U.S. S. Enterprise (Cv6) History: Confidential

D ~S ED
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)
WAR HISTORY
7 DECEMBER. 1941
TO
15 AUGUST. 1945
The Chief of Naval Operations directs that this report be

shown only to those persons to whom the report would be of
value In the performance of their dut111s.
Steps shall be taken, accordingly, to Insure that the report
wlll be seen by those persons responsible for design, con·
struction and repair of naval vussels, as v.cll as for their
operation, but by no others.
Preliminary Design Section

Bureau of Ships
30 April, 1947 Navy Department
WAR DAMAGE REPORT No. 59
Printed By U. S. Hydroaraphfc Office

CONFIDENT IAL
DECLASSIFIED
U.S.S. EIITERPRISE (CV6)
War History
7 Decemoer 1941
to
15 August 1945
Class........ YORKTOWN (CV5 Class) Length (O.A .) .............. 82'7 Ft. 4 In.
Launched ........ .•..•. 3 O.:tober 193(:; Length (B. P.) ............. .'170 Fl. 0 In.
Displacernenl (Standard) 19. 900 tons Beam (Without Blisters) 83 Ft. 1 In.
(Before Blist.~r Addition) Beam (With Blisters)... 95 Ft. 4 - 1/2
In.
References:
General:
(a) War Diaries oi ENTERPRISE , complete from April 1942 through
September 1915, plus January 1942.
Damage of 1 February 1942:
(b) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. Hr. to BuShips CV6/S81(50-w y), Serial 027
of 7 February l P42.
Damage of 24 August 1942:
(c) C.O. ENTERPRISE con.f. llr. to BuShips CVG/Lll - 1(50-wy), Serial
0200 of fl Septemuer 1942.
(d) Comdl.Havy Yard, Pearl Harbor, conf. !tr. to BuShir.s C - Lll-1/CV/NY lO,
Serial Y-01957 of 25 October 1942.
(e) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. !tr. to BuShips CV6/L9- 3(50-B l), Serial 052 of
16 Mnrch 1943.
Damage oi 2o <Xtober 1942:

(i) C.O. ENTERPRISE coni. ltr. to BuShips CV6/Ll1 - l(f)0-Bl ), Serial
0273 of 8 November 1942.
(g) Comdt. Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, conf. ltr. lo BuShips C-Lll-1/CV /
NY10, Serial Y-01420 of 14 July 1943.
Damage of 18 and 20 March 1945:

(h) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CVti/ Lll- 1(50- cl), Serial 0200
of 4 April 1945.
Damage of 11 April 1945:
(1) C.O. ENTERPRISE con!. llr. to Comlnch CV6/ Al6-3(11-Pe) , Serial
0208 of 16 April H.145.
(j) C.O. ENrERPRISE conf. ltr. lo BuShips CV6/L9- 3('70- Ec), Serial 0258
of 5 May 1945.
Damage of 14 May 1945:
(k) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. lo Cominch CV6/ Al6-3(1 l -Pe) , Ser ial
0273 of 22 May 1945.
(1) War Damage Report - U.S.S. ENTERPRlSE - Actions of 11 April 1945
and 14 May 1945, prepa r ed by Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and U.S.S.
ENTERPRISE , forwarded by ComNavShiµY dPug conf. ltr. to BuSnips
CV8/Ll 1(254), Serial 0649 of 1 February 1946.
er
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10.~ 1
CONFIDEN T!.AL
CONTENT S
SECTION
A FOREWOR D 1
Photograph s Nos. A-1 to A-•1
B EARLY HfSTORY 2
1. Design and Constructi on 2
2. Peacetime Or (rations 2
3. Start of th• W!ir 3
c BOMB DAMAGE, MARSHAL L ISLANDS, 1 FEBRUAR Y
1942 4
1. !Jarratlve 4
2. Material Damage 4
3. Fire and Firefightin g 5
4. Conclusio!' l 5
Photograph s Nos. C-1 an<l C-2
Plate I
D HISTORY, FIRST STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND,

2~ FEBRUAA Y 1942, TO THE LANDINGS IN THE
SOLOMON S, AUGUST 1942 6
1. Strikes Against Wah and Marcus Islands,
24 February and 4 March o
2. Bombing of Tokyo, ~8 Aprll Li
3. The Battle of Midway, 4.-6 June ti
4. Landings on Tulagi and Guadalcan al, 7 -9 August 7
E BOW.LB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF THE EASTERN

SOLOMONS, 24. AUGUST 1942 8
1. J.Iarrative 8
?.. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 9
3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Pipinir,
Machinery and Electrical 12
4. Flooding and Flocx:l.ing Control Measures 13
6. Japanese Bombs 15
7. Conclusion 16
Photograph s Nos. E-1 to E-20
Plat~.::> 11 and lll
s
CONFIDENTIAL
lU~ClASSIFIED
SECTION
F BOMB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ,

26 OCTOBER 1942 l '7
1. Narrative l 'I
2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 18
3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping,
Machinery and Electrical 21
4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures 22
5. Fire and Firefighting 23
o. Japanese Bombs 24
l. Conclusion 24
Photographs Nos. F - 1 to F-24
Plates IV and V
G HISTORY, 30 OCTOBER 1942 to 18 MARCH 1945 26

1. The Batlle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942 26
2. Winter and Spring 1943 25
3. Overhaul, Summer 1943 2'7
4. Amphibious Operations and Strikes, Winter 1943-44 28
5. Spnng Activities, 1944 28
6. Advance to tne Philippines, 1944-45 29
1. Landings on Iwo Jima, F~bruary 1945 31
H BOMB DAMAGE, STRIKES AGAINST SOUTHERN JAPAN,
18 and 20 MARCH 1945 33
1. Narrative 33
2. Dud Bomb of 18 March 34
3. Near-Misses, "Friendly" Shell Hits and Fire of
20 March 34
Photographs Nos. H-1 to H-6
Plate VI
SUICIDE PLANE CRASHES, OKINAWA, 11 APRIL 1945 37
1. Narrative 37
3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, 39
Machinery and Electrical
4. Flooding and Flooding -:ontrol Measures 41
5. Fire and Firefighting 41
o. Japanese Planes and Bombs 41
7. ConciUSt ,n 42
Photographs Nos. I-1 to I -10
Plat;.; VII
CONFIDEN TIAL
SECTION DECtASSIFIED
J SUICIDE PLANE CRASH, KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1945 44
1. Narrative 44
3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping,
Machinery and Electdcal 46
4. Flooding and Flocxiing Control Measures 49
6. Japanese Planes and Bombs 50
7. Conclusion 50
Photograph s Nos. J-1 to J-18
Plate VU
K EXIT ENTERPR ISE 52

1. Repairs 52
2. The "Magic Carpet" 52
3. A National Memorial 52
L SUMMARY AND CONCLUSI ON 53
1. Summary 53
2. Conclusion 55
CONFIDEN TIAL
LASSIFIED
SECTION A
FOREWOR D
2
\
\
I, B O MB DAMAGE, MARSHALL ISLANDS, I FEBRUARY 1942

2 BOMB DAMAGE , BATT L E OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGU9T 1942
3.BOMB DAMAGE, BATT L E Of SANTA CRUZ,26 OCTOBER 1942
4 BOMB DAMAGE,ST RIKES AGAINST SOUTHERN JAPAN, I S AND 20MARCH 1945
5 .SUICI DE PLANE CRASHES, OKINAWA, II APR IL 1945
6 SUICIDE PLANE CRASH, KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1945
A-1. The war history of ENTERPRI SE is unique in length of active

service, in extent of destruction orought to lhe enemy and in number of
instances of c.lamage survived. Therefore, this war damage r epor t has
been written with brief summarie s of operationa l history and detailed tlis -
cussions of each instance of damage to cover the whole war experience
of the ship.
A-2. EN:ERPRI SE served with the Fleet throughout the war , steaming
more than 2'/5,000 miles and accumulati ng 18 out of a possible 22 combat
stars for- carriers in lhe Pacific area. She missed only the Batlle of the
Coral Sea and thr ee operations in the Southwest Pacific: Eastern New
Guinea, Bismarck Archipelag o and Treasury- Bougainville Island.
A-3. Her planes, the " big guns" of a carrier, a r e c r edited with
sinking or an assist in the sinking of 71 enemy ships and with damaging
192 enemy ships. The sinklngs and assists include three lar ge carrier s
and a heavy cruiser of the Japanese Fleet in lhe Battle of Midway and a
battleship, large cruH;er and four carriers in t!'le Battle for Leyte Gulf.
A-4. During the per iod of lhe war she was damaged by the enemy on
six separate occasions by 13 hits or near-miss es from oombs or suicide
planes. ln addition, she was damaged by a fire caused by the detonation
of a " friendly" 5-inch anti-aircra ft shell. In a~l cases but one, her
excellent damage control organizatio n pr evented serious consequen ces
and enabled ENTERPRI SE to continue in action. Damage to her flight
deck which resulted from the suicide plane cr ash of 14 May 1945 so
impaired her oper ating efflclency that she was forced to retire the
following day.
•solid line indicates hits

Dashed lines indicate near-miss es
t"Friendly " shell hits
-1-
COi·7FIDEi 'ITIA L
..
PhJlw A - 1: ENTERt'RI SE stortly after her commissi: m -

ing 12 r~:ay 1833.
·~
Ps.ot 1 A- '~: Sll';'ERf.-ft!Si'.. frum L!l~ f).)rt quart~r, sh)rtly

<i.iter n-r :!Jmin1:>~1.;r.ing.
C OHFID ENT IA.L
Pn.)tJ A-~i: Pi.d'.le!" t&J:ing )lf ir.lm E.HTE.RPRI!:.'E.

bra ..;tr:IY.t:: in tr.• WestPr Pacific.
---_-...-
PhoL'J A-4: ~l!TER.tJRISE a.::; sf.e '.lppear.ed durinl! the

~:att•~r part :>f th..-
1!a.I' a.ft~!· .1,•r 1~143 Jvcrll':.l.UL
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION B
EARLY HIST0RY
1. Design and Construction
Bl-1. At Uie close of World War I lhe potentialities of Naval air-power

were recognized and in order to initiate development of a sound doctrine
the collier JUPITER was converted into the experimental aircraft carrier
LANGLEY (CVl). She was followed in 1927 by LEXINGTON (CV2) and
SARATOGA (CV3), which were converted from battle-cruise rs as a result
of lht:- Wasnington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament.
Bl-2. Through the years 1922 to 1929 preliminary design studies of

10,000, 13,800, 17.230 and 23,000 ton standard displacement aircraft
carriers were made in order to determ!m, t.ne best way to utilize the
69,000 tons of carriers allowed under the Washington Treaty. Problems
of suitable speed, armor, armament, torpedo protection, disposilion of flue
gases, arrangement of flight decks, elevators and hangars, location of
bridge. criteria of stabllity, etc. were studied by the Bureau of Construc-
tion and Repair and discussed wlth the General Board, other Bureaus of
the navy Department and operating personnel. The studies finally crystal-
lized into plans for RANGER (CV4), lhe first U.S. aircraft carrier to be
designed as such irom its inception. RANGER was ordered 1 November
1930 and commissione d 4 June 1934.
Bl-3. With a valuable background of design lessons derived in the

evelopmenl of RANGER and a much greater knowh..-'Cige of carrier
operations gained from experience with LANGLEY, LEXINGTON and
SARATOGA, preliminary design work on ENTERPRISE was started in
1931. Displacemen t was increased from 14,500 to 19,900 tons standard
and speed irom 29.5 to 32.5 knots. Many significant changes were made
in the arrangements so that ENTERPRISE and her sistership, YORKTOWN
{CV5), embodied many advances in carrier developmenl. Construction of
NTERPRISE was ordered 3 August 1933 and her keel ~as laid 16 July
1934 at Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. She was
launched 3 October 1936 and commissione d 12 May 1938.
2. Peacetime Operations
B2-1. After a shakedown cruise lo Brazil and winter maneuvers with

e Fleet in the Caribbean early in 1939, ENTERPRISE was ordered to
the Pacific h1 April 1939. With lhe proclamation of a state of limited
national emergency in September 1939, she proceeded to Pearl Harbor
where she trained for war operations as a part of the Hawaiian Fleet
Detachment and shuttled planes and squadrons among the Pacific island bases.
n 28 November 1941 she departed Pearl Harbor for Wake Island with
twelve Marine Corps fighter planes to be delivered to lhe newly completed
irfield there.
-2-
CONFIDENTIAL
3. Slarl of the War
B3- l. ENTERPRISE was scheduled lo return to Pearl Harbor on

ti December, but fortunately was delayed a day by heavy weather. Some
of her planes flew to Pearl Harbor during the Japanese raid on '7 December
and the remainder were launched in an unsuccessful attempt to locate
the enemy carriers after word of the attack on Pearl Harbor had been
received by radio. During the early weeks of the war she patrolled to
the west of the Hawaiian Islands and acted as escort for transports
reinforcing Samoa. Later in January she sailed north lo participate in
the first offensive U.S. carrier action of lhe war -- lhe strike agai.nst the
Marshall and Gilbert Islands on 1 February. There, ENTERPRISE with
one task group oi cruisers and destroyers and YORKTOWN with another
participated in a joint air and sea bombardment.
B3 - 2. Planes from ENTERPRISE bombed and strafed shore installa-

tions on Moloelap, Wotje and Kwajalein in the Marshalls, and bombed and
torpedoed several enemy ships including one cruiser and two submarines.
The raid set back Japanese plans for strengthening bases in the West
Central Pacific, and provided the first good news after lhe disaster at
Pearl Harbor. The opposite result might have occurred ii ENTERPRISE
had not successfully evaded lwo determined bombing allacks from Japanese
land-based planes, receiving only minor damage from a near-miss.
CONFIDENTIAL
SEC':'ION C
BOMB DAMAGE
MARSflALL ISLANDS, 1FEBRUARY1942*
\ I
~--~~\~~~~~~~
-~--~~~_ _ _ _!.,_
~a- ' - - - · - - - - - - { -
I NEAR-MISS 62 5 KG BOMB, FRAME 130 PORT
1. Narrative
C 1-1. About 1340 on 1 February 194.2 while operating in the north:-

Pastern Marshalls, ENTERPRISE was approached on the starboard bow
by five Japanese twin-engin·ed land planes flying at 10,000 feet. While in
a shallow power dive to about 3,500 ieet, each plane released three bombs.
ENTERPRISE was maneuver ing at high speed and all bombs fell beyond the
ship, the nearest about 50 feet off the port quarter at frame 130. The bombs
were estimated by the ship to be general purpose with instantaneous fuzes,
weighing between 100 and 200 pounds and were probably the 63 Kg Type 99
r o. 6 Ordinary type (U.S.Navy Bomb Disposal School designation 63 Kg SAP).
This bomb corresponds in stze and charge weight approximately with the U.S.
100-pound GP type, but has somewhat superior penetrating ability.•• Splashes
were 100 to 125 feet high. Slight shock was felt throughout the ship, similar
to that caused by firing the ship's guns. Fragments struck the port quarter.
Cl -2. One plane returned,apparently to strafe the ship. Its right winv;
scraped lhe flight deck between frames 74 and 65, knocking off the ships
port side light and cutting off the tail of a scout bomber on deck. It
plunged over the port side at frame 62 and carried away the forward stay
of the antenna outrigger.
Cl-3. A second attack began at 1600, when two Japanese twin-engined

planes each dropped two bombs off the starboard bow. The nearest was
150 yards away and the splashes appeared to r ise higher than those of
the first bombs. Although several fragments wer e found on the forecastle ,
no damage was incurred.
2. Material Damage
C2-l. Fragments from the first attack opened four 1/2-inch holes i.n
the 1/4.-inch medium steel plating of the port hangar bulkhead between
frames 130 and 133 and six holes in the hangar roller curtain (Plate I).
There were numer ous dents in the 5/8-inch STS shell plating below the
main deck and fragments pierced and dented the splinter mats, gallery
walkwayJ. ladders and gallery deck in way of 'the . 50 cal. machine gun at
frame 1J4..
• BuShips War Damage Report No. 5
** Handbook of Japanese Explosive Ordnance, OPNAV 30- 3M, 15 August 1945
-4-
CONFIDEN TlAL
L;2-2. The externally- fitted 2 lo 2-1/2-inch gasoline line was
pierced by fragments in nine places between frames 119 and 135.
A gasoline fire resulted.
C2-3. The M-1, M,2 and M-6 coils of the externally- filled degaussing
cable at frame 126, i.he hangar sprinkler electrical control box in the port
pocket at irame 133 and fifteen minor electrical cables were pierced or
severed by fragments or destroyed in lhe gasoline fire.
3. Fire and Firefightin g
C3-1. Gasoline from i.he pierced gasoline line caught fire either from
hot fragments or electrical short circuits and the fire spread over the
port gallery walkway and the boat pocket between frames 130 and 144.
The flames consumed canvas covers, splinter mats, airplane fueling hose,
rubber deck matting, life jackets and paint on the deck and bulkheads
(Photos C-1 and C-2).
C3-2. Although the fire seemed very threatening , it was soon extinguishe d
wli.h chemical foam from pressure-o perated foam generators (phomene
accumulato rs).
4. Conclusion
C4-l. By quick and effective use of the available firefighting apparatus,
ENTERPRI SE repair parties successful ly passed their first real test.
C4-2. The penetration of splinter mats by fragments substantiat t:d the

prior decision to discontinu e their use because of their limited valuP
against even low velocity fragments.
C4-3. Although a gasoline fire developed as a result of penetration of

the exposed portion of i.he gasoline piping by fragments, no change ln its
location was seriously considered . It would be impractica ble to glve
adequate protection to this main and a fire on the gallery walkway is
obviously preferable to one in the hangar.
C4-4. Allhough internal fitting of degaussing cables had become

standard practice, ENTERPR ISE could not be so filled until her extensive
1ri43 overhaul.
-5-
CONFIDENTIAL
f'h.JL.> C-_: Fir• •11rr...ig"" ~n .oO cµ··· ma!..!hine gw1 ~allery,

p;rt .Jilt:. 1:J1r~ur tat:~r. :'.'r.:im 1i.:; ..ut frarn~ 144 l.;oking
f .>!' "a.ru.
Phot:> C-2: Cnarrc:a paint on ouiY..nead, port gun gal1ery.

ArcnwaJ· anj laci tr:..r arr: bet N~en fram12s HO and 141.
?romeoe a(.; ·umUJ ltOr at xtrt:n. _ !eit.
COl':FlD ENTlAL
SECTION D
HISTORY
FIRST STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND, 24 FEBRUA RY 1942
TO THE LANDINGS IN THE SOLOMONS, AUGUST 1942
1. Strikes Against Wake and Marcus Islands,

24 February and 4 March
D 1-1. After the success of lhe raid on the Marshall s, other strikes
were plan."led. While one task force assemble d around LEXINGTON ma.de
a diversion ary attack on Rabaul, ENTERP RISE accompa nied another
force against the newly establish ed enemy garrison on Wake Island.
Extensive damage to shore installati ons was inflicted by a combined
air-sea bombard ment.
Dl-2. A brief surprise attack wa~ next made on Marcus Island.

Planes bombed shore installati ons before dawn and then returned
to ENTERP RISE which was already proceedin g toward Pearl Harbor.
Dl-3. During March, alteratio ns, including removal of ten boats

and most of the .50 cal. machine guns and the installati on oi thirty
20mm gtlllS and additiona l radar units, were accompli shed by Navy
Yard, Pearl Harbor.
2. Bombing of Tokyo, 18 April

D2-l. On 8 April, ENTERP RISE and her escort departed Pearl
Harbor lo rendezvo us with HORNET (CV8) which had sailed from San
Francisc o with 16 Army B-25's spotted on her flight deck, destined for
a bombing raid on Tokyo. ENTERP RISE provided search and combat
air patrol for the attack on the Japanese capital. Although the force
encounte red heavy gales and was discover ed some 800 miles off the
coast of Japan, the bombers got away and were successfu l in carrying out
their mission. The ships returned to Pearl Harbor on 25 April.
3. The Batlle of Midway, 4-6 Jwie
D3- l. ENTERP RISE next headed south to assist LEXINGTON and

YORKTOWN in their efforts to slow the advance of the Japanese ,
but arrived too late to take part in the auack on the Japanese force
at Tulagi, 4 May, and the air battles (Battle of the Coral Sea), 7 and 8
May, in which LEXINGTON* was sunk and YORKTOWN.. was damaged .
She returned to Pearl Haroor just in time lo depart again to repel the
expected Japanese landings on Midway.
03-2. The Battle of Midway was a turning point in the Pacific War,
for from this time the balance of power in the Pacific shifted steadily
to the United States side. Three large forces of Japanese ships,
• BuShips War Damage Report No. 16
.. BuShips War Damage Report No. 23
-6-
CONFIDENTIAL
including many transports and cargo vessels, supported by seven

carriers, eleven battleships, about fourteen cruisers and many des-
troyers were severely mauled and driven ofi by U.S. air groups from
two task groups buill aroWld ENTERPRISE, HORNET and YORKTOWN
and by land-based bombers. The Japanese WPr~ completely surprised.
Four carriers and one heavy cruiser were sunk and one heavy cruiser,
tWQ destroy.ers and one transport were damaged. On 4 June dive bombers
from ENTERPRISE and HORNET severely damaged the four carriers
which later sank, and sank the heavy cruiser on 6 June. One of the
damaged carriers was torpedoed by a submarine and sank, one sank as
the result of a delayed fuel tank explosion and the olher two were
scuttled by lheir crews on 5 JWle. ENTERPRISE was not damaged,
but YORKTOWN* and HAMMANN (DD4.12) were lost.
4. Landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, 7-9 August
D4-1. Following Midway, ENTERPRISE had a short availability at

