57. PETRONILO NAPONE, JR.
AND EDGAR NAPONE prosper, the following requisites must concur, namely: (1)
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 193085; NOVEMBER 29, 2017
TOPIC:
JUSTIFIYING CIRCUMSTANCE – SELF DEFENSE,
DEFENSE OF RELATIVES – NEGATED;
CONSPIRACY NEGATED
DOCTRINE:
It has been held that when the accused invokes the
justifying circumstance of self-defense and, hence, admits
to killing the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him.
The rationale for this shift is that the accused, by his
admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he
satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove his innocence by
clear and convincing evidence. For this purpose, he must
rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if the latter is
weak, it could not be denied that he has admitted to be the
author of the victim's death.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must
satisfactorily prove the concurrence of all of its elements,
which are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Similarly, for defense of a relative to
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression;
and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in
the provocation.
In both self-defense and defense of relatives, whether
complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. After all,
there would be nothing to prevent or repel if such unlawful
aggression is not present. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated there must be an actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.
(CONSPIRACY) Settled is the rule that much like the
criminal act itself, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary to establish the existence of conspiracy. It cannot
be established by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.55
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Junior and Edgar, together with their father, Petronilo
Napone, Sr. (Senior; collectively, the Napones), were
charged with the crime of murder for the death of Salvador
Espelita (Salvador) under an information, dated 13
November 1992, the accusatory portion of which reads:
 That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1992, in
the evening at [B]arangay Mabunga, [M]unicipality of
Baungon, [P]rovince of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and
superior strength, armed with a bolo, firearm and stone, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack,
hack, shoot and throw stone at SALVADOR ESPELITA,
inflicting mortal wounds to wit:
Hack wounds, frontal left side of the head, (1) 4 x 1 cm.
(2) 2.5 x 1 cm. (3) 3.5 cm. (4) 1 cm. - Gunshot wound, left
chest measuring 8cm. in diameter, 2 inches from the
midline, at the 4th intercostal space [surrounded] by
contusion collar, directed straight forward penetrating [and]
perforating the left ventricle thru [and] thru, traversing
towards the right piercing the intervertebral muscle at the
back at the level 5th inter space 4 inches from the vertebral
column that caused his death thereafter.
On 4 May 1993, the Napones were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The RTC found Junior and Edgar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide. The trial court rejected
petitioners' claim of self-defense and in defense of a
relative ratiocinating that they failed to establish the
presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Salvador.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the trial court and the ca erred when they ruled
that the petitioners did not act in self-defense and/or
defense of relatives; and
Whether the petitioners acted in conspiracy.
RULING:
NO.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court
finds that the defense failed to discharge the burden of
proving that the petitioners acted in self-defense or defense
of relatives.
It is doctrinally settled that findings of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect
and will not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of
any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which could have altered the
conviction of the appellant. 
Clearly, Senior armed himself with a bolo and was
ready to use it against the Espelitas making them his
specific targets because of his belief that they were his
son's assailants. At this juncture, it is well to emphasize that
the fact that Calib was seen lying on the ground is not the
unlawful aggression required under the law. It was
established during trial that any attack on the person of
Calib by the Espelitas, if there was any, had already ceased
at the time the Napones arrived. No actual, sudden, and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life or limb of
Calib, therefore, could justify Senior's attack on Salvador.
Thus, the defense's claim of self-defense and defense of
relatives, which have been held to be inherently weak
defenses because they are easy to fabricate,54 were reduced
into incredulity when scrutinized against the prosecution's
evidence. The Court, therefore, sees no reason to disturb
the trial and the appellate courts' findings that the killing of
Salvador was not attended by any justifying circumstance.
(CONSPIRACY) In this case, no other evidence was
presented by the prosecution to establish conspiracy aside
from the circumstances that the accused were members of
the same family, that they arrived at the scene of the crime
at about the same time, and that they attacked Salvador
successively. These pieces of circumstantial evidence
would not suffice to establish conspiracy. It has been held
that the fact that the defendants were relatives and had
acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their
victim does not prove conspiracy in the absence of other
independent evidence positively and convincingly showing
its presence.
From the foregoing, no concerted action pursuant to a
common criminal design could be attributed to the
petitioners. In the absence of conspiracy, each of the
accused, herein petitioners, is responsible only for the
consequences of his own acts.
58. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GELAVER;
GR NO. 95357; JUNE 9, 1993.
TOPIC: ARTICLE 247 – EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES; MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE – VOLUNTARY SURRENDER;
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION NEGATED.
DOCTRINE:
Before Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code can be
operative, the following requisites must be present:
"1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his
spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and
living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person.
"2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon
any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or
immediately thereafter.
"3. That he has not promoted or facilitated that prostitution
of his wife or daughter, or that he or she has not consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse."

FACTS:
In the Information filed with the trial court and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 643, Eduardo Gelaver, was
charged with Parricide, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 24th day of March, 1988 at 7:00
o’clock in the morning, more or less, in Barangay
Poblacion, Municipality of Sto. Niño, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused with intent to kill and being
then armed with a knife did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
VICTORIA GELAVER Y PACINABAO, his lawfully
wedded wife, with the use of the said knife hitting her and
wounding her on the different parts of her body and as a
result thereof said Victoria Gelaver y Pacinabao died
instantly."
Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that
he did so after catching her having carnal act with her
paramour.
Appellant further testified that on March 24, 1988, after he
was informed by his daughter that his wife and paramour
were living at a house in front of the Sto. Niño Catholic
Church, appellant immediately repaired to that place. Upon
entering the house, he saw his wife lying on her back and
her paramour on top of her, having sexual intercourse.
Appellant’s version of the killing was that when his wife
saw him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her paramour
immediately stood up, took a knife placed on top of the
bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter was able to
wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the
paramour, who evaded the thrusts of the appellant by
hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who
received the stab intended for the paramour.
