Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud

Poland and the international system: external

influences on democratic consolidation
*
F. Steves
Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK

Abstract

Democratization in Poland has been heavily influenced by agents and structures external to
the Polish state. However, the influence of these external agencies is mediated through dom-
estic social and political institutions, the state foremost among them. The Polish state’s
response to and interaction with external agencies is heavily conditioned by the very process
of democratization which these agencies seek to influence. Thus, the impact of external agenc-
ies on the democratic consolidation process cannot be understood without reference to the
influence that democratization has played in reshaping Poland’s foreign relations. This paper
explains the interaction between systemic and domestic factors in shaping the democratic con-
solidation process in Poland.  2001 The Regents of the University of California. Published
by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Democratization; Poland; Foreign policy; NATO/EU enlargement; Central Europe; Pan-Euro-
pean organizations

Introduction

Democratization in Poland, as in many countries across Eastern and Central Eur-

ope, was precipitated and has been heavily influenced by agents and structures exter-
nal to the Polish state. While the consensus within the democratization literature has
stressed the importance of domestic factors in democratic transition and consoli-
dation, the Polish case demonstrates the critical role of external factors in influencing
democratic consolidation. However, democratic elites and domestic populaces are
not merely passive objects of external influence; they are active agents of change who

* Tel.: +44-1206-872751; fax: +44-1206-873598.

E-mail address: fmstev@essex.ac.uk (F. Steves).

0967-067X/01/$ - see front matter  2001 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 9 6 7 - 0 6 7 X ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 1 2 - 5
340 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

respond to, and thus condition, external agencies (Pollard, 1999). These responses are
heavily conditioned by the very process of democratization which external agencies
seek to affect, because the influence of external agencies on the consolidation process
is mediated through domestic social, economic and political institutions, the state
foremost among them. The state responds to external actors primarily through formal
channels of foreign relations. Thus, the impact of external agencies on the democratic
consolidation process cannot be understood without reference to the influence that
democratization has played in reshaping Poland’s foreign relations.
Analysis of foreign policy in democratizing states is more complex than in states
with stable regimes, as it must take account of the impact that political change has
on the domestic politics of foreign policy, and the way that the (re)construction of
domestic political institutions and the reconfiguration of elite coalitions shape the
foreign policies espoused by a range of competing domestic elites. Democratization
has a tendency to radicalize the domestic politics of foreign policy. Societies
undergoing ‘triple transition’ (Offe, 1991) evolve through a unique set of institutional
and socioeconomic constraints which create complex and evolutionary distributions
of state power. This shifting power landscape, when combined with weak insti-
tutional constraints, puts foreign relations on the electoral agenda, with competing
elites utilizing foreign policy as one resource to garner domestic popular support.
This paper explores the complex linkage between democratization and shifts in
Poland’s foreign relations to shed analytical light on the interaction between systemic
and domestic factors in the democratic consolidation process in Poland. A description
of how important external agencies have attempted to influence domestic politics in
the Polish transition is given first. These include prospective European Union (EU)
membership; participation with and eventual accession to NATO; pan-European
organizations, such as the OSCE and Council of Europe; and regional security and
economic associations. Particular focus is given to how domestic political and social
structures and elite interactions have shaped the Polish response to these external
agencies, and how these responses have determined the success or failure of external
influences. The paper concludes with some observations on the possible future effects
of external agencies on Polish domestic politics.

Prospective EU membership

The European Union has been one of the two most important external influences
on the democratic consolidation process in Poland (see Sandford, 1999a,b). Prospec-
tive EU membership has been both a passively influential set of incentive structures
which have shaped and conditioned the behaviour of Polish political elites, and an
active agent of political reform. EU and NATO memberships represent the two pillars
of the ‘return to Europe’ project, which includes the adoption and institutionalization
of ‘Western’ norms of social, political and economic organization. Complementary
to its role as an influential external agent, prospective EU membership has also been,
and remains, a central foreign policy issue of political relevance within Poland. The
debates around the reform necessary for EU membership have shaped the evolution
 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352 341

