Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Volume Three
Fall 1991
'Continuous Innovation Is close to "kaizen" as described by Imal 11986]. Both are incremental
or evolutionary processes, not revolutionary. And both are customer oriented. However, the
Japanese term "kaizen" implies that focus is on the factory activities. Continuous innovation
is applied to all corporate activities.
The info rmation-for-dedsions approach Is close to what IJlrl (1975) calls the decision
approach, although he contrasts It with the accountability approach.
Hiromoto
Figure 1
Market-Driven vs. Technology-Driven
Cost Management Systems
TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN SYSTEM
RESOURCES PRODUCTS
TECHNOLOGY
STANDARD
COST
MARKET-DRIVEN SYSTEM
RESOURCES PRODUCTS
often the province of accountants who had Httle knowledge about their
firm's markets and technologies. Now is the time to change. A management
accountant as a member of the team is neither the distant evaluator of
perfonnance nor the gatekeeper of the organization's financial resources.
Some Examples
Example A
Factory A deals with almost a dozen product categories, including
packaged air conditioners (its major product), chiller units, fan coils, and
freezers. Each product category includes various models and types that.
taken together, number about 3.000.
In the late 1970s. Factory A noticed that demand was growing for a
wider variety of products. It produced 466 different items in 1977; this
increased to 518 in 1978 and 580 in 1979. It was obvious that product
diversification made manufacturing processes extremely complicated and
caused ballooned indirect manufacturing costs. Managers of the factory
faced the problem of promoting diversification while preventing cost in-
creases. After consideration, they concluded that diversification increased
the number of parts used and thus made the production process compli-
cated. At the same time, they paid attention to standardization, which was
so important a theme for the company that it held company meetings on
standardization. As a result, the reduction and standardization of parts
used became an immediate manufacturing strategy for the factory.
Then, they looked into the next problem, determining the appropriate
measurement system for implementing the strategy. As discussed In the
section on "team-oriented approaches." management accountants of the
factory were always thinking of how they could contribute to solving
management problems.
The question was raised about how product designers could be moti-
vated to cut the number of parts and work toward use of standard parts.
The company's product designers were expected to work with the Idea
that their department was a profit-making part ofthe company. Therefore,
they worked on designs to give the products better function at lower cost.
After discussion, management arrived at an agreement: to find a method
to allocate manufacturing overhead so that product costs increase with
the number of parts used and with the number of non-standard parts used.
As described below, design and testing costs were allocated to products
according to a new method called "standardization-based allocation." which
was set up to motivate the new strategy. The people concerned agreed that
there was a cause-and-effect relationship between design and testing costs
and the number and commonality of parts used.
Under the standardization-based allocation system, design and testing
costs were first allocated to each product category based on the number of
the employees engaged in the category. Then, the total weighted number of
parts used (TWN) was computed by product category using this formula:^
*rhe weighted values. 10, 5. and 1 were derived from an engineering study so that people would
acceptthemasfalr. Thesefiguresmay be Inexact, but not capricious [Anthony. 1983, pp. 126-
7\. The reader may imagine Intense arguments about whether it should be 10, 9, or 8, rather
than an understanding of the purpose ofthe calculation. Note that the purpose is to calculate
an Influencing cost instead of the "true" cost.
10 Journal of Management Accounting Research, Fall 1991
TWN = Z,(NixWNi)
= I,{Nix(UPix 10 + CPAix5 + CPBix 1)}
where,
Nl =
production quantity of model i
WNi =
weighted number of parts used in model i
UPi =
number of unique parts used in model 1
CPAl =
number of common parts among products In the same
category used in model i
CPBi = number of common parts among products in different
categories used in model i
Suppose a model in product category X uses 100 parts. Thirty of them
are unique, 50 are shared with other models In X, and 20 are common
parts also used In other models in different categories from X. Then, WN is
570 for the product.
The budgeted burden rate was obtained by dividing budgeted design
and testing costs by TWN for each product category, and revised every six
months. The costs were allocated to individual products at the charge rate
multiplied by WN.
The new system had a substantial effect. When I asked about improve-
ment, they gave me the following measures. They obviously stressed the
progress of performance over time. The standardization rate (number of
common parts / number of total parts) for all products was 60.5 percent in
the first half of 1978. grew to 62.2 percent In the second half, and to 63.8
percent in the first half of 1979. The same figure for newly developed
products was 11 percent in the first half and 20 percent in the second half
of 1978. rising to 22 percent in the first half of 1979. The rate Increased
steadily despite increasing product variety, and reached almost 68 percent
as of the second half of 1987 for all products.
I
Example B
The above-mentioned factory. Factory A. faced a new problem in the
late 1980s in the form of a substantial change In the market for the factory's
major product, packaged air conditioners. The market for 1.5 to 3.0 hp air
conditioners began to grow rapidly and was recognized as promising. It
became strategically important to invest as many resources as possible In
that particular product group. The problem facing the factory was that 5
hp and 2 hp air conditioners used the same number of parts, but the ratio
of retail prices was 100 to 60 or 70. Since the standardization-based allo-
cation system allocated the same costs to the two products. It determined
that the 2 hp product, which the factory should have been emphasizing,
was less profitable. WhUe it became necessary to encourage designers to
work on this type of product much more than before, the allocation ^stem
of Example A became a big obstacle to the strategy.
On the other hand, the designers had learned the value of common
parts so that they now naturally design products with common parts.
Moreover, computer-aided design had been introduced during the last few
years, which promoted the use of standard parts.
As a result. Factory A decided to abolish its standardization-based cost
allocation system and introduce a new system starting from October 1988.
