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MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF BEING

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 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48

Journal of Integrative Humanism (JIH)

Publisher: Faculty of Arts, University of Calabar, Nigeria.

Integrative Perspective
MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF BEING

EMMANUEL KELECHI IWUAGWU (PhD)

Department of Philosophy
University of Calabar, Calabar

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Journal history This work is a critical exposition of Martin Heidegger’s life, times and
First publication, 2011 exploration into the question of Being. The work surveys the background of
ISSN:2026-6286 Heidegger’s philosophizing, his principal interest in ontology, his attack on
traditional metaphysics, his adoption of the Husserlian phenomenology as a
method and his use as his starting point Dasein, the only being who
understands what it means to be, the being for whom his being is in question
Online Publishing: and is of special interest to him. The work also made an exhaustive critique
Edioms Research and of Heidegger’s analysis of human existence especially with regard to
Innovation Centre Dasein’s mode of being, its tripartite ontological structure of existentiality,
facticity and fallenness; its authentic and inauthentic existence and the
Website: comprehensive concept of care. The work further examined Heidegger’s
www.ediomsric.com other themes discussed in his search for the meaning of Being, these include:
temporality, historicity and nothingness. The work observed that Heidegger’s
Email: failure to rise above what he condemned in traditional metaphysics left him
helpdesk@ediomsric.com confused and unable to complete his major work Being and Time and forced
him to make a turn. This turn (die kehre) which initiated his later philosophy,
though still preoccupied itself with the question of Being , followed a less
rigorous means. This new way is the use of poetic language to make Being
KEY WORDS: unconcealed. The work in conclusion observed that Heidegger’s
Ontology, Phenomenology, preoccupation with the question of Being by his methods and themes left him
Dasein, Human existence, a phenomenological ontologist, an existentialist, a humanist and an atheist
*Nothingness. Temporality, while leaving the question of Being unanswered.
Historicity.

© Faculty of Arts University of Calabar, Nigeria.

 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
INTRODUCTION
Martin Heidegger is considered the most original thinker
in the field of contemporary German philosophy and a
leading exponent of Existentialism and Phenomenology.
His unfinished magnus opus, Being and Time stands out
as one of the most significant philosophical writings of
the 20th Century whose seminal influence has contributed
immensely to the development of European Philosophy.
Heidegger’s ideas in philosophy extends beyond
existentialism and phenomenology to such areas as
hermeneutics where he influenced Gadamar and Paul
Ricoeur; political theory where he influenced Hannah
Arendt, Herbert Marcuse and Habermas; in psychology
where he influenced Boss and Binswanger; in theology
where he influenced Buttman, Karl Rahner and Paul
Tillich; in literary criticism as testified by Ziarek and in
cognitive science as testified by Kiverstein and Wheeler.
The principal interest of Heidegger in his Being and Time
was ontology i.e. the study of being. In addressing the
question of being in the first part of this work Heidegger
started with a phenomenological analysis of the being
that has an understanding of its being, the human being
which he designated as Dasein (‘Being-there’) in relation
to its temporality and historicity. After the change of
direction in his thought (the turn) he tried to access being
through the use of language as a means of unfolding it.
These approaches led Heidegger to criticize traditional
philosophy which he accused of derailing in addressing
the question of being thereby slumping into nihilism.
Though a controversial figure because of his involvement
with Nazism, Heidegger contributed immensely to the
unfolding of the philosophical notions of truth where he
insists that the original meaning of truth is
“unconcealment.” For Heidegger, ‘philosophical analysis
of art is a site of the revelation of truth and philosophical
understanding of language is the “house of being” ’
(1998, 5). Heidegger, being an original thinker, creates
his own words making his writing very difficult to
understand even to a German reader. This work will try
to throw light on Heidegger’s ontology precisely how he
tried to answer the question of being through his
phenomenological and existential analysis of human
existence in the world.
HEIDEGGER’S BIOGRAPHY
Born in the rural town of Messkirch, Baden in Southern
Germany on September 26, 1889, Martin Heidegger was
the son of a sexton of St. Martins’ Catholic Church. His
mother was Johanna Kempf Heidegger. In a privately
printed autobiography, he describes himself as a little
boy, the son of the sexton of St. Martin’s of Messkirch
“whose hands often rubbed themselves hot in ringing the
church bell …which had its peculiar relationship to time
and temporality” (Spiegelberg 1965, 292 ).
Martin started his education at a public school at his
hometown before he was supported by a church
scholarship to study at the Gymnasium of Constance
(Konstanz) from 1903 to 1906. After this, as he was still
nursing the desire for the Catholic priesthood, Martin
studied with the Jesuits at the Berthold’s – Gymnasium
(or Seminary) in Freiburg where he obtained a diploma in
1909. He then studied one full semester of theology as a
Jesuit novice at the University of Freiburg.
According to Spiegelberg (1965) and Richardson (1963)
Martin Heidegger’s first introduction to philosophy came
by his reading the first philosophical book casually given
him at the summer of 1907 by the pastor of Trinity
Church in Constance, Dr. Conrad Grober. This book was
a doctoral thesis of the philosopher and psychologist
Franz Brentano (1838 -1917) titled “On the Manifold
Meaning of Being According to Aristotle”. The magnetic
influence of this book on Heidegger evidently was a
determining factor in establishing his life-time pre-
occupation of unraveling the meaning of being. After
only one semester of theological studies at the University
of Freiburg, Heidegger gave up his theological studies for
the Catholic priesthood and took up the study of
philosophy, mathematics and the natural sciences.
Heidegger’s first published work was a short article on
epistemology entitled, “The Problem of Reality in
Modern Philosophy” published in 1912. In 1913, he
wrote his doctorate dissertation on “The Doctrine of
Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive
Contribution to Logic” which was directed by a Catholic
philosopher A. Schneider. On` account of his frail health
Heidegger was exempted from military service during the
World War I and so continued his studies at Freiburg. In
1916 he published his habilitation thesis or special
dissertation which will entitle him to teach philosophy as
a privadozent (Lecturer, an unsalaried associate
professor). This work entitled “Don Scotus’ Doctrine of
Categories and Meanings” was written under the
supervision of the Neo-Kantian philosopher, Heinrich
Rickert. This work according to H. Spiegelberg “shows
Heidegger in full transition not only from scholastic
philosophy but even from Rickerts’ transcendental
philosophy to Husserl” whom at this point Heidegger has
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
not met. This means that “the basic themes of
Heidegger’s phenomenology, being, time and history
were already formulated when Heidegger came in
personal contact with Husserl” (1965, 294, 297). After
his appointment as a privatdozent or lecturer in 1915, his
lecture courses were mostly in Aristotelian and
Scholastic philosophy.
In 1916, Edmund Husserl arrived the University of
Freiberg; this will bring about the so-called
“phenomenological Period” in Heidegger’s life. In 1917
he got married to Elfride Petri a Lutheran and Economics
student who had two sons Jorge and Herman, with the
second gotten through extramarital affairs. With this
marriage solemnized both in a Catholic and Protestant
ceremony, Heidegger officially broke with the “system of
Catholicism” and returned to Freiburg in January 1919
where he became a salaried senior assistant to Husserl
until 1923. In 1918, Heidegger served for ten months in
the meteorological unit in the Western front during the
World War I.
Heidegger, Husserl and Phenomenology
Heidegger first met Husserl at the University of Freiburg
in 1916 as a young Privatdozent (Lecturer) just 27 years
old when Husserl a full professor was 57 years. Though
he was never a student of Husserl, the intimate
relationship that developed between them brought a great
influence in Heidegger’s intellectual direction. Husserl
tried to imbue Heidegger with a real sense of dedication
to the cause of phenomenology, preparing him as a
successor and standard bearer of phenomenology. The
goal of phenomenology as envisaged by Husserl is to
study the structures of consciousness as experienced
firsthand, as it appears. For him, phenomenology studies
consciousness and the objects of direct experience. In
Husserl’s view, the central structure of an experience
consists in its intentionality, that is to say, it’s being
directed towards something, this is because every
experience is an experience of some object. Heidegger
was highly enthralled by Husserl’s logical investigations
which labored over the question of things in themselves.