of post-communist Polish foreign policy and the consolidation of democracy dom-

estically.
The primary mechanism of influence emanating from Brussels has been the struc-
tural and behavioural prerequisites which Poland has had to fulfil at each successive
stage of the accession process. The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993
introduced a number of preconditions for Polish and CEE accession to the Union,
including stability of democratic institutions; respect for the rule of law, human
rights, and the rights and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning
market economy operating under competitive conditions; the ability of the candidate
to assume the obligations of membership; and acceptance of the goals of political,
economic and monetary union (Harasimowicz and Pietras, 1994, p. 63). The Copen-
hagen criteria make a qualitative distinction between the “stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights” as a general precondition
for accession, and a second precondition, the “respect for and protection of min-
orities.” (Sigma, 1998, p. 43). The political project of joining the West thus requires
that Poland demonstrates “clean human-rights records, meticulous adherence to
Western economic and political norms, and tolerance toward both neighbouring
countries and national minorities.” (Janos, 1995, p. 160). While there might be
occasional ‘ethnic nationalist lapses’ by prominent politicians, these have been inter-
preted as exceptions to the strong commitment of a presumed broad liberal or civic
political mainstream, promising to overcome backwardness “by adjusting their econ-
omic, political and legal institutions to square with the models presented by the more
advanced West.” (Janos, 1995, pp. 160–161).
The process of application to and negotiations with the EU has been a long, com-
plex and at times frustrating process for Polish political elites, who nevertheless have
remained firmly committed to the return to Europe project over the past decade.
Informal negotiations with the EU began soon after the collapse of communist rule
in 1990. Poland was then admitted to associate membership of the EU in 1993, and
formally applied for full membership in April 1994. The review process for appli-
cations, however, was begun only in late 1996. As a preliminary step to establishing
the economic conditions necessary for membership, Poland entered into bilateral
negotiations with the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), a free trade regime
including most EU members as well as some European states which had remained
outside the EU. The objective was Poland’s admission to EFTA as a preliminary
step to EU membership, and the 1992 agreement between EFTA and the EU was
intended to create a common market, reinforcing the integration of Poland’s economy
with that of Western Europe.
As negotiations between the EU and the CEE applicants progressed, internal
changes within the EU were also being negotiated and implemented, partly in order
to prepare the institutions of the Union, and the existing member states, for its expan-
sion to include as many as 15 new members. The Schengen Protocol, established in
1990, stipulates that the agreement “must be accepted in full by all States candidate
for admission.” In other words, candidate states are not eligible for existing
optouts — even if they might be able to negotiate long transition periods for
implementing the acquis, which may, de facto, turn out to be quasi-permanent. The
342 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

refusal of optout is, in any case, a clear indication that existing members are determ-
ined to curb exceptionalism (Edwards and Phillippart, 1988, p. 39). In this sense,
Schengen has limited the manoeuvrability of Polish political elites vis à vis the
accession criteria and curtailed the possibilities for elites to make demands on the
EU to develop or satisfy domestic political audiences.
Negotiations over prospective EU membership have not only been conducted
between Warsaw and Brussels, but also on a bilateral basis with other prominent
EU member states. Polish elites believed, particularly in the first half of the 1990s,
that “the path to Western Europe must lead through Germany.” (Guérin-Sendelbach
and Rulkowski, 1994p. 247). The German leadership, concerned to centre Germany
in the heart of Europe, has responded to the Polish regime’s aspirations, becoming
the leading sponsor of EU membership for the Visegrád states and assuming a key
role in vouching for the admissibility of the Visegrád states to an integrated Europe
(Freudenstein, 1998). This reliance on Germany as Poland’s chief backer for its
return to Europe served to reduce significantly the mobilizational power of anti-
German rhetoric within Poland’s domestic political sphere.
The EU has been an actively influential agent in the Polish transition through a
variety of mechanisms. Foremost amongst these has been the variety of multilateral
and bilateral aid and loans programmes implemented since 1990. From 1990–1995
the G-24 made a total of $21.5 billion in assistance commitments to Poland, of which
more than 45% came from the EU (Ners, 1996, pp. 63–65). From 1990–1996, the
EU’s ‘Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy’
(PHARE) alone made grants to Poland of almost $1.7 billion, while Germany,
France, Italy, and the European Investment Bank issued credits to Poland in excess
of $4 billion (Ners, 1996, p. 67). From 1991–1994, more than $10.2 billion was
disbursed, more than 50% of which came from European multi and bilateral aid
programmes (Ners, 1996, p. 58). The long term objective of this transition assistance
is to enable Poland to build a self-sustaining market economy and viable civil society;
the medium term goal is the removal of critical barriers to accession, the mobilization
of foreign and domestic resources and the improved allocation of resources once
macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment are achieved. Both the international
financial institutions (IFIs) and the EU states have imposed a combination of explicit
and implicit, political and economic conditionalities on this massive aid programme,
which included first and foremost commitment to marketization, liberalization, and
democratic consolidation (Gomulka, 1995).
Through the gradual accession process, policies advocated by Western govern-
ments and foreign advisors have generated unforeseen domestic political conse-
quences (Millard, 1996, p. 205). Despite widespread commitment to EU accession
among Polish elites and electorate, there has nevertheless been significant disagree-
ment among Polish political elites over the speed and nature of the return to Europe.
As the post-revolutionary euphoria began to dissipate in 1990–1991, it was met by
growing discontent and even limited opposition to Poland’s economic and political
integration with Western Europe. The Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments (1989–
1991) espoused a liberal internationalist ideological stance toward Europe, advocat-
ing a ‘Europe of regions’ in which Poland’s national identity would be preserved
 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352 343

