Raider’s Rampage A Mysterious ‘Ace’ Idflieg’s Errors Tiger Commander

The ‘benevolent’ piracy of The shot-down Bf 109 which The failings of Germany’s Michael Wittmann: a look at
von Müller and the Emden confused the British WW1 aviation inspectorate the Panzer expert’s medals

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T
Head of Design and Production he word ‘iconic’ is possibly one Panzer ace Hauptsturmführer Michael
Lynn Wright
of the most overused words Wittmann, of SS Division Leibstandarte,
ADVERTISING
Sales Executive Kristina Green in the English language, often became something of a poster boy darling
kristina.green@warnersgroup.co.uk being lazily applied to describe of Nazi Germany with an astonishing
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people, places, films, aircraft, technology number of claims of enemy tanks
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Production Assistant Charlotte Bamford
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be exercised. After all, with the word labelled ‘iconic’!
Tel: 01778 395092 meaning something that is revered, or In death, Wittmann’s legendary status
Marketing Executive Luke Hider embodying essential characteristics was perpetuated beyond the end of the
luke.hider@warnersgroup.co.uk
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DISTRIBUTION superlatives ever be used in connection much continues to be written about him
Warners Distribution with Third Reich Germany? Perhaps not. that simply peddles and regurgitates
Andy Perry
In this issue, we feature a piece of the same old Nazi propaganda. This has
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PUBLISHED BY
equipment and an individual frequently helped elevate and perpetuate his status
Warners Group Publications, described as iconic: the Junkers 87 Stuka as a Nazi ‘icon’. Nowhere is this more
The Maltings, West Street, and Panzer ace Michael Wittmann. Both sickeningly evident than at his burial
Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH
Tel: 01778 391000 have come to symbolise the Nazi regime. place in La Cambe German military
ISSN 2632-4725 The Junkers 87 was certainly a cemetery, Normandy, where finding his
Marked with a spectacular snake remarkable piece of technology, and grave is a simple matter: stand at the
emblem painted down its fuselage, a although often having a bad press as to cemetery gates and one will notice a
Junkers 87 B-2 Stuka of II/StG2 dives
to attack a British vehicle convoy on a its efficacy, it was an incredibly accurate well-worn path leading across the grass
desert road in Libya during the North and potent weapon. As with all military into the distance. Follow that path, and
African campaigns of 1941.
1941.(Artwork by
Piotr Forkasiewicz) equipment, the Stuka had its failings and one will come to his grave, heaped with
ZI
NE
& BROCHURE
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shortcomings. However, it remained in flowers and decorated with candles.
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 IN THIS ISSUE
CONTENTS
ISSUE FOURTEEN
Features
06 THE SORCERER’S CAULDRON
We look at the visceral and vivid
memoirs of Kurt Scheffel, a Stuka pilot
who flew in action in Poland, in the
Battles of France and of Britain, on the
Eastern Front, and until the end of the
76
war in Europe.
32 A QUESTION OF TACTICAL
ABILITY
Panzer historian Wolfgang Schneider
critically examines the frequently
acclaimed role of Tiger ‘ace’, Michael
Wittmann, in respect of the part he
supposedly played during the battle for
84
Villers-Bocage.
44 IDFLIEG’S ERRORS
During the First World War,
Germany’s Idlfieg, which oversaw
the air service’s procurement and
development strategy, made critical
errors of judgement affecting the air
100
force’s performance.
70 CAPTIVE STUKA
When an RAF fighter pilot in the
Middle East had the opportunity to
EDITOR’S CHOICE
4 ❙ IRON CROSS
fly a captured Junkers 87 Stuka, he
was astonished by how well it flew.
Surprisingly, it became his all-time
favourite aircraft.
THE KAISER’S BENEVOLENT
PIRATE
In August 1914, SMS Emden became
a successful commerce raider in the
Far East under Fregattenkapitän von
Muller. His ethos was to capture or
Regulars
sink enemy commercial shipping but
to spare lives. 20 THE MICHAEL WITTMANN
GROUP
Michael Wittmann was one of the most
famous German combatants of the
CHURCHILL’S IRON CROSS
When Winston Churchill was
presented with a trophy Iron Cross at
Second World War and Dietrich Maerz
gives us a privileged and detailed look
the Tehran Conference in 1943, it was at Wittmann’s decorations and related
supposedly taken from an agent paperwork.
who was sent to kill him. But what is
the truth behind that story?.
30 TIGER IN COLOUR
In our new occasional Equipment
in Colour pages, we feature the
FRENCH BEUTEPANZER
When France fell in the late
spring of 1940, Germany found itself
Wehrmacht's Tiger I tank.
in possession of a vast resource of
equipment and materiel and quickly
made use of captured French tanks
38 THE FORBIDDEN SYMBOL
In a new occasional series,
we give readers and contributors a
which it pressed into Wehrmacht
service.
chance to air their views in our ‘Opinion’
pages. In this issue, Joe Fry looks at the
56 THE ACE WHO NEVER WAS
When a Messerschmitt Bf 109 was shot
down over Kent in October 1940, RAF investigators
were puzzled when they found a rudder marked
with an astonishing number of victory tallies. And
yet they had never heard of the pilot they had in
captivity. Clint Mitchell unravels the intriguing
story behind the aircraft and its pilot, whilst editor
Andy Saunders inputs his own research into the
episode during the 1970s when he interviewed
eyewitnesses on the ground as well as the
German pilot who was shot down in the aircraft.

controversial use of swastikas in the
context of the military history sector.
68 REAL TO REEL
In our occasional war film feature,
and following the Junkers 87 Stuka
'theme' of this issue, we take a look
at efforts to source examples of the
aircraft type for the 1969 film Battle of
Britain and some of the innovative and
unsuccessful steps taken to represent
the Stuka in that film.
89 LETTERS
Letters to the editor in this issue
covers elements of the Kriegsmarine’s
Channel Dash.
90 KEEPING AFLOAT
We investigate why it was that
some Luftwaffe aircrew, operating over
Britain and the English Channel during
1940 and 1941, would carry with them
rubber rings or vehicle tyre inner tubes.
96 BOOK REVIEWS
We review some of the latest
military history titles, including an
excellent work that will undoubtedly
become the definitive combat history of
the Dornier 217 by Iron Cross contributor,
Chris Goss.
99 NEXT ISSUE
A taster of some of the exciting
content in our next issue of Iron Cross
44
magazine, on sale on 21 December 2022.
See page 74 to ensure you get your copy!
110 STUKA WRECK RECOVERY
In our Conflict Archaeology
feature, we look at the excavation of a
Junkers 87 Stuka shot down on Britain’s
South Coast on 18 August 1940, now
recognised as the hardest fought day of
the Battle of Britain.
124 GERMAN BOMBS OF WW1
In this issue’s Notes from the
Armoury feature, we examine a selection
of the various German air dropped
weapons in use by the Luftstreitkräfte
and Navy during the First World War.
127 COMPETITION
Following the subject matter
across some of this issue’s main content,
win one of five copies of the book 'Stuka
Attack', by Grub Street Publishing Ltd.
128 PHOTOS FROM THE FRONT
Our colourised image depicts
a pair of German soldiers on the Western
Front during the First World War pedalling
a tandem generator ‘bicycle’.
130 FILM POSTERS
Again, following the Junkers
87 Stuka theme, our featured wartime
film poster depicts one of the Luftwaffe’s
feared dive bombers illustrated to
promote an early war propaganda film.
CONTRIBUTORS
Introducing you to some of our main
contributors for this issue:-
CAMILLE VARGAS
Camille Vargas is a French
journalist and military
history writer specialising
in the period of the First
and Second World War. She
covers technical subjects
such as artillery, armoured vehicles,
fortifications, and weapons. She also writes
for Batailles & Blindés, Trucks & Tanks
Magazine, and the Mook 1944 project.
PETER HART
Peter Hart was the oral
historian responsible for
interviewing veterans for
the Imperial War Museum
for nearly 40 years. He has
written many books on both
world wars, appeared as a subject specialist
on various TV documentaries, runs his own
battlefield tour company and has a weekly
podcast: Pete and Gary's Military History.
CLINT MITCHELL
A Luftwaffe historian, Clint
runs the discussion forum
www.luftwaffe-research-
group.com and focuses
on technical aspects of
pre-1942 German aircraft,
specialising in the Bf 109E and Luftwaffe
camouflage and markings An aircraft
multiple-view projection illustrator, he
volunteers at Kent Battle of Britain Museum.
OBERST A.D WOLFGANG
SCHNEIDER
Wolfgang Schneider is a
leading expert on Panzers
and Panzer operations. He
served for 41 years as a
Panzer officer, retiring in
2010. He served in command functions up
to deputy commander of a Panzerbrigade
and was also responsible for combat
development, doctrine, and procurement.
IRON CROSS
COLOURISATION ARTIST
Richard J Molloy is the
house colourisation artist for Iron Cross magazine,
unless colourised images are credited otherwise.
SAVE OVER
20% A YEAR
when you
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SEE PAGE 74 FOR DETAILS
IRON CROSS ❙ 5
 FROM THE ARCHIVES

■ A Junkers 87 B crew return from a sortie over

Poland, September 1939. (Colour by RJM)

The Sorcerer’s Cauldron

When pilot Kurt Scheffel compiled detailed memoirs of his service from the first day of
the war through to its end, he left a remarkable first-person account of what it was like
to go to war in the Junkers 87. Andy Saunders presents extracts from his unpublished
manuscript.

I
n the late 1960s, writing the introduction to an
astonishing record of life as a Stuka pilot, Kurt
Scheffel explained the background to how such a
unique document came to be compiled:
“During the third meeting after the war in Bad Königstein/
Taunus of veterans of the 3rd Staffel of Stukageschwader
77, the wish was expressed for a history to be written of I
Gruppe of StG 77.
“According to the Bundesarchiv in Freiburg, however,
there were hardly any official documents of the unit in
existence. Thus, any history could only be written by
former pilots of the Gruppe. Today, it is difficult for former
comrades to sit down and write down their memories of
events; moreover, many of them are still working and do
not have time to do so. However, I collected a great deal
of material relating to the war period. My mother started
keeping many objects very early on and managed to keep
them safe until the end of the conflict.
“I then began to write my own memoirs in 1944 during a
long stay in hospital and continued with it after the end of
the war. That is the context. There is nothing left but to dive
into the war as I saw it.”
For many years, that manuscript was locked in Kurt
Scheffel’s desk and seen by nobody before being gifted to
Dr Alfred Price with a request from Kurt:
“Do with it as you please. I am finished with it and was
going to put it in the bin or burn it. Nobody wants to hear
of Nazi times in Germany today. I shall be admonished by
friends and family if I make it public in my lifetime.”
Alfred Price contacted Kurt Scheffel in 1977 during

6 ❙ IRON CROSS
research for his book on 18 August 1940 (The Hardest Day,
MacDonald and Janes, 1979) and was thus fortunate to save
this invaluable archive from destruction.
Shortly before he died, Alfred Price gifted the manuscript
and collection of accompanying photographs to the
editor of Iron Cross magazine, passing on Kurt Scheffel’s
instruction with an accompanying note, and adding: “Use it
however you please.”
The following are extracts taken from the 1940 entries.

THE POLISH CAMPAIGN

31 August 1939
“A mail ban was announced, so that we were no longer
allowed to send private letters to anyone. We all noticed that
something was brewing, and at the end of the evening our
Staffelkapitän (Oberleutnant Fritz Sayler) was called to the
Kommandeur. He came back a little later with maps under
his arm..
“Meanwhile, the ground crews started loading bombs
onto the aircraft and then we were all called by the
Staffelkapitan to a briefing where we learned the war would
start the next day. Someone handed us our objectives and
our maps. The first take-off was to take place at 04:45 hours.
“Everyone was calm and rather serious, and we all
wondered what the days and the coming weeks were going
to hold for us. There was no excitement comparable to the
atmosphere that was supposed to have surrounded 1914. We
would surely not have a joyful war. Our strength lay in being
equipped with excellent aircraft and we had all received
intensive training. The big question mark for us was the
Polish Air Force. However, our Jagdaeschwadern were
equipped with the best fighter aircraft, the Messerschmitt Bf
109. We were happy about that..
“The Polish anti-aircraft air defences on the ground were
not given much consideration, mainly because our aircraft
■ Junkers 87s of I./StG 77 are prepared for another sortie during September
1939. Note the wind-driven siren on the landing gear spat. By the time of
the Battle of Britain, these had been removed. (Colour by RJM)
were very manoeuvrable. Nevertheless, you could see many
serious faces in those early days.”.
1 September 1939
“The day arrived, and we were awakened at 02:15 hours.
All the flight personnel studied flight plans, while ground
personnel prepared the machines. The purr of engines
being warmed up echoed through the air. After another
short briefing by our Staffelkapitän, and information about
the flight formation, the weather, and the attack altitude, we
head out to our aircraft. The weather was not particularly
good, with patches of cloud at 1,000 metres in places, with
ground fog and poor visibility.
“The aircraft were loaded with a single 250 kg and four
50 kg bombs, with the objective of the entire Gruppe being
columns of enemy troops at Wielun, 75 km north of Oppeln.
“The Gruppe gathered on the northeast course and soon

Hauptmann Kurt Scheffel

■ Stuka pilot Kurt Scheffel photographed
when he held the rank of Leutnant.
Kurt Scheffel was born in Krefeld in 1915, and
after obtaining his Abitur (examinations diploma)
from his school in Bonn, he joined the Luftwaffe
as a Fahnenjunker (officer cadet) on 3 April
1936.
He was promoted to Leutnant in March
1938 and transferred three months later to
Stukageschwader 165 in Schweinfurt where
Scheffel’s training continued with the unit until
the end of September that year.
One year later, on the eve of the Second
World War, Leutnant Scheffel was serving
with 2./StG 77 (the unit having been formed
out of StG 165) based in Oppein, the then
administrative seat of the province of Upper
Silesia; today, this is Opole, southern Poland.
He was appointed Technischer Offizier
(Technical Officer, or TO) of 2./StG 77 and later
became overall TO for the I Gruppe.
On 24 November 1941 he was awarded the
Luftwaffe Ehrenpokal (Honour Goblet) and on 26
July 1942 he was again wounded in action.
On 1 August 1942 he was promoted to
Hauptmann and was awarded the DKG (German
Cross in Gold) on 9 September 1942.
Kurt Scheffel was one of relatively few
Luftwaffe fliers who flew the Junkers 87
throughout almost the entire war and survived,
albeit that he suffered wounds across his period
of service.
▲

IRON CROSS ❙ 7
FROM THE ARCHIVES

crossed the border. The landscape changed sharply; the

roads became much wider and unpaved, the rivers and
streams not regulated by locks - but the towns looked like
German villages. It was not easy to keep one’s orientation,
and I was flying as number three, just to the right of the
Staffelkapitan. I could clearly see Oberleutnant Sayler
comparing his maps to what he saw on the ground. We
then crossed several cloud banks, and suddenly all the
other Staffeln had disappeared. Oberleutnant Sayler, a bit
nervous like all of us, hadn’t been able to find Wielun. In the
distance, though, I could see several Staffeln dropping their
bombs. It was the rest of the Gruppe who had located the
objective..
“We kept circling the area until Sayler decided it was time
to head back. As we descended, we entered a thin layer of
clouds and then, just in front of us, appeared an airfield ■ The aircraft of 2./StG 77 taxy out for another sortie.
with many aircraft on the ground. Oberleutnant Sayler gave
the signal to attack, and swung the nose of his aircraft into
position.. “On the road, we could see that the local population was
“He dropped his first bomb, but then I saw that Henschel fleeing the villages and we followed the Warta towards the
123s were taking off from the airfield and there were Junkers west until we reached the bridge. The Gruppe’s Stab and 3
52s. parked there! Over the radio, I shouted: “Cease the Staffel flew in the lead, while 1 Staffel followed behind us,
attack! This is one of our fields!” Thus, only one bomb fell the 2nd Staffel.
there but, thank God, Oberleutnant Sayler in his excitement, “Shortly before reaching the bridge, we climbed to
had forgotten to arm his bombs. His bomb crashed into a altitude, then dived before dropping our bombs. The enemy
wooded area without doing any damage.”. machine guns were positioned on the bridge, and we flew
directly under their fire. The guys must have found aiming
Later that same day, I Gruppe of StG 77 took off again on easy.
another sortie, with Scheffel flying Junkers 87 B-1, S2 + HK, “When the bombs from the Staffel in front of us went
on what was his second war flight. off, we were just over the target and diving straight at it at
an altitude of 150 metres. The blast from the explosions
“The next mission was a low-level attack by the entire threw us in all directions and clods of earth crashed into the
Gruppe against a bridge and positions near Działoszyn on cockpit..
the Warta River. The Gruppe took off at 08:30 hours, then “A machine gun salvo then hit my aircraft from the left.
flew low to the River Warta east of the objective. There was a loud crash in the cockpit, and it later transpired

■ Hermann Goring visits I./StG 77 at Radom, Poland, on 13 September 1939.

The senior officer in conversation (but facing the camera) is Generalmajor
von Richthofen, the officer looking straight ahead is Erhard Milch and the ■ The Junkers 87 Stuka of Oberleutnant Hartmann, Staffelkapitän of
officer visible just behind him is Generalmajor Hans Jeschonnek. 3./StG 77, damaged during a sortie to Warsaw on 6 September 1939.

8 ❙ IRON CROSS
that a fuel line had been cut causing a strong smell of petrol.
As I ascended, my radio operator reported in a calm voice
that fuel was leaking from the left wing, and as the coolant
temperature was rising, I climbed about 1,000 metres..
“Isolated from the others, I turned in the direction of the
aerodrome where we eventually arrived without further
incident. On landing, my aircraft felt like a wooden horse,
because the left wheel had been punctured. I taxied to the
edge of the field where we exited the aircraft as quickly as
possible because it was unclear whether the leaking fuel
would catch fire as it was spurting profusely from the left
wing.
“There were 14 holes in the aircraft, two of which had
passed through the left tank. At the time, these tanks were
not yet self-sealing – in other words, not surrounded by
several layers of rubber which, in the event of perforation,
would close and prevent the fuel from flowing out.
“This is how my baptism of fire took place. The serious
things were just beginning!”.
Kurt Scheffel had completed an astonishing total of 62
combat missions by the end of the Polish campaign,
and in October 1939 he was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd
Class. A few months later, on 10 May 1940, the Wehrmacht
launched its offensive in the West.
Once Again, Leutnant Scheffel, who had been appointed
Technischer Offizier, (Technical Officer), or TO, was in the
heart of the action.
ATTACK IN THE WEST
9 May 1940
“At Cologne-Butzweilerhof, everyone was working feverishly
on the airfield where I reported to Staffelkapitän Sayler on
9 May. As a result, I did not have much time to greet my
■ The awesome spectacle of a formation of Junkers 87s during the spring of 1940.
comrades and I immediately threw myself into my work as
the T.O, and also as leader of a Kette.
“The Staffeln was on the west side of the airfield, just off
Militärringstrasse. There were sheds along the runway, each
of them had room for three aircraft. There was also a line of
Junkers 52s parked on the field and, due west a little, many
DFS 230 gliders were being assembled.
“I washed and dressed, then walked to the eastern edge of
the airfield where the 2 Staffel crews were working on the
aircraft. What would the weather be like? What would we be
doing over enemy territory? And how would this campaign
end? I guess those were the thoughts I had as I walked out
on the grass into the direction of my aircraft.
“When I arrived, I was served a hot cup of coffee. It was a
blessing in the cold of the morning. Then we again studied
the maps. Our first target was along the Albert Canal, west
of Maastricht. Interestingly, I remember the channel being
hand drawn on the maps! Slowly, day was breaking in the
east. The weather was foggy and with high clouds.
“Suddenly, the Junkers 52s on the airfield started revving
their engines, and in the light of this new morning I could
now see the DFS 230 gliders stationed a short distance
behind them. Shortly afterwards, we started the engines
of our Junkers 87s and the noise on the airfield became
deafening. Two Stuka Gruppen, each with 30 aircraft, and
10 Junkers 52 - or another 30 other engines, roared – 90
engines in total!.
“The troops were to attack at 05:30 hours, shortly before
sunrise, and at that time the gliders were to be on target. It
was during these twilight hours of the morning that the first
Junkers 52s, their navigation lights on, accelerated down
the runway. It was a striking sight to see them slowly taxiing
with the gliders in tow behind them. They had hardly gained
altitude when they lost some over the fence at the end of
the.airfield, but behind the fence was an open field.
IRON CROSS ❙ 9
FROM THE ARCHIVES

■ The Junkers
87s of I./StG 77
dispersed under
trees at Courcelles,
near St Quentin,
June 1940.

“One by one, the machines took off and disappeared turned off the ZSK and the sight. A quick glance back to see
into the grey, misty, morning sky. After a short wait, a few if stragglers were still following, before catching up with the
minutes after 06:00 hours, our time arrived. aircraft in front of us. As quickly as possible, we gathered
“We climbed into our gear, prepared our maps, and were together..
driven out to the runway. Oberleutnant Sayler was in front of “I could see the gliders swooping to land on Eben Emael
us with the first Kette, then came Oberfeldwebel Gläser with fort and remember wondering what it looked like down
the second, followed by me, at the head of the third. there..The enemy flak had opened fire, but the shots were
“In front of us, the Stab (Staff Flight) and the other Staffeln not very well directed. Soon, we crossed the border again
took off first, while behind us lined up the rest of the and landed.safely in Cologne at 06.45 hours.
Gruppe. Soon, everyone was in the air, and we assembled “Our objective had been to break and overwhelm
and headed west. We quickly passed over Jülich, but defensive lines along the Meuse and Albert Canal as
there was still mist and the visibility ahead of us was not quickly as possible. To do this, we needed to capture the
particularly good. We crossed the border north of Aix-la- bridges intact, and the Stukas were tasked with launching
Chapelle and soon passed Maastricht, about 3,500 metres continuous attacks close to the bridges and suppressing
below us on the left. I could see that the bridges over the enemy opposition until our ground troops reached the
Meuse were still intact. Meuse.
“Shortly afterwards, the Albert Canal came into view, “While we were bombarding Hees, the 1st Staffel bombed.
and we could see our Fallschirmjäger as they descended
- all those white parachutes in the sky made for a grand
spectacle - but there was no time to admire it. It was time
for our attack.
“The 2 Staffel was to bomb positions at the exit of the
town of Hees, behind a village to the left of the canal. The
Staffekapitän waggled his wings - the signal to attack.
“The target appeared in the window in the floor, and
I went through pre-attack procedures: illuminate the
Zunderschaltkasten (ZSK - bomb arming panel), switch the
bomb selector on, release the dive brakes, close the radiator
shutters, switch on the Revi sight! And now we dive.
“The sirens began to emit shrill howls, and then I waited
for the aircraft in front to release its bomb, adjusted the aim.
and pressed the bomb release button. A vibration under the
fuselage indicated that the bomb had been released.
“The visibility on the target was good, but I don’t quite
■ On 26 May 1940, Kurt Scheffel encountered a formation of what
remember at what altitude we dropped our bombs, but it he believed to be Gloster Gladiator fighters. In fact, they were the
must have been at 600-700 metres. Afterwards, we closed obsolete Hawker Hectors of 613 Squadron which had been sent to
dive brakes, opened the throttle and the radiator shutters, dive-bomb targets at Calais.

10 ❙ IRON CROSS

Riemnstedt, 9 km southwest of Maastricht – I can’t
remember where 3 Staffel attacked.
“The 2nd Staffel would conduct three more raids that day,
and in the evening the Gruppe attacked bridges north of
Antwerp, southwest of Merksem. We had done half the trip
to Antwerp when my engine suddenly started to complain. I
couldn’t keep up and had to turn back. It’s not very pleasant
flying alone in enemy territory, but I managed to return
without being attacked by fighters although, during the
journey, I noticed my wing had been punctured by a bullet.
It must have occurred during one of the previous flights.
Once back in Cologne, I could see that the bullet had gone
through the wing cleanly.
“During the return flight of this mission, the leader of 3
Staffel, Oberleutnant Hartmann, was shot down in flames
at Herentals. On the same day, 2 Staffel lost two crews in a
mid-air collision: Unteroffizier Bussenius with Unteroffizier
Behnert and Feldwebel Becker with Unteroffizier Albrecht.
“The death of Hartmann, who was well-liked and
respected, led to organisational changes. From then on, I
became the TO of the entire Gruppe, and when joining the
Gruppenstab, I met up with my old comrade, Henze”..
From here on, the war would be unrelenting for Kurt
Scheffel and his comrades. The worst was yet to come.
11 May 1940
“We were ready early in the morning, but orders to support.
the ground troops did not arrive. The advance was so quick
that they had no targets for us. Far behind the front, just like
■ The moment of
bomb release is
captured as a Junkers
87 dives onto its
target which appears
to be a group of
enemy vehicles. The
cradle which has
swung the bomb clear
of the propeller arc
can be seen retracting
into position.
the day before, there were heavy enemy troop movements,
especially in the Antwerp area and to the north where there
was heavy fighting in Rotterdam. Therefore, our Gruppe
then carried out an attack on the enemy columns on the
road from Antwerp to Breda, in the Zundert region.
“It was a long flight to get there, more than 150 km, and
before attacking we could see the Dutch Islands and the
North Sea off to the west.”
26 May 1940
“We carried out our first attack against ships in the English
Channel at Calais. From Dunkirk, the English were trying to
get their beaten troops back to their island. None of us had
had experience attacking ships, and most of our bombs fell
short. We hadn’t really calculated that these things were in
motion. However, we did manage to hit a ship which was
being towed by another*.
“During this flight, we met the first English fighters. They
were biplanes, probably Gloster Gladiators*. When we got
back to base, we were almost out of fuel. The flight took
us over the battlefields of the First World War, the great
cemeteries of Cambrai, Arras, and Bethune clearly visible.”.
*Although he did not realise it, Kurt Scheffel had not seen a formation of
Gloster Gladiator fighters but, instead, obsolete Hawker Hectors of 613
Squadron on a desperate do-or-die sortie to dive bomb targets at Calais.
He could not have imagined that the aircraft he observed were also dive
bombers!
27 May 1940
▲
.“Attack on the outskirts of the town of Poperinge, west of
IRON CROSS ❙ 11
FROM THE ARCHIVES

■ Stuka
Geschwadern used
Dornier 17s as
reconnaissance
aircraft or
to navigate
formations to
the target. This
wrecked aircraft,
a Dornier 17 M
of Stab/StG 1,
was shot down
at Fleet, Dorset,
on 25 July 1940
while engaged on a
sortie scouting for
targets.

Ypres. Heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire, but we placed our

bombs right in the middle of the long columns. They did a
lot of damage.”.

1 June 1940
“Attack on Dunkirk by the Gruppenstab. Weather not
particularly good, high clouds and misty. Terrible anti-
aircraft fire over Dunkirk. Real barrage fire, flak bursts one
behind the other. The sky below was saturated with steel,
and Dunkirk itself was barely discernible. Everything was
covered in smoke, and we could not distinguish our targets.”.

3 June 1940
“The Gruppe moves to Guise... but what was the situation on
the front? Dunkirk is surrounded. The British Expeditionary
Force was evacuating Dunkirk with heavy losses. During the
night of 3-4 June, the last British soldiers left the city. Some
34,000 French soldiers remained behind to cover them. And
the battle for Belgium was more or less over.”

BATTLE OF BRITAIN
■ On one of their sorties over Dunkirk, I Gruppe StG 77 could not see their After a brief respite follwing the fall of France, the pace
intended target as it was shrouded in smoke from massive fires. began to pick up again in early July when the Luftwaffe

12 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ The residence and HQ of the Kommandeur of I./StG 77 near Caen,
August 1940.
I suddenly saw an English fighter heading towards us from Portland. At first, I was
terrified. I was completely speechless. I had to look again to be sure I had seen
correctly. But I was right, there were 10 to 15 Spitfires. And they were closing in at
frightening speed.
”
commenced attacks on coastal shipping in the English
Channel. The Battle of France was over. The Battle of
Britain was about to begin.
9 July 1940
“The Gruppe, with the Stab and 1st Staffel, is sent up to
Theville, east of Cherbourg, as traffic in the Channel had
been reported. Theville was previously a French airfield
and quite large. We spent the morning sunbathing next to
our machines, but in the evening, the order to attack ships
between Portland and Torquay arrived.
“We took off with the Stab flight and the 1st Staffel, guided
towards our target by the unit’s Dornier 17. We first flew.
towards the Portland Peninsula, halfway up the English.
Channel, with the high clouds having disappeared giving
way to clear skies. Near the cliffs of England, we spotted two
small ships of about 2,000 to 3,000 tons each. They were to
be attacked by the Stab, while 1 Staffel continued towards
Torquay*..
*The attack was led by the Kommandeur of the 1./StG 77, Hauptmann
Friedrich-Karl Freiherr von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels. It involved 27 Junkers
87s with an escort of Messerschmitt Bf 110s provided by V./(Z) LG 1.
“The leader approached the ships from the east and then we
dived, the leader first, followed by Henze, and me last of all.
However, the direction of the wind we had been given was
apparently incorrect, so the bombs fell into the sea on the
right side of the ships. Henze had sunk quite low, and I had
to follow him.
“We were widely scattered after the dive, and I had to run
Colour by RJM
■ Hauptmann Horst Liensberger, the CO of V.(Z)/LG1, prepares for the I/StG 77
Junkers 87 escort sortie over the English Channel off Portland on 9 July 1940.
after the leader who was about 800 metres ahead and 200
metres higher. We followed the English coast to the west,
the.commander in front, Henze on the right, and me on the
left. Behind my right wing, I could see Portland very clearly.
“We were now at an altitude of 2,000 metres and still
about 500 metres from the commander, when I suddenly
saw an English fighter heading towards us from Portland.
At first, I was terrified. I was completely speechless. I had
to look again to be sure I had seen correctly. But I was right,
there were 10 to 15 Spitfires. And they were closing in at
frightening speed. Neither the commander, nor Henze, nor
the three radio operators had seen them.
“I shouted over the radio: “To the right! Enemy fighters!”
As the commander did not react, I repeated the same
sentence, adding: “Turn to the right! Into the clouds!”
Further up the English Channel, and 300 metres below
us, there was a thick patch of cloud. This become our
saviour, but there was no longer any chance of catching the
commander. He was too far away. It was too late. And the
Spitfires were right behind us. I had just enough time to see
how Henze veered south - and that’s when the wild dance
began.
“I was heading towards the clouds at full throttle when the
first tracer bullets passed in front of me. Like a madman,
my radio operator started firing his machine gun while
indicating from which direction the enemy fighters were
attacking. I put the aircraft on its nose. I pulled up into a
steep climb. I turned to the left. And I made a sharp turn to
the right, both hands on the stick.
▲
“Long bursts of tracer bullets passed in front of my
IRON CROSS ❙ 13
FROM THE ARCHIVES

■ The engines of Junkers 87s are warmed-up and checked prior to

another sortie. Bombs lay in the grass, ready for loading.

aircraft and some Spitfires approached so close that I could badly injured, except for a number of bruises caused by
make out the faces of the pilots. There were about five ammunition drums that had been buzzing around in the
of them now and they were trying to finish me off. I only cockpit like flies.
had one goal at this point in the fight: to the clouds, to the “After 20 minutes, we calmed down and I slowly
clouds! descended to a lower altitude to check if we were close to
“I can’t say how long the dance lasted, but I clearly the coast. Everything was clear and no other aircraft were
remember the wild cries of my radio operator: “From the visible.
left! From right! Above! Below!” and how he cursed rudely “We had just landed, and I was returning the machine to
between each warning. The empty ammunition drums from its parking area when my radio operator shouted: “Three
the machine gun were supposed to be kept in a container
with a lid, but during the air combat this obviously went
wrong and suddenly the empty drums began to fly around
the cockpit, causing my radio operator minor head and
shoulder injuries.
“Suddenly, I found myself in the cloud and my
surroundings turned milky white. I could breathe a sigh of
relief. At least, I. thought so. But at that moment, my radio
operator shouted to me: “Aircraft coming from the left!” I
threw the aircraft into another left turn, pushed the stick,
and got out of the clouds. Below, an enemy machine was
heading towards me, firing. So, I went back into the cloud
layer, which was very thin. However, the enemy hunters
above could see the stream of a wake from my propeller;
they only had to follow.the whirlwind I was making and
open fire. All of this was repeated twice more, then calm
returned.
“I was able to leave the clouds and my radio operator
■ Pilots and aircrew of StG 77 relax between sorties, France, summer
stopped firing. I had been flying blind with instruments 1940. On the left, wearing the white tunic, is Oberleutnant Fritz
through the clouds. It worked well, but I was not familiar Sayler, Staffelkapitän of 2./StG 77, with Hauptmann Karl Henze (then
with this type of flying. My radio operator was not the Staffelkapitän of 1./StG 77) sitting in the deckchair.

14 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ Unteroffizier Heinz Selhorn, one of the radio operators of I./St.G 77
on 18 August 1940, sits on a bomb as he reads a book while waiting
for take-off on that operation. He said of the raid: “There were
burning Stukas all over the place, but I fired and fired and saw the
muzzle flashes of the attacking fighters. We radio operators felt as
though we were human armour to protect the pilot sitting behind us!”
fighters approaching from the sea!” Had the English
pursued.us?
“I turned off the ignition and we both jumped out
of the cockpit, flattening ourselves on the ground. The
three hunters roared above our heads: but they were
Messerschmitt Bf 109s returning from a mission! It was a
false alarm**.”.
**The Gruppen Kommandeur, Knights Cross holder Hauptmann
Friedrich-Karl Freiherr von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels, and his radio operator,
Feldwebel Karl Götz, failed to return from this sortie. It was a heavy
price to pay when set against the sole success which only saw a
merchantman, the SS Empire Daffodil (398 Gross Tons), damaged.
16 August 1940
“I sent my aircraft, along with others, to the Junkers
workshops in Bernay. Over there, they would be fitted
with. armour plates behind the pilot’s seat. Changes of this
kind were constantly being made. At that time, there was
also one.that provided the radio operator with armoured
protection. Nevertheless, the machines returned the next
day - but without armour!
I remember a comrade said that if there was a mission in
the coming days, then things were going to turn out badly.”
17 August 1940
“In the evening, we went to the cinema and saw ‘Der
Postmeister’ with Heinrich George. Afterwards, we met in
the Hotel Normandie. A great evening. We got to bed late,
but Oberleutnant Platzer of the III Gruppe slept over with
us.”.
The evening had been an oasis of relaxation in the
maelstrom of war - a calm before the storm. Kurt Scheffel’s
un-named comrade would turn out to be horribly correct
when he made his doom-laden prediction.
After tomorrow, things would never be quite same again
for StG 77.
THE HARDEST DAY
On 18 August 1940, Junkers 87s of StG 77 suffered heavy
losses during attacks on RAF Ford, RAF Thorney Island,
and the Chain Home radar station at Poling. Meanwhile,
StG 3 was assigned Gosport as its target during the same
operation.
On this occasion, no less than 109 Stukas were deployed,
with I Gruppe StG 77 to strike Thorney Island with 28
Junkers 87s, 28 aircraft from II/StG 77 assigned to raid Ford,
and 31 more Junkers 87s from III/StG 77 to bomb the radar
station at Poling.
Another 22 Stukas of StG 3 bombed Gosport, with the
entire Stuka force being escorted by no less than 157
Messerschmitt Bf 109s of JG 27 and JG 2. (See map on page
113 of this issue)
It was to be a momentous day for Stukageschwader 77.
18 August 1940
“Yes. And then came a day that no member of the I Gruppe
will ever forget. It all started so casually. The 1st Staffel
was having a sports competition in a nearby village, and
the Kommandeur had taken a car there. Henze, Platzer,
and I had had a heavy night and had taken our time that
morning. We were about to go over to Maltot aerodrome
when a call from the Geschwader HQ came with the order:
all preparations to be made on the ground and immediate
transfer to Tonneville.
“We quickly went to the sports field to relay this
information to the Kommandeur; the competition was
over immediately, and everyone headed for Maltot where
we took off at 11:45 hours to land in Tonneville at 12:20
hours. The weather was fine, no clouds, and a light westerly
wind. For a while, Hauptmann Meisel, Oberleutnant Bruck,
Sayler, Fischer, Henze, and I were lazing in the sun near the
command post. We had lunch, and then the precise mission
orders arrived: a large-scale attack on installations on the
south coast of England.
“The Gruppe took off between 14:30 and 14:45 hours
and assembled over Cherbourg with the Geschwader’s two
other Gruppen. It was a truly spectacular sight. Cherbourg
lay spread out and illuminated by the sun below us, and we
could see waves breaking on the coast. The sky was clear,
and a thin layer of mist hung over the English Channel.
Once again, the route took us via Pointe de Barfleur which
we crossed in a wide front before the lighthouse slowly
disappeared behind us.
“Our route then took us to Selsey Bill, a peninsula to the
▲
east of the Isle of Wight. The escort of fighters passed us
IRON CROSS ❙ 15
FROM THE ARCHIVES

■ The II Gruppe of StG 77 suffered fewer losses than I Gruppe on 18 August 1940, this aircraft of 5./StG 77 being one of them. It was shot down and
made a landing at Ham Manor Golf Course, Angmering, after the attack on RAF Poling. The pilot, Oberfeldwebel Kurt Schweinhardt, was captured
badly wounded but the radio operator, Oberfeldwebel Willi Geiger, died of his wounds later that day.

