411

石油技術協会誌 第 84 巻 第 6 号 （令和元年 11 月）411 ∼ 420 頁

Journal of the Japanese Association for Petroleum Technology
Vol. 84, No. 6（Nov., 2019）pp. 411∼420

講   演
Lecture

Asset integrity & operation assurance in production assets

of overseas operations＊

Manabu Nakajima , Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin

＊＊，
† ＊＊ ＊＊＊

（Received July 11, 2019；accepted September 9, 2019）

Abstract： Asset integrity management system（AIMS）outlines the ability of an asset to perform its required
functions effectively and efficiently whilst protecting safety under the integrated system. AIMS is drawing attentions more
than ever since the maximum valuation of existing assets is the main stream in E&P industry currently under the volatile
oil market and AIMS plays an important role on this.
On the other hand deteriorations of aging facilities or deviation from the basis of design are common challenges in
brown field. Such late stage challenges were eminent issues in the production Asset A and in addition to the rigorous
inspection and maintenance program a facility life extension work（FLEW）had launched for the extension of the facility
life. At the same time an asset integrity & operation assurance（AI&OA）initiative had been built from the corporate
standpoint to propagate the AIMS concept to the production assets.
In 2017 an AI&OA survey under AI&OA initiative was conducted focusing on FLEW to observe the status and ensure
FLEW was in progress under systematic and competent manners in line with the AIMS. AI&OA framework is a cyclic
process stating from the risk identification. As the result of the survey it was acknowledged FLEW needed to reinforce
some items such as the risk assessment, organization structure, project execution plan, monitoring and key performance
indicator（KPI）, technical authorization, document control and project review process.
Another AI&OA Survey was conducted in 2018 focusing how FLEW program was conveyed adhering to AI&OA
framework and addressing the items pointed out during 2017 survey. 2018 survey result had indicated FLEW program
was executed in line with AI&OA framework fulfilling all of requirements.

Keywords： asset integrity, risk-based inspection, RBI, risk assessment, facility life extension, pipeline, inspection,
maintenance, corrosion, ALARP, class

for example. For the sake of the ef ficient operations and

1. Introduction
Due to the oil market down turn commencing from late
2014 the sentiments for the suppression of new investment
become common fashion among E&P players. This is self-
explanator y that the investment for E&P sector globally
dropped 25% in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Although the
activities are picking up in 2019 the responses are weak
and slow. E&P players are prone to shift more stable and
lower risk business models under the volatility of oil market,
the value enhancement by the existing production assets
＊
令和元年 6 月 13 日，令和元年度石油技術協会春季講演会開発・生
産部門シンポジウム「油ガス田開発を新世代へ∼進化するデジタル
技術と開発計画の再構築∼」で講演 This paper was presented at the
2019 JAPT Development and Production Technology Symposium entitled
Explore the next stage ~Apply digital transformation and re-visit E&P
projects~ held in Tokyo, Japan, June 13, 2019.
＊＊
JX 石油開発㈱ JX Nippon Oil & Gas Exploration Corporation
†
Corresponding author：E-Mail：nakajima.nanabu@jxgr.com
maximum valuation the asset integrity is drawing an attention
in E&P sector more than ever.
In order to promote the asset integrity many of the brown
fields should face challenges by deteriorations of aging
facilities, the failure of the integration or off-spec application
by the deviation from the basis of design initially set. Such
dif ficulties were eminent to our production asset（Asset
A）and in addition to the rigorous inspection, repair and
maintenance（IRM）program, Asset A had launched an
extensive FLEW（facility life extension work）project for the
extension of the facility life in competent manner.
The typical challenges in Asset A production operations are
described as followings.
・ In our production asset case particular the contract terms of
the production concessions with host country had decided the
design life. Due to the technical intervention and optimization
of the field performance and successful extension of the
original concession terms now the production assets need to

Copyright © 2019， JAPT

 412 Asset integrity & operation assurance in production assets of overseas operations

stretch their operational viability exceeding original design life.

・ The basis of the design for the production facilities was
formed from the primordial data of untapped field such as
the DST data. The operating conditions of the brown fields
were very much unlike the original state and many of the late
stage production parameters did not match to the original
production conditions. Sometimes the operating conditions
may have exceeded the design envelop and extensive IRM
（inspection, repair and maintenance）program and facility
modification program needed to be intervened.
In this extent an asset integrity & operation assurance
（AI&OA）initiative had been introduced and AI&OA survey
had been launched in 2017 to our two core production assets
in overseas in order to identify the challenges and prepare the Fig. 1 Field layout for Asset A
benchmark.

