Operational Reliability Investigation of Turbogenerator

based on Technological aspects and Human Factors

Igor Santos Araujo1,, Salvador Ávila Filho1, Jefferson dos Santos Mascarenhas1,
Danillo Ramos Camargo1

UFBA, Salvador, Bahia, Brazil

1

Igors_araujo@hotmail.com, Avilasalva@gmail.com, Jeffersonmascarenhas76@gmail.com,

Danilloramos@hotmail.com

Abstract. In the search for operational excellence of equipment and systems in

the industrial sector, it is essential to analyze their failures and seek solutions to
increase the reliability of the process. This article aims to investigate the causes
for the failure of a turbogenerator in a refining unit based on reliability tools,
analysis of critical variables and elaboration of mental map root cause. The fail-
ure occurred after 5 months of operation due to high vibration, with erosion of
the vanes and severe unbalance of the assembly. The studied turbogenerator gen-
erates electrical energy using the energy from the combustion gases of an FCC
(fluid catalytic cracking) unit. The investigation showed that human factors, such
as operational discipline, decision-making added to technological factors, such
as low efficiency of the combustion gas cyclones of the FCC catalyst, in addition
to the design failure of the pipeline contributed significantly to the occurrence.

Keywords: Human Factors · Oil and Gas · Turbogenerator · Reliability

1 Introduction
In the current global situation, where environmental resources are scarce, it is necessary
to seek solutions in the energy field, to make these processes more efficient and more
reliable. This implies a scenario with energy savings and reduction of CO2 and green-
house gas emissions, which impacts society. According to [1], the carbon emissions in
the world from energy use grew by 0.5% in 2019, less than half 10-year average growth
of 1.1% per year. This means that the world is changing, and large energy companies
need to adapt and improve efficiency in their processes to be competitive in this sector.
The petrochemical industry has great relevance in the global energy scenario. In Brazil,
the oil production grew by 7.8% in 2019 and the national refineries processed 1.8 mil-
lion barrels per day [2]. Due to its high complexity, it is important to monitor its pa-
rameters and study reliability solutions including human and technological factors with
real cases.
This article aims to investigate the causes for the failure of a turbogenerator located in
a fluidized catalytic cracking (FCC) unit of an oil refinery in Brazil. When this equip-
ment is operating continuously, it produces electrical energy from the heat generated in
the process itself. This work is based on reliability tools, human factors, and analysis of
critical variables, to identify the causes of failure, mainly the root cause of the event.

2 Literature Review
Oil is basically composed of a mixture of hydrocarbons. Its chemical composition may
vary widely. The combustion of petroleum products generates energy to power automo-
biles, trains, ships and airplanes. There are numerous possible applications using petro-
leum products and refineries are responsible for transforming oil into its products that
are consumed by the society [3]. According to [4], the different refining processes pre-
sent in a refinery can be classified according to the transformation that aggregate the
input stream, which can be separation, conversion and treatment processes. One of the
most profitable conversion processes is catalytic cracking. The main purpose of the unit
is to convert high-boiling petroleum fractions called gas oil to high-value, high-octane
gasoline and heating oil [5].
A catalytic cracking unit operates under severe temperature conditions and uses a cata-
lyst based on silica and alumina in the process. In these units, the energy contained in a
flue gas stream in the regenerator can be used to generate steam in boilers and electrical
energy in turbogenerators. The role of this equipment integrates the demand for power
in this industry with the process of expansion of flue gases. This machine is complex,
large and has auxiliary systems that are essential for its continuous operation. Common
causes of failure of turbogenerators are discussed in [6], where we highlight: failures
due to expander support, unit vibration, rotor rubbing and catalyst deposition and plug-
ging.
The search for operational excellence and operational continuity of the turbogenerator
involves the study of reliability to achieve good results. Complex systems involve sev-
eral factors that can contribute to the failure of a component or equipment. According
to [7], a study of accidents in Petrochemical and refining units identified the following
causes: equipment and design failures (41%), operator and maintenance (41%), inade-
quate or improper procedures (11%), inadequate or improper inspection (5%) and mis-
cellaneous causes (2%). This guide aims to understand the causes of human errors and
suggest ways to reduce them. The PSF (Performance shaping factor) is anything that
affect a worker’s performance. So, managers can improve the PSF’s and reduce the
frequency of human errors.
Human error is discussed in [8] by the traditional view and by the systemic view. Ac-
cording to the traditional view, errors occur due to negligence, lack of commitment and
failure to observe rules or procedures. Meanwhile, the systemic view of human error
says that they occur due to the complex relationship between factors such as: environ-
ment, culture, inadequate guidelines and systems. It is a challenge to create an environ-
ment of antecedents appropriate to the behavior that one wishes to achieve in the or-
ganization [9]. A model of human reliability analysis is SPAR-H, which is a model that
combines elements of the stimulus-response and the information processing approaches
and acknowledges the role of environmental factors upon diagnosis and action [10].
Thus, it is possible to identify human factors that contribute to the occurrence of a fail-
ure.
3 Methodology

