WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT

POLAND AND HUNGARY?

Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek

 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Executive Summary.......................................... 1
Section 1. Terms ................................................ 2
Section 2. Country Specifics........................... 3
Section 3. Wider Context ............................... 6
Section 4. Points of Divergence..................... 6
Section 5. What can be done?........................ 10
5.3 Conclusion ................................................... 15
Bibliography........................................................ 16
Endnotes............................................................... 18
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek is a Title VIII Fellow
in the Transatlantic Leadership program at CEPA.
Buchanan Ponczek graduated from the University
of Oxford with an MPhil (dist.) in Russian and East
European Studies and was awarded the Michael
Kaser Prize for the best political economy thesis.
Previously, she earned her BA (magna cum laude)
in Political Science at Miami University, with a
focus on Russian kleptocracy and petroleum
transit in the Caspian Sea region. At CEPA, she
will research the domestic drivers of Polish and
Hungarian foreign policy.

ABOUT CEPA
The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)
works to reinvent Atlanticism for a more secure
future. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., and
led by seasoned transatlanticists and emerging
leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA
brings an innovative approach to the foreign
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and future challenges to transatlantic values and
principles. CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit,
public policy institution.

All opinions are those of the author(s) and do

not necessarily represent the position or views of
the institutions they represent or the Center for
European Policy Analysis.
Cover: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban
and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki
shake hands during Hungary’s National Day
celebrations, which also commemorates the
1848 Hungarian Revolution against the Habsburg
monarchy, in Budapest, Hungary, March 15, 2019.
Credit: REUTERS/Lisi Niesner

ii
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
Executive Summary:
What’s gone wrong,
why it matters, where
it’s heading and what
to do about it
Governments in Poland and Hungary —
U.S. allies and members of NATO and the
European Union — continue to pursue
policies that are fundamentally at odds with
healthy democratic development and that
marginalize some of their most vulnerable
communities. Outsiders have lumped
the phenomena in Poland and Hungary
together, but that glosses over some
important differences between the two
countries and possible approaches to their
situations. In Hungary, changes to electoral
law and deteriorating economic and political
institutions put the country in a precarious
place, compounded by the government’s
cooperation with other nondemocratic
regimes. Poland has maintained its strategic
alignment with the U.S. and economic
integrity, but its domestic politics and social
policies are worrisome. Both governments
were democratically elected and earned
a legitimate mandate to rule from their
populations. Both governments also assert
that external actors should keep out of their
domestic affairs. Nevertheless, as an ally and
active promoter of democracy in the region,
the United States must find a way to head off
decline. Through diplomatic pressure, the
incoming administration should strongly
advocate minority rights and support
regional civil society. With other partners,
such as the EU and NATO, the U.S. should
establish democratic expectations and
make it clear to the Polish and Hungarian
governments that accountable governance
through rule of law and democratic norms
is the key to stability and partnership.
In 2020, covid-19 swept through the globe,
causing a public health and economic crisis.
To offset the economic fallout, the European
Union set up a recovery fund. There was a
hitch: the European Commission would
1
hand out money from the fund only to
members that demonstrated respect for the
rule of law, a condition that EU leaders had for
years been seeking to link to other funding
disbursements. This stipulation targeted
primarily Poland and Hungary, which then
blocked approval of the EU budget and
recovery fund. Refusing to back down, the
EU threatened cutting Hungary and Poland
out of the covid fund if the gridlock was
not resolved.1 The commission was not
alone: Majorities in all European countries,
including Poland and Hungary, support the
principle of tying EU funds to respect for the
rule of law.2 In the resulting compromise,
the EU Parliament passed the rule of law
conditionality, but the EU Commission had
to make several concessions on language,
scope, and enforcement.3 This flurry of
political developments is the culmination
of years of accusations that governments in
Poland and Hungary are pursuing domestic
policies at odds with their democratic
mandate, resulting in a great deal of head-
scratching about how outside parties should
respond.
The U.S. should establish
democratic expectations and
make it clear to the Polish
and Hungarian governments
that accountable governance
through rule of law and
democratic norms is the key
to stability and partnership.
Earlier in 2020, Freedom House downgraded
the most democracies ever in its 25 years of
compiling the Nations in Transit report. Poland
and Hungary stood out as the worst examples
of democratic decline.4 Critics have accused
Hungary’s Fidesz-led government, which
came to leadership in 2010 under Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán, of consolidating
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
power by undermining independent media
and the judiciary, changing election laws
and facilitating corruption.5 In Poland,
the Law and Justice-led coalition (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość, styled “PiS”) has drawn
criticism throughout its five years in
power, especially for its changes to the
judiciary, which the EU and other critics say
undermine the rule of law and violate the
principles of EU membership.6 The PiS and
Fidesz governments defend their policies
as necessary.7 Domestically, both parties’
focus on economic development and social
spending have won them a mandate to rule,
especially from rural voters.8
The charge that democracy in Poland and
Hungary is deteriorating is serious and
has prompted calls for intervention. As a
bilateral ally, NATO member and promoter
of democracy in the region, the U.S. has
an important role to play in addressing
challenges to the rule of law and its
consequences for democracy.
This paper argues that Poland and Hungary
are pursuing policies that erode the rule of
law and democratic norms. It also argues
there are key differences between the two
countries, all of which put Hungary on
a more worrying trajectory. The United
States should maintain its role as an active
promoter of democracy in the region and
continue to advocate minority rights,
support civil society and stress to the
Polish and Hungarian governments that
accountable governance through rule of law
and democratic norms is the key to stability
and partnership. To do this, the U.S. should
lead with diplomacy and set the conditions
that will safeguard its relationships in
central and eastern Europe, a region that
still matters for the United States’ strategic
interests.
In this report, Section 1 will explain the
spectrum of concepts and definitions
applied to the domestic situations in
Poland and Hungary. Section 2 provides an
account of each country’s recent domestic
developments. Section 3 gives broader
context for attacks on the rule of law and
2
backsliding. Section 4 notes differences
between Poland and Hungary. Section 5
offers a discussion on policy options, makes
recommendations, and concludes.
Section 1. Terms
Experts debate what to call the situation
in Poland and Hungary, and its causes.9
Some call it backsliding.10 Others call it
a “playbook of autocracy” or “autocrat’s
playbook.”11 Still others consider it a mere
hiccup not indicative of a lasting deviation
from the countries’ prior trajectories: All
democracies have occasional problems, and
Poland and Hungary are not swerving off
democratic course.12 Even the concept of
democracy is complex and encompasses a
spectrum of systems.13
Populism and backsliding are separate
phenomena that feed off each other.14
Populism enables a party or political
formation’s path to power; backsliding is the
way that power is wielded and maintained
through twisting proper governing
mechanisms.15 Populist rhetoric provides
a narrative of why for the ruling party —
why the country is in danger; why the party
is the only hope for salvation and ought
to be voted into power; why governing
mechanisms need to be altered. Backsliding
is how those ruling parties stay in power. It
is the sum of measures taken to ensure that
the power structures are still secure in favor
of the ruling party even if the electorate
has a change of heart or stops believing the
narrative. Related to this, one prevailing
explanation for populism’s success is a
divided and/or weakened opposition.16 The
opposition’s weakness could in turn be
due to the lack of a compelling platform,
infighting or the power of the majority
party’s simplistic narrative (especially if it
taps into aspects of the electorate’s identity).17
The rise of populism and concerns over the
deterioration of democratic institutions are
not unique to Hungary and Poland. Other
EU members, and indeed countries around
the world, are experiencing these problems
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