Pearl Harbor, during which lhe forward auxiliary elevator, lhe two cata-
pults on lhe main deck and lhe remaining . 50 cal. machine guns were
removed. A 1.1-inch anti-aircraft mount was added at the extreme bow
on the forecastle deck and forward fire control radar installed.
D4-2. ENTERPRISE departed 15 July for Tongatabu, the staging

area for the landing in the Solomons. To covn lhe amphibious force
and fire support groups of t.he first U.S. offensive lhrusl, three task
groups were formed around SARATOOA, WASP (CV7) and ENTERPRISE.
Dunng the successful landings of 7 August on Tulagi and Guadalcanal,
planes from the carriers provided air reconnaisance and tactical bomb-
ing. They were unable to participate, however, in the surprise night
engagement of 8-9 August fought off Savo Island during which three U.S.
cruisers were lost.
• BuShlps War Damage Report No. 25
-7-
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION E
BOMB DAMAGE
BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGUST 1942
I 250 KG . BOMB HIT, FRAME 174 3 250KG BOMB HIT, FRAME 127
2 250 KG . BOMB HIT, FRAME 179 4 NEAR·MISS 250KG. BOMB,FRAME l 93 PORT
1. Narrative
El-1. Durtng the two weeks following the landings in the lower Solomons ,
the three carrin task groups operated to the southeast of Guadalcanal.
On 23 August, WASP's task group was detached, leaving SARATOGA and
ENTERPRISE in the area. The following day air contact was made with a
large Japanese force of combatant ships. Planes from our carriers
attacked this force at the same lime our carriers were being attacked
by Japanese planes. A Japanese carrier, a destr oyer and a transport were
sunk; go enemy planes were destroyed; a small carrier and a light
cruiser were damaged. The Japanese rel!..red wilhoul a surface engage -
ment being joined. ENTERPRISE was the only U.S. vessel damaged.
El-2. About 1112 on 24 August, ENTERPRISE underwent a heavy

five-minute attack from more than 30 Japanese dive - bomber s during
which she received three direct bomb hits and four near-misses. The
first bomb struck about two minutes after the start of the attack piercing No.3
elevator at the flight deck and detonating 42 ieet below, between the second
and third decks, close to the starboard side. It caused extensive, though
not serious structural damage, mi.nor flooding, disablement of No.3 ele-
vator and s~veral stubborn fires. Hali a minute later a second bomb
struck the flight deck at frame 1'79, close to the starboard edge of the
same elevator, detonating 8 feet below. The flight deck was deflected
upward and a severe fire broke out as 40 rounds of 5-inch 38 cal. pro-
pellant powder were ignited. A third oomb, dropped a minute later,
detonated on impact with the flight deck near the after starboard corner
of No. 2 elevator, pulling the elevator out of commission and starting a
small fire. Al 1 71 '7 a bomb detonated in the water about 12 feel off the
port quarter, causing general flexural vibration of the ship and .permanent
deformation of the hull and several decks, including the flight deck. Three
other near-misses, which caused minor fragment damage, occurred
during the attack.
El-3. Despite the damage. ENTERPRISE commenced landing planes

within an hour after the engagement. The following day, however, she
proceeded to Pearl Harbor for repairs, escorted by PORTLAND (CA33)
and four destroyers.
- 8-
CONFIDEN TIAL
2. Damage and Damage Control Med.Sures - Structural
E2-l. The first bomb, released from a 65° or 70° dive at an altitude
of about 1500 feet, penetrated the forward starboard corner of No. 3
elevator at frame 174, 22 feet to starboard of the centerline. Leaving
only a small hole, it continued down Lhrough the starboard bulkhead of the
elevator well, Lhe inboard forward corner of Lhe GROUP lll gun gallery,
Lhe hatchway on the flat below, the hangar deck at frame 172 and the
second deck in D-203-1 LM to its point of detonation between thP ~econd
and third decks in D-303-lL at frame 1'71, 12 feet from Lhe starboard side.
Total Lhlckness of steel plating penetrated was 2 inches including 1/4
inch of STS and distance from point of impact to point of detonation was
42 feet (Photos E-1, E-2 e.nd E-3).
E2- 2. The bomb detonated high order. Its blast tore large holes in
the second and third decks, a 12-foot by 4-foot hole in the fourth deck, and
a 6-foot by 2-!oot hole through the side plating (Photos E -4 , E - 5 and E-6).
The second dP.ck was bulged up 4 lo 12 inches over it.:; entire width between
frames l5 7 and 173 and Lhe third deck was dished d ·wn more or less
irregularly over the same area (Photos E-8 and E-9). The main deck
was bulged up symmetric ally between frames 157 and 1 '73 between Lhe
port and starboard boat pockets to a maximum height of 10 inches at
frame 165. Stanchions between the main and second, and second and
third decks were torn loose at their base but remained attached to the
overhead (Photo E-9). The fourth deck was dished down in D-419-3A from
the starboard shell to the inboard bulkhead. Transvers e bulkheads 15 7 and
173 were only slightly distorted , except above the third deck immediate ly
adjacent to the detonation where bulkhead l 73 was badly distorted and
torn. The starboard bulkhead around hydraulic oil tank and elevator
machinery trunk, D-523- T, was severely deflected and holed above the
third deck (Photo E-7) and deflected between the third and fourlh decks.
Watertight doors 2 - 173-1, 3-157-1, 3-173-1 and 3-186-2 were blown open
and wrecked. N€'arly all bunks and lockers in D- 203 -lLM, D- 303-lL and
D-305-L were demolished . The crew's washroom, D - 203 - 2L, the car-
penter shop and the brig were wrecked. Numerous longitudinal~. frames
and vertical stiffeners were severed, cracked or buckled.
E2-3. Fragment damage was extensive. Stiffeners, cables, ducts and

piping under the main deck above Lhe explosion were riddled, though only
a few fragments per forated the deck itself (Photos E-4 and E-5). The
second d\.!Ck was peppered with holes and the third and iourth decks
were also penetrated . A few fragmr·nts pierced the shell plating in
D-305-L, D-303-lL, D-419 - 3A and D-521-A (Photo E-6). Other frag-
ments passed through bulkhead 15 7 above the Lhird deck, through bulkhead
165 into D-417-A, and. through the starboard bulkhead of D-523 - E. The
maximum distance traveled by a fragment was 56 feel after which il
pierced the 3/8-inch medium steel plate of bulkhead 157 above the third
dec1c The maximum i.hickness of plating penetrated was the 5/8-inch
m~ium steel shell plating below Lhe fourth deck, al a distance of 16
feet.
E2-4. The second bomb, released al about the same height and angle
as the first, pierced the flight deck at frame l 79 about 11 !eet from the
starboard edge of that deck and close to the starboard edge of No. 3
elevator. Il traveled about 8 feet and detonated high order about 3 feet
- - 9- -
CONFIDENTIAL_
above lhe deck of Lne GROUP Ill gun galler y, shghlly for ward and outooar d
of the point of impact (Photos E-11, E-12 and E - 13).
E2-5. The blast tore a 12-fool by 6-foot hole in the adjacent starboard
bulkhead of No. 3 elevator trunk and anothe r ' about 18 feet by 8 feet in Lhe
gallery deck (Photos E-15 and E-16). I nstruments on 5-inch guns Nos.
5 and 7 were wrecked and the guns r endered unsafe ior use. The ammu-
nilion hoist for No. 7 gun was torn loose and pushed inboard and the scuttle
completely destroyed. The hoist for No. 5 gun was damaged and disabled.
The splinter shield between the guns was Lorn loose al the bottom and bent
aft (Photo E-14) and the sponson shield for No. 5 gun was blowu out. The
ready service powder locker for gun No. 5 was demolished and blown in-
t)Oard and approximately 40 rounds of f>-inch propellant po:.vdPr were
destroyed by burning. Although the r eady service locker for Uo 1 gun
also was distorted, the powder in it did not ignite. Hatch and scuttle
02-174-1 were blown m and wrecked and the upper half of door 1-1'/4 - l
was blown of! an<l twisted. The Hight deck above the gun gallery was
deflected upward a maximum of 18 inches between frames 1 73 and 186
(Photo E-12). No. 2 arresting gear deck sheave was loosened and the
yielding element control cable cut.
E2-6. F r agment attack was less severe lha::i from lhe first hit.
Fragments traveled downward through the deck of the gun gallery,
the platform deck in the ready airplane issue room D - 103- A, the main
deck in D-103-A and upward through lhe flight deck. The splinter shields
anu guns Nos. 5 and 7 were peppered with small fragments and other frag-
rnents perforated the st'1rooard bulkhead of No. 3 elevator trunk and the
starooard bulkhead of D-102, E. The maximum distance t r aveled by a
fragment was about 50 feet after which it penetr ated l/4 - inch medium steel
plate. The maximum thickness of plating pier ced was that of the 3/4 - inch
STS main deck at a distance of about 19 feet.
E2-7. The third bomb, released from a 60° dive at an altitude of

about 1500 feet, struck the flight deck at frame 127, 28 feet to starboard
of the centerline. close to I.be starboard after corner of No. 2 elevator
and detonated instantly (Photo E-18). Por tions of lhe nose continued
down through hatch cover 2-1H1 and trunk C- 408-lA as far as the iourth
deck.
E2-8. A hole approximately 10 feet in diameter was blown in the

flight deck by the detonation (:Photos E-17 and E - 18) Blast knocked a
high pressure torpedo charging ilask from its br acket on the hangar
deck bulkhead, but did not damage it. The yielding element of No. 9
arresting gear was blown overboard.
£2-9. Fragments cul or damaged the purchase cable sheave bracket,

purchase cable, yielding element contr ol cable and barr ier cross-deck
cable of No. 9 arresting gear and the purchase cables of Nos. 7 and 8
arresling gears. Fragments also pierced hatch cover 03 - 107, elements
of No. 2 crane, U1e overhead of C-0211-A. the flight and hangar decks
and one continued through the second deck. Although the bomb detonated
almost against 3/4-inch STS plating protecting U1e ready torpedo and
warhead stowage, no fragments penetrated. Yet the 3/4-inch STS after
bulkhead of C - 0301 - M was pierced at a distance of ti8 feet. The maximwn
distance traveled by a fragment was 113 feet after which it pierced
1/8-inch medium sleel plating.
- 10-
CONFIDEN TIAL
· E2-10. While the ship was heeled to starboard in a left turn, a bomb
detonated abreast frame 193 about 12 feet from the ship's port side.
lt had been released on the starboard quarter at a low angle of dive, about
50°, and at an altitude of about 1000 feet. The detonation caused general
flexural vibration oi the ship of low frequency but of relativdy high
amplitude. The Commandi ng Officer estimated that the slt::rn was
llited oodily 2 or 3 feel.
E2-11. 'fhe column of water thrown up by the detonation deformed

the flight deck upward about 8 inches between frames HJ4-l/2 and 198
for l l feet inboard of the port waterway (Photo E-20). Four of the
fi!gh~ deck longitudina ls were bent and two broken, planking in Lhe area
was split and shredded and a oO-man life raft secured at lhe gallery
level on the port side was completely demolished . The force of the
detonation dished in the hull between frames 188 and 196 from the first
platform to the main deck (Photo E-19). The hangar deck was bulged
upward slightly over a radius of 5 fer:>l al frame 192 port, the second
deck was buckled upward about 2 inches between frames 192 and 193-1/2 for
about 3 feel inboard )i the shell, third deck plating was wrinkled throughout
the after CPO washrovm and fourth deck plating was wrinkled 10 feet
inboard of lhe shell. Bulkheads 190-1/2 and 192 were wrinkled 5 feet
inboard. Below the fourth deck, in the void spaces, floors w~re buckled
from the stern to as far forward as frame 188 and frames 189 through
195 were variously bent or broken.
E2-12. Two other confirmed near-miss bombs which detonated abreast

frames /0 and 100 on the port side caused minor fragment damage on the
pQrt side between frames /8 and 93.
E2-13. The structural damage caused by the hits and near-miss es

did not seriously reduce the streng'.h oi the ship girder, but impeded
operations . The large hole in the flight deck resulting from the detona-
tion of the third bomb was rapidly covered with two 6-foot by 9-foot,
3/8-inch plates which were secured to the wood deck around the hole by
60 penny nails, previously cut short to a length of 2-1/2 inches. Nail
holes had previously been drilled in the plate edges at 6-inch intervals.
An identical plate was used to cover lhe hole in No. 3 elevator. Pieces
of 1/8-inch plate 2'1 inches by 12 inches or 18 Inches square were
secured in a similar manner over small fragnient holes. These
repairs were evidemly effective, ior, within an hour, plane.3 were
landlng on the t.ieck.
E2-14. Wooden shores were fitted to support the main and second
decks In way of ruptured stanchions , but vibrations at high speeds
loosened the shores, so the stanchions were partially re-establis hed
by welding pai.ches over the holes torn in the deck and four short
lengths of 3-inch by 3-inch by 3/8-inch angle to each stanchion and to
the patched deck (Photo E-9). ::>eek longitudina ls broken at their con-
nections lo deck beams were temporaril y strengthen ed by welding
short sections of 2-1/2-inch by 2-1/2-inch angle to the beam, the
longitudina l and the overhead. Where the deck had been pulled away
arowid sounding tubes, split cotlars were filled and welded to the deck
and pipe.
-11- -
CONFI DENTI AL
3. Damag e and Damag e Contr ol Measu r es -

Piping, Machin er y and Eleclrl cal
E3- l. The princip al machin er y damag e caused by the fir st hit was
dlsable menl of machin ery of No. 3 elevato r which put the elevato r out
of commi ssion. Bolh lhe low and lhe high pressu re accum ulator tanks
were forced away from the starbo ard bulkhe ad rn D-023- E, the oil
storag e lank was crushe d and the bottom blown -.>ut, and mot:>rs were
subme rged in oil and sail water . Thts was a seriou s casualt y, its
repair beyond the capacit y of lhe ship 's for ce. Howev er, since the
el"vato r was al the flight deck level, night operati ons we r e able to
continu e.
E3-2. Ammw1it1on hoist motor No. 8 in D-203 -lLM was knocke d

from ils mourni ng and hoists tn D- 203-lL and D-303 -lLM were bent
1
and inopera ble. Ventila tion blower s 2-158- 1, 2 - 158- 2, 2- 1'70, 2-116-
and 4-1 73-4 were wrecke d and ventila llvn ducts in the damag ed spaces
was
render ed useless . The afterm ost riser of the firema in al frame 1 73
but with the firema in split into iour section s,
rupture d in severa l places,
this casualt y was easily isolate d. The starbo ard
each with lts own pump,
riser for the hangar deck water curtain in bay No. 4, frame 1 73, was
the
rupture d eight feel above the main deck and damag e contro l mains in
damag ed compa rtment s were rup.ture d or carried away. Numer ous
lighting cables wete cul in the damag ed zpaces .
E3-3. 'l'he second bomb comple ted the disable ment of No. 3 elevato r.
r
Fragm ants goug1 d 'L·1d burred tne main plunge rs. destroy ed the elevato
platfor m lock. Cd.rri1>d away all electri cal laads and extensi vely
damag ed thu t11ght d ·k safety rail and its starbo ard contro l shaft.
£3-4. AH power wiring, firt: contro l wiring, LC. wirmg and lightin g
in GROU P III gtin gallery were comple tely destroy ed. The motor and
soleno id for control ling closur e of the vent cover on the steerin g engine
nom exhaus t duct were dem)li shed. Machin er y in the aviatio n sheet
ruetal shop was damag ed.
E3-f> An hour and a half after the second bomb hit and as a second ary
re:mlt Ll ereof, the casualt y occurr ed which. from an operati onal stand-
was
p int, was the most seriou s of the whole engage ment. ENTER PRISE
retirin g south frorn the battle with the rest of the task force at 24 knots
ly,
iur cliouu. g again almost normal ly ar.d landing aircraf t when, sudden
the> rudder wem hard left, thPn hard rtght and finally stopped at 20°
right. Watsr anti foamil e used to fight the fire caused oy the second
oomb had co1lech.:d 1r1 the exhaus t vent trw1k leading directl y frDm the
-E)
tw...> steerin g motor caJirtg s in steerin g motor anti contro l room (D-524
trunk, holed by the first bomb at the level 01 the
to the gw1 gallery . This
ex-
gun gallery , had been closed 0!1 immed iately at its lower ~nd and the
haust fan secure d when smoke and water passed dowu the duct. Supply
olower 4-173- 4 had been disable d by the first hit, cuaing off the
supply of air lo the space;;; so, conditi ons becam e almost wibear&.ble
foe persou nel. When tne ventila tion system was reopen ed, water
and
foau1itr-> pouroo from the exhaus t duct, flooded the starboa rd steerin g
motor and its control panel and slopped the motor. Exhaus ted oy heat
-12-
CONFIDENTIAL
and smoke, personnel on watch could not shift to lht: wid<tmage<i port
motor before collapsing and the rudder slopped as noteo above. A
rescue party made its way to the space and put the port motor in opera-
tion restoring steering 38 mrnutes after il had h~en lost.
E3-6. The third bomu C1isaoled No. 2 elevalor leaving only No. 1
elevator aole lo handle aircraft. The platform lock control shaft,
including the bevel gears. was carried away for auout lf> feet along the
starboard after side of the transverse hatch g.rder, the flight deck
safely rail and tw6 stanchions were oadly damaged, hydraultc and air
lmes to the main elevator platform lock power unil were ruptured or
crushed, and elevator control caoles ano electrical leads to tne after
safety rail control motor were carried away. Both ele"'.aLOr plungers
were scored and burred by iragmenls, the largest score being 1-1/2
inches long by 3/32 inches deep in the forward plunger. 'I'he adj~cent
torpedo elevator was also rendered inoperable. Repair of this damage
was beyo!'ld the capacity of the ship's for<.;e.
E3-7. The near-miss on the porl quarter caused consid~rable leakage

through the stern luoe glands of Nos. 2 ana 3 shaits. Two blades of
No. 2 propeller and all three blade~; of No. 3 propeller had edges
curled aft by the delonation. Degaussing cable "Q" and "M" coils,
fitted externally on the sheer straKe, were lorn loose fr.1m their sup-
p:>rls for a length of 30 feet on the port quarter, out were not broken.
E3-8. Fragments from the other near-misses pWlctured the "M" and
"F" degaussing coils in numerous places in way of frame 80 port and
starboard, pierced sections of the gasoline line at hangar and flight
deck levels between frames 80 and lOo port, and carried away the aux-
iliary radio antenna on the port side at frame 80.
4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures
E4-1. The shell was opened in way of the waterline oy ~he d.etonalion
and fragments from the first bomb hit. As a result, D-f>21-A was
completely flooded and D-419- 3A partially flooded. A small hole in
the forward bulkhead of D -419-3A permitted D-41'7-A to flood lo a
di:pth of about one foot on the starboard side. The addi"tion of this
water caused a list of approximately 3° to starboard. Trim aft was
increased by 11 inches. The increase of mean draft was negligible.
Drafts: Forward Afl
Before damage: 24 feet 0 inches 27 feet 8 inches

After damage: 23 feet 'l inches 28 feet 2 inches
These drafts do not quite check with lhe ship's estimate of 245 tons of
flooding ·nater, but may have been incorrectly read.
- 13- -
CUNPIDENT lAL
E4-2. Mea.mres were taken immediately to remove lhe h t by

pumping out r1pproximalel y 10,000 gallons (38 Lon ... ) of sea water from
each of the following staruoard tanks: B-15-F 1 B-21-F and B-27 - F;
aud flooding the following port tanks "Nlth 10,000 gallons each: B-16-V.
B-22-V ru1d B-28-V. Spaces aljacPnt D-52i-3A were founo to be
ligut so Lhe outboard bulkheads of D-~20-A and IJ-523 - E were shored.
Floodiug through the holes in D-521-A and D-419 -A was stoppeo by
construcung a cofferdam betwi>en fram s 169 and 173, from the third
dee;}: down to the shell. The coff rdam was constructed oi 2-inch
by 6-lnch plarll':tng set vert"cally into sl ls formed bet·Neen 3-incu
by 6-lnch tJy 18-foot planks laid on tne third ano fourth decKs (Plate 111).
Wire me!::'h was laid over the .1.arge hole and mattresses, ulankets ar.d
pillows were packed down oetween the shell and lhe cofferdam, which
was th8n wedged outboard, forcing lhe packing materials light against
the hull (Photo E-t>}. Flooding through a smaller hole, about 12
inches oy 18 inches. just uelow the large hole, was stoppea with an
18-inch wooden plug cut to shape. Smaller wooden plugs were forced
into U1e little fragment holes. Altnough a speed of 25 knots and many
course changes made construcuon very diiiicult, tne cofferJarn was
compbted in dghteen hour.:;. Air-driven sub:mersiole pumps were
used for initial pumping oown of the flooded compar~mems and
electric submer.;ible pumps were add·~ later. It took iive pumps about
six hours to dewater U1e two spac;es oecause debris c::>r.tinually dogged
the stratntirs. After the compartmen~s were pumped down, only one
suomersible pump ruri!ltng ten nun:.1.tes an hour was required to take
car of the seepage through the c;oiferdam into D - 521 -A.
5. Fire and Firefighting
E5-1. The first bomb started a smoldering fire in pr:iteclive cloth-

ing and gas masks rn GROUP III 5-inch gun gallery as it passed through.
This fire was absorbed in ~he gener al conflagration on the gallery deck
which result~ from the second hil.
E5-2. Detonation and ir.igments from the first bomb started a

serious Class A fire in oeduing and personal effects in living com-
partments D- 203-lLM, D-303-lL and D -305- L. Dense smoke com-
plet• ly filled U1ese compartment s. Ther e was little paint on bulkheaas
and overheads to support lhe conflagration .
E5-3. Dense smoke, wreckage and damage to the firemain hindered

firefighting personnel. The ventllation supply sy.3tem was started in
the w1damaged area forward on the second and third decks, portable
ventilation sets were set up and doors and hatches were opened to
lhc hangar oeck in an effort to clear the smoke and give access to the
firt>fighters. Gas masks were found to give r elief from the smoke for
short periods. At :ft r sl, firemain valves 5 - lti0-5 and 5- 125-3 were closed
t.J segregatl) the aamagea section, but when the damage was found to be
in the ris"'r aft of frame 100, valve 5-125 - 3 was opened. Before the
damaged main was segregated, water pouring from the r is •r helped to
extinguish the hottest fire in D-303 -lL near th-.. point of detonation. Dam -
age control valve /-12\J was closed to prevent flooding irom broken damage
control mains and risers, but was reopened and valve 6 - 143-5 closed when
dam ige was found to oe confined to lhe starboard side. The fire was
urvught under control in an hour.
- 14-
CONFIDENT LAL
Efi-4. Detonation of the second bomb in lhe gun gallery caused the
immediate ignition of about 40 rounds of 5-inch 38 cal. ready service
powder. Heavy weather and protective clothing, gas masks, rubber matting
on lhe deck and painl on lhe guns conlrlbuled additional combustible
material. Slnce all personnel in lhe gun gallery were killed, lhe fire was
fought by repair parties from the flight deck (Photo E-11). Water, foam
and co2 were used to bring this fire under control in about 40 minutes.
As soon as condilions permilled, all remaining powder and projectiles
from the gallery were jettisoned. The Hre spread from lhe blasted gun
gallery to airplane accessories, flight clvlhing, rubber lungs, etc. in
airplane issue room D-103-A immediately below. This fire smoldered
and broke out periodically for eight hours. ln D-103-E minor fires
occurred and were quickly extinguished among rubber hose, bedding,
el ec lrl c cables, in lhe paint on the overhead and in some small pieces
of wood ln lhe port forward corner of the elevator pit.
E5-5. A small fire, which was extinguished by water and C02, was
igmled in the port after corner of C-0211-A by fragments from the
third bomb detonation.
6. Japanese Bombs
£6-1. The Commanding Officer estimated the hits to be from bombs

as follows:
Weight Impact
in Diam- to Delo- Fragments
Pounds et er Kind nation Detonation Recovered Smoke
--
1st Hit 1000 12 In. AP 42 Ft. High Order 1 In. Yellowish
2nd Hit 500 12 In. GP 8 Ft. High Order 1 In. Not Noxious
3rJllit 500 ? ? 0 Low Order 10 In. White
Nose
Near-Miss on
Port Quar-
ter 500-1000 ? ? ? High Order None None
E6-2. The holes left by the first bomb as it passed through the ele-
vator and main deck indicate that the diameter was approximately 12
inches (Photos E-1 and E-2). Therefore, this bomb was probably a
250 Kg Type 99, No. 25 Ordinary bomb (U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal
School designation 250 Kg SAP) which corresponds approximately in
size and charge ·.veight with the U.S. 500-pound GP bomb. The extent
oi tlarr.age was consistent wilh the amount of explosive carried in a
250 Kg i.Jomb ana fragmentation was exceptionally g')od.
E6-3. From the small amow1l of evidence available, it is estimated

that the second hit and the severe near-miss under the port quarter
were also 250 Kg Ordinary bombs. The second bomb detonated in an
unconfined space·which would account for lhe lesser damage as compared
with that of thP first bomb.
-15-
CON FID EN1'IAL
Eo-4. The comparatively light damage and the recovery of large

fragments, some 10 inches in diameter, and segments of the nose of
the third bomb indicate that it detonated low order. ll, too, was prooably
a 250 Kg Ordinary bomb.
'T. Conclusion
E7 -1. The campaign to scrape all paint from bulkheads, overheads

and decks inside the ship, which was almost completed in the section
affected by the first hit, reduced the e xtent of lhe fires. Dispersal of
repair party personnel and equipment and tletailing special fireiighters to
ope ral•3 co2 systems in paint, alcohol and pyrotechnic lockers led to
prompt action in combatting fires and repairing damage. The skill
shown by personnel of ENTERPRISE in coping with serious damage and
controlling fires and flooding alLests to lhe serious attention given to
careful preparation of equipment, to study of war damage to LEXINGTON•
and Y 0RKTOWN** and the r ecommendations of the special Damage Con-
trol Biard of Inspection made in December 1941 and to regular damage
con~rol drills.
* BuShips War Damage Report No. lo

