The maréchaussée sabell (gendarmerie
saber), commonly known as the klewang,
T
he only thing Dutch about Raymond Paul
Pierre Westerling was his blood. Born on
Aug. 31, 1919, in the ancient city of Istan-
bul, where several generations of Wester-
ling men had made their living as antique
dealers, young Raymond showed signs
of the adventurer he would become in
adulthood. In his 1952 autobiography,
Challenge to Terror, Westerling noted having spent
his boyhood capturing snakes and lizards, gambol-
ing with playmates through the merchant souks,
experimenting with firearms and gunpowder, and
reading everything from “stories of pirates, historical
romances and Wild West adventures” to detective tales.
A precocious child who breezed through formal
schooling, Westerling grew up in a cosmopolitan
milieu—his father spoke English, French, German,
Italian and Turkish, while his mother spoke French
alongside her native Greek. By age 18 the young man
was proficient in all of these languages. Ironically,
the only tongue he couldn’t speak was Dutch, though
he and his family were citizens of the Netherlands.
Westerling’s life turned far more adventurous in
early 1941. Itching to see the world and experience
life outside Istanbul, he visited the Dutch Consulate
and enlisted in the Free Dutch Forces in exile, as the
Netherlands was already under German occupation.
His father doubted his headstrong son would accept
military discipline. Embracing the challenge, Wester-
Young Westerling (circled) passed through
some of the British army’s toughest training
schools and served with No. 10 Commando.
34 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY 2021
was carried by KNIL officers and NCOs.
ling (dubbed “The Turk,” due to his upbringing)
resolved to get into the fight as soon as possible.
Over the course of the war he would pass through
some of the British army’s toughest schools, including
the Commando Basic Training Center in Achnacarry,
Scotland, and serve with such legendary fighting units
as No. 2 (Dutch) Troop of No. 10 Commando and the
Princess Irene Brigade. Despite his eagerness to fight,
the Turk did not come to grips with the enemy until
spring 1945 when, as a commando embedded with
the Dutch resistance, he led his men on hit-and-run
missions against German positions. War’s end did not
dash his hopes of seeing combat, however.
In August 1945 Westerling, who had learned his
mother tongue while serving with Dutchmen in the
British army, received orders to ship out to the Dutch
East Indies (present-day Indonesia). Still in the uni-
form of a British junior officer, he took command of a
small Anglo-Dutch force tasked with establishing order
following the surrender of Japanese occupation forces.
There in the steamy Southeast Asian jungles Wester-
ling made his name as one of the most successful (and
infamous) counterinsurgents in modern history.
PREVIOUS SPREAD: NATIONAAL ARCHIEF, NETHERLANDS: THIS PAGE, TOP: IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUMS; LEFT: KONINKLIJKE LANDMACHT
At the turn of the 17th century Dutch traders established
a mercantilist monopoly on several Indonesian islands,
including resource-rich Java and Sumatra. With these
islands in their orbit, representatives of the Dutch East
India Co. sold to Europe nutmeg and other spices, coffee,
sugar and other items in high demand. An intra-
Asian trade proved most lucrative, with Dutch
ships controlling most major sea routes in the
South China Sea. The capital of this new com-
mercial empire was Batavia (present-day Jakarta),
on Java. Atop the ruins of a small Muslim garrison
company men built a fortified city crisscrossed
with canals and steeped in a unique Dutch-Malay
culture. Chinese culture was present as well,
thanks to thousands of immigrants from the
southeastern province of Fujian.
Batavia’s founder, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, once
hailed as a Dutch national hero, is reviled in
Indonesia as the “Butcher of the Banda Islands.”
In February 1621, seeking to avenge several
failed expeditions against the archipelago, Coen
stormed ashore at Fort Nassau on Banda Neira
 Saluting with his klewang, Westerling
leads Dutch special operations troops
during a 1947 parade in Batavia
marking the birthday of Princess
Juliana of the Netherlands.
with a punitive force compris-
ing 19 ships, nearly 1,700 Dutch
soldiers and some 300 Japanese
mercenaries. Linking up with the Sukarno
250 soldiers from the port’s garri-
son, Coen’s invasion force merci-
lessly sacked the island.
Despite the actions of Coen and
others, for centuries Dutch power
in the East Indies did not extend
much beyond Java and parts of Su-
matra. Indeed, their control over
all of the Indonesian islands would not be finalized until
the 19th century. By that point, long after the collapse
of the Dutch East India Co., the East Indies were the
centerpiece of Amsterdam’s small but wealthy empire.
In 1905 the Dutch government demonstrated its attach-
ment to the East Indies by sending 40 million guilders
for the development of Java and Madura. The Dutch built
thousands of schools between 1900 and 1930. The archi-
pelago also saw the expansion of roads and hospitals.
Inspired in part by expediency, but also by a brewing
nationalist movement, colonial administrators estab-
lished an advisory People’s Council (Volksraad) in 1918
in order to give political voice to the three largest demo-