2. 2017 AI&OA sur vey in Asset A

In 2017 two AI&OA sur veys were exercised for two
independent production assets located in offshore, SE Asia.
One of the production asset（herein called Asset A）is located
approx. 135km off the coast starting oil production since
1998. The offshore facilities consist of 1 x central complex,
6 x production platforms and 1 x FSO. Gas lift and tertiary
oil recovery program are implemented to assist the depleted
reser voir and unloading the well with excessive water
production（Fig. 1） .
2.1 Outline of 2017 AI&OA sur vey
Some of the production facilities were designed to match
up with the original concession terms（15 years production）
with host country and the revised concession terms require
the integrity and fitness on production facilities exceeding
the design life with the re-certification of the class by CA
（certificate authority）.
Asset A had initiated FLEW（facility life extension work）
plan as early as in 2015 and started to seek for any special

Fig. 2 AI&OA cycle diagram

石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号（2019）
 Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin
IRM（inspection, repair and maintenance）to extend the field
life of given production facilities.
2017 AI&OA survey was exercised in July 2017 targeting
FLEW to observe the status and identify the challenges and
hindrances FLEW was facing and importantly FLEW was in
progress under systematic and competent manners.
Prior to 2017 AI&OA survey AI&OA framework had been
defined and AI&OA cycle flow diagram had been introduced
（Fig. 2）to Asset A to align the mutual understanding of
AI&OA framework. AI&OA framework is the cyclic program
starting from the risk identification.
2.2 AI&OA framework
The production facilities are designed to meet ever y
operational circumstance with risk reduction or avoidance or
transfer and any of the risks remaining after such mitigation
plans should have to be retained in the design envelope under
ALARP（as low as reasonably practicable）principle adopting
procedural controls such as operational procedures, safety
cases, permit to work（PTW）system, MoCs（management
of changes）managing the risks inactive. In this extent the
operating envelope should not exceed the design envelope
under any circumstance（Fig. 3）and if so required the
facility design needs to be reviewed with some modification/
rectification work associated（e.g., carbon steel flowlines
replaced by stainless steel materials）.
Based on the risk assessment and data acquisition and
analysis derived from the production operations the inspection
and maintenance plans are defined and implemented. In
FLEW（facility life extension work）case the final deliverables
would be the inspection and maintenance plans to meet the
late life production field. After the implementation of the
inspection and maintenance plans（e.g., RBI, risk based
inspection）, the plans should be reviewed and fed-backed to
the technical authority or other authorization layer（s）for the
further actions thus AI&OA flow should continue cyclically.
Other than each segment described in Fig. 2 and above
paragraph, there are two essential aspects to be incorporated
in AI&OA framework. One is organization structure and the
other is monitoring, which incur in the entire AI&OA cycle
Fig. 3 Deviation from basis of design
413
and relevant to each AI&OA segment as per Fig. 2.
As for organization structure it does not mean only FLEW
and production operation（P&O sections, as the end user）
teams are the members of organization structure. Assuming
that the sand production and associated events（e.g., sand
wash-out for the sub-sur face or sur face equipment and
plugging or settlement in pressure vessels）are identified as
the eminent risks, the data should be furnished from geology
and geophysics（G&G）and P&O sections. Then production
and subsur face flow assurance and control should be
managed by reservoir/production management section（e.g.,
control of production rate based on the draw-down criteria or
gas injection control for the enhanced oil recovery program）.
If the mitigation plans need to be in place with the well
intervention（e.g., sand bailing, review of perforation design,
work-over with sand control program）well construction
section needs to join to the organization thus a cross-section
and multi-disciplinary organization（e.g., sand control team）
would be required.
The importance of the organization structure is not only
for the cross-boundar y communications and joint ef for ts
but leadership and internal authorization flow. The strong
leadership and initiatives are always inevitable to promote the
cross-boundary project and the internal decision and approval
process（e.g., stage gate）should be in place for the assurance
and authorization of each stage.
The monitoring is often located at the base of alarm
management hierarchy as the first line of defense where the
internal audit is situated at the summit（Fig. 4）as the last
line of defense and metrics index or KPIs（key performance
indicators）are used for the tools to visually and quantitatively
measure the performances. If the ARP（asset reference plan）
has been introduced the KPIs or metrics can be used for the
tools to understand the deviation from original plans or targets
quantitatively and evaluated the performances of numerical
Fig. 4 Alarm management hierarchy
J. Japanese Assoc. Petrol. Technol. Vol. 84, No. 6（2019）
 414 Asset integrity & operation assurance in production assets of overseas operations
targets for the budget, field development plan（FDP）, financial
performances, production even though the definite ARP is
not available in the production assets for the analysis in later
stage.
2.3 Risk-based inspection（RBI）
Risk-based inspection（RBI）is a process that refers the
risk assessment for the preparation of the inspection plans
（e.g., intervals, priorities, locations）seeking for the more cost
effective manner with the optimum use of the resources.
In Asset A RBI program was first introduced for the
inspection plan of the pipelines in 2012 and RBI for the
pipelines would be revised based on the data derived from
ILI（in-line inspection）program and RBI program could
extensively be applied to other equipment inspection plans
（refer the chapter of P1/P2 Pipelines of this article for
detail）.
2.4 2017 AI&OA sur vey result in Asset A
In Asset A FLEW（facility life extension work）planning
and preparation works were in progress with the participation
of project and production operation sections. The FLEW
was initially regarded as a small scale and localized events
（e.g., inspection and maintenance program with minor
modification）and the systematic approaches were not
essential. After the extensive discussion with sur veyors
the sur veyees had recognized the FLEW had required the
further reinforcements using more systematic and rational
approaches in line with AI&OA philosophy and framework.
The following items were identified some reinforcements or
reviews were required.
2.4.1 Project objectives and deliverables