As to why he continued to stab his wife, appellant said that
his mind had been "dimmed" or overpowered by passion
and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act
with her paramour.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
W the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of RP for
the crime of parricide instead of the penalty of destierro for
killing under Article 247, RPC (Death under exceptional
circumstances.
RULING:
YES.
DEATH CAUSED MUST BE THE PROXIMATE
RESULT OF THE OUTRAGE OVERWHELMING
THE ACCUSED AFTER CHANCING UPON HIS
SPOUSE IN THE ACT OF INFIDELITY.
Implicit in this exceptional circumstance is that the death
caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse
in the act of infidelity (People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735
[1987]). In this case, appellant wants this Court to believe
that he caught his wife and her paramour in sexual
intercourse. However, his testimony is tainted with
inconsistencies which leads us to believe otherwise.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE; VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER; APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. —
The trial court was correct in finding the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the
authorities. Appellant, immediately after committing the
offense, voluntarily placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities as evidenced by the entry in the official
police blotter.
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION, NOT PRESENT
WHERE CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME HAS
ELAPSED FROM THE ACT PRODUCING THE
OBFUSCATION WHEN THE CRIME WAS
COMMITTED. — The trial court erred in finding the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation "as a result of his (appellant’s) wife leaving
their home and their children." Before this circumstance
may be taken into consideration, it is necessary to establish
the existence of an unlawful act sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind. The act producing the obfuscation must
not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused
might have recovered his equanimity. The crime was
committed almost a year after the victim had abandoned the
conjugal dwelling.
59. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OLOVERIO;
GR NO. 211159; MARCH 18, 2015
TOPIC: MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE –
PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
DOCTRINE:
Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance need
not be felt only in the seconds before the commission of the
crime. It may build up and strengthen over time until it can
no longer be repressed and will ultimately motivate the
commission of the crime.
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the accused must
be able to prove the following elements:
1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such condition of mind; and
2. that said act which produced the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity.

FACTS OF THE CASE:
According to the prosecution, on October 2, 2003, at
around 3:00 p.m., Rudipico Pogay (Pogay) and Dominador
Panday (Panday) saw Rodulfo Gulane walking about five
(5) meters away from them with Oloverio trailing behind
him. Oloverio allegedly tapped Gulane's right shoulder and
hacked him on the chest and extremities with a bolo until
Gulane collapsed on the ground. Oloverio then allegedly
took Gulane's money from his pocket.
Pogay heard Oloverio shouting the words, "Patay na ang
datu sa Brgy. San Pablo!" ("The rich man in San Pablo is
already dead!") Gulane managed to tell Oloverio, "Man
luba ka man, Ling?" ("Ling, why did you stab me?") After,
Gulane died. Panday proceeded to inform Gulane's family
of the incident.6
In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of
the incident, Gulane had been accusing him of having an
incestuous relationship with his mother. He allegedly kept
his cool and told Gulane to go home, but the latter
continued to mock him by asking in a loud voice, "How
many times did you have sexual intercourse with your
mother?" He allegedly asked Gulane to go home again but
the latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell me to go
home?"7
Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio
stopped him by drawing his own bolo. They grappled with
it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing Gulane,
which resulted in the latter's death. Accompanied by a
barangay tanod, Oloverio went to the municipal hall to
surrender to the authorities. He admitted that he stabbed
Gulane because he could no longer bear the insulting
remarks against him.8
Romulo Lamoste (Lamoste), then Barangay Captain of
Barangay Belen, Palompon, Leyte, alleged that Gulane and
Oloverio had an altercation before the incident. He alleged
that Oloverio's daughter had once confided to Oloverio that
Gulane wanted to touch her private parts. About a month
later, he allegedly heard Gulane ask Oloverio "in a joking
manner about his incestuous relationship with his
mother."9 Oloverio allegedly got mad and they ended up
fighting, but Lamoste was able to subdue them. He,
however, admitted that he was not present during the
incident.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
W the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
is present in this case.
RULING;
YES.
There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a
considerable length of time." The provocation and the
commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a
reasonable length of time has passed during which the
accused would have calmed down and be able to reflect on
the consequences of his or her actions. What is important is
that the accused has not yet "recovered his normal
equanimity" when he committed the crime.
To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating
circumstance, the facts must be examined on a case-to-case
basis.
However, a fight between the accused and the victim prior
to the crime is not always enough to be able to successfully
prove that passion and obfuscation attended it.
This court has also ruled that acts done in the spirit of
revenge cannot be considered acts done with passion and
obfuscation.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrowed its
understanding of passion and obfuscation to refer only to
the emotions accused-appellant felt in the seconds before a
crime is committed. It failed to understand that passion may
linger and build up over time as repressed anger enough to
obfuscate reason and self-control.
Gulane not only threatened to molest accused-appellant's
daughter but also accused him in public of having
incestuous relations with his mother. Gulane was said to
have insulted accused-appellant in full view of his
immediate superior, the barangay captain.
Both victim and accused-appellant lived in the small
locality of Palompon, Leyte. As with any small town, it
was a place where a person's degrading remarks against
another could be made the measure of the latter's character.
Gulane's insults would have been taken into serious
consideration by the town's residents because of his wealth
and stature in the community.
There was neither a reason given why Gulane acted that
way towards accused-appellant nor any evidence to show
that accused-appellant had previously wronged him.
The prosecution did not deny that Gulane insulted accused-
appellant on various occasions. The witnesses could not
state with reasonable certainty that Gulane did not provoke
accused-appellant a few minutes before the incident; they
could only testify to the incident itself and the seconds
which preceded it.
In view of these considerations, we find that the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present in this
case.
60. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLACER
GR NO. 181753, OCTOBER 9, 2013
TOPIC: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE – SELF-
DEFENSE, NEGATED; MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE – VOLUNTARY SURRENDER)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On August 3, 2001, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Sorsogon charged Ramon and his brother Virgilio Placer
with murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon
City, alleging thuswise:
That on or about June 24, 2001, at more or less 7:00
o’clock in the evening at barangay Somagongsong,
Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with a bladed weapon,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Rosalino Gernale, thereby inflicting
mortal/fatal wounds which caused his instantaneous death
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
On June 25, 2001, Ramon Placer voluntarily surrendered
himself to Brgy. Capt. Rey Loilo of Beguin, Bulan,
Sorsogon who then accompanied him to the local police
authorities.
ISSUES:
W Ramon acted in self-defense;
W Ramon is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender assuming that he is criminally liable for
homicide.
RULING:
IN RE: SELF DEFENSE
NO.
By pleading self-defense, Ramon admitted the authorship
of the killing of Rosalino Gernale.  The consequence of the
plea of self-defense was to shift to Ramon’s shoulders the
burden of evidence, that he must then prove clearly and
convincingly the following elements of self-defense, to wit:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. 15  Although the
elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on
proof of the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, if no unlawful aggression from the victim is
established.16 In self-defense, unlawful aggression is a
primordial element, a condition sine qua non. If no
unlawful aggression attributable to the victim is
established, self-defense is not a defense, because there
would then be nothing to repel on the part of the accused.
The fatal confrontation between Rosalino emanated from
the near collision between Rosalino’s tricycle and the
tricycle driven by Virgilio which then also carried Ramon.
The near collision immediately led to a heated exchange of
words between Rosalino and Virgilio, but they later parted
with each going his separate way. However, Virgilio soon
after pursued Rosalino’s tricycle and blocked its path. Both
Ramon and Virgilio quickly alighted from their tricycle to
confront Rosalino, who also alighted from his tricycle to
protest. It was at that point when Ramon assaulted Rosalino
by stabbing the latter in the chest with his balisong, causing
the latter to fall towards his own tricycle. On his part,
Virgilio also stabbed Rosalino in the stomach supposedly
with an icepick just as the latter was falling down from
Ramon’s attack,19 but Virgilio’s supposed assault with the
icepick was deemed by the RTC to be unproved. This
sequence of the events showed that the aggression
originated from Ramon, not from Rosalino, thereby
removing any factual and legal bases for Ramon’s plea of
self-defense.
IN RE: VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Voluntary surrender is a circumstance that reduces the
penalty for the offense. Its requisites as a mitigating
circumstance are that: (1) the accused has not been actually
arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in
authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary.30
The presence of the foregoing requisites was sufficiently
proven by Ramon. He had voluntarily yielded himself and
the balisong used in the stabbing to Barangay Chairman
Rey Loilo of Beguin, Bulan, Sorsogon, who then brought
him and the weapon to the police station for proper
disposal. This took place at about 9:25 o’clock in the
morning of June 25, 2001, the day following the fatal
stabbing of Rosalino in the evening of June 24, 2001. The
time and manner of the surrender were documented in the
police blotter of Bulan Police Station.31 That the surrender
preceded the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Bulan on June 27, 200132 is
notable. There is every indication that the surrender was
spontaneous on Ramon’s part,33 indicating his intent to
unconditionally submit himself to the authorities, either
because he acknowledged his guilt or he wished to save
them the trouble and expenses necessary for his search and
capture.

61. PEOPLE VS. ROGER RACAL @ RAMBO;
GR NO. 224886; SEPTEMBER 4, 2017
TOPICS:
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE – TREACERY;
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, NEGATED;
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE – INSANITY,
NEGATED; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE –
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION, NEGATED;
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE – PLEA OF GUILT,
NEGATED FOR NOT BEING SPONTANEOUS.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on
August 15, 2006, Racal was charged with the crime of murder
as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads, thus:
That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20
A.M., more or less, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
armed with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and
evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and
there, suddenly and unexpectedly, attack, assault, and use
personal violence upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco
by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal
wound and as a consequence of which he died.
Upon arraignment, Racal entered a plea of not guilty.
Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established that around 4
o'clock in the morning of April 19, 2006, "trisikad" drivers
were lining up to pick passengers along Lopez St. at Sitio
Alseca in Cebu City. Among the "trisikad" drivers was Jose
Francisco (Francisco). Also present at that place during that
time was Racal, who was then standing near Francisco. While
the "trisikad' drivers were waiting for passengers, Racal spoke
in a loud voice, telling the group of drivers not to trust
Francisco because he is a traitor. Francisco, who was then
holding a plastic container in one hand and a bread in another,
and was eating, retorted and asked Racal why the latter called
him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached Francisco
and stabbed him several times with a knife, hitting him in the
chest and other parts of his body. Francisco, then, fell to the
pavement. Immediately thereafter, Racal stepped backwards
and upon reaching a dark portion of the street, he hailed a
"trisikad" and sped away. Thereafter, one of the "trisikad"
drivers called ue barangay tanod, but by the time they arrived,
Francisco was already dead.
Racal, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Francisco.
However, he raised the defense of insanity. He presented
expert witnesses who contended that he has a predisposition to
snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts
compulsively, involuntarily and outside his conscious control.
Under this state, the defense argued that Racal could not
distinguish right from wrong and, thus, was not capable of
forming a mental intent at the time that he stabbed Francisco.
ISSUES:
W there is treachery in this case.
W appellant can claim the defense of insanity
W the circumstance of evident premeditation can be considered
in this case.
W there is sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party
W there is a voluntary plea of guilt on the part of appellant.
RULING
IN RE: TREACHERY
YES.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape.
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements
must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him.