graphic groups—Indonesians, Chinese, and the Dutch
NATIONAAL ARCHIEF (2)
and Eurasians (mixed Dutch and Asian). Despite grow-
ing autonomy, however, all was not well. Newer Dutch
arrivals, particularly those fleeing economic hardship
back in Europe, tended to view the East Indies as a
pleasure palace to be exploited for max-
imum profit. Many refused to interact
with the Eurasian population, which
had long been accepted as part of the
social hierarchy. Homegrown national-
ist groups further destabilized Amster-
dam’s colonial rule.
In the 1920s several Dutch-educated
Indonesians returned to the East Indies
armed with revolutionary ideals. The
Royal Netherlands East Indies Army
(Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger,
or KNIL) and police readily suppressed a 1926 revolt
in West Java by the small Communist Party of Indonesia,
but other parties, such as the Indonesian National Party
Westerling made his name as
one of the most successful (and
infamous) counterinsurgents
(Persatuan Nasional Indonesia, or PNI) and the student-
run Indonesian Association (Perhimpunan Indonesia, or
PI), proved harder to eliminate. Such groups espoused
a left-wing brand of nationalism, envisioning a central-
ized and secular state. From the ranks of the PNI rose
Kusno Sosrodihardjo, aka Sukarno, future president of
the Republic of Indonesia.
35
 Much like the later French and American wars in Vietnam, the conflict
in the Dutch East Indies was characterized by small-unit operations
in challenging terrain (above) and by the widespread use of reprisal
operations aimed at civilians believed to be aiding insurgents (right).
Dutch control in the East Indies effectively ended in
late winter 1942. Between February 28 and March 1
a 34,000-strong Japanese invasion force bested a defend-
ing force of 25,000 KNIL soldiers and limited Allied sup-
port units following three amphibious landings on Java.
The Japanese had better armor and air support, while
the KNIL suffered from poor morale and worse logistics.
Intended primarily for internal security, the KNIL had
an ethnically mixed body of soldiers which had never
numbered more than 50,000. Some units fought well
(notably the 38th Division), but much of the KNIL either
surrendered, evacuated to Australia or ditched their uni-
forms and melted in with the Indonesian population.
Three years of Japanese occupation saw the Europeans,
Eurasians and Chinese civilians and Dutch and Allied
POWs herded into filthy concentration camps, where
tens of thousands died from starvation and tropical dis-
Take a Stab at It
36 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY 2021
eases. As harsh as Japanese rule was, a beaten Tokyo’s
decision to let anarchy reign in Indonesia before the first
Allied liberation troops could enter made things even
worse. “The Japanese,” Westerling recalled, “did not
attempt to check the marauding bands which formed
spontaneously in the confusion of the end of the war.”
Many Japanese soldiers sold their weapons to the ban-
dits and let them pick army arsenals clean. Some joined
LEFT: NATIONAAL ARCHIEF; RIGHT: JOHN FLOREA/LIFE PICTURE COLLECTION (GETTY IMAGES); BOTTOM: IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUMS
the ranks of nationalist insurgent forces as military advis-
ers. As for the men, women and children held in concen-
tration camps since 1942, the Japanese either kept them
locked away or allowed the roving bandits to brutalize,
rape and execute them in cold blood. The situation was
untenable. It was obvious someone needed to establish
stability in the East Indies. The first nation tasked with
the assignment, Britain, did not have the stomach for it.
After landing on several Indonesian islands in October
1945, the British tried to enforce a cease-fire, demanding
local militias surrender their arms. The Indonesians re-
fused, and before long they were targeting British officers
for assassination. The standoff came to a head in Novem-
ber amid the Battle of Surabaya. For three weeks British
During the post–World War II fighting in the Dutch East
Indies insurgents andd KNIL and Dutch troops all carried
the traditional Indonesian kris dagger. Its asymmetrical
blade proved deadly when used as a stabbing weapon.
 soldiers battled nationalist militias, the British losing
nearly 300 men, the Indonesians upward of 6,000. De-
spite its military victory, London decided Indonesia was
not worth the cost. Yet Britain, Australia and the United
States collectively resisted the idea of handing back Indo-
nesia to their erstwhile Dutch allies. Only the French,
then trying to reassert colonial rule in Indochina, backed
Amsterdam’s claims. Foreign bickering mattered little
to the average Indonesian or European islander, who
were more concerned about survival. Given the British
did little more than man their scattered garrisons, those
seeking to quell the chaos sought other means. By early
1946 Dutch soldiers, many of whom were veterans of
the resistance, joined remnants of the KNIL in a last-ditch
effort to establish order and prevent suspected commu-
nists from wresting control of the East Indies.
Such was the situation at war’s end when Westerling
arrived in-country. The Turk’s first assignment called for
his special operations talents, when superiors tasked
him and a force of European, Eurasian and Indonesian
soldiers with rescuing remaining prisoners from the
Japanese camps and stopping the rampant banditry.