Project objectives had initially set up for individual scope
however FLEW project objectives for entire project scope
was not sufficiently addressed. The definition of the project
deliverables（e.g., cost reduction initiatives, inspection
& maintenance plans, revised operational procedure &
philosophy）was uncertain also.
2.4.2 Risk assessment
Risk assessment had been conducted earlier however
some critical decision needed to be made after receiving the
specific information（e.g., P1 and P2 pipelines baseline survey
data, restructure of fatigue model of structures using weather
data）. Once such data would be available new risk profile may
have been installed and risk assessment would be updated
accordingly.
2.4.3 Organization structure
Since the cross-boundar y and multi-disciplinar y
approaches are the key to success for FLEW the organization
structure, person in charge（PIC） , role and responsibility,
communication and command flow, interface management
（including with contractor）and authorization process
would have been clearly specified, defined and written in the
documents.
Also to prevent the omission and oversight upon the risk
identification stage it is essential to incorporate the multi-
disciplinary approaches by obtaining the outcome from each
石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号（2019）
relevant technical expertise.
2.4.4 Project execution plan（PEP）
Project execution plan（PEP）was required to prepare
FLEW in ef fective and ef ficient manner such as work
breakdown structure（WBS）to allow effective formation of
schedule, cost estimation and resource allocation, project
costs & schedule, project control plan for costs, schedule
and QA/QC of deliverables and contracting strategy &
management plan.
2.4.5 Monitoring
Vigilant monitoring of the per formance and facility
conditions（including consequence and side-effect）would
be required for the assessment of FLEW and production
operations. It was ideal and ef fective if such monitoring
was visual and measurable combined with KPI/metrics for
example. Then such monitoring result would be fed back to
AI&OA cycle for the further reviews and actions（e.g., revised
risk profile）.
2.4.6 Technical authority
Although some of the items（e.g., structures, pipelines）
would have been certified by the class authorities（CAs）for
the FLEW process many of the items were not CAs scope
and business critical elements（e.g., fiscal metering）were
completely outside of CAs boundary. In addition CAs would
certify the individual components however assurance and
verification of the entire system and flow would be irrelevant
to CAs scope.
2.4.7 Document control & record management
References to standards/guidelines were partially available
but there should have been some revisions to be required to
improve the accessibility to the information.
3. 2018 AI&OA sur vey in Asset A
3.1 2018 AI&OA sur vey result in Asset A
2018 AI&OA survey was conducted at Asset A in July, 2018,
focusing on FLEW（facility life extension work）to observe
the project progress and par ticularly how it adhered to
AI&OA philosophy and framework and how the items pointed
out during 2017 AI&OA survey were addressed and reflected
in the FLEW.
3.1.1 Overall structure
Project execution plan（PEP）had been established for
the FLEW defining project objectives and deliverables and
incorporating project schedule and organization with each
role and responsibility.
At the same time Asset A had been preparing in an OMS
（operations management system）as an inherent own system
in line with AI&OA philosophy to control and manage entire
production operations and FLEW in more systematic manner.
Some of the missing items such as the internal technical
authorization flow and interface management should have
been captured in OMS once established.
3.1.2 Risk identification and management.
Project risk assessment for FLEW was conducted and RBI
（risk based inspection）plan was incorporated in to the IRM
 Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin
（inspection, repair and maintenance）program for the in-field
pipelines（refer 4.1.1. P1/P2 Pipelines in later section） . RBI
application to the pressure vessels was under assessment at
the time of the survey.
3.1.3 Monitoring
Monitoring & feedback had been implemented through KPI
and metrics mechanism.
3.1.4 3rd Party technical assurance and authority
Some of the cer tifications of CAs（class authorities）
were to be expired in 2018, where asset design lives have
reached. Obviously the mandatory requirements of the CA
certifications should have been prioritized（the status of the
CA extensions were described in 4.1.3. CA extensions in later
sections）.
Since the requirements of CA certifications were limited
to the certain asset components（e.g., pipelines, pressure
vessels, structures）the technical assurance and authority
should have been required for other items such as business
critical elements（BCE）. Asset A utilized 3rd party technical
consultancy for the technical assurance and authority of the
non-certified components in FLEW scope.
3.1.5 Document control & record management
Basis for the codes & standards for FLEW were identified
and shared.
4. FLEW（facility life extension work）
Asset A owned total 17 x in-field pipelines, 6 x drilling/
production platforms with 1 x central complex and 1 x floating
storage and offloading system（FSO）（Fig. 1）. The field had
been developed in a manner of phased development thus the
field facilities obtained different installation timings, field life
spans and expiries.
P1 Pipeline（P1 P/L, 2,000 m）was installed with #1 Platform
（#1 P/F）in 1998 when the said oil field started production.
At that time limited processing system on board #1 P/F and
floating production, storage and offloading system（FPSO）
were used for the main processing and field storage of the
productions. P1 P/L was directly hooked up to FPSO as the in-
field production lines. In 2008 after the replacement of FPSO
by FSO and installation of production complex P1 P/L ceased
its function to flow the production to FPSO, connected with P2
pipeline newly installed（5,516m）and started to receive the
Table 1 Pipelines with critical design lives
Expected
Facilities Installation Design Life
Extension
Main Field
#1 P/F 1998 2018 2025
P1/P2 P/Ls 1998/2002 2018 2025
Satellite Field
#5 P/F
P15 P/L 2008 2018 2023
P16 P/L
415
production from #2 P/F. P1 and P2 P/Ls obtain different field
life however they function as an integrated unit thus the field
life（with expiry of CA certificates）were controlled by P1 P/L,
20 years after the installation（up to 2018, Table 1）.
On the other hand #5 Platforms（#5 P/F）along with P15
and P16 Pipelines（P15 and P16 P/Ls）were developed in
2008 as the satellite facilities of Asset A on the independent
geological structure located at the north-east of the main
geological structure. P15 P/L was used for the production line
where P16 P/L was used for the dry gas line for the gas lift
operations. The earlier study suggested the rapid inclination of
the reservoir performance thus 10 years design life had been
