Haslam1992 Book TheSovietUnionAndTheThreatFrom

STUDIES IN SOVIET HISTORY AND SOCIETY
General Editors: R.W. Davies, Emeritus Professor of Soviet Economic

Studies, and E.A. Rees, Lecturer in Soviet History, both at the Centre for
Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham.
Lynne Attwood
THE NEW SOVIET MAN AND WOMAN
Judy Batt
ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EASTERN
EUROPE: A Comparison of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian
Experiences
R.W. Davies
FROM TSARISM TO THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY: Continuity and
Change in the Economy of the USSR (editor)
SOVIET HISTORY IN THE GORBACHEV REVOLUTION
Stephen Fortescue
THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND SOVIET SCIENCE
Jonathan Haslam
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1930-41
Volume I 1930-33: THE IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION
Volume 2 THE SOVIET UNION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE, 1933-39
Volume 3 THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THREAT FROM THE
EAST, 1933--41
Volume 4 ISOLATION AND EXPANSION: SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY, 1939--41 (in preparation)
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLITICS OF' NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN EUROPE, 1969--87
Malcolm R. Hill and Richard McKay

SOVIET PRODUCT QUALITY
Peter Kneen
SOVIET SCIENTISTS AND THE STATE: An Examination of the Social
and Political Aspects of Science in the USSR
Ronald I. Kowalski
THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY IN CONFLICT: The Left Communist
Opposition of 1918
Nicholas Lampert
WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE SOVIET UNION: Complaints and
Abuses under State Socialism
Nicholas Lampert and Gabor T. Rittersporn (editors)
STALINISM: Its Nature and Aftermath
Neil Malcolm
SOVIET POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND AMERICAN POLITICS
Silvana Malle
EMPLOYMENT PLANNING IN THE SOVIET UNION: Continuity and
Change
David Mandel
THE PETROGRAD WORKERS AND THE FALL OF THE OLD
REGIME: From the February Revolution to the july Days, 1917
THE PETROGRAD WORKERS AND THE SOVIET SEIZURE OF
POWER: From thejuly Days 1917 tojuly 1918
Catherine Merridale
MOSCOW POLITICS AND THE RISE OF STALIN: The Communist
Party in the Capital, 1925-32
David Moon
RUSSIAN PEASANTS AND TSARIST LEGISLATION ON THE EVE
OF REFORM: Interaction between Peasants and Officialdom,
1825-1855
E.A. Rees
THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY IN DISARRAY: The XXVIII
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (editor)
STATE CONTROL IN SOVIET RUSSIA: The Rise and Fall of the
Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, 1920-34
Christopher J. Rice
RUSSIAN WORKERS AND THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARY
PARTY THROUGH THE REVOLUTION OF 1905-7
Richard Sakwa
SOVIET COMMUNISTS IN POWER: A Study of Moscow during the
Civil War, 1918-21
Jonathan R. Schiffer
SOVIET REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: The East-West Debate
over Pacific Siberian Development
Nobuo Shimotomai
MOSCOW UNDER STALINIST RULE, 1931-34
Daniel Thorniley
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET RURAL COMMUNIST
PARTY, 1927-39
The Soviet Union and
the Threat froiD the
East, 1933-41
Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the
Pacific War
Jonathan Haslam
Senior Research Fellow in Politics
King's College, Cambridge
in association with
Palgrave Macmillan
© Jonathan Haslam 1992
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1992
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of

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Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this
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claims for damages.
First published 1992 by

THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
ISBN 978-1-349-05681-1 ISBN 978-1-349-05679-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-05679-8
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95
Contents
Preface VI
Negotiation from Weakness to Negotiation from

Strength, 1932-34 1
2 Deterrence and Attempted Detente, 1934-36 ~8
3 The Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern 54