Westerling’s way of dealing with the “terrorists” (his term)

was as effective as it was harsh. For example, during
one operation he and his men snuck into a village and
captured a suspected rebel leader. After interrogating
the man, Westerling had him decapitated. His men then
returned to the village with the rebel’s head, which they
impaled atop a stake as a warning.
“In the East it is not the execution itself which im-
presses and deters other would-be murderers,” Wester-
ling reflected. “It is the method of execution.”
A more infamous incident occurred at a social club
in the city of Makassar, present-day capital of the prov-
ince of South Sulawesi. Having warned a known Indo-
nesian spy to refrain from visiting the club, Westerling
confronted the man a second time at his regular table.
“Do you remember what I told you?” the Turk asked.
When the spy nodded nervously in the affirmative, West-
erling pulled a revolver and shot him in the face. The
man collapsed to the floor, dead.
Even amid the darkest days of the insurgency, Indo-
nesian and Dutch residents of the East Indies branded
Westerling a murderer for his aggressive approach to While counterinsurgency operations in the Dutch East Indies relied
counterterrorism. Sukarno’s republican government de- heavily on local recruits to the KNIL (top), regular troops of the Royal
cried him before the United Nations, laying the murders Netherlands Army and Marine Corps also played important roles,
of thousands of Indonesian civilians at the Turk’s feet. particularly in protecting such vital infrastructure as railways (above).
In Challenge to Terror Westerling dismissed such talk as
“hullaballoo.” Contrasting his method of executing insur- a mix of violent displays, targeted assassinations and night
gent leaders with the traditional military response of raids—by September 1946 the Turk’s commando unit
NATIONAAL ARCHIEF (2)

shelling or bombing enemy villages, he raised the rhe- controlled the large and lucrative island of North Suma-
torical question of which method kills more innocents. tra. His 500-man DST (Depot Speciale Troepen), composed
Whatever his justifications, Westerling’s small-unit tac- of KNIL soldiers and village-based militiamen trained
tics proved effective. Thanks to the “Westerling method”— by Westerling, became experts at police-style operations