set starting from 2008（up to 2018）on the satellite facilities
however the favorable production performance combined
with the dilution of operating expenditures（Opex）with main
production field allowed further extension of the economic
field life therefore additional 5 years technical field life needed
to be sought（up to 2023）.
In summar y FLEW（facility life extension work）was
divided into 3 major segments as followings.
1. Pipelines（P1/P2 Pipelines and P15 and P16 Pipelines）
2. Platform Jackets（#1 and #5 Platforms）
3. Platform Topsides（#1 and #5 Platforms）
The following sections highlight the findings on FLEW for
each segment respectively.
4.1 Pipelines（P1/P2 Pipelines and P15 and P16
Pipelines）
4.1.1 P1/P2 Pipelines
Since 1998, field production operation start-up in Asset A P1
P/L had never received the inspection on the internal surface
conditions（ILI, in-line inspection） , where external surface
conditions were obser ved by ROV/diving inter ventions
regularly. With the sweet crude production and low pressure
low temperature（LPLT）operating conditions the corrosion
of the production equipment was initially categorized as low to
medium risk.
ILI survey program had been executed for P1/P2 P/Ls in
November 2017 using the intelligent pigs consisting of caliper
and magnetic flux leakage（MFL）inspection methods（Fig. 5 ） .
The caliper inspection was designed to detect, locate and
report the internal diameter and external profile indirectly
along the full length of pipeline（e.g., anomaly caused by
Fig. 5 ILI work for P1 and P2 Pipelines
J. Japanese Assoc. Petrol. Technol. Vol. 84, No. 6（2019）
 416 Asset integrity & operation assurance in production assets of overseas operations
the external physical impact such as anchor drop, trawling
activities）. On the other hand MFL should have r un to
detect, locate, size and report anomalies and/or features of
the internal surface along the full length of pipeline（e.g.,
pitting, hole, loss of wall thickness）. Two ILI runs were made
launching 2 separate intelligent pigs（caliper and caliper with
MFL）from #2 P/F, passing through P2 and P1 P/Ls and
eventually received at the #1 P/F in production complex（P/
C） .
The caliper run did not detect any anomaly however MFL
sur vey identified 6031 internal metal loss spots, 5892 for
independent spots and 139 for clusters. All metal loss spots
were judged estimated repair factor（ERF）less than 0.80 thus
no repair work was scheduled.
The metal loss counts were observed in both P1 and P2 P/
Ls however concentrated much more in P1 P/L section and
it suggested the development of the corrosion had been slow
and time dependent. The separate adenosine triphosphate
（ATP）test confirmed the microbial activities in P/L fluid and
the cause of the corrosion was concluded as MIC（microbial
influenced corrosion）from the anaerobic microbial activities.
The post ILI survey assessment was made using in-house
model for the P1/P2 P/Ls compatibility to the maximum
anticipated operating pressure, 9,310 kPa upon the resumption
of the production as per ASME B31G Edition 2012 Code
outlined by Pipeline Operator Forum（POF）. The assessment
concluded the compatibility of P1/P2 P/Ls for the anticipated
maximum operating pressure. The competency of the P1/
P2 P/Ls in the current operations was determined using
in-house model however the life expectancy and to design
appropriate inspection and maintenance program such as
MIC management plans were beyond Asset A s expertise. In
order to fulfill the gap Asset A utilized the 3rd party technical
consultancy（refer section 3.1.4）and finalized the forward
path on the P1/P2 P/Ls with a directive from the host country
CA organization as followings.
・ In accordance with the technical consultancy the life
expectancy of P1/P2 P/Ls was predicted 8.9 years which
gave them the safety assurance up to October 2026
assuming that the corrosion progress would trace the past
trend and current MIC management plans（e.g., dosing
of biocide and corrosion inhibitors）and the rigorous
monitoring of H2S/CO2 concentration and ATP test would
be in place.
・ Considering 15% measuring tolerance on ILI sur vey the
lowest end of the life expectancy was 3.3 years（up to
March 2021）in the extreme case. Asset A had planned
to undertake another ILI sur vey in 2020 to confirm the
corrosion trend and study result.
・ Risk based inspection（RBI）2012 Model would be reviewed
based on the new risk profiles extracted from ILI survey
and study results.
4.1.2 P15 and P16 Pipelines
As for P15 and 16 Pipelines considering 10 year ser vice
span and no evidence of H2S/CO2 and microbial activities by
石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号（2019）
Table 2 CA status for pipelines
Original Host
CAs Inte l
Expiry Country
Main Field
P1 P/L 2018 3/31 2021 3/31 2021
P2 P/L 2022 7/31 2023 7/31 2022
Satellite Field
P15 P/L
2018 7/31 2023 7/31 2023
P16 P/L
viable count and ATP photometr y suggested the pipelines
were intact to the microbial influenced corrosion（MIC）. The
maximum potential corrosion ratio of pipeline was 0.15 mm/
year and considering 3 mm design corrosion allowance it was
sufficient for P15 and P16 Pipelines to fulfill the extended
service period. It was concluded no further inspection, repair
and maintenance（IRM）program was applicable to P15 and
16 Pipelines.
4.1.3 CA extensions
In regard to CA certificate extensions, the CA extensions
were given as per Table 2.
4.2 Platform jackets（#1 and #5 Platforms）
The design life of the platform jackets for #1 and #5 P/F
would have come to the end in 2018 and the certificate validity
by CAs would have also expired at the same time thus the
prompt actions for the integrity assurance and re-issuance of
the certificates were absolutely necessary.
V iability and possible extension of ser vice life for
platform jackets were assessed using the 3rd party technical
consultancy focusing on 4 individual aspects, a） . fatigue re-
analysis, b）. strength assessment, c）. cathodic protection
inspection and d）. marine growth inspections, consisting of
general view inspection（GVI）and close visual inspection
（CVI）.
4.2.1 #1 P/F jacket
4.2.1.1 Fatigue re-analysis
Considering historical weather condition parameter the
fatigue life of the #1 P/F jacket had been calculated much
greater than the expected service period. The lowest fatigue
life was calculated 140 years（@ safety factor 2.5）.
4.2.1.2 Strength assessment
Jacket members（unity check > 0.8 @ 17 pre-selected
points）had been inspected using flooded member detection
（FMD）technique. The weight losses were confirmed less
than 1.5 mm by ultrasonic thickness measurement（UTM）
ensuring the competency to fulfill the service requirement till
2025.
4.2.1.3 Effectiveness of cathodic protections
Cathodic protections had been inspected by general visual
inspection（GVI）and found satisfactory to conduct service.
4.2.1.4 Marine growth inspection
Marine growth removal had been conducted at an interval
of 5 years or whenever the excessive marine growth was
 Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin 417