.+ BuShips War Damage Report No. 23
-lo-
CONFIDEi,TTIAL
Fl.'.Jt) E-1: First h.t. f:Dmb t!ntry h.ile c:.t f:)l'.V<o!.td .-u.1.ro.)ard
c )rne:r .;f after elt v-n J!'. frarr.e _ 14 . .110U:..ig for·' ard ana L>
.::tarb.)ard. EJmo t"Xplt>Ciei.i oE..twe~u i:;~i.;.ma. and third dP.i;k$.
rihoto E-2: First nil. Path .v<i:,• Jf bomb a-u!T1

g·-t~ .• ry
Ut!Cr: thr.;ugh ou.U:.heau 173 d.r1d r:.:..-1.in .tE::~k.
Just ti) starooar·u ..ii iorwarJ .31oe 0f aflt:::r e!e,1a-
t0r pit.
conFIDENT lAL
PhOt) E-Z: Fir$t hit. LJ)t\!lf aft and up•.vard

f1"Jrt. c mpa1·tm·ml D- 203-lLJ-.: Lhr i.... gh 1 Jml
f.Ja.-;::;al!, ltOlP ln !11~if! ;:h r;k tJ 0 )lY1D pa..:;sar,: 0 hol-
Ul t: ulr:t.-:.id l 73 L.t:.tW•:::"' .. thG r.;nin and gall»r:1
dt:cr:~.
, I
( ;
•< •
' .,..' '\
Photo E-4: F~rst hit. Boml.l h:>le in .Jecon.d dl:ck, e;:nn -

p~rvn"'n:D - 2'"J3- 1LM. Nr..-te fn1.g.m~m h0les.
C ONFID ENTlA L
Ph0to E-5: First hit. Compa rtment D-419- A, starbo arJ

ail r ·urn...!r looking Jutooa rd. Note oomb h.Jle in third
aeck a.nd sh.:>ring and mattre sses us:;d to sup lea.k ln
shell just beleiw the fourth ueck.
Photo E - 6: First hil. Hole lllown in shell just bebw

fouru1 decK showi.!:g wire mesh a:10 mattr _sses usP.Ci lo
stop rapid influx of water.
C0NFD E1ITLA L
.1:-'hol' r- : F.r-l 1,it . .;,,1•Ja.rtr-1P.!.· !:-31,,:3-,_L

ln1du1:r ait :tu,v.1w ;3Lart.nar1 ou ..KLntd jf N ).~-!
• l \.. •t r r.un i:-- r ~m ,!J-fr.:J -I 11 >t..• J .r. u
f Jrt. t11.n1 iJ ct. 01.lhtJU '.I \1m 1.:. l .;.->c Jnd tt:ck
at.·n··l -4 .
.1: h.)t() E-b: .First hit. C ... rr.partn1~1.t !J-30:3-1.:... l.> >t:ing for-
~·ard 5fi.J'l!.:tg dt...ih·cti ~n oi u •. r.1 ctecr;:.
CONFIDE N'I'IAL
P11 )to E-:J: First hil. View of port aiter c0rner Jf

D-303 - lL. il.'.>le oulg~ in overhead anci t ... mporary
angles welde<l between su.nt:hion and thir.:..1 ueck.
PMlo E-10: Fil·st hit. View forward acrDss No. 3

elevator pit showing bulge in main deck.
CONFIDENTI AL
Photo E-11: Second hn. Flghling fire in the Group Ill

gWl gallery.
I
Photo E-12: Second hit. Group lII gun gallery showing
oulge in :flight rl.ecr: above gWls caused by bomb explosion
aad amrnw1ition olttst.
Photo E-13: S"'-c:mc. hit. Emranc!:: hole in fli;;::-ht dPck maJe
by bomo.
Photo E- 14: Second hil. Damage lo STS shield between Nos.

5 and 7 guns.
CJNF!liEt!TIAL
Ph 't.> E-15: ..>econd hit. View of fl-inch ur.Jup 11! gun

gaLery lookine; for .vard sho·;.•ing damagt in gallery decK
and inboard oul.k head by explo.3ior. Jf bomo and burning
of b- inch reauy - servlce ammunition.
Ph::>to E- 10: Sec ond h it. Looking outboard from No. 3

elevator t r unk through hole blown in mooar d bulkhead of
Group III gun gallery by explosion oi bornb and bur mng
oi 5- inch r~ady - service ammun1tion.
CONFIDENTIAL
Photo E-17: Tnird hit. View of flight deck s:1owing bomb

hole near after starooard cornei: oi No. 2 elevaLOr.
Photo E-18: Third hit. Close - up of bomb hole in flight

deck.
CONFIDENTI AL
Phot::i E-19: Near-miss. View of CJlUiter sh0·.ving near-

rni:-is damagf'. IJote near rupture of snell in way ::if third
deck and degaussing caole clips sheared ~Mm snell.
Photo E-20: Near -miss. Damage to extr eme after por t

corner of flight deck caused oy water column frum the
near-miss.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION F
BOMB DAMAGE
BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 2o OCTOBER 1942

\3
\
I 250 KG BOMB HIT, FRAME 4 1

3 NEAR - MISS 250KG BOMB , FRAME 129 12 STIO
2 2 5 O K G B O M 8 H I T , F R A M E 4 4 112 4 N E A R • M I SS 2 5 0 K G B 0 M 8 , F R A M E 3 0 S T B 0 .
l. Narrative
After leaving the Solomons on 25 August, ENTERPRISE pro-

:eded via Tongatabu to Pearl Harbor, docking immediately upon her
~·rival on 10 Seplember. Shl was undocked three days later and
J!pairs were completed by 7 Octooer. Besides baltle damage repairs,
~>me outstandlng ShipAlts including installation of twelve additional
JJmm guns, replacement of four 1.1-inch mow1ts with four 40mm quad-
uple mounts and installation of a search radar were accomplished .
Jl - 2. I:>amage to SARATOGA on 31 August and loss of WASP on

f1 September, both from submarinE: tor pedoes, had reduced the number
carriers available in the South Pacific to one- -HORNET (CVS).
l:ter hastily repleni~hing her st:>res and training a new flight group,
lNTERPRlSE departed Pearl Haroor for the South Pacific with her
•;cort plus the new battleship SOUTH DAKOTA on 16 October. On
: October she joined HORNET's task force northwest of the New
¥brides Islands.
U-3. In the meantime, despite the victory of the Battle of Cape

:;perance on the night of 11-12 October, the support for U.S. lr-:iops
1 Guadalcanal was not proceeding well. The Japanese w+=>re preparing
large-scale land and sea offensive to drive the Americans out of the
lomons with a force whlch included four carr iers, four ballleships,
me c r uisers and a large number of smaller ships. The US. task
free ready to repel them was barely half as large, with only two
r rlers, one batlleshlp, six cruisers and fourteen destroyers.
Air reconnaissance made initial contact with elements of the

panese force about noon, 25 October. The Battle of Santa Cruz took
)ace tht! follow ing day without contact being made al any time between
1r face ships of the opposing forces. During the cour se of the battle ,
anes from the Japanese carriers made al least eight separ ate attacks
l lhe U.S. ships, damaging both carriers, the battleship, one light
·uiser and lwo destr.:iyers, at a cost of about 100 planes. HORNET
1d PORTER (DD356) were so extensively daUlaged that they were
>andoned and sunk by our own force. ENTERPRISE was damaged
1 two uomb hits and two near- misses. Three waves of aircraft
om HORNE'r and ENTERPRISE SUCCt-!eded in damaging twu of the
panese carriers, a heavy crui:;er and two destroyers, with lhe loss
- - 17-
C 1.)NFID ENTIA L
of /'1 planes, 20 of lhem in combat. Althoug h lhe cost.y Baltle of Santa

Cruz appeare d of dubious value to our cause, aircraft losses and damage
inflicted on the enemy'~ carrier s prevent ed him from providin g effecliv e
air cover in the decisive Battle of Guadalc anal, 11-15 Novemo er 1942.
Fl-5. Between 1115 and 1120 on 26 Oct~ber. ENTER PRISE ·nas attacked
by 24 dive bomber s which succeed ed in making two direct hits and two
damagin g near-m isses. The first bourn slruck the fltght deck at frame 4,
port sld-=, passed down and out through the ship's side and detonate d tn
the air ofi thP port bow. ll produce d hF>avy fragmen t damage and started
two small fires. The se(;ond bomb struck at frame 44-1/2 on the por~
side of the flight deck and broke up below, part detonati ng on the hangar
deck and part on U.e third deck in the forward repair party station. It
caused blast damago in second and third deck living spaces, disablem ent
of the forward elevato r and two smal1 fires. A near-m iss bomb detonate d
aoout 8 feel below the waterlin e, 10 feel from the starboa rd side at frame
12!1-l/2, deflecti ng the shell plating below the armor, flooding three fuel
tanks and causing shock damage lo No. 2 H.P. turbine casing. Twenty
minutes later, 25 torpedo bomber s were driven off. At 1221, some 20
dive bomber s attacked scoring a second near-m iss with a bomb which
detonate d approxi mately 11 feet below the waterlin e and 8 feel outooar d
of the starboa rd shell opposite frame 30-1/2. The shell plating was dis -
torted, several tanks were floodeu and the pump and motor for No. 1
elevato r were disabled by shock. At 1232, a fourlh group of 15 dive bomber s
was repulse d without damage to ENTER PRISE.
Fl-o. Despite the cripplin g damage to No. 1 elevator , ENTER PRISE

continut..-'<l in action and landed a large number of planes from the abandon ed
HORNET as welJ as her own. With the hangar deck full and planes parked
on U1e flight deck as far aft as No. 1 elevato r, aircraft continue d to land
success fully. The followin g day, ENTER PRISE proceed ed south toward
Noumea for repairs , arriving 30 October .
2. Damage and Damage Control Measur es - Structu ral
F2- L The first oorub, released by a dive bomber at an angle of 45°

and a height of about 1500 feet, pierced the flight deck at frame 4,
9 iect to porl oi the centerli ne (Photo F-1), passed through the trans-
verse bent at frame 3, tumbl..:Ki down through the forecas tle deck just
inboard of the port bitts about 2 feet forward of the forward perpend icu-
lar (Photo F-2) and exited 2 feet farther forward through the port shell
above the main deck, tearing two of the externa lly-fille d degauss ing
c·1bles (PholO F-3 ).
F2-2. This bomb detonate d high order about 20 feet below the
forecas tle deck, close to the port bow. Blast effect on U1e ship was
negligib le, but the fragmen t attack was heavy. About 160 fragmen t
holes were made, varying in diamete r from 1/4 inch to 12 inches, the
majorit y oeing small. Fragme nts periora ted the ship's side in
A-1-W, A-101-A and A-201-A , some continui ng out through the star-
board side (Photo F-4). Other fragmen ts traveled upward through the
port edge of the forecas tle deck, the splinter shield of the 1.1-inch
directo r anrl the flight deck. The maximu m distance traveled by a
-18-
- CONFIDENTIAL
fragment was about 50 feet after which it pierced Lhe 1/4-inch flight deck 1
plating; the maximum thickness of plating penetrated was the 3/4-inch
medium steel stem plate in way of the second deck at a distance of 10 feet.
F2-3. The second bomb, released from approximately 1500 feet in a

45° div~. pierced the flight deck at frame 44-1/2, 6 feet to port of the
centerline, leaving a 14-incb diameter hole, struck the lower flange of
the transverse bent at frame 43 and broke in two (Photo F-5). The
conical tail section sheared away from the cylindrical body and hit the
hangar deck 3 feet lo starboard of the centerline at frame 39, tearing a
14-inch by 16-inch bole, and detonated (Photo F-6). The nose and body
section pierced the hangar deck on the centerline at frame 40-1/2,
making a hole about 14 inches by 37-1/2 inches and passed through batch
2-39 in A-208-lL (Photo F-7) down to hatch 3- 39 at the Repair II Station
in compartment A-306-L where it detonated (Photo F-8).
F2-4. The detonation of the main portion of the bomb caused exten-
sive blast damage on the third deck in A-306-L, A-307 -lL, A-307-2L and
A-308-lLM (Photo F-9) and on lhe second deck in A-208-lL, A-208-2M,
A-208-3M and A-208-7L. Above the third deck,bulkhead 38 was deflected
forward and bulkhead 43 aft. Watertight doors 3-43-2 and 3-54-2, open
during the attack, were damaged and watertight door 3-43-1, which was
closed, was blown off and wrecked. The third deck in A-306-L was
wrinkled. The second deck was deflected upward unevenly a distance
of 2 to 5 inches above A-306-L and A- 307-lL, pulling up stanchions and
tearing boles in the third deck. Bulkhead 38 above the second deck was
distorted and both doors in it were wrecked. The hangar deck was
deflected upward symmetrically between frames 37 and 54 to a maximum
of 14 inches at frame 42 on the centerline (Photo F-10) except in way of
the lop of gasoline trunk A-513-T where it remained undeformed. Trunk
A- 513-T was not damaged. Hatch 3- 39 to magazine trunk A-409-T was
demolished and watertight hatch 3-42 was distorted. The staterooms and
Repair II locker in A-306-L were demolished. Officers' washroom
A-307-2L and all staterooms in A-307-lL were wrecked. Blast effect
in A-308-lLM was confined to the port side, partially wrecking the
warrant officers' messroom and slightly damaging the staterooms. Blast
damage on the second deck between frames 38 and 54 may have resulted
from bolh detonallons. All staterooms in A-208- lL and baths A-208-4L
and A-208-f>L were demolished. The lightly constructed bulkheads of
ammunition handling rooms A-208-2M and A-208-3M and their d ..>0rs
2-41-3 and 2-41-2 were demolished. Officers' washroom A-208- 7L was
parlially wrecked. On the main deck, lhe sllding door to the bomb ele-
vator at frame 7~ was blown off and hatch 1-39 was wrecked.
F2-5. Fragments traveled downward from the point of detonaUon of

the nose and oody of the bomb through the deck of A-306-L and hatch
3-39. Hatch 4-39 was pierced at the edge by a fragment, destroying the
watertight integrity. Fragments flew sideward in all directions, but
none penetrated upward through the second deck. Fragments from the
tail section penetrated downward through the second deck, sideward
through the starboard bulkhead of No. 1 elevator trunk slightly gouging
and burring the elevator plungers, and through doors 1-39-1 and 2.
Other fragments traveled upward and through the flight deck and No. l ele-
vator. The greatest thickness pierced by fragments from the main
porUon of the bomb wa::t 1/" -inch STS, 9 feet distant. Fragments from
the tail passed through 1/4-inch medium steel plate at a distance of 40
feet.
-19-
CO.'.'IFIDENTlAL
F2-6. The first damaging near-miss occurred when a bomb detonated

about 8 feet below the waterline, 10 !eet outboard of the starboard snell
opposite frame 12g-l/2. SJ:.:ir.k to the ship was moderate and a general
flexural vibration of low ir~quency occurred oi an amplitude estimated
by lhe Commanding Offlcer a.; 1-1/2 feet.
F2- 7. The shell was opened by rivet iailure along the seam between
"G" and "H" st rakes between frames 124 and 129 and also at the upper
seam of "H" strake between frames 131 and 134 (Photo F - 11). Tanks
D-3-F, D-13-F and C-35-F were opened to lhe sea. Plating was do::flected
inward generally over an area aoout 48 feet oy 17 feet between frames 123
and 135, from the upper edge o! lhe armor oelt at the fourlh deck almost to
the r1ilge keel. Maximum deformalio:i was about 18 inches al lhe lower edge
of "H" strake. Evidently the lap seam between "G" and "H" strakes pro-
vided local discontinuity of stru<;Lure. as the plating was bent very sharply
lnwarJ Just above the seam (Photo F - 11 ). All structural members behind
the deflected plating were buckled between frames 124 and 135 (Photos
F-12 and F-15). The armor was sprung in a maximum of 10 inches and
helo by the l>ent plating behind. No. 2 torpedo bulkhead immediately
iuboard and the iourU1 deck were not damaged. Bulkhead 123 was not
distorted, l>ut bulkhead 130 was badly buckled {Photos F-13 and F - 14) and
torn at the face plate oi the longitudinal stringer behind the lower edge
of lhe armor belt. Bulkhead 134 also was slightly buckled bul not torn
(Photo F-lti). There was no penetration of structure by fragments.
F2~. During the third attack of the day, ENTERPRISE was heeled to
port in a hard right turn when lhe second damaging near - miss, a oomo
released from a Japanes 0 plane ma 45° dive. glanced oi! the s:arooard
side al the waterline, frame 30. It delonated about 1 / ieet below tae
waterliue and 8 feet outboard of the starboard snell opposite frame
30-1/ 2. Shock was moderate. causing a general flexural vibration of
low frequency with an eslimated amplitude of one foot.
F2-9. The shell plating was deflected inward over a rougnly ellipitcal
area about 48 feel tly 25 feet, between frames 23 and 35, from tr1e first
platform level to the keel. The maximum indentation was about 2-~/2
feet, at frame 30-1/2, above and oelow the lower l')ugilud\r,al belnnd "F''
strake (Photos F-1 7 ana F -18). Four small cracks (c1rcled in Photo
F-18} were torn m the snt"l1 by the buckling oi frames and longitudinals
which pulled a.vay from the plating. 0:1e crack occurred at the juncture
of bulklwad 2~1 ana waterlighl longitudinal 2-1/2, openinr; up adjoining
c mparlruents, A-G-W, A-7-V, A-11-V and A-901-V. The largest crack
was tJ inches by 1 inch at the juncture of tanks A-901-V and A-l>V. All
frames, floors and bulkheads in way oi deflected plating were bent or
buckled (Photos F-19 and F-23) and frames 30, 31 and 34 were oroken.
The 4-inch ST.3 bulkheau at frame 3f> held rigid aud no distortion
occurred ait of it. BulkhPad 29 was carried away above long!tutlinal
.-1/2 mtert;ounectlng tanks A-7-V and A-11-V and a weld cracked below
10ngiluninal 2-1/2 inter.:onnecting tanks A-6-W a~d A-901-W. Bulkhrad
2o b&tween A-o-W and A-fJ- W was buckied and forced away from the shell,
making a 3-inch by 1/32-incl: opening. Bulkhead 18 was bulged forwarj
openin~ two small leaks near lht' keel between A-3 - A am1 A-•1-W. Inner
oottom plating, extending to the fourth deck was bulgea inboard in spaces
A-9-E ana A-6-W from frame 34 lo bulkhead 2o (Photo F - 24) with ii maxi-
mum deflection of l 5 inches at a pJint just below .1ongitudinal 2- l/2 at
frame 31.
-20-
CONFIDENTIAL
F2-10. The weakened structure showed signs of panting with the shtp
underway; so temporary shoring was installed in A-fi05-A to strengthen
the fir~t platform over A-9-E and A-6-W and the inboard bulkheads oI
A-/-V and A-11-V. There was no penetration of structure by fragments.
F2-11. Several other bombs detonated close enough lo the ship ~o

throw geysers of water Oii the side. The only damage noted, however,
was a pattern of small fragment holes in the hangar curtain at frame 102
on the port side, probably resulting irom a near-miss oif frame 95.
3. Damage and Damage Control Measures -