alongside its emerging European identity. This perspective on Europe was captured
by Skubiszewski, who argued that European integration “is no threat to national
identity but rather enhances its fuller development.” (Polytika, 1992).
In the 1990–1993 period, the ex-communist alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)
and Polish Peasant Party (PSL) was broadly opposed to the return to Europe project
drawn up by Skubiszewski and driven by the Solidarity coalition. However, this
position was “not so much a symptom of a dislike of the West in general but a
reflection of fears that too hasty and ill-prepared bids to enter Euro-Atlantic structures
might lead to an unnecessary destabilization of the situation in Central Europe.”
(Rosati, 1999, p. 12). Olszewski’s right-wing nationalist government, in office from
December 1991 to June 1992, focused its energies on uncovering communist con-
spiracies and made little progress on negotiations with the EU. Through the economic
turbulence of 1992 and 1993 social discontent continued to grow and even embraced
some xenophobic and nationalist traits (Millard, 1996, p. 205). The nationalist–popu-
list parties (Centre Accord, Christian National Alliance (ZChN), and Confederation
for Independent Poland (KPN)), while committed strongly to NATO membership,
were less pro-European than the liberal and even social-democratic parties. They
tended to see Europe as potentially threatening the erosion of Polish national identity
and condemned the Association Agreement as weakening Poland’s ability to protect
its ‘national interests’ (Millard, 1996, p. 210). Although Suchocka’s ‘Solidarity
coalition’ was firmly committed to Europe, the Pawlak-led Social Democrat (SdRP)-
PSL government which succeeded it pursued a more ambivalent policy toward Euro-
peanization and favoured closer relations with Russia. However, despite Western
(and Solidarity) fears about the strength of the ex-communists’ commitment to
democracy and market reforms, no significant political formation seriously favoured
the ‘Eastern option’ of closer political and security association with Russia (Millard,
1996, pp. 205–206).
The fact that obstacles to integration with the West still remain ten years after the
fall of communism has begun to erode popular support for Europeanization and the
European idea. The extended delay in accession is beginning to cause resentment
and even popular opposition to Polish membership, and anti-European political elites
are capitalizing on this declining consensus for domestic political gain1. Following
the election of the Solidarity Electoral Alliance-Freedom Union (AWS-UW)
coalition government in 1997, matters relating to EU accession quickly came to
dominate Polish political discourse (Blacyca and Kolkiewicz, 1999, p. 131). As a
result of several fiascos in the domestic political preparations for accession, including
the failure of a number of PHARE applications and the sacking of the minister in

1
Blacyca and Kolkiewicz report a consistent decline in popular support for Poland’s accession to the
EU, from 72% in April 1997 to 64% in February 1998 and to 58% in June 1998. From May 1998 to
May 1999, Polish support for EU membership declined from 60% to 55% among the general populace,
with ‘no’ increasing from 23% to 26%. This compares with 60% support for and 23% opposition to
NATO membership in March 1999, immediately before accession. Among farmers, ‘yes’ respondents on
EU membership declined from 25 to 23% between March 1998 and June 1999, while ‘no’ more than
doubled from 21 to 46%. See Blacyca and Kolkiewicz (1999); Economist (1999).
344 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

charge of the Europe Committee, the issue of ‘Europe’ commanded the domestic
political scene and buffeted the ruling parties. Under the Buzek government, prep-
arations for EU accession have become inextricably intertwined with macroeconomic
reforms, and political leaders opposed to European integration, even within the nom-
inally pro-European governing coalition, have taken a staunch protectionist line with
regard to economic and trade reforms. As many as 60 AWS coalition MPs hail from
parties such as the KPN-OP and ZChN, both of which had opposed Poland’s Europe
Agreement; indeed, their leaders, Adam Słomka and Marian Piłka, were deputy lead-
ers of the AWS before the KPN-OP and some ZChN MPs left the coalition (Blacyca
and Kolkiewicz, 1999, p. 134).
However, the overall picture of the domestic political debate has been one of the
specific details of EU entry, rather than conflict over the fundamental principles of
policy direction. Despite the evolving bandwagon effect of anti-European sentiment,
particularly in times of political crisis, no mainstream political parties or elites have
proposed an end to Poland’s ambitious crusade to return to Europe. The EU itself
has been effective both in directly influencing the democratic consolidation process,
as well as continuing to serve as a set of strong incentives for Polish domestic polit-
ical and economic reforms in order to fulfil the Copenhagen and Schengen criteria,
including civilian control of the armed forces, successful democratic consolidation,
and minority rights protection. Overall, the EU has served to stabilize both Poland’s
post-communist foreign policy and the processes of political democratization and
economic liberalization.