4 The Sino-Japanese War and Soviet Aid to China,
1937-38 88
5 Frontier Fighting: Lake Khasan ( 1938) and
Kha1khin-Go1 ( 1939) 112
6 The Tables are Turned: Japan Appeases Russia,
1939-41 135
Conclusions 163
~~ 1~
Bibliography 193
Index 201
v
Preface
The substance of the account begins with Japan's rejection of a
non-aggression pact with the USSR in December 1932 and ends
with the signature of a neutrality pact in April 1941. The story
thus continues that begun in Soviet Foreign Poli<;J 1930-33: The
Impact of the Depression, which closed when the faults and weak-
nesses of the forced pace of industrialisation but few advantages
were apparent. A second volume, The Soviet Union and the Struggle
for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39, pursued the European half
of the story until the outbreak of war, but put Asian affairs aside.
The two accounts - Europe and Asia - are of course inextri-
cably entangled. But, as in Europe, events in the East also had a
dynamic of their own; and to have squeezed Soviet reactions to
both Germany and Japan in one volume would have been
impracticable. A final volume, Isolation and Expansion: Soviet
Foreign Poli<;J, 1939-41, will return us to the European arena to
examine the events leading to the German invasion of the Soviet
Union in June 1941. It is hoped to complete this as soon as the
Soviet Foreign Ministry has published the diplomatic correspon-
dence for the years 1939--41.
At the time of writing, however, Soviet Foreign Ministry
archives are still de facto closed to foreign scholars working on the
1930s, despite the resolution of the Council of Ministers of 10
August 1990 formally granting such access. As a result I have
scavenged far and wide over many years to fill in the gaps left by
the edited Soviet diplomatic correspondence for the years 1932 to
1939. During the course of research I have, however, benefited
from the help of a number of people and institutions: Professor
Ian Nish (London School of Economics), Professor Robert
Davies (Birmingham University) and Dr Zara Steiner (New
Hall, Cambridge), who kindly read the manuscript and offered
key criticisms; Mrs Helen Foster Snow, widow of the late Edgar
Snow, who granted permission to consult the Nym Wales collec-
tion at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Professor
Lyman Van Slyke (Stanford University); Professor John
Stephan (University of Hawaii); Professor Alvin Coax (San
Diego State University); Dr John Garver (Georgia Institute of
Technology); Professor Chalmers Johnson (University of Cali-
VI
Preface Vll
fornia, San Diego); Tanya Litvinov; two young research assis-

tants, Tetsuo Kojima and Hao Yu-fan, who translated material
from japanese and Chinese respectively; the Bibliotheque de
Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (Nanterre); the
CREES Library (Birmingham University); Cambridge Univer-
sity Library; the Hoover Institution Library and Archive;
Thejohns Hopkins University SAIS, which processed innumer-
able inter-library loan requests with welcome fortitude; the ar-
chives of the Public Record Office (Kew); the archives of the Quai
d'Orsay (Paris); the archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry (Far-
nesina, Rome); the diplomatic and military sections of the US
National Archives (Washington DC); and the archives of the
Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York). Last but not least, I
must thank SAIS, the Hoover Institution and King's College,
Cambridge, for financing various segments of the research; and
Professors Alex Dallin, Gail Lapidus and George Breslauer for
arranging a year at Stanford and one at Berkeley courtesy of the
Berkeley-Stanford Program on a light teaching load, without which
the volume would have taken even longer to complete.
1 Negotiation from
Weakness to Negotiation
from Strength, 1932-34
It is easily forgotten that the Soviet Union was not merely a
European but also an Asian Power. And, despite the bold
declarations of revolutionary principle at the time of the
October revolution, Soviet foreign policy bore the ambiguous
hallmarks of both Tsarist geopolitics and revolutionary
in tern a tionalism.
Soviet dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo and the
conduct of diplomacy along traditional lines testified to the
continuity of policy with the Tsarist era. Soviet sponsorship of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) illustrated Moscow's ulti-
mate commitment to the cause of world revolution. The policy
that resulted from the pull between these occasionally conflicting
objectives was a curious and frequently uneasy mix of support
for revolution and the practice of classical Realpolitik.
First, the element of continuity: the regime governing relations
between Japan and the Western powers was that set by the
Washington treaties of 1922 which, inter alia, created a balance in
naval armaments between Tokyo and the democracies. The
Soviet Union - unrecognised by the United States and Japan,
eclipsed as a power in the Far East and lacking a fleet in the
Pacific- was not invited and played no part in the proceedings.
Instead its relations with Japan were based on the Portsmouth
treaty concluded at the close of the Russo-Japanese war on 5
September 1905. That treaty was long seen by the Bolsheviks as
a bad end to a bad war. In the Bolshevik paper Proletarii,
Vorovsky - later assassinated by the Whites as Soviet head of
mission in Switzerland - warned that 'The shameful end to a
shameful war will leave its traces for years to come.' 1
The Portsmouth treaty deprived Russia of Southern Sakhalin
and the southern half of its railway network in Manchuria. The
former effectively cut Russian naval communications between
Vladivostok and Kamchatka. The latter gave the Japanese a
firm foothold from which they could, when events turned to their
2 The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East
advantage, expand to the north and jeopardise rail communi-