Piping, Machinery and Electrical
F3-1. The "M" amd "F" liJops of the degaussing cables externally
fitted on the porl bow were cut by the first hit as it passed out through
the shell and by fragments. About 20 lightmg cables located on the
iorecastle forward of frame 9 were also cut by fragments. No. 2
radio direction finder loop on the port catwalk fon1ard was knocked
ovPr the side and the receiver and power pack were wrenched loose
from the bulkhead of i.he uirection finder room.
F3-2. As a result of the second hit, firemain risers were carried

away at frame 40, port and starboard, in A-208-lL and on the port side
in A-306-L. The maln had been segregated at frame 111 port and star-
board prior lo the action, creating 4 separate sections. Ventilation
blower 2-43 was damaged, its control panel destroyed and motor shait
bent and all ventilation ducts in the olasted areas were demolished.
F:-3-3. There were about 30 gouges und burrs on lhe main elevator
plungers, the largest being about 1 mch long, 1/2 inch wide and 1/16 inch
deep in the starboard plunger. The starboard pitch and roll guide and
gear rack were also slightly gouged .
F3-4. Remote control and telephone caoles for GROUP I 5-inch

ballery, all power, lightlng, iire control and I.C. cables in A- 208-lL
and A-306 - L and many cables ln A- 307-lL and 308-L were cut. Con-
trollers for two sprinkling valves were damaged, several power panels
destroyed and two ammunition hoist motors were torn loose from their
foundations In A-208- lL. The flooding and sprinkling remote control
station l.n A-306-L and auxiliary Batlle Dressing Station ll were destroyed.
Vacuum tubes were shattered and leads broken by shock in all trans-
milters in Radio U (A- 0201-C).
F3-5. The most serious damage from the shock of the first near-miss
bomb detonation was a crac~ which occurred ln i.he after bearing pedestal
of No. 2 H.P. turoine. The pedestal was cast iron and formed an
integral part of the aiter lower section of the turbine casing. The crack
extended fore and afl on the inboard side, just abov~ the fillet to the lower
ilange of the pedestal.
F3 - 6. The cracked pedestal was repaired temporarily by securing an

angle suppor~, built up of a 1-inch plat~ vertical leg, 1-1/4-inch plale
-21 -
CONFIDENTLAL
horiz,:mtal leg and 1-1/ 4-rnch plate gussets to the ioJt and vertic~: weub
of the pedeslal wnich were ground to make a neat fit. The horizontal
l r oi lhe angle support was secured by e;dra long 09lls pal"o;,ing through
the foot of the pedestal, and the vertical leg of U1e angle was secured to
the webb of thi: pedestal by eight body-bound bolls and one cap screw.
F3-7. ln additi )11 to the crackiaa pedestal and also as a result of to

shock of the first near-miss, the forward and after gyros spilled a small
quantity of mercury. lhe ioremasl was rotated in its socket throwing
lhe SG radar wave gULde out of alignment, the YE homing antenna drive
shaft was disableu, an overboard flushing line was cracked at frame 130
in C-409~ L and fourteen fuel oil tank level gauges were broken.
F3-8. Shock of lhe second uear-miss threw No. l elevator pump and
molor off their fotmdation in A-9-E and bent the drive shaft. This,
togeUter with damage from lhe second hit, effectively disabled the
elevator. In addili:m, some lengths of high pressure hydraulic piping
were distorted and ruptured. the secondary drain pump in A-9-E was
lhrown off its foundation and brok"'n and overb0ard piping <tnC1 valves
from the pump were ruptured. Two fresh water pumps were damaged.
4.. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures
F4-l. Peak lank A-1-W was flooded by seas coming in through frag-
ment holes from lhe first bomb hit in way of and above ll'!e waterhne.
No att.e.mpl was made to cunlrol this flooding until ENTERPRISE returned
to port. The tank was then pumped out with submersible pumps and the
holes were patched.
F4-2. Flooding alter the second hit came from the broken iiremains
i.n A-208-lL and A-306-L. Firemain valves 5-56-2 and 5-5'7-5 were
dosed to stop flooding from ruptured risers al frame 40 after it was
found tbat remote controls for root valves ln Lhe risers were inoperable
and the valves were inaccessible because of 6 feet oi flood water in
A-406-A. A-410-A and A-412-A were flooded to a depth of two feet
fr·om A-307-lL through .hoies in the lhird deck opened by the pulling
up :)f stanchions. A small amount of waler ran down venlilation duct
outlets, located just above the second deck, into magazines A-509-M,
A-510-M, A-514-M, A-520-M, A-521-M, A-524-M, A-601-M, A-602-M.
A-704-M and A-705-M. Some water also leaked lhrough lhe fragm~nt
hole in hatch 4-39 into magazine trunk A- 508- T.
F4-3. The four rows '.:>f wing tanks in way of lhe first near- miss were
generally empty exCPpt for tanks in lhe second row between torpedo
bulkheads 2 and 3, which were about three-quarters full of fuel oil.
Three outboard lanks, C-35-F, D-3-F, and D - 13-F, were holed by the
detonati.)n and flooded lo the waterline. C-35 - F and D-3-F flooded
immediately. D-13-F flooded more slowly, at about 3000 gallons per
hvur, and was controlled. with pumps. A list of 2-1/2° lo starboard
resulted from the flooding.
-22-
CONFIDEN TIAL
F4-4. Tank relief valves in compartme nts C-409-L and D-401-L above
the flooded tanks were gagged to prevenl progressiv e flooding. The list
was removed by partially counterfloo ding six diagonally opposite fon1ard
tanks, A-48-F. A-54-F, B-14-F, B-10-F, B-22-F and B-28-F. Although
no explanation was given for not completely flooding two or three of U1ese
tanks, il is possible they were already partially full.
F4-5. Compartm ent A-'7-V flooded completely and compartme nts A-11-V
and A-901-V flooded to a depth oi 19 feet in about 1-1/2 hour.> through small
cracks in the hull opened by the second near-miss. A-9-E flooded to the
fourth deck through ruptured drainage piping and through the overflow piµes
from fresh water tanks, A-4-W, A-5-W and A-6-W. Very slow flooding
occurred in these U1ree tanks through cracked plating and bulkheads.
A-3-A also flood.ea to a depth of almost six ieet.
F4-6. The slow flooding resulting from the second near-miss could
not be controlled by the ship's pumps because the drainage pump in
A-9-E was disabled and subsequent ly submerged and severed power
leads ln the vicinity of frame 3!'>, cut by the second bomb hit, prevented
the 1,;.se of electric submersib !e pumps until casualty power leads could be
rigged.
F4-7. Draits resulting from the flooding and counterfloo ding were
approxima tely 30 feet forward and 29 feel aft. Drafts prior to the action
were approxim:cilely 26 feel iorward and 28 feel aft.
5. Fire and Firefightin g
F5-1. Heat generated as the first bomb pier.;ed the flight deck set fire
lo plaaking in way of lhe hole. A plane parked nearby caught fire and
leaked gasoline which burned on the deck. Passage of the bomb also set
fire to some rags, ounting and small cordage in A-101-A. The burning
plane was pushed over the bow and lhe small nres quickly extinguishe d.
F5-2. Several fires resulted from the twofold d~tonation of the second
bomb. Three planes triced up in the overhead and one plane on the hangar
deck near frame 40 were ignited by hot fragments or ilash from the deto-
nation oi the tail section. These fires were quickly extinguishe d by the
sprinkling system which was turned on immediate ly in the forward end
of the hangar. Fires in bedding. office files. etc. in A-105-L, started
by hot fragments, also were extinguishe d without difficulty.
F'B-3. A small fire started in protec;.tve clothing and personal efiects

in A-306-L from detonation of the main portion of the second bomb.
This iire was extinguishe d by water from th•: ruptured firern:ciin riser
at frame 40 on the port side of the compartme nt. The only serious fire,
a co:nbinatio n electrical and Class A fir~·. o)<.:,.;urred In A-208- L. Dense
smoke filled lhe compartme ot and hampered firefighter s, but was
partially cleared oy turning on the supply ventilation in A-309-LM and
A-3~0-11 M. The iire was brought wider control within an hour by
water and C02.
- -23- -
CONFIDENTlAL
6. Japanese Bombs
Fo-1. Recognizable fragments of the second bomb were recovered,

including several pieces of lhe tail !uze, small pieces of lhe nose .fuze,
pieces of lhe nose, body and conical tail and one tail strut. With these,
the t>ornb was identified as a 250 Kg No.25 "Land" bomb which cor-
responds approximately will. tm U.S. 500-pound GP type. The conical
tail section was secured by a row of screws to a collar, which in turn
was riveted lo the cylindrical body. This weak connection, later corrected
by U1e Japanese, probably caused the rupture of lhe bomb. The tail cone,
containing about 011e quarter of the explosive, fell to the hangar deck and
detonated, set off by the tail fuze as described in paragraph F2-3. From
the large size of the fragments, the fact that unburned powder still clung
lo these fragments and the extent of damage, it ls estimatect that the tail
portion detonated 1-ow order. ll is believed that lh.e main portion also
detonated low order.
F6-2. Although no conclusive evidence exists for identifying the other

three bombs, it is believed that they were of the same type and size. The
first oornb detonated high order, judging by the excellence of the fragment
attack, which was, however, of a different character than lhal of he first
bomb hit on 24 August. The size of the holes left in the ship's structure
by the passage of the bomb inc.llcates a diameter of about 14 inches. The
two near-miss bombs which struck close to the starboard side also evl-
denlly detonated high order. As experience has often indicated, the water
prevente:.1 underwater fragment anack. The shock of the detonation was
in ooth cases sufficient, however, to open up the shell by structural
.failures.
7. Conclusion
F7- l. Again, as during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the

excellent damage control organization oi ENTERPRISE prevented fires
from getting out oi hand and enabled lhe ship to continue in the battle as
an almost normal fighting w1it. Measures taken to train the crew and to
strip the ship of all inflammable material had been conlinued at an
accelerated pace. Linoleum and paint were being removed, wooden
articles, overstuffed furniture and transoms had been put ashore. office
files, libraries and publications had oeen reduced to a minimum, and a
policy of keeping only one week's supply of inflammable materials
stowed above the waterline had been established.
F7-2. As in the action of t.M August. flooding of watertight compart-

mt.:nts through pi plug, ventilation ducts, etc., occurred. Firefighting
water fow1d its way down ventilation ducts into some :>f · h magazines,
and elevator pump room A-9-E flooded partly throuvh relief valves in
overflow pipes froin the three fresh water tanks forward. In way of the
near-miss afl, however. tank relief valves were ace· .·siLle and were
gagged by the ship's force i.o prevent progressive flooding in spaces above
those opened to direct floodiug.
F7-3. Flooding resulting from lhe two near-misses probably could

have oeen avJidt:d had the outboard spaces been full oi water instead of
empty.
-24-
CONFIDENTIAL
The crack sustained by the after bearing pedestal of No. 2

H.P. turbi11e ca.sing from the shock of the first near-miss again
emonstrated the poor shock resisting qualilies of cast iron. During
e ship's atJailaoillty in the summer oi 1~43, thls pedestal casting was
eplaced with one made of ca:::t steel. It was decided, however, not lo replace
e undamaged cast iron pedestals oi the other turbines. IL is, therefore,
f particular mterest to note Lhat the casualty occurred again on 11 April
945 on No. 3 H.P. turbine as a re<:>ult of an underwater detonation.
-25-
co:;FIDEN flAL
Ph >D F-1: Fir st h"t. V~ 0 w >: b:mrn entry h.>le tll flight
d ck.
PhotJ F-2: First hit. Bomb passage h.>le in p~rt side oi

i:>recastle deer:.
CO.ffl;)EI!Tl AL
r'hoto F-3: F!.rst h.t. Bomo exit h.>l in way of

d gaussing caoles and fragmei t nol~ on port bow.
Photo F - 4: First ht. Fragm nt hl.)!e.- :m (:. rt

o.>w. Fragment exit noks circled 1u starooarj
O'J'.V
CONFIDENTIAL
Photo F-5: Secor.d h~t. Vie·.v fror;i hangar dt:t:k ,·hoJ1ir.g-

bomo ··ntry hJle in flight deck and f'.>int ;.>f unpact :>r.
transver~·e bent at frame 4.3.
Phot0 F-6: SecDr.J nit. Hangar decK at nai.c;i, ~ - 3G,

101..1k:ng ait. 1'.iair, ~:>rt1on of oomb pa.;sed tnr::mgh d.,ck
aft 0i hatch on centuli.ne. Tall portio11 slruck and
d~tonated on starroard side of l.atch.
CONFIDENTIAL
Ph )l, F- I: fe..:vnd hiL Hal.en :C. - 3g Jn seconci deck look:ng

forward. M'lin iJ.Jrt!.-r.. 0f t.iomb passoo thrJug.t halch to
A-3)o- L. Fn1.i:;mem hJles are frDm d~tor.ation ')f tail
j.....)l'ti0r. at mai.r. aeck above .
Ph~U F - ~: ::'l;;!c..>nJ hiL. Third :ieck r.ear pvint of

dl"tonaLhn oi mair. portion of bOmb h A- 306-L.
-.::oNFlDEIJTIAL
Photo F-.J: Second hit. Blast eiiect in A-306-L, starooard

sid 0 lJoking aft. Stanchion in center is at frame 50.
Pnot F-10: Sccona hit. B.i..u>t eifect m A-2v8-L.

showing liiting of main deck and teanng of bulkhead
42.
COiffIDENTIAL
Photu F - 11: Fir.'>L near - miss. Star boar d side frames

:23- 13f1 in ·J/ay of dl?:Lonalion. Note wooden plugs driven
int:> rivel holes by divers.
Photo F - 12: Fir st near- miss. Looking aft and outboar d to

frame 12 / and sh 0 ll ,n tam: C-35- F. .Note sharp bends in
shell al seam bdwe<"n G and H str akes.
C0N1"IDE, ITlJl.L
Photo .F - 13: Pir.::;t r.e'lr - rn1. s. LooKinf aft to ou.lr.J1ead .

frame .. 30 .n tan~ C -3o- F . Note j1;>er-. wri nkles rn hulk -
hea::i platin-r.
Photo r - !4: Fir .:;t near - miss. Looking fo rwar j

and .Jutboard in tank !:>- 3 - F sh::>w u.g uistorted
stii fener s or1 bulr:ht.ad 130.
CONFIDElJTIAL
Photo F - 15: First near - miss. Tank D - 3-F I.Joking

aft and up to armor deck.
Ph<Jto F-16: First near- miss . Tank D- 13- F, looking

forward and outboar d l:> shell and upper porti:>n of
bulkhead 134.
co:-JFIDENT! .AL
..
Photo F - 17: Sec ..md near- m.ss. VLw of damage to

snell frames 23-3f starooard.
Photo F-18: Second nP.a r- miss. View Ji dam-

nge to sheil >11llh small cracks in pnting
ci r deo.
)
• )
Ph'JtO .F - 1~: Si:.:(;Ond n~ar - rmss . Tank A - 5- W

looking for war d anu oi..tti.:>::n·i.l to shell and
swash bulkhead 24 .
Photo F - 20: Secona :v"ar- miss. Tank A - 6-W looking

dovm and aft Jr. forJJa r d side of bulkhead 2::!.
CON.F'IDENTIAL
Photo F - 21: Second near - '11iss. Tank A - 11-V looking

fon1ard and ao·.vn to swas!". oulkheat l 32.
Photo F - :-'2: S ... cond near- miss . Tank A - 11 - V looking

down and !Jrward between frames 33 and 34 . Note
oreak in fram 0 34.
CONFIDENTI AL
Pf'iolo F-23: Second near- miss. Looking down into tank

A-7-V.
Photo F-24: Se.::ond near-miss. Deflected inner

bottom pla:..ing in A-9 - E, looking forward on
starboard side.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION G
HlSTORY
30 OCT0BE;R 1942 TO 18 MARCH 1945
l. The Batlle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942
Gl-1. Jn Noumea, shipfit~ers and machinists from VESTAL (AR4), a

construction bat;.allon and the ship's for.:;e worked continuously to repair
damage incurred lu the Battle of Santa Cruz. Work was not completed
on 11 November, however, when ENTERPRISE was ordered to proceed
to Guru.lalcanal.
Gl-2. The japanese had assembled a large force with which Lo make
a last supreme eifort to drive the U.S. forces frDm Guadalcanal. It
was essential to reinforce our troops and destroy the Japanese force.
ENTERPRISE's planes, operating from Henderson Field, gave air sup-
port to U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal and made strikes against the
~a.panes•" Fleet in the battle which culminated in the defeat of a superior
Japanese force by two U.S. battleships and escorting destroyers in the
night surface engagement of 14-15 November, and lhe full retreat of
the remnants of the Japanese Fleet on 15 November.
G t-3. Unremitting repair work on ENTERPRISE succeeded in ready -

ing lhe fon1ard Pleva.tor for testing at lhe height of the battle. However,
because of the possibility lhat it might not come up again after being
lowered, the tests were postponed and ENTERPRISE completed her part
in the engagement wilh only twJ elevators operating. After her return to
Noum•"a on 16 Nov·3mber, work was continued, although no effort was
ma.tie to repair the damage caused by the two near -misses received on
26 October beyond restoriug watertight imegrity and stiffening weakened
frames for JJard as extended drydocking would have been required. Canvas
partitions sufficed 'to replace demolished joiner bulkheads in the officers'
country forward until permanent repairs could be made the follo·Ning
summer.
2. Winter and Spring 1943
G2-l. From December 1042 until May 1943, ENTERPRISE operated

out of Espiritu Santo spending a relatively quiet lime in port with
occasional sorttes for patrol, submarine hunting or train ng duties.
The only action occurred at the end of January when her planes pro-
vided air cover for CHICAGO which had been damaged by Japanese
bombers and torpedo planes in the evening of 29 January. Unfortu-
nately, a f,m::e of 11 or 12 Japanese torpedo planes, intercepted in a
projected attack on ENTERPRISE, succeeded in hitting CHICAGO with
four ad'lltiona1 torpedoE:s which sank her. The enemy planes were all
shot down subsequently by AA fire and fighter planes.•
• BuSMps War Damage Report No. 37
-26-
CONFIDEN TlAL
G~-~. ENTERPR ISE sailed for Pearl Harbor on 1 May where she was
drydocked from 18 to 29 May for Lh r ....pai r of the underwater damage
suffered in the Battle of Sama Cruz. .Jn '>7 May, Admir al Nlm:;.z pre-
sented the av:ard of the Pr13sidenti al u~1t Ctl<ition to ENTERPR ISE. the
first carrier to re<..:elve lhls distinction .
3. Overhaul, Summer 1943
G3-l. After leaving drydock on 29 May, ENTERPRI SE remainea m

Pearl Harb:>r ourln& June and parl l Jul.y. A few alterations , including
fitting of identlf1cat1 on radar, removal of patnl and inflammab le st res
tv fum"'-tlght compartme :-its below the waterhne iuted with mechanlca .
v •ntllation and C02 fi r e extinguishi ng sy.• tems, and fitting of watertight
qu1cr:-acti ng scuttles rn halches leading to •levator machinery and pump
room A-9-E. were accompllsn ed dur.ng this period.
03 - ,_. On l·i July, ENTERPRI SE departed Pearl Harbor for Puget
..,ourtd where she was placed in No. 5 gr aving do;:k on 23 July. During
the period from 23 July to 26 September blisters we r e fittf>d between
frames 36 and 150 to effect improveme nt in stability necessitate a by
the increase in topside weights r~sulting irom wartime alterations .
Her original gasoline t:i.ni<S were r eplaced with sc...ddle tal1Y.s which had.
l>een devised to give increased protection a.gainst underwate r attack,
spells, bombs, splinter::., de. (A discussion of this type of tank is
included in BuShips War .:..>arrage Report No. 39 " W.f\SP").
G3-3. rn addition to the two major s~n.:ctural alleratio1 s mentioned

ao.:>ve, comparlm ems A-18 and A-25, made availaole by the change in
gasoline stowage, were altered to pr ovide additional 40rnm. p:ane
arnmwutio n and ir:cemiiary bomb stowage; gasoline mains were extended
aft; a manual1y-coutr.:>l1ed Inert gas system was installeu to replace the
Cu2 system ior protection and purging of gasolme lin1:::s; and air-d riven
defueling pumps were filled at each fueling statior. on the flight aud
hangar deck!'" to expedite the ara!mng ~f fuel tanks in returned planes.
G3-4. Firefightin g facilities were improved by U1P install~tion of

manually-c ont r olled fixed iog nozzle systems in many spaces and steam
suuthering lines 111 the machinery spaces and oy r eplacing chemica: foam
generator s with new desi~n mechanica l foam pr essur e proportion ers.
Add1t1onal cutout valves were fitted in lh-" damage control and f1rern?.in
systems and two 1000 GPM Diesel -driven centriiugal pumps were
installed, one in A-~-E and one in D-523 - E, and connected to the i!re-
mains.
G3-5. The enti r e ventilation system was r evisoo to impr ove water-
tight Integr ity and living conditions. The ::;ystem was altered m the
steering motor r oom to prevent a recurrence o:f the casualty of 29
August 1942 and te rminals of all natural exhaust ducts .:'.rorn forwad
magazines were r aised 5 feet above the second deck.
G3 -o. Other alter ations included fitting 00-p.:>und STS plati:.g ar:>m.1
trunk D-304 -T between the second and thi r d decks leading to the after
- 27 -
CONFIDENTIAL
magazines; installatio:-i of lnterual degaussing cables; addition of several

radars; replacement of the two forward flight deck calapults with units
of a later design; and an increase of armament by the addition oi 8 - 40mm
t.vln mounts and scvera1 20mm guns. All alterations, trials, etc. were
complete and El'ITERPRlSE was ready for sea 31 October.
4. Amphibious Operations and Strikes, Winter 1943-44
G4-l. On 1 NovE moer, ENTERPRISE departed Pugel Sound for Pearl

Haroor where on ! 1; vt:mber she ~oined the task force which was to
support the landings 0r. Tarawa, Makin and Apamama in the Gilbert
Islands. On board were newly organized teams of night fighters, "Bat
Teams," each consisting of a radar-equipped Avenger torpedo plane and
two Hellcat fighters. ENTERPRISE planes struck at Makin during the
three-d11y perioa 19-21 lJovemoer and during the nights. of 24, 25 an1l 2o
Novemoer ner mght fighters successfully repulsed attacks oy Japar.ese
torpedo bombers against the task force. ENTERPRL.SE withdrew on the
afternoon oi 28 November, her part in the opGratiou against the three
islands complei.ed. On the way back Lo Pearl Harbor she circled north
of the Marshalls in order to launch a strike aga!nst shipping and shore
installations on Kwajalein. She arrl•1ro in Pea.n Harbor !:i December.
G4-2. ENTERPRISE departed Pearl Harbor 16 December to participate