Suddenly, there was a loud crash inside the aircraft and my left shoulder was hit
hard. So hard that I collapsed onto my side. The left part of the canopy and the
windshield in front of me shattered and something hit the thumb of my right hand
which was holding the control column. The pain was terrible.
”
in the direction of the coast: a Geschwader in free hunting left and we straightened our course.
mode and another Gruppe of fighters attached to each “Glancing back up briefly, I saw English fighters swooping
Gruppe of Stukas as close escort. down on us. As soon as I saw them, they opened fire. I sent
“Slowly, the English coast appeared out of the mist. a warning on our frequency: “Fighters! Above right!” My
There were no clouds either and all was calm as we flew radio operator, Gefreiter Binner, opened fire and I began
over Selsley Bill. Then the Gruppen separated, each section to perform cautious evasive manoevres - as much as was
towards their own objectives. Ours was Thorney Island possible in such a tight formation. A dogfight with our
airfield, east of Portsmouth. We were flying at 3,500m and fighter escort ensued as aircraft charged our formation from
could already see our target. The commander slowly veered both sides.
“Tracer bullets were now coming from all directions, I saw
enemy fighters attacking the Stab Kette, and then Henze
and the Kommandeur opened fire. We were not far from
■ This clip of belted
7.92 mm ammunition our objective when Spitfires made a third attack on our
was taken from one Kette Once again, we received a deluge of tracer projectiles.
of the wing guns “Suddenly, there was a loud crash inside the aircraft and
of the Junkers 87 my left shoulder was hit hard. So hard that I collapsed onto
downed at Ham
my side. The left part of the canopy and the windshield in
Manor Golf Course,
with a British front of me shattered and something hit the thumb of my
.303 bullet having right hand which was holding the control column. The pain
smashed through was terrible. The glass plate of the Revi sight shattered, and
one of the belted pieces of it flew into my face. I was lucky to be wearing
rounds.
splinter proof flight sunglasses. Then, my radio operator
screamed and collapsed onto his machine gun. I saw it all
happen in the rear-view mirror.
“When I regained some sort of consciousness, I saw that
I had dropped out of formation and was flying behind. The
1st Staffel was flying above me in the line of attack. I didn’t

16 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ The port side of the pilot’s cockpit of the Junkers 87. The knob
with the lettering on the handle of the lever (Sturzflug Bremse) is to
operate the dive brakes. Wounded on his left side, Kurt Scheffel had
great difficulty in operating this lever during the dive-bombing attack
on 18 August 1940.
■ In his rear-view mirror (top right of canopy frame) Kurt Scheffel saw
his radio operator, Otto Binner, killed and collapse over his machine
gun. Also visible is the Revi sight, the glass of which shattered and
flung splinters into Kurt’s face. Note that the sight is offset slightly
to the right of the centreline.

have time to think and knew I had to stick with them. If I

stayed alone at altitude, the English fighters would bite at me
like a cheap snack. With a painful effort, I was able to activate
the throttle with my left hand, but I could not use this hand
for the lever of the dive brakes located to the left of the seat.
“The 1st Staffel now began its dive, and I had no choice and
had to remain stuck to their aircraft. I don’t remember how
I managed to deploy the dive brakes, whether it was with
my left hand or right hand, then I went from the throttle,
cocked the bombs and so on, and all with a 3 cm long shard
of aluminum stuck in my right thumb, which was bleeding
profusely. Below us was the airfield with its hangars and its
runways and from where several aircraft took off at that
time.
“I aimed through the auxiliary sight, dropped my bombs,
■ A group of Junkers 87s
went back up, folded the dive brakes, opened the throttle return at low-level and loose
and radiator flaps, and then set course with the others, south, formation across the English
and out to sea. Channel after an operation
“Once again, a swirling fight ensued. We were at an altitude against the south coast of
England. (Chris Goss)
of 500 metres and heading back towards the sea. Flak guns
fired from the ground, and fighters from both sides circled
around us. Tracers everywhere, aircraft crashing, parachutes
in the sky. It was a real sorcerer’s cauldron.
“I was flying to stay in front of and below one of our own
aircraft; that way, my back was protected from his gunner.
My radio operator was no longer moving. I called him several
■ Feldwebel Rudolf Singler
times through the intercom, but that also seemed to have
was another pilot who flew
been destroyed. Vertically ahead of me was a Blenheim twin with 2./StG 77 and who took
engine, and when I looked to the right, I noticed a Defiant [sic.] part in the attack on 18
trying to get in front of me. The Defiant* was a two-seater August 1940. His Kette, led
with a rotating rear turret that housed four machine guns. by Oberleutnant Brinkmann,
returned unscathed. Like
This turret was turning towards me. I veered right, pulled Kurt Scheffel, Singler was
away, and found another Junkers 87 to cover my rear. a fortunate survivor of 18
▲

“This all happened around 15:30 hours (Central European August 1940 and of the war.

IRON CROSS ❙ 17
FROM THE ARCHIVES
■ The wreckage of
Sinn’s Junkers 87
after its crash at
Spring Gardens, 18
August 1940.
Time – editor) and we finally reached the coast. We were no
more than 100 metres above sea level. On my right, in the
open sea near the Isle of Wight, there was a concrete tower*
from which anti-aircraft fire emanated.
*In fact, there were no Defiants in this action or anywhere nearby and it
must be concluded that, in the excitement and confusion, Kurt Scheffel
had glimpsed one of the 235 Squadron Blenheims, up from Thorney
Island, and saw the turret of that aircraft turn towards him.
**The Nab Tower
“Everywhere, there were small groups of Junkers 87s. No
one knew where their comrades were. Further on the right,
I could see a Junkers 87 floating on the water, and now we
were only 10 metres above the sea and slowly calm returned.
Then, suddenly, I found myself alone with five other Junkers
87s heading south towards Cherbourg. There should have
been a trail of smoke leading the way and supposed to have
■ This crumpled body is believed to be that of Unteroffizier Josef
Schmitt, radio operator of the Junkers 87 flown by Leutnant Hans
Sinn of 2./StG 77, which was shot down at Spring Gardens, West
Ashling, on 18 August 1940.
18 ❙ IRON CROSS
been spread by a Heinkel 111 with smoke bombs. But there
was nothing.
“We continued to fly without being worried any more by
the enemy, and my engine was running without problems.
It was only then that I finally had time to take a look at my
machine. The Perspex on the left side of the canopy had
been destroyed and the wind was whistling through. On the
dashboard, almost all the instruments were damaged. There
were holes everywhere and components were hanging off.
Outside, both wings had holes in them like sieves. I was
hoping the fuel tanks weren’t damaged, and the fuel would
stay at a sufficient level to allow us to reach the coast..
“By now, I couldn’t move much and was sitting
permanently slumped to my left, my thumb, lacerated by
the shrapnel, was .still bleeding. The control column was
completely covered in blood, and I tried to remove the
shard with my left hand but didn’t have the strength to
do so. In the rearview mirror I could see that my face was
also bleeding from splinters. And I could see that the radio
operator was definitely dead, also hit by the bullets..
“As I was flying a Ju 87 B-2, I was a little bit faster than the
others and quickly found myself at the head of the group.
We were halfway over the English Channel when the others
suddenly veered to the right. I thought they had made a
navigational error and kept the same course. I was now
alone and only 20 metres above the water. Water, water,
and yet more water! Later, I learned the others had spotted
Barfleur and headed towards it. I don’t exactly remember
my thoughts at the time, but I didn’t want anything more
than to be back on firm ground. It seemed an eternity.
“Eventually, I finally had land directly ahead of me. It was
rather flat, so not close to Cherbourg. With a deep sigh of
relief, I climbed to 200 metres and suddenly saw a town on
the left and headed towards it. Thanks to the landmark of
its cathedral, I identified it as Bayeux. I knew that I would
soon reach Caen where there was a large emergency landing
ground at Caen-Carpiquet. When I got there, I could see
neither people nor ambulances and decided to continue
 ■ Left: Kurt Scheffel
recuperates in
hospital at Caen after
receiving wounds on
18 August 1940 that
came very close to
killing him.

■ Right: Another
survivor of the 18
August 1940 raid,
this radio operator
of the 1./StG 77,
Unteroffizier Karl
Maier, was hit eight
times in the body
but escaped serious
injury. He was also
injured by flying metal
and Perspex splinters.

In the rearview mirror, I could see that my face was also bleeding from splinters.
And I could see that the radio operator was definitely dead, also hit by the bullets.

towards Maltot. ■ Right: The operating manual for the

”
“When I arrived, three other Junkers 87s were landing, Junkers 87 B-2. It was this model which
Kurt Scheffel was flying on 18 August
and I had to circle around. With great effort, I managed to
1940, an aircraft which was slightly
pull the landing flap lever with my right hand, then flew in faster than the Junkers 87 B-1.
a southeasterly direction. When I hit the ground, I noticed
that my three tyres had been punctured and the aircraft
bounced violently - which hurt me a great deal.
“I didn’t know then what had been damaged but cut the
ignition as soon as I touched the ground. I passed in front
of the barn where several people stood, then stopped at the
end of the track.”.

It took a while for anyone to get to Kurt Scheffel to help

him. Too weak from loss of blood and his injuries to get
out of the cockpit, he was eventually lifted from his blood-
stained seat while the body of his dead radio operator,
Gefreiter Otto Binner (a native of Hirschburg, Silesia) was
gently carried away.
Examined by the medical officer, it was found that
Scheffel had a large metal sliver embedded in his left
lung, two more splinters in his shoulder blades, and a
dozen smaller fragments in his neck as well as the massive
splinter lodged deeply in his thumb. One bullet had
slashed through a shoulder strap of his parachute harness,
completely severing it. Thus, had he taken to his parachute,
death would have been certain.
Meanwhile, ground personnel counted the hits to
Scheffel’s aircraft. There were at least 84, with 50 of them
in the fuselage.
For Kurt Scheffel, his war was temporarily over while
he recuperated in hospital. And of Stukageschwader 77,
Generalmajor von Richthofen wrote in his diary:
“A Stuka Gruppe has had its feathers well and truly
plucked.”
■ Left: On return to Maltot,
Kurt Scheffel’s aircraft
was found to have been hit
multiple times and had all
three tyres holed. This was
the bullet holed wheel spat of
his aircraft.
Across the force deployed that day, losses amounted to
14% of the total. It was a severe blow. But not a crippling
one to the Stuka force as has so often been suggested.
Notes:
• See also Conflict Archaeology on pages 108 – 121 of this
issue for further details of the action on 18 August 1940.
• A full list of all the losses suffered by Stukageschwader 77
can be found on pages 122 – 123.
• Further extracts and images from Kurt Scheffel’s memoir
will be published in future editions of Iron Cross magazine.
• Thanks to Alex Churchill for translation services.

IRON CROSS ❙ 19
 ORDERS, MEDALS, AND DECORATIONS

■ The wedding of then SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann with Hildegard Burmester on 1 March 1944. The Knights Cross winner behind Michael
Wittmann is his friend and best man, SS-Rottenführer Balthasar ‘Bobby’ Woll, the gunner of Wittmann’s crew.

The Michael Wittmann Group

The story of Tiger ace, Michael Wittmann, is widely known and has filled countless
publications across the decades. Dietrich Maerz gives us a remarkable glimpse of
Wittmann’s medals, decorations, and associated documentation.

T
he writer had the good fortune when visiting a
militaria fair in the United States during February
2008 to scan and copy photos and documents
which came directly from the widow of Michael
Wittmann. Some of these photographs and documents
had not been published before and the author is pleased
to have been given the opportunity to make these
historical pieces and documents available to a broader
community through Iron Cross magazine.
From a historical perspective, this grouping is
significant in the field of the collecting of orders, medals,
and decorations given its connection to one of the
Wehrmacht’s most famous soldiers.
The medals and associated documents are presented
here as a photographic and historic record appertaining
to the awards granted to one of the Second World War
heroes of Germany. Their pictorial depiction in this
feature is not in any way intended to glorify or glamourise
the deeds of Michael Wittmann as a combatant of the
Third Reich.

20 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Wittmann
photographed
playing with a
little rabbit.

■ Deed of transfer regarding

the Knights Cross of Michael
Wittmann. The widow,
Hildegard Helmke, attests
that this Knights Cross
was awarded to Michael
Wittmann on 14 January
1944 on the occasion of
his 66th kill [sic.] by SS-
Obergruppenführer and
General der Waffen-SS, Sepp
Dietrich. The widow also
testifies that this is the
cross which her husband
wore until his death near
Gramesnil, south of Caen.
The document goes on
to describe the Knights
Cross as a Klein & Quenzer
specimen and the original
award piece.

■ Unquestionably, the Knights Cross Michael Wittman wore on this photo as it is ■ The testified Klein
a Klein & Quenzer and the one which was certified by his widow. It is also certain & Quenzer Knights
that Wittmann wore a Knights Cross with Oakleaves and Swords on the day of his Cross coming from
death. Without doubting the word of his widow, it was certainly the case that he the widow of Michael
received another Knights Cross for daily wear (as witnessed by other photographs) Wittmann.
▲

and that this example, testified by his widow, is the actual award piece.

IRON CROSS ❙ 21
ORDERS, MEDALS, AND DECORATIONS

■ A very early photograph of Wittmann (2nd from left) and his crew, ■ The crew of SS-Sturmführer Heinz Kling: Warmbrunner, Wohlleben,
taken in September 1943 in Northern Italy on the birthday of his Kling, Reiners, Jonas.
friend and comrade, Heinz Kling.

■ Above: A formal
note from General
der Panzertruppe
Erhard Raus (Supreme
Commander 4th
Panzer Army) to
SS-Untersturmführer
Wittmann
congratulating him
for the kill score of 20
enemy tanks which
had broken through
the main line. He
mentions that this
was the 88th kill of
enemy tanks.
■ Left: Transcript of
a wire of 30 January
1944: ‘Wittmann as
380th soldier of the
Wehrmacht awarded
with the Oakleaves to ■ A selection of some of the photographic proofs of the photos taken
the Knights Cross of on the day of the Knights Cross award for Wittmann and Woll. The
the Iron Cross. Report comparison between the two crosses shows that they are not the same.
on 1 February to the Wittmann wears a Klein & Quenzer and Woll either an S&L or a Juncker.
Führerhauptquartier. The angle of the cross arms as well as the loop are quite different.

22 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Below: Another photo of Wittmann and Wisch on the day of the
Knights Cross award near Charkow in Russia. SS-Untersturmführer
Wittmann continued to rack up kills of Soviet tanks with his Tiger
tank and his crew. Between the award of the Knights Cross on 14
January 1944 (88 confirmed kills) and the award of the Oakleaves on
30 January 1944, just 16 days later, Wittmann had scored another 29
kills, although some sources quote 26 as the score.

■ Photo taken on 18. January 1944 after the award ceremony for
Wittmann and Woll ‘in the field’ in front of their Tiger. The officer to
the left is SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Theodor
Wisch, commander of the 1. SS-Panzerdivision Leibstandarte SS ‘Adolf
Hitler.’
■ Below left: Cable of congratulations from Reichsführer-SS Heinrich
Himmler to SS-Untersturmführer Wittmann und SS-Rottenführer Woll
for the award of the Knights Cross.
■ Below right: Telegram from SS-Obergruppenführer und General der
Waffen-SS Jüttner to Wittmann with congratulations for the Knights
Cross.

IRON CROSS ❙ 23
ORDERS, MEDALS, AND DECORATIONS

■ Letter from the Inspector General of Panzertruppen Guderian ■ Hand-signed photo by Adolf Hitler with the note: Hauptquartier,
congratulating SS-Untersturmführer Wittmann for the Knights Cross. 2 February, on the occasion of the awarding of the Oakleaves to
Wittmann at the Berghof in Bavaria.

■ An
exhausted
looking
Michael
Wittmann
with the
newly
awarded
Knights Cross, ■ Contemporary newspaper photo from the private collection of
which is Wittmann’s widow. It reads: ‘On a street in the West - Wittmann’s
clearly a Klein hunting bag’. This reports on the action at Villers-Bocage on 13 June
& Quenzer 1944 where Wittmann with his understrength company stopped the
manufactured advance of the 22nd British Armoured Brigade, destroying over 20
example. British tanks.

24 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Photo from the private album of Hildegard Wittmann showing the meeting
between Sepp Dietrich and Michael Wittmann.

■ ‘21 British Tanks destroyed in 20 minutes!’ reads this press

clipping. SS-Obergruppenführer und Panzergeneral Sepp Dietrich
(left), holder of the Swords to the Oakleaves at the invasion front in
conversation with Oakleaves holder SS-Obersturmführer Wittmann
who killed these with his Tiger in addition to several British AFVs. SS-
Obersturmführer Wittmann had already been credited with destroying
over 120 tanks on the Eastern Front.

■ A wire from Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler to SS-

Untersturmführer Wittmann of 1. SS Panzerdivision “LSSAH”
congratulating him for the award of the Oakleaves to the Knights
Cross of the Iron Cross.

■ Right: SS-Obersturmführer Wittmann on the day of the visit by

Sepp Dietrich. This exceptionally sharp photo allows us to determine
that the Knights Cross Wittmann is wearing here is not a Klein &
Quenzer example. It appears to be more like a Steinhauer & Lück or
▲

Juncker type.

IRON CROSS ❙ 25
ORDERS, MEDALS, AND DECORATIONS

■ In the spring of 1944, after the award of the Oakleaves, Wittmann

made a promotional visit to the Henschel company in Kassel. Here he is
seen holding a speech standing on a Tiger I.

■ A letter from the chief engineer of the Henschel company to

Wittmann, sending him the above photos. He also asked him to
relate any future experiences with the Tiger tank to him.
■ Right: Wire from Reichsführer-SS Himmler to Wittmann
promoting him retroactively on 21 June 1944 to SS
Hauptsturmführer. The message is dated 29 June 1944.

26 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ ‘The First Swords in
the West’ proclaims
this newspaper
clipping of 24 June
1944 announcing the
award of Swords to
the Knights Cross for
SS-Obersturmführer
Michael Wittmann of
SS-Pz.Abt 501/ 12.
SS-Panzerdivision ‘Hitler
Jugend’.

■ Unofficial photo of
the ceremony with
the cover letter from
SS Hauptsturmführer
Günsche to comrade
Wittmann.

■ Official photo of the award ceremony of Oakleaves with Swords ■ Covering letter from SS-Obersturmführer Günsche to comrade Wittmann
to SS-Obersturmführer Wittmann at the Berghof, 29 June 1944. The with the hand-signed photo of the presentation of the Oakleaves by Adolf
▲

photo is dated and signed by Hitler. Hitler to Wittmann.

IRON CROSS ❙ 27
ORDERS, MEDALS, AND DECORATIONS

■ Grave of Wittmann in La Cambe.

■ Wire from the Führerhauptquartier, dated 22 June 1944, to SS-

Obersturmführer Wittmann to inform him of the award of the Oakleaves with
Swords to the Knights Cross as the 71st soldier of the Wehrmacht to be so
awarded. The message is signed by Hitler.

■ Above and below: Michael Wittmann and Balthasar ‘Bobby’ Woll in

Normandy shortly before the invasion and the battles that followed.

■ Michael Wittmann celebrates the news of the award of the Swords with his
comrades and a bottle of Champagne.

28 ❙ IRON CROSS
 SPECIAL EDITIONS
The Blitz in
Colour
This year marks the 80th
anniversary of the end
of The Blitz – one of
the most infamous and
widely remembered
chapters of WW2.
This 132-page special
collectors magazine
– written by Andy
Saunders, the former
editor of Britain at War
– covers all the military
and human aspects of the Blitz. It
doesn’t just look at London, it looks at all the UK cities
attacked. It looks at the aircraft used, the losses and
the heroic stories. Illustrated with hundreds of original
images colourised to bring them to life.
The Battle
of Britain
in Colour
A unique and stunning
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showcasing the work
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telling the story of the
Battle of Britain through
colourised images from
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To buy your special edition simply go to these websites.
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Aircraft of
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This 132-page special
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records and shows
a picture of EVERY
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as well as training aircraft, cargo flights and even the
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Tanks of
World
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This guide to the tanks
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variants and models
from the light tanks of
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Front and the range of
Panzer models deployed by Nazi Germany throughout
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Colour by RJM

30 ❙ IRON CROSS
 EQUIPMENT IN COLOUR

The Tiger I

A
lthough only relatively few Tiger I tanks
were built (1,347 between July 1942 and
August 1944) they nevertheless became
one of the most famous tanks operated by
the German army, if not one of the most well-known
and ‘revered’ tanks of the Second World War.
The Tiger I (officially the Panzer VI Tiger Ausf E)
first entered service with schwere Panzerabteilung
502 on the Eastern Front in August 1942. The unit
was attached to Army Group North for operations in
the Leningrad sector of the front, where the terrain
posed as many problems as the Red Army. Guderian
later wrote scathingly of its first deployment on 23
September 1942:
“He [Hitler] was consumed by his desire to try
out this new weapon. He therefore ordered that the
Tigers be committed in what was quite a secondary
operation and in a limited attack that was utterly
unsuitable, for in the swampy forests near Leningrad
heavy tanks could only move in single file along
the forest tracks – which, of course, was exactly
where the enemy positioned his anti-tank guns,
just waiting for them. The results were not only
heavy and unnecessary casualties, but also the loss
of secrecy and the element of surprise for future
operations.”
Notwithstanding the powerful punch packed by
its 8.8cm gun, the tank was far from the invincible
leviathan that is sometimes supposed in popular
narratives, although it would be fair to say that
its supposed killing potential and reputation
was enhanced by the exploits of the Tiger ‘ace’
Michael Wittmann – as feared in the two articles
accompanying this colour feature. The reality was
rather different, and the Tiger I had a reputation for
breakdowns and unreliability.
The Tiger had originally been designed as an
offensive breakthrough weapon, but by the time it
went into action, the military situation had changed
dramatically. This meant that its main use was
on the defensive, and as a mobile anti-tank and
infantry gun support weapon. Tactically, this also
meant moving the Tiger units constantly to parry
breakthroughs and this caused excessive mechanical
wear. As a result, Tiger battalions rarely entered
combat at full strength.
In this image, a Tiger I (number 211) of the
2./SS-Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504 has been
demolished by its crew (under the command of
Leutnant Heim) after it broke down at Caltagirone,
Sicily, and could not be recovered. Here, it is being
examined by British troops and local residents on
20 July 1943.

IRON CROSS ❙ 31

A Question of Tactical Ability
While the death of Michael Wittmann has frequently been debated and dissected, his
earlier ‘success’ at Villers-Bocage has often been taken at face value. Wolfgang
Schneider looks at the reality and the myth behind that famous action in the battle for
Normandy. All images via the author unless otherwise credited
M
ost of those who are
interested in the Tiger
tank and its wartime
operations will be aware
of countless descriptions of the career
of Germany’s ‘most successful tank
commander’, Obersturmführer Michael
Wittmann. Unfortunately, almost all the
reports about Wittmann and his actions
are simply wrong. Evaluations made
immediately after the events in which he
was involved require critical appraisal,
this being made possible with the action
at Villers-Bocage now having been
verified down to the smallest of details.
To set the scene for the events that
unfolded at Villers-Bocage, the Allied
advance from Gold and Omaha beaches
had put the 352. Infanteriedivision under
pressure, and as the division withdrew
south, a 12 km gap opened in the front
line near Caumont-l’Éventé.
Sepp Dietrich, commander of I.
SS-Panzerkorps, ordered Schwere SS-
Panzerabteilung 101, his only reserve, to
position itself behind the Panzer Lehr
■ Wittmann’s
2.Kompanie,
7 June 1944,
seen en-route to
Morgny, Normandy.
Wittmann is
standing in the
turret of Tiger 205.
(BA)
32 ❙ IRON CROSS
PANZER ACE
Division and SS Division Hitlerjugend.
From this position, the battalion could
protect the developing open left flank.
Anticipating the importance the British
would assign to the high ground near
Villers-Bocage, Wittmann’s company
was positioned near the town. It arrived
late on 12 June and was nominally
composed of 12 tanks, but his company
was 50% understrength due to losses and
mechanical failures.
The next morning, lead elements
of the British 7th Armoured Division
entered Villers-Bocage, their objective
being to exploit the gap in the front line,
seize Villers-Bocage, and capture the
nearby ridge (Point 213) in an attempt to
force a German withdrawal.
It is against this background that we
must consider the awards, prowess, and
‘kill’ claims of Michael Wittmann as set
out in the previous article.
NOT READY FOR ACTION
As part of the German plan, the
Schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101 was
to be kept ready on the left wing of I.
SS-Panzerkorps and was accordingly
assigned an area immediately east of
Villers-Bocage. This coincided with
British and Canadian preparations for
Operation Perch which had the goal of
encompassing Caen to the north-west
and taking control over the river Odon.
Heavy enemy artillery fire began
during the night and the approaching
tanks therefore had to change their
assigned operating area three times.
The 2. Kompanie, with its six tanks, went
on below the southern edge of the hill
at Montbroq, into a ravine about 100
metres due south of the Route Nationale
175, two km east of Villers-Bocage and
about 500 metres southwest of Point 213.
Meanwhile, the eight tanks of 1.
Kompanie were located a little further
north-east in an area on the other side of
the main road.
The ravine provided good cover for
2. Kompanie, but it did not allow all the
tanks to exit from the side of that sunken
position at the same time. One of the
tanks (Oberscharführer Lötzsch) also
had track damage and was not ready for
action and at the front of the column
stood the tank of Unterscharführer Stief,
and this had engine problems.
After the British artillery attack,
company commander Obersturmführer
Wittmann was still on his way to join up
with the other tanks. However, all the
crews were completely exhausted after
continual night marches and one man
from each tank had taken turns acting
as a lookout while the others rested.
Urgently needed maintenance was also
scheduled for the next day, but from
05:00 hours on 13 June, the 7th British
 ■ Michael Wittmann
had already been
created a hero of the
Third Reich before
his action at Villers-
Bocage. Here, he is
seen with his crew
on the Eastern Front.
(Colour by RJM)

IRON CROSS ❙ 33
 PANZER ACE
■ Tiger tanks of Wittmann’s 2.Kompanie wait in the assembly area.
Armoured Division had been deployed as
part of Operation Perch.
ALARM MESSAGE
Not deployed in that operation, but
nevertheless proceeding in line on the
Caen to Villers-Bocage Road, were a
group of vehicles from the British 22nd
Armoured Brigade which finally came to
a position just before Point 213 and then
stopped, the British having accidentally
exploited and penetrated the gap
between the 352. Infanteriedivision and
the Panzer Lehr Division.
Meanwhile, still waiting in the ravine,
Wittmann received an alarm message
that tanks – presumably English – were
heading east on the road. From a vantage
point, he could see the enemy column
Map by Battlefield Design
34 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Michael Wittmann’s knocked-out Tiger in Villers-Bocage.
and he immediately jumped into the first
tank, sending its commander (Stief) to
the other tanks to alert them. The driver
was ordered by Wittmann to drive off,
but after about 20 or 30 meters, it was
clear that the engine was not running
properly. Wittmann immediately,
dismounted and ran towards the next
tank, which is just moving out of the way.
This was ‘222’ of Unterscharführer Sowa
whom he ordered out of his tank and
took it over for himself.
Ahead of his company, which was still
not ready for action, Obersturmführer
Wittmann attacked the leading part
of the group: A Squadron, 4th City of
London Yeomanry, along with parts of
the 1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade. First, he
destroyed a Cromwell travelling in the
direction of Caen, and then a Firefly
from A squadron which were already
around Point 213. He then drove parallel
to the road to Villers-Bocage, and at
point-blank range destroyed the bulk
of the 1st Rifle Brigade, comprising 13
M3 half-tracks, three Stuart scout tanks,
two Sherman artillery observation tanks,
the intelligence officer’s Daimler scout
car and the unit medical officer’s M3,
along with more than a dozen Bren and
Lloyd carriers together with the anti-tank
battery.
Arriving on the outskirts of the town,
he then destroyed three of the four
Cromwells of the Regimental Command
Group, 4th Canadian Light Yeomanry,
before driving alone into the enemy-held
village of Villers-Bocage, pursued by the
fourth Cromwell which he destroyed
from behind his Tiger.
OUT OF THE BATTLE
In the village, Wittmann was then
intercepted by B Squadron’s tanks, which
included a Sherman Firefly (a dangerous
opponent for the Tiger), before he
turned around and drove back towards
his starting point. On the way back, he
destroyed another Cromwell (which was
following him) with two hits from just 50
metres.
A few hundred metres further on,
Wittmann’s tank finally came to a
standstill after being hit by an anti-tank
gun. He was out of the battle and left the
disabled tank behind before making his
way to the command post of the Panzer

■ Some of the British tanks knocked-out in the action at Villers-Bocage.
Lehr Division in Orbois-Sermentot.
Meanwhile, the three other operational
tanks of 2.Kompanie had taken up
positions east of Villers-Bocage (south
of the road) after Wittmann had
rushed off. They destroyed two more
Cromwells (Sowa) and three Shermans
(Oberscharführer Brandt), while about
230 prisoners surrendered.
From 08:00 hours, 1. Kompanie
(Hauptsturmführer Möbius) attacked
Villers-Bocage with eight Tigers, also
moving along the RN 175. Five Cromwells
standing to the north were abandoned,
undamaged, by their crews. Several
Panzerkampfwagen IV of the Panzer Lehr
Division, located in Parfouru-sur-Odon,
also took part in this attack in which two
Tigers and a Panzer IV pulled up along
the main street, Rue Pasteur.
Tiger ‘112’ (Oberscharführer Ernst),
driving behind the others, was destroyed
by a Firefly of B Squadron and as it
advanced further, the Panzer IV was
destroyed by an anti-tank gun, and Tiger
‘121’ (Untersturmführer Lukasius), driving
in front, was hit from behind by the
Firefly. Later, these tanks were all set on
fire by the British.
Meanwhile, five more Tigers advanced
on the roads further south where one
Tiger was destroyed by an anti-tank gun
on Rue Emile Samson. Two more Tigers
were immobilised, one on the corner of
Rue Jeanne Bacon and Boulevard Joffre by
a 57mm anti-tank gun of the 7th Queens
Lancers.
Tiger ‘132’ (Unterscharführer Wendt)
remained on the outskirts, and during the
night ‘132’ was at Point 213 while the four
Tigers of 1. Kompanie were in position
south of Villers-Bocage. The 2. Kompanie
then moved again, parallel to the RN 175.
The unit’s personnel losses that day
amount to three fallen Unterführers
and seven enlisted men. Meanwhile, the
British had lost a total of 26 tanks, 14
M3s, and eight Bren and Lloyd carriers. In
the meantime, 3.Kompanie had reached
Falaise.
The next day, the commander of 1st
SS Panzer Corps, SS Obergruppenführer
Dietrich, suggested that Wittmann be
awarded the Oak Leaves with Swords for
the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. The
award, with simultaneous promotion
to Hauptsturmführer, was effective on
22 June 1944. However, the following
statements in Dietrich’s award proposal
are noteworthy:
“Company Wittmann ... stood ... at point
213 ... ready for action” and “Wittmann
could no longer give orders to his dispersed
men...” that he “destroyed ... all vehicles
within range ...” then “…advanced again to
Villers-Bocage.”
THE FACTS
In total, the number of tanks destroyed
by Wittmann was stated to be 25. But let
us examine the facts.
When evaluating these events, one
must consider several important factors.
First, Wittmann was popular with his
subordinates and highly valued by his
superiors who had already created a
hero out of him. Certainly, he fought
bravely in the Balkan Campaign, and
especially on the Eastern Front where he
had destroyed numerous enemy tanks.
However, it must also be borne in mind
that the situation on 12/13 June 1944 was
anything but clear, although attacking the
enemy who was about to make a decisive
breakthrough was imperative. And in
the events that followed, Wittmann’s
personal commitment was certainly
energetic and courageous. Nevertheless,
several critical questions arise.
The content of Sepp Dietrich’s
proposal for the award is easy to
evaluate; put simply, all the statements
summarised above are false.
First, the reader can easily determine
the number of Wittmann’s tank kills set
out in the details of the action above.
This stands at seven. Even if one were
to count the artillery observation tanks
‘armed’ with a wooden cannon, and the
light Stuarts, one wouldn’t come up with
25, either.
As to Wittmann’s company “standing
ready for action”, we can see that this
is something of an exaggeration, as is
the claim that he could “…no longer give
orders to his dispersed men.” Finally, it
was stated that he “…advanced again
to Villers-Bocage.” In fact, he had
abandoned his disabled Tiger and
made his way to the command post of
the Panzer Lehr Division rather than
‘advancing again’ to Villers-Bocage. It
was 1.Kompanie that pressed on with
further attacks against Villers-Bocage and
amassed more ‘kills’. Not Wittmann.
There remains the suggestion by
Dietrich that Wittmann’s courageous
action averted an “imminent serious
danger”. Normally, individual levels
of the Knights Cross awards were for
‘battle-breaking’ single deeds, not for
a great number of kills. But was this a
▲
‘battle breaking’ deed?
IRON CROSS ❙ 35
PANZER ACE

In considering the action in question,

it is essential to take into account the
operational principles and doctrines
of the armoured Panzer forces which
stipulates tanks be deployed in an
operational area in such a way that, so
far as possible, movement options are
unrestricted. Additionally, the tactical
leader (in this case, Wittmann) must
always have a precise overview of the
operational readiness of his vehicles
and crews. Additionally, an operational
area must be secured in such a way that
the enemy cannot approach unnoticed.
Further, that tanks must always be
combined for use.
As far as all these points are
concerned, the reader can make up their
minds based on the actions of 12/13 June
1944 described above.

■ The column of vehicles knocked-out by Wittmann, including an anti-tank gun. (BA)

PERPETUATING A MYTH
In retrospect, it is difficult to assess
whether there was sufficient time to wait
for the remaining (three) tanks in the
company to become fully operational,
but the fact that one of the temporarily
unserviceable tanks was able to
immediately follow Sowa indicates that it
would have taken only minutes.
■ Michael Wittmann is often held up to
be almost solely responsible for German
successes at Villers-Bocage. In reality, that
was not the case. Additionally, his tactical
ability must be called into question.
Certainly, and as the British behaved
in such a casual and careless manner,
Wittmann could have had much greater
success against their tanks had he waited
for all his Tigers to be readied, but in
all probability, he could well have been
brought to a standstill by hits in his
running gear. The fighting distances were
so small that even the Cromwells, who
normally stood no chance against a Tiger,
could have scored such hits.
In retrospect, Wittmann could have
driven to an observation point, had his
tanks readied, and then approached with
much greater fighting power and mutual
fire protection. And even if enemy tanks
had advanced beyond Point 213 in the
direction of Caen, they would have run
into 1. Kompanie.
Driving all alone into an enemy-
held town is not up for debate and it is
unclear what he hoped to achieve by it.
It broke all the rules of tank actions, and
Wittmann paid for his tactical error by
having his tank knocked out.
It should also be added that the
subsequent tank attack by parts of the
Panzer Lehr Division, and almost the
entire 1./SS-101, towards Villers-Bocage
and without infantry support, does
not exactly correspond to operational
principles and doctrines which stipulate
that towns and villages are to be avoided
by tanks as far as possible. Thus, it is
understandable that significant losses
soon followed.
In summary, it can be said that the
use of the two Tiger companies (together
with elements of the Panzer Lehr
Division) averted the danger of a decisive
British breakthrough. But the critical
comments on its execution, and the
open question of whether Wittmann’s
personal actions were decisive for the
battle, remain valid points for debate.
That Wittmann’s supposed number
of tank kills that day continue to
be unquestioned by many simply
perpetuates a myth, originally created
by Nazi propaganda, that Wittmann
was entirely responsible for German
successes in that action. It is thus
necessary to look objectively at what
really happened at Villers-Bocage.
In conclusion, it is worth recording
that Wittmann’s last operation at
Gaumesnil on 8 August 1944, and which
resulted in his death, was another failure
of tactical ability.
That failure had seen a badly carried
out attack which had no flank protection
and allowed Wittmann’s carelessly
advancing Tiger to be taken out by a
Firefly.

