A.M. No.
3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July
1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from
the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a
total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a
commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14
February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent,
instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which
then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued
three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the
amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated
25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon
presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after
their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by
the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced
and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against
respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a)
one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358;
and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360
and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all
three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine
of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant
in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal
Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3)
cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but,
in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the
practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision
read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence
sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda
is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which
she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and
shall not practice her profession until further action from
the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and
28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this
decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as
required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's
Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice
of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper
forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this
Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court
noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and
declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17
October 1988 had become final and executory upon
expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on
certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the
Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of
Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari
under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,
respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh
if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's
penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's
action on the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere
belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of
the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the
respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when
she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend
to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law
imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent
Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the
offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2
the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property but an offense against public
order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of
the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade
and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
3(Italics supplied)
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character
of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v.
Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires
that she shall be a person of good moral
character.1âwphi1 This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to an admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion
to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders
from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and spread on the record of
respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and
Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the

practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme

Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals

or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from
practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney shall
not practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was

convicted also import deceit and violation of her
A.C. No. 10185 March 12, 2014
LICERIO DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
On May 14, 2004, complainant Licerio Dizon
(complainant) filed a petition against Atty. Marcelino
Cabucana, Jr. (Atty. Cabucana), before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), praying for the disbarment of the
latter for falsification of public document.
In his petition, complainant alleged that he was one of
the would-be-buyers of a parcel of land owned by the
heirs of the late Florentino Callangan, namely, Susana,
Jun and Angeleta, all surnamed Callangan who were
parties in Civil Case No. 1-689 filed before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City (MTCC); that
on November 6, 2003, a compromise agreement was
executed by the parties in the said case and notarized
before Atty. Cabucana on the same date it was signed at
the MTCC; that at the hearing conducted on December
11, 2003 regarding the due execution and the veracity of
the compromise agreement, the signatories therein
testified that they signed the instrument in the court
room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana
as Notary Public; that because of the irregularity in the
due execution of the Compromise Agreement, there was
undue delay in the resolution/decision of Civil Case No.
1-689 which caused damage and injury to complainant;
that Atty. Cabucana violated the Notarial Law in
notarizing the document in the absence of most of the
signatories/affiants; and that he should be sanctioned in
accordance with Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Code and Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant further alleged that Atty. Cabucana uttered
grave threats against him on July 20, 2004 after the
hearing of the said case in MTCC.
In his Answer, Atty. Cabucana averred that the complaint
was intended to harass him because he was the private
prosecutor in a criminal case filed against complainant
before the MTCC; that complainant had no cause of
action as his right was not violated because he was just a
"would be" buyer and not a party to the compromise
agreement; and that complainant would not suffer any
damage by the pendency of the case or by any defects
obtaining in the notarization of the compromise
agreement.
In its Report and Recommendation,1 dated January 22,
2007, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty.
Cabucana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he notarized the
compromise agreement without the presence of all the
parties, and recommended that he be suspended as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years and from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
In its Resolution,2 dated May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
with modification that Atty. Cabucana be suspended for
only six (6) months for violation of his obligation as
Notary Public.
On motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of
Governors, in a Resolution,3 modified its earlier
resolution and suspended Atty. Cabucana from the
practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified him
from re-appointment as notary public for one (1) year.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors except as to the penalty.
Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the
Notarial Law states:
The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or
an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is
known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official
seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.
The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was
further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules
on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time
of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a
document unless the person who signs it is the same
person executing it and personally appearing before him
to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him
to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document
is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Marcelino
Cabucana, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 Accordingly,
the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
three (3) months, REVOKES his incumbent notarial
commission, if any, and PROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years,
effective immediately, with a stern WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all cou1is throughout
the country.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON,
petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have
been commuting to this Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas
Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain
machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return
the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago
appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs.
Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ
of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for
a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy
was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon
City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on
October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale,
failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the
petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this
Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718,
affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house
and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold
the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest
bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago
failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees
Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of
First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the
properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his
wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-
7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the
obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was
rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in
their conjugal residential house and lots which were
levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be
reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They
alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a
party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was
rendered and the writ of execution was issued only
against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a
party to her husband's venture in the logging business
which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which
did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex
parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of
sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title
and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from
carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose
where what the Manila court had ordered to be done,
the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1,
1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary
injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of
deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the
petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession
was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued
a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but
then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and
for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring
of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon
City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966,
docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and
dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also
dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed
to this Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët We dismissed the
petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of
Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R.
39438-R). The said court gave due course to the petition
and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it
rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from
enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case
No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed
with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits
without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners
Castañeda and Henson filed the present petition for
review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not
interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in
the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not
interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining
order it had previously issued against the enforcement of
the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of
Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the
writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife
was a party in one case and the husband was a party in
another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was
upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago
similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her
husband for which their conjugal properties would be
answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the
present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
instituted for the protection of the common interest of
the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their
conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's
business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court
of Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue
until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the
property is adversely determined, the said appellate
court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or
a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of
course obviously wrong, for, besides living with her
husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his
business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got
embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of
their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas
is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the
claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that
the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter
also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the
interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the
writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is
clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there
has been no change in the ownership of the properties
or of any interest therein from the time the writ of
execution was issued up to the time writ of possession
was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge
Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day
for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part
of the property is unleviable because it belongs to
Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally
privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made
and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3)
she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the
properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband
had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction
to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale
on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8)
Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal
properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his
family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution;
and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife
filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale
upon the issue that the wife's share in the properties
cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a
party to the logging business and not a party to the
replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to
raise the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore
discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them
from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review
suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession
to and ejectment from the one-half share in the
properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This
half-share is not in esse, but is merely an inchoate
interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal
nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only
upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be
assets of the community.3 The decision sets at naught
the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to
protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even
the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses
admittedly live together in the same house5 which is
conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of
possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but
the decision under review would prevent the ejectment
of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be
vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes
continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here;
the decision would actually separate husband and wife,
prevent them from living together, and in effect divide
their conjugal properties during coverture and before
the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil
case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents
Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents,
with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen
(14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment
thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5
times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their
counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek
justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends
of justice.6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty.
Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and
moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and
honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to
be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use
the courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in
order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the
case below which might again come up to the appellate
courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio
examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother
case of the present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11
years ago) but trial on the merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their
answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a
supplemental complaint where they impleaded new
parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint,
the Agos filed a motion to admit an amended
supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional
new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on
this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the
admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated
April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of
time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the
complaint, supplemental complaint and amended
supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the
reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff
levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago
despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was
personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture
that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit,
did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the
wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable,
is the same issue that we have already resolved, as
barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the
dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted.
This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of
the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on
January 5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant
to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of
certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use
thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up to
May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a
valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of
seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's
sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and
unlawful because the sheriff did not require the
Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of
P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there
was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a
mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National
Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for
P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor
Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the
judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and
because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in
damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no
obligation to require payment of the purchase price in
the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the
judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has been
filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not
exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39,
Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the
concern of the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the
sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no
moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of
P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was
dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no
valid cause of action and is moreover barred by prior
judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages
allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts
complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the
fourth cause of action derives its life from the preceding
causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the said
fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver
that the action was unfounded and as a consequence of
its filing they were compelled to retain the services of
counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos
obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer
of titles and possession of the properties to the
Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of
the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such
deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value;
and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched
their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the
court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the
filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage
of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to
cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of
the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more
damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife
two of the parcels of land in question; that the
purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the
defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants'
lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought
by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank
also acted in bad faith.
sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal
properties could not be levied upon, then the
transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we
have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of
action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and
it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of
the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the
remaining cause of action in the supplemental complaint
and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals
under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim
in a new and independent action. Treble costs are
assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu
Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M.
Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the
personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of
Court.

The second cause of action consists of an allegation of

additional damages caused by the defendants' bad faith
in entering into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of

action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the
inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause
damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan
Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them
also in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas
Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan
Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired
them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties
are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the

first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and
the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the
cause of action would depend upon the validity of the
first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the
Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of
ownership and possession of the properties by reason of
the agreements subsequently entered into by the
Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale
are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor
Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged
with malpractice for having published an advertisement
in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as
follows:
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was
suspended from the practice of law for the period of one
month for advertising his services and soliciting work
from the public by writing circular letters. That case,
however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more
elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to
repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is,
reprimanded.