cations between European Russia and Vladivostok. 2 The humili-
ating impact of the treaty was not assuaged by the subsequent
conclusion of a general political agreement on 30 July 1907,
which was prompted by the need to realign Russo-] apanese
relations to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, now that Russia stood
with Britain and France in opposition to the Central Powers in
Europe. The 1907 agreement contained a secret treaty according
to which the Russians acknowledged Japanese hegemony over
Korea in return for Japanese acknowledgement of Russian hege-
mony over Outer Mongolia. 3
The Portsmouth treaty left an ugly scar on Russo-Japanese
relations, a wound reopened by Japanese military intervention
in 1918-22. Negotiating Japanese diplomatic recognition dur-
ing the next two years, the Russians were forced to accept the
Portsmouth treaty as the basis for future relations. The conven-
tion establishing diplomatic relations signed in Peking on 20
January 1925 included in article 2 the statement that the Soviet
Union 'agrees that the treaty concluded in Portsmouth on 5
September 1905 remains in full force'. 4 At the same time the
Russians were most concerned to leave the door ajar for treaty
revision. Denied that opportunity in the text of the convention,
the Russians issued a unilateral declaration:
Entering this day into signature of a Convention on the
fundamental principles of mutual relations between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the undersigned
Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has
the honour to state that recognition by his Government of the
validity of the Portsmouth treaty of 5 September 1905 in no
way means that the Government of the Union shares with the
former Tsarist government political responsibility for con-
clusion of the above-named treaty. 5
The full significance of that statement became evident much
later, at Yalta in February 1945, when Stalin insisted on inser-
tion in the Allied agreement of a declaration referring to 'The
restoration of rights belonging to Russia, violated by the
treacherous attack by Japan in 1904 .... ' 6 The Soviet Union
entered the Pacific War on 9 August. And on 3 September Stalin
spoke to the Soviet people of 'our special account to settle with
Japan':
Negotiation: From Weakness to Strength 3
Japan began its aggression against our country as early as

1904, at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. As you know, in
February 1904, when talks were still under way between
Japan and Russia, Japan, having taken advantage of the
weakness of the Tsarist government, unexpectedly and
treacherously, without a declaration of war, fell upon our
country and attacked the Russian squadron in the Port-
Arthur region .... As you know, in the war with japan Russia
suffered defeat at that time. Japan used Tsarist Russia's defeat
to seize Southern Sakhalin from Russia, to gain a foothold on
the Kurile islands and thereby lock in our country in the East
from all egress into the open sea - consequently also to all
egress to the ports of Soviet Kamchatka and Soviet Chukotka.
More than once Stalin emphasised that 'the defeat of Russian

forces in 1904 in the period of the Russo-] apanese war left
painful memories in the consciousness of the people. It left a
dark stain on our country. Our people believed and expected
that the day would come when Japan would be beaten and the
stain would be removed.' 7
The elements of continuity are thus well attested. The elements
of change are no less apparent. Back in 1905 the Bolsheviks were
not unnaturally ambivalent about Japanese aggression; at the
very least it shook the foundations ofTsarist power and prepared
the path for revolution. And after Lenin led the Bolsheviks to
power in November 1917, they declared all Tsarist treaties -
particularly those predicated upon territorial expansion - null
and void. They sought to spread their revolution across the globe
and set up the Communist International (Comintern) for that
very purpose in March 1919. The gap between the old and the
new regimes must have seemed unbridgeable.
Yet Communism appeared a force unlikely to triumph in
China for the foreseeable future. Under Lenin - and with the
British empire the leading adversary of Soviet power - the
Russians saw their interests best served by the triumph of
'national liberation movements' against Western imperialism.
Thus it was that after the Allied war of intervention against the
Bolsheviks, the Soviet regime forged a strategy of support for
'bourgeois nationalists' in the colonial and semi-colonial world
as the most practicable means to dislodge Western dominance in
Asia. In China this meant a coalition between Communist
(CCP) and Nationalist (Kuomintang) forces, with the CCP as