People wearing protective face masks attend a voting during the presidential election at a polling
station in Warsaw, Poland June 28, 2020. Credit: Slawomir Kaminski/Agencja Gazeta/via REUTERS.

to some degree.18 Ironically, growing responses.21 Sketching out events in each

illiberalism elsewhere helps the Polish and
Hungarian governments claim that the
“West” and “Western media” are singling
them out — a convenient narrative.
country also helps avoid the tendency to draw
overly simplistic caricatures. While some
comparison can yield valuable insights, if
we rely too much on this approach, we risk
overlooking some of the nuances specific to

Section 2. Country each country.

Specifics 2.1. Poland

Although criticism has intensified in recent
years, concerns over the domestic politics
of Hungary and Poland date back to the
early 2000s and 2010s. Then, onlookers
cited Poland as the worse offender.19
Now, Hungary has taken the lead, with
Poland’s government allegedly mimicking
the Hungarian government’s methods
to keep a grip on power.20 A summary of
developments in the two countries over
the past decade shows similarities, but also
some striking differences that ought to be
noted in assessments and subsequent policy
PiS controls the executive and legislative
branches of the Polish government.
President Andrzej Duda won reelection in
Poland’s summer 2020 election, which had
turnout of over 68% in the second round.
In the 2019 parliamentary election, PiS
won 2m more voters than in 2015, earning
the party 235 of the Sejm’s 460 seats and
building on momentum over five years.
Ever since PiS won the presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2015, critics have
decried Poland’s “backsliding.”

3
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
In Poland,
the ballot box still has
legitimacy, and matters.
The 2015 election outcome was unexpected.
PiS pushed the Western-leaning, fiscally
more conservative and socially more liberal
Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska,
styled “PO”) out of government, winning an
absolute majority and control of two of the
three branches of government.22 PiS has been
accused of using its majority to threaten
the rights of minorities, particularly sexual
minorities (the 2020 “LGBT-free zones”),
roll back rights for women (the PiS-packed
Constitutional Tribunal’s November 2020
ruling that created a near-ban on abortion
and triggered massive protests in Poland
and elsewhere) and discriminate again
ethnic minorities (the reluctance to take
in non-Ukrainian refugees). PiS has also
been charged with upending the balance of
powers through substantive changes to the
judicial branch and its oversight ( judges’
retirement, appointments and discipline,
the restructuring of the Constitutional
Tribunal and a law to punish judges who
criticize these changes); and curtailing
freedom of the media, especially the state-
owned TVP.23 Critics also contend that PiS
engages in majoritarian political tendencies,
like rushing bills quickly through the
legislature without proper review and
debate, and degrades the public discourse,
resulting in erosion of informal institutions
and political practices vital to maintaining a
healthy democracy.24 As recently as the time
of publication, PiS is under fire for a proposal
that challenges “foreign” ownership of
the media and attempts to “re-Polonise” it
— reminiscent of Orbán’s media-control
strategy in Hungary. It is unclear how PiS
could make this new initiative compatible
with EU law.25
Voter turnout was high in Poland’s 2020
election, when a slim majority voted for
PiS despite the policies critics find so
4
abhorrent. This is not so shocking — PiS
has appeal. The party has been a good
steward of the economy, helping many Poles
where it matters: It has made housing and
medicine more affordable, reversed PO’s
hugely unpopular pension age increase
and undertaken massive redistribution
campaigns without destroying public
finances.26 The proudly politically incorrect
party has given many Poles, especially in
rural areas, a voice. It has also tapped into
concerns over gay rights and religious
freedom while exploiting concerns about
the EU overstepping Polish sovereignty.27
PiS has invested in left-behind communities
and won support. But votes for PiS should
not be mistaken for agreement with all
of its policies: the salience of some issues
that PiS has prioritized outweighed voter
disapproval of other aspects of the party’s
agenda. Similarly, in 2020, cracks opened
up in PiS’s majority coalition. So while
single issues have decided entire elections,
the pendulum can swing the other way. In
Poland, the ballot box still has legitimacy,
and matters.
2.2. Hungary
Hungary’s trajectory, and that of its ruling
party, Fidesz, is seen through the prism
of one man: Viktor Orbán.28 A self-styled
defender of Europe from the so-called
“immigrant hordes,” Orbán built up his
power by seizing the opening provided by
a weak opposition, which lost elections in
2014 and 2018.29 The fragmented bunch —
comprising the Social Democrats (MSZP),
green parties (Dialogue and LMP), social
liberal parties (Együtt and DK) and even
Fidesz’s old nationalist tag-along party,
Jobbik — has failed to mount an effective
platform to counter the juggernaut of the
Fidesz-KDNP coalition, which in turn uses
the media and other institutions to cement
its position.
Orbán has openly challenged the
principles of liberal democracy, defending
majoritarian rule as a Hungarian form of
illiberal democracy.30 Hungary has forced
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban before the
bilateral meeting of the Second Belt and Road Forum at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing,
China April 25, 2019. Credit: Andrea Verdelli/Pool via REUTERS/File Photo