detected during level II or level III underwater survey. close 4.2.2.1 Assessment result
view inspection（CVI）had been carried out without detection It was conclude that #5 P/F jacket should have remained fit
of any flaw or defectiveness. for extended service life until 2025, subject to the conditions
4.2.1.5 Assessment result that the annual and major surveys would be duly executed to
It was concluded that #1 P/F jacket should have remained the satisfaction of international/host country CA organization.
fit for extended ser vice life until 2025, subject to the 4.2.3 CA Extensions
conditions that the annual and major surveys would be duly In regard to CA cer tificate extensions, the following
executed to the satisfaction of international/ host country CA extensions were given for each P/F jacket as per Table 3.
organization. 4.3 Platform Topsides（#1 and #5 Platforms）
4.2.2 #5 P/F jacket FLEW also confirmed the fitness and competency of #1 and
As well as #1 P/F jacket the viability and possible extension #5 P/F topside and it was concluded the operability of the #1
of service life for #5 P/F jacket were assessed using the 3rd and #5 P/F topside and associated equipment for the expected
party technical consultancy focusing on 4 individual aspects, service period as per Table 4.
fatigue re-analysis, strength assessment, cathodic protection
inspection and marine growth inspections consisting of 5. AI&OA sur vey in Asset B
general view inspection（GVI）and close visual inspection AI&OA sur veys were exercised in Asset B in 2017 and
（CVI）. Fatigue re-analysis demonstrated that the lowest 2018 respectively as well as Asset A. Asset B is a production
fatigue Life had been 18 years（@ SF. 5.0）which was much asset in offshore, SE Asia and located approx. 80 km out
greater than the expected service period. of shore starting the gas and condensate production since
2003. The offshore facilities consist of 1 x main production
platform and 1 x satellite platform. In addition a crude oil
production development project had been launched to extract
Table 3 CA status for #1 and #5 P/F jackets the crude oil from the lower reser voir in same field and a
FPSO installation was planned in late 2019 for the crude oil
Original Host processing, storage and of floading operations. The main
CAs Inte l
Expiry Country production platform was installed and hydrocarbon production
Main Field
had started in 2003 with the design life of 30 years thus the
#1 P/F Jacket 2018 9/25 2023 9/25 2023
ser vice life should have been assumed until 2033 without
Satellite Field
#5 P/F Jacket 2018 7/31 2023 7/31 2023 the expiry of CA certification. Asset B was construed to be
free from the issue for the design life and CA certification