Hiromoto 11
Under the new system, design and testing costs were first allocated (as
before) to each product category based on the number of employees, and
then allocated to each model in a category based on sales expressed In
yen.^ This encouraged the designers to be much more Interested In the 2
hp product because the 2 hp product became more profitable under this
method.
Example C
Factory C introduced a flexible manufacturing system (FMS) into a
manufacturing department in 1984, based on the strategic judgment that
as far as possible, in-company production of parts was preferable for cost
reduction, improved quality, and shortening the delivery time as well as
secure employment. However, it was not easy. Because the reported con-
version cost ofthe newly-established FMS department was almost twice as
high as that of outside manufacturers, it was more economical to order
from outside manufacturers.
The problem faced by Factory C was that if decisions were made using
available cost information, then the long-term manufacturing strategy for
internal production by FMS could not be realized. Various alternative
measures of product cost were examined. Including the proposal to count
the variable costs only or count only direct costs. However, agreement could
not be reached about this sort of partial costing. For senior management,
product cost had to be total absorption cost. The result was It seemed
impossible to carry out an internal production strategy while maintaining
total absorption costing.
Managers ofthe factory succeeded in solving the problem by changing
their way of thinking. The business environment was becoming increasingly
competitive internationally due to such factors as the advancement of newly
industrialized economies and technological irmovation had also accelerated.
To survive in such a competitive environment, what needed to be asked
was not "whether our current activities were economical" but "what to do
In order to cany out economical activities tomorrow." If the current tech-
nological level was not economically viable, then technological innovations
were required to make it economically viable. Accordingly, management
accountants ofthe factory changed their focus in designing their cost system
from an information-for-decisions to a behavior-influencing focus.
As a result. Factory C came up with an innovative cost accounting
system in 1988. The factory revised its method of charging conversion costs
to the product. Under the new system, the conversion cost charged to each
product or job order was not based on its own currently accrued cost, but
based on the cost arising from outside manufacturers, as illustrated below.
Notable was that internal conversion costs charged were made equivalent
to outside manufacturing cost.
For example, suppose the company has some work that takes 120 hours
for outside suppliers to process, but only 100 hours for the company thanCks
to the FMS. The outside order charge is $25 per hour, while the conversion
in yen and the number of employees are often used allocation bases, since they are
considered equitable. Hiromoto (1990, p. 18] Illustrates an example of how Influencing
strategies can be incorporated In the aJlocaUon process on the basis of sales.
12 Journal of Management Accounting ResearcK Fall 1991
cost is $50 per hour Assuming the company does 24 hours of external
work in 20 hours and contracts 96 hours outside of the 120 total hours.
the product costs for in-house and outside work are calculated as follows
according to the new system:
Outside order
materials cost $2,000
cost of outside work $25 X 120 hrs 3.000
total 5,000
In-house processing
materials $2,000
cost of outside work $25 X 96 hrs 2,400
conversion cost $30* X 20 hrs 600
total 5.000
•E>qulvalent value of In-house processing or $25 (120 hours/100 hours) =$30 per hour.
ducing products as needed and cutting lead time. They began to understand
that improved efficiency in each division did not necessarily add up to greater
efficiency for the factory as a whole. They knew they had wrongly believed
that everything was fine If only high capacity utilization was secured.
Management started a change by explaining its new manufacturing
strategy to all the people in the organization. Putting a strategy into prac-
tice required the cooperation of people in all departments.
Unfortunately, the sales department had always anticipated future
possible orders and included them as well as actual orders in their infor-
mation system because they feared delays in deliveries to customers. This
practice obviously went against the new strategy of producing the actually
required product in the required quantity. The thinking and action of the
sales people had to be changed. As a starter the input code for "anticipated
sales" in the sales department computer was eliminated.
In 1984, Factory D added two new performance measures, lead time
and inventory turnover, and gave priority to them. In addition, it decided
not to report actual processing time by division, even though modem com-
puterization of factory operations drastically reduced the cost of detailed
measurement of actual processing time. Efficiency in each division did not
necessarily lead to efficiency of the whole. Reporting the actual processing
time of each division encouraged actions focused on the efficiency of the
division at the cost of efficiency for the overall operation, and discouraged
necessary cooperation among divisions and employees.
A remarkable improvement in performance was made. Turnover days
were reduced from 102 days in 1985 to 30 days in 1988. Production lead
time was reduced from 108 days in 1984 to 52 days in 1988.
Allocated manufacturing overhead used to be calculated by multiplying
the predetermined division rate by the actual processing time. But, since
divisional actual time became unavailable, it was replaced by the division
standard time, which was the sum of each work station's standard pro-
cessing time.
At this point, the cost allocation system was not yet totally linked to
the factory's new production strategy. In 1989. however, the new cost al-
location system was devised and introduced. Under the new system, allo-
cated costs were calculated by multiplying the division rate by the total
standard "elapsed time" of the divisions.
The new system worked as follows. Assume three work stations. A. B,
and C. The standard processing time of each work station Is. respectively.
2 minutes. 10 minutes and 3 minutes. Then, the total standard elapsed
time was computed to be 10 x 3. or 30 minutes, while the total division
standard time is 15 minutes. The factory reported that the new cost system
began to influence employees' behavior so that cost reduction activities
were concentrated on bottleneck or constraining work stations.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The business environment is not entirely chaotic, and at the same time
it is not entirely definitive. Business activities are carried out in a mixture
of optimization and innovation. However, yesterday's management ac-
counting lost Its balance. Yesterday's management accounting overem-
14 Joumal of Management Accounting Research. Fall 1991
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Hiromoto 15