the junior partner. However, the unexpectedly rapid growth of
the CCP within this coalition during the revolution against
British imperialism ( 1925-27) made Kuomintang leader
Chiang Kai-shek receptive to secret overtures from Britain to
break with and crush his domestic Communist allies and dis-
sociate himself from Soviet patronage in return for major con-
cessions to Chinese nationalism. As a result, any further
expansion of Soviet influence - whether through the CCP or
from the presence of Soviet military advisers - was firmly
checked for years to come.
By that time Stalin had emerged as the leading figure in the
Soviet dictatorship. His cast of mind and that of those closest to
him favoured a resurgence of old-style Russian nationalism in
new-guise socialist patriotism; this was typified in the re-
emergence of the Tsarist term Rodina (Motherland) in a Pravda
editorial on 9 June 1934. The upsurge in revolutionary proselyt-
ism had never entirely engulfed pre-revolutionary thinking; now,
under Stalin, the element of continuity between Tsarist and
Soviet foreign policy reasserted itself. In 1929 Soviet troops
attacked Chinese forces that had attempted to repossess the
Chinese Eastern Railway. Soviet Russia thereby risked identifi-
cation with the imperialist powers in China, a risk taken to
sustain a foothold in an area strategically critical to the security
of the Soviet Far Eastern region. Obstinate geopolitical realities
thus reinforced pre-revolutionary means of dealing with the
outside world. But Soviet irredentism had yet to assert itself and
for one very basic and practical reason: while the Soviet Union
remained weak relative to the outer world, all notions of
re-annexing territory lost in 1918-20 were suppressed in subor-
dination to the higher priorities of domestic economic recon-
struction and forced social change, the so-called 'revolution from
above'. The Russians still did not possess the power to overturn
the Portsmouth treaty regime. During the 1920s the revolution-
ary instruments of Soviet state policy- for what else had foreign
Communist Parties become? - proved unavailing in the battle
to redress the balance of power in the region. And by the early
1930s the balance turned even further to Soviet disadvantage.
A foolhardy revolutionary offensive launched by the CCP from
the countryside against the cities in 1930 played into the hands
of those Japanese bent on the colonisation of the Asian main-
land. The planting of a bomb on the South Manchurian Railway

on 18 September 1931 served as the transparent pretext for
Japan's expansion into China, which by the end of 1932 had
culminated in the occupation of Manchuria. Japan's Kwantung
Army command was all too eager to deliver the Russians an
early blow. The mixture of anti-Bolshevik fears and the beliefin
Japan's imperial mission proved potent inspiration. Within
Japan the government proved incapable of taking control of the
crisis created by the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Reluctant
to contemplate the violent consequences of attempting to rein in
the Kwantung Army, successive Japanese administrations, be-
ginning with the Minseito cabinet under Wakatsuki, supinely
accepted and legitimised the aggression that followed from the
Mukden incident. In case any politicians thought to act differ-
ently, the assassination at the hands of young officers of Prime
Minister lnukai in May 1932 underlined the heavy price that
would be paid for resistance to extremist demands.
Abroad such reluctance was equally apparent. The Great
Depression that had in no small measure precipitated the growth
of extremist politics in Japan also undercut the ability and the
will of the other Powers to intervene on China's behalf. 8 The
United States, in so far as it was prepared to act, would not act
alone. In Europe the British economy was at its nadir. On 15
September 1931 the Atlantic Fleet mutinied at Invergordon over
a cut in pay and on 21 September Britain abandoned the gold
standard. The French were in a better financial position but,
fearing for their colonies in Indochina and at odds with Moscow
over Communist subversion, were not entirely averse to Japan
striking to the north rather than to the south.
The Russians were thus on their own. Half of the railway that
ran through Manchuria lay in their hands and became the target
for Kwantung army ambitions. The Russians were under press-
ure to allow Japanese forces to use the Chinese Eastern Railway
(CER) to further their occupation and subjugation of Man-
churia. When the Russians refused to succumb, the Japanese
simply took direct control over parts of the CER, prompting idle
Soviet protests that these actions breached the Portsmouth
treaty. The key question Soviet representatives in Tokyo had to
answer was whether the Japanese were likely to attack the Soviet
Union in the near future. The Soviet polpred (ambassadorial
equivalent) was Aleksandr Troyanovsky (of whom, more later).
The leading figure in the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs

(Narkomindel) responsible for policy towards the Far East was
Lev Karakhan (ofwhom, more later). On 31 March 1932, with a
major crisis in Soviet-Japanese relations, Troyanovsky sent an
interesting despatch to Karakhan attempting to clarify Japan's
immediate intentions:
The foreign policy programme of Japanese imperialism has