36 ❙ IRON CROSS
Knights of the Luftwaffe

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 OPINION

The Forbidden Symbol

In the first of an occasional series, we give readers a platform to air their views. To
launch these pieces, Joe Fry looks at the controversial subject of swastikas in the
context of military history and in vehicle and aircraft restoration.

recent feature in Iron Cross
magazine (Issue # 13) looked
at the wartime deletion of
swastika emblems on the
Messerschmitt Bf 109 aircraft of III/JG53
by that unit’s pilots. Whilst the context
is rather different than that which is
discussed here, the topic resonated with
the writer in terms of the use of the
swastika today in the heritage sector.
Such is the symbolic strength of the
swastika, that it must first be made clear
that this article does not in any way
support the evils of Nazi ideology that
it has come to represent. Nor does it
seek to minimise the powerful impact
that the symbol continues to have today,
since its appropriation by the Nazi party.
Indeed, it is perfectly understandable
that in post-war Germany anything to
do with the Nazi party was consigned to
destruction as a reaction to the atrocities
committed under their banner. This
continued in the decades immediately
following the Second World War when
the memory of war was still vivid in the
minds of survivors and relatives. It was
for this reason, for example, that model
aircraft manufacturers of the 1960s did
not include a swastika in kits’ decals or
box art.
The swastika was not an invention
of the Nazi party and thus was not
always an icon to the heinous deeds
and beliefs of the Third Reich. It is as
a result of this changeable connection
between symbols and ideology that the
writer seeks to highlight the doubtful
efficacy of pan-European attempts to
cover up the swastika or selectively
ban it. Furthermore, he questions the
wisdom of such aspects of the symbol’s
exclusion – particularly in respect of its
association with heritage objects and
projects.
Whilst this article will challenge the
increasingly strict legislation on this
matter across the globe, one exception
should be noted – that of Germany –
where the author accepts that given
the recent history of the nation, the

■ The partial swastika. The practice of marking historic aircraft with partial elements of the swastika has become more commonplace in recent years.
However, this aircraft, a Spanish built HA-1112-M1L Buchon, is a type that regularly represents the Messerschmitt Bf 109 in Luftwaffe service. In this
instance, the aircraft is on the German civil aircraft register (D-FMVS) and thus explaining the sensitivity of displaying the swastika in this instance.
(via JF)

38 ❙ IRON CROSS

ban of any display of the swastika is
understandable – even generations on.
ALL OUT BAN
There remains today a fascination with
the Third Reich, and that cannot be
argued. However, such fascination or
interest should not be automatically taken
as some kind of tacit approval of Nazi
Germany and its deeds.
The Third Reich’s advanced technology,
artefacts, and awesome power all came
from a near-bankrupt country which, in
little more than a dozen years following
the First World War, took on the
military might of America, Great Britain
and Russia combined. It is necessary
that we continue to engage with this
history in order to better understand
how and why this occurred. And whilst
the overwhelming majority of those
interested in the subject entirely reject
the racist doctrines of the Nazi party
that resulted in the Holocaust and
other unimaginable crimes, it must be
recognised that there exists an increasing
number of people who admire it. Ignoring
this deeply despairing and troubling fact
would be at the very best disrespectful
to the memory of those we attempt
to honour and, at the very worst, it is
extremely dangerous.
It is necessary, of course, to always
be mindful of any attempt to dilute or
ignore the history of the Third Reich,
as this could well risk not dismantling
the threat from the extreme right but
instead push it into the shadows where it
would surely become ever more difficult
to fight. After all, it is often said that
those who do not learn from their past
are doomed to repeat it. In this vein,
the writer argues that seeking an all-out
ban on the swastika is undesirable. Its
universal concealment will not alter its
use, its glorification, or its past. Instead,
it might well represent a step towards
obscuring elements of that inglorious
time in 20th century history from which
we must continue to learn for as long as
humanity exists.
The swastika was a symbol used by
all branches of the Nazi military, and
especially by the Third Reich political
organisations. Even though vast numbers
of combatants were likely not idealised
Nazis, they fought on behalf of that
regime and, at least in part, for what they
believed were grave injustices meted
■ The removal
of swastikas on
the fins of the
Messerschmitt Bf
109 E aircraft of III/
JG53 in 1940 (see
issue #13 of Iron
Cross magazine)
prompted the
author of this
piece to consider
the use or display
of the swastika
in the historical
and collecting
sphere – albeit that
the deletion of III/
JG53’s swastikas
was an altogether
different context.
(AS)
out to the German people following the
treaty of Versailles.
The swastika was originally - and still
is - a Eurasian good-luck icon that is
at least 3,000 years old. In Hinduism,
it is an important spiritual icon along
with its counterpart, the left facing
sauwastika, with both symbols still highly
revered in many Asian cultures today. Its
significance as a symbol of prosperity
and good fortune led to its increasing use
in the Western world at the turn of the
20th Century, from US fuel companies
and confectionary brands to the Finnish
Air Force who used it in their emblem
from 1918 until as recently as 2020.
THIRD REICH ARTEFACTS
It is perhaps hardly surprising that the
swastika was officially adopted by the
Nazi party in March 1933, well before the
true horror of their political ambitions
became apparent. There was a great
interest among the Nazi leadership
in symbolism and ancient history -
especially if it conveniently fitted Nazi
ideals. Many of their symbols came from
old religious and Nordic iconography,
▲
with Himmler taking note of similar
IRON CROSS ❙ 39
OPINION

■ As the emblem
of the Third Reich’s
criminal and
barbarous regime,
the swastika is
seen as a symbol of
evil. Its continued
use or display
in any historical
context is thus
understandably
mired in
controversy and
poses difficult
questions. (Colour
by RJM)

symbols found in ancient churches Nazi flags, which the author can find no extremist political groups in many
– especially if connected to the Holy understandable reason for anybody to countries (regardless of the symbol they
Grail and the Templars. On a visit to want to buy), the online sale of material choose to represent them) does not seem
Montserrat monastery in northern Spain featuring the swastika has resulted in to alter the proliferation of such factions
in October 1940, Himmler carefully the bizarre practice of sellers altering who have seen a rise in recruitment via
recorded the many carved stone images images by adding an insignificant dot the use of social media. This is despite
on the buildings resembling versions of to the symbol which, perversely, simply a ban on associated iconography –
the swastika. These were reproduced draws more attention to it. because, simply put, banning an image
almost exactly on many of the so-called We know that associated with extremism does not
‘Tinnies’, the cheaply made badges sold the ban on change or alter the spread of ideas. If it
to raise money for the Nazi party and
German charitable causes.
It is impossible to avoid seeing
and displaying (or even touching) the
swastika on a vast array of Second
World War objects both in museums
and private collections, and it is quite
legal everywhere in the world to trade
and collect Third Reich artefacts
specifically. And yet, displaying swastikas
in public is now banned throughout
most of mainland Europe. Even with
online militaria auctioneers, where
■ Many international online auction sites allow the sale of Third Reich military collectables
the sale of Third Reich paraphernalia
but prohibit the showing of any swastikas. Efforts to delete are seen by some as simply
(either reproduction or of an original serving to highlight them. Here, a wound badge and medal bar have had the swastika emblems
Nazi provenance) is permitted, the obliterated. In Germany today, it is legal to sell items branded with the swastika so long as the
appearance of a swastika is not. ‘anti-constitutional’ symbol is covered up by the dealer. However, this only applies to material
produced up to 1945 while the sale of replica Nazi era military uniforms, badges, flags etc. is
Putting aside items with no historical
forbidden. (DKM)
value (such as modern reproduction

40 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Since 1918, the Finnish Air Force used the swastika in its emblems and
its aircraft carried blue swastikas on a white disc. However, the use of
the swastika by the Finns had no political relevance and did not signify
any ‘allegiance’ to or recognition of the Nazi party. Nevertheless, the
Finnish government dropped its use as recently as 2020 to avoid any
confusion or mistaken connection to the Nazi symbol. Ahead of Finland’s
admission to NATO, this was likely a wise decision.
■ As early as the 1960s, model aircraft kit manufacturers were omitting
the swastika from decal sheets and box artwork. In this instance,
a Revell aircraft kit of the Focke-Wulf 190 has had the swastika
incorrectly replaced with a Balkankreuz, albeit that this aircraft and
the Balkankreuz symbol are inextricably linked to the Third Reich and
Nazism. Nevertheless, this action made the model saleable in post-war
West Germany. (Andy Godfrey)

did, then one might be tempted to argue
for a ban on all photographs of Hitler
himself, for example.
In addition, in today’s world of digital
media, it is near impossible to enforce
a ban on the use of the swastika in such
circles anyway. Where a ban on the
swastika does impact, however, is in the
heritage sector. Here, the case for its use
is entirely different.
THE HERITAGE SECTOR
Displaying the swastika on the side of
a carefully restored military vehicle or
Messerschmitt aircraft is not promoting
or glorifying a political party or ideology.
Instead, it seeks to educate by restoring a
part of historical technology, accurately
and historically reflecting how it would
have originally appeared. Surely this
cannot be compared to its use by flag
waving neo-nazis?
The restoration of such aeroplanes
and vehicles is often the result of an
individual’s life’s work, or else dedicated
efforts by museums and volunteer
groups in the heritage sector, to ensure
the continuation of education on the
cataclysmic historical context from
which they originate. However, some
owners feel compelled to paint on
a ‘politically acceptable’ version of
the swastika. This not only ruins the
is quite obviously transparent! These
emblems show only parts of an outline of
the forbidden symbol, but in such a way
that is beyond risible. In much the same
way as the little red or white dots of the
auction house, so this strange emblem
attracts more attention than would a
complete and unadulterated swastika.
The swastika cannot be un-invented,
and banning it surely risks idolisation
and covert attention by focusing on it as
if it were the source of all the evil rather
than properly educating the public as
to its association with the Nazi party.
Such a ban could surely even result in
encouraging a right-wing view if enforced
in an irrational manner.
As an example, some while ago, a
well-known national military museum
in the UK gave a lifetime ban to a veteran
Luftwaffe pilot visiting an air show
there because he wore a tiny lapel pin
incorporating the Luftwaffe eagle and
swastika - and yet German aircraft on
display in that same museum (and flown
in the air show) had swastika markings
boldly on display!
The illogicality of this story caught the
attention of the media, acting as a dog
whistle to those seeking to disparage
any liberal ideal as ‘wokeism’ and further
encouraging division. This incident surely
highlights the importance of considering
the context of the swastika’s use. Whilst
well have been more than ill-advised, it
was very likely done in all innocence and
was something which bewildered the
elderly gentleman through what he rightly
perceived to be a double standard.
Another example can be seen in a
recently republished edition of The
Passenger by Ulrich Alexander Boschwitz.
This is a fictional story about a Jewish
man fleeing Nazi persecution and was
written in 1939. The illustration on the
front cover of early editions of a recent
publication of the book, shows the subject
fleeing in a German station adorned
with swastika flags. In subsequent
editions, however, the swastikas have
been erased. This renders the illustration
of an exceedingly good novel about a
Jewish man’s struggle to evade the Nazis
visually meaningless. At first glance, the
illustration instead suggests the subject
is running because he is late for the train,
or he hasn’t paid for his ticket! Without
swastikas, the red banners hanging in the
station have lost all context and meaning.
‘RED BARON’ KITE
Taking into consideration a lack of
thought and irregular application of the
ban, it is concerning that concealment
of the swastika is motivated by political
appeasement and represents little but a
superficial attempt to tackle the insidious
▲

authenticity of the machines, but it the veteran’s wearing of the badge may rise in right-wing extremism, rather than

IRON CROSS ❙ 41
OPINION
any committed investment in doing so.
If anything proves that further education
is required on these issues, then the case
of Australian store Kmart is a perfect
example.
In 2020, Kmart were widely criticised
for selling a kite shaped like a red triplane
with an Iron Cross symbol printed on the
wings. This design was loosely based on
the aircraft of Manfred von Richthofen
(the famed ‘Red Baron’), and yet Kmart
were forced to remove it from sale and
apologise for the use of so-called ‘Nazi
iconography’ and for the offence that
they had caused.
This nonsense demonstrated a
desperate lack of education and
any understanding as to what ‘Nazi
iconography’ is. As we know, Manfred
von Richthofen pre-dated the Nazi era by
some twenty years. Not only that, but the
Iron Cross is a German national symbol
and has nothing to do with the Nazis per
se; only in as much as they continued
with its use as a ‘Nazified’ award.
Further, if Kmart’s shoppers were
offended by this child’s kite, then
imagine how they might feel were
Germany (an ally of Australia) to send
a contingent of its military aircraft or
42 ❙ IRON CROSS
vehicles to the country on an exchange
or goodwill visit since all their vehicles
and aircraft are marked with an Iron
Cross emblem identical to that on the
Kmart toy. And if a ban is also sought on
the Iron Cross, then this very magazine
would surely be in trouble in Australia!
Another reason that is often (and
entirely understandably) given in support
of a total ban is that the swastika is
simply incredibly offensive to many
people due to the atrocities committed
■ Pre-dating the appropriation of the swastika
by the Nazi party, its use in marketing by
various brand names was not unusual. These
examples date from the 1920s and there is
often surprise at the use of the ‘Nazi symbol’
by brands like Coca-Cola when examples
of this pendant turn up decades later. The
reality, of course, is that its use in this context
had no connection to the Nazi era.
■ So-called Nazi ‘tinnies’
were cheap badges sold
for charities etc. in Third
Reich Germany. Many were
overtly military in nature,
but others represented
the swastika symbol as
used by a variety of other
cultures and societies.
(Bunker Militaria)
by the Nazi party - in particular, of course,
to the Jewish community and other
persecuted groups. Again, this surely
depends upon the circumstances and
context in which the swastika is displayed
or shown?
If it is to educate, then is it any more
offensive in that context, say, than the
‘Arbeit Macht Frei’ slogan still chillingly
displayed above the main gate of
Auschwitz? Similarly, that piece of dark
symbolism exists to remember and to
educate – as should, the writer argues,
the display of the swastika in any proper
and appropriate context. However, it
is accepted that the Auschwitz signage
is in a controlled and memorialised
environment, whereas the counter
argument might reasonably be that
swastika usage elsewhere is not controlled
and might be used in a ‘hate’ context.
Although the writer argues that this is not
going to be the case in the heritage sector
where historical accuracy and education
are key.
If the sight of a swastika makes one
shiver and soberly reflect upon what it
once represented, then surely this can
only be a good thing? And pasting paper
stickers over swastika emblems on
historic military vehicles at displays and
exhibitions in Europe and elsewhere does

■ Same book, two covers. This engaging and highly recommended novel,
published by Pushkin Press, tells the story of a Jewish man fleeing Nazi
persecution. One book jacket showed red banners with swastikas in an
image which dramatically told its own story. Another ‘sanitised’ version
depicted the red banners with the swastikas removed, thereby losing all
sense of the drama unfolding and what the novel might be about.
■ This ‘Red Baron’ kite caused outrage and indignation when it went on
sale in the Australian store Kmart a few years ago. The store withdrew
the kite and apologised for the offence it had caused. It was a perfect
example illustrating a wider lack of understanding as to what ‘Nazi
iconography’ actually is. In this instance, of course, the Iron Cross
emblem has no connection to the Nazi party and is still the symbol of the
German Bundeswehr today.

nothing to make the horrors of the Third
Reich recede. As ever, context is all.
DIFFICULT AND DIVISIVE
SUBJECT
Taking the argument one step further,
then one might ask why is a ban not
sought on the Hammer and Sickle and
Red Star? These communist symbols
are banned in many former Eastern
Bloc nations such as Hungary, Georgia,
Latvia and most pertinently, Ukraine.
This in response to the millions of deaths
attributed to Stalin’s regime and, later, the
USSR. Yet, in the rest of Europe, there are
no regulations against their use.
Looking to the east, we can find another
example: Mao Zedong, responsible for the
deaths of an estimated 55 million people.
Again, his image can be found adorning
tee-shirts in high street stores across the
west. How can this double standard be
justified? Where does it end, and most
importantly, what does it really achieve?
If any reminder were necessary that
the threat of atrocities in Europe is once
again growing, then it is the apparently
gratuitous and barbaric violence meted
out today on the civilian population of
Ukraine. This follows the attack on that
nation by the inheritors of the Soviet
■ Historical photograph - or an image
promoting hate? This photograph of pre-war
Lufthansa pilot, Hans Bauer, resulted in the
seller being permanently banned from an
online auction site for selling an image that
‘promoted race hate’ because of the swastika
image. Although Bauer later went on to
become Hitler’s personal pilot, it is difficult to
see this as anything other than an historical
image. Perversely, the same auction site
allows the sale of Third Reich postage stamps
which display both the swastika and Hitler’s
head as well as the selling of history books
which contain images of swastikas. (AS)
killing machine - not displaying a swastika
or the Hammer and Sickle, but instead
the letter ‘Z’. This amply demonstrates
that it is not the symbol that is evil, but
the perpetrators of the crimes.
Despite all, the writer accepts that
this a difficult and divisive subject, but
it is one which is of direct interest to all
those involved with any aspect of Second
World War military history. That remains
the case whether they are historians,
collectors, appropriate living history
actors, auctioneers, museums, publishers,
heritage sector restorers or even model
makers and kit manufacturers.
There exists a never-ending supply of
icons and imagery waiting to be hijacked
by wicked regimes, and if we continue
to focus our efforts on chasing a ban on
iconography then we remain distracted
from what it is that these forces of evil are
really doing and have done.
Editor: Would you like to challenge the
viewpoint of Joe Fry? Or perhaps write
your own ‘Opinion’ piece for Iron Cross
magazine? If so, please contact us at:
andy.saunders@warnersgroup.co.uk
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article do
not necessarily reflect those of the publisher or
the editor.

IRON CROSS ❙ 43
 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
All images via the author unless otherwise credited

■ An example of the many mistakes made by Germany’s Idflieg organisation during the First World War is illustrated by the Albatros J.I (J.I 758/17 shown)
which used the wings and rear fuselage of the Albatros C.XII. The C.XII was powered by the 260 hp Mercedes D.IVa, whereas the much heavier, armoured
J.I was powered by the 200 hp Benz Bz.IV. Compared to the lighter and more powerful C.XII, the J.I had higher stall speed and lower maximum speed,
reducing its flight envelope and significantly compromising its safety and agility during flight. Note that repaired bullet holes in the fabric have been
painted with British roundels.

Idflieg’s Errors
Its enemies having vastly superior industrial capacities, Germany was also hampered by
shortages of essential resources and needed to maximise and exploit any advantage it
could obtain. Jack Herris considers the performance of Germany’s aviation inspectorate,
Idflieg, in respect of those immense challenges.

M
ost of those who are interested in First
World War aviation probably first became
fascinated by the subject after reading stories
of pilots’ heroic adventures flying primitive
wood and fabric aircraft in deadly duels - and without
parachutes. The ‘novelty’ of such combat, and the courage
needed to participate in that new adventure, appeals to
the appreciation of the heroism involved. Additionally, the
unsophisticated technology of the early aircraft involved is
also of interest to many.
However, beyond the heroic exploits or even comparison
of the relative merits of the opposing aircraft types, one
needs to look at the greater context of the warring powers
and the different situations confronting the combatants.
In this respect, it is important to consider how effectively
Idflieg*, the German Inspectorate of Flying Troops, guided
development and procurement of German warplanes given
Germany’s strategic situation.
The main antagonists, Britain, France and Germany, were
reasonably well matched in technology and productivity of
their respective industries. Germany was larger and more
populous than France, and it had a more powerful army. On
the other hand, both Britain and France had more valuable
overseas empires with large populations and plentiful
natural resources. Russia, allied to France and Britain, had a
huge army but little industry, and the United States entered
the conflict too late to be a major factor in the air war.
The winning Allied advantage was Britain’s Royal Navy,
by far the world’s largest and most powerful navy. After
the outbreak of war, the Royal Navy instituted a distant

*Idflieg was short for Inspektion der Fliegertruppen and was the Imperial German bureau that oversaw all German military aviation prior to and during
the First World War. Founded in 1911, Idflieg was the administrative part of the Fliegertruppen des Deutschen Kaiserreiches (German Flying Corps) which
became the Luftstreitkräfte in 1916.

44 ❙ IRON CROSS
naval blockade that Germany was unable to break, with
the result that Britain and France had access to the world’s
resources and Germany’s resources were severely limited.
Once the war of manoeuvre transitioned into the trench
war of attrition in November 1914, Germany had no realistic
chance of ever winning the war and was condemned to
always be outnumbered on the ground and, importantly
for this article, outnumbered in the air as well. This had a
fundamental impact on Idflieg’s decisions, many of which
will be discussed here.

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

Germany & Austria-Hungary Allies (Britain, France, Russia)
Land power Sea Power (Britain) + land power (France
& Russia)
Blockaded Access to world’s resources
Numerical inferiority Numerical superiority ■ The Junkers J.I is one of the best examples of an Idflieg success. Not
only was it a very successful example of a new category of aircraft, the
J-type armoured infantry cooperation aircraft, it was the world’s first all-
As we have seen, the First World War was a war fought metal production aircraft. Here we see J.I 134/17 of Pour le Mérite winning
between major industrial powers, and each combatants’ Leutnant Schreiber, one of those sat on the wing.
production of aircraft and aircraft engines was a critical
contributor to its air arm. The table in the box below shows
aviation production for each major combatant:

WW1 AVIATION PRODUCTION

Country # Aircraft # Aero engines Notes
Germany 50,296 43,486 Inadequate engine
production
Austria-Hungary 5,286 4,902 Inadequate engine
production
Subtotal 55,582 48,388 Great numerical inferiority
Central Powers dictated being on the
strategic defensive
France 51,700 92,386 Most successful aviation
industry
Britain 52,027 41,034 Heavily dependent on
France for engines
Italy 11,986 14,849 Most successful of minor
powers
Russia 5,607 1,511 Very dependent on France
for engines
USA 10,980 32,420 Most aircraft were trainers
Subtotal Allies 132,300 182,200 Numerical superiority gave
air superiority

The most significant fact shown by the table above is that

the Allies enjoyed a huge numerical advantage in terms
of airframes and aero engines. In particular, France had
a major aero engine production advantage not apparent
from the table is that France also supplied aero engines and
complete aircraft to all other Allied powers.

The United States did not enter the war until April 1917,
and no US-designed aircraft appeared over the Western
Front; the US primarily relied on French aircraft for combat.
The 400 hp V12 Liberty engine would be the only true
American aviation success story of the war.

■ Claude Dornier, chief designer at the Zeppelin-Lindau works, focused on

UNLIMITED RESOURCES all-metal aircraft, initially giant flying boats for the German Navy. Here, the
Always having the numerical advantage, the Allies decided Zeppelin Rs.IV is in flight over Lake Constance. In March 1918, the preceding
▲

to maximise that advantage by producing large numbers Rs.III giant all-metal flying boat was delivered to the SVK at Warnemünde.

IRON CROSS ❙ 45
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
■ The world’s first all-metal production fighter was the Junkers D.I.
of aircraft of a limited number of types. For example, the
British F.E.2 was in combat for the entire war. The F.E.2b
entered combat in an air fighting role, quickly transitioned
to a reconnaissance role, and ended the war as a night
bomber. A two-seat pusher of modest performance, it failed
in its air fighting role – as did all other aircraft fulfilling that
role due to its fallacious concept which was based on naval
combat and did not consider the third dimension available
to aircraft: altitude.
Transitioning to reconnaissance, F.E.2b crews adopted
tactics to survive in air combat and fulfill their mission.
Installation of the excellent Rolls-Royce V12 significantly
improved its performance and enabled it to carry more
■ Zeppelin D.I 1751/18 Ersatz was an example of Dornier’s all-metal semi-
monocoque construction that was the most advanced structural design of
the First World War, a construction technique that is still used today.
46 ❙ IRON CROSS
armament but did not solve its vulnerability to fighters
because it was a pusher. As German fighter performance
and tactics continued to improve, the F.E.2d (as the Rolls-
Royce powered version was called) became too vulnerable
in daylight combat and transitioned to night bombing, thus
enabling it to serve at the front until the Armistice.
Having essentially unlimited resources, the Allies were
able to invest those resources to develop and produce
many different engine designs, and in large quantities.
Engines feature many parts designed and built to very
precise tolerances and bringing a new engine from concept
to production — if it was able to perform well enough to
warrant production — typically required about 18 months.
In contrast, airframes do not require the precise tolerances
of engines, and a new airframe design could be brought
to production status in four to six months — again, if its
performance warranted production.
Being resource limited, Germany’s Idflieg chose a strategy
in contrast to the Allies in several respects. First, Idflieg
was much more conservative in engine development and
production, preferring to manufacture a limited number of
successful engine designs to maximize engine production.
To achieve superior performance, Idflieg decided to
continuously develop new airframes. After all, producing a
new airframe with relatively simple technology was much
easier and faster than introducing a new and complex
engine through to production.
Moreover, instead of producing large quantities of
basic designs, Idflieg fostered development of specialised
aircraft types for different roles. The goal was to maximise
 ■ Ago C.I 96/15 of
FFA 9b was one of
the few German
pusher designs. It
was purchased by
the Bavarians for
Bavarian units, but
Idflieg opposed
pushers despite
their excellent
field of view for
the observer. Only
about 64 Ago
C.I aircraft were
purchased.

performance in these roles. Examples include N-types

(single-engine night bombers), CL-types (escort fighters that
evolved into ground-attack aircraft), and J-types (armoured
infantry cooperation aircraft that also evolved to also
undertake the ground-attack role).
Although N-types were soon abandoned in preference to
the use of G-type twin-engine bombers, both CL-types and
■ All-metal construction technology spread widely among German
J-types were so successful that the Allies started to develop
manufacturers by the end of the war. Here the Zeppelin-Staaken E.4/20
counterparts, although too late for the war. approaches to land. It was the first all-metal four-engine monoplane
transport in the world.
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
DEPENDED ON STRATEGIC SITUATION
Germany Britain & France
this important juncture, Idflieg still continued to stress
Focus on reliable, standardised engines Focus on quantity production of
for greatest production with airframes standardised, general-purpose airframes inline six-cylinder engines as it had since 1915.
optimised for each role to compensate to maximise numerical superiority. This V8 configuration offered greater power from its
for numerical inferiority.
Limited use of rotary engines due to Great use of rotary engines to make
additional cylinders, combined with reduced engine size
lack of necessary lubricant, need for use of good power/weight ratio for best and weight, and German engine manufacturers recognised
best reliability, and lowest fuel & oil performance. Later in the war, powerful
consumption. V8s & V12s were common. this and produced a number of prototype V8 engines.
88% of engines were water-cooled, Industrial capacity & resources allowed However, Idflieg did not push to adopt this configuration
six-cylinder in-line, for low drag & good use of V-8s, V-12s, radials, rotaries, and
reliability using minimum consumables. six-cylinder inline engines.
and stayed with the ‘inline six’.
Focus on advanced metal structures and Focus on more powerful engines for As the V8-powered Spad, and later the V8-powered S.E.5a,
aerodynamics for performance. performance. achieved technical superiority over the ‘inline six’ Albatros
fighters, Idflieg supported development of V8 aero engines.
Although Daimler and Benz, the two largest and most
THE BIGGEST FAILURE successful German aero-engine producers, developed V8s,
When the Hispano-Suiza V8 appeared over the front, and both companies eventually brought their V8 engines
installed in the Spad 7 in August 1916, the future of to production status, these engines were too late, and no
aero-engines was on display. The V-engines had more German warplane powered by a V8 engine appeared over
development potential, and in the Second World War the front during the war.
▲

basically all liquid-cooled engines were V12s. However, at Similarly, whereas V12 engines could be developed

IRON CROSS ❙ 47
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

relatively straight-forwardly from combining successful

■ Germany experimented with stealth at this early date; here Linke-
Hofmann R.I has had the rear fuselage covered in Cellon.
six-cylinder inline engines, Idflieg first tried to achieve
greater power from six-cylinder engines. When that was
not successful, Idflieg finally decided to ask for V12 engines,
especially for R-type giant bombers. Again, no German
warplane powered by a V12 engine appeared in combat
during the war, and while German engine manufacturers
recognised the benefit of the V12 and developed a number
of prototypes, Idflieg did not press development. This
was partly due to the extra engineering, production, and
consumable resources needed.
In contrast, Rolls-Royce produced many very valuable
V12 engines that were applied to flying boats, the DH-4, and
the Bristol F2b. America’s only significant aviation success
during the war was designing and producing the V12 Liberty
engine to supplement production of the Rolls-Royce Eagle
V12.
The result of Idflieg’s engine policy was that the Allies led
aero-engine development throughout the last two years of
the war.

SUCCESS AND MISTAKES

On the other hand, Idflieg’s airframe policy was generally a
success as they continually requested development of new
aircraft types and fostered development of all-metal aircraft.
Junkers introduced the world’s first all-metal aircraft, the J.I
infantry cooperation aircraft, into production, the Junkers
being very successful in combat. Additionally, Claude
Dornier, chief designer for the Zeppelin-Lindau division,
developed the most sophisticated all-metal aircraft as
exemplified by the Zeppelin (aka Dornier) D.I fighter. This

■ Above: The Fokker E.III was another type

that experimented with Cellon for stealth;
E.III 369/16 is shown here. The experiment
was not successful because Cellon was
weak, easily torn, and absorbed water and
became loose on the airframe. Although
Cellon reduced visibility, it was also shiny
and reflected light like glass.
■ Right: Designed as a high-performance
replacement for the Ago C.I, the Ago C.IV
was one of the fastest German two-
seaters, partly as a result of its tapered
wing planform that reduced induced
drag. Unfortunately, the C.IV was not
as robust as the C.I nor did it have good
handling qualities which was also due to
the tapered wing planform. Without more
advance techniques developed years later,
the wing stalled first at the tips, causing
the ailerons to lose their effectiveness
at a critical flight condition. The initial
C.IV was modified for improved handling
qualities by addition of fixed fin and
ailerons on all four wings as illustrated
here. Handling was improved but it was
still dangerous and finally pilots refused
to fly it.

48 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ The Fokker Dr.I was Germany’s only successful use of the triplane configuration. Shown here is the aircraft famously flown by Manfred von
Richthofen. (Colour by RJM)
semi-monocoque all-metal construction method is used to
the present day.
Idflieg also avoided the use of the pusher configuration
for reconnaissance aircraft. In contrast, the Allies
maintained mediocre reconnaissance designs, including
a large number of pushers. These remained in production
long past the time they ceased to be competitive in combat.
Anthony Fokker’s development of the wooden cantilever
wing was sparked by his Idflieg-forced association with
Hugo Junkers, during which he flew an early all-metal
prototype monoplane with thick cantilever wing. However,
this technical breakthrough was essentially a private effort.
Idflieg’s frequent introduction of new types kept
German aircraft, especially two-seaters, at the forefront
of performance during the war - despite no V12s to
power them. Meanwhile, development of production all-
metal aircraft meant Germany led the Allies in airframe
technology at war’s end.
At least twice, Idflieg encouraged German manufacturers
to copy Allied design concepts; first with the Neiuport
sesquiplane wing cellule, and later with the triplane wing
configuration used by the Sopwith Triplane. While copying
an opponent’s designs and tactics has a long history, doing
so at a time of rapid technological change means the copier
is always technically behind the originator.
The Nieuport fighter was introduced when the Fokker
Eindecker was the leading fighter, and while the Nieuports
initially did not have the synchronised machine guns
enjoyed by the Eindeckers, the Nieuports had better speed,
climb, and manoeuvrability. When some Nieuport fighters
were captured, Idflieg distributed detailed technical data
along with several examples to German manufacturers and
requested the manufacturers utilise the sesquiplane wing
cellule. The results ranged from the SSW D.I, which was
basically a copy of the Nieuport, to the Albatros D.III, which
applied sesquiplane wing cellule construction to the D.II.
The D.III had a better speed and climb rate than the D.II
due to the improved aerodynamic performance of the
higher aspect ratio wing. However, the single-spar lower
wing was a structural disaster. Although it was strong
enough statically, the single spar wing was subject to ‘flutter’,
a rapid oscillation of the wing bending around its spar,
which could result in immediate and disastrous wing failure.
This adversely affected the Albatros D.III, and it was a worse
problem with the D.V, limiting pilot confidence in the
aircraft. In April 1917, though, German aviation achieved its
greatest — and last — superiority over Allied, and especially
British, aviation.
At that time, the only British fighter superior to the
Albatros D.III was the Sopwith Triplane. Germany had not
yet fully absorbed the mistake of copying the Nieuport
sesquiplane wing when Idflieg assumed that the secret
of the Sopwith Triplane’s superiority lay in its triplane
▲
configuration.
IRON CROSS ❙ 49
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

■ The SSW D.I was

a direct Nieuport
copy, and a small
number were
evaluated at
the front. Here,
Leutnant Kurt
Schneider is in
the cockpit of D.I
3761/16 at Jasta
5. Not surprisingly,
by the time the
D.I arrived at
the front, it was
obsolescent. The
worst damage
copying the
Nieuport wing
cellule caused was
the weakness of
the Albatros D.III
and, even worse,
the D.V/Va.

As a result, and by early 1917, Idflieg asked German

■ The Pfalz Dr.I had the best climb rate of any First World War German
fighter, but its Sh.III counter-rotary engine was not yet developed enough for
production.
manufacturers to explore the triplane configuration for
fighters. The result was Germany’s ‘triplane craze’ that
lasted for most of the rest of 1917 and caused a huge waste
of valuable engineering time and resources while it lasted. A
careful thought experiment reveals that the three wings of a
triplane necessarily have more drag than a similar biplane,
but many prototype triplane fighters were built in Germany
to find the secret of the Sopwith Triplane.
Only two successful triplane fighters were developed in
Germany; one was the well-known Fokker Dr.I, which saw
limited production and became famous for its appearance
and use by the ‘Red Baron’ after he became Germany’s
most famous ace. The other was the Pfalz Dr.I, with its
exceptional climb performance provided by its innovative
Sh.III counter-rotary engine. However, the Sh.III was not
yet ready for production and only ten Pfalz triplanes were
built. Significantly, when the Sh.III was finally produced
in quantity, it powered the new SSW D.III and Pfalz D.VIII
biplane fighters.

UNEXPLAINED FATAL ACCIDENTS

■ When the Sh.III was finally ready for production, it went to the front in the
Pfalz D.VIII biplane, which was clearly derived from the Dr.I. This aircraft was
flown by Paul Bäumer, later to win the Pour le Mérite.
Another serious Idflieg error was the under-powering of
German aircraft designs. Many German aircraft, especially
seaplanes and bombers, were under-powered; charitably,
this was due to the need to save fuel and oil coupled with
inadequate production of more powerful engines. For
floatplanes, the greater drag of the water on floats made
takeoffs more difficult, and the weight and drag of floats
once airborne reduced speed and range, thus making the
use of more powerful engines important for operational
safety and effectiveness.

50 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Germany’s
‘triplane craze’
resulted in several
odd designs, this
being a triplane
development of
the Pfalz D.III. It
had worse speed
and climb than the
original biplane due
to its extra drag.
■ Below: The Naglo
D.I was the final
multiplane fighter
design and the
ultimate absurdity
of the ‘triplane
craze’.

A case in point is the Gotha WD11 torpedo plane, which

had two 160 hp Mercedes D.III engines. In comparison,
the Gotha G.IV bomber, which was very similar in size and
weight, was powered by two 260 hp Mercedes D.IVa engines.
Another bad mistake was the substituting of the lower
powered 200 hp Benz Bz.IV engine in the heavy, armoured,
J-types in place of the 260 hp Mercedes D.IVa. This was
partly inspired by the availability of the 200 hp Benz,
whereas the 260 hp Mercedes was in great demand for
G-types and high-altitude C-types.
Use of the 200 hp Benz made all J-types underpowered,
which made them less safe during normal flight, in addition
to limiting the number of airfields they could use due to
the long take-off run they required. Idflieg’s reason (or
excuse?) was that the J-types depended on their armour, not
■ The BFW N.I represented the convergence of two trends: the N-type
single engine night bomber and the triplane configuration. Despite the
additional drag, the triplane configuration enabled a larger bomb load
speed, for protection. However, due to their greater weight,
the J-types had higher stall speeds coupled with lower
maximum speed. This significantly reduced their flight
envelope, making normal flight more hazardous because
of the danger of stalling the aircraft and a limited ability to
recover from the stall.
While the 260 hp Mercedes was considered for
installation, it never occurred. Had it been used, the aircraft
would have been safer to fly, more able to avoid fighter
attack because of their higher speed and greater agility and
been able to use shorter airfields.
Idflieg also abandoned some very promising fighter
prototypes. During evaluation of the AEG D.I fighter in
summer 1917, it was determined to be much faster than
contemporary front-line German fighters such as the
Albatros D.V. German fighter pilots desperately needed
faster fighters, but after two unexplained fatal accidents,
development of the AEG D.I was abandoned. Was the
aircraft fundamentally flawed? That is unknown, but AEG
D.I prototypes continued to fly without incident for months
after development was abandoned.
▲

due to its large wing area in modest span. It remained a prototype. The Fokker V17 prototype, meanwhile, was very

IRON CROSS ❙ 51
 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

maneuverable, climbed well, and was the fastest fighter at

Germany’s First Fighter Competition in January 1918. It was
a mid-wing monoplane that was allegedly rejected because
of its poor field of view from the cockpit. Interestingly, its
basic configuration was almost standard among Second
World War fighters. It is likely that the real reason it was
not pursued was that it was a cantilever monoplane. By
not ordering at least a small production batch for service
evaluation, Idflieg abandoned a fast, robust, manoeuvrable
fighter that was far in advance of the German fighters then
at the front. ■ The armoured AEG J.II could carry two downward-firing machine
The ill-fated Fokker E.V finally brought many of the guns for ground attack. The gun barrels protrude from the belly
advantages of the V17 — but six months later and with a and are seen between the undercarriage struts. These guns were
fitted to some AEG J.I aircraft as well, and were part of the J-type’s
parasol configuration to address the field of view issue. evolution to a ground-attack aircraft. The AEG J.I and J.II were the
Ironically, in-flight failures of its parasol wing (due to most numerous J-types. As with all other J-types, they were powered
Fokker’s typically poor production quality control) ruined by the Benz Bz.IV.
its debut and kept it away from the front until the war’s
last weeks. Moreover, when the world’s first all-metal
fighter debuted, the Junkers D.I, its cantilever monoplane Was the reason due to undue influence by the powerful
configuration was very similar to the Fokker V17. Albatros company on Idflieg? At this late date, we will never
A controversial Idflieg procurement decision was the know for certain. However, when the new CL category was
near monopoly the Albatros company enjoyed in fighter established, the Halberstadt CL.II – bearing a very distinct
purchases from late 1916 through to the summer of 1917. family resemblance to the D.IV – was a very successful
Clearly the Albatros fighter family was effective when competitor. Was the comparatively small Halberstadt
introduced, and generally better than competing German company asked to design a CL-type as consolation for no
fighter designs for many months. On the other hand, further fighter development? This question remains, but
contemporary Halberstadt fighters were more robust and now cannot be answered.
manoeuvrable and were thus preferred by many fighter
pilots. The prototype Halberstadt D.IV had more power and
twin guns to compete with the Albatros but was rejected due DEALT A LOSING HAND
to a design flaw. The aircraft was supposed to be modified Idflieg’s contemporaries, however, were not without their
and re-evaluated, but that apparently never happened. own mistakes and when the Fokker cantilever wing debuted
Darren Harbar / World War One Aviation Heritage Trust

Lozenge pattern printed fabric

As Idflieg struggled with improving
productivity throughout the war, while
at the same time reducing the need
for reliance on the limited availability
of resources, one small success was
the development and employment of
printed camouflage fabric towards the
middle of 1916.
The official name for the printed
fabric was Flugzeugstoff, developed
■ Printed lozenge under the name Ballonstoff because
fabric as seen on this it was originally conceived to replace
Albatros DVa at The the more visible yellowish colour of
Shuttleworth Trust, observation balloons. In modern-day
Old Warden. (Darren parlance, it is generally referred to as
Harbar) ‘lozenge fabric’ due to its design.
■ Right: An example of Printing the camouflage fabric using
original German First coloured ink eliminated the need to
World War lozenge paint the completed airframe, which
camouflage fabric. (AS) was labour-intensive, used a great
deal of paint, and weighed more than
printed ink material. Quite apart from
production and technical advantages,
however, Lozenge camouflage also had
three main advantages when in use:
• The top surface colours were difficult
to see against ground terrain.
• The undersurface colours could
easily match evening or morning
sky colours, with pinks, mauves and
blues being prominently used.
• Optically, it took enemy pilots longer
to decide whether an aircraft was
coming or going.
The colourful lozenge patterned
fabric gave many German aircraft
of the First World War a unique and
distinctive appearance.

52 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ The massive Gotha WD14 was powered by the 220 hp Benz. Even this large floatplane could not receive the more powerful 260 hp Mercedes D.IVa. This
is marine number 1946.
■ Despite its size and weight being very similar to the Gotha G.IV, the
Gotha WD11 torpedo plane was powered by two 160 hp Mercedes D.III
engines. One consequence was the airframe had to be very lightly-
built to carry a torpedo, and it was very fragile. On 15 June 1917,
marine number 911 torpedoed and sank S.S. Kankakee in the Thames
Estuary for one of the types’ few successes.
■ The AEG D.I was the fastest German fighter of its time. Despite
that, it was abandoned after two fatal accidents, one involving D.I
4400/17 shown here. It was flown at the front by Pour le Mérite ace
Walter Höhndorf on 5 September 1917, when he crashed fatally.
Höhndorf’s unexplained fatal crash ended D.I development despite its
high speed.
in the Fokker Triplane, it was basically ignored by the
Allies because attention was on its triplane configuration.
However, the exceptional handling qualities of the later
Fokker D.VII biplane with their thick Fokker wooden
cantilever wings raised second thoughts. Here was a biplane
that had excellent performance and manoeuvrability and
exceptional handling qualities, could fly at unprecedented
angles of attack and was safe and easy to fly.
At that time, nearly all contemporary aircraft used thin
aerofoils with numerous rigging wires to tie their structure
together. The editor of Flight even commented that the
thick aerofoil had too much drag and was not a good choice
compared to thin aerofoils. What he missed is that the thick,
cantilever aerofoil eliminated the need for drag-producing
rigging wires. The thick cantilever wing thus had less drag
than the thin wing with its required rigging, making it a
better choice both aerodynamically and structurally.
Furthermore, the benign stalling and handling
characteristics of the thick aerofoil sections allowed pilots
■ The Fokker V17 had excellent manoeuvrability and climb rate and was
the fastest competitor at Germany’s First Fighter Competition in January/
February 1918. Despite its exceptional performance, it was not even
produced for an evaluation batch. It was rejected for its poor downward field
of view. However, the Fokker E.I–IV had essentially the same configuration.
▲
IRON CROSS ❙ 53
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

■ The Halberstadt CL.II, which had a strong family resemblance to the D.IV with
internal aileron controls, was a very successful CL-type. Here, six of them from
SchlaGru D are shown in action. The CL-types were very effective in combat.

to fly the D.VII to its limits without major concern, thus

enabling them to get the most out of their aircraft in
combat. In contrast, only expert pilots could safely fly thin-
wing fighters to their absolute limits in combat.
Looking at the situation in context, and due to
Germany’s inferior resource situation, Idflieg had a very
difficult task to keep German aviation in the fight and its
greatest failure was staying with the inline six-cylinder
engine in preference to V8 and V12 engines. However, it
had numerous successes.
Fundamentally, due to resource constraints compared
to its enemy’s access to the world’s resources, Idflieg (and
Germany) had already been dealt a losing hand in the war of
attrition. Even if Idflieg had strongly promoted V-engines, ■ The Fokker D.VII used the thick cantilever wooden wing
and then brought them into production for German developed by Fokker and was the best German fighter, especially
when powered by the over-compressed BMW IIIa engine that was
aircraft in time for combat, the Allies would still have had a optimised for power at high altitude. This is the Jasta 72 lineup,
significant and growing numerical superiority that Germany with the closest aircraft being that of Pour le Mérite ace, Carl
could never have overcome. Menckhoff.

SUMMARY OF GERMAN AIRCRAFT

DEVELOPMENT SUCCESSES & FAILURES
Successes Failures
Development of reliable six-cylinder Inadequate urgency to develop powerful
inline engines. V8 & V12 engines.
Development of over-compressed, high- Encouraging use of the Nieuport
altitude engines. sesquiplane wing.
Development of thick aerofoils and Encouraging use of the triplane
cantilever monoplanes. configuration.
Development of all-metal aircraft. Complacency after Albatros fighters
achieved technical superiority in late
1916.
Development of armoured infantry Under-powering floatplanes and J-types
aircraft. due to rationalisation and shortage of
high-power engines.
Development of specialised two-seat
escort and ground-attack aircraft
■ Despite its good performance, strength, and manoeuvrability, the
(CL-types).
Halberstadt D.IV was rejected for production due to ‘...its unfortunate
Development of armoured J-types for
cabane design.’ From its usual published photograph, that was hard infantry cooperation and ground-attack.
to understand. However, this photo from a different angle shows the
Avoided production of pusher two-
aileron controls exiting the fuselage to the upper wing. The control seaters.
rods created drag and obstructed the pilots’ field of view. The D.IV Development of pre-printed camouflage
was supposed to be modified and re-tested, but there is no record fabric to reduce production time and
that actually happened and the D.IV remained a prototype. resources.

