Professional Documents
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This is just one example of the many that could be chosen of Olby's careful
depiction of why scientists, because of their professional socialization, or
institutional location, or theoretical commitment, chose quite plausibly and
rationally to accept an interpretation of the evidence that we now see as
incorrect. Observations such as these serve to mitigate the teleological character
of the narrative and—although this theme is scarcely developed in the book—
to draw our attention to the ways in which the development of scientific ideas
is structured and channelled by social and cultural forces.
The third section is concerned with the role of experiments on bacterial
transformation in throwing light on the nature of the gene, and it begins with
detailed chapters on the British bacteriologist Frederick Griffith, and the later
work of Oswald Avery and his collaborators at the Rockefeller Institute. The
significance of, and reactions to, Avery's famous paper of 1944 on DNA as the
transforming substance are carefully assessed, and this takes us to the work on
276 Essay Review
the structure of DNA by Erwin Chargaff, which broke the hold of the tetra-
nucleotide hypothesis.
The fourth section is entitled 'Intellectual migrations', and it concerns the
direct and indirect influence on studies of the gene of physicists, structural
chemists, and crystallographers, amongst them Bohr, Schodinger, Delbriick,
Bragg, Pauling, and Bernal. The section concludes with a consideration of
Pauling's seminal work on the helical conformation of proteins, an idea which
in 1950 forced crystallographers to reconsider some of the intellectual ground-
rules of their speciality, and with a chapter on Watson and Crick, the figures
who come to dominate the final section, 'Hunting for the helix'. One interesting
effect of this section of the argument is that one comes to see both these men
rather less as individuals directing themselves towards particular institutions
and problems because of some intrinsic clarity of vision, and rather more as
junior scientists being guided and educated by their scientific peers—in Watson's
case Salvador Luria, in Crick's A. V. Hill.»
The final section deals with the creation of the double helical model for
the molecular structure of DNA by Watson and Crick, building on the pre-
fatory work, clues, and incorrect assumptions described in the rest of the book.
It is an extremely detailed and assured account of the reasoning that led to the
building of yet another model in March 1953. It appears to rely heavily on
material taken from interviews with Crick, whose comments in the preface
indicate the extent to which he sees the book as a counterblast to James
Watson's account in The double helix, but the effect is always convincing. The
creation of this model, the distribution of credit for that work, and the validity
of Watson's account of this research have given rise in recent years to a number
of related controversies. Ann Sayre's recent biography of Rosalind Franklin,
the crystallographer who unknowingly provided some data on which Watson
and Crick relied heavily in their success, has re-awakened such discussion.10 It
is a measure of Olby's skill that his account is both relevant to the continuing
debate on the technical issues and, in my view, very persuasive.
Even in an extended review it is difficult to convey the complexity of the
intellectual pattern created in The path to the double helix. By the end of the
book, a large number of characters have been brought on to the historical
stage, some only for a brief appearance. Many of them, however, are brought
on without any introduction, and this soon becomes rather taxing. Similarly
Olby is more or less unrelenting in his deployment of detailed technical
arguments without any brief explanatory comment, and one wonders what
readership he had in mind. These are more than stylistic conventions; they
flow directly from Olby's conception of his book as a text very close to the
technical literature of science, addressed principally to working scientists, with
their own simple received view about how the history of science should be
written. In this connexion I find it significant that the very extensive biblio-
graphy is almost entirely made up of references to primary scientific material.
One may say, of course, that if sociologists and historians of science do perceive
science in a radically different way, then it is now up to them to appropriate the
material assembled here and re-locate it in different cognitive and historio-
graphical frameworks. There are signs that this is indeed happening. Two
examples of the directions in which future investigators might go must suffice
to illustrate this contention.
There are a number of intriguing moments in The path to the double helix
when one catches a glimpse behind the intricate technical argument of
scientists seeking support from funding agencies, peer groups, and laboratory
directors for particular projects, experiments, programmes, or approaches.