included the seizure of Manchuria, the subjection of China in
its entirety to Japanese influence and expansion in various
forms - from economic penetration to the direct seizure of our
Far East. These goals were formulated in the famous memor-
andum of Baron Tanaka [of 1927], and by various declar-
ations by Japanese politicians.
The realisation of this programme has depended upon
prevailing conditions and the correlation of forces.
In this respect last autumn proved a favourable time, and
they embarked on military action to seize Manchuria as the
basic and most immediate imperialist task.
The Manchurian events have evolved by degrees. It is
possible that there were some disagreements between the
military and the leaders of Japanese foreign policy of the
Shidehara trend .... In any event the military, advocates of
more decisive and broader action in Manchuria, predomi-
nated .... The minimum programme has become the sub-
jugation of the whole of Manchuria, and the maximum
programme- the subjugation of the whole of China and plans
for seizing our Far East: the maritime province and Sakhalin
first and foremost .... We have information from various
sources to the effect that the Japanese general staff is of the
firm conviction that neither America nor the USSR is willing
or able to fight. With regard to America and the USSR it is
considered that for the Japanese imperialists now is the most
favourable moment, since in the long term the United States
will strengthen its fleet in accordance with the decisions of th~
London [naval] conference, and the USSR, now 'impotent',
will gradually reinforce its military might.
Troyanovsky tried not to sound entirely pessimistic, however.

He offered two reasons why the Japanese might be deterred from
war with the Soviet Union: in Shanghai the Chinese 19th army
had unexpectedly offered stiff resistance to Japan; and along the

border with Manchuria the Soviet Union was reinforcing its
lines of defence. 'This does not mean that we are guaranteed
against military conflict', Troyanovsky cautiously concluded.
'Of course, the danger of this is now very great and became so
when the Japanese "line of defence" came right up to our
frontiers. The slightest change in the international situation
might easily create a military situation, all the more because as
many willing hands as required can be found to drag us into a
war.' 9
A further despatch, dated 19 August, confirmed that the 'basic
question in our work remains the question of the war danger'.
That tension in relations had reached a peak in March-April
was confirmed by a Japanese journalist, who underlined that
'the navy, and Admiral Kato especially, played a major role in
forestalling an armed conflict between the USSR and Japan at
that time'. Thereafter the crisis cleared, only to gather strength
again by August. Troyanovsky now reported from various
informants 'that General Araki [War Minister] and his group has
once more recently raised a campaign for war with the USSR'.
The majority of the Japanese government did not, however,
share Araki's views, nor did society at large, though this was
difficult to estimate. 'Recently,' he wrote, 'in connection with
Araki's campaign, there have been expressions of opposition, in
particular by General Koiso, who on a farewell visit solemnly
assured me of the peace-loving intentions towards us of Japan
and the Japanese army. But', he cautioned, 'they cannot lessen
the energy we put into our peace policy. All in all we must be on
guard and not under any circumstances be taken by surprise.' 10
We have no record of how, precisely, Moscow reacted to Troya-
novsky. But confirmation of the need for vigilance came from the
Soviet mission in London, which reported: 'A few days ago
Strachey (former member of parliament) spoke to Boothby.
Boothby told him that Eden (under-secretary for foreign affairs)
informed him that some months ago the Japanese government
asked the English and French governments whether it could
count on their direct support in the event of war with the USSR.
In Eden's words, the English government replied that at the
present stage - no. n•
The Soviet leadership dominated by Stalin naturally preferred
to take a firm stand to deter the Japanese. The memories of
1904-5 and of the Japanese war of intervention in 1918-22 still

rankled. Yet from 1931 until the autumn of 1933 the Russians
lacked the means to deter Japan. Under constant pressure to
toughen its stand against Tokyo, but wary of acting resolutely
without the force to back it up, Moscow decided on an abject,
though they hoped temporary, policy of appeasing the Japanese.
Mikhail Karsky, polpred (ambassador equivalent) in Lithuania,
'volunteered' to the US charge d'affaires 'that his Government
would not consider except under [the] most provocative circum-
stances a decision of war upon Japan as a result of the latter's
activities in Manchuria' . 12 As the Soviet Deputy Commissar for
Foreign Affairs Lev Karakhan explained to the Chinese: 'Our
policy is to keep a vigilant eye on events as they unfold and not to
intervene. This is the only correct and possible policy for now.'~ 3
This did not mean the absence of bellicose expressions of anti-
Japanese feeling in the Soviet press. But it meant that, when
words had to be backed by deeds, the Russians would invariably
retreat; and that, wherever possible, they would seek pre-
emptively to remove the most obvious sources of conflict with
Japan.
Thus on 31 December 1931 the Soviet Government had
offered the Japanese a non-aggression pact. 14 Non-aggression
pacts were by now a customary means by which the Soviet
Union demonstrated its pacific intentions and simultaneously
tested the intentions of the other party. Not until a year later, on
13 December 1932, did Japan reply; the Japanese note stated
that 'the time' was 'not ripe for the formal opening of
negotiations'. 15 Japan's refusal was scarcely a surprise. It did,
however, confirm existing fears. In these circumstances Moscow
moved rapidly to alert the world to Japan's rejection of the
proposal. First the Russians asked the Japanese for agreement to
publish the notes exchanged. When Tokyo refused and the
Japanese press published distorted accounts of the notes, the
Russians went ahead on their own. 16 The Soviet reply and a
summary of the Japanese note appeared in /zvestiya on 17 J anu-
ary 1933, much to the annoyance of the Japanese. 17 The Soviet
Union had no aggressive intentions, Pravda asserted, but the
Japanese had rejected the offer of a pact; 'from this one can draw
the appropriate conclusion', the paper concluded ominously . 18
The point was further elaborated by Commissar for Military and
Naval Affairs Kliment Voroshilov on 19 February. Referring to
the behaviour of the Japanese, Voroshilov warned that 'we