37
 Indonesian
Insurgency
A
t the turn of the 20th century the Dutch East Indies (as Indonesia was known) remained
a colonial outpost whose administrators grew wealthy trading in such goods as spices,
coffee, sugar and other commodities. Amsterdam showed its appreciation by investing
profits in the economic development of the islands, including projects to build canals and
roads, hospitals and schools. Yet the majority Indonesian population lacked a voice. In 1918
administrators established the advisory People’s Council (Volksraad), but nationalist groups
increasingly pressed for independence, their pleas turning to violence by mid-century.
In 1942, with the Netherlands government in exile, Japanese forces invaded the archipelago, quickly
besting the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, or KNIL). Before
leaving in 1945, the Japanese loosed roving bands of nationalists to frustrate Allied administrators. On
August 17 leading nationalist Kusno Sosrodihardjo, aka Sukarno, proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia.
But the remaining Dutch weren’t about to surrender their jewel in the Pacific, and fighting broke out. MH

Operation Kraai
On Dec. 19, 1948, the Dutch intiated their final
large-scale offensive of the conflict, successfully
seizing the insurgents’ West Javanese capital
of Linggadjati and capturing President Sukarno.
But all had been for naught, as the international
community recognized Indonesian independence.

38 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY 2021

 Failed Experiment
From his symbolic declaration of independence on
Aug. 17, 1945, Sukarno served as authoritarian pres-
ident of Indonesia until ousted in 1967. Political in-
fighting and economic malaise forced his successor,
Suharto, to resign in 1998. Regional, ethnic and
religious strife continue to bedevil the republic.

Japanese Invasion/Occupation
In late winter 1942 Japanese troops landed in the
Dutch East Indies and swept aside defending KNIL
troops. They soon herded islanders of all stripes into
concentration camps to die by the tens of thousands.
Worse still, at war’s end the humiliated Japanese
unleashed armed mobs to hinder the arriving Allies.
Operation Product
On July 21, 1947, the KNIL and Dutch army regulars
launched this large-scale offensive to quell unrest
across the archipelago. Sent to South Sulawesi were
British-trained counterinsurgency expert Raymond
“The Turk” Westerling and his Dutch commandos.
His brutal tactics included summary executions.