NATO membership, real and imagined

Poland pursued NATO membership for two distinct reasons, which reflected a
wide range of strategic and domestic political goals. First, on strategic grounds,
NATO membership would serve as a guarantee of Polish independence and security
between Germany and Russia. Being a member of NATO would allow Poland to
escape its role as the ‘weak partner’ in the Berlin–Warsaw–Moscow triangle by
using the presence of the United States in the region as leverage against its powerful
neighbours. This was particularly important as it was clear in the early 1990s that
the US would always consider Russia an important partner in the global arena, and
NATO membership would ensure that Poland’s interests were not sacrificed to the
US’s’ global interests. Furthermore, it was hoped that full NATO engagement in
Eastern Europe would prevent the US return to isolationism (Ananicz, et al., 1995,
p. 7). This was particularly important in terms of balancing Poland’s two powerful
neighbours: US withdrawal from Europe would create an insecure Germany which
would be likely to seek rapprochement with Russia (Lentowicz, 1992). The fear of
a Russian–German accord concluded without Polish participation is deeply ingrained
within both Polish elites and the general public.
Second, there was an important normative return to Europe symbolism associated
with NATO membership. NATO and EU represented, in the words of the former
Foreign Minister, the “two principal institutions of the Western World,” and member-
 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352 345

ship in NATO would serve as the ultimate stamp of approval of ‘the West,’ effec-
tively conferring their external legitimation on the transitional regime’s reform
efforts. In the immediate aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet bloc, Wałe
sa and
his Solidarity supporters seemed determined to press for full NATO membership as
soon as possible. Western sensitivity to Russian concerns — particularly following
Boris Yeltsin’s August 1993 reversal on Poland’s accession to NATO — only served
to strengthen the cross-party consensus on the necessity of NATO membership to
fulfil Poland’s security requirements and ensure the success of Poland’s return to
Europe (Millard, 1996, p. 210).
Poland’s official cooperation with NATO began in December 1991 when, at the
Rome summit, nine countries from CEE (including Poland, Hungary, Czech and
Slovak Republics) and South Central Europe (SCE) were invited to join the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In January 1994, the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) programme was launched and until the end of 1995 the same nine states were
members. Since the inception of the PfP, Poland was a leading critic of what it
saw as a halfway house for Eastern Europe. In mid-1994 Polish Defence Minister,
Kołodziejczyk attacked the PfP plan for not making clear how a state was to move
from partnership in the PfP to full NATO membership (Taras, 1995, p. 248). As
with the EU, NATO established various tests of ‘Europeanness’ which all prospective
alliance members had to fulfil prior to accession, including civilian control of the
armed forces, satisfactory assessment by NATO of the strength of democracy,
defence and foreign policy, military posture, and regional relations (such as the
ability to work together in the Visegrád Group (VG)). After Poland’s inclusion in
the NACC and PfP, preliminary association with the Western European Union
(WEU) — an organization established in 1954 to work closely with NATO in ensur-
ing security for states in the EC — was put forward as yet another test for eventual
admission to NATO (Taras, 1995, p. 248).
In July 1994 Bill Clinton visited Poland and announced a $100 million fund for
carrying out joint military programmes with democratic partners in Central Europe,
and highly publicized joint exercises were carried out in Poland shortly thereafter.
In September 1994 the US Congress passed an amendment offering Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic preferential terms for arms purchases from the US (Taras,
1995, p. 248). In April 1995 the US House of Representatives passed a resolution
supporting NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. In response, Russia threatened to
scrap both the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-2) and the Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaties if the Visegrád four were granted accession to
NATO. To counter Russian influence, Wałe
sa redoubled efforts to secure speedy
admission, and even the recently appointed ex-communist Prime Minister Józef Ole-
sky visited NATO headquarters in Brussels to argue Poland’s case. In late May 1997
at the Sintra summit, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created with
forty-four members in place of NACC as still another step toward closer cooperation.
Finally, in July 1997 at the Madrid summit, NATO extended its invitation for full
membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Despite its 1990–1993 opposition to the rapid return to Europe campaign, and its
concern not to alienate Russia, the SLD/PSL coalition which took control of the
346 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