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the

annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on
any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied

having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having
caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence
and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession."
In further mitigation he alleged that the said
advertisement was published only once in the Tribune
and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for
decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a

flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents
or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself
and his profession who stoops to and adopts the
practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979 to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect
resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor
SANTA PANGAN, complainant in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is
vs. his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent, imposing a more severe penalty.

RESOLUTION WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent

Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and warned
ANTONIO, J.: that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa
Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly
It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 delayed, the Investigator of this Court is directed
and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as
case were postponed on the basis of respondent's soon as possible. The request of complainant to appear
motions for postponement. These motions were in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel,
predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of
First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. SO ORDERED
Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the
attorney of record of the accused in said case is one
"Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg.,
Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used
the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in
connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that
he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate
(Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -
his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and
that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an
abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name
and maternal surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name

appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D.
Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official
record containing the names and signatures of those
who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not
authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in
the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear

that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in the temple
of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of
"truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor
and frankness should characterize the conduct of the
lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the court
has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth.
In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D.
Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has
violated his solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the

purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be
overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the
general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the
client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of
the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when
he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 2

In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the

courts instead of the name by which he was authorized
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant

vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA.
GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R.
SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.,
respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office

for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954,

in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G.
Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law
under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm
organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente

A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie,
which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie
Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979,

denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is
Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in
using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm,

cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with
members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker
& Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use

of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in
foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is
not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from

practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE Atty. Ricardo Teruel
PHILIPPINES.
Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas
PER CURIAM:
Atty. Gladys Tiongco
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao
1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center
(or PICC), the following were elected by the House of Atty. Simeon Datumanong
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their
alternates) and proclaimed as officers: Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

NAME The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath
of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en
POSITION banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports
received by some members of the Court from lawyers
Atty. Violeta Drilon who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings
and the adverse comments published in the columns of
President some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates, led by the main
Atty. Bella Tiro protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon
Executive Vice-President Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of
Atty. Salvador Lao certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which
were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit
Chairman, House of Delegates such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to
inquire into the veracity of the reports.
Secretary, House of Delegates
It should be stated at the outset that the election process
Atty. Teodoro Quicoy itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June
3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec,"
Treasurer, House of Delegates headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals,
was unanimously adjudged by the participants and
Atty. Oscar Badelles observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it
upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering
Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates with, and marking of, the ballots.