DISTANCE: Batavia to Surabaya

413 miles/665 km

MAPS BY STEVE WALKOWIAK/SWMAPS.COM

39
 Tactical requiring minimal use of artillery, armor and
air cover. Exhibiting a strong esprit de corps,
Takeaways Westerling’s men marched into the jungles
Small Units Can Win. unsupported. Although always outnumbered,
If they are well-trained, they regularly won the day.
-equipped and -led
and, above all, very From the start, however, politics ham-
highly motivated with strung such “police actions.” Even as the
strong esprit de corps. DST and similar forces successfully pursued
Colonialism Loses ... various counterinsurgency measures, the
The decades following weak Dutch administration faced mounting
the end of World War II
proved conclusively British, American and Soviet pressure to
that colonial empires cede its authority over the East Indies. On
can be solidly beaten March 25, 1947, the Linggadjati Agreement
by native peoples granted de facto independence to Java, Mad-
committed to national ura and Sumatra. Sukarno’s republicans did
self-determination.
... As Does Brutality. not abide by the agreement, though, and by
Harsh repression of summer the ground war heated up as insur-
civilians during counter- gent attacks netted heavier responses from
insurgency operations the KNIL and the Dutch military.
may initially reduce Launched on July 21, Operation Product
resistance, but won’t
succeed over time. was the first large-scale offensive of the war.
As part of the broader operation Dutch ad-
ministrators sent Westerling’s beefed-up force, redesig-
nated the KST (Korps Speciale Troepen), to South Sulawesi,
where Javanese radicals had established cells designed
to take down the island’s pro-federalist government.
Westerling’s subjugation of South Sulawesi proved
much harder than his earlier fight in North Sumatra, due
partly to geography and partly to the fact that, as Dutch
historian Jaap A. de Moor wrote, “Dutch authority on
40 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY 2021
Having interrogated and identified a suspected insurgent (in
white shirt), Dutch troops force villagers to watch the man’s
execution—a harsh tactic routinely practiced by Westerling.
South Sulawesi was on the verge of absolute breakdown.”
From the December outset of his campaign the Turk im-
plemented his policy of summary prosecution and execu-
tion. The KST would encircle a village before dawn, gather
its men in the village square and employ various inter-
rogation methods to identify suspected terrorists. Those
singled out Westerling had shot on sight. Unquestionably
brutal, his methods again proved effective, and by March
1947 the KST had subdued South Sulawesi. An estimated
3,000 to 5,000 islanders died in the fighting, while some
400 were executed. In Challenge to Terror Westerling
admitted to having personally killed more than 100 men.
Though combined KNIL-Dutch operations on Sumatra
and East and West Java also proved successful, the U.N.
condemned the Dutch administration for its own failure
to abide by the Linggadjati Agreement. Ratified on Jan. 17,
1948, the Renville Agreement mandated the Dutch would
continue to occupy Sumatra and East and West Java until
national elections could be held. In the meantime, the
insurgency continued.
The endgame for Dutch military power in the East Indies
KONINKLIJKE LANDMACHT
came in December 1948, when General Simon Hendrik
Spoor launched Operation Kraai, managing to capture the
republican capital of Yogyakarta and capturing President
Sukarno. The operational goal was to force the intransi-
 gent republicans to abide by earlier agreements, and by As is often the case in counterinsurgencies, these Dutch troops are
January 1949 the success of that mission seemed assured. unsure of the direction from which they’ve been taking heavy fire.
But overseas politicians promptly negated Spoor’s victory.
Much like the later French and American experience in of antique books in Amsterdam, Westerling died of heart
Indochina, Dutch soldiers and their Indonesian allies had failure at age 68 on Nov. 26, 1987.
won the battles but still managed to lose the war. To Dutch leftists and Indonesian nationalists Westerling
Alarmed at the prospect of Javanese hegemony, West- was the embodiment of brutal colonialism. Though tacti-
erling armed and trained village militias to repulse repub- cally effective, he employed his method in the service of a
lican soldiers and bandits alike. These self-defense units, doomed effort. For despite his tactical brilliance, Sukarno’s
along with former KNIL paratroopers, pledged allegiance Republic of Indonesia won the day largely due to interna-
to the Turk. His private army became known as the Ang- tional pressure. Sukarno himself served as authoritarian
katan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA), or Prince Justice Legion. president until 1967, when one of his generals, Suharto,
The name stems from an Indonesian prophecy about staged a successful coup and nationwide purge of Su-
a Javan savior of Turkish descent. Westerling’s men per- karno-aligned communists. Indonesia’s troubled experi-
ceived the Turkish-born Dutchman as Prince Justice— ment with independence remains a work in progress. MH
a belief Westerling wholeheartedly encouraged.
On Jan. 23, 1950, the APRA launched a coup against Benjamin Welton is a freelance writer based in New
Sukarno’s government. Due to a loose-lipped Dutch offi- England. For further reading he suggests Challenge
cer, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara to Terror, by Raymond Westerling; A Lifetime of
Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) anticipated the operation. News, by Robert L. Kroon; and Gangsters and Revo-
Despite having lost the element of surprise, the out- lutionaries, by Robert Cribb.
numbered and outgunned APRA did win an engagement
in the city of Bandung, capturing the barracks of the
TNI’s elite Siliwangi Division without losing a single man.
The republicans may have lost as many as 100 dead.
Unfortunately for Westerling, the planned key uprising
in Jakarta folded, as those tasked with smuggling firearms
into the city were thwarted. In the aftermath of the failed
coup, the APRA withdrew from Bandung, and Wester-
ling fled to Singapore, then a British Crown colony. Indo-
nesian authorities pressed for his extradition in vain.
After spending months in a Singaporean prison, West-
erling relocated his family to the Netherlands. After pen-
ning A Challenge to Terror, which ends with a warning
that the Soviet Union and Red China had intelligence
NATIONAAL ARCHIEF (2)

agents and terrorists in Indonesia, Westerling unexpect-

edly became an opera singer, though his single public
recital in 1958 reportedly flopped. His marriage failed, Branded a war criminal by Indonesian and Dutch leftists,
though he later remarried. Ending his days as a purveyor Westerling lived out his life as an Amsterdam bookseller.

41