National Assembly in 1993 and the presidency in 1995 made a rapid policy reversal
in 1993–1994 to embrace a strongly pro-European policy line. After 1993 SLD lead-
ers “spoke out more and more boldly for joining NATO; they were also whole-
heartedly in favour of integration with the EU. Furthermore, a firm commitment
to the Euro-Atlantic option had featured prominently in Aleksander Kwasniewski’s
campaign manifesto.” (Rosati, 1999, p. 12). This enhanced all-party agreement on
NATO and EU memberships — a clear response to popular and elite perception of
the necessity of binding Poland’s security and economic future with the West —
greatly reduced the politicization of foreign policy issues and the concomitant likeli-
hood of elites utilizing competitive prestige strategies to vie for public support.
Nevertheless, the extended and complex set of preconditions which Poland has had
to fulfil in order to achieve NATO membership has been a source of both domestic
discontent as well as vocal debates about the costs associated with the return to Euro-
pe.
There has been significant debate over constitutionally defined civilian control of
the armed forces, particularly between 1992 and 1996 when there was protracted
conflict over whether the President and the Chief of the General Staff, or the Prime
Minister and Defence Minister should control the armed forces (Herspring, 2000, pp.
89–94). NATO accession necessitated a clear demonstration of the armed services’
subjection to civilian control, and Wałe
sa’s objective was to convert the military into
a defensive force capable of participating as an equal in NATO collective security
arrangements. Encouraged by Wałe
sa’s decision not to pursue a radical programme
of purges, the officer corps has not opposed Poland’s new strategic doctrine, which
entails transformation from an offensive-oriented mass army to one that is smaller,
more mobile, more capable of defending the country from all directions, and inte-
grated with its NATO partners (Koziej, 1999). The Polish military elite’s enthusiasm
for NATO membership — and the corresponding willingness to institute structural
reforms in order to prepare Poland for accession — was bolstered by Kołodziejczyk’s
push for bilateral arrangements with NATO to secure financial assistance for mod-
ernization of the Polish forces (Herspring, 2000).
In this respect the Polish army has proven itself to be a positive force for Europe-
anization and democratic stabilization. Certainly by the time of Poland’s formal invi-
tation to join NATO in 1997, the Poles had satisfied NATO’s demands, with the
armed services demonstrating a clear willingness to modernize and adapt national
defence strategy to bring Poland into line with its prospective NATO partners. Pol-
and’s NATO membership thus ensures its security as well as providing for the legi-
timation of the military corps in its role as a civilian controlled institution. The
relative lack of serious disagreement within Poland over the propriety of civilian
control, the new strategic doctrine, and the army’s ‘about-face’ to assume an
important role within the former enemy alliance, coupled with the armed forces’
willingness to accept its diminished role, have greatly facilitated post-communist
transition and successful democratic consolidation.
NATO membership and the radical change in Poland’s geopolitical situation have
dramatically altered popular and elite perception of Poland’s regional and global
security status. This sense of security deepened through the 1990s as Poles watched
 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352 347

the collapse of the Russian Federation as a dominant regional power. When Poland
entered NATO in March 1999, it was clear to elites and the polity alike that Poland
was now secure from external invasion and Poland’s independence was more
strongly guaranteed by its NATO membership than it had been for over 200 years.
Thus, there has been no significant external threat or ‘other’ on which elites might
capitalize for domestic political gain.

Pan-European organizations

On assuming the Foreign Ministerial post in 1989, Skubiszewski immediately set

about integrating Poland into the structures and networks of European international
relations (Millard, 1996, p. 219). This programme has been extremely successful:
since 1989 Poland has concluded a series of pan-European, regional and transnational
agreements, ranging from participation in the OSCE to the establishment of the four-
member VG. The collapse of the bipolar world has led to the creation of a new kind
of supreme authority through an organic web of all-European institutions, including
a new European political architecture in the OSCE and a series of all-European
arrangements such as the Paris Charter (Charter of Paris). In many respects the basic
regulations of these institutions have become mandatory for all European states, and
their provisions, vital for democratization, have been effectively ‘forced upon’ the
CEE states as preconditions of ‘Europeanization’. The evolution of European inter-
national relations in the 1990s entailed the increasing, and to some extent contro-
versial, activity of all-European institutions as quasi-supreme authorities in the
region.
The strongest pressures which pan-European organizations such as the OSCE,
OECD, and Council of Europe have been able to exert on the transitional regimes
in Central and Eastern Europe have been through their legitimation of specific
governments and reform programmes. Public condemnation of a CEE transitional
regime by institutions such as the Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO, would
threaten the recognition of that states’ external legitimacy, and as a result undermine
the transitional regime’s internal legitimacy and popular support. In particular, the
pan-European organizations have established the protection of minority rights as a
crucial prerequisite for Europeanization, as “consensual democracy has become an
elementary precondition for all European states, with minority rights for all citizens
and communities within the CEE.” (Ágh, 1999, p. 267). This external pressure to
protect minority rights was particularly significant, as minority rights and interests
erupted onto the political agendae in many post-communist states.
The Council of Europe and the OSCE have been the most active promoters of
Europeanization in its most comprehensive sense, although the OSCE has been more
successful in elaborating the principles of the new European architecture than in
demanding and monitoring their implementation. The Council of Europe, on the
other hand, has played a much bigger role in homogenizing and extending the criteria
for human and minority rights to all European states, and it also has a stronger
institutional mechanism to monitor their implementation. Poland joined the Council
348 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