out Western-led organizations, including laws were passed democratically in the

Central European University, and used
laws to silence dissenters. At the beginning
of this clampdown, in 2014, authorities
raided nongovernmental organizations such
as the Ökotárs Foundation and DemNet
Hungary, an environmental foundation and
democratic rights foundation, respectively.
The government also raided the homes
of these groups’ leaders and seized
documents and data. These tactics continue,
with Orbán accusing “foreign money,”
particularly George Soros and his Open
Society Foundations, of financing unrest in
Hungary.31 In the first half of 2020, Orbán’s
government passed measures to rein in the
covid-19 risk in the country. Critics of the
restrictions, which lacked a sunset clause
and were seen as further means to silence
opposition media sources, called such
measures draconian; yet even opponents
of Orbán’s government concede that the
parliament, given Fidesz-KDNP veto-proof
majority.32
The democratic and culture wars continued
into the second half of 2020, when
Hungary amended its election laws to erect
even more barriers to the opposition and
changed its constitution to further advance
pro-Christian, anti-LBGT values. Weeks
later, in early December, a staunchly anti-
LBGT Fidesz member of the European
Parliament and minority whip for the
European People’s Party (EPP), József Szájer,
was caught at an alleged gay sex party
in Brussels, despite lockdown laws. He
resigned shortly thereafter. Afterward, EPP
leader Donald Tusk, the former PO Polish
prime minister, suggested Fidesz does not
belong in the center-right EPP.

5
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
Section 3. Wider
Context
3.1. History
Long-standing, systemic issues, like the
legacy of communism, loom over Hungary
and Poland’s democratic development.33
Pathologies originating from the system
persist, while many who benefitted
from the communist regime remain in
power, enriched and well-connected. The
alleged influence of former prominent
party members is often used as a pretext
to introduce sweeping changes. But the
tenacity of powerful elites with roots in the
communist era does not necessarily mean
that post-communist state structures need
a fundamental redesign. And even if it did,
other countries in the region offer useful
examples of how to properly implement
reform, such as Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan
banking reform and Slovakia’s dialogue on
judicial reform.34
3.2. Institutional membership
and sovereignty
The EU is a vociferous critic of democratic
decline, alleging that PiS and Fidesz threaten
values that Poland and Hungary are bound
to uphold as EU members.35 Indeed, the
Polish and Hungarian governments frame
a great deal of what they are doing as acts
of defiance against the EU and assertions
of national sovereignty, which they claim
the EU is undermining. For its part, the
EU has few good options when confronted
with an recalcitrant member.36 Rather
than compelling Poland and Hungary to
honor the collective organization, it risks
ostracizing offenders to the point of forcing
them into a powerful super-minority. And
it further risks creating martyrs or handing
these backsliding parties an alternative
narrative of discord and strife to peddle to
their voters back home.
Fidesz and PiS also know how to exploit
Western liberals’ disapproval of the
6
Hungarian and Polish governments’ us-
versus-them platforms, which are targeted
to those left behind by globalization.37 Both
parties have repeatedly raised the specter of
outside groups — dark-skinned migrants
coming to take jobs or replace churches
with mosques, elite inner circles in Brussels
dictating the rights and wrongs of sovereign
countries. Sincere or not, this rhetoric from
the PiS and Fidesz leaderships are part of a
strategy to tap into issues that resonate with
the population and to channel the public’s
fears, interests, and aspirations into a policy
agenda.
Section 4. Points of
Divergence
Given striking similarities, the two
countries still diverge in important ways
— geopolitical options, the degradation of
economic as well as political institutions
and the hollowing out of the electoral
process. In all, Hungary comes out in a
worse position.
4. 1. Geopolitical options
Poland and Hungary’s geographic locations
have played an important role in their
transitions from communism to democracy
and in informing their current foreign
policy priorities, but their security interests
diverge. Poland’s proximity to Russia, and
Hungary’s to Europe’s southern corridor,
define the policies they adopt toward their
neighbors. In Poland, PiS and PO have
shared most of the same security objectives.
Poland sees itself as staunchly “Western”
in its promotion of democratic values and
norms, and aspires to be a regional leader.38
The country has a forward-looking role in
NATO and strong domestic support for EU
membership. The government in Warsaw
prizes its friendship and security alliance
with the United States. Poland promotes
democracy in developing countries, such as
Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus, and remains
critical of countries that may pose a threat
to that effort, such as Russia.39 Its support
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

A protester walks with the Polish and the EU flag tied together during the demonstration. Under the
slogan «A Walk for Future’’ (Spacer dla Przyszlosci) hundreds of students gathered at the Chancellery
demanding the resignation of Prime Minister, Przemyslaw Czarnek from the ruling Law and Justice
(PiS) party as the minister of education and science, whom they described as «a homophobic
minister proclaiming controversial views.» The Women’s Strike (Strajk Kobiet) and the Youth Strike
for Climate (MSK) also joined the educational strike. Credit: Attila Husejnow / SOPA Images/Sipa USA.

for the demonstrations in Belarus is part of
a desire to establish the Eastern Partnership
countries as a buffer of states firmly linked
to the West to keep Russia at bay and support
democratic development abroad. Poland has
been a welcome home for the Belarusian
opposition and civil society organizations.
Further, Poland wants to avoid confrontation
with Russia or risk being a weak link in
NATO’s eastern border. While it does have
a relationship with China, China has not
yet found an effective way to politically
pressure the Polish government.
Hungary’s foreign policy is best described
as “pragmatic,” according to a pro-Beijing
think tank in Budapest, is “pragmatic.”40
Several of Hungary’s external relationships
complicate its domestic situation. The
country has close ties with Russia, which
includes a deal for Russia’s Rosatom to build
two nuclear reactors there.41 China, too, is
a solid business partner for Hungary, one
that does not make financing and payment
conditional on adherence to democratic
norms or the rule of law. From 2010 to 2016,
China invested between $400m to $600m in
Hungary each year, compared with $200m
to $350m in Poland. Numbers for Slovakia,
Slovenia and the Czech Republic were even
lower.42 According to the UN Conference
on Trade and Development, about 0.22%
of foreign direct investment flowing into
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) from
2010 to 2016 was from China. Of that,
Hungary received 0.4%, compared with
0.17% for Poland.43 Further, the China Global
Investment Tracker shows that 2.08% of

7
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán give a statement on Hungary’s covid-19 preparedness, December 21,
2020. Credit: Prime Minister of Hungary/Miniszterelnok.