Heidegger bought Husserl’s method of
phenomenological reduction which requires one to
discard all inherited preconceptions of conscious
phenomena so as to be able to reveal their essence or
primordial truth. Heidegger employed this method in his
so-called “dismantling” of the traditional approaches of
Western Metaphysics.
From 1919 to 1923 when he transferred to the University
of Marburg from Freiburg he identified himself with the
cause of phenomenology as championed by Husserl. All
his lecture courses and seminars were devoted to
exploring its many facets. But unknown to Husserl his
lieutenant, Heidegger, was not impressed by the later
developments of his phenomenology especially the neo-
Kantian and Cartesian turn towards transcendental
subjectivity. In spite of his lip service, Heidegger was
actually moving away from Husserl’s conception of
phenomenology and the transcendental reduction.
Husserl realized that he and Heidegger were worlds apart
in their understanding of phenomenology when he sought
his collaboration in writing an article on phenomenology
for the 13th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannia.
Heidegger’s draft stunned Husserl who expressed his
disappointment in a letter to Roman Ingarden (Dec. 26,
1927) where he wrote: “Heidegger has not grasped the
whole meaning of phenomenological reduction”
(Speigelberg 1965, 281). in spite of his realization of how
completely at odds Heidegger was with him with regard
to phenomenology, Husserl still hoped he would
understand later and recommended him as the only
qualified successor to the chair of philosophy at the
University of Freiburg on his retirement in 1928.
At the completion of his five years stay at Marburg in
1928, where he rose to full professorship after the
publication of his Being and Time in 1927, Heidegger
returned to Freiburg and succeeded Husserl to the highly
coveted chair of philosophy. From this time onwards, the
two scholars saw less and less of each other and their
relationship became complicated and occasionally
strained (Crowell 2005).
Heidegger’s major work Being and Time (1927) was
dedicated to Husserl. Edmund Husserl’s consternation
about the work after an exhaustive study of it could be
seen in his marginal notes in the text when he discovered
both fundamental differences between his position and
Heidegger’s as well as hidden attacks on his own position
(Spiegelberg 1965, 282 and note 1). It now became clear
to Husserl that Heidegger cannot be a flag bearer of the
phenomenological movement because by his substitution
of Dasein for the pure ego he has made himself a traitor
to phenomenology itself. In Husserl’s opinion,
Heidegger’s views were attempting to reinstate the very
same anthropology which Husserl has sought to
overthrow by his phenomenology. For Husserl,
Heidegger’s promotion of a specie of psychologism mean
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
he has not succeeded in rising above the level of the
naïve.
In 1930, Husserl roundly criticized Heidegger’s position
saying that some of Heidegger’s objectives were “based
on misunderstandings and fundamentally upon the fact
that one misinterprets my phenomenology backwards
from a level which it was its very purpose to overcome,
in other words, that one has failed to understand the
fundamental novelty of the phenomenological reduction
and hence the progress from mundane subjectivity to
transcendental subjectivity; consequently, that one has
remained stuck in an anthropology, whether empirical or
apriori, which according to my doctrine has not yet
reached the genuine philosophical level and whose
interpretation as philosophy means a lapse into
transcendental anthropologism or psychologism”
(Husserliana, V. 140, quoted in Spiegelberg 1965, 282).
Husserl’s public denunciation made Heidegger
henceforth to remain silent over phenomenology both in
his writings, seminars and lectures. As the two former
friends drifted apart Heidegger felt no obligation to
reciprocate Husserl’s kind gestures which made him his
successor at the chair of philosophy at Freiburg
University. Heidegger deserted Husserl in his hour of
need during the Nazi period in Germany. During this
time, Husserl, who is Jewish, was subjected to
unspeakable humiliations while Heidegger, a favorite of
the Nazis looked the other way and made no effort to
assist his former mentor and benefactor. (Kaufmann
1965, 87).
Heidegger was criticized for suppressing in the 1943
edition of his Being and Time, a dedication to Edmund
Husserl because of his Jewish nationality. Heidegger
explained that he did so under pressure from the editor,
however he maintains he retained his acknowledgement
of gratitude to Husserl on page thirty-eight of the text
itself. (Borzaga 1966, 150).
Heidegger’s Political Life, Post-War Period, Last
Days and Works
Heidegger’s years at the University of Marburg between
1923 and 1928 were the most productive years of his
teaching career. It was during this time that he wrote his
unfinished major work Being and Time (1927). He
succeeded Husserl in the chair of philosophy at the
University of Freiburg in 1928. Between 1930 and 1935,
Heidegger wrote very little but devoted much of his time
and energy to the cause of Nazi socialism.
On the 21st of April, 1933 Heidegger was elected the
President (Rector Magnificus) of the University of
Freiburg. And on May 3rd 1933 he officially joined the
Nazi party. In his inaugural rectoral address on the 27th
May, 1933 entitled “The self-preservation of the German
University” he equivocally endorsed the Nazi Socialism
of Adolf Hitler. Heidegger argued that up till the present
time, the educational aims of the University were without
any definite end or purpose. Nazi Socialism now gave the
University students definite goal, namely an active
participation in the fashioning of the destiny of the
German nation. They will share in the establishment of
freedom and self-determination of the German people by
the conquest of other nations. The Jews, in particular as
the enemies of the state were to be subdued. ( Borzaga
1966, 149; Collins 1964, 168-169).
In spite of his equivocal support for the National
Socialism and Hitler in his many public utterances,
Heidegger resigned as the rector of the Freiburg
University the next year to devote more time to teaching
and less to politics. As part of his inaugural rectoral
address was not compatible with the party line, it was
banned by the Nazis. After his resignation from office,
his membership of the National Socialist German
Workers Party (NSDAP) became a mere formality and
because of some restrictions imposed on his freedom to
publish and attend conferences his subsequent lecture
courses expressed criticism of Nazi ideology which he
formally exulted. This twist placed Heidegger under the
constant surveillance of the Gestapo.
After the collapse of the Nazi regime, Heidegger became
a persona non grata. He was forbidden from teaching in
any University by the French occupying forces who
sacked him from the Freiburg Chair of philosophy. The
ban imposed on him by the Denazification commission
from teaching lasted from 1944 till 1949 when it was
lifted. He was readmitted to the University of Freiburg in
the winter semester of 1950 – 1951 session and made a
professor emeritus the following year. Heidegger taught
regularly there till 1958 and as a visiting professor by
invitation till 1967 when he made his second visit to
Greece the first being in 1962. Heidegger, after 1967,
retired to his small ski hut at Todtnauberg in the Black
Forest where he lived in seclusion. He considered this
seclusion as the best environment for philosophical
reflection.
Though officially married to Elfride Petri, Heidegger had
several other extramarital relationships the most
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
pronounced being with Hannah Arendt and Elizabeth
Blochmann both his former students and of Jewish
decent. During his last years, he published little though
he wrote what was published posthumously.
Some months before his death Heidegger reconciled with
the Catholic Church after his confidential meeting with
Bernhard Welte a University of Freiburg professor and
Catholic priest who eventually officiated at Heidegger’s
Christian burial. Heidegger died on the 26th of May, 1976
and was buried beside his parents and brother at the
Church yard cemetery in his hometown Messkirch. He
remained intellectually active to the very end. Among his
many writings include: Being and Time (1927), Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), The Essence of
Reason (1929), What is Metaphysics (1929), Holderlin
and the Essence of Poetry (1937), On the essence of
Truth (1943), Letter on Humanism (1947), The Way Back
into the Ground of Metaphysics (1947), Hegel’s Concept
of Experience (1953), What is Called Thinking (1954),
What is Philosophy (1956), The Question of Being (1956)
What is a Thing (1962), Poetry, Language, Thought
(1971), etc.
Heidegger as an Existentialist and
Phenomenological Ontologist
It has been hotly debated whether Martin Heidegger is an
existentialist, an ontologist or a phenomenologist.