Table 4 CA status and equipment conditions for #1 and #5 P/F topsides

#1 P/F Topsides Facilities（Specific）

Equipment Highlights CA/3rd Party
Main Fitness of service assessment and re-rating of MAOP was applied in Ve r i f i e d w i t h a n n u a l C A
production separator 2010 and magnetic particle inspection was conducted in 2015. Phased renewal.
array ultrasonic testing was carried out for corrosion mapping in 2018.
No mechanical defect or metal loss areas were detected.
Other pressure vessels UTM & Eddy current testing were carried out. Wall thickness was
satisfactory and no physical damage was found.
#1 and #5 P/F Topsides Facilities（Common）
Equipment Highlights CA/3rd Party
Lifting equipment All components have been in good conditions and functional. Ve r i f i e d w i t h a n n u a l C A
renewal.
Safety system Safety measurement devices were verified by 6-months critical Ve r i f i e d w i t h r e g u l a r C A
functional test with records. renewal.
Piping All piping system had been carried out general visual inspection Fit for ser vice for extended
annually. Once per two years, all piping system had been thoroughly life until 2025 with cur rent
inspected with wall thickness measurement. inspection and maintenance
program.
E&I Functional testing for fire and gas system（individual device and system Feasible for life extension up to
as a whole）have currently done for quarterly basis. Malfunction devices 2025.
were replaced.
The spare parts for next 5-years of control system have been in stock.