54 ❙ IRON CROSS
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 WAR IN THE AIR
The Ace who Never Was
When the disintegrating wreckage of a Messerschmitt
Bf 109 fell to earth over Kent during 1940, the RAF
could have been forgiven for believing they had
brought down one of the Luftwaffe’s leading aces.
Andy Saunders and Clint Mitchell unravel the tale.
All photographs via authors unless otherwise credited
■ Major Werner Mölders with Messerschmitt Bf 109 F-2, W.Nr 6660, which he flew sporadically from December 1940 to 9 May 1941. (Colour by RJM)
O
n 25 October 1940, RAF intelligence were
notified that a Messerschmitt Bf 109 had
been shot down at Marden, Kent, and its pilot
taken prisoner. It was an otherwise far from
remarkable event for the period. However, the discovery
of no less than 49 ‘kill’ markings on the Messerschmitt’s
rudder initially marked this incident out as potentially
being something significant. From such an impressive
tally, the RAF must have initially thought they had
downed one of the Luftwaffe’s leading aces. Nothing
could have been further from the truth.
Investigating the crash site and the wreckage, the RAF’s
Air Intelligence A.I.1(g) section reported:
“Me.109. Crashed on 25.10.40 at Maidstone Road,
Marden. Map Reference: R.1762. There were no
identification markings on the fuselage. Manufacturer’s
plate was not found. Engine: D.B. 601, made by Daimler
Benz, Genshagen, No. 66143. The engine had a large white
‘N’ stencilled on top of the crankcase. Following fighter
action, pilot baled-out at a great height and aircraft broke
up in the air. The wreckage was distributed over a very
wide area. No bullet strikes to be found in the wreckage
56 ❙ IRON CROSS
inspected. Armament: 2 x 20 mm shell guns and 2 x MG
17s traced. Armour: fuselage bulkhead, but none other
found. There were 49 so-called ‘victory’ stripes on the
tail. A civilian who was near the crash stated that the
airscrew blades were covered with ice when the aircraft
crashed.”
While this report stated that no manufacturer’s plate
was found, Luftwaffe records show that the aircraft in
question was Werk Nummer 3737.
Further contemporary reports indicate that the
aircraft fell largely in the vicinity of the Milebush Inn,
Coxhill Farm and Mount Pleasant areas on the B 2079
road to the north of Marden. The diary of an ARP
warden based at Marden recorded the following on 25
October 1940:
“11:55 AM Me 109 disintegrated. Pilot baled-out and
landed at Gravel Pit Farm and taken by ambulance to
West Kent Hospital under military escort. Damage was
caused to roof of the box factory and an outbuilding at
Mount Pleasant.”
Spread across a mile and a quarter, the remains of
the aircraft provided rich pickings for souvenir hunters.
■ Hauptmann Hans Asmus.
■ The standard so-called ‘Alpha-Omega’ report form for investigating
officers of the RAF’s A.I.1(g) section, detailing the various points they
were required to note.
■ Leutnant Erwin Fleig.
‘ONE WAY FLIER’
For their part, the inspectors of A.I.1(g) were briefed to
report only on technical matters relating to the airframe
and engine, and whilst the 49 ‘kill’ tabs were noteworthy, it
was not up to A.I.1(g) to report further on any other aspect
regarding those markings. That was for the officers of
A.I.1(k) to follow-up in their interrogation of the prisoner.
In this case, he turned out to be a certain Hauptmann
Hans Asmus.
It didn’t take long for A.I.1(k) to figure out that Hans
Asmus was not a 49-victory ace. Additionally, the
discovery that Hans Asmus was serving with Stab/JG51
(the staff flight of Jagdgeschwader 51) allowed them to
join up the dots, as it were, in terms of the mysterious 49
victories.
Writing to the editor of Iron Cross magazine in 1980
from his home in Baden Baden, Germany, Hans Asmus
gave a detailed account of what happened that day,
leading up to his captivity:
“I was flying with the Geschwader Stab of JG51 when
I became a ‘one way in one way flier’ during my second
▲
mission on 25 October 1940. I think it was about noon.
IRON CROSS ❙ 57
WAR IN THE AIR

■ Right: One
of Werner
Mölders’ earlier
Messerschmitt Bf
109s, W.Nr 2804,
photographed
during August
1940 as his 32nd
victory is painted
onto the rudder.

■ Below:
Photographed in a
Messerschmitt Bf
109 F-2, Werner
Mölders is seen
here describing an
aerial battle after
returning to his
home airfield.

Prior to my transfer to JG51, I had commanded a tactical

reconnaissance squadron from 1938 round to 1 August
1940. After a short conversion course of about four weeks
on the Messerschmitt 109, I asked my old friend Werner
Mölders for a transfer to the Geschwader Stab of JG51 to get
some experience and action.
“On this day, I was flying Mölders’ Messerschmitt Bf
109 E with the DB601 N engine, a motor with a higher
compression rating and about 100 HP more power that
other 109s. Mölders was flying in the first of the new 109
Fs, and his number two was his usual trusted wingman (or
Katschmarek), Leutnant Irwin Fleig.
“The three of us were about to attack about 15 Spitfires
in close formation, and about 1,500 feet lower than us
and on the opposite heading. We were at an altitude of
approximately 30,000 feet when he went into a wide left
turn to prepare our attack on the Spitfires. Unfortunately,
we then discovered that the squadron we were about to
attack was covered by another full squadron of Spitfires.
“Much to my surprise, I found they were flying some
2,500 feet higher than us. Prior to this, we had not
encountered any aircraft of the RAF that could be beat our
ceiling of more-or-less 30,000 feet.
“In retrospect, I concluded that just as we were using
the 109 F for the first time, so a new model or series of the
Spitfire with an improved boosted engine performance was
put into operation for the first time that day.

58 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Lauded by the
news media and
for propaganda
purposes, Werner
Mölders had his
story published
in ‘Mölders and
His Men’ by Fritz
von Forell and he
also appeared on
the cover of the
magazine ‘Signal’
in December 1940
which depicted
yet another of his
Messerschmitt Bf
109s with victory
tallies on its
rudder.

“Anyway, I could not keep up in my E aircraft with
the faster 109 F of Mölders and found myself in a most
unhealthy tactical position versus 15 Spitfires that were
higher than me and on my tail. I had to get away.
“I put the nose of my aircraft down and dived away from
them on an easterly heading. I then saw a battle formation
of about eight friendly aircraft at about 20,000 feet. I
recovered my aircraft below them and then turned to join
them on a westerly heading, deciding to fly the rest of the
mission with them. Flying singly was not the right way to
operate if you wanted a reasonable degree of survivability!
“I had not yet joined this formation and still had the
Spitfires on my tail, but I can only imagine that the Jabo
formation of 109s above that I had intended to join released
their 250 kg bombs and that one of them hit my aircraft.
I can think of no other explanation for what happened to
me, because when I came back to semi consciousness there
was not much left of my aircraft around me. But I was still
sitting on my seat and falling through the air.
“I just had enough time to unfasten my belt so that the
bucket seat fell off me allowing me to open the parachute.
“I came properly back to consciousness in the General
Hospital at Maidstone. I was told that I had a skull fracture
with the usual attendant retrograde amnesia.
“I would like to say that I was given first class surgical
treatment at the Maidstone hospital. And it was here that I
“The RAF officer who tried to question me, gave me
the impression he had not the slightest idea what had
happened to my aircraft which he said was found in
smithereens scattered over a major portion of the county
of Kent.
“As to the markings carried on my Messerschmitt that
day, I cannot now recall any detail at all - except that it
had a yellow nose.”
After his interrogation, it was noted:
“…the pilot would not discuss anything that he thought
would be of interest. This was the pilot’s second sortie of
the day.”
However, from his identity disc number, RAF
intelligence officers quickly established that Hans Asmus
was serving with Stab/JG51.
From this information, it was a simple matter to
deduce who the 49 victories belonged to. After all, and
with just two sorties to his credit (both on 25 October
1940), Hans Asmus did not have a single victory to his
name. Let alone 49!
However, exactly why the aircraft that Hans Asmus was
flying should have disintegrated in such a spectacular
fashion cannot be confirmed, although it probably wasn’t
hit by a falling bomb from one of the Jabo Messerschmitt
Bf 109s as Asmus had surmised.
A combat report filed by a RAF fighter pilot most likely
▲

experienced my first interrogation. provides the answer.

IRON CROSS ❙ 59
WAR IN THE AIR

‘NOT A PRETTY SIGHT’

Although the A.I.1(g) report stated that no
bullet strikes were found in the inspected
wreckage, that might be explained by the
total disintegration of the aircraft over
such a wide area after having exploded in
mid-air.
The combat report by Pilot Officer
Vivian Snell of 501 Squadron tells
how the Hurricanes of that squadron
found themselves heavily engaged with
Messerschmitt Bf 109s (roughly in the
Marden area) at the corresponding time.
Not only that, but Snell’s report provides
compelling circumstantial evidence.
Flying Hurricane N2438, Snell found a
solitary Messerschmitt Bf 109 in his sight
and briefly thumbed the gun button.
Instantly, the Messerschmitt exploded and
fell to pieces before the eyes of a surprised
Vivian Snell - although he had but seconds
to savour his first success in aerial combat.
Moments later, he was hit and forced to
bale-out over Cranbrook, possibly struck
down by the formation of eight ‘109s that
Hans Asmus had been endeavouring to
join.
There was, though, a second
Messerschmitt Bf 109 which broke up
in mid-air in the same area just five
days later in an incident which also
provided rich pickings for trophy hunters.
According to official reports, the location
of this second crash was at Brook Farm,
Marden, although this was not a strictly
accurate or precise location. In fact,
the aircraft broke up in the air, with
the distribution of wreckage also being
widespread and falling across some three quarters of a the brushes to the canes. When I heard aircraft, I turned to
mile. This was a Messerschmitt Bf 109 of 7./JG26, W.Nr tell the girls that they had better take cover. But there was
5242, flown by Unteroffizier Kurt Töpfer, having been shot no one in sight. They had already taken cover!
down at around 12.00 hours on 30 October 1940.* “Suddenly, there was a long burst of gunfire, and then a
Mist and low cloud during the morning of that day bang. This was followed by rushing noises and as I looked
prevented those on the ground from seeing exactly what up, I saw a rain of pieces falling out of the low clouds.
happened – or being able to see the aircraft disintegrate - Immediately, I jumped on my bicycle and rode off to
although farm worker George Collins of Marden provided where I suspected whatever it was had fallen - or would
a first-hand account of what he heard and saw when fall. First, I came across the tail section of a Messerschmitt
interviewed by the editor of Iron Cross magazine in 1986: 109 in a small orchard at Little Brook Farm. Around the
“I was working in a field on Spitzfield Farm tying up corner, at Mr Russell’s Longend Farm, I came across a
loganberry canes. I was planting the canes and being council roadman, Alf Kingsnorth, in an open meadow
followed some yards behind by 12 women who were tying with PC Albert White from Collier Street. I went over to

*Coincidentally, another Messerschmitt Bf 109, an E-4 of 6./JG3, was brought down the same day at Court Lodge Farm, East Farleigh, Kent, with its pilot,
Gefreiter Eugen Schuller, captured wounded. Schuller was on his first operational flight over Britain and was flying an aircraft marked with ten victory bars.
RAF intelligence noted that it had: “…formerly belonged to the Geshwader Kommodore.” This being the case, then presumably it would once have been the
aircraft regularly flown by Major Günther Lützow.

60 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ In yet another variation, these are the kill markings painted onto the
rudder of Werner Mölders’ Messerschmitt Bf 109 F in 1941. (Chris Goss)
■ Left: Photographed after having been removed for maintenance
from W.Nr 3737 during the summer of 1940, the rudder of Werner
Mölders shows 33 victory bars. (Colour by RJM)
■ Above left: The Messerschmitt Bf 109 seat once displayed at the
Lashenden Air Warfare Museum which can now be attributed with
certainty to the aircraft once flown by Werner Mölders. Above right:
Still retaining its yellow paint, this engine cowling fastener possibly
originated from the aircraft piloted by Hans Asmus on 25 October
1940 and which had previously been flown by Werner Mölders.
them and found them with the body of a German pilot.
His parachute was partly burnt and had also ‘Roman
Candled’. He had hit the ground headfirst and impacted
some eight to 10 inches into the soil. It was not a pretty
sight.
“We pulled him out of the hollow he had made and
laid him out on a sheep hurdle before putting him on an
Army lorry. I remember he was a big fine young fellow,
and we had a devil of a job keeping sightseers away. His
right side had been split open by bullets. I remember
that most of the fuselage and cockpit fell in the Brook
Farm and Collier Street area, but papers and maps
fluttered down to land in a wood that Mr Butchers at
Little Spitzbrook owned. The engine went on further and
came down in Horse Islands field near the railway line
at Brook Farm. At that time, it was in the ownership of C
M Fox Ltd. It buried itself on impact and I do not really
know if they ever found it or dug it out.
“I remember a young cockney boy coming up to
PC White and saying: ‘I found his pistol mister!’ as he
handed over a signal pistol which he had found in a
hedge. The radio was found nearby. I remember as well
that we used some of the bits of aluminium sheeting
from the aircraft at Spitzfield Farm to make repairs to
our ladders for many years afterwards.”
With the passage of years, the two disintegrating
Bf 109s - so close together chronologically and
geographically – has become confused and muddled
together, each incident conflated with the other.
Understandably, the provenance of items had thus
been uncertain: had the objects in question originated
with the Asmus wreckage? Or from the Töpfer
wreckage?
As will be seen in the supplementary investigation
by Clint Mitchel, significant items have been positively
identified by forensic research as originating from
the scattered Asmus wreckage, those objects now
linked definitively to the aircraft once flown by Werner
Mölders.
Not within the scope of Clint’s research, however,
were three other items collected after the two aircraft
had crashed.
BULLET HOLED SEAT
During the late 1970s, Lashenden Air Warfare
Museum at Headcorn, Kent, displayed several
artefacts attributed to the Asmus aircraft. But had this
attribution been a matter of wishful thinking and a
desire to associate these objects with Werner Mölders?
Or was it evidence based? Whilst one of those objects
is the subject of Clint Mitchell’s investigation, another
exhibit from the 1970s is no longer at the museum: a
Messerschmitt Bf 109 seat collected from one of the
wreck sites.
▲
Not many miles from where the Messerschmitts
IRON CROSS ❙ 61
WAR IN THE AIR

■ This photograph at the RAF’s A.I.1(g) HQ ‘museum’ in 1940 shows the

rudder fabric from Werner Mölders’ aircraft on the far wall - ringed, right.

met their end, it is unsurprising that objects from either

of these two aircraft should end up at the Headcorn
museum, and although it was not possible for Clint
Mitchell to examine the seat, it is easy to establish its
origins. One needs to look no further than the A.I.1(g)
report relating to Töpfer’s aircraft which specifically
mentions the pilot’s seat, stating .303 bullet strikes were
through its starboard back, five inches from the edge.
Although the seat is not currently extant at the museum,
a photograph of it exists on display and this shows no
bullet damage. (NB: the bullet holes noted in the report on
Töpfer’s aircraft also correspond with the bullet wounds
George Collins later recalled seeing on the unfortunate an engine cowling fastener exists in the collection of
airman’s body.) enthusiast and aircraft restorer, Steve Vizard. Painted
Given these facts, it is safe to say that this seat yellow, it is highly likely that this originated from the
originated from the Asmus wreckage. Additionally, there is Asmus wreckage. Similarly, a Revi gunsight held by the
further compelling evidence in that the seat was unusually Kent Battle of Britain of Museum was donated by a woman
painted matt black (see the following investigation by Clint who picked it up in the Collier Street area. Given the
Mitchell) which we now know to be a feature of the cockpit generality of this location, this object could clearly have
of the Asmus aircraft. originated from either aircraft. It was displayed alongside
Also picked up from somewhere in the Marden area, a small metal eagle NCOs’ lapel rank marking, also picked

62 ❙ IRON CROSS

up at Collier Street. This may well have come from
Unteroffizier Töpfer’s body. It could not have originated
with Hans Asmus who was an officer.
Unlike the seat, and the objects later described by Clint
Mitchell, there seems little to definitively connect either
the cowling fastener or the gunsight to one wreck or the
other.
A QUESTION OF VICTORIES
Although the air intelligence report indicated that 49
victory stripes were found, this does not tally with
Mölder’s known victories at the time because he claimed
three Hurricanes near Maidstone on 22 October, those
being numbers 49, 50 and 51 of his ‘kills’. One would
expect, therefore, that the number of markings on the
rudder would have been either 48 or 51 – although
on the morning of 25 October 1940, Mölders claimed
victories 52 and 53; Spifires NW of Dover and over
Margate respectively. However, if the 49th victory had
been painted on the rudder, then why not 50 and 51 at
the same time? An explanation might be that damage to
the rudder made it impossible to accurately count them.
An interesting feature of the sortie on 25 October
1940 was that it saw one of the first operations of a
Messerschmitt Bf 109 F over the British Isles, with the
example flown by Mölders that day likely a F-1 and
carrying the overpainted factory codes SG+GW, but
no tactical markings. Its Werk Nummer was 5628, the
aircraft later carrying 54 then 56 victory markings on
the rudder. Mölders flew this aircraft until his untimely
death.
Whilst the rain of Messerschmitt Bf 109 pieces across
the Marden district provided a cornucopia of treasures
for souvenir hunters, one tantalising question remained:
what became of the rudder from the aircraft flown by
Hans Asmus? Surely, with its impressive tally of victories,
it would have been the choice trophy? For years, it
remained a tantalising mystery until, in 2021, the editor
of Iron Cross magazine obtained a series of original
photographs from a A.I.1(g) source.
Among these images was a photograph showing the
‘museum’ of A.I.1(g) in the basement of its London HQ.
Included in the photo were easily identifiable parts
of aircraft – instrument panels, radios, navigation
equipment etc. But then, nailed to the back wall,
something caught the editor’s eye; a torn piece of aircraft
fabric which could be identified as being a section of
Messerschmitt Bf 109 rudder. Painted on it were dozens
of victory stripes.
What initially happened to the remains of Werner
Mölders’ rudder with its victory tallies had been solved.
But its fate when the A.I.1(g) collection was eventually
dismantled remains a mystery.
Perhaps one of our readers can provide the answer to
this new question?
X
Investigation of
Surviving Wreckage
Although Werner Mölders’ Flugbuch (logbook)
survived the war, it is frustratingly scant as to any
identifying information on the specific aircraft
he flew and on which flights. The personnel who
entered the data into his Flugbuch only began
recording the Werk Nummer and fuselage markings
of the various aircraft he flew from 5 February 1941.
We therefore only have surviving photographs with
which to piece together the identities of the aircraft
Werner Mölders flew up to that point.
Many of these photographs show Werner Mölders
in the cockpit of various Bf 109 Es during the mid
to late 1940 period. Several of these he did not use
regularly but were simply the aircraft of other Stab
pilots or spare aircraft used by the Geschwaderstab
of JG51.
However, photographs of the aircraft that
carried Werner Mölders’ substantial victory
tally from late September 1940 show that he
was regularly flying two Bf 109 Es that he had
at his disposal. These were W.Nr. 5915, built by
Wiener Neustädter Flugzeugwerke, and W.Nr.
3737 built by Messerschmitt GmbH, Regensburg.
Both were E-4/N versions, powered by the higher
performance DB 601 N engine using C3 (100
octane) fuel.
■ Proof positive. This data plate attached to the fuselage panel
at Lashenden Air Warfare Museum provides crucial evidence
that the object originated from W.Nr 3737.
The two aircraft are identifiable because,
unusually, both were unmarked. Both carried just
the Balkenkreuz on the fuselage sides but did not
carry any other identifying markings, let alone the
Geschwaderkommodore markings ( < - + - ) that his
previous two Stab/JG51 aircraft carried.
Werner Mölders’ close friend and Katschmarek
during this period, Geschwader Adjutant
Oberleutnant Georg Claus, also flew an unmarked
Bf 109 E-4/N.
The reason for leaving these aircraft unmarked
is unknown, but it may have been that the highly
▲
propagandised German fighter ace wished to retain
IRON CROSS ❙ 63
WAR IN THE AIR

■ Werner Mölders
in the cockpit
of W.Nr 3737
showing the yellow
marking on the
port fuselage
side, extending
back towards
the cockpit.
(bpk/Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek/
Heinrich Hoffmann)

some anonymity for himself and his wingman during
combat sorties.
The lack of identifying markings make it difficult to
distinguish the two aircraft from one another. Thus, careful
analysis of their factory-applied mottling and other unique
features is essential.
■ Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-4, W.Nr 3744. (Author’s Collection, C. Berger
(Propaganda Kompanie), Messerschmitt A.G. Calendar, 1941)
1940 FIGHTER CAMOUFLAGE SCHEME
The style of camouflage applied to Werner Mölders’ W.Nr.
3737 (CI+EC) is what the writer considers to be the mid to
late 1940 Messerschmitt factory scheme. This comprised
a standard RLM 71/02/65 splinter pattern with factory-
applied mottling. However, the demarcation lines of the
splinter pattern were looser and more ‘freehand’ with a
distinctive wavy line along the leading edge of the wings
and horizontal stabilisers.
This evolution of the 1940 fighter camouflage scheme
differed somewhat from the jagged and straight
demarcation lines of the earlier pre-mottling factory and
unit applied RLM 71/02/65 splinter pattern.
A perfect example of the later style scheme can be seen
in a well-known period Agfacolor PK photograph depicting
test aircraft W.Nr. 3744 (CI+EJ) being flown during the
filming of a propaganda movie where it featured alongside
a captured Spitfire I thought to have been Pilot Officer
Richard Hardy’s N3277 of 234 Squadron, captured on 15
August 1940.
The proximity of Werner Mölders’ W.Nr. 3737 and W.Nr.
3744 on Messerschmitt’s Regensburg production line mean
the camouflage style applied to both aircraft would have
been almost identical.

64 ❙ IRON CROSS
 Spinner: RLM 70
with 1/3 RLM 21

Aircraft: Bf 109 E-4/N, WNr. 3737

Pilot: Hptm. Hans Asmus

Staffel/Unit: Stab/JG 51

Markings: m(51 victory tabs)

Base: Saint-Inglevert, France.

Date: 25th October 1940 ▲

© Clint Mitchell 2022

IRON CROSS ❙ 65
WAR IN THE AIR

ASYMETRIC YELLOW MARKINGS

At the time of its loss, W.Nr. 3737 had standard yellow
‘friend or foe’ markings applied to its cowling and
rudder.
Evidence suggests there was an anomaly in the
application of these markings as photographs of
W.Nr. 3737 show the yellow markings on the port side
of the cowling extending up to the front edge of the
windscreen and down the fuselage sides to the wing
root.
However, surviving fuselage wreckage from this
aircraft at Lashenden Air Warfare Museum shows
the yellow markings on the starboard side did not
cover the same extended area as it did on the port
side. The museum staff have coated the relic in a
glossy, clear protective coating at some stage, and
this has browned and yellowed ever so slightly over
the years, although close examination of this item
of wreckage on its starboard side reveals that not
a single speck of yellow paint is detectable on the ■ To illustrate the asymmetric colouring, the area marked with a red
surface. Strangely, this suggests that the coverage of yellow dashed line is painted yellow on the port side.
paint on the cowling and fuselage sides was asymmetric.
To illustrate, the writer has superimposed a photograph
of the surviving fuselage portion onto a scale drawing of All detachable parts and instruments were removed
the relevant section of a Bf 109 E’s starboard fuselage. before the black paint was applied. How widespread black
paint was as an interior colour on the Bf 109 E is not clear,
but it was possibly unique to this aircraft. It may have even
BLACK COCKPIT INTERIOR been applied at the personal behest of Werner Mölders for
Another curiosity is the colour of the aircraft’s cockpit its low reflective properties.
interior. Some Bf 109 Es had the cockpit interior painted
in RLM 02 ‘Grau’, and some in RLM 66 ‘Schwarzgrau’.
However, the surviving wreckage of W.Nr. 3737 shows clear ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
evidence that the cockpit interior was originally painted Our thanks to Sonja, Nick, and Nick ‘Scooby’ at the Lashenden Air
Warfare Museum for allowing unrestricted access to the W.Nr.
RLM 02 but was then over-painted in black with a hand
3737 wreckage.
brush. (NB: see previous reference to the pilot’s seat)

■ Photo of the interior showing the Leuchtmunitionsbehälter (Flare

Cartridge Container) with (a) showing underlying aluminium, (b) showing
■ Congealed black paint drips and brushstrokes are in evidence on the RLM 02 paint, (c) showing black paint on top and (d) showing an area of
roughly painted cockpit interior. black paint not covered by the glossy clear protective coating.

66 ❙ IRON CROSS
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Battle of Britain Film ‘Stukas’

The makers of the film Battle of Britain needed to represent the Junkers 87 in their
screenplay and various imaginative means to include Stukas were explored.

W
hen assembling the fleet
of aircraft for the 1969
film Battle of Britain, the
production company
faced the initially daunting hurdle of
sourcing ‘German’ aircraft to represent
the Luftwaffe. Fortunately for the film
company, the Spanish air force still had
serviceable ‘Messerschmitt 109’ and
‘Heinkel 111’ aircraft on their inventory,
these being made available to the film
makers. In reality, these were CASA 2.111
aircraft (to represent the Heinkel 111)
which had been built in Spain under
licence by Construcciones Aeronáuticas
SA (CASA), and the Hispano Aviación ■ One of the Percival Proctor aircraft converted to resemble a Junkers 87 Stuka and intended for
HA-1112 to represent the Messerschmitt use in the film Battle of Britain, a conversion which became known as the Proctuka. (RAeS)
109s. Again, the latter were licence-built
versions and based on the Messerschmitt
Bf 109 G-2. aircraft, the film could only represent the pre-dated the establishment of the RAF
Despite both types being powered Luftwaffe’s operations of 1940 with the Museum at Hendon, there existed in the
by Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, they Heinkel 111 and Messerschmitt Bf 109. RAF’s preserved collection of captured
adequately represented the aircraft in Of necessity, it seemed that other types German aircraft one example of a
service with the Luftwaffe during 1940. such as the Dornier 17-Z, the Junkers Junkers 87 – specifically, a Junkers 87
And for their RAF opponents, enough 88, the Messerschmitt Bf 110, and the D-5, Werk Nummer 494083. Although of
airworthy Spitfires and Hurricanes were Junkers 87 could not be included in this a much later variant than the ‘B’ models
available to make production of the film cinematic representation of the Battle of in use by the Luftwaffe in 1940, it was felt
viable. That said, and in terms of flyable Britain. And whilst the producers could that the aircraft was better than nothing.
live without the inclusion And even if the side profile wasn’t quite
of other twin-engine types right, it would do.
beyond the Heinkel 111, Whether there was ever any serious
they felt that the story of intention to fly the aircraft for Battle
the Junkers 87 Stuka was an of Britain - or whether the plan was
essential element and had to simply ground run it - remains
to be included – especially unclear. However, we do know that
for a scene which saw the aircraft was taken to RAF Henlow
the dive-bombing of a where flying aircraft for the film were
Chain Home radar station. being assembled. Here, its engine was
Thus, a solution to that certainly run-up and a paint scheme for
requirement had to be the film applied while it was assessed for
found. airworthiness and viability for use in the
film.
Ultimately, it became clear that the
■ The availability of flying aircraft to represent the Heinkel 111
and Messerschmitt Bf 109 in Battle of Britain was solved by using
ENGINE RUNS cost of getting it flying, or just ground
Spanish Air Force CASA 2.111 and HA-1112 aircraft. Shown here Although the production running the aircraft, was simply beyond
are the HA-1112 ‘Messerschmitt 109’ fighters. (BPI) period of Battle of Britain even the generous budget allocated to

68 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Junkers 87 D-5, W.Nr 494083, was made available by the RAF for use by the film
company and it is seen here in markings applied for the film. (KW)
aircraft for the film. It was not used,
either, as a static airframe in the film.
Either way, and with this aircraft (literally)
out of the frame, other avenues needed
to be explored.
To this end, a seemingly ingenious
solution was explored and this involved
the drastic conversion of Percival
Proctor aircraft to give them the general
appearance of the Junkers 87. Already,
the aircraft had fixed main undercarriage
assemblies with spats (as per the Stuka)
although considerably more work was
yet needed to make the smaller aircraft
even remotely resemble the Junkers 87.
THE PROCTUKA
Three ex-RAF Proctors (G-AIAE, G-ALOK
and G-AIEY on the British civil aircraft
register) were purchased for use in the
film, and two of these were converted
to alter their appearance to represent
the Stuka - the resulting conversion
inevitably becoming known as a
Proctuka.
The transformation necessitated the
■ The Junkers 87 D-5 is prepared at RAF Henlow for engine
runs. (David Redding)
■ Left: A view of
another of the so-
called Proctukas,
complete with
dummy bomb.
(KW)
■ Right: A gantry
is used to launch a
Junkers 87 model
into the base of
a reconstructed
Chain Home radar
station mast. (KW)
re-configuration of the wings to give
them more of a cranked appearance
and the alteration of the cockpit area,
fin, and rudder, with the conversion
work undertaken by Morris Robinson.
Even so, the overall look of the aircraft
was not entirely convincing. Not only
that, but their flying characteristics were
found to be dangerously unstable to the
extent that there would be no question
of putting the aircraft into a dive or
even executing anything other than
the gentlest of turns and manoeuvres.
One pilot who test flew the ‘Proctuka’
remarked: “If you want to depict the
wings of a Stuka folding up in mid-air,
you’d best use models!” Unsurprisingly,
the Proctuka project was abandoned.
Ultimately, the film makers solution
was indeed to be model aircraft, and
several 1/8th scale radio-controlled
Stukas were constructed with filming of
the flying models undertaken in Malta.
Another model was used to depict a
Junkers 87 crashing into the base of one
of the masts at a Chain Home radar
station.
In fact, some scenes using the models
did involve the wings of stricken Junkers
87s folding up in flight – just as the
nervous Proctuka pilot had suggested!
Post filming, and the Proctukas were
eventually scrapped, although one later
had a starring role in the TV series The
Persuaders, depicting a crashed aircraft.
Any surviving models from those taken
to Malta were simply burnt to avoid the
costs of shipping them back to Britain.
Meanwhile, Junkers 87 W.Nr 494083 was
returned to the RAF’s custody and is
currently in the RAF Museum collection.
In 1968, special effects were simply
not as advanced as they are today, with
CGI not even dreamed of. Under the
circumstances, the flying models were
the only solution available to depict the
Stuka in the film. And it was a solution
that was certainly preferable to using the
Proctuka – for myriad reasons!
Note: In a future issue of Iron Cross
magazine, the wider aspect of the film
Battle of Britain will be covered in our
‘Real to Reel’ series.
IRON CROSS ❙ 69
 PERSONAL TESTIMONY

Captive Stuka
For RAF fighter pilots, the Junkers 87 was simply an enemy aircraft and potential
quarry, but for Hurricane pilot Squadron Leader George McKay, DFC, the Stuka was a
surprisingly wonderful aircraft to fly, and one on which he accumulated many hours.

T
he Junkers 87 was certainly
notorious to anyone who
endured its attacks. And many
were shot down by our fighters
and guns, of course. Its appearance gave
the impression of being cumbersome
and un-manoeuvrable. But I would
never have called it any of those things.
It is true, however, that the example I
flew had been lightened by the removal
of all its guns and some of its armour
plate, but the basic flying characteristics
seemed to be truly excellent.
I first made the acquaintance of
Junkers 87 -D, S7 + LL, at Martuba on
the Libyan coast, towards the end of
November 1942. The Battle of El Alamein
had been won, and 213 Squadron had
just brought its Hurricanes back from a
secret landing ground some 150 miles
behind the German lines. There, it had
carried out strafing raids a further 150
miles into enemy territory.
It soon became apparent that amongst
the great number of abandoned German
and Italian aircraft were a few airworthy
and serviceable examples. No. 5
Squadron, SAAF, had their Messerschmitt
Bf 109 F, while 145 Squadron had a
captured Savoia SM 79 and 216 Squadron
a Fiat CR 42. And then, there was our
trophy - an apparently serviceable
Junkers 87 D. That year’s model!
FUEL LEAKS
I would like to be able to claim that I
was the first to fly it, but this was not so.
I believe that honour went to Warrant
Officer ‘Jock’ Aitken. All the controls
seemed conventional enough, and it was
only a matter of turning everything on,
starting the engine, and away. Flying was
much less complicated in those days.
Alas, for our new toy, when it landed after
its first flight with us, oil was pouring
from every part of it. There was also a
strong smell of fuel. Clearly it was not
flyable and had just been left there to
fool us.
Our engineering officer, Larry
Flowerdew, started to investigate and
went over every part of the fuel and
oil system. He surprised us by stating
there was no leak anywhere. Anyway,
I had studied German for three terms
just before the war and announced that
I would translate all the instructions
on the various controls. However, that
said, some months previously a Heinkel
111 had been shot down on the edge of
our airfield and I found in the wreckage
an object labelled Feurgefährlich. My
German was so good that I confidently
stated that this must be a portable fire
extinguisher. It turned out to be the first

■ Across North Africa, as German forces retreated, the Allies found large numbers of abandoned
or wrecked Junkers 87 aircraft, including these on the flooded airfield at Derna, Libya.

70 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Although of poor quality, this image shows George McKay in ‘his’
Junkers 87 D-3 in North Africa. The aircraft, S7 + LL, had served with
StG3 before falling into the hands of 213 Squadron who later put it in
RAF markings with their squadron code letters, ‘AK’, and an enigmatic ‘?’
symbol. It was first flown by the squadron on 12 November 1942.
■ George MacKay and Engineering Officer Larry Flowerdew flew around
North Africa in the Junkers 87 D-3 looking for spares. They had plenty
of wrecked aircraft to choose from, including this line-up of other StG3
Junkers 87s. All of these aircraft have already been canibalised by the
Luftwaffe, having had their engines and landing gear removed.

Jerry can we had ever seen, and it was full
of petrol. So much for my command of
German! Thankfully, nobody ever threw
it or its contents onto a fire.
Undeterred by past blunders, I sat
down to ponder the mysteries of the
Stuka’s fuel and oil systems. After a lot
of looking and thinking, I eventually
solved the problem. The engine drew its
fuel supply from the main tanks, but on
long trips these could be topped up from
other tanks in the wings. The controls
for this operation were beside the main
controls, hence the apparent fuel and oil
leaks; the main tanks, which were already
full, were being topped up from the extra
tanks and then overflowing.
After this problem was solved, most
of the pilots were queuing up to fly
the Stuka. But then a curious thing
happened. Having got the type in their
logbooks, most of the pilots seemed
content to simply leave it at that. On
the other hand, I was fascinated by this
aeroplane and could hardly leave it alone.
I took my ground crew for a ride, and
then several others in the squadron.
Then I took Larry Flowerdew on a spares
hunting expedition, and soon the Stuka
taxi was available for anyone who wanted
to go anywhere. And when the squadron
moved, Larry and I found that we could
stow all our kit, including our Primus
Stove, in the fuselage and wings. So, what
was this much discussed aeroplane like
from a pilot’s perspective?
FULLY AEROBATIC
Many would likely stare in disbelief
to read that the first point I noticed
was the same that I found when I first
flew a Spitfire the following year. The
controls were so light that I tended to
over control. How could this be, others
would doubtless wonder? And with such
an ungainly and cumbersome looking
machine!
Additionally, visibility from the cockpit
was excellent, and the whole aircraft
suggested power and strength. In fact, I

■ George MacKay had no available technical or pilots’ notes to help him learn ■ The Junkers 87 became quite a popular ‘prize’ for Allied air force units
to fly the Junkers 87. This instructional poster issued by the Air Ministry in North Africa. This example was captured and flown by 601 Squadron.
▲

could not have told him anything he didn’t know or couldn’t discover.

