ideas.
Conclusion
The period of 2011–2014 saw changes in ideology
and ideological work which can hardly be
identified. These changes can be described as
a further refusal of the authorities to develop a
set of sustainable ideas as part of this ideology
and the decrease of the role of ideological
apparatus in the political life of the country and
the strengthening of the role of the ideological
apparatus in controlling people’s sentiments via
social and economic means in response to the
deterioration of the social and economic situation
in Belarus.
15
Николюк, С., Чернов, В. Особенности формирования
среднего класса в Беларуси // Палiтычная сфера. - №9.
– 2007. – С. 23-39.
16
Jayapalan, N. Modern Political Analysis. – New Delhi:
Atlantic Publishers, 1999. – 125 p.
12