FDI in central and eastern Europe was from
China. Of that, Hungary received 7.84%.44
In turn, China has used its relationship
to buy Hungarian silence, as when the
Hungarian government refused to join its
counterparts in the EU, including Poland,
in signing on to the UN’s resolution to
condemn China’s treatment of the Uighurs.45
Hungary is also one of five EU states to
have extradited “economic fugitives” upon
the Chinese government’s request, in the
absence of formal extradition treaties.46
“China may not be trying to force others to
adopt its model,” wrote Aaron Friedberg, a
political scientist at Princeton University,
in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, “but its
actions and example are reinforcing trends
toward authoritarianism in places where
democracy has not yet taken firm root” —
or where it is in decline.47
Hungary has mixed relationships with its
neighbors. Orbán is known for fostering
close partnerships with corrupt governments
in the Balkans and cultivating other
authoritarian leaders.48 His government also
has an increasingly antagonistic relationship
with Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine over
the politicization of Hungarian minorities
in these countries.49 Hungary has issued
passports/citizenship to these extraterritorial
Hungarian minorities, which has resulted
in creating a pro-Fidesz electorate in these
communities. While Hungary remains a
NATO member, there is concern over its
commitment to the Alliance, especially
in light of the allegedly close relationship
between Orbán and Russian President
Vladimir Putin.50 And while Poland has
been accused of copying Hungary, some
argue that Hungary is following Russia’s
lead.51 One source of NATO’s consternation
about Hungary’s commitment is its spat
with Ukraine, to which NATO seeks to