cannot but allow for this disquieting fact in the measures we are
taking, particularly in defence of Soviet Far Eastern frontiers' . 19
Soviet fears were not entirely unfounded. On 7 January 1933
the Marquis Kido recorded the words of Vice President of the
Privy Council Baron Hiranuma, who 'said that the army advo-
cated war against Russia', and on 18 April Kido had a conver-
sation with Lieutenant-Colonel Suzuki of the Bureau of Military
Affairs, who said 'there are two kinds of enemies, an absolute
enemy and a relative enemy. Since Russia aimed to destroy the
national structure of Japan, he cited Russia as the absolute
enemy. He absolutely opposed a non-aggression pact with
Russia ... .' 20 In January-February 1933 the Japanese launched a
further assault on China, attempting to seize Jehol in Inner Mon-
golia. This was a vital strategic position if the Japanese hoped to
attack in the direction of Peking (Beijing) or, more ominously for
Moscow, in the direction of Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Far
East.
This new Japanese campaign coincided with a debate in the
League of Nations Council at Geneva on the long-awaited report
of the Lytton Commission concerning the origins of the Mukden
incident of 1931. On 24 February 1933 a League Assembly
debate closed with the condemnation of Japan's aggression and
a call on members to withhold recognition, de facto as well as de
jure, of Manchukuo (Manchuria), proclaimed in March 1932.
The discussion then moved on to the issue of arms supplies. It
was at this stage- 24-25 February- that the Secretary-General
of the League, Eric Drummond, wrote to the Soviet Government
asking for cooperation. 21 The Chinese (Nationalist) Government
was not alone in hoping for Soviet agreement. But they were to
be disappointed. On 7 March Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Maxim Litvinov wrote to Drummond rejecting the invitation.
His letter emphasised the USSR's 'strict neutrality' with respect
to the hostilities in the Far EastY 'The League of Nations has
"resolved" the Manchurian problem, and after the League of
Nations decision Japanese forces have begun their attack on
Jehol. This serves as the best illustration of what a decision of the
League of Nations is worth', crowed Kommunisticheskii lnternatsion-
al, the organ of the Comintern. 23
Communist commentators might scoff at League impotence,
but the USSR was equally impotent. The first Five Year Plan
that was destined to provide the Soviet Union with a heavy-

industry base for its war machine at a technological level com-
parable to that of the Great Powers was formally completed
early at the end of 1932; in practice, the industrial indices were
wildly exaggerated, much remained to be completed and the
country's communications system - in particular, the railway
network - was groaning under the enormous strains imposed
upon it. More menacingly, the forced collectivisation of agricul-
ture begun in 1929 led to widespread unrest in the countryside.
This unrest seriously undermined morale in the armed forces,
since the better-fed sons of the wealthier peasants swelled the
lower ranks, who now found themselves suppressing their kith
and kin in the name of Stalin. 24 By April 1932 the political
directorate of the Soviet armed forces concluded that its oper-
ations had been inadequate in combating 'negative feelings
among the Red Army masses'. 'Kulak elements' had been at-
tempting to undermine morale 'through letters'. 'Negative politi-
cal sentiments and even cases of desertion are not a rare event', a
report concluded. 25 This was one unanticipated and potentially
disastrous by-product of agricultural collectivisation; the other
was famine. A serious shortfall in food production in 1931,
further exacerbated by massive grain exports to pay for indus-
try's re-equipment and the requisitioning offurther food supplies
for the armed forces in the event ofwar with Japan (more on this
below, pp. 28-30), had by the summer of 1932 begun to wreak
its deadly effect on the health and mortality rates of the popula-
tion as a whole. 'There's no bread, no meat, no fats- nothing', a
senior OGPU official in Leningrad confessed to the British
ambassador in an uncharacteristic outburst of candour. 26 And
by the autumn of 1932 Stalin was under growing pressure to
withdraw his disastrous policies or step down. 27 The net effect of
this domestic crisis was to undermine Soviet diplomacy in its
dealings with the Japanese threat.
The Russians were thus in no condition to reject de facto
recognition of Manchukuo, and the frustration this induced
became apparent during the crises that came to a head over
possession ofthe Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). Theoretically
the CER gave the Soviet armed forces a forward base in Man-
churia: in practice it left them with a likely causus belli with
Japan. From the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis onwards the
Russians found themselves faced with Japanese demands for the
use of the railway to transport troops to the battlefront against