These elements are extant in the facts of this case and
as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To emphasize, the
victim, Francisco, was caught off guard when appellant
attacked him. As testified to by a prosecution witness,
Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread
and was eating. The stealth, swiftness and methodical manner
by which the attack was carried out gave the victim no chance
at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso.
Thus, there is no denying that appellant's sudden and
unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and the fact that the
former did not sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also,
the fact that appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed
the latter is of no consequence. Even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who
would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it, 21 as in
this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA correctly held that
the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the RPC
by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
IN RE: INSANITY
NO.
In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in the case of People
v. Estrada22 is instructive, to wit:
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is
criminally liable for a felony committed by him. Under the
classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the
basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially
a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between
good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act
(delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done
voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man,
therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful
acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes
that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are
voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our law is
that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of
a person. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by
other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the
actor from criminal liability.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he
has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the
accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall
be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a
hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released
without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in
his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable
of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of
reason and act without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation
of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it
by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to
the very moment of its execution.
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it
is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind
within a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for
the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A
person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated
only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to
the practice of people of sound mind.23
In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the
presumption of sanity. The testimonies of Dr. Preciliana Lee
Gilboy (Dr. Gilboy) and Dr. Andres Suan Gerong (Dr.
Gerong), as the defense's qualified expert witnesses, failed to
support appellant's claim of insanity. As correctly observed by
the CA, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were
taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and four
years after the crime was committed on April 19, 2006.
In People v. So,24 which is a case of recent vintage, this Court
ruled that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should
relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the felony is committed. 25 Hence, the results of the psychiatric
tests done on appellant and testified to by the defense
witnesses, may not be relied upon to prove appellant's mental
condition at the time of his commission of the crime.
(***DURHAM RULE, a principle used in criminal courts in
the USA. This rule postulated that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful acts was the result of a mental
disease or defect at the time of the incident. - This rule was
abandoned for being too broad. Hehe).
IN RE: EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
NO.
As to the alleged aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, this Court has ruled that for it to be considered
as an aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must prove (a)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.
In the instant case, no proof has been adduced to establish that
appellant had previously planned the killing of Francisco.
There is no evidence when and how he planned and prepared
for the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had
lapsed between his determination and execution.
IN RE: SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
NONE.
For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines to apply, three requisites
must be present:
a) Provocation must be sufficient;
b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and
c) it must originate from the offended party.
"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to
excite a person to commit the crime and must accordingly be
proportionate to its gravity. In Bautista v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. L-46025, September 2, 1992], the
mitigating circumstance did not apply since it is not enough
that the provocating act be unreasonable or annoying.
Certainly, calling a person gay as in this case is not the
sufficient provocation contemplated by law that would lessen
the liability of the accused.
"Immediate" on the other hand means that there is no interval
of time between the provocation and the commission of the
crime. Hence, in one case [People v. Co, 67 O.G. 7451] the
Supreme Court ruled that provocation occurring more than one
hour before the stabbing incident is not immediate and
in People v. Benito [62 SCRA 351] 24 hours before the
commission of the crime. Per admission of the defense
witnesses, the taunting done by the victim occurred days before
the stabbing incident hence the immediacy required by law was
absent. The lapse of time would have given the accused
[chance] to contemplate and to recover his serenity enough to
refrain from pushing through with his evil plan.
With respect to the alleged mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of Francisco, the rule is that,
as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any
unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate
enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is
accordingly proportionate in gravity.34 In the present case,
appellant asserts that several days before he stabbed the victim,
the latter teased appellant to be "gay" and taunted him that the
girl whom appellant courted rejected him.
IN RE: VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT
NO.
It is settled that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and
after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such
plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.
The voluntary plea of guilt entered by the accused is not
spontaneous because it was made after his arraignment and
only to support his claim of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. The voluntary plea of guilt required by law is one that
is made by the accused in cognizance of the grievous wrong he
has committed and must be done as an act of repentance and
respect for the law. It is mitigating because it indicated a moral
disposition in the accused favorable to his reform. It may be
recalled that accused in the case at bar did not change his plea
from "not guilty" to "guilty". In a last ditch effort to elude
liability, however, accused claimed the defense of admitting
the act of [stabbing].
62. OMBUDSMAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS;
GR NO. 167844, NOVEMBER 22, 2006
TOPIC: RESTITUTION OF MALVERESED FUNDS
AS A MITIGATING CIRSUMSTANCE, NOT
EXCULPATORY.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Respondent belonged to the clerical staff of the Director of
LTFRB Region VII, Mandaue City, Cebu. In November
1998, respondent was designated as concurrent acting
"Special Collection/Disbursing Officer."
On 21 June 1999, the Commission on Audit (COA) audited
respondent's cash and accounts. After inspecting
respondent's records, the COA's examining auditors noted a
shortage of P33,925.99 in respondent's accounts. Although
respondent acknowledged the shortage, she failed to
explain the same. On 28 June 1999, respondent remitted the
missing amount. On 29 July 1999, the COA required
respondent to explain the discrepancy. Instead of
explaining, respondent merely confirmed the cash shortage.
In August 2001, the COA charged respondent in the Office
of the Ombudsman, Visayas ("Ombudsman Visayas") with
Dishonesty ("OMB-VIS-ADM -2001-0412"). In her
counter-affidavit, respondent claimed that the missing
funds comprised her collections for 11 June 1999.
Respondent stated that during the auditing on 21 June 1999,
she kept the collections, which allegedly included two
fake P500 bills, in her vault. Respondent explained, for the
first time, that she did not turn over the collections to the
COA auditors because of the fake bills. Respondent added
that had the COA auditors asked, she would have produced
the funds.
ISSUE:
W Restitution of malversed funds can be considered as an
exculpatory circumstance;
RULING:
NO.
While it is true that Ms. Santos had fully restituted the
shortage by way of depositing her June 11, 1999 collections
on June 28, 1999 in the amount of P33,925.99, this Office,
however, finds the same not an exculpatory circumstance
but only a mitigating one.