8
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
build close ties, over a Hungarian-speaking
minority in a region of Ukraine that used to
be Hungarian territory.52 The conflict helps
feed a sense of injury that the government
finds useful, even after 100 years, over
the Treaty of Trianon, which carved up
Hungary.53 Some have said the dispute
stems from a strict language law in Ukraine
that disadvantages the Hungarian-speaking
minority, but it predates that dialogue, and
Orbán was talking tough about Hungary’s
neighbor at least as early as 2014.54
4.2. Institutions and
Corruption
Hungary’s economic institutions are suffering
the same decline as its political institutions.
A recent report from the European Anti-
Fraud Office identified Hungary as a top
offender for misappropriation of EU funds.
Hungary has 52 probes into misuse of funds
from 2014-2018 and the office recommended
the EU seek to recover the largest share
of these funds compared to any other EU
member.55 This evidence of corruption is
backed by an investigation by the New York
Times in November 2019, which detailed
graft in EU agricultural funding kickbacks
among Hungary’s elite and well-connected,
highlighting the importance of a personal
relationship to Orbán.56 Then in September
2020, Direkt 36, a nonprofit investigative
news organization in Hungary, described
how Hungarian politicians have long looked
for ways to “play” German politicians and
businesses to their advantage.57 Such self-
dealing is not as advanced in Poland, where
politicians have not moved into business
ownership and clientelist opportunities
to the degree that their counterparts in
Hungary have.
Hungary is increasingly putting political
and economic power into the hands of an
elite from whom it will be difficult to wrest
it back. For all the complaints about Poland’s
judicial changes, they do not create a similar
feedback loop of business and political elite
within the country. Organizations such as
the World Bank and European Bank for
9
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
consistently give Hungary lower marks than
Poland (and other neighboring countries)
for the quality of its regulations and efforts
to combat corruption.58
4.3. The State of Electoral
Democracy
Fidesz may have consolidated power to
the point where elections are no longer
fair, in contrast to Poland, where Freedom
House says the electoral process maintains
its integrity. In Hungary, the score for the
electoral process has steadily declined
as controversial changes to the voting
system have created an institutional bias
in favor of Fidesz. In recent Hungarian
elections, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) warned of
an “overlap between state and ruling party
resources,” and added that opaque campaign
finance, media bias, and “intimidating and
xenophobic rhetoric” hampered voters’
ability to make informed choices.59 Further,
it said the electoral oversight commission
(NVB) consistently favors Fidesz. Finally, the
OSCE noted that the national government
maintains effective control of the State
Audit Office (ÁSZ), which monitors
campaign activities and party spending;
rulings made by the ÁSZ, which is led by a
former member of Fidesz, are final, leaving
opposition parties with little recourse.
It is not certain that Hungary’s current
government can be unseated any longer
by free and fair elections.60 The November
2020 amendments to the electoral law
bar electoral party-list tickets for parties
that fail to run in 50 districts, up from
the previous 27. This effectively prevents
smaller opposition parties from joining
joint lists.61 Poland does not yet face that
situation, evidenced by its close presidential
election and high turnout, but the poor
quality of the campaign leading up to that
election suggests Poland could follow down
this road.
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
Section 5. What can
be done?
Engagement in central and eastern Europe
and the wider European Union should
matter to the United States. The European
Union and its member countries represent
the wider thrust of democracy, vital to U.S.
national security. This is particularly marked
in contrast to great-power competitors
China and Russia, whose views on the
international order are at odds with those of
the EU and U.S. As the United States rises to
meet the challenge of Chinese and Russian
reach, it will need the EU by its side, and the
values that the EU, NATO and U.S. underpin
— democracy and rule of law — to defend
regional security and order. This section
will first evaluate some of the current ideas
on how to respond, and then offer policy
recommendations.
5.1. Current Solutions
There are few legal levers to use in response
to infringements of the rule of law in
another country. In the most serious cases,
governments can sanction individuals,
organizations, government agencies, or
entire industries.
One option is a punitive response to force
reform on Poland and Hungary, possibly by
stripping them of voting rights in the EU,
or even putting them on a membership
probation.At the EU level, the suggestion
to strip voting rights or put the two
offenders on probation is going nowhere;
any disciplinary action is stymied by the
two governments’ defending each other.
This approach also makes it easy to paint
the “elites in Brussels” as bullies who are
singling out Poland and Hungary. The EU
focus on Poland and Hungary also becomes
more untenable as populism, backsliding
and attacks on the rule of law become more
commonplace in other EU countries.
Another idea is to condition the deepening
of U.S./NATO military presence in Poland
on adherence to democratic principles or
10
tying military aid to reform — no reform
means no equipment and no troops.62 This
could include conditioning U.S. weapons
sales on the countries’ rule-of-law reforms.63
But the United States is hardly likely to give
up lucrative weapons deals, especially when
those sales are usually cultivated several
years in advance and when plenty of foreign
rivals are poised to sweep in and take
them. Beyond this, skeptics say linking the
domestic situation in Hungary and Poland to
the region’s U.S.-led security framework —
which would be difficult to restructure and
includes a deeply embedded troop presence
— would be counterproductive, even if it
were possible.64 Denying such infrastructure
on NATO’s eastern flank hurts U.S. security
interests. One source said that since Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, NATO infrastructure
has become like a Rubik’s Cube, and
unscrambling it just to make a point would
be difficult, if not impossible. They point out
that in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine, the
security situation in the region is delicate
and that NATO cohesion, already under
strain, should not be further undermined.
Hungary has already drawn closer to China
and Russia, and punitive measures risk
alienating the country further.65 Acting
unilaterally also undermines the United
States’ reliability as a partner in the eyes of
its allies, who should work together to face
common challenges.
The idea of conditionality does have some
merit. While NATO, like the the EU, lacks
the proper tools to coerce members, Poland
and Hungary made great strides when
the prospect of EU or NATO membership
dangled before them.66 Once a country
joins those groups, however, they no longer
represent a powerful incentive. At this
point, Poland and Hungary are members
of the most exclusive global organizations
with strict membership criteria, such as the
EU, NATO, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, and the
World Trade Organization. But arguments
for relinking EU funding to proper
democratic norms have gained momentum
during the covid-19 bailout discussions.
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki,
May 18, 2018, Credit: NATO.
Using EU measures to rein in Poland and
Hungary has seemed like a lost cause, but as
time passes, the mechanisms have become
more sophisticated, and, as we have already
seen at the end of 2020, they are more likely
to succeed in the coming years.
Finally, a last method is to dodge — to work
with Poland and Hungary as they are, in an
effort to keep them at the table. Hungarian
experts, especially, espouse this approach,
fearing that a punitive West could push
Hungary into the arms of China and Russia,
with whom it has cultivated relationships.
Others point out, though, that it was partly
thanks to this laissez faire approach that the
Hungarian government was able to build
ties with these autocratic regimes in the
first place. They argue that nothing more
can be gained from keeping Hungary at the
table.
11
5.2. Policy Recommendations
Considering the above, U.S. should adopt
a cautious and considered approach
in addressing concerns over perceived
backsliding in Hungary and Poland. The
PiS and Fidesz governments were elected
democratically, and they represent a sizable
number of Polish and Hungarian citizens.
Some recent developments in both countries
are undoubtedly problematic, but to call
foul on the legitimacy of their governments
is unwarranted: It’s important to not treat
them like fully authoritarian regimes.
Advocates of softer measures would steer
away from material threats in favor of more
political finesse, vocal diplomatic pressure
and institutional weight. The actions of
Poland and Hungary come nowhere close
to those of countries that have economic or
targeted personal sanctions leveled against
them, such as Russia, Iran and North Korea.
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
The United States must maintain influence
to address key U.S. interests in the region,
allowing strategic objectives to drive its
diplomatic priorities while keeping its
focus on engaging in areas it can influence.
U.S. policymakers can do this by adopting a
tandem of internal and external measures.
5.2.1. Internal
The U.S. should establish formal tools to
measure the impact of its regional stance on
rule of law and threats to democracy. So far,
U.S. policymakers have reacted to crises or
developments in Poland and Hungary on an
ad hoc basis. They have relied on external
meters to diagnose the problem and have
rushed to do damage control (or not). Instead,
the U.S. should establish its own benchmarks
or metrics to gauge whether developments
in Poland and Hungary (and any ally facing
rule-of-law issues) are impeding strategic
objectives, alongside a plan to reassess the
U.S. response when Poland and Hungary
take measures in line with U.S. goals. Such
measurements and procedures would offer
stability, consistency and transparency to
regional partners and clarify the U.S. role
in encouraging democratic practices and
safeguarding strategic goals in Poland and
Hungary.
The U.S. should take a harder line toward
Hungary’s and Poland’s transgressions,
imposing consequences for violations of the
rule of law. The incoming administration
should make it clear that high-level visits,
bilateral cooperation, economic support and
other benefits will depend on meaningful
changes in Polish and Hungarian behavior
and policy. At the same time, the U.S. must
reassure Poland and Hungary that despite
domestic woes, it would defend them
against an external threat.
In official and unofficial meetings, the
United States should press Poland and
Hungary on actions that threaten the rule
of law or democratic norms, especially
laws that restrict the rights of minorities or
limit freedom of the press. The U.S. should
encourage greater social freedoms where
12
possible, modeling adherence to the rule
of law, political decency and democratic
pluralism at home.
The United States should not condition its
military aid or weapons sales — vital to
U.S. interests in the region — on successful
domestic political reforms or EU dialogue.
But a loosely connected approach could
create an incentive potent enough for the
governments in Warsaw and Budapest to
sit up and take note. For example, the U.S.
could privately insist on serious, good-
faith efforts to revisit certain domestic
developments, particularly in the judiciary,
civil society and media, as part of returning
to the shared values under which Poland
and Hungary came to benefit from a U.S.
troop presence along NATO’s eastern border.
The U.S. should support a vigorous and
well-funded civil society in the region.
The United States has made an enormous
difference in central and eastern Europe
not with military might or arms sales,
but through diplomacy and support for
the organizations and people who create
democracy. It should return to these people-
to-people methods with funding, training,
and teaching and learning opportunities
for Polish and Hungarian NGOs and civil
society, including English- and regional-
language NGOs, which inform an ever-
wider audience.
5.2.2. External
There are compelling reasons to push
for a regional approach to democratic
development. An aggressive diplomatic push
to bring local actors into a regional dialogue
could help realize democratic objectives.
The United States must work with allies
and partners to keep Hungary and Poland
from further degrading the rule of law and
to encourage the governments in Warsaw
and Budapest to cooperate in addressing
shared democratic concerns. The U.S. can
use its considerable influence to push for a
structured dialogue within NATO — alone
or with support from other members —
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban attend a news
conference following their talks in Budapest, Hungary October 30, 2019. Credit: Sputnik/Alexei
Nikolsky/Kremlin via REUTERS.