J. Japanese Assoc. Petrol. Technol. Vol. 84, No. 6（2019）

 418 Asset integrity & operation assurance in production assets of overseas operations

until the end of field life unlikely Asset A. The challenge was side even at the same cross section of the flowline（Fig. 6）.
however the integrity and operability of production assets Asset B had reviewed the inspection and maintenance
would have been maintained and assured throughout the field program completely and set up monitoring and remedial plans.
life. The absence of re-certification by CA organization kept The process of flowline IRM work did not follow the AI&OA
the opportunity for 3rd party assurance process away which framework however the entire process and each component
meant the rigorous IRM program and self-assurance system well fit to the AI&OA cyclic diagram（Fig. 7）thus the AI&OA
needed to be installed in-house. cyclic diagram was formed allocating the flowline IRM work
Asset B had experienced the multiple operational issues flow for the better understanding of AI&OA framework upon
from the production start-up and this article would provide the introduction to the asset members.
the two case stories relevant to the corrosion, 5.1. Flowline 5.1.1 Risk assessment
corrosion mitigation process allocated on AI&OA cycle and 5.2 Significant loss of wall thickness on the flowlines beyond
RBI and CMMS application for the corrosion management. original prediction cur ve should invite the risk for the
5.1 Flowline corrosion mitigation process allocated hydrocarbon（HC）release to the air and the event threatening
on AI&OA cycle
Asset B contained 2 % of CO 2 in production fluid and
some influence of the carbonic acid（pitting or weight loss
corrosion）was factored in the material selection and basis of
design. In engineering and designing process carbon steel was
chosen for the flowline materials with sufficient wall thickness
to cater mild weight loss of moderate corrosion activities
within 30 years production life. In 2010, 7 years after the
production start-up the extensive survey campaign was set to
check the corrosion effect on the flowlines. The survey result
had demonstrated the large contrast of the weight losses of
the flowlines which were decided by the location, geometry
and flow velocity and the highest contributing factors were the
curvature and the change of angle of the pipes. The weight
loss was extreme in high bending sections（e.g., elbows）
rather than the mild bending or straight areas and trace or nil
Fig. 6 Weight loss at elbow sections
on the short radius side and the highest on the long radius

Fig. 7 AI&OA cyclic diagram for flowline IRM work

石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号（2019）
 Manabu Nakajima, Nobuhiro Nishikawa and Mahathir Bin Jamaluddin
HSE and business（e.g., fire/explosion, HC spill to the sea and
production unplanned shut-down,）may follow. The excessive
and uneven progress of the corrosion had been registered in
asset risk file.
5.1.2 Data acquisition and analysis
The excessive material weight loss suggested the erosion-
corrosion combined with the kinematic behavior of the
transported fluid thus the flow assurance model needed to be
reviewed completely. Prior to the preparation of the action plan
a new flow simulation model was built for the understanding
of the corrosion mechanism. The new flow simulation model
clearly indicated the progress of the corrosion was highly
dependent on the location and curvature under the same fluid
composition and conditions. The new flow simulation model
was verified by the extensive inspection program introduced
later.
5.1.3 Development of revised maintenance &
inspection plan
The data analysis and new flow simulation model had
shown the original maintenance & inspection plan were not
sufficient to keep the pipelines intact from the corrosion effect
and new maintenance & inspection plan combined with the
revised operational mode had been introduced as followings.
・ Dosing of the corrosion inhibitor at the high temperature
side thus the corrosion inhibitor was dispersed evenly
protecting the entire internal sur face of the flowlines
equally and effectively.
Fig. 8 RBI and CMMS application for the corrosion management
419
・ Increasing flowline temperature to minimize the water
condensation preventing water to retain at the bottom of
flowlines to form the carbonic acid.
・ Reviewing the density of the inspection points applying
grid pattern sampling points rather than a scarce pin-point
sampling.
5.1.4 Performance review
Performance review process should evaluate the side-effect
as well as the effectiveness to fulfill the given objective. The
following inspection program had shown the effectiveness of
the revised maintenance and operational mode however same
time it was noticed that the oil contents in the discharged
water had been unstable. The root cause analysis concluded
the fluctuation of the oil contents was due to the emulsion
formed by the corrosion inhibitor dosage.
The revised maintenance and operational mode had
demonstrated the certain effect to slow down the progress of
the corrosion however the corrosion of the flowlines remained
as the threat to maintain the safe and stable operations and the
fluctuation of the oil contents in the discharged water needed
a remedial action. In later stage the carbon steel flowlines
were replaced by duplex stainless steel and dosing rate of
corrosion inhibitor was controlled not to form the emulsion
thus flowlines corrosion issues were no longer threat to run
the production operations in Asset B.
J. Japanese Assoc. Petrol. Technol. Vol. 84, No. 6（2019）
 420 Asset integrity & operation assurance in production assets of overseas operations