IRON CROSS ❙ 71
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PERSONAL TESTIMONY
■ The wrecks of Junkers 87s in North Africa became popular targets
for trophy hunters, including this Junkers 87 D which is being pillaged
for souvenirs. The aircraft flown by George McKay had also seen such
attention and had had some of its instruments removed.
was hooked right from the very start.
The flying controls were quite
conventional, one difference from the
Hurricane being that the brakes were
operated by tipping the rudder pedals
forward and that the tailplane was
hydraulically actuated to provide fore and
aft trim.
Starting procedure was as follows:
• Fuel cock set to ‘both tanks’
• Prime as necessary - four to five strokes
if warm, 15 to 20 if cold
• Switch on fuel booster pump and check
pressure (1 kg/s.cm)
• Set throttle to figure ‘1’ on quadrant
• Put ignition switch to 1 + 2, ie both on
• Energise inertia starter and booster coil
• Engage starter
• Warm up at figure ‘3’ on throttle
quadrant
When the radiator and oil temperatures
reached the green mark, that is 50 degrees
centigrade and 40 degrees centigrade
respectively, the run up was carried out at
1.5 80 Ata and 2,600 rpm. Taxying out was
easy, provided the tailwheel was unlocked.
Visibility was excellent.
Take off checks were:
• Tail trim at zero
• Rudder trim indicator 90 from full right
• Flaps to Reise Steigen if unloaded, or
‘Start’ if loaded
• Both main tanks on
• Airscrew fully fine
• Radiator and oil cooler, open
72 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ An instrument panel from a Junkers 87. Although this is from an
early ‘B’ model, the panels for later models were essentially the same.
Coincidentally, this panel also has the master compass missing ( middle
centre) as did the aircraft flown by McKay.
Take-off was easy, with no tendency
to swing and a good climbing speed
seemed to be 200 kph at 180 Ata and
2,550 rpm.
It was after this that I discovered the
excellent flying qualities of the Junkers
87 D. It could be thrown about all over
the place and was fully aerobatic. I was
so sure that I could do anything with the
Stuka that when the officer in charge
of the Bofors guns around our landing
ground asked for some practice ‘attacks’,
I was more than eager to oblige.
■ The cockpit of the Junkers 87. It was an
aircraft which became the unlikely ‘favourite
aircraft of all time’ for RAF fighter pilot George
McKay.
FRIGHTENING NOISE
Off I went and climbed to 9,000 feet.
I had never used the dive brakes
before and when I put them out as I
approached the airfield, it suddenly
felt that something had gone terribly
wrong with the controls. The aircraft was
exceedingly nose heavy, and I needed all
my strength to keep it up. I wound the
tail trim back, and suddenly all was well
- and so I continued my approach to the
‘target’.
When I was near enough, I peeled
over into the dive. The brakes kept the
speed down to a reasonable level, but I
was amused to see pilots running out
of the operations tent, apparently in
terror. I was told that the noise really was
quite frightening. I then pulled out of
the dive at 1,000 feet and retracted the
dive brakes. As I settled into a climb, so
the Stuka suddenly tried to loop. Only
quick action on the trimmer kept it in a
normal climb.
For a while, I puzzled over the way
this thing was now flying me instead
of the other way round. But eventually
the penny – or Pfennig - dropped.
I remembered something about
automatic diving. It seemed that a few
seconds after altering the position of
the dive brakes, the tailplane would
automatically change so as to trim
the aircraft into a diving or climbing
attitude.
Other aids to dive bombing were a

protractor, engraved on the side panels
of the canopy to show the angle of dive,
and a transparent panel in the cockpit
floor to help spot the target. This,
however, soon became covered in oil
and dirt.
While I was in 213 Squadron, my
brother was in 274 Squadron and our
moves along the North African coast
were often made together. When the two
squadrons moved to Agedabia, I flew
the Stuka instead of my Hurricane. On
the way, I spotted the ground convoy of
274 Squadron, and as I was only at 1, 000
feet, I dived down to beat them up.
We were by now a considerable way
behind the front, and the Stuka had clear
RAF markings and our code letters on the
side. Anyway, all of 274 Squadron knew
‘my’ Stuka. What I didn’t realise was that
a new pilot had joined the squadron a few
days previously from England. He was
in charge of one part of the convoy, and
he had a Sten gun. He looked up to see
the well-known silhouette of the Stuka
bearing down on him. Determined to
die like a gentleman, he stood his ground
and fired off all his ammunition at me.
Fortunately, he missed.
FAVOURITE AIRCRAFT
When I first flew the Junkers 87, I noticed
that it had no compass, artificial horizon,
or radio. They had all been stolen.
Considering the lack of equipment, I
shudder to think of some of the trips I
did. On 27 January 1943, for example, I
set off from Misurata to fly to Alexandria
to buy solid and liquid supplies for the
mess. I had Corporal Massie with me in
case we had any technical trouble.
Much of the trip was along or near
the coastline, but I decided to save
time by cutting across the Bay of Sirte.
The whole trip was nearly 1,500 miles.
With a following wind, I did it in four
stages. totalling 6 hours 30 minutes
flying time. Coming back under less
favourable conditions needed five hops,
totalling 7 hours 20 minutes. My flight
planning consisted of checking which
landing grounds might be occupied by a
squadron, and a look at the wind before I
■ Left: This Regia
Aeronautica Junkers 87
B was in a rather worse
state than 209 – 18, but
it was still a useful source
for spare parts. The
aircraft still has its bomb
load in place.
■ Right: The dive brakes
which caused George
McKay something of a
puzzle are show here
in the closed (left) and
extended positions in
an illustration from a
Junkers technical manual.
■ Far left: The Regia
Aeronautica (Italian Air Force)
also used the Junkers 87
in North Africa, calling the
aircraft the ‘Picchiatello’. This
example, a Junkers 87 B from
209 Squadriglia, 97 Gruppo
Bombardamento a Tuffo, 209 -
18 (Werk Nummer 5763), was
captured in Libya in September
1941.
■ Left: The same Junkers 87 B,
209 – 18, being flown by the RAF
but wearing a combination of
Italian and British markings.
went. As I said, flying was much simpler
then.
That then was our Stuka. I know the
name can properly be applied to other
German dive bombers, but to most
people it means just one thing: the
Junkers 87. Ours was the latest model to
be seen in the Middle East, the Junkers
87 D. It had a more powerful Jumo 211-J
engine and a smoother, sloping canopy.
Unladen, it had a very useful cruising
speed and with no guns and hardly any
armour plate it was even better. And
there was plenty of room in the rear
cockpit, too. I once had three people in
there. With the guns and ammunition
tanks removed from the wings, the
stowage space was unbelievable.
To us, with Hurricanes, it was an
extremely versatile communications
aircraft which would go anywhere and
do anything. But to me, as an individual
pilot, it was one of my favourite
aeroplanes of all time.
Note: This account was written by Sqn
Ldr G R S McKay in 1969.
IRON CROSS ❙ 73
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 WAR AT SEA

■ The SMS Emden photographed just prior to the outbreak of the

First World War. (Colour by RJM). Inset: the emblem carried on the
bow of the Emden, based on the crest of the city of Emden. (AWM)

The Kaiser’s Benevolent Pirate

It is said there is no room for sentiment or old-fashioned concepts of honour and mercy
during wartime, but there are exceptions. Peter Hart outlines the career of commerce
raider SMS Emden which briefly ran amok in the Far Eastern sea-lanes of the British
Empire in 1914.

T
he SMS Emden was the second
and final member of the
Dresden class of light cruisers
built for the Imperial German
Navy. She was laid down in Danzig
in November 1906, launched in May
1908, completed in July 1909, and after
her sea trials was commissioned in
September 1909.
In April 1910, Emden was sent
overseas to join the German East Asia
Squadron under the command of
Admiral Maximilian von Spee, based at
Tsingtao, a German colony in northeast
China. In 1913, she came under the
command of Commander Karl von
Müller, a highly regarded officer. Before
the war, Emden had already gained
some notoriety in a brief exchange of
fire with rebel Chinese forts on the
Yangtze River. It was a notoriety that
was set to continue across the opening
months of the First World War.
Following the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in
July 1914, Emden was the only German
cruiser left at Tsingtao as von Spee’s
two armoured cruisers, the Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau, were cruising in the
South Pacific while Leipzig was on her
way to replace the Nürnberg off the
coast of Mexico. Meanwhile, on 31
July, Müller put to sea ready to begin
active commerce raiding the moment
hostilities broke out.
Then, on 2 August, Germany declared
war on Russia and the very next day,
Emden struck when she captured the
Russian fast freighter Ryazan, which
was duly escorted back to Tsingtao to
be converted into an auxiliary cruiser.
However, life became far more complex

76 ❙ IRON CROSS
for von Spee’s East Asia Squadron when
Great Britain entered the war on 4
August.

A RISKY BUSINESS
At a stroke, the oceans had now become
a far more dangerous place with the
ships of the Royal Navy seemingly being
here, there, and everywhere. Therefore,
von Spee recalled the Emden to join the
rest of the squadron at Pagan Island in
the Mariana Islands while he pondered
his options. Then came more bad news.
Maximilian von Spee learned that
Japan was joining the Allies, and hence
their ships would soon be adding to the
predators hunting his squadron. Thus,
on 13 August, hard pressed and with few
realistic alternatives, von Spee decided
to take his squadron to South America
where there were neutral ports, more
operational possibilities, and perhaps
even the chance to break through and
back to Germany. Müller suggested
that one cruiser be detached for
independent operations in the Far East,
to which von Spee assented, choosing
Müller himself for the task because
■ The highly
Emden was his fastest ship. respected captain
Thus it was, that on 14 August, the of the SMS Emden,
Emden and her attendant collier, Freggatenkapitän von
Müller. (Colour by
Markomannia, left the East Asia
Luc Heinrich)
Squadron, bound for the Indian Ocean.

■ The Imperial German Navy base at Tsingtao, China, home to the German East Asia Squadron up
▲

■ Admiral Maximilian von Spee. until the outbreak of war.

IRON CROSS ❙ 77
WAR AT SEA
■ As the exploits of von Müller and the Emden became more widely
known, so an appetite for postcards commemorating both the captain
and his ship became ever more popular with the German public.
This was clearly a risky business: Emden
would have no base, with only the
reserve of coal on the Markomannia to
fuel her engines. Everything else would
have to come from captured ships.
Müller decided to target the crowded
shipping lanes between Singapore,
Colombo, and Aden. To cause confusion
amongst both hunted and hunters, he
rigged up a dummy funnel to mimic
the appearance of a British light cruiser,
and on 5 September, Emden entered
the Bay of Bengal. This achieved
considerable surprise, as the British had
thought she was still with von Spee’s
squadron.
At first unsuccessful, Müller moved
across to the Colombo–Calcutta route,
and on 10 September he ran down a
neutral Greek collier, but the 6,500 tons
SMS Emden
The Emden was 388 feet long with a beam
of 44 ft and a loaded displacement of 4, 201
long tons. Her two triple-expansion steam
engines, driving two screw propellers, gave
her a top speed of 23.5 knots. Emden could
carry some 860 tonnes of coal, which gave
her a range of around 4,330 miles at 12
knots and she carried a crew complement of
18 officers and 343 enlisted men.
The armour protection was inadequate
with, at best, the belt and conning tower
armour of only 100 mm, a thin armoured
78 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ HMS Yarmouth, 1914. With an extra dummy funnel, von Müller
emulated Yarmouth and other vessels and caused confusion about the
Emden’s identity whenever the extra ‘funnel’ was raised.
of coal was destined for the British, and
hence fair game. Müller took the ship
into his service, even agreeing to pay
the crew!
In the following days, Emden
captured five more ships. Most of them
were sunk, but in all cases the crews
were rescued and despatched to safety
aboard a ship spared for that purpose.
This chivalry, and a desire to avoid
unnecessary loss of life, would mark out
Müller’s conduct from the very start to
the finish of his commerce raiding.
One of the ships sunk was the Indus,
and this clearly made an impact on
one young Emden sailor, officer’s cook
Friederich Lochau:
“As the water entered through the
portholes, she sank even further to the ■ Kapitänleutnant Helmuth von Mücke.
level of the hatches which had been (Colour by Johnny Sirlande)
deck of only 80 mm and 52 mm thick gun
shields.
The main armament comprised ten
10.5 cm guns in single mounts. They had
a range of just over 13,000 yards and the
ship carried 1,500 rounds of ammunition,
i.e., 150 per gun. The secondary armament
comprised eight x 5.2 cm guns, also in
single mounts. She had two 45 cm torpedo
tubes (with four torpedoes) mounted below
the waterline and she could carry 50 naval
mines.

opened earlier. This sealed her fate.
Gigantic fountains shot out from all the
portholes, and then she dived bow-first,
raising her propeller high up into the air,
and disappeared, leaving behind black
coal dust and some floating wreckage
and lifeboats. As she dived to her grave,
she did so with a final diabolical mystic
howling, intermingled with a crescendo
of crashing noises.”
Then, off the Ganges estuary, Emden
caught a Norwegian merchantman
which the Germans searched. Finding
no contraband, they released her. Her
crew, though, warned Müller of Entente
warships operating in the area, and this
*(See Iron Cross magazine, # 7, page 86, ‘Von Mückes Rise and Fall’ by Dr Immanuel Voigt. Copies still available.)
persuaded him to return to the eastern
coast of India. Here, Emden stopped
and then released a neutral Italian
freighter, whose crew promptly warned
the British naval authorities. The result
was an immediate cessation of shipping
and the institution of a blackout in all
port facilities.
A BOLD STROKE
To deal with the threat, Vice Admiral
Martyn Jerram ordered HMS
Hampshire, Yarmouth, and Chikuma
to search for the Emden, while the
Minotaur and Ibuki were to visit likely
Map by Battlefield Design
coaling stations. Of this, the Emden’s
first officer, Kapitänleutnant Helmuth
von Mücke*, wrote:
“We knew quite well that 16 hostile
ships were in pursuit of us – British,
French and Japanese. We never had any
information with regard to the position
of these ships, nor of their character,
which, after all, could matter very little
to us, since the Emden was the smallest
and least formidable of all the warships
in the Indian Ocean. There was not a
hostile cruiser that she was likely to meet
that was not her superior in strength.”
But try as they might, the Allied ships
failed to track down the Emden, and
▲
IRON CROSS ❙ 79
WAR AT SEA

Kapitänleutnant Helmuth von Mücke

later noted:
“It has been frequently said by the
English that it was wholly due to her
great speed that the Emden remained
afloat as long as she did. This is not the
case. Aside from the fact that the ship’s
bottom was so heavy with barnacles,
etc., that the Emden could not run at
her highest speed, she could at no time
make more than 11 nautical miles on
an average, for the very good reason
that the coal tenders, upon which she
was dependent for fuel, could travel no
faster.”
Müller, however, refused to be
intimidated by the strength of his
enemies and he resolved on a bold
stroke – a night attack on Madras.
At around 21.45 hours on 22
September, Emden entered the port ■ Postcards again marked the Emden’s success after the attack on Madras with this dramatic image
there, which was completely illuminated by Willi Stöwer appealing to the pride of ordinary Germans in their navy.
in casual defiance of blackout orders.
The Emden closed to within 3,000 yards
before opening fire, carefully choosing our shots, an enormous black cloud of results of this night-shooting were that
a line of fire which allowed the gunnery dense smoke, and, following the advice all the oil tanks had been set alight,
officer to hit the tanks of the Burmah of the old adage ‘A change is good for a few shells had done some damage
Oil Company without splaying shells everybody!’ we had sent several millions in the town, and one ship had been
across the streets. Kapitänleutnant worth of the enemy’s property up into slightly damaged. We were fully visible
Helmuth von Mücke watched events the air, instead of down into the sea, as as we steamed on a fictitious course,
with considerable satisfaction: heretofore.” heading northwards. It was particularly
“A searchlight revealed to us the object The Emden had set fire to two oil necessary to mislead the enemy at
of our quest - the oil tanks, painted white tanks, damaged three others, and this point. If we had at once taken our
and decorated with a red stripe. A couple furthermore damaged a merchant ship proper course, it is certain that we
of shells were sent in that direction, a in the harbour, and Ensign Prince Franz should shortly have had enemy warships
quick upleaping of tongues of bluish- Joseph later recalled: on our tracks.”
yellow flame, streams of liquid fire “When 125 rounds had been fired, It had been an audaciously bold
pouring out through the holes made by the captain ordered, ‘Cease fire!’ The attack.

■ Although von Müller took care not to cause collateral damage, at least
some of Emden’s shells fell wide of the target. This photograph shows
damage caused to the Madras Sailing Club. ■ The Burmah oil tanks set ablaze and holed by the Emden at Madras.

80 ❙ IRON CROSS

UNWITTING COLLABORATORS
From Madras, an emboldened Müller
decided to make a foray to the western
side of Ceylon where he found more
victims, sinking two more ships, and
capturing the collier Buresk, carrying
a cargo of invaluable high-grade coal.
A German prize crew boarded Buresk
which was then used as a support ship.
After re-coaling in the Maldives, the
Emden then cruised the routes between
Aden and Australia and between
Calcutta and Mauritius for two days, but
without further success.
■ The ill-fated Russian
cruiser, Zhemchug.
She then steamed to Diego Garcia
where the tiny isolated British garrison
were entirely unaware of the outbreak
of war and, incredibly, treated the crew
to a warm reception. Emden remained
there until 10 October, carrying out vital
engine maintenance and scraping the
hull beneath the waterline. When they
left – heading for the Maldives - it was
only just in time. Shortly afterwards,
the Hampshire arrived – only to inform
the shaken garrison that they had been
unwitting collaborators! And although
they had missed the Emden, on 12
■ Left: Coal was the very lifeblood of ships
like the Emden, and here we see members of
the Emden crew loading coal. Such was the
importance of the task that even officers
are helping in this photograph which also
shows the wheelbarrow marked in chalk: ‘SMS
Emden, Tsingtao’.
October the British did capture the
Markomannia, thus depriving Emden of
her vital collier.
Between 15-20 October, however, the
Emden captured several more ships.
One was claimed as a collier, three
were sunk, and a fifth was sent to port
with the crews of the other vessels. But
Müller then planned a surprise night
attack far to the east, on Penang, British
Malaya.
In preparation, Emden coaled in
the Nicobar Islands and departed for
Penang intending to arrive off the
harbour at dawn, approaching the
narrow harbour entrance at 03:00 on 28
October. As Ensign Prince Franz Joseph
recalled:
“Everyone in the Emden was roused.
Our fourth ‘funnel’ was already hoisted,
and looked quite imposing, rising from
the deck. At 4.50 am we entered the
bottleneck and again received the order:
‘Ready!’ We all rushed for our action-
stations, I for the torpedo flat.”
Emden’s lookouts quickly spotted a
warship in the port with lights on. It
was the old Russian cruiser Zhemchug
which had put into Penang for boiler
repairs. Only one was serviceable,
which meant that she could not get
under way, nor were the ammunition
hoists powered. To make matters
worse, the captain, the splendidly
named Commander Cherkassov, was
ensconced ashore at the Eastern and
Oriental Hotel in George Town with a
lady friend while his crew were partying
aboard ship. There was no effective
watchkeeping.
Unseen, the Emden pulled alongside
Zhemchug and at the point-blank
range of 300 yards, Müller ordered the
starboard torpedo to be fired at the
Russian cruiser. It was a great moment
for the torpedo officer. Again, we turn
to Ensign Prince Franz Joseph for his
▲
account:
IRON CROSS ❙ 81
WAR AT SEA
“We waited with suspense for the
order to release the torpedo. At 5.18am
there appeared on the torpedo flat
telegraph the illuminated word, ‘Fire!’
The torpedo was out, and away. There
followed some seconds of suspense and
breathless listening. There was a dull
report. There were cheers and general
congratulations in the flat. There was
no doubt that the torpedo had got home
and therefore done its work.”
At the same time, the Emden’s guns
also roared out. Kapitänleutnant
Helmuth von Mücke again takes up the
story.
“The Emden passed by the hostile
cruiser from stern to bow, pouring
broadsides into her all the while. Before
many minutes had passed the fore
part of the ship looked like a sieve.
Smouldering fires were eating their way
through the interior of the ship. Great
holes in both sides of the hull made it
possible to look clean through the
ship. Crash upon crash, the shells
struck. When they hit, there was a
bright, sharp flash. Then, for the
space of a few seconds, fiery rings
seemed to be rapidly circling around the
spot where the shell had struck, until,
almost immediately afterward, masses
of black smoke from the interior burst
forth through the great holes in the sides
of the doomed ship.”
One of the Russian gun crews did
manage to get into action, but they
scored no hits. Müller then ordered
a second torpedo to be fired into the
burning Zhemchug as Ensign Prince
Franz Joseph recorded:
“The Emden canted to one side, from
which we inferred that she was turning.
Shortly afterwards followed the order:
‘Fire!’ The torpedo rushed hissing out
of the tube. The second torpedo caused
a tremendous explosion that tore the
Zhemchug apart.”
Kapitänleutnant Helmuth von Mücke
described her rapid demise:
“A great thick cloud of black smoke,
mixed with grey, and shot through with
white steam and spray, rose to a height
of 150 metres, or more. Loose parts of
the ship went flying up into the air. We
could see the cruiser break apart in the
middle, while bow and stern dipped
82 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ The memorial
to the Russian
cruiser Zhemchug
at Penang.
■ An enlisted man’s Mutze (cap) from the SMS
Emden. (AWM)
into the water at the same time. Then
the cloud raised by the explosion hid
everything from sight, and when it had
cleared away, there was nothing to be
seen of the cruiser except the masthead
protruding out of the water. Quantities
of debris, and many men swimming
about in the water, marked the spot
where the ship had disappeared.”
Her destruction in little under ten
minutes killed 81 Russian sailors and
wounded 129, of whom seven later died
of their injuries.
REMARKABLE ESCAPE
The Emden came under ineffectual fire
from the French destroyer d’Iberville,
but it was the appearance of a
mysterious ship at the entrance of the
harbour that caused Müller to retreat
while he still could and being wary of
being bottled in by superior warships.
Outside the harbour, they sighted a
British freighter, the Glen Turret, and
while preparing to take possession
of the ship, Emden had to recall her
boats - because yet another vessel
was sighted. This proved to be the old
French destroyer Mousquet, which
had – thanks to the fourth funnel –
mistaken them for HMS Yarmouth. The
Emden turned to attack, with Ensign
Prince Franz Joseph taking up the story:
“The first effective salvo shot down
the tricolour and found the boiler room,
for huge white clouds of steam were
streaming from the ship. In spite of
severe disablement, the enemy did not
remain quiet, but fired a torpedo which
passed several hundred yards astern of
us. Also, one gun, which stood forward
of the conning-tower, was brought into
action. It must have been a machine-
gun, for it fired with immense speed, but
hit nothing. Most of the shots went over
us, and the noise they made was like a
swarm of bees. Our guns shot splendidly.
After we had found the range, every
round told. The enemy was in a bad
condition. Her superstructure was all
shot to pieces, and everything else as
well. After the Emden’s twelfth salvo, the
Frenchman disappeared in a cloud of
yellowish smoke. Our captain therefore
ordered ‘Cease fire!’ “

However, it was not just the Royal
Navy which had its glorious traditions,
and the French crew gave no sign of
being willing to surrender. The captain,
Lieutenant de Vaisseau Théroinne,
had had both of his legs smashed, but
had himself lashed to his station at the
bridge so he could go down with the
ship. As was his wont, Müller stopped
to pick up survivors – some 36 out of
the 76 strong crew. Ensign Prince Franz
Joseph described the desperate scene:
“The poor fellows, who had fought so
well for their country, were a pitiful sight.
Three men in particular were very bad.
One of them I have always before my
■ The memorial to the Mousquet and her crew,
Penang.
eyes when I think of his pain. The poor
fellow had been hit in the stomach, so
that all his entrails were hanging out.”
The Emden then sped off at around
08:00 while the other French ships back
in Penang were still struggling to raise
steam to get underway. The French
destroyer Fronde, bravely tried to follow,
as Ensign Prince Franz Joseph described:
“With astonishing fierceness,
she shrieked to the world that the
‘fearful’ Emden, which had so terribly
‘assassinated’ her sister, Mousquet, was
ahead of her. She continually gave our
course and speed, in the eager hope that
some ship of the Entente would give
chase. We steamed on a fictitious course,
west-north-west. The God of the weather
also favoured us rather than it did the
French, and sent a violent rain squall,
completely blinding Fronde. Under cover
of this squall, Emden at once turned
north-north-west. When the sun returned
after a good quarter of an hour the
horizon was clear again, and nothing was
to be seen of the Fronde.”
Once again, they had had a remarkable
escape.
It had been another successful raid;
the Emden had not been hit by a single
shell and had sunk two enemy warships.
The attack on Penang was a significant
shock to the Entente powers and caused
them to delay large convoys from
■ One of the Emden’s main 10.5 cm guns is
displayed as a war memorial in Hyde Park,
Sydney, NSW. The story of the Emden’s
demise will run in the next issue of Iron Cross
magazine.
■ Left: The French Mousquet.
Australia, since they would evidently
need more powerful escorts.
On 30 October, Emden stopped the
British steamer Newburn and put the
surviving French sailors aboard before
turning south to Simalur for an essential
rendezvous with the captured collier,
Buresk.
She may not have caused unnecessary
loss of life, but by her actions the
Emden had considerably disrupted sea
traffic across the Indian Ocean and
delayed the sailing of troop convoys
while she engaged the attentions of
British, French, and Japanese cruisers
to a disproportionate extent. She had
even managed to sink a Russian cruiser
and a French destroyer. None of this
would really impact on the course of
the war, but these were considerable
achievements and the Emden crew had
good reason to be proud. But what next?
Müller then decided to attack the
British coaling station in the Cocos
Islands, his intention to destroy the
wireless station and draw away British
ships searching for the Emden in the
Indian Ocean.
And it was at the Cocos Islands that
Emden’s destiny awaited.
Note: Peter Hart will continue the story
of the Emden in Issue # 15 of Iron Cross
magazine.
IRON CROSS ❙ 83
 OBJECTS IN FOCUS

Churchill’s Iron Cross

In 1943 an Iron Cross First
Class was presented as a
trophy to the British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill
at the Tehran Conference.
Supposedly, it had been
taken from a German
agent who had been sent
to kill him. Andy Saunders
investigates the story.

A
t Winston Churchill’s home,
Chartwell, an Iron Cross
First Class of the Third Reich
period is displayed by the
National Trust at what was the wartime
Prime Minister’s country residence.
As war trophies go, Iron Crosses were
‘two-a-penny’, becoming sought after
and popular souvenirs brought home
by returning service personnel at the
end of war. Many, of course, had no
specific story apart from those held in
the memories of the service personnel
who had taken them as souvenirs.
Almost without exception, such Iron ■ The Iron Cross First Class which was presented to Winston Churchill on display at Chartwell, Kent,
Crosses had been picked up as Allied which was supposedly taken from German agent Franz Mayr. (AS)
armies swept across Europe and into
Germany. Sometimes, they had been
taken from POWs, sometimes bartered Iron Cross to a particular person or that story really a credible one?
in exchange for food or cigarettes and event, they can usually be seen as no
– however distasteful - sometimes more than ‘generic’ war souvenirs. And
looted from bodies. Similarly, Allied it is the case that many examples of PROCESS OF AWARD
soldiers on the Western Front in 1914 genuine Iron Crosses (First and Second Before examining the story behind the
– 1918 were enthusiastic collectors Class) that came onto the collectors’ Iron Cross at Chartwell, it is necessary
of trophy Iron Crosses. Only on market in the post-war period would to look at how, why, and to whom
rare occasions, however, can one tie have originated from the trophy the award of both classes of the Iron
a specific souvenir Iron Cross to a collections of returning veterans. Cross were made. The rules on the
particular individual or event. However, the Iron Cross First promulgation of such awards were
The medals were neither named or Class displayed at Chartwell is in an very clear and prescriptive (for the First
numbered (very rarely an owner might entirely different league. Very clearly, and Second World War) and were rules
inscribe his name on the reverse of its historical significance is uniquely which were absolute and inviolate.
an Iron Cross First Class), and thus tied to the fact that it was presented This vitally important element it is one
the identity of original holders is not to Winston Churchill. Not only that, that must be taken into account when
traceable. Thus, and unless there is but its back story, its origin, and its considering the supposed provenance
convincing evidence to link a trophy provenance are all clearly set out. But is of the Iron Cross presented to Winston

84 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Left: This well-known image
of the so-called First World War
‘Souvenir King’, John ‘Barney’
Hines, is a perfect illustration
of how Allied soldiers collected
German trophies. He was said to
have acquired a sandbag full of
Iron Crosses.
■ Right: The recipient of the
Iron Cross First Class which
was presented to Winston
Churchill would first have been
presented with the Iron Cross
Second Class. Both awards
were uniquely military and only
presented to members of the
Wehrmacht.

Churchill.
The Iron Cross was a purely military
award, and although higher grades were
implemented during the period of the
Third Reich (eg The Knights Cross of
the Iron Cross) they were otherwise
awarded in either Second Class (EK II)
or First Class (EK I) in accord with strict
protocols.
The hierarchy of the award meant
that the EK II was the first award of
an Iron Cross that could be made. In
other words, it was not possible to go
straight to the award of an EK I. And
whilst the EK I was of a ‘higher grade’,
per se, it is important to understand
that the German military award system
for the Iron Cross is not comparable to
gallantry awards of other nations. For
example, a single act of gallantry which
may have resulted, say, in the award of
a Victoria Cross in the British forces
may well only have warranted the
award of an Iron Cross Second Class
in the German forces. This is because
it was the ‘act’ and not ‘the nature of
the act’ in the German forces which
was the criteria for award.
In many respects, the minutiae
of the award processes are an
irrelevance in the case of the
Chartwell Iron Cross. That is, except
for two points. First, the original
holder of the Chartwell Iron Cross
would have first been award an Iron
Cross Second Class. Second, the
recipient would have had to have
been a member of the military.
And in the case of the medal gifted
to Winston Churchill, the latter is
significant.
In other words, the holder would
have needed to either be a serving
member of the Wehrmacht, or to have
previously served and been granted
the award of an Iron Cross Second and
First Class during his period of service.
ASSASSINATION AT TEHRAN?
The caption detail provided with the
Iron Cross is very specific as to its
origins, the display stating:
“Mounted Iron Cross taken from Nazi
agent Franz Mayer [sic.] captured on
the 15th August 1943. Mayer was part
of a German plot to assassinate Stalin,
Roosevelt, and WSC at the Tehran
conference.”
This, then, is the starting point for
any investigation as to the origins of
the Iron Cross in question, together
with an examination of Franz Mayr (his
name was spelt without an ‘e’) as an
individual and his role in the supposed
assassination plot. First, let us briefly

■ The taking of Iron Crosses as war souvenirs was common among Allied
personnel. Very often they were either taken from or traded with POWs,
but on occasion they were looted from the bodies of German casualties.
This example was taken from a Luftwaffe airman killed over Britain in
1941 and has been pinned to a portion of his uniform collar which has
been cut from his tunic. (AS)
■ Right: The ‘Big Three’ at the Tehran Conference in 1943: Stalin,
Roosevelt, and Churchill. It was said that a plot had been hatched by
▲

German intelligence to assassinate the three leaders at the conference.

IRON CROSS ❙ 85
OBJECTS IN FOCUS
■ Franz Mayr. (TNA)
consider the Tehran Conference
– the event where it was said the
assassination was to take place.
The Tehran Conference (codenamed
Eureka) was a strategy meeting of
Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and
Winston Churchill held between 28
November and 1 December 1943. This
followed the Anglo-Soviet invasion of
Iran. The conference was held in the
Soviet Union’s embassy in Tehran, the
first of the wartime conferences of the
‘Big Three’ Allied leaders. Although the
leaders had differing objectives, the
main outcome was the Western Allies’
commitment to open a second front
against Nazi Germany.
According to Soviet reports, German
agents planned to kill the leaders at
the conference, but called off the
assassination while it was still in the
planning stage. The NKVD, the USSR’s
counterintelligence unit, informed the
Americans that dozens of Germans had
been parachuted into Tehran, with the
NKVD suspecting that German agents
were planning to kill the ‘Big Three’
leaders in Tehran.
After the conference, Molotov was
asked if there really had been an
assassination plot? He said he knew of
German agents in Tehran but did not
know of any specific assassination plot.
Molotov’s response thus minimised
assertions of any credible plot, instead
emphasising that Stalin thought
President Roosevelt (and Churchill)
86 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Accounts relating to the parachuting into Persia of the Waffen-SS team (which included Gunther
Blume) indicate they were dropped by a Junkers 290 transport. This example was captured by the
British in 1945. (AS)
would be safer at the Soviet embassy.
Thus, it seems that Stalin simply
wished to exercise control over the
venue and the ‘assassination plot’
■ In April 1943 SS-Obersturmbannführer
Otto Skorzeny was appointed commander of
the Waffen Sonderverband zbV ‘Friedenthal’
stationed near Berlin. The first mission of
the Waffen Sonderverband zbV ‘Friedenthal’
was FRANZ in which Skorzeny sent a group
by parachute into Persia to make contact
with dissident mountain tribes in the hope of
encouraging them to sabotage Allied supplies
of material being transported to the southern
USSR. British and American intelligence,
and later Skorzeny himself, later rubbished
the idea that he was in charge of a plot to
assassinate the ’Big Three’.
provided the necessary excuse.
Subsequently, American and
British intelligence reports dismissed
the existence of a plot, while Otto
Skorzeny, the alleged leader of the
operation, later claimed that Hitler
had dismissed the idea as unworkable
before any planning had begun.
However, German agent Franz Mayr
had certainly been arrested in the
country by British intelligence officers
in August 1943. For the purposes of this
feature, there are two questions: what
was he doing there, and why did he
have an Iron Cross in his possession?
COMPULSIVE HOARDER
At The National Archives, Kew, reports
into the capture of Franz Mayr (and
other German agents) during August
1943 are held under the reference KV
2/1478. They provide a fascinating
insight into the Franz Mayr affair.
Active in Persia from at least late
1940, Mayr was virtually cast adrift
from his secret service handlers in
Berlin as things began to go awry for
Germany in the region. Hiding for six
months in an Armenian cemetery,
Mayr finally emerged under heavy
disguise (it is said that his appearance
could easily result in his being taken for
middle eastern) and he then invented,
organised, and controlled a pan-
Persian subversive movement called
Hizb-i-Melliun, formally constituted in
■ The Soviet-British invasion of Iran changed the entire landscape for the work being undertaken by Mayr and his Meliun organisation.
July 1942.
In a few months, Mayr created an
active fifth column and, remarkably,
evolved a grandiose plan for a
‘Blitzkrieg’ invasion and forcible
assimilation of Persia into Hitler’s
Greater German Empire; single-
handedly, and at just 28 years of age. It
was all rather fanciful. The preparations
Mayr undertook to implement his
master plan were, nevertheless, an
extraordinary individual achievement.
However, from the start, things did not
go well for Melliun. And in the autumn
of 1942, everything was going awry.
On 2 November 1942, almost
coincidentally with the reverse of
German fortunes at El Alamein, British
security raided Mayr’s home in Isfahan
and discovered his papers and diaries,
revealing full details of the Melliun
organisation. Notwithstanding his
tradecraft, Mayr was a compulsive
hoarder: he committed everything to
paper and never threw anything away.
But did he leave an Iron Cross for the
British to find?
After the raid, Mayr escaped to
Tehran where he remained in hiding
for nine months, his influence and
operational ability dealt a crippling
blow. Consequently, his health, mood,
and morale began to deteriorate and
Mayr found himself at odds with his
own service. Nevertheless, he begged
Berlin for funds and a skilled radio
operator. Instead, in March 1943, Berlin
sent him an entire squad of Waffen-SS
parachutists (Operation FRANZ), bent
on causing mayhem and destruction.
They proved to be untrained,
undisciplined, and technically
incompetent.
Inevitably, these personnel were
discovered and captured by British
security forces in August 1943 before
they could undertake any special
operations. Mayr was trapped.
Arrested at gunpoint, he was grilled
by interrogators for weeks, those
interrogations covered in detail in the
KV 2/1478 files. Significantly, there
is no reference to an assassination
attempt, only reference to non-
specific plans for the Waffen-SS men
to conduct sabotage operations. Mayr
seems not to have been involved in any
way with a plot to assassinate Churchill
or the ‘Big Three’.
However, the archive perhaps
provides a possible clue as to where
the mysterious Iron Cross may have
originated and who it was awarded to.
INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE
Franz Mayr was born on 15 November
1914 near Munich, but only served
briefly in the Wehrmacht, this being
in a signals platoon in Potsdam.
From here, law sudent Franz Mayr
was recruited by Section 6 of the SS
Reich Security Service. During his very
brief military service (he was in Persia
by late 1940) Mayr was not awarded
the Iron Cross, and as an exclusively
military award, neither the Abwehr nor
Sicherdienst were eligible services. And
even if he had been awarded the medal,
then why on earth would he have had it
with him in Persia? It makes no sense.
As a foreign agent, carrying such an
object would be recklessly foolish.
On the other hand, at least one of the
Waffen-SS men picked up in August
1943 had been awarded the Iron Cross.
And it would not be unreasonable to
consider this man as potentially the
original owner. He was Gunther Blume.
From material in KV 2/1478, the
names and brief backgrounds of
some of the captured Waffen-SS
men accompany the transcripts.
Fascinating though they are, the
specific point of interest is the extract
from Mayr’s interrogation in relation to
Untersturmführer Blume. It states:
“He is aged about 24, tall, with blond
hair which he dyed with ordinary
ladies’ hair dye which he brought
from Germany. He was cleanshaven
when Mayr last saw him. He has a
pale complexion and thin lips. He was
wounded in the Russian campaign, in
which he received the Wound Badge and
the Iron Cross Class 1”
The latter part of that statement is
significant - but would Blume have
been careless enough to have carried
his Iron Cross with him? In considering
▲
an answer, it is worth bearing in mind
IRON CROSS ❙ 87
OBJECTS IN FOCUS
that whilst the uniform status
of the captives is not recorded,
they were presumably in
civilian dress but might
have carried some military
paraphernalia with them to
help back up their service
status if captured – even
if in mufti. That being the
case, then why not an Iron
Cross? Not only that, but
the blundering incompetence of the
FRANZ team is clear. And carrying
an Iron Cross might have been
symptomatic of that incompetence.
However, all we know was that
Blume had been awarded the Iron
Cross First Class. Not that he had
it with him. However, he must be
considered the potential source of
Churchill’s Iron Cross.
Could it have been that Gunther
Blume’s Iron Cross was passed off
to Churchill as Mayr’s? With the
added ‘significance’ of the supposed
assassination plot led by Mayr, it made
a perfect gift for Churchill. Conflating
the Soviet assassination story with the
capture of Mayr, the discovery of an
Iron Cross on another captive made
for a perfect gift that would appeal to
the Prime Minister. Accordingly, it was
framed and presented to Churchill by
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Leslie ‘Joe’
Spencer DSO on 30 November 1943,
Churchill’s 69th birthday. Sticking on
a clipped signature of Franz Mayr was
the final flourish!
The story stuck, too.
ARMS DEALING AND
TREACHERY
But what happened to Franz Mayr, the
88 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Left: The intelligence summary detailing Gunther
Blume confirming that he was the recipient of the
Iron Cross First Class. (TNA)
supposed ‘Churchill assassin’?
In the intervening years, much
has been written of the ‘Tehran
assassination plot’ and Mayr’s
supposed part in it. Some of what has
been written is well researched and
credible. Much of it, less so - although
the mystery has had other subsequent
twists. That said, the purpose of this
piece has not been to examine the
Mayr and Melliun story but simply look
at the Iron Cross story.
Intriguingly, it is not known when
or where Franz Mayr (or Peter Studer-
■ The framed Iron Cross, as presented to
Winston Churchill, displayed by the National
Trust at Chartwell.
■ Above: The description of Franz Mayr from
the intelligence summary. (TNA)
■ Left: The description of Gunther Blume from
the intelligence summary. (TNA)
Mayr) died, or even where he is
buried. After the war, and following
several successful escape attempts
and recapture, he was finally released
by the British. By late 1949, he had
changed his name to Peter Studer-
Mayr, suspected of recruiting ex SS
officers to work for Nasser’s regime in
Egypt.
As an individual who inhabited the
shady world of espionage, it is not
surprising that he appears to have
subsequently made a fortune from
arms dealing. This, it is suspected, was
with connivance of the government of
West Germany.
Mayr later set up an export company
in Hamburg (Terramar GmbH) which is
still in business today. According to one
researcher, MI6 considered using him
against the Soviets, but the plan was
blocked by none other than Kim Philby,
fearful that Mayr might prove a threat
to his own treachery.
Of the Iron Cross displayed at
Chartwell, some things are without
any doubt: it was certainly presented
to Winston Churchill but had never
belonged to Franz Mayr. And, when
captured, Mayr was not leading an
operation to assassinate Churchill.