When petitioner could not present the shortage during the
examination, she was properly deemed to have embezzled
and misappropriated the lacking accountability despite her
restitution which would only be a mitigating circumstance.
Neither restitution of the missing funds serves to prevent
the imposition of this penalty.
63. UNITED STATES VS. TORRIDA
GR NOS. 7450, 7451 AND 7452; SEPTEMBER 18, 1912
TOPIC: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES –
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE, NEGATED;
RECIDIVISM, NEGATED; TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF PUBLIC POSITION, APPRECIATED.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The appellant shortly after entering upon his duties as
councilman of the town of Aparri, Province of Cagayan,
gave, in the month of October, 1910, directions to his
subordinates that the death of all large animals must be
reported by the owners to him as councilman. These orders
were conveyed to the people as directed. Damaso Rabilas
lost one carabao, Bonifacio Rante one, Santiago Rante two,
and Felipe Rante one (those of Santiago and Felipe were
included in the same complaint). The respective owners of
these animals reported their death to the Appellant. Upon
the receipt of this information the appellant informed these
owners that they must pay a fine of P5 for each animal,
these fees to be turned into the municipality by him. The
owners, believing that the municipality had provided for
the payment of such fines, turned over to the appellant five
pesos for each animal that died. There was no provision
whatever made by the municipality or any other entity for
the imposition of such fines. These facts clearly constitute
the crime of estafa as defined and penalized in paragraph 1,
article 535, in relation with paragraphs 1, article 534, Penal
Code.
ISSUES OF THE CASE;
W there was abuse of confidence on the part of the
defendant as an elected public official.
W the defendant is a recidivist
W the defendant took advantage of his position as a
councilman.
RULING:
IN RE: ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal
act.
IN RE: RECIDIVISM
Three separate criminal charges were filed against the
defendant, but all were tried together. The trial court held
that the defendant was twice a recidivist. There was no
final judgment against him, and in fact judgment in none of
the three cases could become final for at least fifteen days.
It was therefore error to hold that defendant was a
recidivist.
IN RE: TAKING ADVANTAGE OF PUBLC
POSITION:
YES.
Defendant took advantage of his position as councilman to
induce the injured parties to pay him the pretended fins. He
could not have secured the money in this manner in his
private capacity.

NO. 64. PEOPLE VS. RODIL;

The mere fact that the people had reposed sufficient GR NO. L-35156; NOVEMBER 20, 1981
confidence in the defendant to elect him to a public office
does not constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse TOPIC:
of confidence. In order to constitute this circumstance the
confidence between the parties must be immediate and AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES – DISREGARD
personal and such as would give the accused person some OF RANK, CONTEMPT OF OR INSULT TO PUBLIC
AUTHORITY.

FACTS OF THE CASE:
PC Lt. Masana and Floro Rodil, herein accused who is a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and an officer of the
Anti-Communist League of the Philippines had an
altercation in a restaurant because of the former’s
confiscation’s of the latter’s gun. Angered by Lt. Masana’s
refusal to return his gun, Rodil suddenly drew his dagger
and attacked Lt. Masana who tried to parry the stabs. Lt.
Masana was hit on the chest and the stomach causing his
death. The Chief of Police who was then present during the
stabbing grabbed Rodil and arrested him. When charged
and tried for murder, the accused admitted the killing but
justified the same with self-defense. The lower court found
the accused guilty and sentenced him to death.
ISSUES:
W the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank can be
appreciated in the case at bar;
W the AG of contempt of or insult to public authority may
be appreciated in this case.
RULING:
IN RE: DISREGARD OF RANK
YES.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should
be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim, PC Lt.
Masana, identified himself as a PC officer to the accused
who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and
therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the
victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary
meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position or
standing as a grade in the armed forces or to a graded
official standing or social position or station or to the order
or place in which said officers are placed in the army and
navy in relation to others or to the designation or title of
distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his
relative position in reference to the other officers in matters
of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or
by which to determine his pay and emoluments as in the
case of army staff officers r to a grade or official standing,
relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status or
scale of comparison within a position.
IN RE: IN CONTEMPT OF OR INSULT TO PUBLIC
AUTHORITY.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to
public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case
at bar. The evidence of the prosecution clearly established
that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present
as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the
incident occurred. As a matter of fact, the said chief of
police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused
from behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter
brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And
 appellant admittedly knew him even then a the town chief
of police, although he now claims that he went to the
municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who
was not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime
of murder with assault against an agent of a person in
authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult
to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating
because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of
assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused
of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating
circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.
65. PEOPLE VS. DAGSIL
GR NO. 218945; DECEMBER 13, 2017
TOPICS: EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE – and he [had] sufficient time to reflect upon the consequences of
INSANITY, NEGATED; QUALIFYING
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE – TREACHERY,
APPRECIATED, ABSORBS ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Accused-appellant was charged with the felony of murder
committed, according to the Information 2 instituted
therefor, as follows:
That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of December
2, 2008, at Barangay San Pedro, Municipality of Sto.
Domingo, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of AMEAN R. BANZUELA, a 14-year old
minor girl by then and there stabbing her chest, thereby
inflicting upon her [a] mortal and fatal stab wound which
was the direct and immediate cause of her death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Amean R.
Banzuela.
The aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime as the
attack perpetrated by the accused was so sudden, unexpected
and treacherous as the victim was asleep at the time and he
deliberately planned to take the life of the said victim having
been seen roaming outside the house prior to the stabbing and
[waiting] for an opportune time to get inside the victim's house
his unlawful act.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, abuse of superior
strength and disregard of age and sex also attended the
commission of the crime. The crime took place inside the
house of the victim after [the] accused gained unlawful entry
[and] stabbed the sleeping victim, [who was] a minor 14 years
of age and a female.