In the landings on Kwajaleln in the Marshalls. Operating to the south and
west of the islands, she provided planes for the bombarJment of enemy
aircraft and grounu installations, ior comoat air patrol. anti-submarine
patrol, photographic rs:connaissance and for dlrec;. support of landliig
troops. The ~apanese ofiered comparatively little resls;.ance. N.:>
special mght fighters were required and the occupation was completed
by 4 Fi:bruury.
G4-3. On 16 February, p•anes from E;i!TERPRISE partidpated in

strikes against shipping and oil storage installations at Truk.
Although Lhe rna1or units of the ~apanesc Fleet had already left
that hase, six enemy combatant ships and many enemy auxiliaries
Nere sunk or damaged. The stri~:es contlnued through the seventeenth.
Then the U.S. carrier.:> and their escorts retired rapidly to the northeast,
pausing to launca lw.:> striKes agarnst shore installations on }aluit,
20 Feoruary.
5. Sprmg Activities, 1944
G!J-1. On l March, ENTERPRISE headed once more for the South-

west Pacific where her pmnes pr.:ivided air support, combat air patrol
and anti-submarine patrol ior the landings or. Emirau. She then
JOined Task Force 58 and participated ln strikes against Peleliu and
Koror in the Pa.hu Islands, Yap and Ulithi in the ·.vestern Carolines
a:id, as the group retired eastwarJ, against Woleai.
G5-2. ENTERPRISE planE>s fle'JJ thE>ir first strikes against air-

fields and lnst.allatlon~-· in Hollarnila on 21 AprU in support of
amphibious operat\oas in TanahmPrah Bay. She remained in the area
-28-
CONFlDE I!TIAL
until 26 April, when, after a final strike against Wakde Island. she
retired to th•.; newly won harbor at Manus to repair a hydraulic leak
in lhe ste~ring engine and lo pick up replaceme ms.
G5-3. On 29 and 30 April, six strikes were ilown by ENTERPR ISE

planes each day against ground insi.allation s anu aircraft on Truk. Her
ta.SK group then continued eastward to Majuro, where they am.:hored 4 May.
G~ -4. After a month of relative inactivity, ENTERPR ISE departed

MaJuro on 6 June with Task Group 58.3 to support lnnuings on Saipan.
Her first fighter s weeps were sent against the Island on 11 June and
continued for the next three days. On 15 June the .andi.ngs took place,
supported oy carrier planes and oombardm ent oy suriace ships. While
repulsing an air attack, superficia l damage to superstruc ture was sus-
tau1ed when a 40mm shell from a U.S. vessel struck ENTERPR ISE.
Go-5. ll was suspected that lhe Japanese Fleet was in the vicinity,
and during 17 and 18 June the U.S. ships worked around lo the west of
Sair-an, searching for the enemy neet. On 1., June the U.S. task group
was attacked by more than 400 Japanese aive bomoer.s a1a toq::.:do
planes. U1e majority of them carrier type aircraft. 3 :> ifective ·Neri?
the comoat at:r patrol and anti-aircra it defense, ti ~ -h roximately 300
•nemy planE:s were destroyed, ENTERPR ISE fliers accounttng i or 19.
UnfJrtun ilely search planes cowd not discover the Japanese naval force
until th~ afternoon of the twentiern, some 6 /0 miles JJest of Saipan.
M deratP. damGl.ge was inflicted on the enemy ana one carrier v:as sunk.
The Japanese retired raµidly westwaru so that, although contaci. was main-
tam~d by search planes through the fo lowing da:,·, the dislunce was too
real to munch a strike. ENTERPR ISE and the other U.S. vess'3ls then
r turned closer LO Saipan from where she launched dally strit:es against
Guam between 28 June and ~J • uly. She returned to Eniwetok ~m 9 July and
frum Eniwetok proceeded to Pearl Harbor \~here she haa availability
at the Navy Yard from 16 July to 3 August.
6. Auvance to lhe Pn11ippmes, 1944-4~
Gtl-1. At the cost oi harJ fightirP and many casualties. Sa pan v.as
stablished a.· a base from which lhe strategic bombing of Jap n could
:.ar:e place. In addition, 1l afforded protection to U1e northern ilank of
th .lne :>f a::ivaace from the Centr.9..1 .1:->acifH.: t the PUHppmes , tJward.
wr.kh thP a1!1phibious force.; of the S)uU1.vest .Pacific were also h aaed.
A bast:> in the ~.' stern Caro.. ine~ was needed, however, and the Palau
Is a11ds Nt>r • chosen.
G6-2. To divert attention from the pro1ected landings on f' • 1u i.. tl.e
Palau I lands. Tas.:< Group 38.4, wh1 ~h included ENTERPRI SE. ma ~e a
raid n the Volcan...> ana Bonm Islanas. .Vh1le the other carrier· of the
task group struck at Iwo Juna, she l 1uncheJ fighter swt:! p..: again.... t
Ch1ch1 Jirna anu provided cornoa~ al r patr ol and photograph ic r con-
na1sance.
- 29-
CONFIDENT IAL
G6-3. After a orief stop at Sa!pan, ENTERPRISE sent fighter sweeps

ano photographic mtss!ons against Yap and Ulilhl on ti, 7 and 8 September,
foll:.>wed by strikes against Malakai Harbor In the Palau Islands on 10 and
1 l September.
G6-4. 011 15 Sep:.ember, troops land~ on Pelellu with planes from

EUTEP.PRISE furnishlng a part of the direct air support. She continued
t.> provide air support wuil 18 Sept<?mber when she retired to Manun.
G6-5. The task gr.oup returned to patrol dutles west of the Pal.aus on
21 September remaimng for tht: next eight days ready Lo intercept any
attempt oy the Japanese Fleet t..> repeat the tactics useo. at Sa1pan.
G6-6. During the vperations against the Palau Island:>, another task
f!'rJup was making the first large raids vn Formosa and the northern
Phillppmes. These were designed to divert the Japan8se away fr.)m the
amphibious operation and to ·>1hlttle down the enemy's strength in the
Philippines. Opp...;sition was so Hght that th~ decision was made lo accele-
rate the speed of advance oy landing directly in the Philippines.
'lo-/. ENTERPRISE 's part preliminary to this landmg was to ... trikt.:
noz'Lt. of Lht: Ph1llppin~s as a umt .::>I one of three task groups.
On
10 October her p~anes flew against Okinawa Shlma ln th£> RyuJ.:yus. The
n~xt day she provided combat air patro. while planes from other carriers
attacked northern Luzon. On 12 and 13 O::..>b1 r, str~kes were made against
strong Japanese installations on Formosa. un '. 5 October, from a positl.:m
t•ast of Luz.>u, ENTERPRISE sent a fighter , trii<e and sweep agatnst
.Manila and on 18 and 19 October her planes made uombing and strafing
strikes against a\rcrait and installations at Legaspi and Mamla.
GG-8. The landings on Leyte took place 20 O:lober, with ENTER!?RISE

planes among the air support groups. She left the next day, however, and
headed toward Ulithi as the La:::k group had been out since 2t. September
and other ships were availaole to cover the operations. But on the
tweuly-lhirJ, ir.1.elllgence advised that the Japanese Fleet was at 1ast
coming out of hidmg to throw all of its weight against the U.S. foothold
in Leyte Gulf and all available American vessels were readied for action.
G6-9. The Japanese attack was three-pronged . Gne force came up from
the :;outh, through the Sulu Sea toward Surigao Strait, south oi Leyte;
a central force passed north oi Palawan into lhe Sibuyan Sea, heading
for San aernardino Strait, north of Samar; and a northern force sailed
south from japan directly toward Samar aud Leyte. The resulting
Batlle :for Leyte Gulf accordingly developed rn three parts, known
respectively as the Batlle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Samar and the
Battle off Cape Engano.
G6-10. ENTERPRISE planes participated in action against all three of

these Japanese Forees. On the morning of 24 October, they damaged two
battleships and a cruiser in the Sulu Sea and in the aflernoon they scored
torpedo ana oomo hits on a thir d battleship in the Sibuyan Sea. During
the night and next day, the Seventn Fleet bore the orunt of the attacks
from the Japanese southern and central forces. The southern force
was routed 1n the night Banle oI Surigao Strait and the next moru:ng the
powerful central force was engaged by a task unll of CVE's. Durmg
-30-
.;0NFllJ£:.N rlAL
t..1 t. m, ErITl!.RPRlSE had steamed north w1U1 the ThlrJ Fleet to

r.gag th · Japar u n rtr.ern fore off Cape Engano. Five strikes
u1uncr.l:d t y F.N. ERP.H.iSE on 2f> 0.;tober as~isted in sin.king four
J1:1pan ~ c rricr ni damaging battleships and other Wlils.
G6-1 l. Tl .led ENTERPRISE's part in the !argesl i-laval engage-

rr. nt f th war. F r the remainuer of lhe month, she remained on
1 atrol ~ast Ji Samar and Leyte, providing ~0mt..al air patrol, survivor
s arcli""S and . arch -altad: groups. On 3 V:.:t ber, a strong enemy
·ur attack d v ioped which included suicin • ..... e crashes on FRANKLIN *
CV13) and BELLEAU NOOD (CVL24). On° ZEKE, although on fire from
r p~ateu hits. dlveu on ENTERPRISE from the starooard bear!l, crossed
the att ·r !11ghl deck, no.rrowly missed parkP.d planes am! fell into the sea
on UL p >rl qu&rtt--r. The nP.xt day the task group departed for Uiilhl.
Go-1 . ENTERPH.ISE spent only thrl"e day~ at Ulithi, leaving on 5 Novem-

bt.r with Task Group 38.4. On 11 November, a successful strike was made
on a Japanese convoy landing troops in Ormoc Bay on the west side of
Leyle nnd on 13-14 November a heavy attack was made against sh\pping
in Subic arid Manila Bays. Many ships wer"' SWlk or damaged. Aiter
r utme patrols and fueling near Palau, the Lask group returried on
£l Novemoer to attack Clarr. Field and Subic Bay.
Gti-13. PJter the strike of rn Novemoer, ENTERPRISE retired eastward

seuding planes against lhe airfields at Yap before anchoring in Ulilhi on
22 Novemoer. Five days later, she departed for Pearl Harbor arriving
6 06cemoer for two weeks' availaoi!ity at the Navy Yard where new
Iour -u~ade:i prope...ers were fitteu in an effort to reduce vibration during
h1gh ~pe .d. turns. The new propellers were successful and on 24 December
she ,i parted for the Philippines.
Gti- 14. After the successiul landings at Leyte and Mindor0, it was
decided t~ land on Luzon and Lingayen Gulf was chosen to achieve
~ urpr1se in th~ rear oi i.he main Japanese forces on the island. In order
t0 protect the amphibious opera.lions, a strong force of carriers and
other ships operated oetweea Luzon and the mainland of Asia.
G6-lb. ENTERPRISE joinerl Task Group 38.5, a night carrier group

forming pad of this strategic support force, on 5 }anuary. During the
following tw~nly days, her planes performed routine patrols, participated
tn strikes against airfields on Luzon, shipping off the coast of Indo-China
ar.d installations on U1e coast of China and made sweeps along lhe coasta1
area of the China Sea irom Formosa to Hong Kong.
7. Landings on Iwo Ji111a, February 1945
07-1. in February, ~s a diversion for the planned amphibious opera-

tions against Iwo f ma, carriers of lhe Fifth Fleet sailed north from
Ulitlti to within 120 miles oi Honshu. While planes from the olher carriers
strU<..:k at airilelds, groWld insta1lat1ons and shipping in the Tokyo area,
ENTERPRISE provided planes for combat air patrol.
* BuShip:; War Damage Rep6rt No. f>li
-31-
CONFIDENTIAL
G7-2. The carriers then retired southward, arriving near Iwo Jima
on the evening of the landmgs. lU Feuruary. For almost three weeks
thereafter, until 10 March, EHTERPRISE planes had a busy routine of
uay and night combat air patrol aud strikes against airfields on Chichi
Jima. With the bitter stru5gle for Iwo Jima almost completed, ENTER-
PRISE returned bo Ulilhi on 12 Mar.::h.
-32-
co:.~IDEiITIAL
PhOlO H-1: :Jud hit. F~rward ele','at::>r shm;:mg polm of

tni~ial irnJJ::t..:t.
Photo H-2: Dud hiL. Port siGe ')f ;!'land and navigat~ng
oridge shnw,ng brac.:Kt:t3 brok<=>n by passa.~e 0f bomb.
CONFIDENTI AL
Photo H-3: Gud f!lt. Fught d ~ck arr"'"idsnips showing main

port Un ~f bomn ar.j ~c::i ttereu lump~ of picric acid.
Pn.>to H-4: "Friend1y" sneL mt. Parked plaiw..:· on

fire. Uotp us~ oi I '>V! veloc 1Ly f >g applicaDr to i.-ntect
r.ian VJith ioam hJse.
C ONFID EI':TiA L
Photo H-5: "!='rieno:y" shell hit. Vh:w )f 11.~r.~ Jo-> 'KI ~ar
h;land aiter fires -::xlinf.U:.;hoo.
Ps.~to H-6: "Friend ly" :=hh! hit. G1.1tti:>d Wmm

rn..:mnts ilos. f and l.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION H
BOMB DAMAGE
STRIKES AGAL'JST SOUTHERN JAPAN - 18 AND 20 MARCH 1945
I 250 KG D U D B O MB H I T , FRAME 3 2 3 . 5 I N C H , 3B C A L~ FR I E N OL Y S H ELL",

2 5 1NCH , 38 C AL " FR I ENDLY SHELL " FRAME 3 4 PORT
FRAME 60 • 70 STARBOARD
1. Narrative
Hl-1. Shortly before operatlons star ted against Okinawa Gunto,

the fasl carrier force which had supponed the landings on lwo Jima
was sent north to continue strikes against the Japanese home islands.
Its mission was to provide a powerful shield between Japan and
Okinawa which could preven: large- scale Japanese Fleet action against
the U.S. amphibious operations, to bombard and bomb strategic shore
installations and to seek out and destroy the remnants of the Japanese
Fleet.
Hl-2. ENTERPRISE departed Ulithi on 14 March as a unit of a

night carrier task group. Her primary mission wa."' to furnish night
combat air patrol for the task force which struck alrfields, factories
and ships in the Kyushu, Shikoku and southern Honshu area during the
three-day period 18-20 March.
Hl - 3. On 18 March, the task group operating to the southeast of

Kyushu was subjected to sporadic attacks by single Japanese planes.
At 0735 a JUDY was sighted on the port bow al a distance of 10,000
yards and an altitude of about 150 feet. Although taken under iire, the
plane flew head on toward ENTERPRISE and dropped a 250 Kg bomb which
ricocheted off the fo.:ward elevator, struck under the navigating bridge
and fell to the deck, a dud. Five more attacks were made on the ship
durhlg the oay without causing damage. The following day, ENTERPRISE
was spared attack, but FRANKLIN was badly damaged by two bombs and
subsequent fires.
Hl-4. On 20 March, the ships were subjected to additional sporadic

attacks from Japanese planes. At 1613 a JUDY dropped a bomb about
50 feet Lo port of frame 60 and at 1626 another plane dropped a bomb
off the starooarci quarter. Ot.her shi.ps in the vicinity had opened fire
a:id two 5-lnch 38 cal. prDjectiles detonated over ENTERPRISE, start-
ing a moderately serious fire on lhe flight deck in way of the island
and a small fire in shield ammumtion at No. o, 40mm mount. Al 1652
anot.her Japanese bomb was dropped but missed the port quarter.
- 33-
CONFIDENTIAL.
Hl-5. The task group retired to the southeast on the twentie~h, and
on 22 March, ENTERPRISE, in company with other damaged shtps, re -
turned to Ulithi for repalr.
2. Dud Bomb of 18 March
H2- l. On 18 March as described In paragraph Hl-3, a bomb was

released almost horizontally from maslhead height, struck the forward
elevator at frame 32 about 7 feet to starooard of the centerline, rico-
cheted aft and struck the island structure just be~vw the port side of the
navigaling bridge at frame '12 (Photos B-1 and B-2). It passed through
seven brackets supporting the navigating oridge and primary fly control,
tumbling as it went, and broke into lwo partd. The small tail cone fell
Lo the flight deck, immediately below thP navigating bridge and the main
portion came to rest farther aft on the flighL deck without detonating.
Some picrlc acid was strewn over severed electric cables under th~
navl.gatini; bridge and ignited by short circuits, causing a small fire.
P1cric acid was also scattered over the flight deck from frame 74 to
frame 125, out did not ignite (Photo H - 3). The bomb was pushed over-
board soon after it hit.
H2-2. Planking on No. 1 elevator was crushed and broken in way of

the in!tia1 impact over an area roughly 10 fef>t by 6 feet, the aluminum
deck beneath was ruptured and one longttudinal was sheared at frame
34 so Lhat lhe elevator sagged abouL 12 inches. Electric cable$ running
along the port side of the island structure to primary fly control and lo
lhe alldade on the port wing of the navigating bridge were severed.
H2-3. The small fire under primary fly control was quickly extinguished
and temporary repairs were made lo No. 1 elevaLOr within half an hour,
permitting it t::> operate. Direction of air activities was shifted to second-
ary fly control.
H2 -4. The bomb was identified as a 250 Kg, streamlined, No. 25,
Mod. ? Ordinary bomb. It corresponds approximately with the U.S.
500- pound GP bomb, but has somewhat greater penetrating ability.
Altho..igh normally fitted with nose and tail fuzes, it had a plug in its nose
fuze seal which partially accounts for its not detonating. The Lail cone
was fuzed with a B - 3(a) fuze which fell out on deck without functioning.
H2 - 5. Throughout the war ENTERPRISE was favored by good fortune

which accoums in no small measure for her survival. This was
particularly lrue in this case, for had the bomb deLOnated either on
impact with the forward elevator or on striking the island, severe
damage would have resulted.
3. Near - Misses, "Friendly" Shell Hits and Fire of 20 March
H3 - 1. On 20 March, as stated in paragraph Hl-4, three bombs det0nated

in the water not far from the ship; one about 150 feel to port of frame 60
and two off lhe port and starboard quarters, 50 to 100 feet away. These
were visually identified as the 250 Kg streamlined Ordinary type. Shock
-34-
CONFIDENTIAL
cracked 2-inch tubing in U1e relief and replenishing line to the expansion
tank of the starboard steering Wlit and a brazed joint between the flange
and shell of a 12- inch copper auxiliary exhaust pipe in the after englne-
room. No other damage was reported. Steering was shifted to the port
uml until repairs could oe effected during the night.
H3-2. During th bombing attack, a 5-lnch, 38 cal. projectile,

fired by another U.S. ship in the task group, detonated over 40mm
mounts Nos. 5 and I between frames 60 and '70 on the starboard side
of lhe fHght deck. Almost simultaneously a second 5-inch, 38 cal.
projectile detonated off the port bow starting a small fire in lhe ammu-
nition on the shield of 40mm mount No. 6. This fire was quickly
extinguished.
H3-3. Shell fragments from the first detonation pierced the belly
gasoline tanks of two F6F planes spotted ln the vicinity of the hit,
igniting gasoline which spread over the flight deck between frames GO
and /5. The burning gasoline ignited two additional planes and initiated
the explosive burning of 40mm ready-service ammunition stowed on
the shields of Nos. 5 and '7 40mm mounts and .50 cal. plane ammunition
piled on the ilight deck just fo::-ward of the island.
H3-4. Primary fly control,the main communication office, radio cen-

tral and CIC were made untenable by heat and smoke and abandoned via
descending lines previously attached to the navigating bridge. The
navigating bridge, however, remained habitable and the ship's course
was altered to take advantage o! the wind to clear smoke and hea:. to port
away from the island.
H3-5. As a result of the fir~ Nos. 5 and 7 40mm mounts and the Mk.51
director for No. 5 mount were burned out (Photo H-6). Primary fly
control was gutted and the port signal bridge facilities were destroyed
or put out of commission. Electrical, radio and IC systems in the
pilothouse, main communications office and Radio I were burned out
or grounded oy water. Flight deck planking was destroyed in the area
between frames 55 and '75 on the starboard side; and the expansion joint
cover at frame 70, the armored hatch of the forward bomb elevator and
lhe palisades al frame 64 were also damaged.
H3-G. Although hampered by exploding ammunition, flying fragments

and continued dive bombing attacks, repair parties attacked the fire
vigorously, cooling and smothering it ·.vith fog and mechanical foam
so that after 35 minutes all out a few persistent blazes, apparently burn-
ing magnesium airplane wheels, were smothered beneath the foam
blank~t. Electrical fires in the island structure persisted somewhat longer,
out all fires were out 50 minutes after the hit.
H3-'I. While the fire raged on the fhghl deck, measures were taken
to prevent its effects from spreading to other parts of the ship. Ready-
servlce ~Omm ammuni~ion In A-0301-M was sprinkled, hose streams
were played on lhe overhead of the hangar deck beneath the conflagration
and the aiter water curtain of the forward bay was turned on to segregate
planes aft. A small fire de\:eloped in the bottom of the forward bomb
elevator well, fed oy gasoline which leaked around the damaged elevator
-35-
CONFIDENTIAL
hatch. Although the elevator trunk bulkheads in way of the thi r d deck
Wf.:re heated, the fir e burned itself out without causing damage .
H3-8. Water tlght integrity ior the most part was good, pr eventing
all bul a small quantity of the tons of water poured Jn lhe flight and
hangar decks from penetrating the hull belo"» the he:mgar deck. Some
gasoline and water leaked down lhe after llomo elevat.::>r without ignit-
ing and gasoline and water also backed up into crew 's head D- 203- 2L and
sick uay bath D- 302- 3L through weather deck and below deck drai.nage
which intercormeded at the same valve on the fourth deck. Ther e was no
measurable reduction in buoyancy or stabilny.
H3-9. Fire- resistant paint and fiber glass insulation on the inside of
U1e island plating stood up excellenlly to the intense heat. Alth mgh paint
on the inside of dead- lights In some cases ~aroonized and flaked, it did
not ignite, th::=reby preventing fire from spreading through the inter ior
)f the island.
H3 - 10. Burning gasoline and exploding ammunition pr esented the

initial ingr edients which in some other cases of carr ier damage
resulle(l in fatal or near falal conflagrations. The characteristically
skillful and vigorous attack made by ENTERPRISE's crew on lhe
conflagration, however. confined it to the initial a r ea-- witl1 the exception
of the smai.l ilre in the forward bomb elevator-- so that a minimum amoWlt
of damage resulted .
- 36-
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION I
SUICIDE PLANE CRASHES
OKINAWA, 11APRIL1945
~
I SUI CI DE P L ANE 8 2 5 0 K G BOMB NEAR M I S S ,FRA ME 136 P O RT
2 SUICIO E PLANE 8 25 0KG 80'<\B N EAR · M SS ,FRAME 3 0 STARB O ARD
1. Nar ralive
Il - 1. On 24 Mar ch, EN1'ERPRISE anchor ed in Ulithi where r epairs

to lhe damage received on 18 and 20 March wer e under taken by the
ship's force and per soru1el from JASON. They wer e not completed in
lime ior her to par ticipate in lh-: 1 Apr il landings on Okinawa, but by
1 Apr il she was aole to join Task Group 58.3 operating near Oagari
Shima, to lhe east of Oklnawa.
Il- 2 After the landings on Okinawa, the Japanese c.:ommnled lhei r

last air r eserves. the Kamikaze corps of suicide pilots, alr eady used
with some success at Leyte and Lingayen. Although a ser ious drain
on Japanese manpower and air c r aft pr oduction, it was the most effective
aer ial weapon 10r damaging naval tar gets developed by the enemy in the
war . so the list of sunk and damaged U.S. vessels gr ew rapialy .
11 -3. A large-scale Kamikaze attack developed against Task Group