that explores democratic norms and the
safeguarding of democracy. Indeed, a U.S.
troop presence in the eastern flank offers
more leverage to shape security and political
outcomes. Even a “failed” discussion could
offer a framework for future talks and, later,
arrangements. If dialogue proves difficult,
the U.S. could focus the conversations on
responding to shared security threats, such
as Russian revanchism or the effects of
Chinese economic power.
In parallel, the United States could use
diplomatic power to support a regional EU-
based discussion track. Piggybacking off the
NATO discussion, the U.S. could facilitate a
regional dialogue on issues of rule of law
and democratic norms. Such conversations
would not require any new institution or
official bi- or multilateral declarations. Like
the NATO conversations, these dialogues
would be open-minded and flexible, and
focused on getting many interests and
players at the table. Some conversations
would be best held with U.S. support but
with no U.S. representation — to ensure
that EU countries feel they are properly
representing their regional interests. Other
conversations could include envoys from
Washington. Still others might include
players outside the region, such as Russia
and China. Currently, the more the elites
in Brussels push, the more the Polish
and Hungarian administrations decry an
external EU “threat” in order to legitimize
their power grabs, but adding the U.S. as a
broker alongside the EU to facilitate these
conversations might wear down Poland
and Hungary’s rhetoric. Dialing back the
heat, even a bit, among Poland, Hungary
and the EU would be conducive to creating
structures for future progress.

13
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
Hungary may seek diplomatic
alternatives in Russia or trade
and investment in China,
but these are not truly credible
alternatives to security and
intelligence partnerships with
the United States.
In addition to this, the U.S. and other
regional partners should use Poland and
Hungary’s desire for power and prestige
within international organizations to
leverage for reform. Both countries would
need to feel they had something to gain by
behaving in line with the norms of those
institutions and that they have a legitimate
opportunity to wield influence within such
organizations.
More broadly, the United States needs to
be more consistent in its policy toward the
transatlantic space. This means not fracturing
the EU or threatening the integrity of the
alliance. Lack of predictable U.S. policy in
central and eastern Europe, and indeed the
EU, breeds uncertainty among allies and
partners, which encourages them to act
in ways counter to U.S. policy objectives,
including hedging. This is particularly true
in Hungary, which has cultivated close
relationships with the governments in
Beijing and maintained a close relationship
with Putin’s Russia. The U.S. can expect
Orbán to continue to deepen ties with China
and Russia, which is strategically smart,
but it should use diplomatic ties to remind
Orbán of Hungary’s enduring and important
relationship with the United States. Hungary
may seek diplomatic alternatives in Russia
or trade and investment in China, but
these are not truly credible alternatives to
security and intelligence partnerships with
the United States. At the same time, the
United States should consider not getting
too close to the government in Budapest,
whose continued threats to the rule of law
14
will likely undermine its long-term stability
and which could increasingly turn to Russia
and China for aid. This move away from
Budapest might give the government in
Warsaw pause, as it sees itself as promoting
Western values, in tandem with the U.S., in
its foreign policy.
Both Russia and China have incentives to
maintain or exacerbate the current divide
between central and eastern Europe on
the one hand and the European Union and
United States on the other. China poses a
lesser threat than Russia to the de facto
territorial integrity of countries like Poland
and Hungary, but China throws its weight
and money around in ways that could
further erode democratic norms.
At the same time, when considering its
relationship with Poland and Hungary,
the U.S. should avoid over-emphasizing
its geopolitical competition with China
and Russia. At this point, Poland is firmly
in the “Western” camp. But countries like
Poland and Hungary are encouraged by the
economic opportunities China provides, and
they should not be forced to choose between
the U.S. and “others.” The U.S. should be
mindful of Russian and Chinese activity in
the region but should avoid treating it as
moves in a zero-sum game. China and Russia
still have largely transactional relationships
with Hungary: Russian activity continues
to focus on projection of power, and China
is focused on sowing economic accord
through investment, but the government in
Beijing has not seemed eager to dive into
domestic politics outside of the political
pressure necessary to ensure its own ends.
Finally, because the U.S. is facing some
of the same domestic issues as Poland
and Hungary, it has an opportunity to
speak to the two CEE countries peer-
to-peer. Common experience could be a
starting point for recommitting to values
underlying a healthy democracy. President
Biden’s remark at an October 2020 town
hall lumping Poland and Hungary in with
Belarus as “totalitarian” is not conducive
to a constructive dialogue. Indeed, Biden’s
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?
victory has gotten a frosty greeting in Poland
and Hungary (as opposed to other Western
countries), as the two countries anticipate
the shift in strategy from the incoming U.S.
government. But the Biden Administration
could echo the dialogue of healing and
return to civility — which it has used
domestically — in addressing such topics
on the transatlantic space and bi-lateral ties.
5.3 Conclusion
A more constructive approach to Poland
and Hungary is essential for sustainable
democratic development and U.S. interests
in the CEE region. A successful strategy
15
will require resilient diplomacy backed
by rhetoric that reinforces stability rather
than provoking confrontation. With this
in mind, the U.S. should not shrink away
from calling out its allies on their more
egregious policies that harm the region’s
most vulnerable communities. The focus
must be on keeping Poland and Hungary
from decline while encouraging cooperation
on shared goals. As a part of this, the U.S.
should bring in the EU and NATO members
to uphold democratic norms. Managing
the transatlantic relationship — of which
Hungary and Poland are a vital part — is
a long-term project that can only succeed
though pluralism, open dialogue and a
shared set of values and objectives.
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

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Endnotes
1 De la Baume, M. and Von Der Burchard, H. (2020). “Von der Leyen threatens EU recovery fund without
Hungary and Poland”. Politico. Dec. 2, 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-commission-proposes-eu-
recovery-without-hungary-and-poland/>
2 European Parliament. (2020). «Public Opinion in the EU in Times of covid-19 (3rd survey),» Kantar. Oct. 20,
2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20201020RES89705/20201020RES89705.pdf>
3 Bayer, L. (2020). «EU budget plan lets Hungary, Poland off the rule-of-law hook (for now),” Politico. Dec. 9,
2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-budget-plan-lets-hungary-poland-off-the-rule-of-law-hook-for-
now/>