ISSUES:
W accused-appellant can claim the exempting circumstance
of insanity.
RULING:
NO.
A simple reading of the aforequoted testimony of the accused-
appellant shows that he was hardly the mentally deranged or
insane (whether temporarily or permanently) person that he
claimed he was when he stabbed Amean Banzuela (Amean) to
death. His answers to the questions propounded to him by his
counsel were intelligent, responsive, and straightforward; they
were not the answers of an unintelligent person or nitwit that
he says he is. In fact, he knew where he lives - at Sto.
Domingo; he knew what he did when he woke up that morning
when the incident happened - he took a stroll in the yard; he
knew that he has a wife who is still alive; he remembered that
after taking a stroll in the yard, he went to a store to buy
cigarettes; he recalled that after buying cigarettes, he went back
home; he also mentioned that on the way home, he happened to
pass by the house of Amelita Banzuela (Amelita) who filed a
rape case against him because he violated her daughter Amean;
he admitted that when he saw Amean, he felt "confused" and
stabbed the girl; he acknowledged that Amean was a daughter
of Amelita; he stabbed Amean because she told him that he
would be killed, and even made the gesture of placing her hand
across her neck; he knew that the knife he used in the stabbing
of Amean came from his residence; he also recalled what
transpired after the stabbing, i.e., he went back to his residence,
and while inside his bedroom, he stabbed himself using the
same knife which he used in stabbing Amean; he also recalled
that the policeman forced open the door to his bedroom, which
he himself locked after entering; placed him in the porch, and
thereafter took him to the municipal police station in Sto.
Domingo, Albay. Against this factual backdrop, which
convincingly showed that he is an intelligent, cognitive,
rational and thinking person at the time of the stabbing, the
accused-appellant's plea of insanity must be rejected because it
has no leg to stand on.
IN RE: TREACHERY; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH –
IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY.
In People v. Isla, the Supreme Court clarified that for treachery
to exist 'the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.' It is important in ascertaining the
existence of treache1y that it be proven that the attack was
made swiftly, deliberately, unexpectedly, and without a
warning, thus affording the unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape the attack. In the instant case, Loreto killed
Amean while the latter was sleeping and had no chance to
resist or escape the attack. Clearly, there was treachery.
Meanwhile, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
deemed absorbed in treachery.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In the
case before Us, the accused-appellant went home after taking a
stroll and after buying cigarettes, then he took the k.'1ife from
his residence and used same to kill the victim. Thus, We are
one with the RTC in its findings that there was evident
premeditation in the commission of the crime.
It must be stated, however, that in view of the attendant
circumstance of treachery which qualified the killing to
murder, as well as the presence of evident premeditation, and
the ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the
imposable penalty would have been death if not for the
proscription for its imposition under Republic Act No. 9346.
Thus, both the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty
of  reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant.
66. PEOPLE VS. MANGSANT;
GR NO. L-45704, MAY 25, 1938
TOPICS: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE –
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, NEGATED;
DISREGARD OF RESPECT DUE ON ACCOUNT OF
AGE, RACE OR SEX NEGATED; ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, NEGATED; MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES - PASSION AND
OBFUSCATION, NEGATED; LACK OF
INSTRUCTION, NEGATED; VOLUNTARY
CONFESSION, APPRECIATED.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The information against him alleged that on April 7, 1937,
in the City of Manila, with evident premeditation, disregard
of sex and taking advantage of superior strength, and with
the deliberate intention to kill, the said accused did then
and there attack Demetria Ferrer, a girl 14 years of age,
stabbing her from behind with a knife and inflicting upon
her various wounds in different parts of the body which
produced her instantaneous death.
Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded "not guilty" but
during the trial and before the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution, said plea was changed to that of
"guilty". He was then allowed to testify under oath to the
circumstances under which he committed the crime. He
testified in substance that the deceased and he, were lovers,
having agreed to marry in the following May; that on the
afternoon of April 7, 1937, the date alleged in the
information, he visited his fiancee, and as in the course of
the conversation, she revealed that she loved another man,
he became so obfuscated that he wounded her with a knife
until she was lifeless.
ISSUE:
W the aggravating circumstances alleged can be considered
in the case at bar.
W the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction can be
considered as well as the circumstances of passion and
obfuscation; and voluntary confession.
RULING:
IN RE: EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
 There was no premeditation according to the
description or account of the crime given in the
information.
IN RE: DISREGARD OF SEX
The aggravating circumstance disregard of sex cannot be
considered because it has never been proved nor admitted
by the defendant that in committing the crime he had
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim.
IN RE: ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
"Neither may the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength be taken into account just because of the
fact that the defendant is a man and the deceased a woman,
inasmuch as this circumstance is inherent in the crime
committed and is moreover absorbed by the treachery
which, in this case, qualifies the crime as murder.  GR NO. 171271; AUGUST 31, 2006
IN RE: LACK OF INSTRUCTION
It is not proper to consider lack of instruction in favor of
the defendant, inasmuch as he admitted that he had studied
in the first grade in a public elementary school. Lack of
instruction cannot apply to one who has studied in the first
grade in a public school, but only to him who really has not
received any instruction (art. 15, first paragraph, Revised
Penal Code). Much less may the circumstance that the
defendant had acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced obfuscation be considered in his
favor because the revelation by the deceased that she loved
another man, under the circumstances in which it was
made, was not sufficient to produce that mental blindness
which article 13, No. 6, of the Revised Penal Code,
recognizes as mitigating.
IN RE: VOLUNTARY CONFESSION
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
confession is present in its commission, without any
aggravating circumstance to offset it, the judgment
appealed from is hereby modified and said penalty imposed
in its minimum period.