the Chinese. Unable to prevent the Japanese from doing what
they chose, the Russians found themselves aiding the invading
forces by giving them access to the CER: a humiliating experi-
ence that compounded the humilations of 1904-5 and 1918-22,
and which could not be endured indefinitely.
APPEASEMENT ON TRIAL
Soviet policy on the CER had to be reconsidered. Continued

possession provided a standing provocation to the bellicose
Kwantung Army Command. By mid-April the Russians had
anyway all but lost control over the entire line. On 16 April the
Soviet consul at the eastern end of the CER, Pogranichnaya,
summed up the situation in a telegram to Moscow:
Chaos on the eastern line of the CER continues. . . . At
Pogranichnaya and along the entire line, the railways admin-
istration has lost any meaning; everything is in the hands of
the Japanese and white guard police, who wilfully take control
of railway premises, give orders to the railway workers and
threaten them. 28
As an immediate measure, the Soviet Government protested to
Japan on the day the telegram arrived; but to no result. 29
Something else had to be tried. In 1930, a matter of months after
defeating Chinese nationalist forces that had attempted to seize
the CER, the Russians had offered to sell it to them. But
negotiations had not made sufficient progress when the Japanese
overran Manchuria. 30 In 1932 the idea of selling the CER to the
Japanese had been raised on instruction by polpred Aleksandr
Troyanovsky in Tokyo. 31 Born into the lesser gentry- a military
family in Tula- on 2 January 1882, Troyanovsky was educated
at the Mikhailovsky artillery school. Despite involvement in
revolutionary activities from 1902, he served at Harbin in an
artillery unit and on the front line in the Russo-Japanese war
( 1904-5). After renewed involvement in the revolutionary
movement he fled abroad and from 1910 travelled through
Western Europe, living in Switzerland, Paris and Vienna, before
returning during the February revolution in 1917. There he was
mobilised into the army on the south-western front before
joining the Reds and fighting in the ensuing civil war. But he
remained a Menshevik, at least until 1923. During the period of
the New Economic Policy he held various posts, including from
1924 to 1927 as chairman of the RSFSR state trading organis-
ation (Gostorg) and as a member of the ruling collegium of the
People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade (Narkomvneshtorg).
On 16 November 1927 he was appointed polpred (ambassador
equivalent) to Japan. Certainly after 1931, when the Soviet
Union suffered innumerable humiliations at the hands of the
Japanese, he strongly favoured a policy of firm resistance; and
this ultimately brought him into conflict with Litvinov. Memo-
ries of 1904-5 undoubtedly played their part in this difference of
opinion. The Tsarist Government had given in to ignominious
conditions for peace in 1905 to free its hands to crush the
revolutionary movement at home. Defeat at the hands of Japan
was thus inextricably bound up - in the minds of some Bolshe-
viks - with the defeat of the first attempted revolution. Troya-
novsky later wrote: 'The Tsarist Government tried to portray the
results of the peace treaties as a great success because the
internal situation in Russia in 1905 was for the Tsarist Govern-
ment extremely burdensome. The revolution was then ad-
vancing. The Tsarist Government had to hide the fact that it
gave in to disadvantageous peace terms in order to crush the
revolution.' 32
Nothing came of the idea of selling the CER to Japan until 24
April 1933 when Japan's ambassador to Moscow, Ota, raised
the matter with Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs (for the
East) Lev Karakhan. 33 At Litvinov's bidding the Soviet leader-
ship accepted the offer, and the decision was relayed to Ota on 2
May. 34 But, as with other foreign-policy matters, the Soviet
Government was not of one mind, even under Stalin.
The offer to sell the CER was extremely unpopular with those
in the Soviet Government, and not merely Troyanovsky, who
wanted a firm line of resistance to Japanese aggression. Karakh-
an was prominent among those who held such views. Some-
thing of a dandy, maliciously described by the impish Karl
Radek as the 'Ass ofClassical Beauty', Karakhan was born on
1 February (new style) 1889 in Tbilisi, Georgia, the son of a
well-intentioned but ineffectual lawyer from Armenia. He
joined the revolutionary movement in 1904 while still at school.
A year later, with Russia's ignominious defeat at the hands of the
Japanese, Lev's father moved the family out to Harbin in Man-