of Europe in November 1991 and signed the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms that came into effect in January 1993. The treaty pro-
vides recourse to the Council of Europe’s legally binding mediation where violations
of civil rights are alleged. Polish governments also made clear their willingness to
be bound by decisions of both the European Commission and the European Court
of Justice, which arbitrates between EU member states.
At the OSCE Bonn summit of April 1990 all member states accepted the principles
of the free market, and at the Paris summit in November 1990 the norms of behaviour
for democratic states were formulated in the Paris Charter. The Paris Charter stated
that all OSCE members would “undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen
democracy as the only system of government of our nations,” and stated that “human
rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are inalien-
able and are guaranteed by law.” Democracy was defined explicitly as characterized
by regular, free and fair elections, representation and pluralism (Annexe 1). The
signatories of the Paris Charter also committed themselves to external verification
of their elections, and an Office for Free Elections was established in Warsaw to
coordinate election monitoring activity within the OSCE context. The Bonn and Paris
summits thus laid the foundations for the Europeanization of the CEE states. How-
ever, only those states which have accepted the more specific goals of Euro-Atlantic
integration — namely, the combined EU and NATO perspectives — have made
significant progress in European integration.
Thus, the primary means of influence exerted on the Polish transitional regime by
the pan-European organizations with which Poland has become actively involved,
have been the establishment of strong and pervasive norms of liberalization and
democratic accountability. While not having the means to ensure democratic consoli-
dation across CEE transitional states, the strong external legitimation conferred by
this range of pan-European institutions has greatly enhanced the success of demo-
cratic reforms and further guaranteed the rationality of Poland’s domestic and foreign
policy discourse.

CEE regional relations

There is evidence from other regions to indicate that regional economic integration
and security cooperation dramatically enhance the likelihood of democratic consoli-
dation (Steves, 2000). In the first years of post-communist transition, cooperation
with CEE neighbours was perceived within Poland to be crucial to maintaining a
strong coalition against Russian influence, as successive Polish governments have
been aware that Poland remains hostage to the tumult in Russia (Olechowski, 1994).
In particular, it was clear to both domestic policy elites and the mass public that
Poland would have to join forces with Poland’s immediate neighbours: the Czechs,
the Slovaks, the Balts, the Hungarians, and, if possible, the Ukrainians and Belorussi-
ans. Fortunately, the elite networks necessary for the successful establishment of
regional cooperation blocs were in place: during the 1980s contacts among opposition
groups within Central Europe, especially between Solidarity leaders and their
 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352 349

counterparts in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, became well established (Terry, 2000,

p. 9). Regional organizations such as the VG and the Central European Free Trade
Agreement (CEFTA), supported by the EU, have been important facilitating insti-
tutions for regional cooperation and integration (Rhodes, 1999).
After its 1990 reconciliation with Germany, Poland signed bilateral treaties that
emphasized political and economic cooperation with all of its neighbours. Trade
agreements were reached with Ukraine and Belarus, and cooperation agreements
with Ukraine on military and defence-industry coordination were envisaged. A
friendship treaty was concluded with Lithuania in 1994, after much wrangling on
the interpretation of historical Lithuanian–Polish relations (Snyder, 1998). However,
the Eastern European cooperation project was dogged from the start: Slovakia was
wary of Polish domination in the region, and the Czech Republic was not as inter-
ested in the project of Eastern European solidarity as Poland.
The VG, including Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, was formed in February
1991 with the objective of coordinating regional activity so as to be consistent with
European institutions and to forge trading relations on the basis of free market econ-
omies. The meeting was hailed at the time as ‘a major breakthrough in Central
European cooperation.’ In October 1991 the VG held another summit, in Kraków,
which produced a declaration calling for the VG’s speedy integration into European
economic and legal systems. The original idea was that the four countries’ combined
populations of sixty-four million would give them a clearer (and louder) voice in
Brussels and Washington and create a common economic area worth taking serious-
ly.
In January 1993 the four Visegrád countries agreed to create a free trade zone,
and in March 1993 CEFTA was inaugurated. CEFTA, meant to scrap all tariffs
between member states, has succeeded in getting rid of many of them, and has since
expanded to include Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia. In 1994 CEFTA and EFTA
signed a free trade agreement, paradoxically intended to promote trade within and
between CEFTA member states (Kolankiewicz, 1994, pp. 485–487). CEFTA, by
contrast with the Central European Initiative (CEI), has so far been an organization
of optimal size with a narrow focus on liberalizing foreign trade. CEFTA has been
able to fulfil its function of fostering the structural accommodation of its member
states’ economies to the EU. Similarly, the development of micro-regions crossing
the borders of states and integrating adjacent territories has played an important role
in enhancing cooperation in basic functions between CEE and its neighbours both
in and out of the EU (Hyde-Price, 1996; Skrzydło, 1994).
Despite rhetorical commitment by regional political elites, the VG soon began to
lose direction: “Instead of becoming an organization promoting intraregional
cooperation as well as integration at the European level, the Visegrád process became
fixated almost exclusively on the latter-in effect, it became a vehicle for coordinating
Central Europe’s ”road to Europe“ while development of closer ties within the region
languished on the back burner.” (Terry, 1993, pp. 215–216). The ascendance of
Vaclav Klaus to the Czech Prime Ministry in June 1992, in particular, marked a
significant blow to regional cooperation, as Klaus saw little future for the VG. Fear-
ing that the alliance might hamper the Czech Republic’s early membership of the
350 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