Though many prominent existentialist identify Heidegger
as an existentialist (Sartre, Paul Tillich and Rudolf
Bultmann among them) he out rightly denied being one,
insisting that he was “not primarily concerned with
existence”. Heidegger told Stefan Schimanski in an
interview “My book bears the title Being and Time and
not Existence and Time. For me the hunting question is
and has been not man’s existence, but ‘being-in-totality’
and ‘being as such’” (Reinhardt 1964, 132). Again, in a
communication sent to a colloquium of the French
Society of Philosophy he refused to be classified as an
existentialist. According to him “I must say again that my
philosophical tendencies…cannot be classified as a
philosophy of existence… The question which
preoccupies me is not the question of human existence,
but it is the question of being as a whole and as such”.
(1937, 193 ; Kockelmans 1965, 22).
In spite of his protestations, Heidegger’s themes, his
method, his preoccupations, posture and influence stand
him out as a leading existentialist in contemporary
European Philosophy. Scholars argue that the
incompleteness of Heidegger’s Being and Time made it
impossible for him not to be classified as an
existentialist. According to Spiegelberg “… For while
Heidegger planned to use his existential studies only as
an entering wedge for his major problem, the sense of
being in general, the non-appearance of the later parts
meant that only his analysis of existence was available”
(1965, 289). It is undeniable that Heidegger’s major work
Being and Time is a classical work of Existentialism.
Hence, its author cannot but be an existentialist. Paul
Tillich, Rudolf Bultmann and Jean-Paul Sartre all
testified to their indebtedness to Heidegger’s influence
(Sartre 1956, 26 [1946]).
In spite of the existential postures and themes in
Heidegger’s Being and Time, his primary concern was
ontology, i.e. the study of being. He started Being and
Time with the traditional ontological question “what is
being?” What does the verb ‘to be’ actually mean? This
he formulated as Seinfrage or the “question of Being.” It
is to answer this question that he was led to distinguish
what it is for beings to be beings (“Sein”) from the
existence of entities in general (‘Seindes’). He then
concentrates on the being who understands what it means
to be, the being for whom his being is in question, the
being engaged in the world (“Dasein”). Heidegger
oblivious of the fact that there are many senses in which
existence can be predicated of a thing, or that there are
many kinds of beings, insists in discovering the most
fundamental kind of being which can be predicated of all
things. Hence in his work My Way to Phenomenology
(1963) he posited the questions of being (Seinfrage) thus:
“If being is predicated in manifold meaning, then what is
its leading fundamental meaning? What does Being
means?”
In order to address the question of being (Seinfrage)
properly, Heidegger started with a preliminary
phenomenological investigation of the being for whom
its being is an issue, the human being whom he called
Dasein. In this enquiry, Heidegger acknowledges his
indebtedness to Husserl’s phenomenology especially as
contained in the Logical Investigations. According to him
without the Husserlian phenomenology his own
philosophical investigation would not have been possible.
For Husserl, “the primary goal of phenomenology
consists in its descriptive, detached analysis of
consciousness in which objects, as its correlates are
constituted”. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the procedure
of bracketing is fundamental in the “phenomenological
reduction’’, a procedure that assists one to free oneself
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
from prejudice or preconception and secure the purity of
his detachment as an observer so as to able to encounter
“things as they are in themselves” independently of any
presuppositions. Though Heidegger bought Husserl’s
idea of phenomenological reduction, his work Being and
Time constitute in itself a powerful critique of the
Hursserlian phenomenology. Here Heidegger presents
the various modes in which we exist and the many ways
we encounter things. For Heidegger, the starting point of
philosophy is Dasein in its being and not consciousness.
Whereas for Husserl the core problem of philosophy is
the problem of constitution: How the world as
phenomenon is constituted in our consciousness?
Heidegger moved the problem a step further by asking,
“what is the mode of being, of that being in which the
world constitutes itself?” In Heidegger’s opinion we
cannot avoid the question of Dasein’s being as far as the
problem of constitution is concerned, for it is in Dasein
that being is constituted.
Whereas Husserl ascribes the term “phenomenology” to a
whole philosophy, Heidegger employs it to designate a
method. Heidegger uses phenomenology as a method in
his philosophy which in Being and Time he refers to as
“Ontology.” For him the method of ontology is
phenomenology which he sees as a way of accessing
Being. If for Heidegger the central goal of his philosophy
is to answer the Seinfrage, the question of Being,
Heidegger is then an ontologist. And if for him
philosophy is nothing but phenomenological ontology
whose starting point is the phenomenological analysis of
Dasein, Heidegger’s lifetime preoccupation, we cannot
but call him a phenomenological ontologist.
Heidegger’s Problem with Traditional
Metaphysics
Heidegger, in Being and Time, made a frontal attack on
traditional metaphysics. Firstly he accused it of losing
focus of its primary goal. Instead of studying the Being
of beings, metaphysics has wasted its time studying
particular beings. This led Heidegger to propose a
“destruction of ontology” in order to refocus on the real
problem of philosophy. According to him, “the
destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound
up with the way the question of being is formulated, and
it is possible only within such a formulation” (1962, 44).
It is by doing this that it will be able to refocus on the
study of the Being of beings (das Sein des Seiendes). In
trying to clarify this question Heidegger employed the
Greek and Latin use of the notions of being (das Seiende)
a being and being (das Sein “to be”). The Greek language
uses ‘to on’ to refer to a being or to “that which is” and
uses “to einai” to refer to the “ising” or the “to be” of
something. In the same vein, Latin language uses ‘ens’ to
refer to the noun (a being) and uses ‘esse’ to designate
the “to be” of a thing. Hence the German usage of das
Seiende is an equivalent of the Greek “to on” and the
Latin “ens” (a being) while das Sein is equated with the
Greek “to einai” and the Latin “esse” (to be) (Lescoe
1974, 185). Heidegger’s problem is that Western
philosophy diverted its attention from its chief
preoccupation, i.e. the study of the Being of beings (das
Seindes Seiendes). This, Heidegger’s argues, started
when Plato made his distinction between the real things
in the world of form and the shadows of them in the
material world. This continued with Aristotle when he
made the study of being as substance or subject of action
the work of philosophy. From this moment, Western
philosophy betrayed its noble calling of searching for the
Being of beings as started by the pre-Socratic
philosophers.
Heidegger’s contention, according to Barret, means “that
philosophy which was supposed to study being has in
reality become an “ontology”, i.e. a study of “that-which-
is” rather than an “einailogy”, i.e. a study of the “to be”
of Being as opposed to beings. Hence “from the
beginning the thought of Western man has been bound to
things, to objects” (1962, 212). For Heidegger, the
forgetfulness of being witnessed in the course of Western
philosophy amounts to the oblivion of the distinction
between das Sein (being) and das Seiende (beings).
Heidegger further points out the extremely misleading
ambivalent interpretation of the role of metaphysics
which was synonymous with the development of the
Western thought. According to him, for Greek thinkers
metaphysics has meant two different things: the study of
the widest notes and attributes common to all things,
secondly the study of the highest being, God. This
approach makes metaphysics confine itself within being
and renders itself incapable of any experience of Being
which hides in being (Fabro 1968, 81).
In Heidegger’s thought the Being of beings is
not any being even the highest being. Richardson
translated and quoted Heidegger’s work Brief Uber
Humanismus (76) where Heidegger said that the Being of
beings “is not God, nor (some) ground of the world.
Being is broader than all beings - and yet it is nearer to
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48

man than all beings, whether they be rocks, animal, work with and through its being, this being is disclosed to it.
of art, angels or God. Being is what is nearest (to man). Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic
Yet (this) nearness remain farthest removed from man.” of DASEIN’S Being” (1962, 26, 27, 32).