58.3 on 11 April no r theast of Okinawa. At 1345 two la r ge groups of
Japanese aircraft were noted closing irom the norlh. ENTERPRISE
openeu fire on two planes at 1408, shooting one down about 1500 yar ds
ofi the star ooard quar ter . While ENTERPRISE was in a port turn, the
other olved on lhe port quar ter, str uck and car ried away the spon,mns
of 40mm mounts Nos. 8 and 10, and fell into the sea. The engine of ~he
plane glanced off the ship's side at the water line, denting and opening
the ulister al frame 136. The bomb cai-ried by the plane d~tonaled
beneath the ship at approximately fr ame 134 li fting the ship bodi!y
and whipping it viol•::!ntly. Eight fuel tanks and t w o voids were
ruptured. r>edestals oI spring bearings for Nos. 3 and 4 shafts, after
pt::!destals of Nos. 3 and 4 turbo-generator s, SK r adar and the fo r ward
master gyr o compass wer e damaged by shock. The damaged genera -
tor s had to be secured , so that split oper ation 01 the electr ic plant
could not be continued.
11 - 4. At 1500 another Japanese plane carrying a bomb, attempted

a suicide dive out missed and struck the water 45 to 50 feet off the
star board. bow opposite frame 30 ">Jher e the bomb delonateo. causing
additional shock damage and slight str uctural damage in six tanks and
voids. Water spray carried as far aft as the pilothouse and part of the
- 3 7-
C ONFIDE NTIAL
plane wing was hur led to the fhgllt deck. A fighler . plane on the _s ta rboard
catapult was ignited and fi r e spr ead to the deck. Swee s hock fa ilure
of lhe fo rwa r d Diesel fir e pump hamper ed fi r efighti ng, the plane was
catapulted into t.he sea. The small fi r e on deck wa. quic:-kly e xtinguished .
U - 5. Dar ing the af ter noon , five mor e enemy planes wer e shot down
near ENTERPRISE. After dar k the Japanese dropped fla r es, but no
attacks dev;;:loped . A to r pedo plane, r etur ning fr.om a nlght inlrud~r m ission,
made a c r ash landing. It destroyed four night fighter ai r c r aft and startro
a fire which was quickly exti!lguished.
2. Damage and Damage Control Measur es - Str ucLural
!2- 1. The outboard gun shields and semicir cula r platfo r ms of 40mm
mounts Nos. 8 and 10 wer e shear ed off or bem by impact of the plane
and blast from the fi r st near- miss (Photo 1-1). Par ts of the plane
r emained in the gun tubs. Distortion of the shield of mount No . 8
blocked the train of the gun until damage contr ol par ties r emoved the
obstr uction. The guns and mount were undamaged.
12- 2. The plane's engine st r uck the blister at frame 136 , tear ing a
3- foot by 2-foot hole into D - 54 - F at the waterline {Photo I - 2). No other
holes were opened in the welded blister plating, although it was dished
in between fram1;:s 134 and 138 by the bomb detonn.l1on.
12- 3. Tanks D - 4 - F and :J - 12- F wer e opened to D - t-4 - F by fa il ure

of about 100 r ivets along the seam just below lhE a r m:)r, (Photo I- 3),
and to :::ach other through a 2-inch crack in a se'1.m A bulkhead 134
which was baaly wrinklea. Swash plates and floor s . frames 132 through
13 7, wer e crumpled, bulkh~ad 138 was slightly buckled and No. 2
to r pedo oulkhead between tank.~ D-4-F and D- 12-F and tank D - 6- F
WtlS def!ec:.ed but not opened. The original shell plating at the bottom of
D-o-F was dished In ancl a rivett>d sea:n o~ned . Tank~ C - 3~ - V, D - 2- V
and D- 10- F , between torpeHo bulkhe&ds 1 and 5, were .:>1,enf'd to the sea
through leaky seams m tne shell. Deformation of bulk.heads aud
stiffeners occurred as far 111board as the port oulkhead of after gene-
rator room. :D - 5-E. No panting of da!11aged st r ucture developed .
12- 4. Violent whipping of the foremast tnuuced by the fl<?xu r ?.l

vibration of the ship broke the struts supporting the SK radar antenna
and snapped off about 6 feel of the starboard yar dar m . The yar dl! r m
was cleare!l and an unsuccessful attempt was made to ins:.all a
temporary supp.Jrt for the antenna.
12- 5. The se<.;011d near-rnisci slightly ouckl~d floors , frames and

bulkili:iads iri tanks A-.:lOl - V, A-'7 -V, A-11-V, A - 17- V , A - 23- V and
A- !5-W. Sligl1L leaks developed through ~he.l seams and rivets into
A - &01 - V, A-7 -V an'.l A - 1 /-V and through bu!khead 35 between A- 15 - W
and A - 1:-v.
-38-
CONFIDENTIAL
3. Damage and Damage Control Measures -
Piping, Machinery and Electrical
13-1. Shock and structural deformation between frames 120 and

150 in way of the first near-miss forced foundations of Nos. 3 and
4 main generators, Nos. 3 and 4 main engines and Nos. 3 and 4
shaft spring bearings inward and upward with a maximum perma-
nent deflection of about one inch.
13-2. Both generators were broken loose from their foundations at

the after ends of the turbines. The turbines were thrown upward four
to five inches. The supporting pedestals broke away from the cast
iron exhaust casings of which they were a part (Photo I-4), leaving the
eads of the turbines with no support. ln addition, the governor relay
ho~sing of NI). 4 generator broke (Photo I-5), fixed and moving rows
of bla.tl:ng were bent at t.he <3dges, and bull gear, pinion and turbine
bearings and bull gear and pinion thrust bearings were wiped. Also,
the forward bull gear bearing of No. 3 generator was wiped. Further
damage was prevented by lifting the ends of the turbines on hydraulic
jacks.
13-3. No. 4 generator, which was carrying the load aft under split
plant operation, tripped out. An attempt was made to carry th:i load
on No. 3 generator in order to maintain split plant operatio:'l, but
after two hours running, vibration became excessive and it was
secured. The ship was then dependent on Nos. 1 and 2 main gene-
rators and the emergency Diesel generaLOrs. It should be noted that
the after emergency generator started instantly and automatically when
No. 4 main generator trip;>ed out.
13-4. No. 4 shaft was slightly bent, the oow in the shaft causing its
Nos. 2 a:.J 3 spring oearings to wobble alhwartships about one inch
with ea<.:t. r•_·v 'lution. In addition, the horizontal lop plate of the founda-
tion for Nu. 3 spring bearing was Lorn from lhe vertical plates,one
foot supporting the shell of No. 2 spring bearing was broken and No. l
spring bearing was moved slightly out of alignment.
13-5. There was no damage to No. 4 main engine, although all

three bearings of the H.P. pinion and the center bearing of the L.P.
pinion were wiped and burned. The after end of the L.P. pinion was
slightly out of alignment bul the bearing was not wiped. This damage
apparently did not prevent the reduction gears from functioning
normally.
13-6. Although bent less than the outboard shaft, No. 3 shaft
suffered more damage to its supports. No. l spring bearing, closest
to the detonation, had three shim chocks on lhe outboard side and the
foot and one shim chock on the inboard side fractured in compr ession
-39-
CONFIDENTIAL
(Photos 1-6. I-7). No. 2 spring oear!ng was broken in a .,1milar way and
in addition had a crack in the bearUJg sni:?li which permitted oil to leak
from the sump. Two shim chocks ea.ch wcri;; oroken at Ho. 3 a:.d No. 4
spring bearings.
13- 1. Damage to No. 3 main engine was appreciable, thoug~~ not dis-
abling. The bearing pedestal at tile after end of the H.P. turorne was
llited 1/16 inch clear of the shim chocks on the uiboard side and the
foot of the pede..;ta! was cracked hy thf' compressive load on the outboard
side (PhJto I-8). Two chocks were broken under the outboad side of
the L. P. turbine. The after bearil1g of the L. P. turbine, the forward and
after bearings of tile H.P. tUrblne anu all tilree bearings of t>olh H.P. and
L.P. plnio:is were wiped. The reduction gear teeth 'Nere not damaged.,
but nnsalignrnent in lhe gears caused intense vibration at high speeds
anrl durlng turns.
13-8. Noi=;. ~ and 4 sh1p's service AC-DC motor-generator.. , were

d splaced by U1e shock. Deformation was generally elastic, however,
with permanent dislorlion only 111 the foundation bolts whlch nad to be
tlghtent>d one half turn. No. 4 motor-g•~nerator was temporarily dis-
able<l l>y a sh rt circuit n its starting panel (Photo I-9). Although it
was not running at U1e Uwe, the motor line switch was in the closed
position and the motor lme contactor was closed momentarily by shock
and then reopened, causing a flash which carbonized the ebony asbestos
panel on which the contactor was mounle<l, so reducing the resistance
between phases of the contaclor that the motor-generator could not be
restarteu. Tne ship's force repaired this temporarily. In addition,
bakelite strips supporting control Clrcuits in the switchboard were
crackeu aud two voltmeters and a synchroscope were shattered.
13-9. The general flexural vibr4tion splashed some mercury from

the bowls of both gyro compasses across electrical connections. The
forwan compass wa... disablea out was restorea to service within a
few hours. The after gyro compass continued to function.
13-10. Miscellaneous shock damage occurred n..s follows:
(i) The after surge tank lea.r<ed slightly through a small crack
iu the shell.
(ii) The base of a 14-mch lathe in the general mat:hine shop was
broken.
(iii) Numerous lherlllometers ar.d gauges in compartments betweer.

irames 120 and 150 were broken.
(iv) There were several piping failures in sall waler fuel oil and
drain lines. •
(v) No. 2 36-lnch sear.:hlight was hit by fragments and damaged

by shock. Lens and instruments Nere broken.
13-11. The SK radar was inoperable because of the broken supporting

struts for the antenna on the foremast.
-40-
CONFIDE.NTrAL
I3-l2. Blast ruptured lhe main drain line of the external gasoline
system between frames 141 and 152 beneath Lhe 40mm mounts. The
system was secured at a cut-off valve forward of the oreak.
I3-13. The most serious machinery damage resulting from the

near-miss forward was the disablement of No. 1 Diesel fire pump in
A-9-E. Shock opened its piping connections, distorted the foundation
and broke the timlng gear housing. Repairs were beyond the capacity
of the ship's force.
13-14. A minor leak occurred in the inner wall of the double-walled

gasoline system drain Hne in way of the gasoline lrunk as a result of
the second near-miss.
4. Floo:iing and Flooding Control Measures
14-1. The three tanks between torpedo bulkheads 4 and 5, D-10- F.

D-2-V and C-34-V, which were opened t.:> Lhe sea through weeping seams
and rivets, were lhe only damaged tanks empty at U1e lime. They filled
slowly and caused a l list to port and an estimated 3- inch increase in
0
<irait aft. The tanks were pumped dml/ll through the main drainage suction.
!4-2. Fuel tanks, D-4-F. D-6-F, D-12-F and D-54.-F were full so
that, although l aks contaminated and largely displaced the fuel, there
was little aH reciable effect on list or trim. Flooding from the sea was
more rapid tha.n for the inboard tanks, hence only D-t:i-F could be
pu.rnped down. A large OLl slick trailed ENTERPRISE for about an
hour.
14-3. The drafts before damage were approximately 26 feet 10 inches

forward and 28 feet \:J inches aft as read on the internal drait gauges.
The draft was increased about 3 inches aft by Lhe flovding from the first
near-miss.
15-1. Failure of lhe forward Diesel fire pump in A-9-E hampered

efforts to extinguish the olaze on the p.i.ane spotted on the starboard
catapult, since segregation of the firemain in battle condition assigned
this pump to the forward starboard plugs. While cross-connection
valves were being opened and hoses led from tbe other plugs, the
ourning plane was catapulted from the ship. The burning tail remained
on deck and was rapidly extinguished with water and foam.
6. Japanese Planes and Bombs
16-1. The problem of mounting an effective attack against the

growing U.S. Pleet, complicated by the improved interception of our
combat air patrols, the accuracy of our sh1p anti-aircraft fire using
the proxi.mlly fuze, a lack of thoroughly trained pilots and other
-41-
CONFIDENTIAL
factors was solved In char acteristic Japanese fashior. by organizir.g a

corps of suicide pilot~. the Kamikaze, to dive explosive -lad ::!n planes
directly Into the target ship. A.though this z:nethod was ~ery wa_steful
of planes and pilots, 1t was extremely effecuve in inflicllng serious
damage Lo our ships.
16- 2. The first appear ance of a deliberate suicide attack by Japanese

planes was at the Batt.e for Leyte Gulf. ZEKE - 52's, tile most commonly
used at first, 'Ner e supplemented by wany ot her types later on. A 250 Kg
bomb was usually carried.
16- 3. T!le final war damage report from the Commanding Officer of
ENTEHPRLSE, which Iorms a part of rderence (1), made no aaempt lo
identify the planes used in the :-;uicidc auac~:s othe r than to call them
dive bombers. The a(;tion rf'oort. reference (I), stated the b•Jlief lhat
both near-misses were oy JuDY-ll's. However, a photograph in
referer.ce (1) show.; a bea::i - on view ~ust before the c rash. which
inclicales that the planP whica grazed the port quarter was a ZEKE-52.
with a bomb slung under the iu.3elage, the type of plane and bomo
po:5illon also used i11 the attack of 14 May. The plane wh ich f ell off
lhe sla rt>oard uow was probably a ] UDY -11, j utiging from the act ion r e1 :>rt
and from a photogr aph oi lhe piece of the wing recovered on lhe flight
deck.
16-4 . 1'ner e is no way to determwi; the type of uoni.b carried ln

eithe r instance. The damage sustained a~ a result of the detonation
wide r lht::- port quarter would .;ugge.5t a 2fi0 Kg streamiine<.i Ordinary
bomb. This bomo wa..; very commonly used during the latter part of
the war and was the typ~ which i,-=.L as a dud on ENTERPR!SE on
!8 Mar ch and also the lyr.e carrii>d into lhe stup oy the ::micide plane
of 14 May.
I. Conclusion
I'l-1. Prompt inleJligc·nt action, typical of the history of ENTERPRISE.

pr evenlt..><l the fi r e in l!1e plane on the starboard catapult frntn bec.:>ming
...:crtous. The manner 111 which the fire started is not known. The :a::t
that pa rt of the wine of the Japanes<=> plane was thrown onto the flignt neck
suggests lhat hot fragments pierced and set iire to the fighter.
Il-2. Except where torn open by the impact of the plane's engine,
Lh" ·.velde<l ultster p.atin~ cliti not develop cracks or tears from the
first near-miss. "!'he .;tructurc was dish9d in, but remained 1n~act.
In contrdst to tt;1.;, rivets popped and seams opened rn the original hull
even whe r., prvlectP<.l by the bl1 >t'"'r.
17-~. A~ ln the Batlle of Santa Cruz, cast 1r on failed when ~uojected

to snock. In the l_attnr inst<i.nce damag"' was much more WJOPSpread,
wit!. iailure of shun chocks wider spring bearings. exhaust casings o:
tu rt_o- generators <l:mi Lh.e pedestal of No. 3 H.P. turbine. The low impact
re:.;1stance \)f cast iron 1s well known and it is now general practiC'e not
-42-
CONFIDEN TIAL
to use grey or white cast iron in machine parts aooard ship. Motor-
generator parts_. which were made of cast liteel rather than ca:;;l iron,
...;tood up very well.
17 - 4. More serious perhai.s lhru1 iaUure of the turbine, generator and

bearing part.; made oi cast iron '.'las the misalignm ent of the two port
shafts. Both were oowed, the .:mtboard one considerao ly, as a result of
general defo1·matio n of tht.: ship' s structure in way of the detonation.
This could oaly be prev1;;nled by design changes which would be too
costly in weight as discusseu i.n the War Damage Report on C.Al:BERRA*.
Allh-.)Ugt1 t.he engineerin g force e:<perienced difficulty iI1 keeping the
oearings cool, the shafts continued to operate, a tribute to rugged
d t sign and }u:.;tiiicatiori of conservati ve factors of safety in snail
c1e!3lgn. It is of particular interest to note that EilTERPRI SE returned
t:.> ~ht:! op1:rat.ing ar~a in iv"tay with ner shg..fts still bowed because the
major repairs requireo to realign the structure were beyond the
!acL'.itks of the forward art.:a.
• BuShips War Damage Report 110. 54
- 43 -
COi:FIDENTlAL
Pr Jt; I-~: First near-mis~. 4:mm rn.Jur.ts No;.". 8

a. d :u. frclm· lf,u p 1n. s.1owin5 ~ur, ..:f ;r~~n .:;t.ic: ... Js
sh('ared off by phm-. Protruding pip~ iin& ;,:; gasoline
mair. dralt1.
Ph >l.> I-2: First near-miss. Hole eu• i:-. bl.:ter, frame

HiG, at waterline. tan.re D-54- F, by plar:e.
CONFIDENTIAL
Phot:J I-3: First near- miss . Riveted seam beiow

armor c.:ilt 1t~slde tJLster lank D- 54 - F, ruptured as
a result <>i bomu detonation.
Photo [-4: First near-miss. Vit w of break in foot,

tur bine end of No. 3 generator.
CONFIDENTlA L
Photo 1-5: First near-miss. Break in gov.:.rnor-relay

housing. No. 4 generator.
Photo 1-o: Ftrst near-miss. Showing compression failures

ir. chocks, port side No. l steady bearing, No. 3 shaft.
COi!FIDENTIAL
PhJtJ I-1: Fi1·st near-m •.·s. C)mpressUn fa1lur-'s

in f.)ot of L~aring h')using. starooard ~ide No. 1
steady nearing, No. 3 shaft.
Photo I-8: First near-m1ss: Cn1ck in No. 3 eugine H.P.

turbine pedestal.
CONFIDENT!A L
Photo 1- 11: Firs;, near- mis:: . View A ..;barred con -

t r 0ller p~inPl , l"!o. 4 motor-gt::ner·alJr .
_ hJto I-1 : 3ecJn.:i near- miss. J e·.~· 1f f!ight di:>cJ.: fJr-

ward aiter ourning fig:::e r plan~ catapllitej ;ii.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION J
SUICIDE PLA.ll'E CRASH
KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1J45
I
"""'-----~----'+
SU ICI DE PLANE 8 2~0KG B O MB H I T , F R AM E 4 2
1. narrative
Jl-1. ENTERPRLSE remained in the viciuity of Okinawa pr0viding

11Igtt com oat air patrol:. anli-S lbmarine patr ols, etc., until H April
1
wh~n sht:: oncE" aga!n depar~ed for Uli:..hi fo r r epai r s . A patch was
we.tied ovpr the hole at frame 130, .;pring i.Jearings were- realigned,
and cracked cast iron fe=-t::t .:m turbines and spriug bearings wer;;;
rt!pa1rco with mi:>tal-lJCi< or brazing. A 4-inch riser to thf:l iiremaia
was connecltld from Ollf.... of tl1e two stearr. cent r ifugal pumps whtd
had b<•t::n installed but not connect"'d in thP summer 'Jf 19·13. By
3 :..1ay tcmp.>rary repairs were comple:':<l and she d<=>pa r le-J Ulithi,
!'"')Dining Taslr. Group 58.:3 on ti May off Okinawa.
Jl - 2. Thtl next si>: day... were spent uortheasl ol Okinawa pro-

viding niRht and Lwilighl combat ai r patr ols, target eombat air
p1.trols ar.d night he\:klcr flights ovPr lhe no r thern Ryukyus and the
airfields of south~·rn Kyushu.
Il-3. On tl1e night of 13-~4 May, U1e tank gr oup was southuar;t of
Kyushu. launching strikes against Japanese airfields. At 0357,
ENTERPRI$E wt:?nt to Gr->nera1 0u~rters upon receipt of the rt>porl
that Japanes,., plan~s were m thi:- vkin\ty. It was not until 064~'
however, that the cornb~t a! r patrol ::-t1ot l.i;>wn thrc>e p.an -..... Al
0 'fi3, the guns of ENTERPRISE open"'d fire on a plan<> to marooar i
ar.d thl! shtp s .vung harj 1f'it ir. an emerger.c:1 turn. but to no avaU.
Tt1e 9nemy plan'3 mar.£;UVt'r d 111 the c.o.il.; and 1ropr P.d from an
altltud£> of appr.n:1mat' ly 1500 :':ePt in a 30° divt>. Som"' 200 yards
from th..: ship the pilot flip:->ed I.he plane O':er in a left-har.d snap roll t o
steepen the dive an:l struck th~ flight deck ~usl abaft tne forward elevato
:::;lig11tly to port oi the c·.=nterli.ne (Photo J- 1).
Jl - 4. The planr.>, engine and bomb c.;ra::-hP.d througr. the .:kck and
lhr:? en~in .. and plecr·s of th"' plan~ came to rl~.;t 1n tile forward.
elevator p!t. The b.:unb penetrate<.: the elPvator pH Into EtOrL'r on1
A-300-A bel')W, .vhere It aet:>natt:d h1gt1 Jruer t'lusing c>Y.l~nsivc>
structwra; damage an:i igmt!r.g a ser:ous fire. Th0 forw:lrd elevator
was completely demo!L...I. ·~ 'lnd the flight dPck .vas r ndr>red
-44-
CONFIDEN~tAL
inoperative aft to frame 70. F•rAS were extiuguishea by 0/30, bm abom