EU, Klaus advocated a country-by-country approach to EU expansion. According to

Klaus, the VG was to serve primarily as a consultative body complementing other
multilateral agencies, such as CEFTA. VG integration was further undermined when
Vladimir Meciar was elected president of the Slovak republic and began to steer
Slovakia into anti-Western isolationism.
The election of Kwasniewski to the Polish presidency in 1995 and the govern-
ment’s appointment of Dariuaz Rosati as Foreign Minister signalled a return, albeit
short-lived, to Poland’s focus on regional relations. As Rosati later described, “The
country’s security and well-being depended — in the external dimension — on future
developments on two basic ‘plateaux’: the strategic and the regional. In other words,
it depended% on our success in eliminating the risk of conflict and instability in the
immediate vicinity of our borders.” (Rosati, 1999, p. 10). Rosati set out three foreign
policy priorities in his first annual policy statement to the Sejm, including Poland’s
return to Europe, “cultivation of the best possible relations with neighbours,” and
“political activity and regional cooperation to stabilize and enhance Poland’s inter-
national position.” (Rosati, 1999, p. 11). Despite the renewed emphasis on regional
cooperation in the first years of Kwasniewski’s presidency, the resistance to multilat-
eral economic and security cooperation on the part of the Czech and Slovak leader-
ships effectively undermined Rosati’s new regionally oriented policy.
However, since 1998 the EU has effectively made regional cooperation a precon-
dition for EU entry, and since NATO accession in March 1999 enhanced security
cooperation between the new NATO members has been necessary. In response to
renewed EU pressure for regional cooperation, the Prime Ministers of Poland, Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic met in Budapest on 22 October 1998 and issued a
declaration about the revitalization of the VG, and on May 14, 1999, leaders of the
four VG members states met in Bratislava and proclaimed the VG’s fresh start. This
revitalization of the VG contrasts with the abject failure of the Pentagone–Hexagon-
ale, transformed into the CEI, and which lost all of its substantive functions after
expanding to 16 states in November 1996.
Regional cooperation and integration in the CEE states has through the course of
the 1990s been more of a rhetorical than a practical pursuit. The VG and CEFTA
have been used by national political elites first and foremost as a means of furthering
their shared aims of NATO and EU memberships. Nevertheless, the importance
placed on friendly regional relations in Polish domestic political rhetoric, and in the
popular imagination, has greatly limited the ‘realm of possibility’ for the exploitation
of aggressive foreign policy rhetoric vis à vis neighbouring states, and as a result
limited the politicization of regional foreign relations by transitional political elites
in Poland.

Conclusion

External agencies, in particular the EU and NATO, have been extremely important
in shaping the democratic consolidation process and simultaneously conditioning the
evolution of Poland’s post-communist foreign policy. These organizations estab-
 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352 351

lished prerequisites for Poland’s return to Europe — the primary goal of Poland’s
post-1989 foreign policy — including successful democratization and the establish-
ment of norms of human rights protection. In combination with direct involvement
in the process of democratic consolidation, from the army of Western-funded
advisors to direct financial and technical assistance, this has led to the institutionaliz-
ation of stable and tightly bounded foreign policy discourse. Stable foreign policy
discourse has in turn reinforced the penetration of external influences and strength-
ened Poland’s integration into Western European political, economic and security
regimes.
The successful penetration of Polish domestic politics by transnational actors, and
the lack of politicization of foreign policy over the first decade of democratic consoli-
dation, however, do not guarantee that Poland’s foreign relations will remain depoli-
ticized in the years to come. Indeed, the very external agencies which have so effec-
tively penetrated and reinforced Poland’s market and democratic consolidation
processes could easily provoke a backlash against excessive external interference in
determining Poland’s political future. The extended delay in achieving Poland’s
return to Europe, and particularly the difficult negotiations currently underway on
the timetable and conditionalities of EU accession, threaten to create significant anti-
European sentiment among Polish voters, which could have a powerful impact at
the voting booth and thus spill over into the democratic formulation of foreign policy.
If the anti-European far-right begins to make electoral gains on the centre–right and
successor parties, those mainstream parties might be compelled to move further to
the anti-European perspective in order to retain popular support, the first step in the
competitive escalation of hostile foreign policy rhetoric described above. Careful
management of Poland’s foreign relations, and sensitivity to the perils of electoralism
on the part of the EU, are necessary to prevent this potentially powerful negative
impact on Poland’s return to Europe project.