FELDPOST
The Kriegsmarine’s ‘Toads’
Dear Sir,
It was with great interest
that I read the article on the
notorious ‘Channel Dash’
in issue #12 of Iron Cross
magazine.
My late father, Flight
Lieutenant Alan Green, was
involved in Operation Fuller
as navigator on one of the
three Wellingtons (R1448,
commanded by Sgt Griggs)
deployed by 218 Squadron.
According to the squadron
Operations Record Book, these
aircraft were to attack the
‘Toads’ (RAF code name for the
three ships) which ‘…had moved
out of Brest and were sighted in
the English Channel’.
Unfortunately, two of the
Wellingtons failed to take off
due to technical problems,
while R1448 left 218 Marham
at 14.50 hours, only to return
when the hydraulics in the
front turret failed.
Following a hasty repair,
the Wellington was airborne
1 hour 45 minutes later, with
the crew’s subsequent report
noting they ‘…came down from
the cloud and found ships
below us. One ship believed
destroyer seen accompanying
■ A Junkers 88 of III./NJG2. An aircraft of the 7th Staffel shot down the
Short Stirling on 21 June 1942
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
to starboard. Attacked from
ahead against the ships in line
astern at about 300ft. Aerial and
rear turret u/s through flak’.
Meanwhile, my father’s
best friend, another navigator
called Philip Gales, was aboard
Stirling N6128, captained
by Pilot Officer Allen which
was attacked by three
Messerschmitt Bf 110s as
described in the article Despite
being outnumbered, the
Stirling claimed to have shot
down one of the attackers*
‘…which was last seen in an
almost vertical dive... lost to
sight through cloud’.
This was the last time my
father flew in Wellingtons, as it
was the squadron’s final sortie
on type before it converted
fully to the mighty Stirling. My
father was subsequently shot
down twice in Stirlings.
The first incident was
the result of ‘friendly fire’
on 5 May 1942 following
misidentification by a Havoc
and Hurricane based at RAF
Tangmere, although all the
crew the crew survived.
The second shootdown
was by a German night fighter
over Holland on 21 June 1942
Send your letters to:
Post: Iron Cross Magazine
Warners Group Publications, The Maltings
West Street, Bourne, Lincolnshire PE10 9PH
Email: andy.saunders@warnersgroup.co.uk
in which three of the crew of
eight perished, the youngest
being only 19. Having managed
to bale-out once again, my
father was in hiding before
being captured while trying
to contact Dutch Resistance.
He eventually ended up in
Stalag Luft III together with the
second pilot, Flight Lietenant
Des Plunkett, the mapmaker in
the ‘Great Escape’ and number
13 out of the tunnel.
My father’s friend, Philip
Gales, was later Mentioned in
Despatches for bravery. On
the night of 3 /4 March 1942,
he went back into a burning
Stirling (N3712) to rescue his
fellow crewmen, even though
he himself had been badly
injured.
On 23 /24 September
1942, his Stirling was lost
without trace; the only formal
recognition of his ultimate
sacrifice is a reference to
his name (and those of his
crew) on the RAF Memorial
at Runnymede and the
International Bomber
Command Centre in Lincoln.
On hearing the news that his
best friend was missing, my
father wrote a very heartfelt
letter from Stalag Luft III about
Philip, expressing hope for
news of his survival.
Stuart Green (By email)
*Note: Our author for the pieces
on the Channel Dash, Chris Goss,
remarks that no Messerschmitt Bf
110 aircraft were lost during this
operation. Additionally, he notes
that Stuart’s father’s aircraft was
shot down by Leutnant Johannes
Werth of 7./NJG2.
■ Photograph taken from
Scharnhorst as she left Brest on 11
February 1942.
■ The Scharnhorst opens fire on Lt
Cdr Nigel Pumphrey’s MTBs.
Dear Sir,
It seems to inevitably be
the case that fresh material
emerges on feature topics just
after going to press. Such is the
case in respect of my recent
pieces on the Channel Dash.
Readers may be interested to
see these two historic images
related to the ‘Dash’ which have
just emerged. The first was
taken from the Scharnhorst
and shows the warships
preparing to leave Brest on the
evening of 11 February 1942.
The second photo shows
Scharnhorst opening fire on
the Royal Navy MTBs led by
Lt Cdr Nigel Pumphrey on
12 February. Prevented from
getting close by German
E-boats, the MTBs failed to
inflict any damage on the three
ships which sailed on. Shortly
afterwards, the ships were
attacked by Swordfish aircraft
of the Fleet Air Arm. Nigel
Pumphrey would be awarded
the DSO for his action that day.
Chris Goss (By email)
IRON CROSS ❙ 89
■ An unidentified Luftwaffe airman who has
been brought down in the English Channel
during the summer of 1940 is helped ashore on
the French coast. He wears the kapok Model 10-
76A Schwimmweste and carries a rubber ring.

90 ❙ IRON CROSS
 UNLOCKING HISTORY

Keeping Afloat
The discovery of a rubber ring in the wreck of a Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-4 shot down
in 1940 caused puzzlement when it was found during an excavation in the late 1970s.
Andy Saunders investigates why it was there.

I
n October 1977, the 590 Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Unit of the
Royal Engineers conducted an
excavation at a Messerschmitt Bf
109 E-4 crash site at Mountain Street,
Chilham, Kent, to recover and dispose
of any ammunition buried at the site.
There was also another purpose behind
the planned excavation: to search for
the remains of the pilot.
The aircraft had been shot down on 2
September 1940, crashing vertically into
the ground and becoming buried on
impact. Of the pilot, there was simply no
trace. It was assumed that he lay deeply
buried in the wreckage of his aircraft.
As to his identity, it was later deduced
that he was likely to be Oberleutnant
Ekkehard Schelcher of StabIII/JG54 who
had disappeared at that time and in this
approximate location.
The remains of the pilot were duly
recovered during that EOD operation
and formally identified as Oberleutnant
Schelcher, the identification confirmed
through the discovery of the number
of the aircraft in which he was lost:
1574. Ultimately, Ekkehard Schelcher
was buried with military honours at
Cannock Chase German Cemetery in
January 1980.
The mystery of his disappearance was
finally solved, although one mystery
remained from the artefacts recovered
in the wreckage of the aircraft: an inner
tube which appeared to have originated

■ When the remains of Oberleutnant Ekkehard

Schelcher (see here as a Leutnant) were found
in the wreckage of Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-4
in October 1977, what appeared to be a car
tyre inner tube was found with him.

from a motor vehicle. But was it

associated with the crash, or had it later
been thrown into the impact crater by
the landowner as a convenient means of
disposing of a piece of rubbish?

BULKY AND WATERLOGGED

Interviewed in the late 1970s, former
Luftwaffe fighter pilot Hauptmann
Joachim-Heinrich Schlichting had
served with StabIII/JG27 during the
summer of 1940 and complained that
his unit had not been equipped with
adequate lifejackets at that point of the
■ For Luftwaffe aircrew coming down in the English Channel, survival was a battle against the sea,
the elements, and often against the early issue kapok filled Model 10-76A Schwimmweste which
war. Instead, they had to rely on what
quickly became waterlogged after immersion. Here, the crew of a downed Messerschmitt Bf 110 he described as car inner tubes for
▲

struggle to vacate their sinking aircraft. Thus far, there is no sign that their dinghy has deployed. extra flotation in the event of coming

IRON CROSS ❙ 91
UNLOCKING HISTORY

down in the English Channel. It seems

an extraordinary claim, and almost an
unlikely one. But could it explain the
inner tube found in the wreckage of
Ekkehard Schelcher’s Messerschmitt?
Almost certainly, when he mentioned
‘inadequate lifejackets’, Schlichting
was referring to the kapok filled
lifejackets supplied to bomber and
fighter crews during the early part of
the war. Officially the Model 10-76A
Schwimmweste, it is often referred to,
colloquially, as a ‘sausage’ lifejacket by
militaria collectors today. The kapok
was stitched into tubular pockets
which gave the appearance of strings
of sausages sewn together, hence its
frequent nickname. This pattern of
lifejacket, though, had both benefits and
drawbacks.
The main benefit was that the kapok
■ A Luftwaffe airman dons his kapok lifejacket in an image which clearly shows the garment’s jacket needed no inflation. Once the
construction. wearer was in the water, the kapok
instantly kept the man afloat. On the
other hand, it was cumbersome and
bulky and very awkward in confined
cockpits. This was especially the case
when worn in the tiny cockpit of the
Messerschmitt Bf 109. But it had another
drawback, too.
Once submerged in water for any
length of time, the kapok became
■ Luftwaffe waterlogged and lost all its qualities of
ace, Major buoyancy, thus causing the wearer to
Helmut Wick, sink.
photographed
in mid-August
The alternative lifejacket, once they
1940. He and were issued to all Luftwaffe aircrew, was
his other pilots the automatically inflating lifejacket –
still wear the the Model 10-30 Schwimmweste. These
kapok 10-76A
were rubber bladders stitched inside
Schwimmweste.
The pack rubberised yellow fabric and blown up
hanging from by a CO2 inflation cylinder. It was then
his lifejacket possible to keep the jacket topped-up
contains a with air through an inflation tube.
fluorescein dye
to mark the
All told, the 10-30 was a superior
sea and make device to the kapok Schwimmweste
downed airmen and many RAF pilots discarded their
more visible. issue Air Ministry lifejackets in favour of
The 10-76A
the 10-30 if they could lay their hands
Schwimmweste
was certainly on captured examples. Nevertheless,
a bulky and some Luftwaffe pilots were wary of
cumbersome inflatable jackets. After all, they could
piece of kit be punctured by splinters, or have holes
to wear in the
confines of a
burned in them. If only for a limited
Messerschmitt period, then at least the Kapok 10-76A
Bf 109 cockpit. would initially float. No matter what.

92 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ Standard Luftwaffe issue: the kapok
filled Model 10-76A Schwimmweste.

■ The Model 10-30 Schwimmweste was considered by RAF pilots and aircrew to be superior to their Air
Ministry issue lifejackets and they often wore captured examples as a matter of preference. Here, RAF
ace Flight Lieutenant Eric Lock wears a Model 10-30 Schwimmweste in the cockpit of his Spitfire. Wing
Commander Guy Gibson of ‘Dambuster’ fame also wore a captured Luftwaffe Model 10-30.

‘KANALKRANKHEIT’ their parachutes over water.

Against the background of the
lifejacket question, and the use
of rubber rings, it is necessary to
consider the phenomenon of so-called
Kanalkrankheit (channel sickness), a
type of combat fatigue experienced
by Luftwaffe crews who continually
operated over the English Channel.
Confronting British defences was one
thing, but there existed a real terror of
coming down in the English Channel
and drowning or dying of exposure. And
whilst the German air-sea rescue service
was efficient, survival depended on
being spotted and rescued.
It is also necessary to factor into this
equation the fact that the Messerschmitt
Bf 109 E pilots operating over the
English Channel early in the summer of
1940 did not carry one-man dinghies,
although there is evidence they began
to be used from at least October 1940.
On the other hand, crews of all other
Luftwaffe aircraft did carry dinghies
although these were only of any use
if the crew could release, inflate, and
board the dinghy. However, they were of
no use to airmen who had had to take to
It is no wonder, all things considered,
that some Luftwaffe fliers carried
rubber rings in 1940. Or did they? Is
there any more evidence that this was a
regular practice? There is.
Hauptmann Helmut Mahlke, a
Junkers 87 Stuka pilot with StG1 in ■ Standard Luftwaffe issue: the inflatable
1940, recalled that his pilots had taken Model 10-30 Schwimmweste.
to carrying seaside Lilos with them as
additional buoyancy aids. Interesting
though this supplementary information
is, perhaps something was lost in
translation, and it was a rubber seaside
ring that Mahlke’s men carried? Either
way, it demonstrates the fear held
by many Luftwaffe crews who were
operating across the English Channel.
Another intriguing photograph shows
Oberleutnant Gerhard Granz and his
gunner, Feldwebel Schutel, fooling
around with an inflated child’s rubber
duck ring during the summer of 1940.
Serving with I/ZG2, they were shot down
over land on 7 September 1940 - thus,
the rubber duck did not have to be put
into action! The significance of that ■ Non-Luftwaffe issue: an inner tube
rubber ring was carried by many pilots and
child’s ring becomes clearer when one
aircrew operating over the English Channel.
considers the lifejackets the men are

IRON CROSS ❙ 93
UNLOCKING HISTORY

■ A series of official Luftwaffe photographs depicting what is described as the Wunderboje,or

,or Wonder
Buoy. This was a weighted rubber float which could be dropped to downed airmen and contained an
inflatable one-man dinghy. The airman could then climb aboard and await rescue. As illustrated in the
-wearing airman is being picked up by a Heinkel 59.
final frame, this Model 10-76A Schwimmweste-wearing

wearing: the kapok 10-76A.

Finally, and as if to confirm the
use of rubber rings or inner tubes
by German aircrew members*,
the recent emergence of the
photograph used to open this article
provides crucial evidence. It shows
an unidentified and soaking wet
Luftwaffe airman being helped ashore
on the French coast. He is wearing
a kapok 10-76A lifejacket and is
clutching a rubber ring. ■ Although a poor quality image, Oberleutnant
That some Luftwaffe fliers felt a Gerhard Granz and Feldwebel Willi Schutel (wearing
need to carry supplementary inflation kapok lifejackets) lark around with a child’s
aids is perhaps hardly surprising. inflatable rubber duck. Although they enjoy the joke,
carrying this toy rubber ring had a serious purpose.
With a high degree of confidence,
we can now say that the rubber
inner tube found in Ekkehard
Schelcher’s aircraft was exactly ■ Above: Not until later in 1940 did
Messerschmitt Bf 109 pilots carry one-man
for that very purpose, thereby
dinghies on air operations over water.
unlocking this intriguing little ■ Left: Notwithstanding the issues with
piece of history. kapok lifejackets, German survival equipment
during the early part of the war was certainly
(*Note: these rings presumably far superior to the kit issued to the RAF.
This is the two-man dinghy carried by the
did not have Schrader valves
Messerschmitt Bf 110 and Junkers 87 Stuka.
common to tyre inner tubes It is equipped with survival equipment, signal
otherwise inflation by the user pistol, rations, first aid kit, sea marker dye,
would have been impossible.) paddles, and re-inflation bellows.

94 ❙ IRON CROSS
 MILITARY INSIGNIA COLLECTORS AND RE-ENACTORS
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 NEW BOOKS AND PRODUCTS
BOOK REVIEWS
EDITOR’S CHOICE material is amply demonstrated
in this truly magnificent
study of the Dornier 217 – an
aircraft type which has been
sadly neglected in terms of
any in-depth study. Now, with
this book, we surely have the
definitive work on the subject.
As an aircraft that might be
considered a ‘refinement’ and
‘upgrade’ of the Dornier 17,
the Dornier 217 became the
mainstay of German bomber
operations in the West from
1941 onwards. However, the
fact that just four Luftwaffe
Gruppen were equipped with
the type for these operations
illustrates the paucity of aircraft
DORNIER DO 217 available for sorties against
Britain, as well as the limited
A Combat and output of aircraft and the
Photographic availability of sufficient aircrew
Record in to mount any meaningful
attacks on the British Isles after
Luftwaffe Service, the 1940 – 1941 Blitz.
1941 - 1945 In what is a typical high-
Chris Goss quality product we have now
come to expect from Crecy,
Publisher: Crecy Publishing Ltd
the author first sets out the
Web: www.crecy.co.uk
ISBN: 978-1-90653-758-6 design and development
Hardback: 184 pages history of the Dornier 217 in a
RRP: £35.00 section which is accompanied
by a selection of photographs
Chris Goss’s depth of and drawings depicting the
knowledge and access to early stages of the aircraft’s
such an astounding wealth of inception and build. He then
96 ❙ IRON CROSS
moves on to the introduction
to service of the Dornier 217
and describes how it was first
‘blooded’ in combat.
The quality of the imagery
throughout the book is first
class and comprises a selection
of photographs which will not
have previously been seen
by most readers. Included
in a truly astonishing range
and selection of imagery are
shots of the aircraft in service,
aircraft that have either been
shot down damaged, detailed
interior photographs and a
selection of photographs of the
pilots and aircrew who flew the
bomber in action. The caption
details, too, are both extensive
as well as informative.
Chris Goss goes on to
cover the use of the Dornier
217 as a night fighter and its
deployment to deliver the
Henschel 293 and Fritz X Glide
Bombs, again covering this
aspect with a fascinating range
of photographs. Six pages of
colour plates depicting the
range of marking applied to
the Dornier 217 are also an
informative addition.
A largely photographic
section depicting the Dornier
217 in use on all fronts
contains of further wealth of
photographic material – again,
with extensively researched
captions. This section leads
to a detailed chapter looking
at the demise of the aircraft,
operationally, under the
heading: ‘Withdrawn from
Battle, 1944 – 1945’.
There follows a series
of extremely detailed and
informative selection of
appendices detailing units,
commanders, personnel,
orders of battle and known
losses during the Baedeker
Blitz raids.
This book is very highly
recommended and an absolute
treasure trove of amazing
detail. Luftwaffe enthusiasts
will not want to be without a
copy!
Reviewed by Andy Saunders
Illustrations ✔.
References/Notes ✔.
Appendices ✔.
Index ✔.

BF 109 D/E
Blitzkrieg
1939 – 40
Malcolm V. Lowe
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Web: www.Ospreypublishing.com
ISBN: 978-1-4728-5031-7
Softback: 80 pages
RRP: £13.99
The third in the relatively
new Osprey ‘Dogfight’
series, this work by
Malcolm V. Lowe will
be sure to appeal to
Luftwaffe enthusiasts
and especially those
with an interest in the
early models of the
Messerschmitt Bf 109.
This compact and
extremely well researched
little volume contains an
extraordinary amount
of detail on the Bf 109 D
and E in action across the
early days of the Second
World War. The chapter
headings are: In Battle,
Setting the Scene, Path to
Combat, Weapon of War,
Art of War, and Combat.
All of these concisely
covering the subject
matter and incorporating
a superb range of imagery
and artwork. And it will
certainly be the case
that most of the readers
with a subject interest
will find the majority of
photographs to be new to
them.
Especially pleasing
to this series of titles is
the artwork depicting
specific battles and actions
which have been skilfully
executed by Tim Brown.
These are both technical
and ‘ribbon’ illustrations,
the latter clearly showing
how the actions unfolded
and how the combatant
aircraft manoeuvred in
relation to each other.
Very often, and even with
detailed descriptions or
pilot’s combat reports, it is
difficult to envisage exactly
how combats evolved.
In these illustrations,
it is easy to follow the
paths of the opposing
aircraft. This puts a
whole new perspective
on understanding what
happened, and how it
happened, during the
course of these aerial
battles.
The author is to be
commended on putting
together a useful and
informative book which is
not only highly readable,
but which constitutes a
valuable addition to any
military aviation bookshelf
and one which is an
extremely useful reference
source, too.
The usual high standard
of Osprey production
has been maintained
to provide a quality
book at an affordable
and reasonable price.
Inevitably, the ‘Dogfight’
series will become
collectable, and this
reviewer certainly looks
forward to adding many
more in this series to his
library!
Very highly
recommended.
Reviewed by Jon Harmer
Illustrations ✔.
References/Notes ✘.
Appendices ✔.
Index ✔.
PRODUCT REVIEW
2023 Cross and
Cockade Calendar
Publisher:
The Great War Aviation Society
Web:
www.crossandcockade.com/store
Price: £10.00
As we head towards autumn,
it is inevitable that we should
start to think about Christmas
and the New Year. And that is
the perfect time to consider
things like calendars for 2023!
At Iron Cross magazine we
are again pleased to support
our friends at The Great War
Aviation Society by reviewing
their 2023 artwork calendar.
As ever, it is a truly lovely
piece of work which utilises
the talented artwork of twelve
different aviation artists
who showcase their skills
across each month of the
year. Included in that group
of wonderful internationally
acclaimed artists is Piotr
Forkasiewicz, now our
regular cover artist for Iron
Cross. Other artists include
Kenneth McDonough, Taras
Shtyk, Antonis Karidis, Ian
Garstka, Russell Smith, Carlos
Alonso, Vadim Slesarev, Steve
Anderson, Ron Cole, Zdenek
Machacek and Paul Lengellé.
The range of subjects
includes aircraft of most of the
combatant nations depicted in
a variety of stunning scenarios.
And many of these artists
will be familiar to readers of
military history books and
magazines who will instantly
recognise the various styles
and the nature of their various
pieces of work across recent
decades.
It is worth recording, too,
that each artist has allowed
their work to be used without
charge to boost funds for The
Great War Aviation Society.
Hitherto known as Cross
and Cockade International,
it has recently been decided
to re-name to The Great War
Aviation Society in order to
promote better understanding
as to the purpose of the
organisation and to help
people interested in the topic
to more easily find the society
online. In the words of the
organisation’s president, Peter
Dye:
“It is our mission to explore,
preserve and share information
on this fascinating period
and to make sure the aircraft,
pilots, ground crew and their
sacrifices are never forgotten.
We hope that the new name
will help continue to keep us at
the forefront of research and
discussion about First World
War aviation.”
Details regarding purchase
of the calendar can be found
at the head of this review,
but those interested in the
society should go to: www.
crossandcockade.com
Reviewed by Andy Saunders
IRON CROSS ❙ 97
Long before Hitler came
to power, he was the target
of numerous groups and
individuals who sought to
eliminate him from the political
scene in Germany. Among
the first recorded attempts
on Hitler’s life was that made
during a speech he delivered in
the Hofbräuhaus, Munich, on
4 November 1921. The event
soon descended into chaos
as socialist and communist
activists tried to disrupt Hitler’s
speech. Two shots were fired
in the direction of the platform
where Hitler was standing.
Both missed. But this was a
foretaste of what would follow
– countless assassination
attempts would be planned or
executed. All would fail.
Though an enormous security
apparatus was constructed
to safeguard the Führer, he
believed more in ‘providence’
or ‘destiny’, as well as his own
unique instinct for survival,
than the endeavours of his
security team. He would
frequently change his travel
THE HITLER
ASSASSINATION
ATTEMPTS
The Plots, Places and
People that Almost
Changed History
John Grehan
Publisher: Frontline Books
Web: www.frontline-books.com
ISBN: 978-1-39901-890-6
Hardback: 251 pages • RRP: £25.00
plans at a moment’s notice or religious convictions, by the
distressing those who had to Special Operations Executive,
plan to secure his safe passage, or from his own military leaders
but equally dumbfounding who saw that Hitler’s policies
those who sought to intercept would lead to the destruction of
him. Germany.
This instinct served him Considerable efforts were
well, as the author of this made by senior German
book has noted in revealing civilians (as well as by Heer and
scores of plots and plans Abwehr officers) to involve
dreamt up by people from the British Government in
Jewish Americans in Chicago, the downfall of Hitler, even
Czech nationalists, former persuading Pope Pius XII to act
friends and political allies, lone as intermediary. Many of these
individuals motivated by social individuals had the same desire
as Hitler: a Europe dominated
and controlled by Germany,
but without going to war to
achieve those goals.
John Grehan has identified
almost 60 plots, some of
which have not previously
been documented in
any modern publication.
Needless to say, the Heer
plots, which culminated in
the 20 July 1944 attempt by
Claus von Stauffenberg at
the Wolfsschanze, are given
considerable attention by
the author, who describes
the protracted and complex
planning by many members
of the military which led to the
suitcase bomb which so nearly
killed the Führer.
This is a superbly researched
book, shining a spotlight on
the many Hitler assassination
attempts. A real gem of a
publication.
Reviewed by Andy Saunders
Illustrations: ✔.
References/Notes: ✔.
Appendices: ✔.
Index: ✔.

More than any other part of
the Third Reich, the wider
organisation that was the SS
epitomises the criminality of
the Nazi regime. Perhaps little
wonder given that the origins
of the SS were a small cadre
of elite soldiers appointed
as personal bodyguard to
Hitler. Although that initial
purpose grew into a military
organisation of some 38
individual divisions, that
elitism arising from its early
days and its initial purpose
was never lost to the SS.
HITLER’S Consequently, it carried before
ARMED SS it a reputation that as a feared
and powerful arm of all that
The Waffen-SS at the Nazi party stood for. In that
War 1939 – 1945 context, the Waffen-SS became
Anthony Tucker-Jones
an organisation willing and
capable of carrying out some
Publisher: Pen and Sword Publishing of the worst excesses in the
Web: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk
ISBN: 978-1-39900-691-0
name of Nazi Germany.
Hardback: 228 pages In many respects, what
RRP: £25.00 the SS was and how it was
organised is subject to much
misunderstanding, although
Anthony Ticker-Jones skilfully
dispenses with all such notions
and misconceptions, setting
out in a concise and readable
way the history of this odious
organisation. It wasn’t always
such an ‘elite’ force, either.
Notwithstanding the fighting
prowess of the soldiers who
served with the Waffen-SS,
particularly its Panzer divisions
and Das Reich, Totenkopf, and
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler,
some formations comprised
poor quality foreign volunteers
and even prisoners and
convicts. Although lacking such
finely honed fighting prowess
and skills, it was often these
elements who were often more
capable of carrying out some of
the Third Reich’s atrocities. But
that is certainly not to say that
the other more ‘professional’
elements of the Waffe-SS were
above such behaviour.
In his narrative, the author
concisely sets out the full
history of the Waffen-SS from
the early 1930s through to
its ignominious end in 1945,
tracing the development of the
organisation along with the
story of its various key figures,
the battles it fought on the
Eastern and Western Fronts
and covering many of the war
crimes it committed.
This reviewer is an admirer
of Tucker-Jones’ work, and this
book does not fall short of the
excellent standards of research
and eloquent writing we have
come to expect from a fine
military historian. Most highly
recommended.
Reviewed by Andy Saunders
Illustrations: ✔.
References/Notes: ✔.
Appendices: ✔.
Index: ✔.

98 ❙ IRON CROSS

Next Issue
The next issue of Iron Cross (Issue No 15) will be on sale 21 December 2022 and the
following features will be included as just some of the magazine’s exciting content.
Smoking out the Wasps Oberst Josef
Kammhuber believed that converted
bombers flown by experienced crews
would be ideal for long range night
fighter operations over Britain, stating:
“When I want to kill wasps, I smoke out
their nest. I don’t swat insects in the
air one at a time.” As a result, intruder
operations were flown over RAF airfields
from Gilze-Rijen, Holland, until October
1941. (1)
The German Cross in Gold Instituted
by Adolf Hitler in September 1941,
the War Order of the German Cross
(Der Kriegsorden Deutsches Kreuz) was
awarded in its gold version for repeated
acts of bravery or military leadership. Our
German orders, medals, and decorations
expert, Dietrich Maerz, details the story
of this important Wehrmacht bravery
order. (2)
2 one. We explore the tensions between
GUARANTEE YOUR COPY OF ISSUE 15. SEE P74 FOR DETAILS.
ISSUE 15
1
Admirals at War Kriegsmarine
admirals Dönitz and Raeder both served
Hitler’s Third Reich during WW2, their
relationship a far from comfortable
the two commanders that focussed
on their diverging views as to how the
naval war should be fought, a bitterness
that continued into their post-war
incarceration in Spandau prison. (3)
3 an in-depth look at
4
Panzerfaust Arguably the forerunner
of the advanced NLAW anti-tank missiles
of 2022, the relatively primitive single
shot point-and-shoot Panzerfaust
(literally, armour fist) was one of the
most effective anti-tank weapons of the
Third Reich. It was responsible for some
34% of Allied tanks destroyed in the west,
and around 70% of tanks destroyed in
urban combat in eastern Germany were
Panzerfaust claims. (4)
5
The Pickelhaube The iconic spiked
German helmet became a favourite
souvenir for Allied soldiers
during WW1 and has been a
popular collectable item ever
since, although its origins
long pre-date 1914. We take
the story of this
helmet type and
its various types
and patterns. (5)
NB: Contents
may be subject to
change.
IRON CROSS ❙ 99
 ARMOURED VEHICLES

■ A captured French SOMUA

S35 tank in German service in
Northern France or Belgium,
c.1941/42. (PanzerDB.com,
colourisation by Luc Heinrich)
100 ❙ IRON CROSS
 Under New Ownership
The German use of Beutepanzer, or captured tanks, was a notable feature of the First
World War. However, Camille Vargas explains how the 1940 defeat of France also
provided a treasure trove of captured armour for the Third Reich’s Wehrmacht.

A
t the end of the Battle of France, and in accord with
the terms of the Armistice of 22 June 1940, the
Germans found themselves in possession of the
entire fleet of French armoured weaponry. In total,
the Wehrmacht got their hands on 2,100 armoured vehicles,
and this included some 1,900 tanks. It was an astonishing
number, but it is also worth noting that at the start of
hostilities France had more tanks and armour than Germany
had at its disposal at that time.
Among the captured tanks were around 150 to 160 B1 Bis -
a rather symbolic gain for Germany, and certainly a symbolic
sign of defeat for France when one considers that the B1 Bis
had been the most powerful tank of the French campaign.
The B1 Bis had caused fear and worry for many a German
tanker during the battle, and Hitler himself was said to have
been impressed when he was shown the carcass of one of
these steel monsters.
The figure of 150 B tanks recovered is a significant one, ■ This B1 Bis lies destroyed alongside a French country road as a
especially given the number of these tanks that were sent Wehrmacht convoy passes by in the German advance. Two of the
into action by France at the beginning of the conflict. This French crew have been buried in a temporary field grave. (PGF)

stood at around 326. However, many B1 Bis were

lost during the campaign simply because they
were abandoned due to lack of fuel or because
of mechanical failure. The speed of the German
advance did not allow the French time to recover
tanks that could otherwise have been repaired
or refuelled, thus forcing the French army to
abandon them in the countryside. This meant
that although they escaped destruction in battle,
they were simply awaiting German collection.
In addition to abandoned tanks that were
found in relatively good condition, the Germans
recovered all the B1 Bis that were then in storage.
Among this rich haul were also another 800 ‘R’
tanks; that is, the R35 and R40. About 200 of
these vehicles were later converted as the base for
self-propelled guns or tank destroyers, and 180
were delivered to other Axis countries including
■ Many tanks lost by the French Army during 1940 were simply abandoned when Romania and Italy. The Germans also recovered
they ran out of fuel or suffered mechanical failure. Later, they became a valuable
resource for the Wehrmacht, although from the smoke stains around the open
some 600 H-type tanks (the H35 and H39), the
hatch, this H 39 tank appears that it may have been torched by its crew before vast majority of which were ultimately reused.
▲

they left it by the roadside. (Colour by RJM) About 300 Somua S-35 tanks were also recovered

IRON CROSS ❙ 101

ARMOURED VEHICLES

(including 30 that were sent to other Axis powers), along with

50 FCM tanks.
In terms of armoured vehicles, 200 AMD35s were also
reused. Mostly, these went on to see service in elements of
the various Panzer Divisions.
Apart from these tanks and armoured cars, the occupiers
also recovered supply tanks - the Lorraine 37 L and the EU
Chenillette. These Chenillettes would serve as the basis for
the construction of self-propelled guns, for refueling, or for
ancillary and secondary operations.
The supply of captured tanks was also used as a reservoir
from which to effect deliveries to the Axis countries that
needed tanks, countries who now looked to their ‘senior’ ally
for supplies. This was especially the case after the first losses
suffered by Italy. ■ One of the many French R 35 tanks that fell into German hands in
But why did Germany decide to use this fleet of captured May 1940. (PGF)
French tanks and vehicles, and continue - in various ways -
to do so throughout the war, especially when most of these
models were already long outdated? Becker already had solid experience in the field of
armoured vehicles, as well as the transformation of foreign
chassis for the benefit of Germany. Now, faced with the
BAUKOMMANDO BECKER growing need for armoured vehicles and resource savings,
Incredibly, the Germans had lost some 28% of their tanks that Becker felt that French tanks could help fill the gap. After all,
had been engaged during the campaign in France, and this the Third Reich needed to spare its industrial capacity in the
was on top of some degree of attrition prior to that. Further face of reality and what was now a far more protracted war
to that, Operation Barbarossa in 1941 became particularly than had been anticipated or planned for. Thus, instead of
‘greedy’ in terms of the armoured vehicle requirements of the producing its own, small, armoured vehicles, it made perfect
German army and the further losses being sustained on the sense for Germany to continue to use the resource it had
Eastern Front. A solution was needed to meet these urgent at its disposal in France. This would help conserve valuable
requirements, and Germany once again turned to the supply resources for the production of more powerful tanks, as well
of captured or abandoned French tanks. as the development and production of new models. Thus,
To this end, a German army officer and engineer, Major some of the French armoured vehicles from 1940 would
Alfred Becker, felt that the now long outdated French tanks go on to serve as a basis for the design of self-propelled
might offer a solution and Baukommando Becker* was set weapons.
up in 1942 to address the problem of a growing need for Fortunately, not everything had been discarded following
armoured vehicles and for resource economies. the vast capture of French materiel of 1940 and its initial

*The full story of Baukommando Becker will be covered in detail in a future issue of Iron Cross magazine.

■ Five Renault FT Beutepanzer seen on the streets of Paris, c.1941. (PGF) ■ Renault FT Beutepanzer tanks trundle through the streets at Mount
Carmel, St Martins, Guernsey, during the German fortification of the
Channel Islands. (Michael Deane)

102 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ Right: Another knocked-
out French tank, a Renault
D2, in May or June 1940.
Again, this tank was
likely only fit for scrap,
or possibly useful as a
spares source for the
Wehrmacht’s Beutepanzer
fleet. (PGF)

■ Below: A French Char B1

bis from the 1st Platoon,
1st Company, 15th Tank
Battalion, of the French
Army’s 2nd Tank Division
that was knocked-out by
German anti-tank artillery
in Saint Simon, 19 May
1940. This would appear to
be another tank was only
good for scrap, or perhaps
for later scavenging by
Baukommando Becker.
(PGF)

stop-gap usage. Far from it. Now, in 1942, those old tanks
would become useful again.
From among the many German transformations of French
armour, it will be helpful to detail some that are emblematic
of Germany’s urgent needs, first in 1940 and then again from
1942.
The Renault R35 had already been one of those tanks
widely used by the Germans and was put to several uses:
basic models for the securing of territories, turretless models
for training armoured crews (including driving) or, later,
conversion into tank destroyers. The latter model, the 4.7 cm
PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731(f) had an open casemate
in place of the turret to accommodate the artillery piece, the
Škoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38 or PaK (t), the vehicle having a
crew of three.
The R35 was chosen as the base because it was more
rugged and had more protection when compared to the
Panzer I. About 170 R35 tanks were transformed into these
self-propelled guns.
As for the Somua S-35 tanks, these received the
Beutepanzer designation Panzerkampfwagen 35-S 739(f),
although its single-seat turret was not liked by the German
crews. To partially solve this problem, the tank’s original
turret was modified to accommodate a two-leaf hatch which
allowed the tank commander to view the battleground from
this observation point. The radio system was also replaced (or
newly fitted if the original tank did not have one) by a German
system, along with other on-board equipment. The German
tank crews did not appreciate the ergonomics of this tank,
but it was never intended as a piece of primary equipment for
the Panzer divisions.
▲

■ A captured French D2 tank, June 1940. (PGF) For the B1 Bis, Renault’s Boulogne-Billancourt facilities

IRON CROSS ❙ 103

ARMOURED VEHICLES

Baukommando Becker

Alfred Becker was born in Krefeld in 1899 and on the outbreak of war
in 1914 volunteered for service, aged 15. He went on to serve in the
artillery where he became an officer, seeing action at Verdun and Cambrai.
Following the Armistice, he became a mechanical engineer and co-owner
of Volkmann & Company, Krefeld. He also formed a manufacturing
business, Alfred Becker AG of Bielefeld.
In August 1939, Becker was called up to serve in the 227th Infantry
Division Rhine-Westphalian, and made an officer in the division’s 15th
Artillery Regiment, rapidly being promoted to Hauptmann. When Germany
invaded Poland, Becker was serving on the western frontier near the
Belgian border.
In December 1939, Becker’s division prepared for Fall Gelb and on 10
May 1940 the division engaged in the offensive into the Netherlands and
Belgium. Becker’s battery provided fire support as the division advanced,
but the guns in his artillery regiment were all pulled by horses, then the
standard practice for German infantry divisions. To pull its artillery, a
battery like Becker’s needed 126 horses.
After the Dutch capitulation on 19 May, Becker came across the motor
transport of a Dutch artillery regiment - heavy vehicles he believed he
could use. To replace the horses, he chose the Brossel TAL lorry and
used captured Belgian trucks to motorise the transport of his division’s
reconnaissance battalion. Motorising the transport for his battery made it
more mobile, allowing them to keep up with the advance of lead elements.
It had been Becker’s first innovative use of captured enemy vehicles.
Then, in 1942, under the authority of the Reich Minister for Armaments
■ Alfred Becker.
and War Production, Baukommando Becker (Construction Unit Becker)
was created, making use of three factories near Paris: the Matford Factory,
spares.
Talbot Factory and Hotchkiss Factory. Disassembled, changes to the design were worked out and assembly
Large quantities of damaged Allied military vehicles were still available
lines set up at one of the factories. The overhauled vehicles were
in France, but their use in 1942 was in serious doubt. The French armouredgiven purpose appropriate superstructures and the basic idea for
vehicles undamaged following the campaign of 1940 had already been conversion was straightforward: Becker built prototypes of replacement
assigned to occupation forces, training units, and anti-partisan forces. superstructures in wood and sent these for steel fabrication which were
These early French tanks were of little value for combat in 1942, but then shipped back to Baukommando Becker.
they were tracked vehicles and Becker saw a use for them. In addition to Becker completed the conversions by refitting and repairing the
wrecked and captured armour, Becker also had access to soft-skinned vehicles in order of importance, one type at a time. The most innovative
half-tracked vehicles. These assorted vehicles were in various states of aspect being assessment of each vehicle to determine how to make the
disrepair, often rusting away and left outside in the elements. most effective use of it in relation to current battlefield conditions.
The task was enormous, but Becker set up his HQ at the Matford In 1942 and 1943, Becker salvaged all usable tank wreckage that
Factory in Poissy and organised his men to scour France for wrecked could be found in France and some 1,800 armoured fighting vehicles were
vehicles previously thought useful only for scrapping. The vehicles created at Baukommando Becker. In July and August 1942, he converted
collected were divided into three main groups: those requiring minor repair
170 armoured vehicles into the Marder I. A further 106 chassis were
and refit, those requiring major repair, and those beyond use except for converted into self-propelled artillery pieces. He also made 30 artillery
observation vehicles using the same chassis.
For his valuable work, Becker was awarded the
German Cross in Gold and the Knights Cross of the War
Merit Cross with Swords.
During the winter of 1943-44, Becker’s work
focused on equipping the 21st Panzer Division using
the tracked carriages of French light tanks to mobilise
the 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun and the 10.5 cm leFH
18 howitzer.
The vehicles were formed into a fire support unit,
Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200, and Becker was
made its commander, leading the unit during the
battles in Normandy. Some of Becker’s unit escaped
encirclement at Falaise and retreated across France
into Belgium, although he was captured on the French/
German border in December 1944.
■ Alfred Becker was decorated for his service, being awarded the German Cross in After the war, Alfred Becker returned to
Gold and the Knights Cross of the War Merit Cross with Swords. engineering. He died in 1981.

