[G.R. NOS. 151809-12.
April 12, 2005] Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth
Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS,
DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN,
CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO,
MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B.
LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED
BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC.,
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND
TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT
CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,
PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS,
INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with
significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the
Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government
service and on the other, its effect on the right of
government to recruit competent counsel to defend its
interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had
extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that
GENBANK had approved various loans to directors,
officers, stockholders and related interests
totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a
bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans
to GENBANK which reached a total of P310
million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977,
the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public bidding
of GENBANK's assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of
the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the
Marcos government. One of the first acts of President
Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao
Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of
Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C.
Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo,
Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin
T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia
Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms,
Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and
Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing
Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive
Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp.,
Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and
Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the
PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties' comments, this
Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents
Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-
0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as
then Solicitor General 10 and counsel to Central Bank,
'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK,
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et
al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent
Mendoza allegedly 'intervened in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his
capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the
Central Bank's officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANK's liquidation and appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance
in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of and
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting
'engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGG's motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found
that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former
function as Solicitor General and his present employment
as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to
that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term
as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent
Mendoza's appearance as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said
section prohibits a former public official or employee from
practicing his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with within one year from
his resignation, retirement or separation from public
office.13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of
the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
were transferred from the Sandiganbayan's Second
Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July
11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied
the other PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the
arguments were the same in substance as the motion to
disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in
its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing
the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a
Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that
the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former
government lawyer from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the
prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central
Bank could not waive the objection to respondent
Mendoza's appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the
resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory,
thus res judicata does not apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive
issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to
the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our
way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: 'A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace
the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical
standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and
other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards
did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of
lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and
fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the
client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at
times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an
obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to
explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other
basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor --
originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had
broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early
post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from
those in England. The colonies and early states used
oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to
govern attorney behavior. The difference from England
was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over time,
but the variation in early America was far greater. The
American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and
differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the
effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the
regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be
fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law
of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of
litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20
The nineteenth century has been termed the 'dark
ages' of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-
century, American legal reformers were filling the void in
two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the
highly influential New York 'Field Code, introduced a new
set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This
concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in
several states in the second half of the nineteenth century.
At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman
and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties.
These reformers wrote about legal ethics in
unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of
understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-
nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field
Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial
regulations - e.g., the 'do no falsehood oath and the deceit
prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law
continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's
litigation behavior. The developing law of agency
recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and
safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to
recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client
privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus,
all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service
to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the
standards were isolated and did not provide a
comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The
reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their
discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
a new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form
of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their
practice - the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar
codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by
lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes
gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the
oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however,
the bar association codes retained some of the official
imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence of
bar associations themselves. Local bar associations
formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late
nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again,
picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off.
Many of the new bar associations, most notably the
Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive
standards of conduct for their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a
comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887
Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states'
codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and
duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full
measure of public respect to which the legal profession
was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association
adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned
the form and function of the canons. Among their
concerns was the 'revolving door or 'the process by
which lawyers and others temporarily enter government
service from private life and then leave it for large fees in
private practice, where they can exploit information,
contacts, and influence garnered in government
service.25 These concerns were classified as adverse-
interest conflicts' and 'congruent-interest conflicts.
'Adverse-interest conflicts' exist where the matter in
which the former government lawyer represents a client
in private practice is substantially related to a matter that
the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.26 On the other hand, 'congruent-interest
representation conflicts' are unique to government
lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to
correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen
new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which
disqualified them both for 'adverse-interest conflicts' and
'congruent-interest representation conflicts.29 The
rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the
government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would
be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of
the government client that later could be to the advantage
of parties who might later become private practice
clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate
in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with
any matter he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend
many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933
and 1937, respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted
as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was
growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect
Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to
study the 'adequacy and effectiveness' of the ABA
Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between 'the inspirational and
the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States
likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace
it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code
of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct
to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary
norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons
into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and,
in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained
unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set
forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the
ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the 'restatement
format, where the conduct standards were set-out in
rules, with comments following each rule. The new format
was intended to give better guidance and clarity for
enforcement 'because the only enforceable standards
were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated
the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis
on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the
rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of
the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to
conflicts of interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away
with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norm's indefinite
nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was
drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and
practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On
June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase 'investigated and passed upon with
the word 'intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable
to both 'adverse-interest conflicts' and 'congruent-
interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the 'adverse interest
aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and
later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the
issue of whether there exists a 'congruent-interest
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The 'congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first,
the meaning of 'matter referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the 'intervention made by the
former government lawyer on the 'matter. The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined
'matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the 'matter which was
the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while
he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the
following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the
'matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40
The PCGG's Case for Atty. Mendoza's Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that
Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank's
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated
March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor
Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya,
then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota
P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial
and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference
with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised
them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK.
The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with
the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the
Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of
August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not
be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be
permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors
and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it
shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal
stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to
liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by
the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March
29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in
filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank's
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes
reads:
The Board decided as follows:
.. .
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor
General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank
dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and
Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General
Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board,
dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29
of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot
on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its
attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed
by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the 'matter or the act of
respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the
case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of. In fine, the
Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter under
Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black
and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. - Whenever,
upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising or examining department or his examiners or
agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall
be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would
involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall
be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith,
in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and
the Board may, upon finding the statements of the
department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official
of the Central Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets
and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes
including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
.. .
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within
the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is
insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the
public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a
petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and praying the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution.
The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings
to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions and enforce individual liabilities of the
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the
assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary
Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a
person of recognized competence in banking or finance,
as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board
under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of
the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the
name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions
as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect
and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding,
the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be
final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only
if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly
arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or
injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the
Central Bank from implementing its actions under this
Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this
Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the
Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith
and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of
the court in which the action is pending a bond executed
in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by
the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash
or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the
amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned
that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff
may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the
injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of
Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Section shall govern the
issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or
injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean
the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as
they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability
to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of
this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the
contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on
the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
'matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
'drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within
the scope of the term 'matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of
argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls
within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No.
342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent
Mendoza which is the 'matter involved in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is entirely different from the 'matter involved in
Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to
liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
'matter where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to
liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then
Court of First Instance. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc.
No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related
to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil
Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they
are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of
GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the
reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from
the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK.
GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due,
among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its
owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG
does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the
'intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. 'Intervene
means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous
feature or circumstance. .. 2: to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events. .. 3: to come in or
between by way of hindrance or modification:
INTERPOSE. .. 4: to occur or lie between two things
(Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an
intervening river. ..)41
On the other hand, 'intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2:
interference that may affect the interests of others. 42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the
word 'intervene. Under the first interpretation, 'intervene
includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence.43 Under the second interpretation, 'intervene
only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold that this
second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word
'intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be
remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government
lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous
such as 'x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer 'should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter which
he has investigated or passed upon while in such office
or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the
phrase 'which he has investigated or passed upon
resulted in unjust disqualification of former government
lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in
DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in
which the lawyer, while in the government service, had
'substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules
further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a)
provides that 'a lawyer shall not represent a private client
in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a
public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent
Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the
special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it
has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then
sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is
arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza
in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the
parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we
note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of
the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal
role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the
Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against
the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank
in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting
the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the
part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from
similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the
United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure
that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will
achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already
difficult for government to match compensation offered by
the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not
inaccurate that the only card that the government may
play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income
in return for the experience and contacts that can later be
exchanged for higher income in private practice.45 Rightly,
Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering
government service would be too great for most men to
endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging
in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted
years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they
become associated to be disqualified.46 Indeed, 'to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it
less appealing to enter.47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye
on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused
to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has noted 'the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive
the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass
and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic
was 'so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to
prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary.48 Even the United States Supreme Court
found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals' description of
disqualification motions as 'a dangerous game. 49 In the
case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent
Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of
respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than
four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which
were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under
which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were
refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not
unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will
be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that
granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose
not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual
lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client
with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The effects of
this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel
cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse
effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service.
According to Prof. Morgan: 'An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment
upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them
to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private
employment does not enjoy such freedom. 53 He adds:
'Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects
the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to
quit inhibits official independence.54 The case at bar
involves the position of Solicitor General, the office
once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be
overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General
should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the
Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent;
it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to
defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any
undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor
General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation
of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our
law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer
may extend to all members of his law firm. 55 Former
government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be
remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of
impropriety and loss of public confidence in government.
But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public
perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at
best56 which can lead to untoward results. 57 No less than
Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions
as to former government attorneys will have any
detrimental effect on that free flow of information between
the government-client and its attorneys which the canons
seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of
impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some
courts have abandoned per se disqualification based on
Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists,
and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and
the public.60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03
in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who
'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries
the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in
the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in
the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure
how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not
inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent
'sides' to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there
is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et
al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the
interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly
defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in
liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied No cost.
Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is
for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to SO ORDERED.
the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no
switching of sides for no two sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule

6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of
loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is
currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to
prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the
Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: 'The greatest
public risks arising from post employment conduct may
well occur during the period of employment through the
dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies.63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern
as 'probably excessive.64 He opines 'x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding
someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last
client - the government. Interviews with lawyers
consistently confirm that law firms want the 'best
government lawyers - the ones who were hardest to beat
- not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates. 65 But
again, this particular concern is a non factor in the
case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate
GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents
Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending
both the interests of Central Bank and respondents
Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to

curtail what is perceived as the 'excessive influence of
former officials' or their 'clout.66 Prof. Morgan again
warns against extending this concern too far. He explains
the rationale for his warning, viz: 'Much of what appears
to be an employee's influence may actually be the power
or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates
quickly upon departure from government x x x. 67 More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those
sitting in government. To quote him further: 'x x x The idea
that, present officials make significant decisions based on
friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends.
It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials
that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the
possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends
in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism. 68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view,

among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be
subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines
that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent
Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted
by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the
Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the
IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to
disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse
of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as
reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the
unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive
period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is
legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the
IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions

dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-
0099 is denied.
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8,
2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig)
against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera
(respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997,
respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan),
entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued
by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with
Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba
(Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration
Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent
and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence
when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and
that the first marriage had never been annulled or
rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting
marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting,
constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue
his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court
resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the
instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the
complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No.
30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution 5 dated March 17,
2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint
against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex
Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file his
comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file
the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that
while it appeared that an administrative case was filed
against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof
since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received
no other pleading or any processes of this Court.
Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus
Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from
pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He
also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the
Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his
brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B
Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further
averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus
Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's
erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband,
Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send
a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected
that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent
him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an
unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife
which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he
and his wife received death threats from unknown
persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new
residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City.
He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint and be given time to file his answer to the
complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to
(a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the
administrative complaint and to submit proof of such
service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on
the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to
show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint
was furnished to respondent at his given address which is
No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No.
2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed
anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint,
the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his
Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy
of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not
complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would
have received the same already. He requested anew that
Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted
respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the
complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her
Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a
simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that
the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate
and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She
attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an
Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the
complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address
in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause
Order to respondent as to why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to
comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite
service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and
unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy
Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with
notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to
submit the correct and present address of respondent. 15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that
respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St.,
Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential
address. However, all notices served upon him on said
address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail
server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353,
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1,
Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as
counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili
Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." 16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a
copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to
respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex,
922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply
with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for
failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint
as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of
₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of
imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and
(b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment
required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing
that respondent failed to comply with the Court's
Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the
Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by
respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER
the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST
and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the
Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report
of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise
resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010,
submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent
II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent
cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No.
922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be
located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given
address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City
was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building.
Considering that the given address cannot be found or
located and there were no leads to determine
respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot
be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in
compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as
per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41
Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the
mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order
dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent
to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received by
respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt.
However, respondent failed to take any action on the
matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and
Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty.
Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from
the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the
court into the conduct of its officers. 22 The issue to be
determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to
be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment
continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this
case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges
against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has
been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence
that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of
Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage
on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the
Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan,
Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera
contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo
Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison
St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates to prove that respondent entered into a
second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently
took place barely a year from his first marriage to
Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage
was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the
second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a
public record. – When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also
clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself,
the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates
would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of two marriages entered into by respondent.
The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith
and credence given to public documents. For purposes of
this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the
Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made
a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without
addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against the
Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the
complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the
span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued
numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will
take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court
has issued several resolutions directing respondent to
comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day,
he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure
to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically,
however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them
have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming
that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a
complaint against him that is pending before this Court
which he could have easily obtained a copy had he
wanted to.
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only
the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court,
it only shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus,
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the
Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with

respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests,
manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by
numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to
reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies
of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different
locations - both office and residential addresses of
respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court
to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently
offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint.
When said excuse seemed no longer feasible,
respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the
liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of
the case and to evade the consequences of his actions.
Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable
disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.

Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience

of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient
cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply
with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw
in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the
Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof."26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant
and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON
PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY.
FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR.,
Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo
— for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon.
Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their
acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a
confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-
evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations
question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971,
1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%,
65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention
of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was
raised for one reason or another, before the bar results
were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I,
rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil
Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well
as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further
therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe
that the grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the
grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this
was without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the
examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without
formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so
now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates.
Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and
unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does
this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to
go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately
decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2,
Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court
checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and
found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and
Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law,
Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some
changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar
candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E.
Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in
the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations
with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45%
and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which
was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971
bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination
Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo
and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their
sworn statements on the matter, with which request they
complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang,
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or
re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the
same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject
upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo
that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents
warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a
resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.).
Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a
passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court
likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name
should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At
the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication
of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to
verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was
not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or
re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954
in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo
Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and
Public International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this
development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise
included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164.
Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it
was also discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-
evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office
Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another
re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the
subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the
grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code
No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the
investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer,
showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon
E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L.
Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal
Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera,
another student of the same university. Confronted with
this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V,
pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he
does not remember having been charged with the crime
of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60,
rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar
examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he
is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July
17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973.
Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit
their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and
Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on
November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho
took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is
believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not
summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except
respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits
and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The
same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which
they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation
conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks
in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge
(later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon
C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year,
while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low
one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year,
he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of
the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back
to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I
found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation
of the answers were based on the same standard used in
the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered
to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and
No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated
his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following
additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were
not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of
examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of
its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith
and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on
the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or
about October 16, 1971, relationship between
Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have
always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the
same; that I have no alternative but to take his
words;
b) That considering this relationship
and considering his misrepresentation to me as
reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get
the consent and permission of the Chairman of
the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was
isolating myself from all members of the Supreme
Court and specially the chairman of the Bar
Committee for fear that I might be identified as a
bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received
by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who
made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge,
Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public
International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8,
1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my
residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding
in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least
two companions. The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and,
after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained
a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant,
the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-
examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority
as long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told
me that the name of the examinee in the case present
bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had
given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible
that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook,
I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and
graded it in accordance with the same standards I had
used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with
the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade
of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my
authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me
that the code number of the examinee in question had not
been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore
corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade
card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I
also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to
item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with
him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he
denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P.
Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the
facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in
political and international law, code numbered 661, I did
know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know
his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5,
1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not
know him personally, and that I have never met him even
up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was
authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority
as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded
or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance
was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and
guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as,
unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about
7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It
did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant
was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me
of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that
he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in
the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered
661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that
the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the
position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade
obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered
661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did
not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar
Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner in said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names
of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It
had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know
the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and
collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed
correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping
in the correction of some of the papers in another subject,
the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in
Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent
and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75% then he would make the general passing
average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%,
that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the
examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent
Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as
to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now
remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did
I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in
his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of
February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had
previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed
the said notebook. He requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had
previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given
him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his
answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me
that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority
as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that
the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr.
Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-
evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained
the same grades in other items. However, I recall that
after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I
had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by
a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in
my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973,
respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn
statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted
in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned
in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he
could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman
of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the
request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the
first time, he was not aware, not having been
apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume,
owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position
of the Bar Confidant, that the request was
legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated
each and every answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by
the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular
subject that the said examine failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal,
to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should
also be mentioned that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent downgraded a
previous rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'
Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I
would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular
Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating
the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed
the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of
April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn
statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the
examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613
in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in
direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar
Examiners Committee that where a candidate
fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned
should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the
time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation
that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up
to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar
Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries
in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set
of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-
evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to
the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial
weight should then be given to clarify of language
and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately
after the release of the results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they
be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests
for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have
some 19 of such motions or requests which we are
reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just
the same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such
instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo
avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the
examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as
bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or
not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation
but that he remembers having brought to the attention of
the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning
another examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law.
As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification
by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent
brought the notebook in question to the Examiner
concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling
the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the
examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-
de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that
his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his
answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed
only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter
being that the notebooks in question were submitted to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all
good faith that they so merited on the basis of the
Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh.
1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier,
leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into
the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and
the early part of February, 1972, on my way back
to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of
buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made
it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I
pick a number from any object and the first
number that comes into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the
first number that I saw was "954" boldly printed
on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street
towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the
south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo
High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
the post to which it is attached is identified and
marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number
"954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to
Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would
contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket,
which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number became
doubly impressive to me because the sum of all
the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a
number that is so significant to me that everything
I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect
it with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the Master
List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up
to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or