References

Ágh, A., 1999. Processes of democratization in the East Central European and Balkan states: sovereignty-
related conflicts in the context of europeanization. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32 (3),
263–280.
Ananicz, A. et al., 1995. Poland–NATO report. Rzeczpospolita 246, 23 October.
Blacyca, G., Kolkiewicz, M., 1999. Poland and the EU: internal disputes, domestic politics and accession.
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 15 (4), 131–143.
Charter of Paris. Available online at http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.htm.
Economist, 1999. The Poles bargain with Europe. July 31, 34.
Edwards, G., Phillippart, E., 1998. Flexibility and the Treaty of Amsterdam: Europe’s New Byzantium?
Occasional Paper No.3. Centre for European Legal Studies, Cambridge.
Freudenstein, R., 1998. Poland, Germany and the EU. International Affairs (London) 74 (1), 41–54.
Gomulka, S., 1995. The IMF-supported programs of Poland and Russia, 1990-1994: principles, errors,
and results. Journal of Comparative Economics 20 (3), 316–346.
Guérin-Sendelbach, V., Rulkowski, J., 1994. Euro-trio France–Germany–Poland. Aussen-politik 45 (3),
246–253.
Harasimowicz, A., Pietras, J., 1994. State and prospects of Poland’s relations with the EU. Polish Quarterly
of International Affairs 3 (1), 59–80.
352 F. Steves / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001) 339–352

Herspring, D., 2000. Civil-military relations in post-communist Poland: problems in the transition to a
democratic polity. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33 (1), 71–100.
Hyde-Price, A., 1996. The International Politics of East Central Europe. Manchester University Press,
Manchester.
Janos, A., 1995. Continuity and change in Eastern Europe: strategies of post-communist politics. East
European Politics and Societies 8 (1), 1–31.
Kolankiewicz, G., 1994. Consensus and competition in the eastern enlargement of the European Union.
International Affairs 70 (3), 477–496.
Koziej, S., 1999. Polish strategy and defence policy in the context of NATO membership. Polish Quarterly
of International Affairs 8 (1), 81–92.
Lentowicz, Z., 1992. What defence doctrine for Poland? Rzeczpospolita (supplement) 170, 21 July.
Millard, F., 1996. Poland’s ‘return to Europe’ 1989–94. In: Bideleux, R., Taylor, R. (Eds.), European
Integration and Disintegration: East and West. Routledge, London, pp. 205–224.
Ners, K., 1996. Foreign assistance to transition in Central and Eastern Europe: six years of experience.
Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 5 (3-4), 59–80.
Offe, C., 1991. Capitalism by democratic design? democratic theory facing the triple transition in East
Central Europe. Social Research 58 (4), 865–892.
Olechowski, A., 1994. Europe’s unification challenge. Polityka 50, 10 December.
Pollard, V., 1999. Globalization, democratization and leadership: domestic and international politics of
foreign policy making in Asia. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual
meeting, Atlanta, USA, 2–5 September.
Polytika, 1992. 42, October 17.
Rhodes, M., 1999. Post-Visegrád cooperation in East Central Europe. East European Quarterly 33 (1),
51–67.
Rosati, D., 1999. Poland’s return to Europe: reflections on foreign policy in 1995-97. Polish Quarterly
of International Affairs 8 (1), 9–22.
Sandford, G., 1999a. Poland: The Conquest of History. Harwood Academic Press, Amsterdam.
Sandford, G., 1999b. Parliamentary control and the constitutional definition of foreign policy making in
democratic Poland. Europe–Asia Studies 51 (5), 769–797.
Sigma, 1998. Preparing Public Administrations for the European Administrative Space. Sigma Papers No.
23. OECD, Paris.
Skrzydło, A., 1994. Euroregions with Polish participation as a form of transfrontier cooperation. Polish
Quarterly of International Affairs 3 (1), 41–54.
Snyder, T., 1998. The Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth since 1989: national narratives in relations among
Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 4 (3), 1–32.
Steves, F., 2000. Regional integration and democratic consolidation in the southern cone of Latin America.
Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research annual meeting, Copenhagen,
Denmark, 15–19 April.
Taras, R., 1995. Consolidating Democracy in Poland. Westview, Boulder.
Terry, S., 1993. Prospects for regional cooperation. In: Staar, R. (Ed.), Transition to Democracy in Poland.
St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp. 7–47.
Terry, S., 2000. Poland’s foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence. Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 33 (1), 7–47.