European Parliament. (2020). «Parliament approves the «rule of law conditionality» for access to EU funds,”
Press Room. Dec. 16, 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20201211IPR93622/
parliament-approves-the-rule-of-law-conditionality-for-access-to-eu-funds>
4 Hungary was the only country in Europe to slide from the category of semi-consolidated democracy to a
hybrid regime; Poland was downgraded from “consolidated democracy” to “semi-consolidated democracy.”
5 Krekó and Enyedi, 2018; Szabolcs, 2020.
6 European Commission and the European Court of Justice, 2019; Sadurski, 2019; Przeworski, 2019)
7 White Paper on the Reform of the Judiciary, Government of Poland, 2018, https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/
files/white_paper_en_full.pdf; Sadecki, 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_41_in-a-state-of-
necessity_net.pdf
8 Charnysh, V. “The Rise of Poland’s Far Right. How Extremism Is Going Mainstream”. Foreign Affairs. December
18, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2017-12-18/rise-polands-far-right; Piatkowski, 2018;
Rodrik, 2019.
9 Bernhard et al., 2020; In a forthcoming book, Ganev provides an indicative review of the early exploration
of opinions and phenomenon, including: Seleny, A. “Communism’s Many Legacies in East-Central Europe,”
Journal of Democracy, Vo.18, No.3 ( July 2007), pp.156-170; Mungiu-Pippidi, A. “ EU Accession is No End of
History,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.18, No.4 (October 2007); Greskowits, B. “Economic Woes and Political
Disaffection,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.18, No.4 (October 2007), pp.40-46; Krastev, I.“The Strange Death of the
Liberal Consensus,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.18, No 4 (October 2007), pp.56-63; Rupnik, J. “From Democracy
Fatigue to Populist Backlash,” Journal of Democracy, Vo.18, No.4 (October 2007). Plattner, M. and Diamond, L.
“Is Eastern Europe Backsliding?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No.3 (October 2007).
10 I.e., Poland and Hungary achieved a certain level of transition toward democracy and are now moving away
from their earlier achievements.
11 Developments in Poland and Hungary are the result of a series of pre-meditated actions aimed at making
the countries more autocratic. Bárd, P. and Kochenov, D. (2018). “The Four Element s of the Autocrats’
Playbook”. Reconnect: 19 September 2018. <https://reconnect-europe.eu/blog/autocrats-playbook/>; social media
discussions on Poland and Hungary, 2020.
12 EBRD (2020). «Coronavirus and the global economy: what next?», Comments from EBRD Chief Economist
Beata Javorcik, April 16, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/ebrdhq/videos/coronavirus-and-the-global-economy-
what-next/2541071709500407/>

18
 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

13 The literature on this is diverse and dense. V-Dem suggests (1) liberal, (2) electoral, (3) participatory, (4)
deliberative, and (5) egalitarian democracy (2020). Freedom House’s scale ranges from (1) consolidated and (2)
semi-consolidated democracies to (3) transitional governments or hybrid regimes, then (4) semi-consolidated
to (5) consolidated authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2020). Others have suggested the terms are
altogether unhelpful and confusing. There are also ratings’ scales to consider. This includes the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) development indicators; Transparency International’s corruption
ratings; the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (which includes corruption, red tape, and payoff threats); and
the OSCE and OECD’s human rights and business assessments. But no rating scale is without its own biases
and problems (Cooley and Snyder, 2016).
14 Interview with Grzymala-Busse, 2020.
15 Ibid, 2020; Grzymala-Busse, A., Kuo, D., Fukuyama, F., and McFaul, M. (2020). “Global Populisms and Their
Challenges”, Freedom Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.
16 Grzymala-Busse, Kuo, Fukuyama, and McFaul, 2020.
17 Mukand and Rodrik 2018; Velasco, 2020.
18 Rodrik, D. (2019). “Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture, and the Rise of Right-Wing
Populism”. <https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/publications/why-does-globalization-fuel-populism-economics-
culture-and-rise-right-wing>
19 Krastev, 2007; interview with Ganev, 2020.
20 Kelmen, R. D. and Orenstein, M. (2016). “Europe’s Autocracy Problem: Polish Democracy’s Final Days?” Foreign
Affairs. January 7, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2016-01-07/europes-autocracy-problem
21 Benedikter, R. and Pawl Karolewski, I. (2016). “Poland is Not Hungary: A Response to ‘Poland’s Consistutional
Crisis’”. Foreign Affairs. September 21, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2016-09-21/
poland-not-hungary
22 Figlerowicz, M. (2019). “Poland’s Right Won the Day, But Not the Future: New Parties and New Voters
Make Themselves Heard”. Foreign Affairs. October 25, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
poland/2019-10-25/polands-right-won-day-not-future
23 Rohac, 2018.
24 An example of the former charge was the removal by the PiS-controlled Sejm (lower house of parliament)
of the requirement for MPs to officially declare side work/incomes/contracts, which opposition MPs claim
could fuel corruption. As for the second criticism, the summer 2020 presidential election campaign saw the
PiS peddle conspiracy theories while regularly labelling dissenting voices as “enemies of the people” or as
problematic to Poland (Zaborowski, 2020).
25 Shotter, J. “Poland’s government sets its sights on private media,” Financial Times. October 25, 2020. https://
www.ft.com/content/06ead126-f8ee-414e-9c2d-f31ad9ac4ce1
26 Piatkowski, 2018; discussions on Polish social media, 2018–2020.
27 Despite this, support for the EU remains high in Poland, and most Poles oppose a “Polexit”.
28 Lendvai, P. (2019). “The Transformer: Orbán’s Evolution and Hungary’s”. Foreign Affairs, September/October
2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2019-08-12/transformer
29 Krekó, P. and Juhász, A. (2015). “Scaling the Wall: Hungary’s Migration Debate”. Foreign Affairs. July 20, 2015,<
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2015-07-30/scaling-wall>
30 Ibid.
31 DW. (2018). “Viktor Orban’s campaign against George Soros ‘mercenaries’,” <https://www.dw.com/en/
viktor-orbans-campaign-against-george-soros-mercenaries/a-44954661>; Krekó, P. and Juhász, A. (2014).
“Silencing Dissent: Hungary’s Crackdown on NGOs”. Human Rights First, September 18, 2014. <https://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/blog/silencing-dissent-hungary-s-crackdown-ngos>
32 Interview with anonymous Hungarian civil society source, April 2020.
33 Michta, C. (2020) Center for European Policy Analysis.