"227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List
is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and
the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh.
5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of
the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as
Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the
1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-
Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was
born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a)
On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and
was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last
Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941.
While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp
was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as
the beginning of a new life for me having been
saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able
to get out of the army byway of honorable
discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got
married and since then we begot children the
youngest of whom was born on February 27,
1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after
buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the
time was on the checking of the notebooks. While
thus checking, I came upon the notebooks
bearing the office code number "954". As the
number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the
writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing
in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh.
1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later
on took them back to the respective examiners for
possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely
the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could
have reference to either of the two cases which I brought
to the attention of the committee during the meeting and
which the Committee agreed to refer back to the
respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50%
(47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 110,
identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade
of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as
Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a
borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at
the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently
left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that
the subject was Political and International Law
under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo
(The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-
Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code
No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased
to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-
Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. -------
Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook
was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law
in the former; and only Political and International Law in
the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made
known to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even
volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so,
notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that
there was very little time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may
not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight
of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to
accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth.
In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to
scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang,
because he "was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over
those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his
affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number
954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the
contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing
office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme
Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing"
case, especially in a situation where the respondent and
the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met
only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire
situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this
Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no
knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the
resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man
intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone
to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination
papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to
have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades
was done among those of others, then it must have been
done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase
the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched.
Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an
evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in
former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in
effect because that would be presuming all the members
of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity,
unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work
that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of
facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973
would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and
that they should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how
respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated
and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or
recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by
deceiving separately and individually the respondents-
examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the
respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian
thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle
part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day,
respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner
Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review
of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees
and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily
high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another,
he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook
for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular
notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade
in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and
under the belief that was really the practice and policy of
the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was
just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated
the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said
subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number
95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the
time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian,
2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee
Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After
such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects
and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for
admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early
part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo
then requested respondent Manalo to review the said
notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the
said notebook and that the examinee concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by
respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average
of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that
he thought that if the notebook were reviewed,
respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also
particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to
the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent
Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze
and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in
the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by
respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration
was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent
Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar
Confidant, had the authority to make such request and
further believing that such request was in order,
proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the
presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the
examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial
Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes made by him
in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310
as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged
to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 &
2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol.
V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo,
Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due
to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one
occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a
new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent
Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent
Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects
except in Political Law and Public International Law; and
that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the
mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will
pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from
respondent that this is possible — the respondent Bar
Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the
Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said
notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the
answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation,
the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase
of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed
the charges made. This notebook with Office Code
Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee
Galang's general average was still below the passing
grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who
was then helping in the correction of papers in Political
Law and Public International Law, as he had already
finished correcting the examination notebooks in his
assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee
who owns that particular notebook had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if
his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to
75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing
the justification and because he did not want to be the one
causing the failure of the examinee, respondent
Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and
thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised
the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same.
The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his
Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol.
V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been
shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter
approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had
failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook
in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was
provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by
respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him
before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise
Galang's general average to a passing grade because of
his failing mark in three more subjects, including
Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's
notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly
set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by
securing authorization from the Bar Examination
Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-
evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on
February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
the rest, the examiner concerned would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-
Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41,
72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was
made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-
evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar
candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number
1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The
matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the
Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol.
V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given
the information that the particular examinee failed only in
his subject and passed all the others, he would not have
consented to make the re-evaluation of the said
paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise
added that there was only one instance he remembers,
which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had
submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code
Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner
Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo
riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to
respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of
February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar
Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with
him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after
the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to
review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook
because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine
who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial
Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority
to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-
evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of
66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code
number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs.
1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp.
12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo,
respondent.
A characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE
ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias
ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having
requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted
in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the
passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8)
weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to
hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the
Court making 74% the passing average for that year's
examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%)
in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It
is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from
the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards
the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners
concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their
respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of
passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his
actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph
4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-
Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm.
Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest
belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing
so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he
act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone
to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the
investigation, the said confidential memorandum was
intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the
initial correction of the examination papers and never as
a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees
(Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is
not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of
delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo,
Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on
the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions
committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and
consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the
respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and
clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted
during the investigation and hearing of the cases show
how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the
passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise
from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue
advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by
the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that
prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the
five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating
the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects
that resulted in the increase of his grades therein,
ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the
Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that
well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the
effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done
two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only by the examinee and the same should be addressed to
66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to
in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well
before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to as the image of the Court.
the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing
Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the
The averages and individual grades of Galang before and trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows: Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the
incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers
BAI for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than
ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging
1. Political Law Public from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI,
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
or 30 weighted points claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays
respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in
referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for
BAI
re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original
weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly
Labor Laws and Social be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than
Legislations 67% 67% = no re- ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
evaluation made. reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang,
as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar
or 33 weighted points. examinations, especially the said more than ninety
candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent
Taxation 74% 74% = no re- Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even
evaluation made. the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or
after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
or 30 weighted points. pretension of good faith.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in
22 weighted points. Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg
and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
examinees who were far better situated than Galang
would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one
Legal Ethics and Practical notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz
Exercises 81% 81% = no re- violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
evaluation made. Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
———————————— examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg
and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15% respectively — as hereinafter shown.