Atty. Justiniano Cortes What the Court viewed with considerable concern was
the reported electioneering and extravagance that
Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon characterized the campaign conducted by the three
candidates for president of the IBP.
Atty. Ciriaco Atienza
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon
Atty. Mario Jalandoni Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis
Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated
Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating
Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in
Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free
Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong
Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were
unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure
Atty. Teodoro Almine tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three
principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo
Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart,
soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP
Atty. Porfirio Siyangco delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's
rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon
allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP
chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso
donations, and she had the added advantage of having
regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department
of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves
of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary)
campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that
there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the
U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity),
as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where
Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions
were promised to others by the office of the Labor
Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same
matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of
the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and
employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and
comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of
out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were
reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened
and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their
votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to
P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to
twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to
P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a
top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in
IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with
campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a
room of the PICC (the Philippine International
Convention Center where the convention/election were
held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-
echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en
banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the
outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of
Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the
House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June
20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the
Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and
to recommend, for the consideration of the Court,
appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming
and strengthening adherence to the fundamental
principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic
postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
heavily stressed at the time of its organization and
commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying
nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board
of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the
IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates
and governors would be chosen on the basis of
professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply
disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of
mouth, that there was extensive and intensive
campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as
expenditure of considerable sums of money by
candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP
President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the
dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel
and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on
the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP
officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter,
the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities
enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before
and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated
Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman,
and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A.
Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of
Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's
Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and
testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to
shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers
of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt,
and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon,
Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective
headquarters and where they billeted their supporters
were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National
Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to
enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP
presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their
campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine
Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that
some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the
convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also
called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the
reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked
for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus
Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine
the nature of their sources of information relative to the
IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on
letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons
who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom
they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after
receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by
such persons as were perceived to have direct and
personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court,
after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and
adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-
LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the
"strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly
non-political, and every activity tending to impair this
basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government
or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
shall be eligible for election or appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A
Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the
Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
position as of the moment he files his certificate of
candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the
prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to
elections. — The following acts and practices relative to
election are prohibited, whether committed by a
candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or
by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form
or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election
campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign
material other than a statement of the biodata of a
candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size
sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement
to be done by persons other than those authorized by
the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of
candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member
to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate,
(1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any
member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar
consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or
causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised
to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for
violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or
commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices
defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar
shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate
or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to
the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member
pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the
investigating committee, the following violations were
established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by
the candidates for president, executive vice-president,
the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and
Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit the
votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the
invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar
dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio
City (during the conference of chapter presidents of
Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10,
p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their
candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country
seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their
votes, and securing their written endorsements. He
personally hand-carried nomination forms and
requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up
and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his
nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning
and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989
after the chapter elections which determined the
membership of the House of Delegates composed of the
120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86).
He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted
photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were:
Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V.
Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C.
Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L.
Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T.
Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius
Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo
Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A.
Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee
T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z.
Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C.
Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo
Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S.
Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt
Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n.,
June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those
formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the
election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said,
is that. some of those who had committed their votes to
him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-
4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-
Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of
Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a
plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol
CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development)
Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane
manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon,
Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys
Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of
the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB
plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about
the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-
118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-
president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in
May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine
Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He
went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for
a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant
Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol
for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be
taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his
fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the
Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His
request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was
to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon
company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet,
Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July
10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of
a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled
that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran
instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of
the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On
the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning
that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he
(Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane.
Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group
which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport
bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon
group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP
chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon,
admitted having formed their own slates for the election
of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for
President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and
for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon),
Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni
(Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern
Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B.
Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern
Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero
A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for
President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates,
and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon),
Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro
Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro
Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys
Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong
(Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and
Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L.
Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario
Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla,
Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and
Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates
and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for
some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar
Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth
about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back.
Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to
get a written commitment from him because Atty.
Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag
mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms,
not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane
tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use them,
because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and
he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July
4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was
his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed
that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real,
Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica),
Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh.
D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and
Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's
candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as
Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks,
entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms
and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his
staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the
Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He
paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the
Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn
were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso
Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto
Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio
Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban,
Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon
Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero,
Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio
Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano
Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C.
Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis
Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth
Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James
Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan,
Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos
Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven
Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified
that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including
the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat.
The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo,
the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-
68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn
for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were
billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign
manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of
which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva,
Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the
contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine
Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine
Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who
first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She
suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He
gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be
the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta
for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the
Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per
Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation
with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an
outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40
rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment
of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the
following persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)
P 25,000
(b) Antonio Carpio
20,000
(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)
10,000
(d) Jay Castro
10,000
(e) Danny Deen
20,000
(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)
10,000
(g) Alfonso Reyno
20,000
(h) Cosme Rossel
15,300
(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)
Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons
have been contributing money every time the IBP
embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that
their partners or associates could attend the legal aid
seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty.
Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine
Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the
room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a
room where she could rest during the convention. She
admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and
meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July
3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms
reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta
Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo
A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo,
Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon
Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito
Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio
Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula
Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla,
Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto,
Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina,
Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis
Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano,
Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of
which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for
rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of
his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n.
July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and
the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm
are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning,
members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted
being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and
the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon
and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They
consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband
being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a
room for the members of his own firm who attended the
legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the
reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid
P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during
the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he
knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the
latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t.
t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras,
entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of
29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a
downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on
April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of
P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon
Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager,
and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt,
testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74
(t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-
Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he
reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to
his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos
Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo
Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din,
Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q.
Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R.
Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto
Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg,
Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for
or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government'
(Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence
from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed
at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly
to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon.
He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho
Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma
Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the
husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance
there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma
Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He
talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu,
Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor
Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of
the campaign, and measured the strengths and
weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions
as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant
Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the
2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls
(amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from
his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in
the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for
Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate
for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as
the "action center' or "war room" where campaign
strategies were discussed before and during the
convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters
of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta,
Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to
plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number
(Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she
has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers
who promised to vote for or support them, but she has
no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who
paid the delinquent dues of another, because the
receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom
payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of
payments in March, April, May during any election year.
This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that
of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not
more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec.
14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty.
Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies
of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his
slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their
tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from
P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own
printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his
campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio
noted that there were more campaign materials
distributed at the convention site this year than in
previous years. The election was more heated and
expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of
the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of
the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that
campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of
the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n.
July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his
vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for
chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-
chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n.
July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt
Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-
Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of
May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department
of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club
in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two
labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and
Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos')
vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where
a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also
tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the
Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate,
Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to
Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship
(This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When
Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the
latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's
informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who
also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the
race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989,
p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for
Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in
Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around
saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a
candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP
chapters informed him that labor officials were
campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-
110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly
campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for
governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some
delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He
testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic
Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of
the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine
Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid
seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the
Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for
him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp.
102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City,
he already knew that the three candidates had their
headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday
Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the
Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the
elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to
Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by
Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the
Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he
said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and
accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July
4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because
he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on
May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him
to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told
Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce
because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and
Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for
Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000
during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount,
the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter
president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of
Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his
trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra,
Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp.
9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to
P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June
3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for
some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters
of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang
up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid
P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage
consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an
unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in
which the principal candidates for the national positions
in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign
preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated
Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the
idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined
in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three
principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-
star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The
Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit
the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the
120-member House of Delegates that elects the national
officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective
positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon,
Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written
commitments and the distribution of nomination forms
to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms
for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the
presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon
and some members of her ticket to enable them to
"assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in
the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of
tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case
of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo)
and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign
materials on the convention floor on the day of the
election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary
of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor
arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them
to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane
tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and
some families who accompanied them) in exchange for
their support; the pirating of some candidates by
inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to
another for some rumored consideration; all these
practices made a political circus of the proceedings and
tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to
"promote respect for law and legal processes" and to
abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who
are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in
unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very
rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued
the presidency of the association detracted from the
dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers
bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor
elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be
the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that
tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome
of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by
it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee
has revealed that those parties had been less than candid
with the Court and seem to have conspired among
themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
information from it to conceal the irregularities
committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the
provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII)
providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of
seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of
the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection
of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP
president has attracted so much interest among the
lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously
perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused
the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the
participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of
the misconduct which attended it and the stern
disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to
restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce,
if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the
top positions in the organization which, as the recently
concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical
practices which seriously diminished the stature of the
IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and
honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they
are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct
election by the House of Delegates (approved by this
Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend,
modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77,
Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and
Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91
IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec.
47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The
right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
President to the presidency upon the expiration of their
two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287)
should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the
Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to
the office of president. The incoming board of governors
shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President
shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until
after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the
rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex
oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There
shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of
Governors to be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended
as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP
shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively,
of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of
Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby
repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of
Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine
(9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration
Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for
each region to be elected by the members of the House
of Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different
Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at
least one (1) month before the national convention the
delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible
be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by
addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the
general membership shall be held prior to any election in
an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of
Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its
amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of
July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be
held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months,
after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this
case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila
to elect from among themselves the IBP national
president and executive vice-president. In these special
elections, the candidates in the election of the national
officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in
Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of
Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in
this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities
attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not
present themselves as candidate for any position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board

shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs
of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions
here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due
time of such further and other measures as are
warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA
BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL,
namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,
SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null
and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division
of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et
al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286.
The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having
been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition
outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65
section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the
instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court,
on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a
burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of
private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to
the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the
basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First
Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of
which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987.
On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day
period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in
the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987
but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit
a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied
their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the
rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on
July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated
and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion
either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and
went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods
of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824,
Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective
application of said rule, and explained the operation of
the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from
the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's
Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to
June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions
of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is,
as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension
on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period,
which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October
28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for
extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more
than a year after the expiration of the grace period on
June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage
of the grace period. Considering the length of time from
the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of
the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case
at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals

committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument

that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied
to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court

Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.