5.2 RBI and CMMS application for the corrosion

management 海外原油生産操業現場における
Although the flowlines and other main process lines were
生産設備健全性対応へのアプローチ
replaced by the duplex stainless steel many of the branch lines
remained carbon steel and the material corrosion had still
中島  学・西河 伸弘
been remained as the potential operational thread. Unlikely
マハディール ジャマルディン
flowline corrosion with the mild progress by the carbonic acid
some of the corrosion features and behaviors were different
2014 年の原油市場の低迷を期に石油・ガス開発事業に
on the branch lines, more acute combined with the change of
the flow phases and velocity（erosion effects by the bi-product おける新規開発投資は抑制傾向となり，過去数年多くの開
such as iron oxide-hydroxide or ferric oxide particle free in 発事業者はより低リスクかつ安定的な事業へと経営の舵を
the fluid stream） . The intensified monitoring and inspection 切ってきた。その延長線として既存資産の価値最大化と
program for the corrosion effect had been vested to some いった生産資産の見直しがあり，生産設備や操業を効果的
specific process piping. かつ安定的に管理する，アセット・インテグリティー管理
In this extent Asset B had introduced RBI and key point シ ス テ ム（asset integrity management system，AIMS） が
monitoring（KPM）approaches for the enhanced monitoring にわかに注目を集めている。
and inspection plans. The corrosion trend had been input 一方生産後期の油・ガス田では施設の老朽化や出水・出
to the RBI software for every KPM. RBI software had been
砂といった生産状況の変化により，既存の設計枠や保守・
linked with computerized maintenance management system
点検計画，作業手順といった従来の操業管理体制では制御
（CMMS）automatically（Fig. 8）to trigger the procurement
できない状況が生まれてくる。生産後期に生じる新たなリ
process for the IRM plans in the timely manner without delay.
スクに対応し，所定の生産期限まで安全・安定的な操業を
6. Remark 確保するには，生産設備に対する抜本的な延命措置，ライ
・ The design concept built at the development phase should フ・エクステンション・ワーク（LEW）が不可欠となる。
be obsolete and no longer ef fective to manage the late LEW にはリスク評価，組織・体制，コミュニケーション・
phase production operations and the late phase production 承認フロー，作業実行計画，モニタリング，外部審査・検
operations may not be sustainably assured with given asset 証，認証取得，文書管理，効果の見直しなど多くの要素と
design and procedural approaches. The life extension 多数の専門分野・組織が交差する複雑かつ高次な統合管理
works（LEW）will be the inevitable solution to bring the 体制が求められる。
production operations back in track. 本稿では海外生産事業所における LEW 実施の事例を取
・ The LEW however require the high level of the integration
り上げ，LEW を統合管理し，より実効性の高いものとす
and assessment of the consequences in the aspects of
るためいかに AIMS に基づいた管理体制を構築したかを
project objectives, risk assessment, organization structure,
紹介するとともに，当社独自の試みである AI&OA 調査，
monitoring, technical authorization, project deliverables
AI&OA フレームワーク・フローサイクルといった手法・
and performance reviews. AI&OA survey had successfully
contributed to impregnate such systematic approaches to 仕組みを説明し，それらの手法を用いた AIMS の操業現場
LEW. への浸透，効果的な適用方法についても解説する。
・ The risk-based inspection（RBI）is the methodology to run
the optimum inspection plan in cost effective manner. The
RBI is compatible with the digital solutions and approaches
which enhance the effectiveness of RBI inferring the failure
trends and linking up with computerized maintenance
management system（CMMS）for the timely procurement
processes spontaneously.

石油技術協会誌 84 巻 6 号（2019）