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-
evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated,
Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great
damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the other
examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang,
with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg
and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-
evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law
for Ty dela Cruz.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office
code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the
first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to
why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately
clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time
only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh.
2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.),
showing that it was just an after-thought.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has B

absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to
make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are
submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his
only function is to tally the individual grades of every
examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the
general average. That done, he will then prepare a
comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to
the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which
the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75
or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ
NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS
GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL
MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO
EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted
having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo
Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners
concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to
circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and him.
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting
officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the that where an examinee failed in only one subject and
latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the
concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the
Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No.
Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and
were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-
43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner
Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3)
containing the date of the two examinees and record of subjects, as follows:
the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him,
he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Labor Laws 3%
Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, Taxation 69%
that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the
Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield Mercantile Law 68%
any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.). Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after
the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, follows:
maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and BA
this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol.
VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is
weighted points
owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as
Taxation 69% 69% = "
appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
and the change is authenticated with the initial of
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office
————————————————
Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative
Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced
by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.;
Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm.
did not interpose any objection to their admission in Case No. 1162, rec.)
evidence.
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to
that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject,
the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer
back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the Political Law 70%
subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, Taxation 72%
rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it
was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo His grades and averages before and after the
declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the
Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.). BA

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
which was referred to the Committee and the Committee Civil Law 89% 89% = "
agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day Taxation 72% 72% = "
following the meeting in which the case of an examinee Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent weighted points
Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Number 954 belongs to Galang. Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee
whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought
to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
that there was no case of an examinee that was referred
to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re- The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law,
violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
in February, 1971, which violation was due to the
misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of
Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can
hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee because even at the time of said
referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of
his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing
grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated
grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75%
under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered
in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as
subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was
71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious
misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby
impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should
be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz
should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to
show cause and the corresponding investigation
conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-
authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major
subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law,
Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting
candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily
involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous
established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals;
and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed
by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers'
Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545).
The determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves
discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969
ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a
Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of
the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members
of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar
subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a
sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar
Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of
the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is
at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily,
every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise
of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the
established rules of the Court and must always be subject
to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the
designation indicates, his functions in connection with the
conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered
to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the
examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5)
subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by
Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the
Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar
Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to
the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation
or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was
in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is
decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led
to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in
accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of
1964, in connection, among others, with the character
requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar,
provides that "every applicant for admission as a member
of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior
to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant
was required to produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2,
Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal
case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the
Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence,
the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of
one's personal record — whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is
still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for
application to take the Bar examinations provided by the
Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of
all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It
is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time
in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already
intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence
or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal
to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so
that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably,
with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court
will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's
involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or
conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent
Galang took the Bar for the second and third time,
respectively, the application form provided by the Court
for use of applicants already required the applicant to
declare under oath that "he has not been accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any
offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
application form prepared by the Court for use of
applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal
cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under
oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any
offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer;
or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there
a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56,
rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally
withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter
repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969
and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for
physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969
and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he
had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case
pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to
take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground
for revocation of his license to practice law is well —
settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that
the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he
applied for admission, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud
upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners,
or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been
apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the
board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N —
W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and
annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of
court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken
from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred
in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise
of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully
and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from
which he comes. The finding of indictments against him,
one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to
the court, with such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having been
apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the very
name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when
he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called
to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about
thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to
the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite
attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is
therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble
profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the
formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973,
apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending
criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for
such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the
Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which
he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to
order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the
striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as
WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion.
The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the
Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable
as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige
of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself
as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American
cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without
any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several
occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful
bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the
grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of
the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report
and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A.
Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character
[In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent
passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -
- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In
the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court
found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were
falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon
Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo
Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having
made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers
in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent
BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good
faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the
examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they
did the same without any consideration or expectation of
any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are
of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-
correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in
the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances,
should have exercised greater care and caution and
should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the
request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could
have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination
Committee, who would have referred the matter to the
Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners
should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete grades and/or the average of the
examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have
failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or
was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so
circumstances. This they could have easily done and the
stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and
Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the
answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited
the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in
connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's
answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents
Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased
the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely
because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz:
"You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my
subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the
exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he
would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because
I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V,
pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this
particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her
subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate
this examination notebook and increase the mark to at
least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar
examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?'
and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done
before to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it
with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried
to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the
answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more
lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not
complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of
68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the
favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their
declarations that the increases in grades they gave were
deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain
extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own
words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-
evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own
accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at
that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19,
1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41,
and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year,
he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of
the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith
and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo,
..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34,
rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving
the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular
subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said examinee deserved a
higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances
utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one
among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected
by them was impartial or free from any improper influence,
their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he
deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records,
Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the
explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were
earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection
with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5)
subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind
herein respondents-examiners that their participation in
the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed
with the highest consideration of public interest —
absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required
to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in
the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his
memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this
unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support
thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his
(examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar
Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar
Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass
said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No.
1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against
the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon
Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and
therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out
during the investigation which in his words is "essential to
his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this
charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian
was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge
against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar
Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this
case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a
favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent
or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he
does not impugn the motives of the five other members of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of
the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in
that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law
examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in
connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the
release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even
though such information was divulged by respondent
Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it
remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member
of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules
of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the
integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith
in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the
illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent
Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971
Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk
of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an
area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount
of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972
but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same
date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and
lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of
P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of
P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the
remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through
a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol.
VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on
January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under
Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In
his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets
was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore
that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971
statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was
used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable
listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not
realized because the transaction therein involved did not
push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-
48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of
respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is
extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of
$2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received
from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not
even presented by respondent during the investigation.
And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider
it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed
upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator
the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was
not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her
own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a
lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-
gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the
foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for
the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage
in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March
20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2,
1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and
lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month,
but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the
same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
which he filed in connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90.
Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no
such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets
and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while
in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed
total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release
of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the
said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent
Galang's examination papers or to show that the money
used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the
above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the
Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in
Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after
Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his
sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court,
respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or
resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of
retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was
informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release
of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent
Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16,
1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value
thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He
initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part
thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and
lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5,
1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against
respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the
dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is
determined that his property or money "is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act
1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent
Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are part of
the records of this Court.
B Legion especially while working with the Philippine
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible
contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or
his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the
latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the
G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine
Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to
1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From
1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was
connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our
veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill
of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator,
Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service
Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of
time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts
with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved
on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver
— July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol.
IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was
his father who all the time attended to the availment of the
said educational benefits and even when he was already
in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational
Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was
employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator
Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13,
rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter
dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to
the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the
transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to
the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly
addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang
at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV,
rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he
never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to
follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he
does not even know the location of the said office. He
does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill
of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the
Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their
ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits
that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a look
at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The
huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside
the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court
building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in
the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for
the several benefits given to veterans like educational
benefits and disability benefits; that he does not
remember, however, whether in the course of his duties
as veterans investigator, he came across the application
of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he
does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has
never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE,
belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and
then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the
war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla
movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to
which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese
occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar
only and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion
in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember
having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he
was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is
not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor
(Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was

with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there
when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese
planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of
respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a

member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as
the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted
as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given
the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and
served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd
Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed
at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the
enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31
December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose
Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has

submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant,
the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose
whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162,

RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN
FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT
RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS
HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.
B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner
Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in
the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner’s
plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his
reinstatement as a member in good standing of the
Philippine Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a
Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion of
which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the
recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby
resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice
of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions
in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant
lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose
partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile
Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had
adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee,
which identified petitioner as the person who had
downloaded the test questions from the computer of
Balgos and faxed them to other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably
recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the
Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the
OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant
portions of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a
lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to become
one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his
family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay
tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he
already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering
service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his
exposure to public service when he was elected
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of
Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he
initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their
barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually
pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law
school, he was elected as the President of the Student
Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern
University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities
including the conduct of seminars for law students as well
as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and
student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his
studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence
Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner
immediately entered government service as a Legal
Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.
Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to
less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in
need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the
Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices.
It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a
lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having
entered private practice, he continued to render free legal
services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate,
petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he was
stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged
involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself
inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable
consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new
lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the City
Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a
member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years,
petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public
service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of
his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of
the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records
of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the
investigation conducted and took personal responsibility
for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest
apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the
2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended
effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his
mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to
make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the
following testimonials and endorsements of various
individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral
character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution
Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in his
Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his
Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member
of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4
June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of
Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa
Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga
Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the
Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association,
Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa
Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng
Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga
Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the
Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc.
(SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa
Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita
(PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang
Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan
Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga
Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association,
Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the
Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to
Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his
Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar" dated 8
June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan,
Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of
Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly Deserving of Judicial
Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr.
Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of
St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty.
Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern University Law
Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University
(FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa
Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa
Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman
sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at
ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan
Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig
Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution
Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to
the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig
City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment
to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other
Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial
Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De
Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval,
Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian College –
Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral
competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated
5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand
[Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President, General
Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High
School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty.
Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers League,
Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge
Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court
(RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice
Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of Appeals and
former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University
(FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner
pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and
compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising
future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case,
the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age,
admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine
Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction
with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by
the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance,
and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two
years, eleven months and eleven days of prision
correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a
judgment handed down by the second division of the
Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact
action which should be taken by the court, we do so
regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation
of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be
lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to
strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in
order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more
circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to exert
all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein
Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the
Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be applied in
the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to
allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the
Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern
for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all
efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking
judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court
[in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the
practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred,
his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only
been in the practice of law for five (5) years when he was
disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that
petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it
not for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but
likewise, after his disbarment, as attested to
overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as
people of known probity in the community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar,
he had already manifested his intense desire to render
public service as evidenced by his active involvement and
participation in several social and civic projects and
activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment,
which could be perceived by some as a debilitating
circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue
extending his assistance to others in whatever means
possible. This only proves petitioner’s strength of
character and positive moral fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in
copying the examination questions from Atty. Balgos’
computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and
which questions later turned out to be the bar
examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar
Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do
believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the
damage that his action ensued, still, he must be
sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the
bar examinations as well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since
reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and
likewise for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of
disbarment may now be commuted to suspension.
Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already
been disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may
be considered as proper service of said commuted
penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice
of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is
respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for
Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November
2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be
GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to
suspension, which suspension is considered as served in
view of the petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence,
petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is
well-taken in part.1avvphi1.zw+ We deem petitioner
worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty
to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law,
inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his
disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish
but to correct offenders.2 While the Court is ever mindful
of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how
to show compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose.3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the
supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer,
we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred
lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life during his years
outside of the bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw,
we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of
respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge
himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and
repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and
capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards
of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and
officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for
more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional
infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of
law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has
regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and
humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an
elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic
and professional organizations, government institutions,
public officials and members of the judiciary. 6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for
Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact
that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of
the petitioner and the length of time during which he has
endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole
measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his
disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously,
he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. x x x
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse
expected of him considering the gravity of his
transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has
redirected focus since his disbarment towards public
service, particularly with the People’s Law Enforcement
Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the
community and other esteemed members of the legal
profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor
Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the
ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas
testify to his positive impact on society at large since the
unfortunate events of 2003.
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service
affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire
membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a
lawyer would redound to the general good and more than
mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the
petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to
him the following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for
Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED
IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN
from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN
(7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7056 February 11, 2009
PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C.
GARCIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision
dated September 13, 2006, finding respondent guilty of
gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional
falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment and
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of
law.
To recall, the antecedents of the case are as follows:
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the
Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of
herein complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the
tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of
Bienvenido de Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez
Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin,
Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, who were the
clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The
PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere
tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject
land. The case was elevated all the way up to the
Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s
rights over the land. Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost
cause, respondent was found to have committed
intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with
the intention to delay the execution of the decision through
the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary
restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title
despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he
allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law – holding themselves out as his
partners/associates in the law firm.
The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found
guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two
years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of
respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as
on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance. 1
Respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration within
the reglementary period, appealing to the Court to take a
second look at his case and praying that the penalty of
suspension of two years be reduced to mere reprimand or
admonition for the sake of his family and the poor clients
he was defending.2
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts
complained of. The courses of action he took were not
meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB
Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were based on
his serious study, research and experience as a litigation
lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to
him by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that
the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal
theory designed to protect the rights and interests of
Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al.3 He stresses that he was not
the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client
relationship with the former lawyer was terminated
because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former
counsel did not explain/argue their position very well,
refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated
them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on
what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his
interview. They maintained that they had been in open,
adverse, continuous and notorious possession of the land
in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus,
the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in order
to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject
property. He avers that he merely exhausted all possible
remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled
under the law, considering that his clients were subjected
to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary
eviction by the complainant.4 He posits that he was only
being protective of the interest of his clients as a good
father would be protective of his own family, 5 and that his
services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro
bono.61avvphi1
Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for
unauthorized practice of law, he humbly submits that
there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the
same or did he fail to dispute this, contrary to the findings
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was
counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the
cooperative Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC).
He was just holding his office in this cooperative, together
with Attys. Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the late
Alfredo Caloico and Marciano Villavert. He signed the
retainer agreement with Atty. Dominador to formalize their
lawyer-client relationship, and the complainants were fully
aware of such arrangement.7
Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating
the rules in the courses of action he took in behalf of his
clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind
consideration, pardon and forgiveness. He reiterates that
he does not deserve the penalty of two years’ suspension,
considering that the complaint fails to show him wanting
in character, honesty, and probity; in fact, he has been a
member of the bar for more than 20 years, served as
former president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal
aide lawyer of IBP Quezon City handling detention
prisoners and pro bono cases, and is also a member of
the Couples for Christ, and has had strict training in the
law school he graduated from and the law offices he
worked with.8 He is the sole breadwinner in the family with
a wife who is jobless, four (4) children who are in school,
a mother who is bedridden and a sick sister to support.
The family’s only source of income is respondent’s private
practice of law, a work he has been engaged in for more
than twenty-five (25) years up to the present.9
On August 15, 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) received a letter from respondent, requesting that
he be issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarial
commission. Respondent stated therein that he was
aware of the pendency of the administrative
cases10 against him, but pointed out that said cases had
not yet been resolved with finality. Respondent sought
consideration and compassion for the issuance of the
clearance -- considering present economic/financial
difficulties -- and reiterating the fact that he was the sole
breadwinner in the family.
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is
expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence to the case, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. 11 A lawyer’s
devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also
entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure
for the client what is justly due him or to present every
defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to
succeed.12 In this case, respondent may not be wanting
in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the
respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of
his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the
interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated.
We are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in
defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the
former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but
respondent should not forget his first and foremost
responsibility as an officer of the court. We stress what we
have stated in our decision that, in support of the cause
of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This
obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense
of truth and justice.13 This is the criterion that must be
borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his
case.14 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly
delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or
by misusing court processes.15

Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be

countenanced, as respondent must have realized with the
sanction he received from this Court. However, the Court
also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate
to refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in the
presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s
length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions
and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, and
respondent’s advanced age, among other things, which
have varying significance in the Court’s determination of
the imposable penalty. Thus, after a careful consideration
of herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration and
humble acknowledgment of his misfeasance, we are
persuaded to extend a degree of leniency towards
him.16 We find the suspension of six (6) months from the
practice of law sufficient in this case

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated

August 15, 2008 is NOTED. Respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated September 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that
respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court
of the date of his receipt of said Resolution within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof.

August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 477.

B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines
with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1 and passed
the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he
went home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old
college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already
working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate
and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved
in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the
mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath,
the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor
as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and "the matter of
signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances
to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable
to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado
filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to
this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s
prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a
fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him
the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is
warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good
moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to
Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a
third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of
more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant
why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado
very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time,
what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa
‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same
time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of
what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do.
I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action
for disqualification from the practice of law, 17 which is
more than what we can say of other individuals who were
successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar.
For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove
to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and
able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the
Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the
Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this Court
will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from
individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral
fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner
Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since
1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest
error of judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse
a person from the legal consequences of his acts 23 as it
negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot
be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may
have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact
when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he
had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no
longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known
that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys,
as it was the act of signing therein that would have made
him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps
to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar,
he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law

by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court,
and acting as such without authority, may constitute
indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after
the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this
case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from
making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against
him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law

likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist

in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit

lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,
the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students
and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations

of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For
his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period,
petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the
practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act
that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the
Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of

Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE
(1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the

Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court

Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.