2100 t':>ll.;:, of firefigliliJJg watf: r •.::i.J iJoode<.i spaces be~ween framf.s 26
and 38 up to th•- nangar d·~k.
~l-5. During U1e attack, EHTERPRISE maintained ht3r station In the

l'Jrurn.uon an?. from O?C18 to 0817 was aclivi.!ly engaged i.n repelling 1nter-
milti=>nt attacKS by Japaue~e planes, "Jf which her gwmers shot ci:iwn four.
Tnc rernalnder oi :.he day ·1.'a..:, relatively quiet.
2. Drunage anJ Damage Control Measures - Structural
J2- l. The plane st.rucr: the GighL deck al an angle of about 45°, just
abaft the 1:.irward e11~valor al frame 4°2, ::lightly to piirt of the centerllue.
A hol~ roughly 12 foet long oy 20 feet witie was punched through lhe
illgnt dc'Ck (1 noto J-3,. After nicking th•~ lower flange of the transverse
!lent at frami.; 4G, plane and bomb separat•"d. The bomb pi~rced tht'!
tilPVator ti•l \dccor.:i d0ck) at about frame 3!1 just to starooad oi the
centerline an.ti det..mated hlgn orJer oelow, in A-30t1-A on top of stowed
rags (.Photo J-4 ). Tho englm~ and piece.:; of th<:: plane landed in Lhe
forward ·tarboard corner ".>i the elevator pit.
J2-2. A hole roughly ~2 r~et square was bbwn through Uie second
dPck nnd a slightly 'malJn one through the thir'.i deck. The forward
elcvatar was ht1rh.-d tn~o tile ail·, the de-eking pulling away from the
m'lin :>upponir.g frarnt•wJrk. AboUL three-quarters of the decking
wad r•rds<=>d imact -:>n a plume of sm.:>ke about 400 feet above the ship
~-:.na ft.!ll into the :;;~a (Pholo J-2). Tne elevalor framew.:lrk was turned
over al>out a transv'-'r..,e axis falling upside down illlo Lite elevator
µh (Ptioto }-b). Otl18r parU; Ji Lhe elevatn. lh•3 remai.nder of the
{ll-'Cking, the pE::ripherr.1.l g;irder and bracketc for lhP. steadying rails
it tl 011 vuriou.3 parts of the flight deck forward and aft uf lhe "'levutor
t1ut1,;h. une pi!.':!ce s:.ruck the; navigating bridge splim.:::r shield at frama
70.
J2-3. The fourth ueck an A-40:J-A was deflected downward oy the

blrist and adjrLcent .;lructure was damfu.g(;d sufficiently to render
ineffoclual ll1e waterlight integrity o( tht:' foJlowing compartml?nl~: A -~ - E ,
A-11-V. A-ti04-A, A-bOf"l-A, A -404-A through A-408-A, A-:~Of>-A.
A-201-L, A-~0()- A, .A-20'7-AT and A-208-IL. The forwar.'..1 bulk.head of
the f:~;..•1tttor trm1k al fra:ne 2•i was deflec~ed forward betwl"en the rr~in
and flight ded:~ (I-111 Jto J-1.:i). Quick-acting 1watertight door 1- 2G-1 was
tnv·Nn forward (PI! >t..l J-7). ThreE: officerd heads forwar.:1 ~f the
1
..,lt..vawr and the uffic1;:rd living quarters surrounding the elevator
were \iPmOlished.
J:::l-4. De...;pittw' the large "venting area' ' provld~ by lhe elevator
:>pening :n th8 flight cteek, the eff~ct of the blast in the hangar space
wad gr~at. 1 he ilight ued: bu~!$'cJ upward acro:;s the whole wiuth ::>f the
::>hip bet;.veen frames 40 and o~ ,Ph.:ito ]-8) with a maximum d<>flecli\>11
?f at;::mt :3 i ,~t o iucht>s at frame 46 centerline. Light, built-up, trans-
'."::r.sP gider~· deflectt>c! m.:>re tr.an heavier plate bents (Photo]-.)). ln
auihion, the po.rt er1d connecti1Jn of the inlerrnediate LransverJ"? ilight
d .1.:r. gi.i·uer nl framt ·10 parted .::m1pit;:lPly and the iligm
-45-
C ,)NFID E.:l 1'1' lAL
d~cr: belw•-r-:H fr0tm··~ 43 and W toru away 'tlong the inb')ar
d bulk.he ad
uf th. g-a:ler y (I..1hotr1 J-1.,,J. Tht> blast wave contin ued
aft ?lowin g out
u1· tlarnu.gu.g hanga r dF>ck ct.rt.a.n;...; uack to
franH~ 14U. Ev.1.uen<.:: was
not~d , f rci..~ct1 u vf the bla::;l ·11av<> duwnw ar:i from the:
f.1ghl uecl<': to
lhe 1Jang&r uect al frame f.:i 7 and upwar J L.J tnP galler y
dec;k at fr~me
80 n•: mvre s~vere ctL.. t ,rtior. of ...;truct11re at tht:sr:i
pomts . Bucklm g
CJf tt;t! 1.e>avy certte rilne slanclL iou ht:low U1i:> maln deck at
frame 67
lllu.,,trat~s t~id rE:L<>ctt )IJ (1A«,to J-11). Ra·no 111 i:in the
gal.er y dec.:k,
frame s Gti to 1i!1, was severe ly darnng"'.!d by buc1ding of the
deck. Stime
stru1.:~ur:tl 1.lei0r matbr1 wa;;:; alo.o f JUrd m tne .,;P.con
tl deck betwe en frame s
20 and 10.
j2-5. The bomb d8t::>nation W"l.8 about 10 feet aft and 4 feet below
a
.;ectio11a1 shel rack in the elt:~.·alor pit Oll ·.vhicl1 was
stowed a quanti ty
of oar sto..;K. Althour•h lhe rack was dt>stru yed, none of lhe
stock waf'
dislod ged as a "mi.~sih.: ha?sr d.'' Th~ bars, ~lill t1Pd togeth
er by light
wire, ft:!ll l<J the dt:t.!k.
J?,-6. Delvna :.ion vn... · jut:t abuv~ a pile of ra~.J. clowed 4 U 6 feet
'lt;...ef. irt A-30fi -A, whlch was dfei.:L~Vt:: in lin11ti.ng fragm
ent penetr ation
btHuw tLe tnird d·~ek. Fravll lent per1etr<ttlon •u~;>ve was
extens ive. The
buUme a L; i>J the P}~v>i.toi· :.runk ar.d pit w~re riddle u by
fragm ents,
{I-hot0 J-oJ, exct:!pl L11 wa.y of six or :::even sheet:> of steel
stowed verti-
cally a(;ains t buik..l, rM 3f3 (Ph0tc) J-5). The hull wa~ penetr ated.
by a
· iew sm'lll iragrn ents Jr1 the U11rd and fourth d~cks in
the vidnit y of the
d·.:t.mation.
!2-1. Twt:.>nty ht lium anJ <:>iXl"'er. uxygPn .;ylind·}r..; jf U1e s!1atle

rproo.f ,
201) c:uoic i·?~t capa1.·H:i type sto'.•:ed in Lue ellvat or pit,
half on each side
al)ng the longitu<ii11a. hUl~tH"aUS 1 were ~:;ubjc•cted l0 frag1n
enl attack and
envelo ped by the •'nsuin g :ir"". Two ":lxygen and ten helium
cylind ers wer'=
rucove red intact. Of thusr· whici1 wer• ciestro yed, appare ntly
none were
::;hatlt :red. Thost? which bur.1t from heat tort;; open l :>ngitu dinally
and
!1atten ed out or ulew oif U1e valve top. rhe gas bled harml
essly
throug h fragm ent h..ile::.· in Lhose which were pierce d.
J2-8 AlthJu gh .;truct u.ral damag e reducr:>d oper_a tional effecll

venes s
hy rende ring Lhe £light d,._.ck u::;eless betwE::r>r frame s 25
and 70, lhe
.:>trength of the ship'.; girder was little affecte d. Tl!e
hanga r deck was
slighll y weaken~ by minor defurm alion and the second and
third decks
were urn 'Jpen t)elow Uh~ elevat or pit, but tempo rary repair
s were not
n~quirtid a11d perma nent repair s could not oe
made with the facilit ies
o:i board.
3. Daniae;11 and Damag e Contr oi Measu res -

Piping , Machi nery and Electr ical
J3- L The m0st seri.ou s piping damag e was the ruptur e in A-305 -A
.Jf
a 6-inch firi::m ain loor. and a 3-inch damag e contro l main
riser. Waler
flowin g throug h u.~se breiLkS was one of the princi pal source
s of floodin?-".
High and low pr~~sure air lines, fr,-.:>.;h water piping and 'iraina
ge piping
abo were ~xtenmvely darnng ed in the vicinit y of the exr
losivn (Photo s
J-12 and J-13).
-4.G-
C ONFlD ENTIAL
J3-2. 'I'11ree :>f lhe nhip's f:>ur gasoline tanks dcvPloped slow leaks
from the .aiot:r:. The port gasoline rna.ir; was crushea and unfit for use
or>twe"n iraanes o2 and lOo; the stas\Joaru main was destroyed by fire
and fragm~utfl oetween frames 26 and 38 and various ri!';er.;, valves
and fueling stations were ctPstroy1::d. The system was P:'>Limated to be
only ~O per C"'nl operative.
:3-3. ~!entllatiou duct.:; wtr~ carried away in the lnnn('diate vicinity

Jf th~ ll"'ton i.ti m ano consinerabk duct work was puncturt=id, dentP.d and
c.rusheo tnroughout Lt.e an·a in w!Hcb bla.~t damag•· to bulkhead~ and
decir.s Jccurred. 'l'hi0 dt1rna.g'":! wa.; heavi~..>l b~lwF>en frames 20 nml 54. on
the sP.cond d£-ck anct frames 18 and U cm tht:: main d1:1ck. Thn most serhms
damage to Utt> ventilatior. .~yst~m uccurred when bla~>t jarnmed oper, th~
Cb.sure of tt1e DiP..1t>l fJUrup air supply duct in A-g-r~ perm1liing firP-
flt;hlir,g waler and wnter from damagt:d mains Lo flood the SJ.-ace. Five
men wi r"' ctriV"'r• oul Jf A-,,-E r.md later trapped and oruwnP.d i:1 A-404.-A.
J3-4. Fboding Jf No. ~ :>ie;·<>l :fire [>Ump in A - ~t-E wn.; the only
important mat:i.inc-r:,· casualty 1•rodw..:ed oy the hit. Pumps were over-
.oa.i~1 .n order L_, mainllin 100 pounds pr~ssure. N\;J. '1 firt>-and-bilve
pump and NJ. 2 Dh'.,i=. firic pump overh1""ated, bul did nJt havP to be
si:-cur~d O"'fOre ti ... fir~ was under control.
J3-5. Ht::..ivy .an ... k>- fror:1 the fir"" rea1.:hed <i.11 mach.n,...ry 3pa<;e.· and
wa.; pa.rlicu.arly .,,E-vt.rf'l rn th~ iirE'r:>om~. Per.:.Jrlllrl hao lQ u~·e battle
lantern:; in :>ta.Pr lo see water lev~l.: in ili,., boiler g;iugP r,lasses. K•:y
men usE'd ho.;;e rnar;k, act~ipt 0d h)' th" ::ihlp' .• hrt:P from irJ\nary gas masks
by removing Lht• -.:ani..c;ter :1nd fitting ::i.r. air ho3e fro111 the iow prt>S!--,ure air
:;yst...,m. Air t,oltles of 200 cubtc ieC!t ...:apacity wPrtJ u.vailablP ir. U1e P'J~nl
Jf fnllun ,.,f Llie comµr··.3sors. Other per.;;o!'mel wrnd cunvemi.mal gas
mas.-.s tu redu\'.e the inl.alalio11 of .;mok·:. Srnoki-> was not ;:;o thick it! lhe
Pnginero >ms a11d m1-SkJ were not worn.
j3-G. Th1;; forward main and auxiliary elPVal0r£" w••r•" c"lruplelAly

aestroyed uy Llie b..>rr.b <l"'tonation and th& two flighl di:>ck llomb el,,..vator.~
betw ~ri frant•"'!:' 71 and 81 on tht' .>i.arooaro sid1~ werP. disahl( d.
]3-1. El(·ctrl ·a.l dnnu1g0 wa.s exLtJr.s!v..... A totc.11 lf 75,0UO fePl Ji pJwtr,
lip:lllinP- a.n<l commun.cati :ln .:able was d1sa~1lcli by fragrllf•nts and flootlinb
wrwar 1 Jl fr 1mc> r '· Pow.,ff c:abb for the: cata:mlts wa!-i .;evered on ~h ...
~tarDOtir.i.dl I• -..f the scc.>nJ dPck. Degau::>i:;ing. cab!~.· Ji lhi:! "M" coil
11
on Lhe third if d: wP1·e ..:..:vered outbvar.:i of tilt- Pl vaur p1.t and " F
<:oil ·abl<>!j wer · burn~ct in tht> wireways wmer U1t:: flight Ll''ek )!l lh~
f1-lnch gun platf~rrn.;;; [>iJrl and ::;tarb:lanl. All lighling fo1·ward of
(r;:i.me 38 wa~· los. by th•.: !"PV1.::rancc .Jf main fe,,.d..,r cahlr~s -::m th~
::;nco11d n:id lliir l Jv.;ks ;Larb.:>ard .~idP outlJourd Ji the i:>lrwaior pit.
anu f:)rwar,1 oi framt: 38 all .;;hip servic'l Li:>l.,:phi:>nc~.; •. mum.l. pJwer..:d
lP!ept. JU"' co111 wllnt :~-1.t Un to tile gun!> a11cl gi:mer·-u :ll<irm bell!:" anrl
uuz2ern ll:lr.;uil '·c;") wer~ )llt .Ji ser~·i.C'e.
j3-8. SOll1"' ligllllng wa~ re.nerd t'y portable cabies and • !T!Prgency
' .v l\J KV A singJ.., ph<ts .. transiorm..:>r.;; madf' up by the ::;hip'.; for<.:e.
-•17-
CONFIDE NTlAL
]3 - ~. The waler which entered A-~1 - E through the supply duct flooded
the secondar y drain pump and both fresh Nater pum~s in the space.
Fr=sh waler supply for the ship was regained by utilizing a bol.ler
!e(:'(I pump taking suction from a reserve feed water tank and discharg -
ing to the fre~h ·.vater system through a hose connecte d between the
pump and a shore filling cormet:tio n.
J3- l 0. No damage was sustained by the gener ating plant. ':J.though

water irorn flooded compartmen~s leaked ttlrough damaged canles and
dripped onto bus bars l)f the forward distribut ion switchbo ard, the
cables werts disconn~cted irom the switchbo ard beiore shorl cir cuits
developed . With split plant ope r alion, only one forward generato r ·.vas
running. lls main circuit breaker tripped out, but the contacts , which
were lashed closed bf'>c;ause the tlrt.aker was nol shoc.:kpr oof, did not
separate anti loss of power was prevented .
J3- ~ 1. The relay panel and controlle r "' fo r valves S2-39-l and S2-3.3-2
oi Lhe hangar sprinklin g syslem were damaged by shock and the cables
wt.re ..,evereo by fragment s . In addltrnn, the controlle rs ior hangar
curtains Nos. 2 and 4 were gr..iW1ded by salt waler.
J3-12. Aler.est complete l•)SS of ventilatio n occurred iorward of

frame 50. Healer and ian panel No. 2 at frame 38 on the second deck
was damaged by shock, fragment s and sall water. Power panels 3~
and 39S, which supply a number of vent ::;els in lhe forward area, were
soaked with saa water and damaged by shock (Photo J-14), and many
ventilatio n unit.:; and control.e rs were damaged by fragment s, shock,
fir~ ur water. Undamag ea units wer<.:l reconnec ted to available 440
volt oul!ets.
!3-1 3. Th;: forward elevator main purnp , sump pump, thruster motors,
contro!le rs, cables and powP.r panel 'Nere submerg ed in salt ·.vater.
Motor s and controge rs for flight dPck stanchion.:5 were destroye d by
fire ana shock (Photo J-:5) and lhe hangar deck stanchion motor con-
troller was destroyed by iragment s and shock.
!3-1'1. Power to the Mk. 14 "'ights of 20!nm batlenes l, 2 and 4

nnd to 5-inc.:h Groups I and II was inkrrupte d by lhe dest ruc~1on of a
bank of transform ers mounteo under the flight deck. directlv in the
palh of the bomb and plant:!. 40mm mounts 1 ,2,3 ,4 and 6 and their
MK.3 l dire~lors lost power by the severanc e of nor mal and alternaliv e
power supply cahles in the ekvator trunk. 5-inch ammunit ion hoists Nos.
1,2.3 and 4 were disabled when two controlle rs in µower panel No.41
wc·re ,:larnaged L>y shod: and limit swHche~• in the hoists were grounded
by salt water.
]3-15. . Almo.;t all of the radio and electroni c appar atus in Radio m.
lm.:ated in the gallery between frames ti7 and 69, was destroye d by
shock and blast.
-48-
CONFIDENTI AL
4. Flo :xiuw and Flooding Conlr.:>l Measures
J4-1. Nater p.:>urmg from breaks in the fire and damage control mains
ana r,.;nrs together wilh ftrefif,hting water rapidly fl..>oded the damaged
arPa fr Hn tbP hangar dC'ck to the hold, six levels bel0w, between frames
~t: and :m. spr~ading through fragm~nl holes, oucts and ruptured
strul!tur~. rhe rirt!ak:: m Uw mains and risers were not isolated for
murt.:! U1an tw<mty minutes after lhe crash because smoke and fire
anund tbE' elevator pit prevented discovery of U1e extensive damage
bE"low LbE" second deck. By 0'130, when fire and tlamage control mains
\" re secured, as stated in paragraph Jl - 4, about 2000 tons oi 'Nater had
L ~en taken a.boa rd, centered at about frame 32.
)4-2. Drafts l>efore damage of 26 feel o inches forward and 28 feet

2 mches afl increased to about 33 feet forward and 2fi feet afl. The trim
had lltt.ie effect on maneuverabi lity. Stability was reduced by the free
surface above the second deck, but not critically. There was no list.
J4-3. S!.eps were taken to reduce the flooding as soon as firefighting

was secured. Electric submersihle pumps were lowever into lhe
elevator pit and two P-500 gasoline-driv en pumps were put into action.
Free surface water rn U1e officers' country on the second deck was
eliminated through tleck drains and commode drains in U1e heads.
Pumping was severely hampered by the fouling oi the pump strainers by
small pieces oi rags and toilet paper. It took 36 hours to removP the
2000 tons of flood water.
J5-l. As a night carrier, ENTERPRISE had no planes armed or fueled

at lhe lime of the crash and bomb detonation. Plane:;; were parked
closely in the forward end of the hangar, however. and four which had
just landed were not completely defuele<l.
Jo-2. As pieces of the enemy plane and the engine crashed into
the elevator pit, flames about ten ieet high ilared up, evidently fr.:>m
the plane's gasoline. Fragments and flash from the detonation of the
bomb set fire to the engines and tanks of the planes spotted forward
or. thP- hangar deck.
J5-3. The iorward oay of lhe hangar sprinkling system from the
elevator to frame /0 was turned on at once by hangar control but
pressure was not immediately avail.aDld on the forward starboard
fire plugs. However, ample pressure on the port plugs enabled repair
parties to nltack lhe fire promptly. Hose streams were tlirecled from
Ute fllghl deck as well as from the hangar (Photo J-16). Within a few
minutes. p1·essure was available on the starooard side iorward. Hangar
dec.K, plane and elevator pit firas were brought under control in lo
minutes and were completely extinguished in 30. No foam was used.
1
Jo-4. Small, stubborn fir~s developed below decks In oii1cers
clothing and bedding from fragments and short circuits . Although
-49-
<.;ONFIDENTlAL
rwt b. Lht::mselves dangerous, U1ey generated a great deai of smoke which

endani;"e l'ed Lhe ship oy marklr,g her as a cripple and by making fire-
fighting am.l rescua work difficult. Rescue i.>reathing apparatus and gas
mas1rn were used effectively. In :.me compartment, A-208-IL. smoke
oecame so thi<.:k that investigation was .mpossible. The fixed fog system
ln Lhls compartment was connecLed to the firemain and turned on for
five minule3 extinguishing most of the fires in that space and permitti:1g
personnel to enter.
J5-5. Fragments caused a severe electric and powder fire in Group l

5-mch e-•ms on the starboard side oi the gallery deck flanking the ele-
vator, and a small fire In Group I1 5-incb gwlS '.)pposite. The fire in the
port g roup was quickly extinguished by installed :spritl.klers and hose
streams. No armrrnnitlon detonated. Water lv f1ght the starb:)ard fire
was ·not available unlil extra hose lines were run from the port side and
fr w1 tr.e sLarboard ii.re plug al frame 69. Some 5-inch ready-service
powder ourned without injury to personnel. 'T'nis f;re was extinguished
at about the sa.rne lime as lhe fire on the hangei.r deck (Photos J- Hi and
J-17 ). Gun crews and repair party personnel threw over u.e side ammu-
nit10n which had been heated.
ti. Japanese Planes and Bombs
JC'-1. Phutograph J-1 ~-"'rmits accurate identification oi the plane

which diwd on ENTERPRISE as a ZEKE-52. The bomb can also be
.:>t:en in lh!c" photograph and its rounded shape strongly supports the
belic>f that it was a 250 Kg streamlined Ordinary bomb which was in
cv111mon use. 'I'lie extent of damage was consistent with this type.
Pragment-3 of the bomb were r·~covered, but tht: bomb disposal offic&r
was kHled so Lht• fragrnems were nol posilively identified.
7. Conclusion
J7-l. ENTERPRISE repair parties performt..-0. excellently and pre-

serious fires from developing into a general conflagration.
Vf'nlt.:r.1
Everyon~ had been at General Quarters ior three hours before the
crasr: frnd was ready for any eventuality. The damage sustained during
lhe previous Lwo months, combined with realistic oattle drills which
were eonducled regularly even in forward areas, had trained the crew
lo a poinl where each man k'1ew exactly what to do. The clue to suc-
cessful firefighting was found to oe immediate action.
j?-2. ENTERPRISE was a night carrier and as such all her planes
wore normally secured in the daytime and the ship was then in the besl
material conditi0n for receiving damage. Gasoline lines were drained
and the bomb magazines securely closed. The aircraft which had been
out at <lawn had been landed and all but four drained of gasoline. Only
lW.) planes remained JH Lhe flight deck. In addition, the Japanese piane
was almost out of fuel when it crashed.
- 50-
CONFIDENTIAL
J7-3. Rescue breathing apparatus, Lype A-1, proved of great vaJur::

rn fir'.lfighllng and rescue work and ga~ masks were sallsfaclory
against smo.Ke for .:;horl periods wher<=> lhe oxygen supply was suiiicient.
The ship reported that sealed oeam lignts and battle lanterns ·.ver~ inval-
uable for penetr;i.liug smoke-filled compartments . ._ Fiash-proof c1othing
p:-oviued excellent and complete protection frorn severe flash. Rigid
stretchers were iotu1d to be impractical for transporting wow1dea through
tortuous passages.
J7-4. Scme of the flooding and probably the drowning of 5 men might
have been prevented had the ventilation duct closure in A-0-E wilh:itood
the blast of lhe detonation. Flooding from brJken fire and damag~ control
mains coul:.1 have been reduced if knowledge of the breaks had been ascer-
tained. sooner.
J7 - 5. Thirty - six hours were required to pump out waler which was
pumped aboara in one- half hour. Strainers of porlable electric submersi-
ble pumps were constanUy clogged by debris. scuppers through wh.ch the
water should have drained off lhe third deck became oL>cked in Lhe same
way and the secondary drainage pump in A - 9 - E could not be used.
J7-6. The experience of ENTERPRISE u1 this case illustrates the

ineffectiveness of " veming" the aeL:maLi0n of a medium Jr large bomb.
The forward elevator was blown clear oi the ship, opening an area of
about 2000 square feet; the large volume of the hangar space was avail-
able and the two hangar curtains just abaft lhe elevator hatch provided
1200 squ::..re feet more of opening. Yet, a large section of the flight deck
was forced upward and rendered useless.
J7 - '7. Al the lime of Lhis hit, ENTERPR1SE was Vice Arlmiral