The methodology for investigating this failure was based on technological and human
factors. The development process involved: reading and analyzing manuals, books and
procedures; interviewing specialists, operators and engineers; application of reliability
tools and analysis of the causes of equipment failures. For this, the methodology is
described in figure 1. In the first step, the operational context of the process in which
the turbogenerator is presented and of the equipment itself was defined. In the second
step, critical variables and tools were defined and we investigated operational reliability
with the appropriate tools applied in the process. In the third step, we discussed the
human factors that influenced the failure of the turbogenerator. In the fourth step, a
mental map with human and technological factors that led to the failure of the equip-
ment was drawn up and a discussion of the results was made.

1. Operational 2. Investigation 3. Human 4. Root

context: Process of operational Factors Cause Map
and Equipment reliability

Fig. 1: Block diagram of Methodology.

4 Case

This work will be applied to a turbogenerator in a fluidized catalytic cracking unit in an

oil refinery in Brazil. The operational context, equipment and analyzes performed will
be discussed below.

4.1 Operational Context

The FCC unit uses a fine solid catalyst based on silica and alumina, which behaves like
a fluid when it is crossed by a gas stream, such as air or steam. In the studied unit, there
is generation of combustion gases capable of generating electrical energy and high pres-
sure steam. This current is named flue gas and goes to a vessel where there is a third
phase of cyclones to remove entrained catalyst fines and then it will be used to generate
electricity with a turbogenerator and high pressure steam with a heat recovery boiler.
The studied turbogenerator is inserted in this flue gas energy recovery system of an
FCC in Brazil. Its objective in the process is to generate electrical energy from the heat
of the flue gas. For this, the equipment consists of an expander that drives a generator
through a gearbox. There is a lubricating oil system that supplies the expander, genera-
tor and gearbox bearings. In addition, the expander has a steam sealing and cooling
system. To monitor and control the machine at startup, normal operation and shutdown,
there are instruments that measure vibration, temperature and speed.
An interlock system is used to protect the machine in situations that are unsafe for it. In
summary, the situations that lead to the turbogenerator shutdown are low lubricating oil
pressure, high temperature in the expander, low cooling vapor pressure, low cooling
vapor temperature, over speed, rotation signal failure, axial displacement, vibration,
rotation signal failure, lubricating oil supply and cooling vapor pressure. An operation
group is responsible for doing the field and control panel routines. There is also a dy-
namic equipment engineering team that monitors the operation of the turbogenerator.
The equipment manual highlights that a regular operation routine of the equipment de-
pends a lot on the continuous operation or not of the FCC unit. It is worth mentioning
that the flue gas that goes to the equipment, despite going through 3 cyclone stages, has
catalyst particles in its composition. The piping design that surrounds the system has
expansion joints and supports that have the purpose of absorbing expansion and vibra-
tions.

4.2. Investigation of operational reliability

The campaign in which this study took place between September 2016 and February
2017. The turbogenerator operated for 5 months until a high vibration shutdown oc-
curred. This investigation consisted of reading the reports of the shift operational group,
choosing the appropriate variables to analyze this campaign, analyzing photos of the
blades of the rotating set of the turbogenerator and post-parade maintenance reports, in
the conversation with operators, engineers, mechanics of the plant and elaboration of
the methodology and application of reliability tools.
The figure below shows a PI (plant information system) screen with green and blue
vibration instruments, yellow speed, pink power generation, and FCC unit feed in Red.
A timeline was drawn up with significant events at the bottom, which are: (A) the
startup of the equipment, (B) operation of the turbogenerator with an average generation
of 15MW, (C) shutdown of the turbogenerator for thermal shock, (D) emergency shut-
down of the FCC unit, (E) significant increase in vibration and reduction of power gen-
erated, (F) shutdown of the turbogenerator due to the need for the process, (G) shut-
down of the turbogenerator due to high vibration.
Fig. 2: Critical Variable in Turbogenerator process September 2016 to February 2017. Green and
blue vibration instruments, yellow speed, pink power generation, and FCC unit feed in Red.

From this screen, at each shutdown of the turbogenerator, the rate of increase in equip-
ment vibration is higher. This occurs until the limit of vibration supported by the ma-
chine is reached. The operational instability of the FCC contributed to the reduction of
the turbogenerator's campaign time.
The figure below shows the relationship between the vibration of the turbogenerator
and the temperature of the day. There is a significant variation in vibration. This graph
shows that the vibration variations with the temperature were not absorbed by the ex-
pansion joints, as well as by the pipe support design.