104 ❙ IRON CROSS

 ■ A parade of
captured SOMUA S
35 and Hotchkiss
H 39 tanks on the
Champs-Elysees in
1941. Sights such
as this must have
been desperately
galling for French
civilians as they
witnessed their
former military
might being
paraded by their
occupiers.

were put into use to recreate a new B1 Bis fleet for the
Wehrmacht, and these captured tanks, or Beutepanzer,
were given the new designation of Panzerkampfwagen B2
740 (f). The last letter in brackets indicated the country
of manufacture or origin of the various Beutepanzer.
The turret of the tank was also modified to allow a hatch
opening on its top, in line with the German preference to
allow the tank commander to better observe the battlefield.
A Renault manufacturer’s plate was also affixed to the
chassis of these tanks during the transformation work,
unlike the production models which did not have one. In
terms of camouflage and markings, the tanks were taken
out of their French colours and painted in the standard
German grey, dark and uniform, and with a German cross
(Balkenkreuz) painted onto the superstructure.
development of armoured vehicles since the beginning of
the war. However, the occupiers still wanted to make these
tanks profitable and to find a useful function for them. For
that reason, the flamethrower tank came into being with the
75 mm gun in the hull of the original model replaced by a
flamethrower projector and its operating device. These tanks
were mainly engaged on the Eastern Front, especially during
Barbarossa.
The B1 Bis Beutepanzer flamethrower, or
Panzerkampfwagen B-2 (f), retained its 47 mm SA 35 gun in
turret, which meant that the tank still had some firepower,
and thus a defensive capability, while the flamethrower

FLAMMENWERFER
The initial reconditioning and repurposing of the B1 Bis was
undertaken quite rapidly, with most of the tanks ready for
use in the autumn of 1940. Some examples were also used
later to serve as the basis for the transformations into self-
propelled guns by Becker, and as flamethrower tanks. The
use of the B1 Bis as a base to create a flamethrower tank
to advance with the infantry generally used only the older
models of B1 Bis.
The B1 Bis, renamed Panzerkampfwagen B-2 (f), was
too slow to be properly integrated into the Panzer- ■ A flamethrower Flammenwerfer Beutepanzer, the B2-740(f) on the
▲

Divisionen and it was obsolete compared to progress in the Eastern Front, converted from the B1 Bis. (BA)

IRON CROSS ❙ 105

ARMOURED VEHICLES
device, the Flammenwerfer-Spritzkopf, was intended for
use against infantry or to dislodge occupants from shelters,
bunkers, or entrenchments. It had additional armour fitted
to the front where the flamethrower was located (to protect
both the device and its operator) and an additional tank
of gasoline was added to supply the weapon. In total, it is
estimated that about 60 ‘B’ tanks were transformed into
flamethrower tanks.
In addition to the flamethrower tank, the Germans
reused the base of the B1 Bis for another purpose: a self-
propelled gun, the 10.5-cm leichte Feldhaubitze 18/3 (Sf.) auf
Geschützwagen B2 (f) 740 (f)). This model was first envisaged,
through the initiative of Hitler, to accompany flamethrower
conversion tanks on the Eastern Front. However, the
development of the 10.5-cm leichte Feldhaubitze 18/3 (Sf.)
auf Geschützwagen B2 (f) 740 (f) took longer than expected,
and the flamethrower tanks went into action against
Soviet fortified positions in 1941 without the intended
reinforcement of these Beutepanzer self-propelled gun
conversions.
The Rheinmetall workshops, near Düsseldorf, were
responsible for transforming the B1 Bis into this new
self-propelled howitzer., and the original turret of the
tank was removed to make way for a platform that could
accommodate the 10.5 leFH 18/3. The crew compartment
was open, but with protection in the form of rectangular
armoured shields 30 to 40 mm thick. In bad weather or high
temperatures, the crew could protect themselves from the
elements with a tarpaulin provided for this purpose. With this
new configuration, the armoured vehicle was now 3 metres
high.
On these conversions, the original 75 mm gun was removed
from the hull of the tank with the crew comprising five
men: a driver, a commander, and three gunners. For close
protection, several slots were provided from which to fire
small arms as well as an MG 34 machine gun.
■ German recycling, 1942 style. A newly fabricated 10.5 cm leFh 16 auf
Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) leaves the Baukommando Becker production line.
(PGF)
106 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Work under way by Baukommando Becker on the 10.5 cm leFh 16
auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) production line. (PGF)
This version retained the original engine of the B1 Bis,
despite now being a slightly higher weight at around 32.5
tons. The weapon with which it was equipped, the 10.5
cm leFH 18/3 howitzer (the abbreviation leFH denoting
leichte FeldHaubitze) was a light short artillery piece with
a maximum firing range of about 10 kilometers and a rate
of fire of four to six rounds per minute. This gun was not
primarily intended to target enemy tanks, but rather light
fortifications or points of support. In total, some 16 examples
of this self-propelled howitzer derived from the French B1 Bis
were produced.
As with the flamethrower version, this self-propelled gun
was often subject to engine and mechanical failures, while
its height made it particularly visible and thus vulnerable to
enemy fire. Similarly, it was relatively slow compared to other
contemporary armoured vehicles.
The Lorraine Chenillette conversion was typical of
the German processing workshops, and while about 300
Chenillettes were reused in their basic configuration for
refueling, and many were used as the starting point for
development of other machines with about 170 Lorraine
37L Chenillettes transformed into self-propelled guns
with several variants: schwere Feldhaubitze 13/1 (Sf.) auf
Geschützwagen Lorraine-Schlepper (f) of 15 cm, the 7.5 cm
PaK 40 auf Sfl. Lorraine Schlepper ‘Marder I’ (Sd.Kfz.135), and
the 5 cm sFH-13/1 auf Geschuetzwagen Lorraine Schlepper(f).
These models all had open armoured casemates on top of
the body to accommodate the artillery pieces.
BARBAROSSA TO BERLIN
With the outbreak of Operation Barbarossa, Germany opened
a new front to the east. Several types of French Beutepanzer
were sent to this gigantic front, including AMD Panhards
which were used within the elements of 7 Panzer Division.
Under the new designation PzSpWg Panhard 178-P204
(f), the French armoured car became very popular with
■ A Vielfachwerfer mounted on a converted and armoured French
SOMUA MCG vehicle at Riva Bella, Normandy, in 1944. The officer
standing with his back to the camera is Alfred Becker. (BA)
its German crews, but it is estimated that 107 were lost
during Barbarossa. The surviving models were converted
to fulfill other ancillary missions. And as already noted,
the B1 Bis flamethrowers were also used on the Eastern
Front and served in the Panzer-Abteilung (Flamm.) 102 unit,
comprising two companies of six flamethrower type tanks
and three B-2 (f) – the latter being the B1 Bis Beutepanzer
with their original 75 mm guns.
The majority of captured French tanks, being deemed
too old or obsolete for any serious front-line use, were
mostly used to fulfill ancillary missions such as surveillance,
the fight against partisans, patrols etc., while the Luftwaffe
used the Renault FT equipped with machine guns to serve
in airfield defence. Meanwhile, the R35, H35, and H39 light
infantry tanks were also used for surveillance of occupied
territories in the Balkans, where Somua S-35 tanks were
also used.
Several B1 Bis (along with other types) were also used for
the occupation and fortification of the Channel Islands.
(Note: the example now on display at The Tank Museum,
Bovington, originated from one of the Channel Islands).
After the eventual dissolution of the B1 Bis flamethrower
unit on the Eastern Front, the few remaining flammwagen
auf Panzerkampfwagen B-2 740 (f) B2 (f) were distributed
■ A Renault FT tank, captured by American troops, is inspected by GIs.
■ Left: A captured B1 Bis Beutepanzer in German service. (PGF)
around different units: for example, the SS Panzer Division
‘Prinz Eugen’, 223rd Panzerabteilung etc. Most were engaged
in Eastern Europe or the Balkan region.
The performance of captured tanks, however, was
rather mediocre with unreliability and mechanical failures,
flamethrowers sometimes being ineffective and with all
Beutepanzer being rather slow.
The last use of the flamethrower tank is believed to have
taken place during Operation Market Garden, while most
examples of the self-propelled B1 Bis, and manufactured
during the first half of 1942, later joined several units such as
the artillery of 26 Panzer-Division. Several of these were also
used in the Mediterranean theatre, and especially in Italy.
Then, in the summer of 1944, Major Alfred Becker took
command of Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200 (a unit of the 21st
Panzer Division comprising assault guns made from captured
French equipment) to provide fire support for the 125th
Panzer Grenadier Regiment. During Operation Goodwood,
Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200 were grouped together in
Kampfgruppe Luck, under the command of Major Hans von
Luck, with one 7.5 cm Pak 40 auf Fahgestell PzKpfw 38 H (f),
six 2 cm Flak by 107, four 7.5 cm Pak 40 on 38 H (f) and five
batteries with six 10.5 cm IeFh 16 and 18/40 on 38 H (f). In
▲
total, this comprised twelve assault guns resulting from the
IRON CROSS ❙ 107
ARMOURED VEHICLES
■ Soldiers of
the 6th Airborne
Division investigate
a destroyed 7.5
cm PaK40/1 auf
Geschuetzwagen
39H(f) in
Normandy, summer
1944. (Colour by
RJM)
conversion of French equipment at the beginning of the war.
The 7.5 cm piece on a French chassis was protected by a
‘cockpit’ formed by open armour on its top, while the 10.5 cm
IeFh 16 and 18/40 on 38 H (f) was also an excellent assault gun,
formidable in anti-tank fighting, as well as being rugged and
solid. The French chassis of this vehicle accommodated the
10.5 cm gun, also protected by an armoured open top.
Apart from Becker’s Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200, the 21st
Panzer Division engaged in the Battle of Normandy also used
a great deal of French equipment and was created on the
basis of a Panzer Artillerie Brigade, the Schnelle Brigade West,
and comprised a real ‘menagerie’ having many vehicles with
curious profiles: the Panzerjäger 7.5 cm Pak 40 on the MCG
chassis – S 307 (f), Leichter Reihenwerfer auf Somua MCG,
the 8 cm Raketenwerfer auf Somua MCL, the semi-tracked
U304 (f) on the UNIC P 107. The first of these models was
born from the assembly of a French artillery tractor, the MCG
SOMUA, and a 7.5 Pak 40 gun. Two grenadier regiments of
the 21st Panzer Division, Panzergrenadier-Regiment 125 and
Panzergrenadier-Regiment 192 had seven of these machines
each for anti-tank defence.
Two Panzergrenadier-Regiment also had other machines
based on the SOMUA chassis, equipped with a rear platform
that could accommodate mortar tubes and Panzerartillerie-
Regiment 155 also had an armoured vehicle manufactured on
the basis of a semi-tracked SOMUA, equipped with a system
of rocket launchers of Soviet origin. Most of these vehicles
were lost in the Battle of Normandy and Falaise pocket.
The use of R35 Beutepanzer is also reported against
American paratrooper units at Sainte-Mère-Eglise on 6 June
108 ❙ IRON CROSS
1944, these tanks coming from independent units called
Panzer Ersatz Battalion and responsible not only for fighting
against the paratroopers but also guarding the approach
to bridges. These R35s operating under the Balkenkreuz
were mostly destroyed by Bazooka hits as the light tank was
completely outdated and an American soldier equipped with
a Bazooka could destroy the tanks easily at 150 metres.
During the Liberation of Paris by the Allies, many French
Beutepanzer tanks were still being used by the Germans
among the 80 tanks then present in the city. Among these,
were numerous light infantry tanks: the R35, H39, and even
the Renault FT. There were also a few B1 Bis. Faced with the
urgency of the situation, all available equipment was thrown
into the battle - including tanks without turrets in use for
crew training. There are also some models such as the 7.5 cm
Pak 40 (sf.) Fahrgestell-Panzerkampwagen 38 H (f); in other
words, a Hotchkiss H39 tank modified to accommodate a 75
mm gun and serving as a self-propelled gun.
There is also the known use of a Leichter
Schützenpanzerwagen auf Unic P107 U.304 (f), another
transformation of Baukommando Becker and based on the
French semi-tracked vehicle Unic. This probably belonged
to a battery of Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200 and was a
vehicle that never made it to the Normandy front. Most of
the tanks present in the defence of Paris comprised a very
heterogeneous set, coming from several units or depots
making it difficult to trace the course of each of its armoured
vehicles. It is estimated that there were, in total, five R35,
three AMD 178, two R40, one B1 Bis, and three B1 Bis (B2)
flamethrowers.
SURVIVAL THROUGH CAPTURE
The Germans had very quickly decided in 1940 to reuse
French tanks, and even although most of them seemed
obsolete by the end of the campaign in France, it was a fact
that the Third Reich needed quantity over quality. In addition,
‘secondary’ operations needed be carried out throughout
their occupied territories and it made sense to use the
Beutepanzer in this capacity rather than frontline tanks.
With Germany sinking deeper and deeper towards
inevitable defeat, incongruities would emerge on the
battlefield where German R35s were pitched against
Shermans in Normandy, while the Hotchkiss H39, and R40
- and even the Renault FT – were used during the German
defence against the liberation of Paris. Incredibly, it is even
possible to find evidence of the Renault FT being used in the
defence of Berlin during 1945!
■ Although there are several former French Beutepanzer tanks preserved
There was also a return of Beutepanzer to their original
around the world, most have been returned to their original French markings
ownership during the liberation of French territory, and and configurations. An exception is this captured R 35 in Russia’s Patriot
through the capture by resistance fighters or Allied soldiers Museum at Kubinka which is displayed in German makings.
of what were formerly French tanks. Some B1 Bis
and Somua S-35, for example, would go back to ■ Left: Used on the
their original owners during the battles of the Royan Eastern Front by
Germany, the French
pocket. R 35s weak spots
Paradoxically, the re-capture of these Beutepanzer were identified on this
made it possible to preserve them for museum instructional Red Army
collections and very many of these tanks are training diagram.
exhibited in museums around the world today. Often, ■ Right: Concerned
that Allied troops
they have been returned to their original colours with might understandably
original guns and equipment now re-fitted. mistake Beutepanzer
Were it not for capture and (importantly) use by the for ‘friendly’ tanks,
Wehrmacht in 1940, then it is likely that most French this instructional
poster warned
tanks would have simply been broken up for scrap
soldiers to be wary
metal during the course of the war. Had that been as to the status of
the case, then many of these important French tanks tanks that might not
would have been extinct with some types probably no at first appear to be
longer in existence today. enemy armour.

BEUTEPANZER OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Brett Butterworth, colourisation by RJM

■ The B 1 Bis preserved and on display at Bovington’s Tank Museum
owes its survival to having once been a German Beutepanzer that was
then recaptured from the Wehrmacht.
See also Iron Cross magazine, issue # 7, for our article British Steel – Iron
Cross which covers the use of captured British tanks, the Beutepanzer,
by the German Army during the First World War. Copies of this and all
other back issues are still available!

IRON CROSS ❙ 109

 CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

■ Oberleutnant Johannes Wilhelm under guard on Chichester Railway Station, 19 August 1940, while on his way to London for interrogation before
confinement as a POW. One of the guards sneaks him a crafty cigarette. Wilhelm had been shot down the day before over Fishbourne Creek, West Sussex,
and the recovery of his Junkers 87 B-1 Stuka is the subject of this conflict archaeology feature. Noteworthy is Johannes Wilhelm’s oil-stained collar
caused by the punctured oil cooler on his aircraft. (Colour RJM)

Stuka Wreck Recovery

During the 1970s, an enthusiast group salvaged the remains of a Junkers 87 from
a south coast harbour where it had been shot down during the Battle of Britain.
Andy Saunders gives an account of a hazardous recovery undertaking.

A
s with many of the big days of fighting during the
Battle of Britain, 18 August 1940 started quietly
enough – a quietness which belied what was to
come. Initially, German air activity was restricted
to a few reconnaissance sorties across the South of England.
Significantly, the track of these flights took the reconnoitring
aircraft over many of the RAF’s airfields. It was a portent of
what was to come later that day, but initially those plans were
hampered by a summer haze. Once it lifted, however, the
German assault got into its stride with a ferocity and intensity

110 ❙ IRON CROSS

 Considerable damage was done at each location, although
the only target of any significance was Poling radar station
which was knocked off the air. Several Stukas were downed
around the West Sussex area and in the English Channel,
while at Ford the devastation was significant. Buildings were
wrecked and set on fire, many aircraft destroyed and 25
people killed – Royal Navy and Army personnel and civilians,
including a young Irish girl who arrived at the main gate to
meet her boyfriend at just the wrong time. Local Bobby, PC
Jack Hamblin, was horrified at the scene which met him on
arrival:
“Lying in the bottom of a bath in the shower block was a
naval rating of about 20. His body was lying in its own blood,
almost severed in the middle. The walls, such as were still
■ A Junkers 87 of Stukageschwader 77 snapped by Johannes Wilhelm
during the Polish campaign is readied for action. At this stage, the
standing, were splattered in blood. At the main gate I found
Stukas carried wind driven sirens, one of which can be seen on the the body of Lt Cdr Michael de Courcy who had been firing his
starboard undercarriage leg. .45 revolver in frustration at a diving Stuka and was caught
in a bomb blast. His dismembered body was found outside
the Wardroom, his right hand still firmly gripping his service
that gave birth to 18 August 1940 being dubbed, much later, revolver.”
as ‘The Hardest Day’. Attacks on airfield targets in southern The Stukas had struck hard.
England were seen during the morning, but it is the action
during the early afternoon which is the focus of this feature.
At 13.59 the Chain Home radar station at Poling, West FIGHTERS
Sussex, picked up a force assembling north of Cherbourg SCREAMING
and calculated to be ‘150 plus’. It was heading for the south TOWARDS US
coast. To start with, the heading towards the Selsey area made One of the raiding
it appear that a repeat of the attack made on RAF Tangmere Junkers 87 ‘Stuka’
two days earlier was incoming. In fact, before the formation pilots attacking RAF
reached the coast, it split into different elements - but not Thorney Island had
before some 68 RAF fighters, Spitfires and Hurricanes, were been Hptm. Otto
scrambled to deal with the threat. Schmid of I./StG77.
The German formation comprised some 55 Me 109s and (Editor: See also pages
no less than 109 Junkers 87 Stukas. Off the Isle of Wight, 6 – 18) Schmid later
two groups swung north-west and two more headed east recalled the terror and
and moments later dive-bombing attacks began at Gosport drama of taking part in
(a naval air station), RAF Thorney Island (an RAF Coastal one of the significant
Command airfield) and RAF Ford – as well as the radar site actions of the Battle of
which had detected them, RAF Poling. ■ Hauptmann Otto Schmid. Britain:

■ Fires rage at RAF Ford, West Sussex, after being hit by Stukas on 18 ■ Ground crew prepare to load a 250 kg bomb onto a Junkers 87, France,
▲

August 1940. 1940.

IRON CROSS ❙ 111

CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

■ Left: War artist Hans

Liska sketched a damaged
Junkers 87 returning
home after a sortie over
England.

■ Right: The unit emblem

of 2/StG77.

“Take off was at 13.30 hrs, but we were not unduly
excited by it. Since the start of the war, I had flown 65
sorties, including against Dunkirk and Channel targets, and
had always returned unscathed.
“We remained in close formation, led by the commander
who gave hand signals as our three groups gained height
to about 12,000 ft and at a speed of about 200 mph. It was
a beautiful summer’s day, and although our fighter escort
hadn’t shown up, we were sure they were in the vicinity.
It was all so calm and peaceful. As the coast popped up
in front of us, we could make out Thorney Island and
intended to go down one after the other on the target. The
leading Stukas looked like a string of pearls as they started
to go in. Then, I saw the first British fighters screaming
towards us. Initial evasive action brought my own flight to
safety, but the last flight in our formation took the brunt of
the attack.
“One Ju 87 went into the sea like a flaming torch. There
were no sounds or words on the radio. There was no time
to think about what was happening. The main thing was
to remember the correct moment to start the attack.
And now it was my turn! First, I made the wing-waggle
(indicating I was about to dive) then I was going down with
my nose pointed on the target. Now, my vision was only
downwards but couldn’t help sparing a thought for my
radio operator. All he could do was gaze up into the sky,
not knowing when the bombs left the aircraft or if his pilot
was still alive! For myself, I was completely fixated on the
target.
“The hangar complex grew in my sight, and I dropped
lower and lower. Then, at last, there was just one hangar
in my cross wire. I pressed my bomb release button, and
my job was done. All I had to do now was make for home.
Making a wide turn, I went to re-join the formation.
Normally, we would re-form into flights without much
trouble. Then, behind me, looming ever larger, was a
Spitfire trying to get into a firing position. I had to act fast
to get out of his way. Turning wouldn’t save me. So, I side-
slipped, and the fighter was foiled. Now, I looked round
at my wireless operator, and he was hanging forward in
his straps and his machine gun pointing aimlessly into
the sky. I didn’t realise that either he or the aircraft had
been hit. In the meantime, the Spitfire turned again and
was coming in for another attack. It was obvious that he
had selected me for his personal target. He must have
seen my helpless gunner and made for my tail. But I
slipped him again and he went screaming past.
“Then, one of my comrades in low-level flight suddenly
plunged into the sea and disappeared, while yet another
Ju 87 was shot down. He bounced on the surface of the
water and vanished. The situation became frightening
as another Spitfire joined in the attack on me, but it
followed my sideslip and touched the water with its
wingtip, meeting its end. Then, I felt a blow on the
aircraft and lost so much height that I touched the sea
with my undercarriage.
“For the first time, I noticed blood on my arm and
realised I’d been hit. Then, I was back over Caen and with
relief put my Ju 87 on the ground – and that was my next
surprise! My landing was rough and fast, and it was only
then that I realised my undercarriage had been torn away.
“The ground crew took my radio operator out of the
cockpit and later found more than 80 hits in the aircraft.
From my own Staffel, only one other aircraft escaped; an
inexperienced pilot so unnerved by what happened that
he was grounded and never flew again. My poor radio
operator died a few weeks later.”
It was the last attack in any force by the Junkers 87
Stuka during the Battle of Britain, and one of the losses
sustained during the attack against RAF Thorney Island
had been a Junkers 87 of 2/StG 77 flown by Oberleutnant
Johannes Wilhelm and his gunner, Unteroffizier Anton
Wörner.
Like others of his unit, Wilhelm had been caught during
the run-in to target, his aircraft hit and crippled at about
12,000 ft.

112 ❙ IRON CROSS

 Map by Battlefield Design
■ The
rear ENGULFED IN FLAMES
gunner’s On the approach to Thorney Island, Wilhelm already had
position the target in sight through the window in the bottom of
of a his cockpit, briefly glimpsing three or four RAF fighters
Junkers
flashing past beneath him. Behind, he heard Wörner’s
87 B-1.
MG15 rattle its defiant defensive fire as an attack from
the Tangmere based Hurricanes of 43 and 601 Squadrons
closed in. Ahead, he watched another Stuka from the
leading Staffel suddenly become engulfed in flames as it
fell away, plunging earthwards like a fiery comet.
As he watched the burning Stuka, a hail of bullets
suddenly smashed into the engine compartment of
Wilhelm’s Junkers 87, at least one of the .303 rounds
piercing the oil cooler in front of the cockpit and causing
a gush of black oil to spurt back over his windscreen,
blotting out all forward vision. Suddenly, a loud bang in the
engine was followed by a menacing gout of flame and an
ominous puff of black smoke.
Although the motor was still turning, Wilhelm knew
they were doomed. He could see that the oil pressure
had dropped alarmingly, the engine temperature was off
the clock and the Jumo 211 engine was running rough
and showing signs of obvious distress. The situation was
▲

hopeless.

IRON CROSS ❙ 113

CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

■ Oberleutnant Johannes Wilhelm being marched to ■ Team member Brian Connolly points ■ This aerial shot by one of the team in
Chichester Railway Station on 19 August 1940, heading out the discovery of the first piece 1975 shows the difficulty of the terrain
for a train and interrogation in London. of wreckage of the Junkers 87 B-1 in and remoteness of the crash site which
Fishbourne Creek, November 1976. is marked ‘X’.

Wilhelm called “Raus!” to his gunner, slid back the cockpit
canopy and rolled the Stuka over onto its back. As he did
so, he instantly received a face full of hot engine oil but
had to wait a few seconds in the sticky black shower until
he guessed that Wörner had exited the aircraft. Then, he
jumped himself. As he cleared the cockpit canopy, so the
slipstream threw yet another massive jet of oil over his
tumbling body, drenching his clothes and covering his face
and hands. Nevertheless, his relief as the parachute canopy
cracked open above him was immeasurable.
Wilhelm could see very little because the oil had sprayed
into his eyes, and he had no idea where his gunner was
or even if he had got out. Down below, he thought he saw
his Stuka plunge into what looked like a harbour, and as
he descended, he was vaguely aware, through stinging
oil-blinded eyes, that he was being circled by what he
presumed to be an RAF fighter. He expected a burst of
gunfire, but it never came. Then, he was down himself. It
was shortly after 14.15 hrs, local time.
Almost immediately, he was surrounded by soldiers,
men of the Home Guard, civilians, and Policemen. For
Johannes Wilhelm, the war was over.
SWALLOWED BY MUD
As Wilhelm had correctly thought, his Junkers 87 had
indeed gone into a harbour. In fact, it had disappeared into
Fishbourne Creek, a tributary forming part of Chichester
Harbour, falling onto the mud flats just above the low
water mark. On impact, the mud literally swallowed up the
dive bomber, leaving virtually no trace of it showing above
the surface.
So total was its destruction and disappearance that there
was nothing of any significance left for RAF investigators
to report. And what was reported by RAF air intelligence
officers was incorrect when they stated:
“Ju.87? Crashed and sank in creek at Fishbourn [sic.],
Chichester, after breaking up in air on 19.8.40. [sic.]
Civilian onlookers say was Ju.87. Completely covered and
inaccessible. Crew: one dead [sic.], one in hospital.”

Oberleutnant Johannes Wilhelm

Although Oberleutnant Johannes Wilhelm had flown in the
campaigns in Poland, France, and the Low Countries, his
fighting war came to end on 18 August 1940. However,
while confined in the POW camp at Grizedale Hall, near
Swanwick, Wilhelm was one of five Luftwaffe prisoners
who broke out of the camp through a tunnel on the night
of 21 December 1940.
With another prisoner, Wilhelm managed to catch a
late-night bus to Sheffield and then hid until dawn before
catching another bus to Manchester. Here, they arrived
just after a heavy Luftwaffe raid and they feared that if
■ Oberleutnant they were captured, then they would likely be lynched on
Johannes Wilhelm. the spot!
Deciding to head out to Liverpool, the pair hitched a lift
and a lorry driver stopped to pick them up. They told the
driver that they were headed home on leave, but when
he explained that he was headed away from Liverpool
the pair climbed in the back anyway. Stopping at a Police
checkpoint, the driver explained that he had two suspicious
characters in the back and the pair soon found themselves
in Mottram Police Station before heading back to Grizedale
Hall.
In 1941, the prisoners at Grizedale Hall were transferred
to camps in Canada where Johannes Wilhelm spent the
remainder of the war before returning home to Germany
in 1946.

114 ❙ IRON CROSS

 ■ In atrocious
However, since even local souvenir hunting schoolboys conditions,
were deterred from venturing to the crash site, then the and working to
investigating officers may be excused for having been beat the tide,
rather light on details about the wreck itself. However, the the recovery
team struggle
investigators also managed to inaccurately report on other
with one of the
key details, and as all visible traces were mostly buried earliest site
within only a few tides, so the story of the Junkers 87 in excavations.
Fishbourne Creek similarly lay buried for decades.
For many years, however, a single undercarriage leg
protruded above the mud, its seaweed bannered and
barnacle encrusted shape a familiar mark in the harbour
and an obstruction that became known to local boatmen
and fishermen. All other traces of the Stuka had totally
vanished. And it was not until the late 1970’s that anyone
bothered to look for it again.
■ A crawler tractor
Then, during November 1976, members of an was brought to the
organisation called the Wealden Aviation Archaeological site by a brave plant
Group ventured out into the harbour at low tide to look for hire contractor
the lost Stuka, searching in the area where locals recall the and used to pull
bulky pieces of
undercarriage leg could once be seen. With no surviving
wreckage from the
examples of a Battle of Britain period Stuka anywhere crater. With the
in the world, this site offered the promise of finding fuselage impacted
significant remains of just such an aircraft. and concertinaed
With the tide out, it was possible to walk along the into the crater,
excavation was
centre of a shallow channel running from Mill Lane, made doubly
Bosham, southwards towards the main harbour. However, difficult through
the position of the wreck was only vaguely known and the combination
so the harbour-trekking team painstakingly scanned the of mud and
compressed metal.
muddy banks as they went.
Eventually, in the area indicated by eyewitnesses as the
■ A section
impact point, a small piece of unidentified material could of fuselage is
be seen protruding above the smooth mud. However, dragged free.
it was quickly discovered that traversing the thick
sticky morass to this unidentified object was extremely
challenging.
Black slime stuck to boots and oozed over Wellington
tops as the intrepid searchers struggled towards their
target. Eventually, in mud about half a metre deep, the
team reached the item and discovered it to be a section
of airframe metal still painted dark green and with a
distinct yellow anodised interior treatment. Without
doubt, this was metal from the Junkers aircraft factory.
Nearby, horizontally in the mud, lay the undercarriage leg
■ A salvaged
remembered by local residents. piece of
Prodding around the area revealed a mass of buried airframe
metal and as the team probed, so petrol and oil bubbled still bears
up to the surface. This was certainly the last resting place its original
camouflage
of the Junkers 87 Stuka that had been abandoned by
and the
Johnannes Wilhelm and Anton Wörner. Nevertheless, its remains of
discovery had been the easy part. Getting it out was going a servicing
to be a challenge. To say the very least. information
triangle. The
yellowish metal
is typical of
UNEXPLODED BOMB the anodised
By the spring of the following year, and with the co- Junkers aircraft
▲

operation of Chichester Harbour Conservancy Board and factory finish.

IRON CROSS ❙ 115

CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY
the adjacent landowner, a full recovery was planned to be
undertaken between tides over a period spanning 23 April
to 7 May 1977.
Despite the tricky location, a crawler tractor was taken
out to the site to extract items that had been excavated
from the thick mud under seriously adverse conditions by
the team of dedicated enthusiasts. Mud stuck and pulled
at the team and slid into holes being dug - holes which in
turn filled with water. Available time between tides was
naturally limited, and so a frenetic chain gang worked
quickly between each low and high water – eventually
finding themselves waist deep in mud and water as the tide
returned. And hidden in the oozing morass were hazardous
razor-sharp pieces of airframe.
Incredibly, the finds that emerged were almost an
embarrassment of riches for the enthusiasts. After all,
the Junkers 87 was a relatively rare aeroplane in terms of
numbers shot down over the British Isles and without any
doubt this crash site held substantial remains of an entire
aircraft. However, initial recovery work during that spring
of 1977 had only been limited in its success. Nevertheless,
and whilst the tail unit complete with bullet-holed swastika
and a quantity of miscellaneous fuselage wreckage had
116 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Left: Wing Commander ‘Jim’ Hallowes, DFC, DFM & Bar, with
the recovered tail section of the Junkers 87 which was shot
down into Fishbourne Creek on 18 August 1940. The unit still
bears remains of the swastika and evidence of bullet strikes.
Hallowes was a regular visitor to the excavations at the crash
site, and although he was involved in the action when it was
shot down it seems unlikely that he was the victor.
■ Above: Team members bale out water from the excavation
after another visit to the site. In the foreground lies a tangled
mass of airframe wreckage.
been pulled out, it was clear that a great deal more lay
buried very much deeper.
The question remained, however: how could the
wreckage be recovered? A mechanical excavator was out
of the question in this location and the only possibility
was a renewed attempt by hand. This time, a larger party
was organised with shovels, baling pumps, buckets, and
makeshift shoring and shuttering.
Over the early summer of 1979, a considerable
excavation was eventually achieved which extended down
through the mud and into the clay and shingle bed of the
harbour where much of the aircraft was still embedded.
Of course, with the turn of each tide, the excavation was
flooded once again with mud and water, and it was back
to square one with each return visit.
Eventually, however, the engine and propeller assembly
were revealed, and wire cables, chains, and buoys were
duly attached. It was now a case of putting into play
the next part of the plan. This involved baling out the
excavation for almost one last time and then sliding a
prefabricated raft of 50-gallon oil drums (secured inside
a scaffold pole frame) down on top of the engine and
propeller and securing them to the makeshift raft. All that
■ Below: A general view of the excavation site at low tide with the improvised floatation raft in place.

■ Right: After the tide has done its job, the propeller unit and remains of the engine block are out of
the crater and ready to be brought ashore on the next tide.

remained was to sit in a dinghy alongside and wait for the
incoming tide to do its job.
Slowly at first, and then with a rush, the raft bobbed up
with the rising water after first sitting completely inert and
submerged under the incoming tide for several minutes.
Now, at last, the engine and propeller were out - although
it yet needed a few more tides before it was possible to
juggle both raft and wreckage ashore. However, it was not
all over yet. One last visit to the crater was carried out to
check for other engine parts and to search for the missing
propeller blade. At this point, a somewhat dramatic
discovery was made.
Beneath the few remaining broken engine parts lay
two large triangular steel plates. Then, a third appeared.
Straightaway, the team recognised them for what they
were: bomb fins! Indeed, feeling around in the mud at the
bottom of the crater there was no doubt about it. One very
large, unexploded bomb was sitting there, pointing almost
vertically downwards in the mud and the clay.
However, given that the Stuka had been caught on its
run in to target, the presence of the bomb was perhaps
not surprising. And although it had lain hidden for nigh
on 40 years, it could not be ignored. Here was a live 250 kg
bomb within a few hundred yards of dwellings and public
highways.
POWERFUL DETONATION
Reported to the Royal Navy bomb and mine disposal unit
at HMS Vernon, a team led by Lieutenant Brian ‘Jumbo’

■ Left: Steve Vizard (left),

Steve Hall (centre) and
Andy Saunders with the
tell-tale evidence of the
presence of the aircraft’s
bomb. Steve Vizard holds
the carrying band with
the lugs to locate into the
bomb cradle which swung
it clear of the propeller
arc. The steel plates are
the three bomb fins.
■ Right: This 250 kg
bomb, ready for loading
onto a Junkers 87, clearly
shows the carrying band
▲

with its lugs.

IRON CROSS ❙ 117

CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

■ RAF and RN explosive ordnance disposal teams

from HMS Vernon and RAF Wittering work in the
crater to remove the 250 kg bomb.

■ Right: Lieutenant ‘Jumbo’ Jervis supervises the

lifting of the bomb.

Jervis dug the bomb free of its muddy pit in an operation

assisted by the RAF Explosive Ordnance Unit from RAF
Wittering.
Finally, on Monday 25 June, the bomb was taken
out on a landing craft to a position off West Wittering
and lowered onto the seabed as RN demolition divers
attached a timed charge to the bomb casing. Some 39
years after the bomb had been destined for nearby RAF
Thorney Island, it exploded on the seabed and rattled
windows and doors at what had been its intended
target. The powerful detonation sent up a column of
water almost two hundred feet into the air in what was

■ A Royal Navy diver prepares to go down to attach explosives to the bomb

which was lowered onto the seabed of the English Channel off West Wittering.
■ Right: The detonation of the Stuka bomb sent a column of water some 200 ft
into the air.

118 ❙ IRON CROSS

 ■ Left: The cockpit
clock (on right)
has stopped at the
moment of impact.

■ Right: The steel

‘Walther’ signal
pistol found in the
wreckage.

■ Still intact,
the pilot’s
control
column was
a remarkable
find.

■ Belted 7.92 mm ammunition for the ■ A manufacturer’s data plate stating that the aircraft had been built
wing mounted MG 17 machine guns. at the Weser Flugzeugbau.

a sobering demonstration of the destructive potential
these weapons still have long after the war.
The list of artefacts recovered over a period spanning
almost two years comprised an impressive and
intriguing one. Apart from the engine, propeller, and
tail fin, the team also found the control column, flare
pistol, first aid kit, gunner’s tools, radio, instruments,
gas mask in its service case, ammunition saddle drums
for an MG15, belted ammunition for the wing mounted
MG17 machine guns, data plates and both oxygen masks
and oxygen regulators. Two cockpit clocks made by
Junghans, one from the front and the other from the
rear cockpit, were also found – both having stopped at
the exact time of impact which stood at shortly after
15.13 hours. However, the Luftwaffe were operating on
Central European Time, and this explains the apparent
discrepancy in the locally reported time of the crash. The
clocks, however, were not the only objects which spoke
powerfully as to the loss of this aircraft.
Found smashed into the back of the remains of the
Junkers Jumo 211 engine was the virtually intact oil
across Oberleutnant Johannes Wilhelm. And there, in
the body of the oil cooler, was the evidence: an impact
and entry point of a .303 bullet.
A particularly welcome find for the enthusiasts was
the control column, complete from top to bottom,
along with a map box containing flying maps. Still
legible was a pencilled course to the target and the
remnants of a German magazine dated 4 August 1940
which was found stuffed into the bottom of the same
container. Additionally, several panels and pieces of
structure were found with the number ‘5518’ painted
onto them in black figures. This was the aircraft’s Werk
Nummer, a detail that had not been previously known
or recorded.
When raised from the mud, the centre section of the
cockpit canopy framing revealed a remarkable find: a
Luftwaffe NCO’s and an officer’s belt, both buckled up
and looped around one of the canopy struts. Dangling
from each belt was a leather holster, a Walther Model
9 in the officer’s holster and a Luger P08 in the NCO’s.
Incredibly, and despite the wreck’s location, all the
▲

cooler which had once sprayed its jets of black liquid recovered items were found to be in superb condition.

IRON CROSS ❙ 119

CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY

■ Far left: The

large oil cooler
sat on top of the
engine and just
in front of the
pilot. When it was
hit, it sprayed
jets of hot oil
over Johannes
Wilhelm.
■ Left: A close-up
detail of the oil
cooler showing
the impact and
entry point of a
.303 bullet.

SPRAY OF OIL
Who had shot down Johannes Wilhelm’s Stuka is difficult to
establish with any certainty as a number of pilots from 43 and
601 Squadrons claimed Ju 87s as destroyed in an action where
there was clearly confused over-claiming and multiple claims for
individual Stukas.
One of the pilots who claimed a Stuka destroyed was Sergeant
Jim Hallowes (later Wing Commander) and he enthusiastically
attended many of the recovery operations at the crash site
during the 1970s. He had shot at the rearmost of five Stukas in
line astern “…about four miles east of Thorney Island.”
Hallowes was surprised to see the crew bale out almost
immediately he attacked the Junkers 87, and he has sometimes
been credited with the victory over Wilhelm’s aircraft. However,
the number of pilots making claims creates considerable
difficulty when trying to establish who shot down which aircraft ■ A number of removal panels and access covers were recovered
and where. And there is a more likely contender for the pilot and all bore the painted number ‘5518’, thereby confirming the Werk
responsible for downing the Stuka in Fishbourne Creek. Nummer of this aircraft.
Another 43 Squadron pilot who hit a Stuka at the same time,
and who also saw the crew bale out, was Pilot Officer Cliff Gray.
However, Gray was immediately compelled to break off the Less unwilling to share his memories had been Johannes
action when his windscreen was sprayed liberally with oil from Wilhelm who enthusiastically wrote of his experiences that
the aircraft he had attacked. That spray of oil might, perhaps, day. He also entered into correspondence with his former
add weight to Gray’s claim for this particular Stuka? enemy, Wing Commander Hallowes. However, Wilhelm
Wilhelm and Wörner both landed quite close to the crash was still sore about one British newspaper account he had
site in Fishbourne Creek, although Wörner’s parachute had read in 1940.
failed to properly deploy, and he fell too quickly. Luckily, he When taken under armed escort by train to London,
was saved serious injury, or worse, by landing in the mud. A Wilhelm was photographed at Chichester railway station
witness, Marjorie Norris, recalled the event during the 1970s and a series of photos appeared the next day in the daily
and wrote: “…I saw the pilot [sic] hit the mud. Had it not been for newspapers. One of those photographs shows Wilhelm
such deep mud, I would have gone to his aid.” Nevertheless, he sitting on a platform bench with his guard and accepting a
was eventually extracted from the glutinous slime and taken to cigarette from a kindly British soldier (See the lead image
hospital. to this feature). This photo, according to Wilhelm, later
Wörner suffered concussion and severe bruising to his legs, appeared in The Daily Mirror of 21 August 1940 above a
but in 1976 was extremely reticent about talking of those events, caption which read something along the lines of: ‘British
writing to the author of this piece: soldier presents cigarette to a Nazi baby killer.’
“I cannot understand what good it will do and what importance
it all is. If you consider this as an interest, then I can find no taste
in these old stories. I believe that in this age of a new Europe we THE RECOVERY PROJECT IN CONTEXT
should leave such old memories to lie quietly and look instead to Quite apart from evoking widely differing memories and
the future.” emotions among those involved in this incident in 1940,

120 ❙ IRON CROSS

 ■ Left: The centre section
of the cockpit canopy
framing was remarkably
intact, and when recovered
the pilot’s and gunner’s
belts were looped around
the structure. Each one
carried a holster carrying
the two men’s pistols.