(1963, 6). Hence Heidegger categorically refused to
identify the Being of beings with God. For him to call As can be seen above, Heidegger uses Dasein to
God the first cause, the highest good, or the ultimate end designate human existence or man. This term
is to behold him merely as the highest among beings, as traditionally means “existence” in German philosophy.
another being in the universe. Many unsuccessful attempt have been made to translate
DASEIN into readable English such as “Being-there”,
In his attempt to effect a destruction of ontology, an “there-being”, “human being”, “man”, “human
overcoming of metaphysics in order to answer the existence” etc. Heidegger rejects the notion of a
question of being which has been abandoned by permanent essence or nature for man. He disagrees that
traditional metaphysics since Plato, Heidegger embarked man is a substance or subject of action or a suppositum
on a phenomenological analysis of a being whose being of a rational nature.
is in question - Dasein (man). According to him it is by
studying man, who is genuinely concerned about the According to Heidegger, Dasein owns his own being.
question of the Being of beings, to whom alone the He has responsibility for his own being, without being
question of being is meaningful, that we shall be able to responsible for being there. Hence whereas other entities
arrive at an important insight into the Being of beings merely are, Dasein exists. Dasein is synonymous with
which is the proper aim of metaphysics. According to existenz but existenz is not some fixed quality or
him “…. Fundamental ontology, from which alone all essence. On the contrary existenz is constant possibility
other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the (1956, 124).
existential analytic of Dasein” (1962, 33-4). According Heidegger, “Existence is the specifically
human mode of being, the distinguishing characteristics
Existential Analysis of Human Existence (Dasein) of DASEIN. All other beings merely are; Dasein alone
In his search for a point of departure in his new exist…. DASEIN is not merely something there, not a
ontology of investigating the Being of beings, pure object like a rock on the beach. Rather it has
Heidegger concluded that only one being is qualified to responsibility for its own being and an obligation to be
serve this purpose, this being is man (Dasein) because significant. DASEIN recognizes its own being as a task
the question of the Being of beings is of special interest to be fulfilled; it must do something about its being”
to him. Man, according to Heidegger, differs (1956, 124; Demske 1970, 16)
ontologically from all other existents. Only him can In Being and Time, Heidegger insists the essence of
make an ontology possible because only him can pose DASEIN lies in its existence “…in each case DASEIN
the question “what is the Being of beings?” By his is its possibility, but not just a property as something
ability to pose this question man can transcend his own present-at-hand would. And because DASEIN is in each
being and that of every other concrete being (1956, 213- case essentially its own possibility, it can in its very
14). Being, “Choose” itself and win itself…. In determining
In describing this being and his choice of it, Heidegger itself as an entity, DASEIN always does so in the light
says: “In so far as Being constitutes what we ask about, of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very
and Being means the Being of entities (i.e. Being of Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal
beings), then entities themselves turn out to be what is meaning of DASEIN’s existential constitution” (1962,
interrogated…. Thus, to work out the question of Being 67 – 69).
adequately we must make an entity- the inquirer-
transparent in his own being …. This entity which each In Heidegger’s thought, since DASEIN is his own
one of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one possibility, we can never speak of him as something
of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the completed, something stable or fixed. DASEIN never
term DASEIN…. Dasein is an entity which does not just quite is. He is constantly realizing his possibilities. He is
occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically always on the way, always forming and fashioning
distinguished by the fact that in its very being, that himself through his existential choices.
being is an issue for it…. It is peculiar to this entity that
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
In his analysis of Dasein, Heidegger looked at him as a
Being-in-the-world. He considers him in relation with 2.
other Daseins, he then reveals the modes of Dasein, the
two basic ways Dasein can exist in the world and their
manifestations and finally he explained care (Sorge) and
the threefold structure of existence.
Dasein as Being-in-the-World
For Heidegger, the most basic and constitutive state of
DASEIN is its being-in-the-world. This means that
human existence is most really and tangibly immersed
in the world of actually existing concrete individuals.
According to Heidegger, it is inconceivable to think of
man in isolation from the world and neither is the
world meaningful without DASEIN. The world is
inextricably bound up with DASEIN in a most intimate
manner. “Both are what they are only in being related
to one another” (1962, 78). Heidegger then devoted
some 130 pages of Being and Time to analyze
separately the notions of ‘Being-in”, ‘the world” or the
‘self’ who is in the world.
1. Being-in
Being-in, far from designating a spatial relationship,
indicates an existential relationship between DASEIN
who is the Being-in-the-world. Thus, without the world
Dasein can neither be nor be understood. For Heidegger
Being-in also includes the notion of “staying close to”
or “Being familiar with”. Thus, “in” when applied to
other beings is limited to spatial relations e.g. there is
water “in the glass”. But when it applies to man this
“inhood” indicates familiarity with something or
somebody. This relationship with other things is what
Heidegger calls “Bersogen” or concern while man’s
relationship with other men he designates with the term
“Solicitude”. In this case “in” expresses that man is
acquainted with something, is used to something, is 3.
conversant with something etc. Hence, Blackham says:
“If a thing is said to be “in” something else, the
relationship is ‘spatial’. If a being of the kind of
DASEIN is said to be “in” something, the relationship is
not primarily ‘spatial’ but means ‘to dwell’, ‘to sojourn’,
to stay in the sense of the Latin word ‘habitare’” (1965,
248). Being-in reveals man’s state of mind, like when I
say, “I am “in” trouble”. This in turn help to disclose
man to his being. Disclosing his situatedness. Heidegger
described the various ways in which Being-in can
manifest itself as concern.
The World
In Heidegger’s usage the term world has quite a
different meaning from the world of cosmos or the
world of physical objects or material universe. For him,
the external world is nothing more than the means for
the realization of human existence. The world is
everything that forms the human environment and
provide the setting in which human life has to be lived.
Thus, Heidegger notes: “Ontologically, world is not a
way of characterizing those entities which Dasein
essentially is not, it is rather a characteristic of Dasein
itself” (1962, 92).
Strictly speaking, then, there is no world apart from man
and man cannot be apart from the world, for to exist is
already to be in the world. Jean-Paul Sartre follows
Heidegger to capture this point when he says: “Without
the world there is no selfness, no person, without
selfness, without the person, there is no world” (1962,
104).
Each Dasein has its own world which is articulated in
terms of its practical concerns. My world consists of
those things and circumstances which are essential to
my being. Heidegger considers objects in their toolness
to man. In this sense, a table in my office is not
incorporated to my world if it is not serviceable to me, it
is merely a “present-at-hand” but if I consider the table
in its toolness, as being useful for my writing, it
becomes fully incorporated into my world and thus
becomes a “ready-to-hand”. Thus, every instrument
derives its meaning from its functional application.
Hence, it is Heidegger’s belief that the world is solely a
matter of human concern; man exists in the world and it
is his existence as such that constitutes the world as
having any real significance.
The Self
This last component of the Being-in-the-world
relationship - the self, is identified by Heidegger as
Dasein (man, the human existence), which is not a
substantial being with human essence or nature. Dasein
has no fundamental properties or qualities, it is not a
stable or permanent subject. Heidegger uses the word
Existenz which denotes not an entity which is (in
contrasts to one which is not), but rather as one which
“ex-sists”, i.e. which stands out or stands forth.
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
For Heidegger, Dasein is never a completed being. He 1.
is
always “on the way”. He is constantly forging his nature
by means of the existential choices which he makes.
Whereas other beings have a fixed nature with some
observable qualities and properties such as colour,
thickness, weight etc. Dasein constitutes himself as he
goes along engaging in his various existential projects.
For Heidegger, Existenz is the essence of Dasein.
Being-with-Others (Mit-Sein, Co-Dasein,
Togetherness)
Just as there can be no existence apart from a world, so
also is existence not possible apart from other existents.
The instrumental world is a common world where we
encounter not only things, but also other people who are
seen as Co-Daseins. We are related to these other
existents not in terms of ‘concern’ by which we relate to
other things but in terms of personal concern or what
Heidegger calls solicitude which characterizes relations
between selves. Thus, Heidegger insists there can never
be an isolated Dasein. We always deal with Co-Dasein.
Dasein as soon as he discovers the world discovers also
other Daseins that co-exist with him. Hence Being-in-
the-world implies a sharing of this world with other
Daseins and entering into a mutual relationship with
them. (1962, 154-155).
It must be observed that unlike Martin Buber, Gabriel
Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre who devoted much time
and space in treating inter-human relationship,
Heidegger’s Mit-Sein received only a passing and most
incomplete consideration. Apart from the very brief
treatment of this important notion in his Being and
Time, Heidegger never developed this notion in any
other work of his, thereby providing no genuine
reaching out on the part of man to other Daseins. Each
human being in the Heideggerian world must solely
work out his authenticity in solitude. He must also face
death alone and in isolation from others.
THE THREE MODES OF DASIEN
Heidegger, after acknowledging that Being-in-the-world
is the most basic state of Dasein, also discusses three
different modes or ways in which Dasein as a Being-in-
the-world can exist authentically. These include self-
awareness or moodness, understanding and discourse.
Self-Awareness or Moodness (Befindlickkeit)
This refers to an initial encountering of oneself in the
world. This word from the German word befinden
means “to find”, “to judge” or “to deem.” The reflective
Sich befinden means “to become aware of” or “to
notice”. The closest English translation of it could be
“self-awareness”, “finding one’s self”, “realization of
one’s situation.” According to Heidegger, man “finds
himself in the world” he “become aware of himself” in
the world. This encountering of oneself is also referred
to as “mood” or ‘moodness”. Apropos to this mood,
Heidegger introduce the notion of thrownness which in
turn suggests facticity.
a. Thrownness. This concept denotes a situation
whereby Dasein does not know his whence or his
whither but finds himself ‘flung’ or ‘cast’ into existence
without ever having anything to say about it. Explaining
the concept thrownness Heidegger says: “This
characteristic of Dasein’s being, “that it is” - is veiled in
its whence and whither, yet disclosed in itself all the
more univeiledly; we call it the ‘thrownness’ of this
entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is thrown in such a way
that, as being in the world, it is ‘there.’ The expression
‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of its
being delivered over” (1962, 174).
b. Facticity. According to Heidegger, thrownness in
turn suggest “facticity”. Facticity (Faktizitat) means that
when Dasein discovers himself already in the world, he
has a number of “givens”. Such factors as race, sex,
intelligence, heredity, emotional stability or lack of it,
etc. are the “already present endowments” with which
each Dasein begins his existence. This means that
Dasein is never an absolutely pure and unconditional
possibility? According to Heidegger, “the concept of
‘facticity’ implies that one entity ‘within- the world’ has
Being-in-the-world, in such a way that it can understand
itself, as bound up in its destiny with the Being of those
entities which it encounters within the world” (1962, 82,
174).
Since Dasein is never an absolutely “pure and
unconditional” possibility, his projects and possibilities
are essentially controlled and conditioned by his own
past choices, as well as by factors determined by “his
race, sex, intelligence, heredity, emotional stability and
all the ‘raw materials’ so to speak out of which I have
either to attain myself or fail to be myself” (Macquarie
1968, 21).
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
2. Understanding
This second mode of Dasein has no connection to an
intellectual grasping of an idea. With its accompanying
structure of “projection”, understanding denotes man’s
ability to stand his “thrownness” and develop his
possibilities and his potentialities for being. Dasein
projects his own possibilities, he seizes upon his future
and in doing so he discovers the things in the world with
their serviceability and ability. According to Heidegger
understanding consists in “the existential Being of
Dasein’s own potentiality-for-being; and it is so in such
a way that this Being discloses itself what its being is
capable of” (1962, 188).
3. Discourse
According to Heidegger, Dasein’s third mode of being
in the world is discourse. For him, self-awareness and
understanding are impossible without discourse (1962,
172). Discourse, for Heidegger is not language but the
very foundation of language. He says that discourse is
the “significant articulation of the intelligibility of
Being-in-the-world” even before there has been
interpretation of it. Language is but the concrete
expression in word and sentences of this intelligibility
(1962, 214).
DASEIN’S TEMPORALITY AND ITS
TRIPARTITE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
(Existentiality, facticity and fallenness)
Heidegger employs the word care (sorge) to express the
modes of man’s existence in the world, how he wholly
and really is. This word is etymologically derived from
the German word ‘Bersorgen’ or ‘Sorge’ which means
‘concern’,‘worry’ or ‘care’. Care for Heidegger actually
mean more than its ordinary usage but points to how
man cares and authenticates his own existence. Thus,
the human being displays three fundamental aspects
namely existentiality (self), facticity (thrownness) and
fallenness (forfeiture). For Heidegger temporality is the
primordial meaning of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
Dasein is essentially temporal in nature and its temporal
character is derived from the above mentioned tripartite
ontological structure.
a. Existentiality
This term more often referred to as existence or
transcendence does not mean existence in the sense in
which trees, stones, etc. exist, but refers to Dasein’s
potentiality-for-being. For Heidegger, man is
characterized by an essential going beyond the factual
situation towards his ulterior possibilities. The human
being exists in anticipation of its own possibilities.
Dasein projects its being upon various possibilities. As
Kockelmans observes, “Dasein is thus essentially
defined by its power to be. In this sense, it is always
ahead of what it actually is and cannot even realize itself
without previously anticipating this power to be…”
(1965, 79).
Dasein is always reaching out beyond itself. It’s being
consist in aiming at that which it is not yet. It is in
recognition of this self-projection towards its
possibilities that Heidegger and Sartre asserted that
“existence is the essence of man” and that this essence
consists in the being-outside-of-itself, projected
constantly not to what it already is, not to the past and
the present, but towards the future possibilities. They
also hold that “existence precedes essence” which
means man has no fixed property but is a bundle of
possibilities. As possibility, human existence is the
anticipation, the expectation, the projection of the
future. Hence, existentiality presents Dasein as a being
which is never itself, but moves towards itself, open,
dynamic, unfinished and unclosed. Maurice Greene
asserts: “Man is possibility; he has the power to be. His
existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are
open to him” (1957, 21).
Hence Heidegger correctly recognizes that man
constantly surpasses himself in order to realize himself
more fully. Thus, he looks upon man’s life from his birth
as a conglomeration of possibilities which man actualizes
as he pilots his affairs in everyday life.
b. Facticity
As has been explained above, facticity (faktizitat)
together with thrownness (Geworfenheit) are terms
employed by Heidegger to designate the limiting factor
of existence and to denote the location of man as a being-
in-the-world. It is the disclosure of the situation in which
man finds himself. Dasein always finds himself in a
certain already historically conditioned spiritual and
material, environment. Facticity can be said to be an
inward, existential awareness of one’s own being as a
fact that has to be accepted. It means that man is always
already in a world into which beyond his willing he has
been cast. Hence without any apriori notification one is
thrown into existence. I just find myself cast into a world
not of my own making. The facticity of my own situation
means all those elements in my situation which are
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
determined beforehand for me. On this issues King says,
“Man dwells in the world in such a way that his own
dwelling manifests itself to him always as an already
accomplished fact, he can never go behind the ‘already’
to originate his own being” (1964, 138).
Thus, man is thrown into existence, each person into his
own existential situation. Without having chosen it, we
find ourselves in existence, in the midst of a world we
did not put ourselves, and in the midst of circumstances
beyond our control.
In human facticity, it is not just the human existence in
general that is given, it is rather my existence, your
particular existence that are in each case characterized by
facticity. Thus, I am this particular ‘I’ which I cannot
exchange with the other person’s existence. It is just an
inexplicable fact that I belong to this particular race and
colour that I have been born into this historical situation
and in this very society. Thus, Okere comments: “One
finds himself as it were there without being consulted.
One does not choose one’s history, one’s culture, one’s
language. One is born into them, this reinforces…all
pervading historicity of Dasein” (1983, 50).
From the human point of view thrownness is like the
throw of a dice in which one may throw any number. In
the same way in life one may come up any person, white
or black, intelligent or stupid, affluent or destitute and
this has to be accepted without any argument.
Existence, as it is seen, dangles in the conflict between
possibilities and facticity. The former revealing man as
an open project who can transcend into what he is not yet
in order to better his conditions and the later (facticity)
showing man as closed by factical situations in which he
already finds himself.
c. Fallenness
This term is derived from the German world ‘Verfallen’
which means falling captive to the world. As a basic
structure of human existence, fallenness designates man’s
tendency to disown himself in the world. In his self-
projection and self-transcendence, man understands his
world and becomes himself. In his practical concern, he
views everything in terms of its serviceability. But as
man shapes his relationship to the things he has made, he
can fall captive to them and forfeit his self. Heidegger
refers to this falling of man as the inauthentic manner of
living. He says, “The term is used to signify that Dasein
is for the most part along the world of its concern. This
absorption in …has mostly the character of being lost in
the publicness of the ‘they’. Dasein has in the first
instance fallen from itself as an inauthentic potentiality
for being itself, and has fallen into the world” (1962,
220).
Thus fallenness can be seen as deterioration, i.e. a falling
away from what is most central and distinctive in
existence. On the one hand, it means being absorbed in
the world of material objects through preoccupation with
the tasks and concerns of the everyday instrumental
world. On the other hand, it designates the loss of oneself
to the impersonal social forces in collective existence.
Thus, King observes, “Fallenness…is a trend towards the
world which is basic to man’s being and which is man’s
tendency to give himself away to things, to scatter
himself in his occupation in company with other people,
literally to disown himself”(1964, 51).
In this kind of disownment, one’s unique self is
sacrificed to the persistent and pressing ‘they’ and thus
the self becomes the indifferent anonymous crowd - das
man. In this state of fallenness where man loses his self,
he gives up his responsibilities and becomes absorbed in
the way others do things without any reflection on the
‘why’. A further discussion on Dasein’s fallenness will
be made later as we consider Dasein’s two other basic
ways of existence: authentic and inauthentic existence.
Authentic and Inauthentic Existence
Heidegger addresses two basic ways in which Dasein can
exist in the world, namely, authentically and
inauthentically. Dasein finding himself ‘thrown’ into
existence without being consulted sees his existence as a
brute fact which he must now face. He is confronted with
a choice of what to do next. The choice he makes
determines the way he exist, either authentically or in
authentically.
If Dasein turns away from his being and does not permit
his being to reveal itself fully and thus falls victim to the
endless distractions of the world, then he has slumped
into inauthentic existence. But if he chooses to take over
his being as his own responsibility, deciding to face it
squarely and unequivocally thus allowing it to disclose
itself fully and uniquely as his own, then he lives an
authentic existence.
a. Inauthentic Existence/Das Man
According to Heidegger, when Dasein reneges from
facing his being fully and to assume personal
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
responsibility for it, he has slumped into inauthentic
existence (uneigentlichkeit). Such an existence is
characterized by a monotonous ‘everydayness’ and
banality. An individual who fails to exploit his truly
existential possibilities and fails to assume his
responsibilities is living the life of a banal, faceless,
anonymous entity which Heidegger terms das Man (the
indefinite ‘one’). Such a Dasein is never referred to as
someone definite or determinate. Das Man is always
spoken of as ‘one’ or as the indefinite ‘they’. Heidegger
describes this impersonality thus: “The ‘others’ whom
one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one’s
belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who
proximally and for the most part ‘are they’ in everyday
Being-with-one-another. The ‘who’ is not this one, not
that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of
them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ (das Man)”
(1962, 164-66).
Man in this inauthentic existence losses his power to be
and losses sight of the numerous possibilities to which he
is open and thus remains unable to realize his authentic
self. By identifying himself with the world, he becomes
impersonal as the world and thus his self becomes a
disowned self which is irresponsible. Commenting on
this unfortunate situation Lescoe observes: “In such a
state of everydayness, we find that Dasein’s individuality
has been completely obliterated. Mired deep in a leveling
mediocrity and shirking his personal responsibility,
Dasein leads a numbed type of existence. His everyday
action is controlled and determined by the all-pervasive
impersonality of “das Man” (1974, 211-212).
Inauthentic existence also manifests itself as fallenness.
By falling away from himself and his genuinely
existential possibilities, Dasein is completely fascinated
by his world as well as the Dasein of others in das Man.
Just as self-awareness, understanding and discourse are
modes of authentic existence, so also are curiosity,
ambiguity and idle talk modes of an inauthentic existence
(1962, 216 – 219).
b. Authentic Existence
As was said above to live an authentic existence Dasein
will choose to take over his being as his own
responsibility, he will face it squarely and allow it to
reveal itself fully and uniquely as his own. Heidegger
discusses three important phenomena that can dispose
man to attain an authentic existence, these include
anxiety (dread), death and conscience.
1. Anxiety (Dread)
Heidegger sees anxiety as the one unique mood which
recalls man from self-betrayal to self-knowledge. It is the
basic mood which lies at the ground of man’s being. It is
a fundamental clue to understanding human existence.
For Heidegger, anxiety (dread) is a phenomenon which is
par excellence suitable to throw light on the unity of
Dasein structural moments. He says; “The entire
phenomenon of anxiety (angst) shows Dasein as actually
existing being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological
characteristics of this being are existentiality, facticity
and being fallen” (1962, 235).
Heidegger sharply distinguishes the difference between
fear and anxiety (dread). The object of fear is always
some definite and known entity; the object of dread, on
the other hand, is absolutely unknown and
undeterminable. Dread or anxiety (Angst) is however, not
a weakness or deficiency which Dasein must seek to
overcome. Rather, dread requires fortitude and
perseverance. It must be lived bravely and resolutely.
What dread does is to disclose to man his fundamental
finitude through death. Unlike fear which discloses a
particular danger or situation, anxiety does not disclose
some particular situation but man’s total situation as the
existent thrown into the world where he is and has to be
(1962, 231).
When anxiety, therefore, brings man face to face with the
world itself and with his own being as being-in-the-
world, it makes him recognize the true state of affairs by
opening his eyes to his real position in the world which is
that of responsibility. Realizing his unique position, man
may see the force of his own reflective capacity, namely,
that he alone is responsible for the world’s having
significance. From this realization, he comes to know
that people can’t really be the source of significance for
his life. Explaining this, Mary Warnock says: “It is at this
point, at the threshold of authentic self-discovery that the
human being experiences anxiety. It is not anything in
particular which afflicts him. It is simply his
unsupported, isolated condition in the world. He begins
to doubt the reality of the world…Even his own place in
the world is doubtful and he cannot take anything for
granted anymore” (1977, 57 – 58).
According to Heidegger, it is the mood of anxiety which
individuates man into his ownmost being-in-the-world,
which essentially throws itself forward into possibilities
(1962, 232). Anxiety, unlike other moods which refer
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
man to other beings, detaches him from them and brings
him purely to himself as a single being-in-the-world.
Thus, anxiety by isolating man from the seductive ‘they’
brings him to himself to squarely face his numerous
possibilities thereby taking him out of fallenness to
authentic existence.
2. Death / Being-to-Death.
Death is another phenomenon that assist Dasein to attain
authentic existence. Heidegger defines Dasein’s life as
“being-to-death”. According to him, once Dasein grasps
the reality of his own death, which is a boundary of
existence, he then becomes authentically aware of his
existence. In his authentic existence, Dasein is always
projecting and transcending itself, it is never grasped in
its totality. In his inauthentic existence Dasein scatters
himself in his concernful dealing with things, hence as
long as man is alive he is incomplete, dispersed and
difficult to be gathered back in his wholeness (1962,
276). Heidegger sees death as the phenomenon which
helps us to gather man back from his dispersion into
wholeness. With death Dasein stands before itself in its
ownmost potentiality for being. According to Heidegger,
“as potentiality for being, Dasein cannot outstrip the
possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the
absolute impossibility of Dasein (1962, 294).
For Heidegger, dying is not just an event that occurs to
man at the close of his life, but man’s mode of being, for
man is a being-towards-death, a being who stands dying
the very day of his birth and lives all his life towards
death. He says: “Death is the way to live which Dasein
takes over as soon as it is …. As soon as a man comes to
life, he is at once old enough to die” (1962, 289).
Death permeates the whole of man’s life, influences it
and gives it its meaning. Heidegger, therefore, sees death
just like dread as means through which man gains
authentic existence.
3. Conscience
According to Heidegger, conscience which is a summons
of the authentic self to the self bogged down in the
everydayness of das Man, also assists Dasein to rise to
the call of authenticity. Heidegger distinguishes between
an inner conscience from a public conscience which is
nothing but “the voice of the ‘they’” (1962, 323).
For him true conscience or conscience at the deeper level
is that which precisely delivers man from the voice of the
‘they’ (1962, 319). The essential function of this
conscience is seen in its call. The voice of conscience
cuts man off from listening to the anonymous ‘they’ and
appeals to man’s self to extricate itself from this
disowned existence it enjoys in this anonymity.
Commenting on this, Blackham says; “Conscience calls
the self of Dasein out of the state in which it is lost in the
one like many …This call is not planned nor prepared
nor voluntarily carried out by ourselves. “It” calls against
one’s own expectation and even one’s own wishes. Yet
the call comes not from anyone else, but from myself and
upon myself” (1965, 271).
Heidegger uses conscience in the existential ontological
sense rather than psychological, ethical or religious
sense. For him, conscience persuades one to face his
inner capacity instead of forgetting himself in this or that.
I have to make my situation mine, instead of allowing it
inflict itself upon me. But still in the midst of this
persuasion, I see a debt I cannot discharge, yet the very
recognition of my being in debt is to know myself no
more in distraction but in my ownmost capacity.
Thus, the call of conscience fetches back the fallen man
out of the anonymous crowd and makes him aware that
he is guilty. It is only when man projects himself into the
potentiality of being and becoming guilty that he can be
open for his own potentiality of existence and can choose
himself in the existential sense and then be able to live an
authentic existence.
Care
Heidegger concludes the first part of his Being and Time
by grouping under one comprehensive concept, “Care”
(Sorge), all the various insights gathered from his
existential analysis of Dasein. Under this general term
Sorge, he sets forth a threefold structure of being, namely
existentiality (possibility), facticity and fallenness.
According to Heidegger; “The formally existential
totality of Dasein’s structural whole must therefore be
grasped in the following structure: The Being of Dasein
means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as
Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).
This Being fills in the signification of the term ‘care’
(Sorge) which is used in a purely ontologico-existential
manner…. Care does not characterize just existentiality,
let us say, as detached from facticity and falling: on the
contrary, it embraces the unity of these ways in which
Being may be characterized” (1962, 237).
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
According to Copleston, though these three aspects
compose one structural whole, it is nevertheless possible
to consider them separately for a deeper understanding of
their function (1959, 181-182).
HEIDEGGER’S OTHER THEMES
In the first division of his major work Being and Time,
Heidegger insisted that care (Sorge) represents the basic
constitution of Dasein’s existence as expressed in
Existentiality (Possibility), Facticity (Thrownness) and
Fallenness (Forfeiture). In the second division of the
work, Heidegger discussed the concepts of Temporality,
Historicity and Nothingness.
Temporality
In the second half of Being and Time titled, Dasein and
Temporality, Heidegger advances his novel interpretation
of the nature of time. For him time is the primordial
foundation that makes Dasein’s unity possible (1962,
274-288). According to him, it is “temporality with its
three ecstases of what is to come, the present and what
has been” that is the ultimate ground.
Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) occupies a very privileged
position in the analysis of Dasein. Time is the very means
whereby the human being is rendered whole and entire.
Whereas care (Sorge) as expressed into three aspects of
possibility, facticity and fallenness considered the various
aspects of Dasein’s existence, it is temporality with its
parallel trio of future, has been and the present that welds
them altogether and renders them as one unified whole.
According to Heidegger, “Temporality makes possible
the unity of existence, facticity and falling, and in this
way, constitute primordially, the totality of the structure
of care” (1962, 376).
According to Heidegger, “the primordial unity of care
lies in temporality” (1962, 375). In addressing the
concept of time, Heidegger categorically rejected the
traditional understanding of time especially as expressed
by Newton and Leibnitz where time is seen as
“proceeding out of an indefinitely stretching past into an
indefinitely stretching future’’. Heidegger regards this
notion of time as unacceptable and inauthentic because it
is “abstract and derivative’’.
Heideggerian Time
In developing his own notion of temporality, Heidegger
holds that time is not something external to Dasein, as if
Dasein were moving from one “now’’ to another. He
insists that time is actually the span of Dasein’s life. Man
is not in time; he is time.
a. The Future
The Heideggerian existential time is primarily futuristic.
Heidegger rejects the notion of future meaning “before”
in the sense of ‘in advance of something’ or ‘not yet now
but later’. He holds that self-projection is imbedded in
the future being an essential feature of existentiality.
According to him, “The primary meaning of
existentiality is the future” (1962, 375-376). He
concludes that “the primary phenomenon of primordial
and authentic temporality is the future” (1962, 378, 373).
b. The “Having Been” (The Past)
The projection of Dasein towards its own death involves
both the future and the past (the having been). The past is
necessary because it is possible for me to project myself
towards death (the future) only on the condition that I
already am. Heidegger sees an absolute interdependence
between the future and the past, both imply each other.
By speaking of time as ‘having been’ rather than as
‘past’, Heidegger refuses to see time as being merely the
sequence of past “nows” which no longer exist. By using
‘having been’ he conveys the impression that Dasein is
not something distinct and separate from time, Dasein
itself is time. Commenting on this position of Heidegger,
Kockelmans says, “the ‘having been’ is that which
having been, is still present, that which is present as
having been” (1965, 86-87).
c. The Present
The last of the ecstases of temporality is ‘the present’
which Dasein achieves by his projection into the future
and then his turning back to assimilate the thrownness of
‘the past’. According to Heidegger, “The character of
‘having been’ arises from the future which ‘has been’ (or
better, which is in the process of having been), releases
from itself the present. The phenomenon has the unity of
a future which makes present in the process of having
been; we designate it temporality” (1962, 374).
Heidegger concludes that it is only when Dasein is
unified through these three ecstases of temporality
discussed above that Dasein can hope to achieve an
authentic existence.
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
Historicity
Heidegger’s novel interpretation of historicity is closely
connected with his unusual interpretation of temporality.
He rejects the generally accepted notion of history as
being concerned with the past. He insists that history is
something which pertains to the future. He argues that
Dasein is temporality and temporality is chiefly oriented
towards the future because human existence is always
reviewed in terms of man’s possibilities. History is thus
directed towards the future because it avails us
information concerning Dasein’s possibilities which are
essentially futuristic. He concludes therefore that the
future is the basis of Dasein historicity. Thus, Heidegger
says, “But if fate constitute the primordial historicity of
Dasein, then history has its essential importance neither
in what is past nor in the ‘today’ and its connection with
what is past, but in that authentic historizing of existence
which arises from Dasein’s future” (1962, 438).
John Wild throws more light on this Heideggerian
conception of history when he says “Men are neither in
history, like things and artifacts, nor can they free
themselves from history and become detached from it.
They are their history. Their being in the world is
historical” (1959, 114). Hence Heideggerian notion of
history is primarily concerned with Dasein’s possibilities
and is therefore directed towards the future and not to
the past. History is to be understood existentially and not
in terms of categories which apply only to things. For
Heidegger, what is primarily historical is Dasein while
other things we encounter within-the-world, not only
equipments or the ready-to-hand but also our natural
environment, are secondarily historical (1962, 433).
Nothingness
This Basic Heideggerian theme “Nothingness’’ or
“naught’’ (das Nichts) was started in his examination of
anxiety or dread (Angst) in Being and Time and
continued in his later writings especially What Is
Metaphysics, an inaugural lecture he delivered at the
University of Freiburg in 1929. In this discussion,
Heidegger contends that every discussion of being (what
is) invariably brings in the issue of Nothingness. The
human being as Dasein attempts to understand both what
the world of being is and how it is (quiddity and
modality). According to Heidegger, that to which “the
world-relationship refers is what-is and nothing else.
That by which every attitude is molded is what-is and
nothing more. That which scientific exposition effects
it’s ‘irruption’ is what-is-and beyond that, nothing’’
(1949, 328).
Heidegger thus asks: “What is this ‘nothing else?’ Is it
merely a manner of speaking or is there something more
to it? Suppose we reject this nothing as being something
absolutely null and void are we not by this act really
admitting it? (1949, 328).
Though science deals with what is and wishes to know
“nothing of nothing,” Heidegger in this same lecture
observes that “at every point where science tries to put its
own essence in words, it invokes the aid of Nothing. It
has recourse to the very thing it rejects” (1949, 328). He
observes that science cannot appropriately deal with the
question of nothingness, the question belongs to
metaphysics.
With regard to the nature of Nothingness, Heidegger
observes in the same work that the question “what is
nothing” already postulates nothing as “something that
somehow or other is”. “But the question as to the what
and wherefore of Nothing turns the thing questioned into
its opposite, the question deprives itself of its own
object” (1949, 330). The answer to this question is
impossible ab initio because it necessarily implies that
nothingness “is’’ this, that or the other. Since thinking is
always by its very nature, “thinking about something,”
if we have a conception of nothingness it means we are
thinking about “something’’ which “is”. Hence
Heidegger concludes that his enquiry into the nature of
nothingness already seems to be doomed to failure.
To get himself out of this fix Heidegger challenged the
generally accepted law of logic by which nothingness is
derived from negation. He proposes a Copernican
revolution where we put it the other way making
nothingness the very ground or foundation which makes
our negations possible. He says, “…we assert: “Nothing
is more original than the not and negation. If this thesis is
correct, then the very possibility of negation as an act of
reason and consequently the reason itself, are somehow
dependent” (1949, 331).
Hence one can say that negation is possible only because
nothingness is first given. James Collins affirms this
when he says, “(Nothingness) is more original and
primary than our negations. We encounter rather than
constitute it, and we are able to encounter it because it is
first given to us for acceptance” (1964, 197). According
to Heidegger, Nothingness is revealed in anxiety (dread),
but does not reveal itself as something that “is”. This
means that even though its presence is revealed through
dread, nothingness cannot be considered an object. When
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
we experience anxiety (angst) we say we feel something
unknown, indistinct and uncanny. Now this “something”
what gives us the uncanny feeling is really nothing
definite, we merely “feel” it generally. “Dread reveal
nothing” (1949, 336).
HEIDEGGER’S LATER PHILOSOPHY
“The Turn”: Accessing Being through Poetry.
The Crux of Heidegger’s Being and Time can be
described as one sustained analysis, by means of the
phenomenological method, of the metaphysical structure
of Dasein. Heidegger undertook an existential analysis of
human existence because man is the only being whose
being is an issue to him.
Many writers see Heidegger’s Being and Time as an
anthropology in the service of ontology (Lescoe 1974,
244). Heidegger’s early thought was completely
dominated by an analysis of Dasein as “being-in-the-
world.” This early Heidegger, the “Dasein period” is
frequently referred to as the period of Heidegger I.
Dissatisfied with the basic approach of Being and Time
which made it impossible for him to write the projected
second part of the book, to be named Time and Being,
there was a shift in Heidegger’s thinking which he
himself called “the turn” (die Kehre). Heidegger in
retrospect acknowledged that the notion of Dasein (one
of the principal innovation of Being and Time) was too
redolent of the subjective and anthropological
preconception he had condemned and was trying to
surmount. His Being and Time may have started with the
question of being (Seinfrage) which Dasein was to help
one answer, ironically Heidegger never returned to this
theme.
The Kehre or turning was a period of “poetic thought”
which began with his writing The Essence of the Ground
in 1929 and it is the so- called period of Heidegger II.
Without dropping his basic subject, Being, there was a
very sharp and definite shift from the thought of the
Heidegger of Being and Time. In his later writings, Being
rather than Dasein is the starting point; the Seinfrage, the
question of being returned to the fore. Speaking of his
inability to write the third division of the first part of
Being and Time and the subsequent Kehre (turning)
Heidegger in his Letter on Humanism said, “…Here
everything is reversed. The division in question was held
back because everything failed in the adequate saying of
this turning and did not succeed with the help of the
language of metaphysics … This turning is not a change
of stand point from Being and Time, but in it the thinking
that was sought first arrives at the location of that
dimension out of which Being and Time was
experienced, that is to say, experienced from the
fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being” (1998,
231-232 [1947]).
It can be said that the earlier as well as later Heidegger
were concerned with the question of Being, but while the
earlier Heidegger of Being and Time approached this
question through an analysis of Dasein, the later
Heidegger confronts Being directly with no special
approach or method needed to access it. Though the
question of being returned to the fore in Heidegger’s later
writings, he later became increasingly doubtful that
philosophy has the capacity to properly articulate the
‘truth’ of being. Discovering that Western metaphysics is
hopelessly defective and incapable of providing a
suitable platform to lunch the question of being,
Heidegger became captivated by the compelling power of
poetry as a means to unveil the mystery of Being.
According to Gray, “Heidegger is convinced that poets
can come to the aid of thinkers now, when the latter are
so out of touch with the sources of being… Heidegger’s
interest in poets is in their ontological significance, the
truth they can teach us about man’s way of dwelling on
earth” (1967, 101). It is Heidegger’s conclusion that the
deficiency on the part of both traditional metaphysics and
Dasein, can be righted only by seeking some less rigid
and more pliant type of thought that will render Being
unconcealed and this he believes poetry can offer.
HEIDEGGER: EXISTENTIALIST, THEIST OR
ATHEIST
In considering Heidegger’s entire philosophical career
one of the most enigmatic aspect has been his refusal to
be categorized either as an existentialist, a theist or an
atheist. His basic themes and concepts as well as his
explicit pronouncement make it both easy and difficult
for Heidegger to be classified with one or the other
group. These themes and notions include: Dasein (with
no definite human nature or essence), the thrownness and
facticity of Dasein, possibility, anxiety, the position that
existence precedes essence, that man is temporality and
Being nothingness, that the Being of beings cannot be
identified with God etc.
These philosophical stances tempt one to classify
Heidegger as an atheistic existentialist. Jean-Paul Sartre
also asserted this in his Existentialism is a Humanism
 Journal of Integrative Humanism Vol.8 No.1 (2017) 25-48
when he said: “…there are two kinds of Existentialism.
There are on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom
I shall name Jaspers, and Gabriel Marcel, both professed
Catholics; and on the other, the existential atheist,
amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the
French existentialists and myself. What they have in
common is simply the fact that they believe that
existence comes before essence – or, if you will, that we
must begin from the subjective” (1956, 287).
Heidegger vehemently rejected this classification of his
philosophy as atheistic arguing that his philosophy is
neither theistic nor atheistic. According to him in his
Letter on Humanism, “This philosophy distinguishes
itself neither for nor against the Dasein of God. It
remains ensconced in indifference. Thus, the religious
question is to it ‘all the same’. Nihilism does not achieve
such an indifferentism” (1961, 207).
Heidegger also disputed his been classified as an
existentialist when he wrote, “Sartre’s key proposition
about the priority of existentia over essentia (existence
precedes essence) does however justify using the name
“existentialism as an appropriate title for a philosophy of
this sort. But the basic tenet of “existentialism” has
nothing at all in common with the statement from Being
and Time (that ‘the essence’ of Dasein lies in its
‘existence’) …” (1998, 250-251).
Inspite of Heidegger’s numerous protestation of his
neutrality; many scholars agree that Heideggerianism is
an existentialism and an atheism. Heidegger in Partisan
Review did acknowledge that while not denying God, he
stated, his absence: “My philosophy is a waiting for
God” (1948, 511). Kuhn observes that “it is difficult to
imagine a more effective exclusion of God from human
vision than is achieved in Sein und Zeit…” (1951, 144).
Sciacca after considering both the early and later
Heidegger said. “It is true that Heidegger in his Letter on
Humanism rejects the atheistic interpretation of his
thought; yet all that can be read in it is still a
confirmation of his absolute dogmatic and preconceived
atheism” (1964, 203). We may conclude without fear of
error that since Heidegger’s themes are existential and
his assertions and notion are humanistic and atheistic, it
will not be wrong to classify him as an existential atheist.
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