67. PEOPLE VS. TUBONGBANUA
TOPIC: AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES –
DWELLING, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STREGTH;
QUALIFIYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
– EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NON-IMPOSITION
OF DEATH PENALTY.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn
Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked as the managing
partner of the Lawyer's Advocate Circle, a law firm
operated as a sole proprietorship, and located at 2302
Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan,
M.M. Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a month as
wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay,
which he received when he did extra driving and other
work for Atty. Sua-Kho's family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to her
condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St.,
Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his employer's bag
to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the
kitchen where he drank a glass of water. Also in the
condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Kho's three year old
daughter Issa and her nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After
talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes,
Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the
accused. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer
screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their
kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya
Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho.
Meanwhile, Nelie also heard her employer's screams, and
locked herself with Issa in the master's bathroom. When
she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa,
whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The latter did
so, and sought help from the security guard. Nellie,
meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Kho's father, Marcelino Sua,
and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a
security guard in front of the condominium unit. When they
entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty.
Sua-Kho sprawled on the floor. Marcelino then brought his
daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where
doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The accused,
meanwhile, fled, using the victim's car. He was arrested
soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to
his home province.
ISSUE:
W the alleged aggravating circumstances can be
considered.
RULING:
IN RE: DWELLING
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her
home. Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but he
decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we
appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
IN RE: ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength
to perpetuate the criminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-Kho by
overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her
body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows.
He could not have executed the dastardly act without
employing physical superiority over the victim. In People
v. Espina,17 we have ruled that an attack by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
IN RE: IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,25 as amended by
R.A. No. 7659,26 prescribes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking
advantage of superior strength without any mitigating
circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have
been death.27
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No.
9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty on June 24, 200628, the penalty that should be
meted is reclusion perpetua.
68. PEOPLE VS. LAPORE
GR. 191197; JUNE 22, 2015
TOPICS: RA 8353 – ANTI-RAPE LAW; SPECIAL
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE – USE OF
DEADLY WEAPON, QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE – ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE,
OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS, MINORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, NOT APPRECIATED, DOES NOT
QUALIFY SIMPLE RAPE TO QUALIFIED RAPE.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The victim, AAA, is thirteen (13) years old and illiterate.
She lives with her parents in Barangay Berong,
Municipality of Quezon, Palawan. On 1 October 1998,
when AAA's parents went to Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, AAA was left at their house with her older
brother, two (2) younger siblings, and accused-appellant
Lapore who was staying at their house as a guest. Lapore
was a pastor in their church.5chanrobleslaw
One evening, AAA's older brother left the house to go
fishing while AAA was asleep. Lapore went inside AAA's
room and removed AAA's panty. Lapore then removed his
underwear and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
cried. When she tried to shout, Lapore pointed a knife at
her neck and threatened to kill her.
With his penis still insider her vagina, Lapore made push
and pull movements and then left.6chanrobleslaw
On 20 October 1998, when AAA's parents returned home,
AAA reported her ordeal to her parents. When AAA's
parents confronted Lapore, Lapore admitted to the rape and
promised to marry AAA. After the confrontation, Lapore
left. Three (3) months passed. Lapore failed to return. Thus,
AAA and her mother reported the incident to the Barangay
Chairman and to the police. AAA was brought to Dr.
Josieveline M. Abiog-Damalerio, the Municipal Health
Officer of Quezon, Palawan, for medical examination. On
23 December 1998, AAA filed the instant criminal
complaint for the crime of rape against
Lapore.7chanrobleslaw
AAA's mother, BBB, testified and presented AAA's Birth
Certificate to prove that AAA was born on 16 December
1984. The authenticity of the certificate was admitted by
the defense.8chanrobleslaw
Dr. Alma Feliciano-Rivera testified and interpreted the
Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Josieveline M. Abiog-
Damalerio. The Medical Certificate revealed that AAA was
diagnosed with healed lacerations, which may have been
sustained a week prior to the examination and that AAA's
physical virginity was lost.
ISSUES:
W the CA erred in ruling that the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances of abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon
cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime from simple rape
to qualified rape.
RULING:
NO.
With regard to the presence of abuse of confidence and
obvious ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly
weapon, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Although the prosecution has duly proved the presence of
abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, minority,
and use of a deadly weapon, they may not be appreciated to
qualify the crime from simple rape to qualified rape.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provide that for qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be appreciated, it must be alleged in the
complaint or information.19 This is in line with the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.20 Even if
the prosecution has duly proven the presence of the
circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they
were not alleged in the Information. Hence, although the
prosecution has duly established the presence of the
aforesaid circumstances, which, however, were not alleged
in the Information, this Court cannot appreciate the same.
Notably, these circumstances are not among those which
qualify a crime from simple rape to qualified rape as
defined under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Thus even if duly alleged and proven, the crime
would still be simple rape.
Therefore, as all the elements necessary to sustain a
conviction for simple rape are present: (1) that Lapore had
carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) that said act was
accomplished through the use of force or intimidation, 21 we
find Lapore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape.
69. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VERDAD
GR NO. L-51797, MAY 16, 1983
TOPICS: ATTEMPTED FELONY, AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE – ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE,
OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS, ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
"That on or about the 7th day of July, 1979, in Cabanatuan
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
bolo, with intent of gain and by means of violence and
intimidation of person, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away from
the residence of Tomas Ramos the following, to wit:
1. Stereo Cassette — P1, 000.00
2. Cash money amounting to P30.00
3. Assorted jewelries valued at P5, 000.000
belonging to Maria Rowena Ramos and Tomas Ramos and,
as a further result thereof said accused by reason of or on
the occasion of said robbery, with intent to kill, assaulted
and used violence upon the person of the same Maria
Rowena Ramos, that is by hacking her thru the use of a
bolo, inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries
particularly on the head which directly caused the latter’s
death.