Milscher'.c; flagship. His comment was :
" Th"" performance of duly of the officers and men on the ElITER-
PRISE unaer fire and lhe1r effective damage control measures
were outstanding, of the highest order and lhe most effective that
I have seen during one year's servicP in (Task Force 58). I was
~.articularlj nnpressed wit..1 the attiLude of tne st ip's company in
combatting fire when under fire; your ship is indicative of the
high order of efficiency that is rapidly winning lhe war."
" BUSh1ps War Damage Reporl No. 56- -FRANKLIN
- 51-
C ONFIDENTlA L
Photo J- 1: ~apane.'>e suicide plane (ZEKE- 52) just oefore

str ~kingdeck.
-
,
:~1 •..1tJ >2: .t-'l..:turt:! taken irom BATJ..AlT (CVL29) sh.:iwing

argt. ~ ~t..)r,i;;f 01 vat.:ir platf.>rm at ~or.- )i explos!;,n p_urr,e.
CONFIDE NT LAL
Phot".> J- 3: Hole in i!ight deck al frame 42, made by-

crashing suicide plane.
Photo J-4.: View of de truction in A - 305-A where

bomb carried by suicide plane detonated .
CONFIDENTIAL
Ph..>U 2-5: Vi<~w l..iuLng JOHn a:1d aft imo .No. 1 ,...le•.r:;.;.u1·
t1·w.k fr::n-a Lrwar:.i ·dge )f L.1gr.t a1=ck 1evel. i\'Jlt "''~:va
t >1' beam:; 1.1p icte .:I.nm tu u?tl'.>m ...; l- it; nv!•..; ol Jv:n m
3d<:.Ond ar.d thi!'d ju:!k::; oy Jetor>.at..:>r. Df L..Jmti.
r>hOLO J-o: Vi~w 1o krng to port and f,Jrward in No. 1

Ed~V~HH lruni{ aiter uebris clearer.1 up. l•!ote dishing-
af oulkh~ :...us a;1d iragment ho!F"::s.
CONFID ENTL<\L
Photo J- 7: Frame of quick-acting, :.vatertLght

door l-2t:-l oetwe~nA-10'1-lLand N.J. l
dt:vatur trunk. Door Na.s blown oul Jf frc.trne.
I'
Pi: o~o T- .,_ V1!"w of flight deck looking f:>rward fr~rn frame
75 sh J~ling de:formati )n of deck.
CONFIDEil'fl AL
Photo J-9: 0vi=rnead of llangar deck looking forward and to port

showing bulg0 u1 flight deck framt.'s 58 to 2ti. Note buck.ling of
gir li»r struts ln benls at frames 4ti and 50.
Pholo J- 10: Flight deck damage looking to star board at frame 46.
Nolt:! large deflection upward .>f i"ctr. tu - larb:>ard of inboard port
bulkhead of galle:ry ca.used by complete failur e of end connections
of light gird 0 r at frame 46.
c~x-JF~ENTlAL
Ph.>to J-1:: St~nchion in wardroom mess, frame

61, buckled by reflection )f 01a;l wave do .vnward
Jn hangar deck at frame 67.
Photo J-12: DamagPd .tlrt:main riser cut-out al main

deck, frame 3 /, looking inboard and aft in compartment
A-~ Oti-L.
.,: 0Nr L::'.l F.l !Tl.AL
Pinto .- 1 : -,ri~·w
f darn-:..~~ fir"'mair . risPr,
: 0 ~:md 1 "K, fram€ 24, ~t.irb') rl iu•.
Photo J-H: Look.ng to starb.)a r 1 tu...k-

h1->ad 3b, ~ 1:. ·or:d Jt ;k. !" :He dam;;i.ged .1t1-
i.itiun p w&r par. £!::;.
CONFID ENTIAL
Photo : - 15: Loo!dng ait arn.l l J sta.rDoa rd. r )rt E- inct.

f.1L1 platform ~ 1 lvwing dam::i.gec1 Light d.::.ck ~1t:>vat::ir tru11k
.;tanchio n mot Jr.
Pnoto J- lti: General vie >1 '>f fir.,.figh ting ai;:tlvili es on

flip:ht deck.
COlJFIDENTLt\L
Phr,tr_, J-1 {: Vi""W )' r·•ady l >Wdt·r lol..!k"'r >n ir,b >u.rd
bu1kheaa uf }r'l..ip I !'-ir. ·h ~ur. gallt-!ty, fram.-. 3(',
gall:- r!J 0"-'1..!k, Jlart Jard; SCC:!l'll:: ')f powder a'1d elPCtrlC
fin...
I.>hoto J-18: View of fire damage on Group I

fi-is.ch gun gallery looking wrward and to p0rt
al fram·· 25.
CONFlDENTlAL
SECTION K
EXIT ENTERPRISE
L Repairs
Kl -1. On 15 May, lhe night carrier task group off Okinawa. somewhat
battered by the Japanese air attacks of the day before, retired lo the
south to iuel. In view of the serious reducllon in her operating efficiency,
ENTERPRISE was sent to Puget Sound. via Ulithi and Pearl Haroor, ior
repairs. She arrived in Bremerton for a two months' overhaul on 7 June.
Kl-2. Despite furious attacks oy fanatical suicide pilots which sank

or rendered inoperative many ships, including ENTERPRISE. the Japa-
nese high command failed to prevent the defeat of the lmpedal Forces.
Surrender of the enemy occurred on 15 August 19.;5 while ENrERPRISE
was still under repair in Pugel Sound. She was,U1erefore, denied the
pleasure of entering Tokyo Bay and witnessing the signing of the final
surrender document::;.
2. 'flie "Magic Carpet"
K2- l. Repairs and alterations, including removal of sponsons Lo

permit passage through the Panama Canal, were completed on 12
Septemoer. ENTERPRISE then proceeded south to Alameda. Cali-
fornia, where she picked up 878 enlisted men and officers for trans-
port to Pearl Harbor. She arrived at Pearl Harbor on 23 September.
K2-2. In order to assist the speedy return of our citizen army to

civilian liie, the Navy madt! ava.1abl ~ a numbe;r of its combatant ships,
with their superior speeds, as a "magic carpel" between to.:> advanced
bases and home. On ENTERPRISE's first trii; as a part of tne carpet,
sne carried 1141 officers nnd men from Pearl Haroor to New York via
the Panama Canal.
K2-3. After a refit at Boston to provide additional berthing space,

she made two magic carpet trips to Southampton, as1d Lhen one last
trip to tne Azores lo pick up passengers rescued fNm the ATHOS II
and the HOOD. In January 1946, she tied up at Bay . mne, New Jersey,
awaiting decision as to her permenent berth.
3. A National Memorial
K3-1. As a tribute lo ner llllsurpassed war record, ENTE.RPRISE

was cnosen for retention as a National Memorial in tne company of
such ships as CONSTELLATION a11d CONSTITUTION. On 1 November
184b, the President of the Umted States approved the recommendation
made oy tile Secretary of the Navy that " - - -ENTERPRISE should be
retained permanently al some proper place a::; a visible symbol of
American valor and tenacity :m war and of our will to fight all enE>mies
who assail us---"
-52-
CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION L
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
1. ~ummary
Ll-1. ENTERPRISE was damaged in six different engagements

by a total of si.x bomb hits, six damaging near-misses, one dud
bomb hit and two "friendly" shell hits. Her exper ience is tndica-
uve of the impor i.aucc of the bomb as a weapon against aircrafl
car r iers and is confi r med by the r ecord of U.S. ca rriers damaged
or sunk in World War 11. Out oi a total of sixty- seven cases of
ca rr ier damage or loss, fifty -two were caused by bombs or Kamikaze
suicide planes. The balance of the damage or loss was caused hy sub-
ma r ine and air c r aft Lorpe<loes except ior damage to three escort carriers
and loss of one escort carrier by shell fire. The 62.8 Kg Ordinar y. 250 Kg
Land, 250 Kg Ordinary and 250 Kg streamlined Ordinary type bombs were
identified as having been used against ENTERPRISE. In the last two
actions, bomos were carried Into her oy Kamikaze planes presaging lhe
advent of pilotless ai r crait and guicied missilies as pr lmar; weapons
against $hips.
Ll - 2. Although extensive structural damage was incurred on

24 August l~H2. 26 October 1942 anu 14 May 1945, t.he !'>lrenglh of
the ship girder was never seriously affected. Nos. 2 and 3 elevators
wer e rendered in.>perative by bomb ciamage on 24 August and 26 Octo-
ber 1!142, but '»ere locked in the up position at the time damage was
incurred. This permitted contmuation of flight operations with only
slightly reduced eificiency after completion of temporar y r epairs to
the Hight df,Ck. The bomu explosion of 14 May. however, demolished
No. 1 elevator and damaged the flight deck fo rward so extenslvely
that ENTERPRISE could not continue flight ope rations .
·Ll - 3 As previously noted, Lhe only carrier s to be attacked by

shell fire during the war were unarmor ed CVE's. The side belt armor
of ENTERPRISE was not attacked at any time.
Ll-4. Engineering casualties wer e numer ous , but fortunate!y of a

rt}lalively mlnor nature. Shock damage from near-misses on
26 Ocl\>b •r 1942 and 11 April 1945 resulted In the most serious
derangements incurred by the mach:nery. Cast iron parts of No. 2
main i:>ngine were fractured on 26 O:tober and cast iron parts of
steady bearings ior Nos. 3 and 4 propd.Ler shafts. parts of No. 3
maln ~nglne and Nos. ~ and 4 ma1n generators were fractured .)n
11 April. E.L1minat1on vi cast iron from machine parts aboar.:i ship
Nill preclude i..he recurrence of similar casualties. Nos. 3 and ·~
propell1::r shafts were bowed by shock derangement of supporting
structure on 11 April. Similar cases are fully .:liscussert in wai-
damage reports 'ln C.Ai!BERRA (CA70)• and HOUSTON (CL81) u .
,. BuShips 'Har Damage Report No. 54

• • BuShips War Damage Report No. 53
- 53 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Nurnijrous instances of shock damage to electr ic switchboar ds , motor
controller panels and electr onic equipment il.u-t r ated the need for
continued effor ts to imp r ove the ability of equiµrnenl to withstand shock.
Ll-5. The desi r ability of segr egating duplicate systems was demon -
strat~d by the loss of steer ing conlr ol after fir efighting water stopped
the sta r boar d steer ing motor on 24 August 1942. Per sonnel on watch wer e
overcome by heal exhaustion befor e U1eJ could star t the por t s t eer ing
motor which was localed in the saine cowpar tmenl and steering cont r ol
was l ost for 38 mh1ules. Similar ly, all potable water pumping capacity
was lost when d uplicate fresh wat e r pumps , both located in elevator
machinery and pump r oom A- D- E , wer e stopped by Hooding o f the
pump r oom on 26 October HJ12 and '\gain on 14 May H.J45.
Ll-G. Piping, ventilation and electr ical sys tems wer e ruptur ed or
dest r oyed in many places rn way of bomb detonations. P r ompt s~g r e
g::i.tion of fi r emains, however, maintained fir efighting efficiency;
em'-'lrgency ventilation equipment r~stor ed essential ventilation; and
casualty power lines supplied vital power r equirements.
Ll - 7. Plooding ior the most pan was confined to tanks and non-
essential compar tments and control of f.ooding was pr ompt so that
res~ rve buoyancy and stabilily wer e neve r ser iously reduc;ed. The
cofferdam oullt in storer ooms D - 521 - A and D- 4i9 - 3A on ?4 Augu st
194£! was a major W1dertaking anu proved ver y effective. On <c,o 0:-L.>ber
when elevator machinery and pump r oom A-9 - E was ilooduo tLr ough
ruptured piping and over flow pipes from flooded fresh water pipes,
and aga!n on 14 May 1~45 when A- f.1 - E was flooded by firefighting
water pour ing tllrough a faulty ventilation duct cover , lhe use of !Jo. l
Diesel fire pump was lost. This hindt>red the attack on fi r es in the
forward sectio1. of the snip until connections could be made to pumps
aft. The flow of firefighting wate r and wate r from r uptur ed f!remai ns
to lowPr comparunenls of the ship th r ough damaged structur ..:- and
ventilation clucts and through faulty ventilation closur es was part icu-
larly serlous on 1'1 May when some 2000 Lons of flood. water were
laken aboa r ti. h1 thi:; way. Continual dogging of str aL'1er s hamper ed
efforts w remove Good waler on "'very occasion of ilood ing.
Ll-8. Although fires resulted from bomb detonations ln each of the

six actions, the ship's preparedness and the pr ompt and intelllgenl
attacks made upon the conO.agr1tions prevt>nled any from getting out
of co11trol. The vigorous progr am of scr aping paint from all inter ior
surfaces and substituting one thin coal of fire r etardant paint, the
removal of overstuffed furnitur e and non- essential paper s , files . etc.
and the stowage oi all but a week' s supply of inilammable sto r es in
compartments bPlow the walerline, together with Lhe fact that µiaaes
for thi=> most par t were u1;1gassed and mW1ilions wer e ~aowed in the
magazines at the time of the attacks, reduced exposed comoustible
material to a rnmimum , thus greatly limiting the severity of con-
ilae;rali"Jns. The hangar sprinklme; system was very effective in
limiting the spread of the fires of 20 March and 14 May 19·15 and
rnechanical foam rapidly extinguished the gasoline fi r es of 20 Mar~h
and 11 Ap r il 1945.
-54 -
CONFIDENTIAL
2. Conclusion
L2-1. ENTERPRISE was fortunate in thal no oombs p ...r etraled to

her magazines, gasoline tanks, main machinery ')r 0ther vital spaces.
Her pianes were secured and deiueled, with bombs, torpedoes and
plane ammunition stowed in magazines al the time bomb hits were
scored. A policy of keeping personnel at General Quarlers when lhere
was danger of enemy attack was maintained so that they wer"' not
caught Wlprepared. As many fire hazards as possible w12re "'liminated
and Material Condition ABLE was maintained when in dangt'rous areas.
assuring that lhe ship would be i.;1 Lhe best possible condition lo resist
damage. Finally, conslam damage control drill and study of lessons
learned by other ships so developed the crew's skill that each ma1.
knew his dulies and carried Uiem oul wiU1out hesitation, thus pruc.iucing
the immediate action which is the fundamental clue to succe;,siul .fire-
fighting.
L2-2. Failure of cast iron machinery parts when subjected to shock

clearly illustrates the grave potential danger 0f substituting cast iron
for cast steel .)r steel weldments in machinery components. Deviations
from machinery specifications whicb require casl steel or steel wel:i-
menls for machinery components therefore should be undertaken only in
lhe event of severe procurement difficulties.
L~-3. Flooding oi lhe duplicate steering motors and duplicate fresh

water pumps indlcat~s the undesir ability of 10caling duplicate units
in lhe same compartment. Although such an arrangement provides
adequate protecti.:>n against the failure of one unit during peacetime
operations, war lnilicted casualties will g1::nerally aifect bolh uni ts
unless lhey are separated al least by a watertight bulkhead.
- 55-
PLATE I
BOMB DAMAGE
ll...tl , PLATE I
CONFIDENTIAL
rfl-
I 1
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GALLERY DECK
SECTION AT FRAME 146 SECTION AT FRAME 134
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MARSHALL FES. 1942
M AIN DECK
BOMB DAMAGE
NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OF SH I PS
1'> •
PLATE .II
BOMB DAMAGE
PLATE JI
CONFIDENTIAL
HIT NO 2
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USS ENT-ER PR I SE
EASTERN SOLOMONS
BOMB DAMAGE
cV-6
24 AUG 1942
GALLERY DECK MAIN DECK ~l .. lf•ATlD f"( N1U•dAlt HC:•

H .T•tl• rtt.t.V(f tl7 ut JD
NAVY DEPT BUREAU or SHIPS
-----------..J..::--------<=-=:....:....-=t"" l"~-
PLATE ill
BOMB DAMAGE
PLATE 1II
CONFIDENTI AL
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EAST°ERN SOL OMONS 24 AUGUST 1942
SECTION AT FRAME 190 COFFERDAM T CONTROL
SECTION AT FRAME 172

L.OOK NG A rT FLOODING FROM HIT NO. I
F RAM E 172
BOMB DAMAGE
~OO~ I HG A rT
NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OF SH I PS
~
PLATEN
BOMB DAMAGE
PLATE JS[
CONFIDENTIAL
NEAR MISS BOMB NO I
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BOMB H
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SANTA CRUZ 26 OCTOBER 1942
BOMB DAMAGE
NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OFSHIPS
PLATE JI.
BOMB DAMAGE
PLATE Y
CONFIDENTIAL
.,,, ..
'OC.ILC DCCIII. Ot """""TO• "0C' W
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SANTA CRUZ 26 OCTOBER 1942
BOMB DAMAGE
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INFORMATION PLATFOR M LEGEND
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U.S.S. ENTERPRISE CV·6

SOUTHERN JAPAN 18-20 MAR. 1945
DUD BOMB 81 FRIENDL Y
NAVY
SHELL HITS
DEPT. BUREAU OF SHIPS
PLATE 3ZII
BOMB AND SUICIDE

PLANE DAMAGE
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?-- us s ENTERPRISE
OKINAWA 8 l<YUSHU
CV•6
II APR ,14 "IAY 1945
SECTION AT FRA M E 136
HOL D 1..oo,r1uet 11.r T BOMB AND SUICIDE
PLANE DAMAGE
NAVY DEPT BURE AU OF SHIPS
't-b1~-
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DECLASSIFIED

U.S. S. Enterprise (Cv6) History: Confidential

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D ~S ED

U.S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

The Chief of Naval Operations directs that this report be

Preliminary Design Section

WAR DAMAGE REPORT No. 59

Printed By U. S. Hydroaraphfc Office

Damage oi 2o <Xtober 1942:

Damage of 18 and 20 March 1945:

D HISTORY, FIRST STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND,

E BOW.LB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF THE EASTERN

F BOMB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ,

G HISTORY, 30 OCTOBER 1942 to 18 MARCH 1945 26

SUICIDE PLANE CRASHES, OKINAWA, 11 APRIL 1945 37

K EXIT ENTERPR ISE 52

I, B O MB DAMAGE, MARSHALL ISLANDS, I FEBRUARY 1942

A-1. The war history of ENTERPRI SE is unique in length of active

•solid line indicates hits

t"Friendly " shell hits

PhJlw A - 1: ENTERt'RI SE stortly after her commissi: m -

Ps.ot 1 A- '~: Sll';'ERf.-ft!Si'.. frum L!l~ f).)rt quart~r, sh)rtly

Pn.)tJ A-~i: Pi.d'.le!" t&J:ing )lf ir.lm E.HTE.RPRI!:.'E.

PhoL'J A-4: ~l!TER.tJRISE a.::; sf.e '.lppear.ed durinl! the

1. Design and Construction

Bl-1. At Uie close of World War I lhe potentialities of Naval air-power

Bl-2. Through the years 1922 to 1929 preliminary design studies of

Bl-3. With a valuable background of design lessons derived in the

B2-1. After a shakedown cruise lo Brazil and winter maneuvers with

B3- l. ENTERPRISE was scheduled lo return to Pearl Harbor on

B3 - 2. Planes from ENTERPRISE bombed and strafed shore installa-

MARSflALL ISLANDS, 1FEBRUARY1942*

C 1-1. About 1340 on 1 February 194.2 while operating in the north:-

Cl-3. A second attack began at 1600, when two Japanese twin-engined

3. Fire and Firefightin g

C4-2. The penetration of splinter mats by fragments substantiat t:d the

C4-3. Although a gasoline fire developed as a result of penetration of

C4-4. Allhough internal fitting of degaussing cables had become

f'h.JL.> C-_: Fir• •11rr...ig"" ~n .oO cµ··· ma!..!hine gw1 ~allery,

Phot:> C-2: Cnarrc:a paint on ouiY..nead, port gun gal1ery.

1. Strikes Against Wake and Marcus Islands,

Dl-2. A brief surprise attack wa~ next made on Marcus Island.

Dl-3. During March, alteratio ns, including removal of ten boats

2. Bombing of Tokyo, 18 April

3. The Batlle of Midway, 4-6 Jwie

D3- l. ENTERP RISE next headed south to assist LEXINGTON and

including many transports and cargo vessels, supported by seven

4. Landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, 7-9 August

D4-1. Following Midway, ENTERPRISE had a short availability at

D4-2. ENTERPRISE departed 15 July for Tongatabu, the staging

• BuShlps War Damage Report No. 25

BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGUST 1942

El-2. About 1112 on 24 August, ENTERPRISE underwent a heavy

El-3. Despite the damage. ENTERPRISE commenced landing planes

E2-3. Fragment damage was extensive. Stiffeners, cables, ducts and

E2-7. The third bomb, released from a 60° dive at an altitude of

E2-8. A hole approximately 10 feet in diameter was blown in the

£2-9. Fragments cul or damaged the purchase cable sheave bracket,

E2-11. 'fhe column of water thrown up by the detonation deformed

E2-12. Two other confirmed near-miss bombs which detonated abreast

E2-13. The structural damage caused by the hits and near-miss es

3. Damag e and Damag e Contr ol Measu r es -

E3-2. Ammw1it1on hoist motor No. 8 in D-203 -lLM was knocke d

E3-7. The near-miss on the porl quarter caused consid~rable leakage

4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures