PLATO’S ETHOD OF DIALECTIC BY JULIUS STENZEL D. J. ALLAN OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1940‘ke 888.4 Staz_ Stenzel, Julius, 1889-1935, Plato's method of dia seg sey diet PRE ‘ACE Hlowing translation of Stenzel’s dissertation on the Lennon la Now Ye Be io Form and Content of Plato's Dialogues and of his tints eee jevelopment of Plato’s Dialectic, was made from fattemptcd Walue of hen T here had in mind. The sense of such words as {Béa, 25§a, and Biaipeors, with fthose nuances which they possess in Greek, but not in any modern language, is often the main subject of discussion in these studies, and in the German ecition single terms were fofien quoted in Greck or transliterated, and nearly all quota- fions from the Dialogues were given in the original. In franslating so technical a book, I myself have not hesitated to make a liberal use of Greek phrases; but I have ventured fo give an English equivalent in a fev places where it did not Appear that the argument would suffer; and I have reproduced ll longer quotations in the version of Jowett. For permission 0 use this I am obliged to the Jowett Copyright Trustees. he spirit of these studies is, as the author himse lone of historical criticism, as opposed to what it w fashionable to call ‘systematic’ exposition. Nevertheless, more ise is mace of the technical language of philosophy than we are @ecusiomed to find in English works on Plato; and the word Concept’ (Begrif) is in a special way fundamental to the thesis book, which tells the story of Plato’s progress towards gards the distinction between individual and uni- word Begriff is widely used by German logicians y stabilized sense, owing to the influence of Kant ntveeD monet Bnirane cl, but its English equivalent ‘concept’ (preferable,vi PREFACE I think, to ‘notion’ or ‘essence’) is much less familiar and 7 be a source of suspicion. Let it be said, then, that this te used here with no metaphysical implications, and is inteng something which any logical doctrine must ackn The ‘concept’ is that which we comprehend when] know a definition; it is contrasted with visible form, with ved by the senses, with the individual; it is and Aristotle 7 +h Av elvan Antisthenes, in his famous dispute with Plato, called 'mmg and professed himself unable to see. The word does necessarily denote something which could not exist apart fro mind: Zeller held that the Ideas of Plato were concepts wi somehow existed in their own right, and Stenzel himself ag that this was the position in the later Dialogues, though that it was so at the outset. The terms ‘conceptuali alism’, invented under different circumstances at a when Latin was in normal use, are here misleading: in the sl of the German Begrif, both schools recognized the existeng the concept, but the conceptualist held that it was onl thought, whereas the realist held that it existed i natura rl I must express my deep indebtedness to Frau Dr. Stenzel, who has offered me just and helpful criticism, saved me from many mistranslations DJ. INTRODUCTION _ Srenzet, who taught as a professor of philosophy at afterwards at Halle, and died in 1935, was one of 1 and industrious Platonic scholars of his tim: fe signs of a powerful and adaptable mind will be obvious a ant the following pages. Stenzel is primarily a faithful ‘vant student of the text of h’s author; but he is also out Kiel anda pe most ovis Hand obs¢7 dieemely skilful at summing up a long and tortuous argument. mes he devotes a chapter to the dissection of one crucial, ometimes he surveys two or three Dialogues in a para- these obvious virtues of Stenzel’s work do not help ke it more lucid, and the translator feels it to be his duty mething of the problems which Stenzel had to face, and ‘Two distinct works are included in this translation: an essay lon the literary form and philosophical content of the Dialogues, tudies on Plato's Dialectic, The essay was read to y in 1916, and the studies were written during the follow- fing year; when they came to be published, the essay was used by the author as an introduction to them, and we have followed In the essay he shows how certain changes in the clas a guide to the thought, tell us something Which we could not otherwise ascertain. Plato does not appear Bin person in any Dialogue, yet he is asle to show whether he fasrees with a particular assertion, or how seriously he means it From the formal point of view, itis natural to divide fais example 1s into two classes, according as Socrates is or is not ker. Now Socrates’ leadership begins to waver in the least of it, he is no longer sent These fhe Pormenides, where, to sa} fumphant; in the Sophist, Statesman, and Timacus he is pi imply witness; in the Laws he vanishes altogether. rgues which, by stylistic tests, we should assign to ge. The facts, therefore, at first seem to lend them- «simple chronological interpretation. How familiar, of true information, thisinterpretation is! Plavi INTRODUCTION adopted the Socratic Dialogue because he wished to give to world a true picture of his masters retained it, ater he had be to have a philosophy of his own, beca inconvenient to him; eventually lost his interest in popula descriptive writing, turned to more abstruse philosophical qt tions, and came before his audience in cap and gown. Ifit is a fact that in the earlier series of Dialogues Plato self always remains behind the scenes; if he presents Socrat ‘mood if he does not resume the Soa Dialogue in old. age, but steadily forgets his master, and i last Dialogues are a pure exposition of doctrine—then thisl plausible view. But not one of these things is true. Iny Phaedrus and Philebus, of which the second at least is very i Plato resumes the Socratic form. In the earlier Dialogues a man of unvar the Socratic Dialogues proper, he presents his master someff as devoid of knowledge, sometimes as a reporter of sublime| tines, And there is a strong tradition, which all scholars accept, that the later Dialogues do not reveal, and are not mg to reveal, the real teaching of Plato. ‘This was reserved fork exposition. Stenzel’s essay, then, is designed to show that the familiar ‘of Plato's development is too simple, and that the truth will appear if we make a joint study ofform and content. What d this mean? Not simply that Plato is at once a supreme and a great philosopher. This statement would be true, could make no pretence to novelty. ‘The suggestion is tht suits Plato's temperament to insinuate part of his me: artistic, or formal, devices. His whole meaning is not al conveyed in plain words, as it is with a thinker who reg expression as a secondary matter. It follows from this that it cannot be the task of one stude criticize the philosophy of Plato's Dialogues, whilst anoth careless of their meaning and truth, goes into transp enthusiasm over the beauty of form and felicity of style this, or something like it, is the course normally ordained i universities. The whole philosophy of Plato, it may be said hostile to speci How, then, ca INTRODUCTION iB carer to his meaning? Of this difficulty Stenzel had Gog 8 TC ware. He saw the interpretation of Plato's sed beyond recall to the faculty of philosophy, fstic scholar, content to have a province of his 1 himself to the soothing influence of style, sical allusions in the Dialogues, compiled statis- Tn one classroom the form of the as treatises like those a ato’s vocabulary outed! or nothing; interpret Hegel, wrenched into the moulds of modern philo- In the neigh- Dial piKant and sst much of their original meaning. n the quest of theoretical truth was not a primary read Plato as one would listen to an eloquent emphasizing ‘lation of form and content, irying to attract his fellow Platoniststoa new method ind to show that existing methods were fruitless, His Bienze! bfstudy ining was that of a philologist; but he had gone int and Husserl until he was able to debate with in their own language. He soon found himself judgement of Plato. To ‘philosophical’ writers— ‘ohen, and others—he acknowledged a great debt. fain they had explained passages of Plato which tery to their classical coll But he was fonvinced that, in the version they gave, a vital part of Plato's femained a m agues. He dissented entirely, as we shall , from their version of the theory of Ideas; he sumed that when Plato distinguished two world, the intelligible id the sensible, and passionately insisted on this contrast, he leant what he said, and meant it as a plilosopher. We can now approach the argument of the essay. ‘The first Pint is that, in the early Dialogues, Plato sometimes peeps over Heshoulder of Socrates. ‘Thus, in the Meno, Socrates shows by nethod of argument that whatever knowledge is, it is ly detived from experience—its latent in the soul, and Yeminiscence’. ‘Then he tells how he hacl once hearel ts and priestesses’ that the soul has really pre-existed mes for a time into the body and will depart again. bx INTRODUCTION In the Symposium, he is able to show by his own methods Love is nol. But when he begins to describe what it real namely a progress away from the visible world towards intelligible, he begins to report a discourse which he had by from the priestess Diotima, and not properly understood. Bat this, it may be said, is not necessarily a hint of Plato's belief; it might, for instance, be meant to indicate that there certain limits to intellectual apprehension, Where it suits to ascribe metaphysical doctrines to his master, he does so. throughout the Phaedo Socrates discourses on the immortal thesoul. In the Parmenides, he propounds the belief in Ideas own, insisting upon the The whole of the Republic is an excursion into an ideal 1 where change and imperfection do not exist. The whole fa depends upon knowledge of a sublime and abstract, but t0 I, Idea. How can it be main and fleeting glimpses of knowl separateness philosopher supremely that Socrates has only Stenzel strives to meet this objection by a comparison Phaeio with the Republic. Teis true that S Phaedo, is 2 metaphysician; but the state which he normal state. Within a few hours he isto dic, and he faces d with a serene confidence. We find him still under the inf ofasingular dream which has exhorted him to write poetry like a swan, which sings once before it dies; is his final proof of the immortality of the soul (84). No precisely this proof which involves the doctrine of Ideas. But the Phaedo itself contains ex really maintained the belie ed doctrine, is in the famous autobiographical passage. He had beguf adent of nature, but could find no satisfaction i usual explanations of the world; they were all, except thi Anaxagoras, in terms of matter alone. ‘The notions of i gence, design, purpose, good, are necessary to a full explangl of the world, or of any fact within it, such as his sitting hi this prison. But Socrates confesses himself unable to state highest kind of cause’. He had, however, been accustom his arguments to discover a second kind of cause, which INTRODUCTION x «in argument (# Adyois), though, without the first ie Bae ryrel tobereal, Here the theory of Ideas is tated jcaul n°" Wherever many like things in eg. the Idea of he Idea is a und nothing more is said here than that it causes what But weare shown how hypotheses can be examined, BE her hypothesis, from which the first one followed, and this process until we had attained ‘something self-evident truth, cr a hypothesis which factory usually tentative way. ssary to postulate an Ider fesstet uhich is beautiful ‘in and by itself". eon: tei. either Ber ants agreed to be Phe Idea, then, is a hypothesis used as a premiss to a parti- iment, oF assumed to explain a particular set of facts aid of its independent reality. Nor is it said that all jealar ar Nothing uch hypotheses are necessarily connected with each other, or fagain that they may all be deduced from any single self-evident fruth, Tt is only said that when a hypothesis is questioned, it is Giecessary t0 re-establish it by connecting it with ‘something Jadequatc’, whatever that may be. What is most remarkable in the Phaede is that Socrates, though the personally fecls this method to be satisfactory, describes it as The second best. He knows that itis defective because the hypo- heses arc not related to the Good, without which no explana~ Bion of causes can be complete. In the metaphysical part of the Republic, Socrates is made to foresee mach more definitely the characte fanothe: al explanation; and in the Timaeus, when Bother speaker has taken over the leading part, that explana- ion is actually attempted. We are here concerned with the Pétablic stone. Socrates, itis true, professes the greatest hesita- before he begins to speak about the Good; and he will only OREent to delineate its visible image. However, his difficulty i ean "uch that he himself does not know the Good from experi= rans st such an experience cannot be adequately described ers. ‘His first image, that of the Sun, emphasizes that the of the mind, is not brought into existence The sun not only illuminates the world, but causesoi INTRODUCTION things in it to liveand grow. Similarly, the Good isthe soure only of true explanation, but of real existence, In thenextsi two stages of knowledge are contrasted, vénors and Ztév019, W represent human thought with and without the Idea of the Gq In Aidvoie certain ‘hypotheses’ are taken for granted; from i the mind proceeds to conclusions which have a kind off visional truth. ‘Though the parallel is perhaps not exact, ti what Socrates in the Phaedo had called the second best met In vénais the hypotheses themselves are tested and, if pos justified; the mind does not rest until it has reached a 4% ‘whichis unconditionally true. And the goalisnolonger the: ‘11 Ixavév of the Phkeedo (which suggests that the mind can where it wants); itis a point firmly fixed in the nature of thi We shall mention later that there are certain interpreter whom Plato’s Ideas are not entities existing in their own tg but mere rules of scientific explanation. For these criti statement of the theory in the Phaedo, whereby the Idea true colours, whereas in Bool Stenzel hypotheses, shows it in i of the Republic it appears in a festive dress. this interpretation. The effect of the two passages, he thil is to show Plato’s relation to Socrates, although the latter i relinquishes the role of chief speaker. Socrates sees the prot Jand, and is allowed, in the Kefubli, to make an imaging excursion over it; but he never really crossed its borders, passage from the Phaedo gives an accurate picture of Soa philosophy, because, until the Good is known, no Idea is i than a hypothesis. In the Republic, together with more pail information about the Good, we receive an assurance tha Ideas are real. Plato docs not need to appear on the scene he shows that he has answered, in the spirit of Socrates, a pra set by Socrates, It is scarcely necesary to say how essentl the difference on this point between Stenzel and his oppome for them, the real existence of Ideas is a mere fancy, not dele upon in a critical spirit; for him, itis a step forward in real earnest, and proudly viewed by Plato as a culmingl to his master’s lifelong pursuit of truth. * Stenzel doesnot ignore the ponibiliy that Plato himself had acquired INTRODUCTION il ne RpublicPlto'sdctrine undergoes a material change, Farting to this, dere isa gradual transition ta new Bae eer riogue wherein Socrates plays no active part. No Bae geen in the light of orl goodness no longer = Ject Ideas. The theory of Ideas itself is either Wesniile Someta tas guided beh the Pade id 018 here a few" 5 cer in silence, passed over f of reckoning has plainly come the inspiration which had po vali: In the Theaetolus he reappears in his least positive mood, and asserting none. In the Parmenides Plato Be sien o show bim ami the hesitation of youth Mheeriticism ofthe Ideasin the fist part of the Parmenidesis not Ietieular!y mysterious, once we realize that there was bound to fvioleSocratic philosophy which hehadinherited. Thiscriticisin fe to be viewed as a revelation of Plato’ state of mind when he Rote, not as an essay on the state of philosophy in the time of Socrates’ youth. ‘The second part of the Dialogue is of interest fo an observer of literary form, since here for the first time a peaker other than Socratesisallowed tonssume control. Stenzel, fivhis essay, has unfortunately omitted give any special inter- and, in his work on Plato’s Dialectic, he omits to compare the Dialectic exercised by Parmenides logue so named with that exercised by the Stranger in points must be, ‘ed his difficulties, Plato sees that it is by Dia- c must solve them, Notice that this is Parmenides’ ion to Socrates: vy, mply yowandtivs, & Singers, épltoten Insp, Xai Alkciy ead Eyetby val fy Bacay vv «By, tvatnce yp Dusteyoutvou Bed2e “ApoTow BBE. KGAA WY pu puts En tots Nyouy Dieoou 2b oxy wa ois dxperou ds al xehounbons td i vog ete Bd, ob Singer fad eat during the interval between the Phaedo and. the ot be between hae and Socrates, but pent, Buti two Dialogues whlch are ‘ore natural to suppose that they were to nee, and that diting the Phasio something wasxv INTRODUCTION But the method of Dialectic has never yet assumed a di shape: Plato sees two alternative forms of it, and condug Tong experiment in each, assigning the chief parts to Parma and the Eleatic Stranger in order to indicate in what ding he had found most help. To.comenext to the Theaeletus:ifin time of writing itis 10 contemporary with the Parmenids, it is externally linked with the Sophist and With them, it forms a dra trilogy, to which some think that a fourth Dialogue, ony Has the Th Philosopher’, was to have been appended. any philosophical claim to belong to this hand, it is hard to think that the drat fancy without further significance. And some questions tetus and Sophist, the iseritical. On the other undoubtedly common to the 1 being dogmatic where the form: the earlier part of the Theaeietus preserves the ‘moral orienta of the Republics and the statistics of style and vocabulary to demand an interval of composition between it and the SM With the evidence at our disposal, itis not easy to decide whi Plato really shared the doubt ascribed to his master Theactelus, or whether he set out in systematic fashion (0 the questions before he gave the answers, Taking the alternative, Stenzel rests his case on two convincing gro} firstly, on the aptness of the answers themselves, and seco on the fact that in the Theaetetus there is too much professi@ ‘mere criticism: ‘Socrates’ is too impeccably himself, Most les are carefllly chosen from the moral sphere, rathe# ocrates makes a great show of his yeneyrikt ctus to discover that Knowledge does not from science. He helps Th on, but searches definition, and does not openly bring in t Here is an interesting point of literary form: while Plato hill ‘was really in the Socrat permitted Socrates to bed momentarily ‘above himself” and foresce a solution to hig plexities. Now, he apparently has to strive to recaptut Socratic frame of mind. A suspicion being thus formed, we begin to look for a pal fendenvour INTRODUCTION xv The Theactelus is en- gioxed co the question, What is Knowledge? Te is fy civsile, however, into ovo parts. In Part Iwe learn aly on, though no doubt an element in knowledge, is not ist truc, espedally in morals and poli- Plato develops for ion of these two Dial Biscussion of tl self neith they appear: count of the mechanism of sense-pereeption; s that the senses cannot perform acts of comparison nt, since each has its special work to do; he begins Jnhas become customary. (184D: yuxiy... Soa clotnré.) Part IT Gko negative in its result. Can knowledge be defined as the B cestion or exerciseof 4c? This word has now to be taken in Bproader sensc than before, Even in the Republic 3é§crhad been Phere opinion or belief, essentially contrasted with émiotfun, and fay siguestion that it aves knowledge, or could be intensified so fs to become knowledge, would have been ipso facto ridiculoy fere fg a new emphasis on the activity of the mind—on the orm 269, rather than the possession ofiit as a per- nent state; new interest in the psychology of knowing, and a Gecline of interest in its metaphysical implications. But an un- acle arises to defeat the suggestion that ‘true judge- jet is Knowlecige: what is false judgement? and if we cannot fell, how can we say which judgements are true? As a last re- Bisiee it may be said that Knowledge is true judgement ‘accom- , usré: Abyou. ‘This would have been full arlier stage in Plato’s thought, since he would Be defined éyos simply as the appreiension of the Ideas by fess tr emp ote femmictocs whi fof meaning lemind. Now even ASyosis included in the general scepticism. |i may indicate three things: (a) speech or vocal expres- {with the inner speech of the mind, (b) the viption of a thing by an enumeration of its ele- finition of a thing by discovery of its distinctive rns. The third of these meanings seems at first ostive criterion of Knowledge. But look more ‘onvenince’ sake, I andcipate dhe argument of Stenzel inthe thirdi INTRODUCTION closely: it is not the thing’s iopopém™ms, but Anowledge @ Aregopémns which will constitute Knowledge; and this fy cular. Such is the argument of the Theacletus: Part 1T fol naturally upon Part I—but Part II is deeply interwoven the positive sequel in the Sophist. jext day the friends of Socrates return by appointment, B ig with them an Eleatic Stranger who is courteously intrody A problem is soon stated, and a method of inquiry selected ‘more formal fashion than ever before. Socrates feats thal new arrival may be no Stranger, but a God, come to spy out refute unskilful reasoners (gavhous Svras futis &v ols trroyduevds 7e Kal EXtyGeov). Theodorus has described h philosopher: will he tell the company whether he think philosopher to be identical in nature with the statesman ang sophist? Or are there three distinct characters, as there are names? Let him not trouble about the method, for the ready to listen to him either in a Dialogue or in an uninten talk. The Stranger, no doubt asa complin the Dialogue; but it is made clear that this no longer im any genuine resistance on the part of the responden quotes as an instance of Dialogue, not his contest with Tha machus or Protagoras, buthis juvenile debate with Parmenid in which the replies he gave were never more than mere fr of agreement! Turning to the question proposed, the Stranger is not profit by the freedom granted to him. He employs a pe new technique of definition, having first illustrated it hearers by some examples, because it will be strange to Thisisthetechniqueof division intoclasses, + xorr’efn Atel By dividing a class exhaustively into sub-classes, generally at a time, the inquirer proceeds until he reaches a class Wh coincides with the notion to be defined. ‘This, in its simi form, is diaipears. Tt may not be obvious without quiry which major class should be chosen for division; it case there will be need for a reverse process of ‘collection cowvéyav els fv, which begins with particular species (nal sible particulars) and decides on their natural arran, Foe rlater theory. But oven with che new method pring (°° Be ine cas of ons Oo wsins of the unreal, 78 Hi\év?. The Stranger had Bee a oe previous days diesson, when Socrates Beas posible to think or state “what is no. Bahhe had known all about it. A theory of Being is wanted Bae oo tne nalute of Not-Delng. The Strange hs Bees i the Sophist does not follew an easy course. He hhose who make what is illusory or unreal. question, among others, as he offers as a compromise. There are some who fry, which he of ‘nly in what they can see and touch, others who admit eee sy of Tea if we define the real as that which bas + (abvayis) of acting or being acted upon, both may be Some maintain the unity, others the multiplicity of he veal: what if there are many real forms united in one system, ‘that their interrelation can be accurately defined? Each ‘gill then ‘be’, but it will ‘not be’ in the sense that it is not This disposes of the paradox both of false ind of negative statement. Both seem to involve a out ‘whatis not’. ‘The new theory maintains that also is not, since itis other than many other things. ing may therefore be said to be, without the absurdity of Bpposing it to be a department of reality. From this follow ious conclusions, which are all answers to problems raised in Theaeietus, Knowledge is the power, which the philosopher one fully possesses, to judge truly about the interrelation of Judgement (Ao) is the act of uniting a predicative 1 (Afiua) to a noun or subject (5roKo) sits truth or falsc- Bod dependson whether or not it faithfully represents the union BEladcas. As toAdyos, itmeanstheaudiblespeech in which judge- Expres: parted by one person to another. ‘Thus, by examining ht in these two Dialogues, we see why Plato forms dramatic sequence, and why he makes Socrates hand rt to the Stranger; conversely, the dramatic situation ‘oie Plat and bis lowers, whose thory, sewed by the Strange, land inadeqeateINTRODUCTION contains the essential key to what Plato has to say, and the da of confidence with which he says it. ‘The form is fitted tg content, the content to the form. ‘One more question remains. May it be assumed that, the retirement of Socrates, Plato speaks without disguise) coincides entirely with the new leaders of the discussion, as Parmenides and ‘Timacus? No, we are obliged to repl although Plato deposes Socrates, he preserves the Dialogue and the Dialogue is literature. What does Plato say of liter in the Phaedras? He claims, still using Socrates as his expe that books are entirely unsuitable for philosophical teagh ‘They can serve only for amusement, when a philosopher chi to write on some subject which is not nearest to his heart, notes to remind a man in old age ofthe true knowledge Whig has received! by some other means (276 A-p).. Earlier sch were inclined to assume either that Plato was here Socrates speak in character, or that he was joking. But J entered on a new path with his inquiry into the origin of totle’s Metaphysics, published in 1913. He found that, wha Plato's Dialogues were designed for publication, more of in the modern sense, the treatises of Aristotle were the reg of his oral teaching. In so far as the prevailing opinion aff totle as.a stylist is founded on a comparison between hist and the Platonic Dialogues (and it isso, to a greater extent many care to admit), it is absurdly wrong. And it is again, to assume that Plato’s teaching in the Academy sarily resembled his Dialogues, even the later ones, eith manner or in substance, Aristotle mentions trines’ of Plato, and when dealing with the doctrine of Id » Stengel steses the exact corrxpondence between the problems i. the tua and thee anower in the Syst and seems definitely to take the view plan sas prearranged, x0 thatthe Socratic “etesm inthe Tleadtu is Bat (1) he himse docs not deny that Plato did pass thcough an interval beeen his two stages of positive assertion; (2) he perhaps goes oo far i niwers are pereely adapted 10 fons. “The questions raise fal—what happem in the mind when we are ssid to know, oF tl rr given is metaphysical, And in regard to Aye, the {nlite more than 1 play ants doe meaning of ‘rational discourse” and Sf ‘eg. Bruns im his work om Dat leach Parte dr Green INTRODUCTION xix iy wo his recollection of thess, and very ile to the Be ie and his master were therefore faithful to ven in the Phaaérus; and there was no reason why eee heard the inner doctsine should refer to the Neen a nsom neu meals Nee eee chiapas ie ois and these have aecdenially survived, when by Br Pac the Hiterary work for which he was once famous ned peri! Beowle ips gives little help to the modern student, to know Plato through his Dialogues. Butit makes rstand his meaning in the Phaedrus, and also in re he insists that no written and codified law adaptable knowledge, the knowledge can be obtained. And the later Dialogues, as a ile, will be better estimated when we think of them as con ing what Plato himself considered to be the mere outer husk Teremains ¢ of the Phcedrus and Philebus. The im of thse Dialogues is peculiar, inasmuch as they present Socrates once more in the leading part, although there are many 1s of late composition, both stylistic and. philoso- |, Stenzel does not deal separately with the Philebus. He I think, agree that it couples the Socratic form with a hought; he would deny that theformistru pening theme is, indee¢, an old one—Philebus s that the Good is pleasure or eajoyment, Socrates that «d Protarchus are young We can almost imagine Socrates meeting mnasium, and compelling them to have the icized—until we discover to cur astonishment that it ho have come to him with a special req. He has for an rwousiay 19 0). aciously consented; but, Tot {hat he may slip away, and threaten to detain him by Bye cl he has puta ‘satisfactory conclusion’ to the argument. Prong Somehow recals the vist of Odysseus tothe under It Teicesias, And the ghostly Socrates brings withx INTRODUCTION him, not a firm persuasion of his own ignorance, but a sh Pythagorean speculations, The old problem of the one a many is a childish game, There is, indeed, a new probl but that too, fortunately, can be solved by the heave method of ‘division’, All truth depends on numbers and py tions; the purest pleasures are those aroused in the mind sight of regular geometrical figures; the good life itselfis much a compound of pleasure and knowledge as a kind of in which these elements are mixed, ‘The whole world is ai mate being, inhabited by a rational world-soul The mystery of the Phaedrus is so well described by S two passages (pp. 17, 149) that little need be said here, of ts enthusiasm and exuberant beauty, its numerous stories passages of myth, it was once classed as a juvenile wor earliest Dialogue, said Schleiermacher, in which Plato, a outset of his writing, gave a presentiment of the whole (Ai des Gang their characteristics defined, it has become increasingly. that the Phaedrus belongs with them; and this conclusion the whole, reinforced by the statistics of style. ‘The fact rem that the speaker is Socrates, and that the problems dealt love, rhetoric, the soul, the Ideas—are Socratic probll Stenzel correctly observes that the whole personality of Soe is transformed he speaks as one inspired. Moreover (thed tent corresponding as usual to the form) insight into the methods ofa later genera he expounds the method of Division, and confesses himsél lover’. ‘Thus the Phasdrus ecases to be a problem, and is el by Stenzel as a crowning illustration of the thesis of his @ Plato prepares us admirably for a change in Socrates’ chara He shows Socrates meeting Phaedrus at the city wall, and bf lured into the country by the book which he carries coned beneath his cloak, like a hungry animal by a branch; he si him reclining, in the noonday heat, under a plane-tree the Ilissus. No occasion could be more favourable for a propil limpse into the future. And Socrates—we are not quite lil whether he is awake or asleep—proceeds to foretell ho INTRODUCTION ai Plato will found a school in which his memory is ".,and invent methods toset hisdoubtsatrest. ‘The writ- th a Dialogue would be attractive to Plato, because it ble him to show how his thought, in every fresh form + assumed, Was inspired by Socra‘es. He could make fun ders, of his own or a later day, who wished to inflict stages of development’. the pointof vantage attained in his essay, it was possible cl to follow either of two roads tempt to give, perhaps fer the first time in the {'scholarship, a complete picture of Plato’s later philo- nicture which would include on the one side his oral as reported by Aristotle and some of his neo-Platonist entators, and on the other side the Tater Dialogues. To rtaking Stenzel devcted his Number end Form (19245 and edition, 2933). Here he made a jgeat coutribution to the history both of mathematics and of Philosophy. He concluded that it was principally the notion of ice sion, which served as a link between the literary fand oral branches of Plato's philosophy. In the Dialogues he deals with the division of physical substances and the division of Tess; for in the Timaews he stated an idealistic atomic theory, din del berate antithesis to Democritus, and in such Dialogues as the Sophist and Statesman he expounded a logical division which began und ended in the intelligible wo:ld. Finally, in his lec~ Mures Plato seems to have discussed the division of Ideas, especi- ally nose of numbers, into their elements. Everywherein nature, but most clearly in the ease of numbers, he discovered a formal 4x! material principle, ‘the One’ and ‘the great and small’, or he calls them in the Philebus, ‘limit’ and ‘the unlimited’ istotle, Metaphysics 987 18: én 2° aria we ein, To's caciveay ororxeter TavTEY GriGy TY SvTeO” elvan oTOI- oly TAny TO byes nel 73 ywmpdv elven dpyds, cs 2° 18 & AE bralveov yap narr& whBEIv Too EVs even tods Buous,) Stenzel had little patience with the view that Aristotle Mhindcrstood, or purposely misrepresented, this later Plato-xii INTRODUCTION nism. He saw that this speculation about numbers, thot seems strange to us, is not to be dismissed as an idle dred Plato's dotage, Aristotle criticized the real theory of Ideai the popularized version; and this was the natural thing fa todo. A second course was to follow Plato’s philosophical de ment in the Dialogues, assuming a broad division of th an earlier and a later group. ‘This is undertaken in the pi ‘work, entitled in the original ‘Studies in the development Platonic Dialectic—Socrates to Aristotle’; there is a su ‘Areté and Diairesis’ author awaited a summons to military service. He wrol great haste, and addressed the preface from the battlefield, must be taken into consideration before a complaint of scurity is raised, But it is doubtful if'a work so planned have been lucid, even in more favourable circumstances. Al cise review of a number of Platonic Dialogues, detailed, to be useful, yet brief enough to offer a can never be easy. Itis, therefore, very desirable in reading these studies to freshly in mind the argument of the Republic, Theartetu Sophist. The English reader needs further to be equipped some knowledge of the German authorities constantly @ In the remainder of this Introduction T This work was written in 1917, whi genuine comp: or refuted. attempt to explain the polemical intention of the Studies, lear their argument, and estimate their value. Let i be thought that the prejudices opposed by Stenzel werell and ephemeral; English scholarship has, unfortunately, overshadowed by similar misinterpretation. thas been said that he wished to stecr between two ext a sentimental literary criticism of the Dialogues, and a ford adaptation of them to the notions of mod intelligible to either party saw its importance; but th ‘of philosophical terms. ‘The philosophers, on the other hand only had to listen to a sharp criticism of themselves, but f@ INTRODUCTION xiii nr into a fatiguing analysis of the text, We must ‘a statement of this ‘philosophical’ Platonism, ‘y fashion two different versions of the theory of to the first of these versions, which was due Platonic Ideas were substantialized con- iversals. Plato had learnt from Socrates to distine ‘ce from just actions, redness from red things—and, if Hy certain passages in the Republic and Parmenides, bedness beds. Since these concepts were known, it followed for were seal. They did not draw their life from the world, but infused life into it. And they were not Zeller gave overwhelming proof from the text that ideas were never conceived by Plato himself as thoughts of ior man. ‘The theory of Ideas was a theory of Being, in fradition of the Eleatics. But whereas Parmenides taught iat reality must be single, simple, and motionless, Plato dis- ally ater the Republi, thatdlistinction, complexity, tematic relationship, and movement were indispensable con- fions of both Being and Knowledge. Such was Zeller’s exposi- He did not consider too curicusly the chronological nt of Plato's views; he had ne reliable data about the Dialogues, and he did not lly realize their popu- and literary character; he regarded them, in fact, ftom a fematic point of view his was, in substance, the account of the theory of Ideas Which Aristotle gives in the first book of his Metaphysics. It was Hot obviowsly untrue; and, coming from a scholar with an un- Bivalled knowledge of the ancient philesophers, it required no Breible assimil: i : ; ation of ancient Greek to modern European ler’s view was, however, discarded by the next BEtion of philosophical cries. Notorp and his asociates the Mart. : } school’, as they are termed by Stenzel) were Kan- a y St K { that Kant had put an ead to disputes about the Bani, Steledge, and very anxious to show that Plato had De ig 4 Bim. AIL great philosophers must agree—all must erpreted through each other—and Kant is the latest and plete; such were their axioms. Kant’s philosophy wasxxiv INTRODUCTION first whittled down to a bare theory of knowledge; no notice taken of the more speculative tendencies of the C Reaso sensible was that between form and matter. What else is m by the famous passage in the Phaedo, in which Socrates int the Ideas as necessary hypotheses?—Was there no more? doubtedly, for Plato was at the same time a poet, gifted soaring imagination. So, regardless of logic, he had sometf described how the dialectician leaves behind him the wor sense, and divests himself of sense-perception to rise to a of pure forms, ‘substance really real, Being colourless and s less and intangible’. ‘This, however, was when Plato had pt the academic gown. It was unfortunate that his first dis and successor had been a person criminally insensitive tof difference between prose and poetry. The whole Platonism down to the time of Kant had been impeded by Aristotelian interpretation of the Ideas as real substances, Dialogues do not give the least support to this view, if only use imagination where itis required, and restrain it where We invited to restrain it." One would have thought it necessary, if such a view Wal be maintained, to show by quotation from the text that the stantial being of the Ideas is involved only in passages writ 1 fancifal style, never in passages of logical argument. ‘This never been shown; and, on the first attempt to show it, thed section of Plato’s personality would stand revealed as qi Among works published in England, Stewar’s work Plot's Doct is avowedly an adaptation of Natorp; hut Stewart imagines that Pato had pated not only Kant, but Begs greater part of paral i Companion to Pits Republi) borrows from Hegel a curious and dsaste tdom betwen the Ides as pictures, andthe Ideas as essences. ‘The later, are never viewed by Pata ae thing; see his notes on Book V. Netleship fn the Republic, 249-58), thong ovearly to have eon influence Natorp, expounds the Meas st ‘mature. All these waiters are thet tarred with the philsophi INTRODUCTION ww a complete misundersanding of the myths to «mere fancies, like Grimm's fairy-tales, or think appendices to the arguments which precede this, the substan:ial being of the Ideas is A implied in passages which ace half:mythical, or not The problem is this: the very eritics who de- s the villain ofthe piece, are really in complete i¢h him in so far as they regerd the real and separate a flagrant absurdity. But if none of these authorities has correctly apprehended the meaning of who has? The only avenue whick remains to be explored ato, at of his Beivatihe Iden By Zeller, stands i ISfenze! therefore begins with the remark that scholarship has icism. Perhaps the usual account of the run by Aristotleand closely followed lucidated the Theory of Ideas, but only made it more and ting no time in negative criticism of his he roughly divides the Dalogues into wo main we one hand, all those in which Socrates predomi- exception of the Theaeletus, Phaedrus, and Phile- her, the remainder. ‘The philosophy of the first at be termed Socratic. It was marked by ‘moral he topics chosen, and the examples used, were broadest sense; the theory of mathematics was assed, but only because Plato found in it something noral perfection. ‘The second main phase shows us inning to take a wider interest in the world, extending of his Ideas, and consequently baffled by logical Problems. He welcomes the method of division, Ateipears, as a Heaven-sent means of deliverance from kis difficulties. Both the Peobless and ehcir solution seem childish to the modern logician; BF 0 accustomed to find logical theories of great profundity Ble Visions, the Republi, for instance, that he is unable to Beco Baie ef A his apparent triviality in the later ones. How often ard that Plato, in his examples of Btedpeots, is simply himself and his readers! has been said, it will be cear that Stenzel by no dxevi INTRODUCTION means assumes, within these main groups, complete unify cither of literary form or of doctrine. Neither does he su that they are quite discontinuous, and represent two sue philosophies. But he does suggest that Plato's interest, at first been confined to the sphere of human action, was wards widened to include the study of nature, and that point tosome external influences which might either have or have intensified this change. We may now outline the account of the earlier phase cont in Chapter I. Socrates, though he had made logical distinel wwas not consciously a logi i and inductive argument (Metaphysics, 1078° 17.) been the end of Socrates’ philosophy; seeking knowl passionately as a means to virtue, he did not stop to a its nature; yet he gave instinctive and accidental expresso many a logical truth, All this was equally true of Plato in earlier phase of his thought which culminated in the Ref He inherited from his master no doctrine of ‘concepts’, no of treating questions in abstraction from the practical involved, but an intense desire to escape from a world moral distinctions could be altered to suit men’s taste or inte and all knowledge was a mere groping after temp truths. Founded on this desire, there arose a belief in reall powerful Ideals, Everything was viewed in a practical If ‘The meaning of the world, or of any single thing in it, mu the same as the supreme Good for which it strives. Plata not yet philosopher enough to contemplate dispassionatel ind to ask, What is their d what do we mean by knowledge? objects around we know them’ same questions occurred to him in practical form, What & lence (peri) does this thing require? What purpose of knowledge to serve? The Ideals which this v must necessarily have certain features: they must confined to the sphere in which the need for improvement see to be urgent; they must be real and individual; th far enough above the familiar world to fire o1 INTRODUCTION wwii hn Ideas were not a suitable means for the solution Jing logical difficulties, On the contrary, Plato lucky if when he came to censider those difficulties, Bs pale“ ee sal ee Sent eon re ae ea But both now, and Berra er ee Re are eeeereger i retnaisoety aster Deca eet eee a ee ates in identifying it with virtue the senses. Stenzel, on the other hand, emphasizes cal derivation of eos an¢ te, ‘vision’; as shape to the eye, so is the Idea to the mind. This, in lato’s doctrine, and no Greek ccheld the complicated modern view, especially at such ly stage: Greek thought was intuitive and objective. It is Plato possessed, almost ftom tae beginnin: t into mathematical knowledge. But it isa peculiarity mathematical sciences that they can ignore the difference ve individual and the universal; in them, an intuition ar instance serves to demonstrate a universal truth, 1 proof, expecially, depends on illustration, Moree Bic, io mathematies the imperfection cf the sensible world isa familiar fact. The reasoner knows that the tr angles which he Meclares to be triangular, the magnitudes which he declares to Be eval murely seem so tothe gross perception of his senses ul’ Pato ask for a more striking confirmation of the theory Piel he had previously assumed on moral grounds? The R, and foam, an Besta: ijublicis so clearly the fulfilmentof the earlier Dialogues, arply cut off from the first of those which follow according to the stylistic researchers, the Parmenides Theaetetus), that itis natural to treatit as thecrowning mani- this earlier mode of thought. ready, in the Tenth,sexvill INTRODUCTION Book, there are signs that Plato is wavering in his ‘moral o tion’, and beginning to consider how itis possible to know which could not conceivably have Ideas in the carlier seng the education prescribed for the guardians every tend empirical observation had been harshly repressed, and yet are signs of a more sober and impartial cone ‘Once Plato's first effort of construction had spent its fa was inevitable that he should look back at it in a calmer f mind; and then a crisis would come. ‘The progress of emg science in his time, even within the Academy itself, in all p bility hastened this crisis. ‘The allusions of comedy show i some consideration was given there to animal and plam the interest in biology which was common to Speusippy Jstotle probably began in the Academy. Plato, morgl began the close association between philosophy and me which Aristotle continued; he hi entirely in an a prior spirit, in the Timaeus. Most signifi all, he proposed to the astronomers a problem which must sarily involve observation of the planets, and when it was by Eudoxus, completely withdrew his condemnation of em cism in astronomy (Republic, VIL. 529 0). His whole attita the visible world was transformed by the discovery that i region at least, changes recurred with unalterable regu Atthe same time the pungent attacks of Megarian logician pelled him to attend to the logical problems which he had Ii totaken in his stride. Everything tended to show that his @ theory had been too rigid and exclusive. He had made the servant of moral sentiment, and now it seer ‘was about to take its revenge on him. Plato was not content until he had made a full expos his own doubts and weaknesses. ‘This we have in the rmenides. Tt was neither, as some hold, an indirect hit at hig temporaries, nor, as others hold, a jest, but a frank conf that his doctrine was in need of revision. And in the Tied which we have already analysed, he raised afresh the inquiry as to the nature of knowledge, omitting a INTRODUCTION vod their elementary character. Though summit of his career as.a writer, he was a logician; end he began with que vo Dialogues pow passed the s ese his Bae id not yet know the answers FEO vent of Stenzel’s book is as follows. He enumer- Hane ee roms which were latent in Pato’ theory of tart, and goes on to describe how they emerge veo Dialogues just mentioned. ‘The real Being ifficaltes. He deposes Socrates from the lending jount his d o entirely new Bore ataches the new Dialogue tothe Theat The Preciopments didnot, in Plato's own eyes; amount to a Fhe theory of Ideas: in Plabs, 16, for instance, ha itis the old problems which have been nde Bived, though perha he nature of the Ideas. In Chapter VI Stenzel elucidates the Hewmetho« of Dialectic. Tn the chapters on 26Ga (Chapter VIT) fad on the metaphysical status of the Ideas (Chapter VIII), now Plato fulfilled to his own satisfaction the se ng his earlier doctrine to serve the purpose Bfa gencral theory of knowledge. ‘The last three chapters have he nature of appendices; that on Deraocritus, though inade- there has been some transformation in s especially interestng, for Stenzel has not Bly shed new light on Plato's physical theory, but shown how Bc development of his views in this feld was parallel to his Mbgical development. Even in the Phaedo he had demanded an aiterpretation of nature which would show how its phenomena Bere iniclligently designed for a good end. But the demand was Btstinccive and practical, and was prompted mainly by a sense of Re defects of Bette: informed an ey atlier science. In the Timacus Plato is not only about Nature, but far clearer in his conception of nation of Nature in terms of design 2y be, plans the two Dialogues together some vguenes i permisbleINTRODUCTION Tpropose here to deal only with two essential questions aq from the book: what was the nature (a) of Tdeas, and (6) offi the later Platonic theory? ‘The former question i Iways meets by an appeal to the technique of Atatpeoi owaycoys which hehad introduced in the Sophist and no fi progress is possible until we have said something of § processes, Plato had at one time implied that each Idea was selfsu Either it had no relation to other Ideas, or it was affected by such relations as it had, In Parmen had made Socrates throw out a challenge on this point: cot be shown that the Ideas ‘participate’ in each other, as sem things participate in them? The challenge was taken upp Parmenides in the latter part of the Dialogue, and still m the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist. He shows, in some, examples, how a notion may be defined by including it wit wider class, and ‘dividing’ the class into its natural componel ‘one of which will be the notion required. In its simplest such division might be represented by the diag but Plato sometimes appeals to instances which cannot B represented: e.g. in Philebus, 18n, he mentions the divisions mi by the science of grammar: and he sonants or ‘mutes’, pave: now these classes can be sublivid until thevarious letters of the alphabet (ororyeia) are reach What distinguishes the grammarian, however, is not the pow of making these distinctions, but knowledge of the way in words, INTRODUGTION iewill done harm to concentrate here observe the following points, (1) The terms eos as we should expect, retained and applied to the tataleeos; whether they preserve the nature, as well ia the main questicn hich we have 2) Plato aust obviously face the critisism thet this hod of discovery, but only one of arrangement. This ae ily discussed at present, Butt should be Pair adhe classifications which Plato has in mind are in no ical or capricious, Heoften advises the philosopher at natural nnot be 4 making two or three or more »s is appropriate, He thinks, as does the botanist in plants, that in a true classification the human mind (3) Every Idea is ‘one’ in the sense cs unity to the subordinate Idea: which it comprehend: Je course of ni nn the sense that its essence is shown to be composite, Bunles it is the supreme Idea of all, e.g. the essence of D is AB, plus some specific quality. Or this may be reversed: every Idea Bs‘onc’ becauscitsessenceisa unity composed of diverse elements, fand ‘many’ because it comprehends a variety of lower species Baby rou rodrrév By Kol woAAd od Adyeov yryvéueva TEpITpEyEWY oimeéA kai viv, ‘the one nd the many, reduced to the same thing by discussion, per- DPetuelly recur in every sentence that is uttered, both now and of ld!" (4) Whether the Ideas dealt with are on the level of com- Mon experience, like man or horse, or very abstract like Mave- Tent ancl Sameness, the method remains the same—it is either Division (aucipetv xo e€4q) or Collection (ovvécyew es &). But Plato observes that the commoner #4, may be represented #2 Sight or some other sense, whereas the abstract ones must BBE conte mplated by the mind alone without assistance from he imavin 2 a, High no image BBE rain ‘sme one ad sey canbe ight ‘The passage then a cof in Young aa ty etme wh daede tec 4 ours, Topi fl Arig vw veda By ork A BR sipiov. ‘The metaphor is fram selliag open a book, ‘ion. In the former case it is possible to explain the of an object without reasoning (xeopls MSyou); but the Tdeas are detached from physical realitywet INTRODUCTION could bear any resemblance to them (ré yp doeoporey, KEN Sura Kal ulyiora, Abyep UdvoV, ENAep BE OVBeVi ooxpids Deh The higher the mind is required to ascend, the more i becomes the exercise of Dialectic, and training among far objects, where the accuracy of one’s divisions can be checkt experience, is needed to impart the necessary skill. Plato’ ‘cussion of péysoreryév9 in the Sophist isa specimen of this ex Dialectic. (5) There had always been some hint of degn dignity within the world of Ideas (compare, for instancgy gradual ascent towards 78 Kak6v in the Symp éyaéév in the Republic); but with the extension of Id the moral sphere, and the development of the method of sion, these differences of degree are accentuated. ‘The diag of a iaipeois inevitably suggests that Reality forms a ki pyramid, with sensible particulars at the base, and the sup Idea, whatever name be given to it, at the apex. In the this impression is a correct one. Even in the Republic, the contrast between the intelligible and the sensible was far important than any gradation within the intelligible sphere there was no attempt to mitigate the suddenness of the m leap from one sphere to the other. ‘The method of Ad appears to indicate a rapprochement between the two worlds, only in the sense that it shows the gradual approach of th telligible to the fringe of the perceptible, but also in the that both alike are analysed and found to reveal the & structure. ‘Theimposition of Form upon Matter, 1épos upom éreipow, isa feature common to both worlds Nevertheless, Plato insists that it is impossible, by prolong the division of Ideas, t0 reach perceptible individuals important to grasp this, since upon it depends his view of relation between sensation, olo8ners, and judgement, 266 Aéyos. He always says that, just as there are physical atom there are logical atoms or indivisibles, &roue, érunra. In fining a concept, itis a mistake to rush straight to one’s goal means ofa hurried division without any natural basis; but equally a mistake to ‘arrive at unity too slowly’, i.e. to pers division beyond the natural limit (Philebus, 160). There €0F INTRODUCTION ax one should ‘allow the innemerable individuals tc jhe undetermined”, 78 fv feaotov 7 gar yaipew &&v. More simply expressed, this is a Be ot we may seek to define man or dog, but not this Iyarni'’ dog. Unfortunately Plato deserts us here, and does ‘out explicitly the grounds for his view. Why is there and why is it not an arbitrary limit, relative to the e has so far obsained? Plato's reason évrevelgto nowledg ss that a limit must come somewhere: the intelligible mopever be attenuated step by step into the sensible, and ft can neve perceive th x be the same thing to hear a logical formula and to ne thing to which itrelates, What constitutes an indi- Papal, «this, isnot so much the possess.on ofa private descrip- jon 2s the fact that it is in time and space, here and now. In the Tinaeus Plato docs his best to account for individuality on fhe metaphysical side—and to account for it without using th tion of substance! In the Philebus and Sophist, he attempts an fven more difficult task—to show how onr sensory and logical powers assist one another, although, since they operate in di ferent worlds, there can be no real contact between them. ‘The fact of division is common to the physical world and to the world fof Ideas; and Plato therefore stresses the divine origin of the method of Division (Philebus, 160, x, Phaedrus, 2668) and insists that ic can remove the problems which had perplexed him in the Parmenides Plato, then, severely warns the dialectician not to define indi- Viduals—not to intrude into the kingdom of the émeipov. He Probably perceived the logical truth tt Alternativ individuals are not cations of their class, as classes are specifications Ol their genus. He likewise realized that sensation is, or at least esi 1 physical process—a bodily change, caused by some Othe i : i bodily change in the neighbourhood. It must always be y how such a process could have the least relevance to ge, which is the perception of Ideas by the mind. Here two mysterious ‘ ning, the other between sensible individuals and ‘atomic kn te: form: sparations’—the one between sense and The ‘atomic form’ is like an outpost of reason in itsseativ INTRODUCTION campaign against the chaos of irrationality. And the m of Division shows that it can communicate directly with, inner citadel of knowledge—unless the outpost itself is um thrust forward into a region which can never be subdued, Let us now briefly follow Stenzel a stage further in his a ment. Late in his career as a writer, Plato undertakes to the logical problems which had emerged to perplex him in life. In Chapter VII, an obscure but highly original cha Phileb allian ch other, produce Aéfx and Adyos. The sp totem fe 2660 is incidentally solved. Fron Sophist, Timacus, and Philebus we have also to try to undersi the metaphysical status of the Ideas in Plato’s later thot Stenzel argues, during the course of the long chapter on 26f that the Ideas are still independently real, though in every of respect they are now class-concepts; and he reinforces the pi of this in Chapter VIII. Now the method of Siaipeors is Pl key toall these problems, both epistemological and metaphysi Those scholars have misunderstood Plato who, because themselves despise dratpeors as a trivial game, deny that he! deeply attached to it. He is sincere in proclaim from the gods to men, thrown down to us by some beneyé Prometheus together with a very luminous sort of fire’. Onl perverse view of Plato's development, whereby he is credit with profound logical insight from the start, has hitherto mi it impossible to take him at his word Is Plato's instrument adequate to his purpose? ‘That is to is he over-optimistic in thinking that his account of knowl and of the Ideas is no longer threatened by ‘separatioll (a) As regards knowledge or judgement, his final ¢ seen in the Philebus (37-40). The body is subject to movere some of which ‘are extinguished before they reach the whilst some others pe soul and body in one feeling and motion may prope consciousness’ (34.4). Memory is defined! as the preservatiol consciousness; recollection as the recovery of a former consid Bate ae forma judgement (Bx wrivns 7e Kal alobhons Adga ey a caokagew byyeigey yiyvet”txdiotore). ‘Thus, sup- ey van indistinctly sees some obj Pre about it, His first act is to question himself, “What is it Hese8< "rs to be standing beside that rock, beneath a tree?" that *? He mY a fig’ drcompanion,and it mes & spoken proposition (ASy05) tata distance, and wishes hitom the true answer ‘itisa man’, or on a false one ‘it is made by some shepherds’. When he has formed the 1660), he may desire to communicate it by speech to Tosee the difference between truth an¢ falsehood, we have to twonew faculties. The soul at sucha time islikea book: mention nemo feelings which ‘write judgements (or speeches) in our souls.’ At the same time there is another crafisman at work, a painter, who creates ,, coinciding with the sensations, and with the other ‘company them, appea's to me, as it were, to images of the judgements written. (Thuse.g. an image of ‘scar row’ might follow upon the judgement that I had seen a scare- row.) The images are true or false according to the judgements Wwhich they represent, Plato has not tried to say here what more profound cause there may be for the truth and falschood of Judgements Here it should especially be noticed, first that Plato has not taken che scientific judgement as his instance, but that of per- feption, and secondly that he depicts judgement as a proces, taking timeand involving an effort of the mind (notice 26a Kai AB dicchofagew ey xeipsiv)—not as a passive acquiescence in some object of higher or lower grade. Peshaps the crucial phrase is ‘memory, coinciding with the ver ations, appears to write judgements in our souls. ‘This is imilar to Hume’s definition of belief as ‘a lively idea ace wnied by a present impression’. ‘The sensations result in 4 mental image (gavraote or kev), and this, with the help of the judge- s to which they gave for which veaname, ‘itisa man’, itisascarecsow’, And thesurvey of is the work of Dialectic and pure reason, On the surface, nory (i.e. memory either of previous images, o is ascribed to someINTRODUCTION it does indeed seem that this analysis of 2666 has made posi a transition fom the physical act of sensation to the ined one of thinking. But, of course, there remains some mys The gavraoiacis presumably in the mind, no about the first stage of all mental rather than a physical characte space. How, then, is it the consequence of anything phys On this, Plato has nothing to say. His analysis be gavracia and shows how, with the help of memory and 9 faculties, itis referred to the proper Idea—or, if the judger is false, to an improper one. For this purpose the gavraole ig limit of analysis, and its relation to the movements beloxg remains an insoluble problem, ‘Though the analysis rem incomplete in this way, itis interesting that Plato should h condescended to deal with the judgement of perception, typical of the direction in which his mind moved. But would be true to say that Plato has abandoned the purely mathemati ideal of knowledge which he upheld in the Republic, and mi room for a new method in which perception and observa play a large part? Stenzel’s answer to this is not quite cleay will be more convenient to consider it in connexion with Philebu (8) As regards the Ideas, our question is whether Plato, result of his exercises in 2iaipeois, is any better able to expl their relation to particulars than he had been at the time of Parmenides. Tt will be remembered that the original Ideas not class-concepts, but rather Ideals from which human asp tion could derive its force and take its direction. For this rea Plato not only saw no absurdity in giving them an existemed rerum natura and making them independent of the mind, but obliged to do so. But how did the absolute existence of Id fare when the moral point of view was abandoned, and Id were freely postulated (Republic, 596 a), wherever acommon. ‘was applied to a group of objects? ‘There are really two q tions to consider: firstly, whether Plato withdrew his claim’ there were Ideas which did not depend on the mind, or oth ‘wise modified his opinion about them in an essential ways secondly how, ifhe held fast to that claim, he supposed that INTRODUCTION wexwvil cihod of Division could make their separate existence seem Ber plausible. Now it has been positively maintained by Luto- gor’ F" and others that in Dialogues later than the Parmenides shies ave nowhere said to have real existence outside the dhe "or human mind, Plato itis said, soon retreated from the ee ideainc’ WRCKIRE ha mwaciy tease el Be Sia, Phau Cad pen, sede see tea tO Jpynblic. 1a Book X a new phase has aleady opened, for Plato Hi nly introduces God as the maker of Ideas, but says that we fie. men) assume an Idea wherever ye use a general name. Disco's exercises in Braipeais seem at fist to confirm this view {When the concept of ‘art’ or of ‘animal’ is split up by analysis, wedinate classes are found in higher and lower ranks, we and st ddo not seem to be dealing with entities which could exist apart from the mind, It would appear fantastic to suppose that each Idea in a scheme of classification really exists, independently of fis parent Ideas and of the knowing mind, Is there not, then, bumcant evidence that Plato was only able to escape from his perplesities by changing his carlier theory out of all recog- nition? Icis not enough, in answer to this question, to point to the pissage from the Parmenides (132 2) in which Socrates seems toreject the view that the Ideas are thoughts" (vor|yer), for he fakes this suggestion in a rather different sex fuller reply. In the Tenth Book of the Republic, we are not fold that God creates the Ideas by thinking them he makes them se. Let us attempt precisely as the human craftsman makes a table, as is clear from the contrasted names gurevpyés and 2nwioupyés, AS to the fencral question, Plato himself is confident that he has met the labs, 15-16); and Slificulties of yeopioués fairly and squarely’ Surely this is not hypocrisy or self-delusion, ‘There is no passage from which it unavoidably follows tha: the Ideas are mere thoughts; and so important a change, if it were ever made, Pould surety call forthe greatest emphasis. Again, ie was the Hnction of the Ideas to be objects of knowledge, and Plato would Rac sometimes alge thatthe canes dpayed by “dviion’ ofthe pe Sih are ns en, Bute, Pid ©seo INTRODUCTION hardly be satisfied if they had anything less than an existengdl their own right. Even if they were created by the mind of @ a suspicion of unreality would still surround them, Plato had once stated the principle 78 mavTehdis du Tre yuoorév (Republic, 477.8). This belief he always retains, when Dialectic has become classification and the Idi appearance, mere general notions. ‘The uéyiota yé Ideas which no sensibleimages can represent, are also Te Most people would think that a faint gleam of reality is ty ed to these Ideas from the world of life and movement: P thinks the reverse. Reality emanates from the Ide: to those of species: it does not emanate from them to sensi particulars, since particulars are only real in so far as they: known to belong to an Idea. Neither the word ‘emanate’, it be said at once, nor anything similar actually occurs; but Bl evidently finds the secret of the intelligible world in some g of derivation of complex and inessential notions from simple allpervading ones. Did he consider this derivation to be mer logical, or also temporal? Are we meant literally to thi reality as streaming at every moment from the highest Idea It is extraordinarily difficult to answer such questions. But haps itis fairly certain that Plato always considered know to be an intuition of independently existing objects, And accounts for Aristotle's impatience with the theory of Ide He had not been an eye-witness of the earlier phase, in whielif was absolutely necessary that the Ideas should have existe in their own right. Coming to the Academy at about the ‘when the Theacietus was written, he could only regard the d as concepts, and their existence ‘apart’ as a harmful and i necessary addition Stenzel describes the Philebus as solving ‘the problems stall in the Parmenides by the methods of the Sophis’. In order t that this is quite correct, it is enough to compare 129 cr, with Philebus, 15-16. ‘Two things become : Parmenides: frst, that neither of Plato’s usual metaphors is 4 cient to show how the Idea can retain its singleness, and yet ible particulars; and secondly, that the cote for the Guts ta how how waront Teas aa fhe pone and separated’ (oxyrpéonta val Rawat) i. themselv o had at first a phenomenon which Bene inane to thc aaa ings. Ta Pe (e5) hae prohim each remain single, though t pervades an infinity of things in the world of Becoming (év ols yryvopivors xai drmel- > ‘Then we hear that it is as comforting to know the answer stions as it is embarrassing to be without it (&méons 1c i KORIDs SyohoynBevra xa edwroplas Ot Kes), land Socrates knows ‘a way’ which will lead out of the embar- fassment, though itis difficult, and he hes frequently missed it in the past. (0¥ phy Covi KodAleov 6Ae5 002" dv yivorto fistyestpaors iy clus 621, ORNs BE ye NAn Atewuyatioe Eonow kal Erropoy seviomow.) Its secret is that ‘all things which are ever said f0 Je, arc derived from One and Many, and have finitude and i finity inherent in them’. A procedure which we cannot fail to recognize as that of Division is now described, and its use is illustrated, as in the Sophist, from the sciences which deal with Jewers and sounds. Division reveals the manifold structure of the intelligible world, but constantly reminds us that its variety fs not infinite, Only if one is so incautious as to approach the sensible world will ‘infinity’ be in danger of obtaining the mastery ° ‘tiv 28 00 émrelpou Yate pds 7d TAFIOS UA mpospépery weplv dv is Tov dprbudy atrod wévre Kel yeroGv 100 émtelpou te Kell TOU bvés, wore 2° fn TO Ey EkcerToV Toy mévteav els 18 Srrarpoy uROévrex xoipaw bv, But how does this method mitigate the eventual break between the two realms, the sensible and the intelligible? Or, Plato does not intend that it should, how is the earlier problem, the problem.of the Parmenides, answered? Is he telling us that advancing step by step to the edge ofthe cliff, we can persuade selves that itis not there? We must give this answer: Plato ved now, as he had always believed, that the real was the able. His later treatment of AéGain the Philebus and Sophist ot bel ky ©onfirmed him in the belief that the particular, as such, is "Now demoted by the mathematical term pons