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 What Can We Do about Poland and Hungary?

34 Spáč, S, Šimalčík, M. and Šípoš, G. (2018). “Let’s Judge the Judges: How Slovakia Opened Its Judiciary to
Unprecedented Public Control”. Transparency International Slovakia, <https://transparency.sk/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/Impact-Study_pdf_final.pdf>; <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22500493/slovakia-is-closer-to-the-
judiciary-reform-cabinet-approved-the-draft-document.html>
35 European Commission (2020). “2020 Rule of law report — Communication and country chapters”. Justice
and Consumers. September 30, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-
re port-communication-and-country-chapters_en
36 Dempsey (2018) “NATO’s Bad Apples” Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75962
37 This is effectively explored in Rodrik, 2019.
38 Interview with Anonymous, April 2020.
39 Polish Foreign Policy Strategy, 2017.
40 “Hungary external relations briefing: Hungarian foreign policy in 2019. China-CEE Institute. 2 March 2020.
<https://china-cee.eu/2020/03/02/hungary-external-relations-briefing-hungarian-foreign-policy-in-2019/>
41 Dunai, M. “Rosatom’s Paks nuclear project in Hungary delayed”. Reuters. 6 October 2017. <https://br.reuters.
com/article/us-rosatom-hungary-nuclearpower-idUSKBN1CB2FT>
42 Szunomar, A. (2018). “Chinese FDI in Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview of Factors Motivating Chinese
MNEs in the CEE Region”. Research Group on Development Economics Institute of World Economics, Centre
for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences cf MOFCOM/NBS (2017).
43 UNCTAD. “Global value chains: investment and trade for development”. United Nations, New York and
Geneva.
44 China Global Investment Tracker, (2017), Chinese Investment Dataset.
45 Basu, Z. (2020). “More countries join condemnation of China over Xinjiang abuses,” Axios, 8 October 2020.
<https://www.axios.com/un-statement-china-uighurs-xinjiang-6b29dbf5-b93c-4c70-bd4c-333e1c23471f.html>
46 https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-pitfalls-of-law-enforcement-cooperation-with-china/; By contrast, when
the US requested the extradition of two Russian arms smugglers from Hungary to US to face charges, Hungary
denied the request and sent them to Russia instead (where they apparently got off the hook). https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-hungary-idUSKCN1NW1I0.
47 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-10-23/overreach-china-hawks
48 For example, Orbán gave refuge to the former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, who was
sentenced to prison on corruption charges, e.g., <https://euobserver.com/opinion/143489>; Orbán has also
teamed up with Vucic of Serbia and Slovenia’s Janza after all have faced criticism for their less democratic
tendencies, e.g., <https://www.politico.eu/article/epp-rebels-lay-out-political-vision-viktor-Orbán-janez-jansa-
aleksandar-vucic/>
49 Terenzani, et al. (2020). “Slovak Election to Test Orban’s Clout among Ethnic Hungarians”, Balkan Insight,
February 12, 2020. <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/12/slovak-election-to-test-orbans-clout-among-ethnic-
hungarians/>
50 Something that Orbán has always dismissed as necessary, but that has caused considerable concern among
allies. https://www.dw.com/en/vladimir-putin-and-viktor-Orbáns-special-relationship/a-45512712; https://www.
rferl.org/a/putin-to-visit-eu-nation-hungary-as-russian-presence-grows/30243531.html; https://www.ft.com/
content/9a1988e4-f8ff-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6.
51 Rohac, D., “Hungary Is Turning Into Russia,” Foreign Affairs, April 12, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/hungary/2017-04-12/hungary-turning-russia>.
52 MacKinnon, A. (2019). “Did Hungary’s Viktor Orban Turn Trump Against Ukraine?” Foreign Policy, October 22,
2019. < https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/22/hungary-ukraine-feud-viktor-Orbán-trump-russia/>
53 In a 2020 poll, 94% of Hungarians view the treaty as unjust and excessive, e.g., <https://hungarytoday.hu/
survey-majority-hungarians-trianon-treaty-unjust-excessive/>
54 Gardner, A. (2014). “Orbán to Ukraine: give Hungarians autonomy,» POLITICO, May 15, 2014, <https://www.
politico.eu/article/orban-to-ukraine-give-hungarians-autonomy/>

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55 The OLAF Report 2019. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/olaf_

report_2019_en.pdf>
56 Gebrekidan, S., Apuzzo, M., and Novak, B. (2019). “The Money Farmers: How Oligarchs and Populists Milk the
EU for Millions,” The New York Times. November 3, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/world/europe/
eu-farm-subsidy-hungary.html>
57 Szabolcs, P. (2020). “How Orbán played Germany, Europe’s great power,” Direkt 36. September 18, 2020.
<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/a-magyar-nemet-kapcsolatok-rejtett-tortenete/?fbclid=IwAR1mzzgXoK1sdVQMIc
HSdl4iMjFppKeAYn3XcvbSWCpLJbb9xr6io_AxK5Y>
58 EBRD Transition report, 2019.
59 OSCE election assessment, Hungary. April 9, 2018. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/377404
60 Diamond, L. and Kovacs, Z. (2019). “How Democracy Is Hungary?” Foreign Affairs. September/October 2019.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2019-08-15/how-democratic-hungary
61 Inotai, E. (2020). “Fidesz Submits New Laws to Shore Up Position Before Next Election». Balkan Insight.
Nov. 11, 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/11/fidesz-submits-new-laws-to-shore-up-position-before-
next-election/: “The most controversial of the bills was submitted just one minute before midnight and is an
attempt to modify the country’s electoral law [...] The government argues that the modification is designed to
target what it calls “pseudo-parties”, which run only to get public funding.”
62 Zaborowski, 2020; interview with Anonymous think tank source 2, May 2020
63 Zaborowski, 2020; interview with Anonymous defense source, May 2020.
64 Interview with Anonymous think tank source 1, May 2020.
65 Ibid.
66 Dempsey, J. (2020). “Judy Asks: Can Europe Save Democracy in Hungary and Poland?” Carnegie Europe. May 7,
2020. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/81732

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