Fig. 3: Variation of the vibration (blue and green) and the temperature (red) of the day during the
campaign.
The photos below were taken after the turbogenerator interlocked by vibration. The
image on the right shows the blades of the turbogenerator. This picture shows the pro-
cess of erosion that these blades have suffered. The low efficiency in separating the flue
gas from the catalyst caused excess catalyst particles in the flue gas to go to the turbo-
generator, and this erosive jet caused severe unbalancing of the assembly and continu-
ous increase in vibration. The image on the left shows that there was an opening in the
closing of the high-pressure box. This indicates that the machine has been over ten-
sioned.

Fig. 4: Photos of the turbogenerator after the interlock by vibration.

4.3. Human factors

The human being has a fundamental role to guarantee the operational continuity of the
studied turbogenerator. Some error likely situations described in API 770 were found
here. Regarding the operational group, it was noted after talking with experienced op-
erators in the area that their training in relation to the turbogenerator is insufficient. As
it is a complex machine, a specific and continuous training program is necessary, which
was not noticed. There are procedures for operational routines and equipment startup
and shutdown. However, in this period studied there was no adequate system to ensure
that routines were performed. The emotional structure of the operators affects their
work and routine. Ergonomic factors such as high noise from the operating area in ad-
dition to external personal factors increase the stress of operators and decrease their
performance. The engineering team responsible for monitoring the equipment has ade-
quate knowledge about the machine. However, points of improvement in the sense of
communication with the operation can be upgraded. In addition, a human analysis is up
to managers, as their decision making influences the machine, as they can maintain or
modify the third stage of cyclones and the design and piping items of the turbogenera-
tor. Some human factors are discussed below.
Procedure: Starting the plant involves remarkably high flow rates, time and quality
targets that are difficult due to the complexity of the process and the possibility of me-
chanical impact. The checklist for this procedure is completed quickly and there may
be slips. In addition, since the FCC unit is large and complex, there may be mistakes in
completing routine checklists.
Insufficient knowledge: Training a large turbogenerator requires hours of dedicated
study and proper instruction, as well as refresher courses. For not having full
knowledge of the equipment, problems can occur and do not receive the proper treat-
ment.
Monitoring of engineering and communication: The dynamic equipment engineering
sector serves the entire refinery. There is no specific engineer for the FCC unit alone.
As a result, there may be slips in certain analyzes as well as communication failures
between this important team and the operational group.
Decision of the Manager and Supervisor: The leaders of the plant have the power to
maintain or change a specific project or component of equipment. Keeping the turbo-
generator operating with a third stage of cyclones with low efficiency can result in a
gas for the equipment with a high number of solid particles, creating an erosive jet in
the vanes.

4.4. Root cause map

Based on previous discussions on the investigation of operational reliability, this mental
map was elaborated with factors that influenced the operational continuity of the turbo-
generator, causing it to shutdown due to high vibration with damage to the blades and
the set as a whole. The factors were divided into technological (TECH - Technological
factors) and human (HUMAN - Human factors). There is also the operational instability
factor at FCC unit, which was classified as human and technological.

HUMAN HUMAN TECH

Decision of
mantaining the third
stage of cyclone and
the support piping
HUMAN
Insufficient
knowledge and
training of Operation
Emotional factors of Low efficiency of the
the employees third stage of cyclo-
nes.
Shutdown the turbo-
generator due to high TECH
Turbogenerator sys-
vibration and struc-
tem piping
tural damage to its
design error
components

HUMAN TECH/HUMAN
HUMAN
Monitoring of Operational insta-
Deficient Procedures
Engineering bility of the FCC
and communication unit
Fig. 5: Root cause map.

5. Conclusion

Failures resulting from the design of the turbogenerator are mixed with human errors
due to deficiencies indicated in human factors. The mechanical stress of solids on the
blades of the turbogenerator is a technological issue accompanied by undue human fac-
tors. The root cause map presented in 4.4 shows the causes contributing to the shutdown
of the turbogenerator due to high vibration. This work showed that the failure of the
turbogenerator comes from human and technological factors. In human factors, insuf-
ficient training, deficient procedures, automatic check list and decision making to main-
tain the projects of the third stage of the cyclone and the pipes may have contributed to
the event. In technological factors, the main contributions were the low efficiency of
the third stage of cyclones and error of piping design, in addition to the operational
instability of the FCC unit. Because it is a complex machine, it is difficult to determine
the root cause. This will be for a future study.

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