■ Right: The pair of service

pistols recovered from the
wreckage. Left, Johannes
Wilhelm’s Walther Mod.9
and Anton Wörner’s Luger
P08.

the rescue of artefacts from Junkers 87 Stuka B-1, Werk Nevertheless, a great deal of historical detail was learned
Nummer 5518, was unique among the many recoveries and recorded about this incident and its background, albeit
of Battle of Britain aircraft wrecks which were being that no proper curatorial recording of finds, the logging
undertaken by enthusiasts across the 1970s and 80s. of finds in context or any professional conservation was
However, it must be accepted that this operation was not undertaken. As a result, the recovered objects became
conducted in accord with any archaeological principles. widely dispersed among the enthusiasts involved, the
Indeed, conflict archaeology as a discipline would not
be established for another two or three decades, and no
official or formal archaeological interest then existed in
these sites. ■ This hazy frame from
an RAF gun camera
The regulations governing such projects were eventually shows a Junkers 87
imposed under the Protection of Military Remains Act under attack in 1940.
1986, but these were yet to come into force with the
Ministry of Defence having no interest or regulatory
powers over such sites in the 1970s. Thus, it would not
be unfair to categorise operations such as the project to
recover the Stuka from Fishbourne Creek as nothing more
than trophy hunts led by well-meaning enthusiasts.

The Stuka Killer

The engagements by RAF fighters against
the attacking Junkers 87s over the south
coast on 18 August 1940 became a confused
affair which resulted in multiple overclaiming
by RAF pilots and resulted in some difficulty
in attributing specific pilots to actual losses.
However, in the case of the Junkers 87 shot
down into Fishbourne Creek that day, the
combat report of Pilot Officer C K Gray, flying
a Hurricane of 43 Squadron, RAF Tangmere,
closely fits the known circumstances:
“I was Yellow 3 and took off with the
squadron at 14.12 hrs. On sighting the enemy,
I attacked with my section. I fired a short burst
at one E/A and it went into a steep dive. I then
chose another with a red spinner and fired a
burst at 250 yards, the enemy aircraft then
caught on fire from under the fuselage. The
E/A appeared to still be under control, so I
approached
very close and
fired another
burst of five seconds when the aircraft
appeared to explode, covering my windscreen
with thick oil. I watched the enemy crash
near a farm at the edge of a creek about two
miles north-east of Thorney. I then used the
remainder of my ammunition on four other
Ju87s but owing to the oil could not judge the
result. I was then attacked by a Me 109. I threw
it off and returned to base.”
Gray is very specific as to the crash location
(i.e., the edge of a creek) and its description,
and these details perfectly fit the aircraft
which is the subject of this feature. Additionally,
Gray’s aircraft was smothered in engine oil
after he closed in for his second attack. This is
compelling, especially given the testimony of
Oberleutnant Johannes Wilhelm.
Further detail in Gray’s report is a very
specific description of the aircraft he attacked
as having had a red spinner. Since Wilhelm
was flying with 2/StG77 (in other words, the
2nd Staffel), and the 2 Staffel identification
colour was red, then this is further compelling
evidence.
With a high degree of probability, it is
possible to say that Pilot Officer C K Gray
was most likely responsible for bringing down
this aircraft. However, the possibility that
other pilots may have fired at it cannot be
discounted.
▲

IRON CROSS ❙ 121

CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY
Junkers 87 Losses of Stukageschwader 77 - 18 August 1940
Apart from the loss of Johannes Wilhelm’s aircraft on 18 August 1940, the
hardest fought day of the Battle of Britain, Stukageschwader 77 suffered
significant other casualties during the attacks that day that were conducted
against RAF Thorney Island and RAF Poling. Those casualties are listed below:
Stab I/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by fighters during sortie to
attack Thorney Island and crashed in the Channel 30 km off the English coast
2.30 p.m. FF Hptmn Herbert Meisel (Gruppenkommandeur) killed, and BF
Obergefr Horst Jakob missing. Aircraft 100% write-off.
The body of Herbert Meisel was later washed ashore on the French coast.
• Stab I/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Crash-landed at Carentan damaged by
fighters 10 km south-east of Portsmouth
following attack on Thorney Island 2.30 p.m. FF
Oberlt Karl Henze (Gruppenadjutant) slightly
wounded - admitted to hospital in Carentan,
gunner believed unhurt. Aircraft 60% damaged
- write-off.
• Stab I/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-2. Returned to
Maltot damaged by fighters 10 km south-east
of Portsmouth following attack on Thorney
Island 2.30 p.m. FF Oberlt Kurt Scheffel (Gruppe
TO) badly wounded in left shoulder - admitted
to hospital in Caen, BF Gefr Otto Binner killed.
Aircraft S2+CB 30% damaged but repairable.
■ Hauptmann Herbert • 1/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Returned damaged
Meisel led the attack by fighters 10 km south-east of Portsmouth
by Stukageschwader 77 following attack on Thorney Island 2.30 p.m.
on 18 August 1940 but FF Fw Hans Meier and BF Uffz Karl Maier both
was one of those who slightly wounded. Aircraft damage state not
did not make it home. recorded.
• 1/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by
fighters 10 km south-east of Portsmouth following attack on Thorney Island
and believed crashed in the Channel 2.30 p.m. FF Uffz Erwin Weniger and BF
Uffz Werner Möbes both missing. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 2/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Undercarriage sheared off attempting landing on
beach north of Bayeux after being badly damaged by fighters 10 km south-
east of Portsmouth during sortie to attack Thorney Island 2.30 p.m. FF Fw
Günther Meyer-Bothling slightly wounded by splinters in head - admitted to
hospital in Bayeux, BF Uffz Erhardt Schulz killed. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 2/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by P/O C.K. Gray of 43 Squadron
during sortie to attack Thorney Island and crashed and exploded at Spring
Garden, Cutmill, West Ashling, 2.30 p.m. FF Lt Hans Sinn baled-out and
captured unhurt on landing near Ham Farm, BF Uffz Josef Schmitt attempted
to bale-out too low and killed. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 2/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1 (5518). Engine caught fire under attack by Sgt
H.J.L. Hallowes of 43 Squadron during sortie to attack Thorney Island and
crashed in Fishbourne Creek, between Dell Quay and Hook Farm, 2.30 p.m.
FF Oberlt Johannes Wilhelm baled-out and captured unhurt landing behind
Stockbridge Garage between Birdham Road and Selsey Road, BF Uffz Anton
Wörner baled-out with damaged parachute and was injured on landing in
estuary mud - admitted to hospital. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 2/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by fighters 10 km south-east of
Portsmouth following attack on Thorney Island and crashed in the Channel
2.30 p.m. FF Oberlt Fritz Sayler (Staffelkapitän) and BF Fw Albert Ziera both
missing. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 2/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by fighters 10 km south-east of
Portsmouth following attack on Thorney Island and crashed in the Channel
2.30 p.m. FF Oberfw Wilhelm Neumeier and BF Uffz Karl-Heinz Schmidtbauer
both missing. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 3/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by Hurricanes during sortie to attack
Thorney Island and impacted at Whitehouse Farm, West Broyle, Chichester,
2.30 p.m. FF Uffz August-Hermann-Adam Dann and BF Uffz Erich Kohl both
killed. Aircraft 100% write-off.
122 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Above left: A Junkers 87 B-1 of 3/StG77 diving to destruction over
the rooftops of Chichester on 18 August 1940.
■ Above right: Moments later, the Stuka photographed diving down
over Chichester had impacted at Whitehouse Farm, Chichester. Both
crew members were killed.
Despite confusion in contemporary records, the pilot of this aircraft,
August Dann, originally identified by name in official casualty reports,
subsequently ‘lost’ his identity and was buried two days later in
Christchurch Cemetery, Portsdown, as an ‘Unknown German Airman’.
Subsequently, the grave of August Dann has been identified and he is now
marked with a named headstone.
• 3/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by fighters during sortie to attack
Thorney Island and abandoned over the Channel five miles south-west of
Selsey 2.35 p.m. FF Oberfw Günter Riegler and BF Gefr Oskar Langwost
rescued by motor-lifeboat Canadian Pacific and both captured wounded.
Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 3/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Returned badly damaged by fighters 10 km
south-east of Portsmouth during sortie to attack Thorney Island 2.30 p.m.
FF Otto Schmidt slightly wounded, BF Uffz Gerhard Bärsch badly wounded
- died in hospital October 2. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 3/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by fighters during sortie to attack
Thorney Island and believed crashed in the Channel 2.40 p.m. FF Oberlt
Dietrich Lehmann and BF Uffz Hans Winiarski both missing. Aircraft 100%
write-off.
• 3/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1 (5089). Shot down by fighters during sortie to
attack Thorney Island and believed that which crashed and burned out at
North Barn, Chidham, 2.30 p.m. FF Oberlt Hans-Jakob Schäffer and BF Uffz
Ewald Klotmann both missing. Aircraft 100% write-off.
Although official contemporary reports on this incident include mention of
the death of both crew members, and Schäffer is named in contemporary
official reports on the incident, no record of their recovery, identification,
or burial has been traced. Shattered Junkers Jumo 211 engine excavated
by Kent Battle of Britain Museum in October 1972 along with 250kg
bomb later rendered harmless by RE Bomb Disposal Team from Chatham.
Aircraft serial number ‘5089’ found on metal tag at the site by air historian
Peter Foote in 1984. Further unexploded ordnance in the form of the
wing-mounted 50 kg bombs were found at the site during 1990s, when a
damaged Iron Cross First Class
was also picked up at the
crash location.
• Stab II/StG77 Junkers
Ju87B-1. Shot down by
■ Some of the raiders on
18 August 1940 were lucky
to return home, albeit
that some had suffered
extraordinary degrees of
damage.
■ This Junkers 87 B-1 of 5/StG77 made a forced landing at Ham
Manor Golf Course after the attack on RAF Poling on 18 August
1940.
fighters during attack on Ford and crashed in the Channel 2.30 p.m. FF
Oberlt Heinz Sonntag (Gruppe TO) missing, BS Uffz Karl Witton baled-
out but killed. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• II/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Crashed on landing at Barfleur damaged
during attack on Ford 2.30 p.m. Crew both unhurt. Aircraft 100%
write-off.
• 5/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by fighters following attack
on Ford and crashed in the Channel 40 km off the coast 2.30 p.m.
FF Oberlt Heinz Merensky (Staffelkapitän) and BF Oberfw Gerhard
Sengpiel both missing. Aircraft 100% write-off.
• 5/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1 (5167). Shot down by Sgt B.E.P. Whall of
602 Squadron during attack on Ford airfield and forced-landed at Ham
Manor Golf Course, Angmering, 2.23 p.m. Also engaged by ground-fire
from 455 Troop, No.76 Battery, RA, prior to landing. FF Oberfw Kurt
Schweinhardt captured badly wounded, and BS Oberfw Willi Geiger
died of wounds the same day. Aircraft S2+JN 100% write-off.
• III/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Forced-landed at Caen damaged by
fighters during sortie to attack Poling RDF Station 2.30 p.m. Pilot
unhurt, BS Stabsfw August Westphal believed wounded. Aircraft 35%
damaged but repairable.
• III/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Crashed on landing at Argentan damaged
by fighters during sortie to attack Poling RDF Station 2.30 p.m. FF Fw
Hans Schulze and BS Obergefr Arno Böcker both killed. Aircraft 100%
write-off.
• III/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Crashed on landing at Argentan damaged
by fighters during sortie to attack Poling RDF Station 2.30 p.m. Crew
both unhurt. Aircraft 30% damaged but repairable.
• 9/StG77 Junkers Ju87B-1. Shot down by Sgt B.E.P. Whall of 602
Squadron during sortie attack Poling RDF Station and crashed in
flames in the sea 5 km south-west of Littlehampton 2.25 p.m. FF
Uffz Wilhelm Moll and BS Uffz Arthur Schwemmer both baled-out but
killed. Aircraft 100% write-off.
Wilhelm Moll was washed up at the entrance to Newhaven Harbour
on 26 August, the body of Arthur Schwemmer later coming ashore in
France.
NOTE: Ranks are abbreviated in this table for reasons of space,
while FF denotes Flugzeugführer (pilot), BF denotes Borfunker (radio
operator) and BS denotes Bordschutz (air gunner).
■ This snap was taken
by Johannes Wilhelm on
an earlier sortie. On the
reverse, he has written
‘Heimflug’ (flying home)
although many aircraft
of his unit did not reach
home on 18 August
1940.
■ Although the remains of the Junkers 87 B-1 from Fishbourne Creek
have now been widely dispersed, they were the most significant finds
from any of the few Stuka crash sites in the British Isles. No surviving
example of a Junkers 87 which served in the Battle of Britain is in
existence today.
provenance of many objects since lost. Furthermore,
many pieces have now found their way onto the collectors’
market and it is known that objects from other Junkers 87
wrecks (notably from Russia) have had the ’provenance’ of
W.Nr 5518 fraudulently attached. This presumably on the
basis that objects from a Stuka lost during the Battle of
Britain will command much higher prices than parts from
an unidentified wreck on the Eastern Front. As ever, caveat
emptor!
At the crash site today, there is again no sign of what
occurred here. Although somewhere in the mud, either
side of the impact crater, are presumed to be four x 50 kg
bombs. Two would have been hung beneath each wing, but
no trace of either was found during the excavations.
Some of the excavated finds did find their way to
museum collections and exhibitions, however, while others
have simply been lost to the mists of time, sold to dealers,
or else retained in private collections. The cockpit canopy
section, for example, was later stolen and the remains of
the Junkers Jumo engine was sadly eventually scrapped by
the Tangmere Military Aviation Museum in the 1980s after
so much effort had been expended to recover it.
Nevertheless, all of this must be seen in context of
the project being undertaken at a time of zero official
or archaeological interest, and when the historical
significance of the wreckage was not more widely
appreciated. Not only that, but the period between the loss
of the aircraft and its salvage spanned just 35 years. On the
other hand, some 45 years now separates its recovery from
the present day.
Quite apart from the history surrounding the loss of
Junkers 87 W.Nr 5518 on 18 August 1940, so the story of its
recovery is now also part of that history.
IRON CROSS ❙ 123
 NOTES FROM THE ARMOURY

All images via the author unless otherwise credited

■ Ground
personnel load
P.u.W bombs onto
a Gotha G V prior
to an operational
sortie over Britain.
(Colour by RJM)

Great War German

Aerial Bombs
During the war of 1914 – 1918, Germany delivered a variety of aerial bombs on enemy
targets, dropping them from both Zeppelins and conventional aircraft. John Metcalfe looks
at some of the principal types in use by the Imperial German Navy and Luftstreitkräfte.

A
s the world marched
inexorably towards a global
war in the early 20th century,
so Germany developed its
Artillerie- Prüfungs-Kommission (Artillery
Test Commission) or A.P.K aerial bomb in
1912/13, a simple cast-iron spherical shell
of either 5 kg or 10 kg and fitted with an
impact fuze and suspension ring. A crude
device, it was nevertheless the first bomb
designed specifically for aerial delivery by
Germany. Although the weapon was not
deployed during the war, it was a portent
of things to come.
When it became clear to all combatant
nations that the war would be conducted
in the air, as well on land and at sea,
so the technological race to develop
weaponry for use in aerial warfare
gathered momentum. Initial efforts
to fully utilise aircraft and airships for
military purposes were both clumsy
and limited in their success, although
it was quickly recognised that the value
of observation from the air could be
enhanced by the dropping of missiles
onto the enemy. To that end, it was clear
that the principle and design of the pre-
war APK bomb needed a complete re-
think, but any new bomb had to be based
around the main aerial delivery platform
of the day: the airship.
In that context, and with its
considerable lift capacity, it was obvious
that the Zeppelin was potentially able to
deliver heavier loads than, say, clusters of
‘pin-prick’ 5 or 10kg APK bombs. Thus far
(at least during the early stages of the war),
the giant ‘R-Planes’ were not yet in service
and so the focus on bomb development
and the capability to deliver heavy loads
necessarily centred around the Zeppelins.
CARBONIT BOMBS
Although Imperial German Navy and
Army Zeppelins carried bombs of
different designs, the HE bombs used by

124 ❙ IRON CROSS

■ With the Zeppelin-dropped Carbonit bombs often tending not to detonate, it became popular to be photographed with unexploded ‘Zepp bombs’,
including this group at Heacham and another showing two understandably anxious looking little girls posed with a 50 kg Carbonit. (via Ian Castle)

the Navy Zeppelins were known as the service the new giant ‘R’ aircraft from of which was already in use with the
Carbonit bomb. They were constructed 1916, it was again necessary to consider Zeppelin fleet. These Carbonit bombs,
by Sprengstoff A.G. Carbonit and came the weaponry that might be deliverable it is worth pointing out, had a small
in a distinctive ‘teardrop’ form. And from these leviathan bombers, and it propeller activated tail fuse. However, the
although only basically ‘aerodynamic’, was initially the case that only Carbonit Carbonit was not exactly fit for purpose,
they were certainly more so than their type high explosive bombs were on the but they were used from 1914 until 1916.
A.P.K predecessors. inventory. The problem was, however, To overcome the shortcomings of
The most common type of Carbonit that while the new Gothas could carry the inaccurate Carbonit, P.u.W and the
was the 50 kg bomb, although both 100 kg the 50 kg Carbonit, the 100 and 300 kg optical firm Goetz Freda (a manufacturer
and 300 kg versions were also deployed. versions were too big to be easily carried. of bombsights), cooperated in 1915
With the relatively cavernous nature of Initially, this was dealt with by the to develop the so-called Prufanstalt
Zeppelin bomb cells, this feature allowed manufacture of 4.5 kg, 10 kg, and 20 und Werft (P.u.W) bomb. This new
for the Carbonit bombs to be suspended kg Carbonit bombs – these were used torpedo like bomb had a far superior
vertically, hanging from a metal loop built alongside the 50 kg bomb, a version aerodynamic performance and it is
into the structure of the bomb fin.
This series of bombs comprised a
■ This illustration of Carbonit
cast iron body with a steel tipped nose and incendiary devices was
which was fitted for better penetration posed with a soldier and young
on impact, and it was fitted with a boy for scale.
ring-shaped stabilising fin. Generally,
the explosive filling was TNT. Accuracy,
however, was not a strong point of the
Carbonit bomb.
At best, the bombs could be cascaded
onto the general target area but with
little prospect of any proper sighting –
especially at night. However, they were
capable of considerable destruction
if they hit a target and exploded. That
said, both the hitting of intended
targets and detonation were not
■ Left: The primitive pre-war A.P.K bomb was simply an
always a given and the bombs tended
explosive filled sphere with an impact fuse and suspension ring.
to oscillate long after release, had a
tendency to drift with the wind and had a
high rate of failing to explode on impact.

ADVENT OF THE GIANTS

▲

When the Luftstreitkräfte ushered into ■ The sleek P.u.W bomb was a quantum leap in design technology from the Carbonit type bombs.

IRON CROSS ❙ 125

NOTES FROM THE ARMOURY
widely considered by armament experts
to be the true prototype of the modern
aircraft bomb – a fact that is clearly
apparent by just the most rudimentary
inspection. Its shape and design would
not make it look especially out of place in
even a 21st century setting.
Unlike the Carbonit, the P.u.W was
manufactured from high grade steel
rather than cast iron and this gave it
superior penetration power. Meanwhile,
the tail fins were mounted at an offset
angle to spin-stabilise the bomb during
its trajectory and to activate the fuzes
by centrifugal force. By any standards, it
■ This 300 kg P.u.W bomb was dropped on
Nancy in 1918 and has failed to explode. The
spade leaning against the fence might indicate
that the unexploded bomb had been dug out
of the ground. The angled tail fins imparted a
rotary motion to the bomb during its fall which
stabilised its trajectory while the centrifugal
force generated was used to arm the bomb by
causing three brass segments to move clear
of the firing pistol. The bomb needed a fall of
1,600 metres to be armed.
126 ❙ IRON CROSS
was far more technologically advanced
than the rather archaic looking Carbonit.
All early ‘R-planes’ were designed to
carry P.u.W bombs hung horizontally in
the bomb bays or cells with the larger
bombs hung by fore-and-aft cables
from simple rectangular frame in the
bomb bay. The small 12.5 kg bombs
were carried in special magazines, each
holding six bombs.
INCENDIARY DEVICES
Apart from the HE Carbonit devices,
Carbonit incendiary weapons were
also developed and put into use and
were deployed from both aircraft and
Zeppelins.
These bombs comprised a blunt
nosed cylindrical sheet steel container
filled with a highly flammable mixture
consisting of one-part benzol or
petrol, five parts kerosene and a small ■ An unexploded incendiary device, clearly
quantity of liquid tar. The total weight showing the tarred rope outer binding.
of the bomb was 10 kg, of which 3.5 kg
represented the incendiary mixture. Due
to the highly inflammable nature of the at the exceedingly high temperature of
bomb, it was always filled shortly before around 3,000 degrees centigrade. This
take-off. Its volatility was naturally a bomb consisted of an inner iron cylinder
matter of concern when being carried filled with thermite, surrounded by a thin
aboard largely wooden and fabric sheet metal container filled with 3.5 litres
aircraft and especially when they formed of benzol and the device was triggered by
part of the payload on Zeppelins. an inertia fuze on impact. The outer shell
Another incendiary weapon which was wrapped with tarred rope which
found use in the early years of the war prevented dispersion of the benzol and
was the so-called Goldschmidt bomb. helped to keep the bomb burning after
This was named after the German the chemical reaction had subsided. Its
chemist, Hans Goldschmidt, who total weight was about 11 kgs.
patented a thermite chemical reaction Crude though many of these
for use in welding. It is important to early aerial bombs initially were, they
stress that he was not the designer of were then the cutting edge of the
the bomb itself (as has sometimes been technology of aerial warfare. And from
suggested) but simply the inventor of the crude pre-war A.P.K bomb, Germany
the process which was the incendiary went on to develop the P.u.W bomb - a
reaction of the weapon. sleek and streamlined device which was
Filled with a mixture of benzol, tar, the forerunner of the modern aerial
and thermite this incendiary burned bomb.
 COMPETITION

Win one of five copies of a Grub Street Publishing book!

Stuka Attack! The Dive-Bombing Assault on
England during the Battle of Britain

W
ith the theme of the
Junkers 87 Stuka
running heavily ENTER
throughout this ONLINE
issue of Iron Cross magazine, we are TODAY
grateful to Grub Street Publishing for
providing five copies of the paperback
edition of this title as competition prizes.
It seems an appropriate competition prize for this issue!
The book was first published in hardback in 2013 and
is the definitive account of Junkers 87 Stuka operations
conducted against Britain by the Luftwaffe during 1940.
Written by Iron Cross editor Andy Saunders, the book
includes a wealth of photographs and appendices as well
as listing all Junkers 87 claims by pilots of RAF Fighter
Command in 1940, along with a table of all losses of the
type during operations against Britain in that same year.
It is unlikely that any other account in such
comprehensive detail on Stuka operations against Britain
will ever be published. The title makes for a fascinating
read, as well as being an extremely useful reference
source. The book also dispels many of the popular
myths and misunderstandings about Stuka operations,
particularly in respect of the Battle of Britain.
With stunning cover artwork by Iron Cross magazine
artist, Piotr Forkasiewicz, the book comprises a packed
224 pages.
So, for your chance to win one of these five copies,
simply go to the boxes below, follow the instructions,
and answer the simple question we have posed. Good
luck!

HOW TO ENTER RULES AND REGULATIONS

Entries close at midnight on
The winners will be drawn QUESTION: What is generally regarded as the hardest Wednesday 14 December
at random from those with fought day of the Battle of Britain as well as being the 2022. One entry per person.
To enter, you must answer
the correct answer. All last date upon which the Junkers 87 was employed in any the question correctly and
you need to do is answer significant numbers against targets in England? entries received after the
the question correctly by closing date will not be
going to: accepted. Full terms and
ANSWER: (A) 16 August 1940 conditions can be found
www.militaria-history. (B) 18 August 1940 at www.militaria-history.
co.uk/competitions (C) 15 September 1940 co.uk/competitions

Our thanks go to Grub Street Publishing for their generosity in supplying these prize books: www.grubstreet.co.uk

IRON CROSS ❙ 127

 PHOTOS FROM THE FRONT
Colour by RJM

128 ❙ IRON CROSS

 M T
RO

OS F

HE
#12

F RO
OT
NT PH

Fahrrad für zwei!

D
uring both the First and Second
World War, the bicycle was a
means of transport used by all
combatant nations. Indeed, that
form of transportation has continued in
common use by armies around the globe right
up until the present day. The subject of our
colourised photograph in this issue, however,
depicts a ‘bicycle’ of a rather different nature.
With wireless and telegraphic
communications coming very much to
the fore as a developing technology for all
the combatant nations between 1914 and
1918, it was necessary to provide a reliable
electricity supply to power transmissions and
to be able to receive signals. Very quickly,
it became apparent that effective wireless
communications in the field could either
make or break success on the battlefield, and
it thus became necessary to ensure a power
supply for this purpose.
The use of batteries or accumulators could
not be relied upon to provide a continuous
source of power, and so there was a need to
rely upon a generated electrical supply.
In this photograph, we see a mobile
communications unit on the Western Front
which is accommodated in a horse drawn
wagon and fed by a dual electrical power
supply source. This appears to comprise a
petrol driven generator and a back-up man-
powered generator. The latter is similar to a
tandem bicycle – but without wheels – and
it was operated by two soldiers who are
required to pedal furiously to maintain power
all the time the station is in operation.
It is likely that the petrol driven generator
was the primary power source and that the
pedal operated generator would be used if the
petrol ran out or the mechanical generator
broke down. After all, the man-powered
supply was good for as long as the soldiers
could keep pedalling.
A recently discovered contemporary period
print of this photograph has a handwritten
German caption to the reverse. Translated, it
reads: “Our bicycle to nowhere for two! Pedal
faster, Hans!”

IRON CROSS ❙ 129

 WAR FILM POSTERS

Feuertaufe

Featuring a Junkers 87 Stuka on its

poster, the 1940 film Feuertaufe (Baptism
of Fire) used the aircraft type to good
effect in the propaganda role. That is, to
instil awe in the might of Germany and
its Luftwaffe. To the home audience, this
would have stirred nationalistic pride and
a feeling of undoubted invincibility. To
hostile foreign audiences, however, that
impression of awe would have translated
to fear and dread of the German war
machine. And that was just what the
filmmaker had intended.
Although Feuertaufe was not wholly
about the Stuka, the aircraft figures
prominently in this film, featuring what
are portrayed as the heroic exploits of
the Luftwaffe in Poland in 1939, where
we see the aircraft and their crews in
action. To bring home the point about the
destructive might of the Luftwaffe, the
viewer is then shown a good few minutes
of footage of blasted and destroyed
buildings in Poland, with walls that are
bombed to rubble or pock-marked with
bullet and splinter holes.
Feuertaufe opened in Berlin on 5 April
1940 to an invited audience hosted by
Hermann Göring, the timing of its release
being just ahead of the campaigns in
Norway and the west. Indeed, it can
have been no coincidence that in the
invited audience were the ambassadors
of the Nordic nations – and it was almost
on the eve of the launch of Operation
Weserübung, the invasion of Norway and
Denmark, on 9 April. If nothing else, it was
calculated to concentrate political minds.
As the second of what became a
trilogy of war documentary films (the
others being Feldzug in Polen and Sieg
im Westen), Feuertaufe was written and
directed by Hans Bertram and relied
exclusively on actual footage shot in
action. None of the footage was ‘staged’
or acted for the cameras.
Its rather tedious 90 minutes of running
time comprises a laboured telling of
German prowess and invincibility, with the
New York Times reviewing the film and
stating:
“The picture was not intended to inspire
goodwill for Germany, it was said, but to
strike terror. From that viewpoint, it was a
great success.”
As a piece of its time, it is also of a
genre which holds no artistic merit nor
any content of historic significance.
Although remastered digital copies have
been made, they cannot be considered of
any worth.

130 ❙ IRON CROSS

SELLING฀ YOUR฀ MILITARIA?
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 BATTLE OF
BRITAIN
RAF OPERATIONS MANUAL

SAMPLE

JULY TO OCTOBER 1940

HOW SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND DEFENCE SYSTEMS
HELPED THE RAF WIN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
Warners Group Publications
The Maltings
West Street
Bourne
Lincolnshire
PE10 9PH
Tel: 01778 391000
Fax: 01778 392422
www.warnersgroup.co.uk

© Andy Saunders 2015

Andy Saunders asserts his right

to be identified as the author of
this work.

Design
Charlotte Bamford

Reproduction in whole or in part without

written permission is prohibited. All rights
reserved. Dates, information and prices
quoted are believed to be correct at time
of going to press but are subject to change
and no responsibility is accepted for any
errors or omissions. Neither the editor nor
the publisher accept responsibility for any
material submitted, whether photographic
or otherwise. While we endeavour to
ensure that firms and organisations
mentioned are reputable, the Editor can
give no guarantee that they will fulfil
their obligations under all circumstances.
Whilst every care has been taken to
compile current valuations, the publishers
cannot accept liability for loss, financial or
otherwise, incurred by reliance placed on
the information herein.

The views expressed by

contributors and advertisers are not
necessarily those of the publishers. Every
care is taken to ensure that the contents
of the publication is accurate but the
publishers cannot accept responsibility for
errors. While reasonable care is taken when
accepting advertisements, the publishers
cannot accept any responsibility for any
resulting unsatisfactory transactions.
They will however investigate any written
complaints.

Hurricane pilots of 32
Squadron relaxing between sorties at RAF
Hawkinge during the high summer of 1940.

Sgt Pilot John McAdam sits

astride the engine cowling of his 41
Squadron Spitfire Mk I. He survived the
Battle of Britain only to be shot down and
killed over Dover on 20 February 1941.
CONTENTS
5

36

62

89

119

136

154

157

158

159
 INTRODUCTION
‘This is the BBC Midnight News read by Alvar
Lidell. Up to ten o’clock one hundred and seventy
five German aircraft had been destroyed in today’s
raids over this country. Today was the most costly
for the German air force for nearly a month. In
daylight raids between three hundred and fifty and
four hundred enemy aircraft were launched in two
attacks against London and south-east England.
About half of them were shot down.’
(BBC Home Service, Sunday 15 September 1940)

Prime Minister Winston Churchill: ‘This was their finest hour.’

5

O
n 18 June 1940, before a packed
House of Commons, Prime
Minister Winston Churchill
delivered one of his most famous pieces
of oratory. He said: ‘What General
Weygand has called the Battle of France
is over . . . the Battle of Britain is about
to begin. Upon this battle depends
the survival of Christian civilisation.
Upon it depends our own British way
of life, and the long continuity of our
institutions and our Empire.’ What he
said was perhaps the very first time that
the term ‘Battle of Britain’ was used.
Ultimately, it would refer to a battle that
stands very much in the British nation’s
consciousness as an epic and unequal
struggle for survival, as well as being a
worldwide landmark in the fight against
tyranny and oppression.
Following the fall of France and the
Low Countries, and the evacuation
from Dunkirk, it was inevitable that
the Germans would seek to invade
The
Thin Blue Line:
Hurricane pilots and occupy the British Isles from its
of 501 Squadron newly conquered territories. Ultimately,
wait for the call
to scramble in the German forces drew up plans for
August 1940. Operation Seelöwe (Sealion), which
would comprise a seaborne and
airborne invasion of Britain. It was,
necessarily, a hastily put together
plan and one that would have carried
enormous military risks, particularly
in view of the lack of specialised
maritime assault and landing craft
and the enormous threat posed by
the Royal Navy who, as a significant
maritime power, were in a position to
wreak havoc upon any invasion fleet in
the Dover Strait and English Channel.
However, the Luftwaffe remained
confident that its bomber force (and
especially the Junkers 87 Stuka) would
be able to deal with the concentration
of British naval vessels interfering
with the invasion. Indeed, the Stuka in
6
particular had already shown what it
could do against shipping involved in
Operation Dynamo, the evacuation from
Dunkirk, and more recently in attacks
on Channel convoys and shipping.
However, the Luftwaffe’s confidence
perhaps presupposed one thing – that
it had already wrested air superiority
from the RAF. Thus, as soon as Luftwaffe
forces were established and organised
at their new bases across northern
France, Belgium and in the Netherlands,
so the air assault against the British
Isles commenced and what Churchill
had already referred to as the Battle of
Britain got under way.
Officially, the Battle of Britain
commenced on 10 July and ceased
on 31 October 1940. However, these
are entirely artificial dates that were
set, post-war, by the British. In reality
there was clearly no defined beginning
or end to the battle. Initially, and in
its 1941 publication on the Battle of
Britain, the Air Ministry had stated the
commencement date to have been 8
August 1940. Whilst there was some
merit to the allocation of this date due
to the first massed air assaults against
British targets taking place (in this
instance, coastal convoys) it was also the
case, for example, that huge air attacks
had also taken place on 4 July against
Portland Royal Navy base and English
Channel shipping. It was the former
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of RAF
Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal
(ACM) Sir Hugh Dowding, who would
later, and somewhat hesitantly, set the
official and definitive battle dates in his
‘Despatch on the Battle of Britain’ to the
London Gazette on 10 September 1946:
‘It is difficult to fix the exact date on
which the Battle of Britain can be said
to have begun. Operations of various
kinds merged into one another almost
insensibly, and there are grounds for
choosing the date of the 8 August, on
which was made the first attack in force
against laid objectives in this country,
as the beginning of the Battle. On the
7
other hand, the heavy attacks made
against our Channel convoys probably
constituted, in fact, the beginning of the
German offensive; because the weight
and scale of the attack indicates
that the primary object was rather to
bring our fighters to battle than to
destroy the hulls and cargoes of the
small ships engaged in the coastal
trade. While we were fighting in
Belgium and France, we suffered the
disadvantage that even the temporary
stoppage of an engine involved the loss
of pilot and aircraft, whereas, in similar
circumstances, the German pilot might
be fighting again the same day, and his
aircraft airborne in a matter of hours.
‘In fighting over England these
considerations were reversed, and the
moral and material disadvantages of
fighting over enemy country may well
have determined the Germans to open
the attack with a phase of fighting in
which the advantages were more evenly
balanced. I have, therefore, somewhat
arbitrarily, chosen the events of 10 July as
the opening of the battle. Although many
attacks had previously been made on
convoys, and even land objectives such as
Portland, the 10 July saw the employment
by the Germans of the first really big
formation (70 aircraft) intended primarily
to bring our fighter defence to battle on a
large scale.’
However, the relative merits of
commencement and end dates to this
epic battle are somewhat academic.
But, in setting the scene for this book
it is important to understand that this
was not a battle that began suddenly
and came to dramatic halt on the
achievement of a clear victory. In that
respect, this was a battle perhaps
quite unlike any other fought during
the Second World War. It was also
different, from Britain’s perspective,
because for the first time in the history
of this nation it saw a battle fought out
in full view of its population and with
significant numbers of that population in
the front line. Of course, the history of
that battle, and the Blitz that followed,
have been covered in detail in countless
works on the subject and it is not the
purpose of this book to cover any
of that ground. Instead, the aim of
this book is to set out the planning,
organisational and operational detail
of how the RAF, and specifically Fighter
Command, fought that battle.
Unlike the evacuation from Dunkirk,
which was very much made up and
on-the-hoof, RAF Fighter Command
already operated within a fully
integrated air defence system that had
a comprehensive command and control
organisation, comprising not only the
fighter squadrons themselves but also
radar, the Observer Corps, Balloon
Command and Anti-Aircraft Command.
To a certain extent, defeat in France had
been brought about through the lack of
any such centralised and coordinated
command and control structure in the
French air defence system. It would be a
different story during the defence of the
British Isles during the Battle of Britain,
though.
This book, then, looks in detail at how
that system worked and how all of the
parts of the system meshed together in
order to allow RAF Fighter Command,
hard-pressed and outnumbered, to
fight the Luftwaffe in an organised and
effective fashion. Not always, however,
did the system work exactly as planned
but it has often been said that a battle
plan rarely survives first contact with
the enemy. Without that ‘battle plan’,
though, the air defence of Britain in
1940 could not have had a successful
The
aggressors: outcome and this detailed examination
Reichsmarschal
Hermann Göring
also looks at the nuts and bolts and
inspects Luftwaffe minutiae of the system – the weapons,
bomber crews of tactics, operational procedures,
Kampfgeschwader
76 at Beauvais in equipment, terminology, individual
northern France
during the Battle
units and organisations, casualties, the
of Britian. commanders and other participants.
8
THE HISTORY OF THE RAF THE EARLY YEARS

THE AIR DEFENCE

OF GREAT BRITAIN
PROTECTING BRITAIN’S SKIES

The air defence of Great Britain in the Battle of

Britain was based around the ‘Dowding System’,
providing an organised plan of defences in the air
and from the ground, and with a centralised
command and control structure. This had largely
been developed since Fighter Command’s
creation, with Dowding in charge.
Although pictured here in 1941 when the organisation had become the Royal Observer Corps,
this photograph of an Observer Post in the Watford Group is typical of the Battle of Britain period.

9
I
n considering the overall picture of
the air defence of Great Britain during
1940 and the Battle of Britain, RAF
Fighter Command may be regarded
to have been at the sharp end of that
defence. However, elements other
than direct fighter protection were
very much part of the integrated air
defence system, although overall
control of the entire system rested with
Fighter Command. In order to better
understand how each part of the air
defence plan worked, the organisational
chart and command structure shown
above gives a simplified over-view of
the system.
‘All the ascendancy of the Hurricanes
and Spitfires would have been fruitless
but for this system which had been
devised and built before the war. It had
been shaped and refined in constant
action, and all was now fused together
into a most elaborate instrument of war,
the like of which existed nowhere in the
world.’
(Winston S. Churchill)
Britain’s system of early warning,
interception and control
has widely been called
the ‘Dowding System’
after the C-in-C of RAF
Fighter Command who
instigated its planning
and implementation in
the years immediately
before the war. This
system, the first of its kind
in the world, comprised
a network that stretched
from the northernmost
parts of Scotland down
to the south coast of
England. Although the
inner workings of Fighter
Command’s system of
command and control remained a
closely guarded secret throughout the
war, a surprising public glimpse of the
system was given in 1941 when the
illustrated HMSO booklet, The Battle
of Britain: August–October 1940, was
published with its outline of the system.
However, the schematic diagram
was somewhat economical with its
detail and, importantly, it left out one
particular element from the explanation
of how the organisation worked – radar.
Although the Germans were far from
being unaware of radar, and were
indeed developing and using systems
of their own, their failure to understand
its role within the command and control
structure of Fighter Command placed
them at a most serious disadvantage
during the Battle of Britain. However,
they were more than aware of the chain
of radar stations which had sprung up
around Britain’s coast during the late
Organisational
1930s sporting huge arrays of aerials
chart showing and concrete bunkers, and although
the air defence they acknowledged these sites to be
significant they did not fully appreciate
of Great Britian
in 1940 with RAF
Fighter Command to what extent. For this reason, perhaps,
at the ‘sharp end’
(All photographs
their concentration of attacks on them
and illustrations was somewhat piecemeal and rather
are from the lacklustre in effort. That said, the
author’s collection
unless credited relatively few attacks mounted by the
otherwise) Luftwaffe on these sites did have some
10
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