The crime was committed with the attendance of the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence or
obvious ungratefulness, evident premeditation, taking
advantage of and with use of superior strength and with the
use of a motor vehicle and nighttime.
ISSUES:
W Verdad should be penalized with the capital punishment
of Death in consideration of the attending aggravating
circumstances.
RULING:
NO.
IN RE: ATTEMPTED FELONY
There is an attempt to commit a felony then the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by over
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
(Article 6, Revised Penal Code.) Applying the criterion to
the case at bar, it is a fact that in his extra-judicial
confession, the accused admitted that he had intended to
abuse the victim. As the crime unfolded, however, the
accused did not perform any direct overt act commencing
the execution of the crime of rape.
IN RE:ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR OBVIOUS
UNGRATEFULNESS
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence or
obvious ungratefulness (Article 14[4], Revised Penal
Code.), and abuse of superior strength (Article 14[15],
ibid.) were properly appreciated by the Trial Court. The
accused was treated like a member of the family and was
completely trusted. That confidence facilitated the
commission of the offense.
 IN RE: ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is likewise
present. The accused had abused that superiority which his
sex and the weapon he had employed afforded him and
from which the 14-year-old Rowena was unable to defend
herself (People v. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122 [1960]; People
v. Braña, 30 SCRA 307 [1969]).
IN RE: PENALTY IMPOSED FOR LACK OF THE
NECESSARY VOTES:
With the plea of guilty offsetting only one of the
aggravating circumstances, there still remains another
aggravating circumstance that calls for the imposition of
the penalty in its maximum period, or death (Article 294[l],
Revised Penal Code), as found by the Trial Court.
However, for lack of the necessary votes to impose this
extreme penalty, the sentence is commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
70. PEOPLE VS. MANZANO, JR. ET AL.
GR NO. 217974, MARCH 5, 2018
TOPICS: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE – SELF-
DEFENSE, NEGATED; QUALIFYING
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE – TREACHERY,
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE – VOLUNTARY SURRENDER,
NEGATED.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused-appellant and his elder brother Resurrecion
Manzano (Resurrecion) were charged with murder before
the RTC of San Jose, Antique, in an Information3 docketed
as Crim. Case No. 10-07-8009, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2010, in the
Municipality of Hamtic, Province of Antique, Republic of
the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with
knives, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with
said knives one Lucio Silava, thereby inflicting upon the
latter wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous
death.
With qualifying circumstance of treachery and abuse of
superior strength.
Contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
The parties agreed to have an inverted trial after the
accused-appellant who, pleading not guilty during the
arraignment, raised the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Resurrecion remained at large.
To prove his claim of self-defense, the accused-appellant
himself testified. SPO2 Roberto Javier (SPO2 Javier) of the
Hamtic police office took the witness stand to prove that
the accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered.

The prosecution tried to prove its case against the accused-
appellant by calling to the witness stand Dr. Ma. Eva D.
Pacificador (Dr. Pacificador), Victoria N. Silava (Victoria),
Atty. Rean S. Sy (Atty. Sy), and Luisa P. Monteclaro
(Luisa).
ISSUES:
W the trial court erred in not appreciating incomplete self-
defense by Manzano.
W the trial court erred in finding that Manzano acted with
abuse of superior strength
W the trial court erred in not appreciating Manzano’s
voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstance.
RULING:
IN RE: SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.43
Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused fails to
prove the existence of justifying circumstances.
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must
establish: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense.
On the first element, the consistent teaching by the Court
on unlawful aggression is as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the
primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the
life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the
peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. 
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material
unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful
aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means
an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point
of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making
a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression
must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such
as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like
aiming to throw a pot.
Accused-appellant's plea of self-defense is controverted by the
nature, number, and location of the wounds inflicted on the
victim, since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a
determined effort to kill and not just to defend. 57 The
postmortem examination58 conducted by Dr. Pacificador on the
body of Lucio revealed that he sustained fifteen wounds, four
of which were fatal, and that the cause of his death was
hypovolemic shock secondary to hemorrhage secondary to
multiple stab wounds. The findings of Dr. Pacificador justify a
declaration that there was undeniable intent on the part of the
accused-appellant to kill Lucio.
The absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio in this
case unmistakably belies the accused-appellant's claim of self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete. In view of this, the
Court finds no reason to further discuss the other elements of
the justifying circumstance of self-defense and will proceed to
determine the offense committed by the accused-appellant.
IN RE: TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH
The intent to kill by the accused-appellant and Resurrecion was
confirmed by the fact that they were armed with knives when
they attacked Lucio who sustained a total of fifteen wounds.
Despite the fact that Lucio was already bleeding from his
wounds, he was able to run away from his assailants who
pursued him. Resurrecion stood in front of Lucio while the
accused-appellant held him at the back and both assailants
continued to stab him. According to Dr. Pacificador, there were
four fatal wounds inflicted on Lucio, i.e., wounds numbered 1,
4, 5, and 6 which penetrated his major organs.
For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated,
the following elements must be shown: (1) the employment of
means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the
safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts
of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.
It must be pointed out that since treachery had qualified the
crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.
IN RE: VOLUNTARY SURRENDER:
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, the following elements must be present, to wit:
(1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent;
and (3) the surrender is voluntary.79 The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give
himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because
he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities
the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture.
Records show that it was Reno who went to the Hamtic police
station to request that they take custody of the accused-
appellant who was then in his house. 81 Undoubtedly, when the
police went to Reno's house at San Angel, San Jose, Antique, it
was for the purpose of arresting the accused-appellant and not
because he was surrendering to them voluntarily. Simply put,
Reno merely facilitated the accused-appellant's arrest. Thus,
without the elements of voluntary surrender, and where the
clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of
arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not
spontaneous and therefore cannot be characterized as
"voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.