Essay Review 277
Sometimes they succeed and sometimes they fail. For example, one sees
Staudinger eventually getting his ideas accepted by his colleagues, but failing
to get the money for an ultacentrifuge and, later on, failing to set up a research
programme in biology as he wanted.11 One sees Astbury attracting large
funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, but failing after the war to get money
from the Medical Research Council.12 By contrast Bernal and Needham failed
to interest the Rockefeller Foundation in the establishment of an Institute of
Physico-chemical Morphology in Cambridge,'3 and after the war Bernal was
handicapped by a curious shortage of funds until he got some support from the
Nuffield Foundation.'4 One sees Randall's proposed grant application for a
biophysics research unit doubled by the influential A. V. Hill,J5 while Bragg,
Cavendish professor at Cambridge, Nobel prizewinner, and Atheneum member,
traded on his status and connexions to solicit support for one of his proteges
from Sir Edward Mellanby, Secretary of the Medical Research Council.16 The
feature that all these incidents have in common is that they concern professional
appraisal and the attempt to gain financial support, and they involve important,
rarely discussed, historically changing criteria of scientific and practical value.
In the case of the Rockefeller Foundation, Robert Kohler has recently shown
us in a fascinating paper how complex these judgements and criteria for the
advancement of research in specific forms can be.x7 What Olby has indicated is
how interesting it would be to carry out this exercise for molecular biology as
a whole, as changing social and scientific elites gain and lose control over
funding and the resources of professional power.
My second example of further analysis suggested by Olby's work concerns
the history of ideas. One striking feature of the book is the assumption that the
development of science can be discussed adequately by constructing something
very similar to the everyday discourse of research, without regard to the deeper
intellectual structures underlying sets of theories and conceptual schemes.
There is one passage where Olby does strike down to this subterranean level,
in the chapter on Bohr and Schrodinger and their respective thoughts on
biology. In the terms of the analysis up to that point in the book, both these
thinkers were distinctly marginal to the development of molecular biology,
except in the indirect sense of having turned some people towards the subject;
but having tapped this philosophical substratum, Olby is only able to get back
to the earlier mode of argument with some fragmentary evidence about the
impact of Schrodinger's book, What is life? and this apparent digression or
thematic break seems to have puzzled some readers.18
My suggestion, then, is that in writing the history of molecular biology we
should try to deal not only with technical, experimental, and conceptual
changes, but also with the philosophical and cognitive levels which inform
scientific theory and practice. Particularly in the case of molecular biology,
this leads one immediately to some interesting issues. Why, for example, should
the concept of 'information' play such an important role in contemporary
biology ? From where was it imported ? By which group and with what purpose ?
At what point was the concept of hereditary informationfirstused in genetics ?
Was it linked to the rise of information theory and cybernetics just before and
during the Second World War?»9 The example of information presents us with
an idea that is central to the conceptual framework of modern biology but is
not the sort of artefact that is re-worked by everyday scientific practice, and is
therefore not explicit in scientists' writings and thoughts, and yet which links
the generative philosophical level of scientific discourse with the level of
social and professional institutions about which we can ask quite concrete
questions.
278 Essay Review
At several points in this review I have compared Portugal's and Cohen's
more recent book, A century of DNA, unfavourably with The path to the double
helix. This is perhaps unfair, since they are different productions. The later
book is shorter, less dense, less intricate, and spans a slightly longer period,
from the discovery of DNA by Miescher to the cracking of the genetic code. It
too has been assembled from the primary scientific literature, and from inter-
views, correspondence, and posthumous papers. It contains rather more
material on nineteenth-century biology, and the emphasis overall is rather less
on crystallography and rather more on biochemistry. More attempts are made
to explain parenthetically what particular concepts mean, and who particular
individuals were, and thus it is slightly easier to read than Olby's arcane book.
But correspondingly it is less densely packed with reflections and comments,
and therefore less interesting to the historian. For all that, it is a carefully
written, comprehensive book, and anyone who wants to learn about the history
of molecular biology should certainly read it.
Finally, the question of what purpose is served by writing histories of the
contemporary life sciences is raised by Portugal and Cohen in their introduction;
they suggest that it has a general humanistic value, particularly at the present
time.
In a more general sense, knowledge of science and technology is not essential to most
people, and indeed, many young people today reject science as too austere and rational
for their tastes. It is not necessary to understand the laws of thermodynamics or the operation
of a jet engine in order to fly in an airplane, just as it is not necessary to understand genetics
or DNA in order to reproduce. Yet surely, all of man's discoveries since the Age of Reason,
none should fascinate us more than the endeavor to understand the mystery of the basis of
life."
This seems to me to reveal the extent to which both these careful and intelligent
works, by Portugal and Cohen, and by Olby, are in one sense the victims of the
mythology of molecular biology. For both of them, in concentrating on the
intellectual and technical level, leave us short of the social realities of scientific
competition, interprofessional jealousy, and the drive for individual power,
status, and security through a scientific career. Whilst molecular biologists
have done a great deal in recent years to show us something of the 'mystery of
the basis of life', the peculiarly rapacious way in which they have gone about
it in the political and institutional context of post-war science has led to the
creation of a speciality renowned also for its competitiveness, intellectual
arrogance, and elitism. With that in mind it simply will not do to say, as do
Portugal and Cohen ,'That scientists compete to be the first to make a discovery
was as true in 1869 as it is today',21 for their own account provides testimony
of the differences between, say, Miescher waiting politely for Hoppe-Seyler to
be able to publish his results on the extraction of nuclein in 1869 and 1870, and
the frantic rush in the early 1960s to be the first to decipher the genetic code
which they describe in Chapter XII, and which as an editor of the Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences Portugal must have observed at first hand.
Only if we can bring ourselves to include these elements in our historical picture
will we get any closer to understanding why significant numbers of young
biologists were attracted by the mythology of the New Biology in the 1960s,
only to be repelled by the harshness of the institutions that the pioneers had
earlier created.
EDWARD YOXEN
University of Manchester
Essay Review 279
NOTES
• For further information see the newsletter of the Survey of Sources for the History of
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, available from Dr David Bearman, American Philosophical
Society Library, 105 South Fifth Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106, USA.
* See in particular the Journal for the history of biology, Studies in the history of biology.
3 E. A. Carlson, The gene: a critical history, London, 1966; F. Jacob, La logique du vivant;
une histoire de Vhlreditl, Paris, 1970 (English translation by B. Spillman, 'The logic of living systems,
London, 1974); J . S. Fruton, Molecules and life: historical essays on the interplay of chemistry and
biology, New York, 1972.
• See M. Teich, 'A single path to the double helix?', History of science, 1975, 13, 264-83;
S. S. Cohen, 'The origins of molecular biology', Science, 7 March 1975, 187, 827-30; D. Fleming,
'Cracking the genetic code', Times literary supplement, 17 September 1976, pp. 1163-5.
5 The same argument is presented in R. C. Olby, 'The origins of molecular genetics', Journal
for the history of biology. 1974, 7, 93-100; and 'The protein version of the central dogma', Genetics,
!
975> 79, 3-14-
6
R. C. Olby, The path to the double helix, London, 1974, p. 70.
7 F. H. Portugal and J. S. Cohen, A century of DMA: a history of the discovery of the structure and
function of the genetic substance, London, 1977, p. 216.
8
Olby, op. cit. (6), p. 157.
9 Ibid., pp. 298, 306, 308-9, 310.
I
° A. Sayre, Rosalind Franklin and DNA, London, 1975. For discussions of this book of varying
perceptiveness see H. Berman, 'A restitution', Science, 14 November 1975, 190, 665; C. P. Snow,
'The corridors of DNA', New York review of books, 13 November 1975, 22, 3-4; F. Hussain, 'Did
Rosalind Franklin deserve DNA Nobel prize?' New Scientist, 1975, 68, 470; Portugal and Cohen,
op. cit. (7), pp. 251, 254, 265, 266-8.
" Olby, op. cit. (6), pp. 14-19.
II
Ibid, pp. 55, 326-7.
•3 Ibid., pp. 252-3.
"4 Ibid., pp. 261-3, 336.
•5 Ibid., pp. 328-9.
"> Ibid., pp. 264-5.
' ' R . E. Kohler, 'The management of science: the experience of Warren Weaver and the
Rockefeller Foundation programme in molecular biology', Minerva, 1976, 14, 279-306.
18
See Cohen, op. cit. (4).
•91 have tried to explore some of these issues in E. J . Yoxen, 'The social impact of molecular
biology', University of Cambridge PhD thesis, 1977.
10
Portugal and Cohen, op. cit. (7), p. xi.
11
Ibid., p. 16.