churia: the chief city on the CER, densely populated by Russians
and latterly imbued with fierce anti-Japanese sentiment. Karak-
han took to underground agitation and, although he moved to St
Petersburg three years later, he continued to commute to and
from the Russian Far East, mainly Vladivostok, on revolution-
ary business. Karakhan belonged to the group known as the
mezhraiontsy - those who tried to heal the split between the
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks from a centrist position. On 20
November 1917, barely a fortnight after the Bolsheviks (merged
with the mezhraiontsy) had seized power, Karakhan was, some-
what to his own surprise, appointed 'assistant to the comrade
People's Commissar' for Foreign Affairs Lev Trotsky. Karakhan
then served as secretary to the delegation at the peace talks with
Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1917-18, even though he knew no
German. He subsequently took charge of oriental affairs on 25
April 1919 under Commissar Georgii Chicherin, Trotsky's
successor. 35 At that time Lenin essentially formulated his own
foreign policy. But after Lenin's death both Karakhan and
Chicherin increasingly came into their own. It was Karakhan
who handled the opening of diplomatic relations with Sun
Vat-sen's infant Chinese Republic. It was Karakhan who nego-
tiated the Sino-Soviet agreement allowing the Chinese some role
in the management of the CER in 1924. 36 lt was Karakhan who,
as polpred in Peking and doyen of the diplomatic corps in the
Chinese capital, had ensured the provision of aid to the Chinese
revolution in the attempt to oust the British from China.
Whereas Chicherin and Karakhan were determined enemies of
the British empire, then Deputy Commissar (for the West)
Litvinov ultimately sought an accommodation with Britain and
belittled the prospects for and significance of revolution in the
East.
Litvinov was born Moishe Wallach on 17 July 1876 in Byalis-
tok, in the Polish borderlands of the Russian empire. The son of
a Jewish bank clerk, he was denied a proper secondary edu-
cation at a Gymnasium because of his race and instead attended
the Realschule. University was also closed to him for the same
reasons. He therefore entered the army, 37 being immensely
strong 38 and of considerable courage, as the next best avenue of
advancement; commerce - the traditional route upwards -
held no interest. In the army poor eyesight relegated him to the
quartermaster's store, where he educated himself further; and it

is here during idle hours that he took to Marxism. 39 He began a
subterranean life thereafter as a political agitator and before the
end of his second year of service he was arrested and incarcer-
ated in Kiev. Released from prison a convinced revolutionary, he
joined the abortive revolution in St Petersburg in 1905 and was
subsequently forced into exile and found sanctuary in Britain
three years later. There he worked selling agricultural machin-
ery, among other items, and giving Russian lessons, while also
playing a leading role as secretary of the Bolshevik emigre group
in London. By the tirr.e Ivan Maisky- a Menshevik- arrived
in 1912, Litvinov was already an 'old inhabitant'. As early as
this, Maisky was 'greatly struck by certain qualities which later
on made him one of the greatest statesmen in the Soviet Union-
his sober and powerful mind, his strong character, his gift for
quickly and firmly grasping the essentials of a question without
getting lost in the details, his bent for sarcasm, his fundamental
dislike of empty talk, his genius for organization. ' 40 By May 1921
he was first Deputy Commissar (for the West) at the Narkomin-
del - the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs - then run
by the eccentric ex-Menshevik Georgii Chicherin: where Litvi-
nov was dour, Chicherin was emotional; where Chicherin was
chaotic in his habits, Litvinov was the model of organisation;
where Chicherin remained the romantic idealist, Litvinov was
resolutely down to earth. It did not take much imagination to see
whom Stalin would prefer. By 1928- partly due to Chicherin's
ill-health but partly also due to his fall from favour- Litvinov
became de facto Commissar, a position formally confirmed in july
1930. 41 Louis Fischer, perhaps the most enterprising and open-
minded American journalist to work in Soviet Russia, and
certainly the best-informed, characterised Litvinov thus:
Maxim Litvinov is the coldest Bolshevik realist. Slogans never
misled him. He has cast off all illusions. 'The prospect ofworld
revolution disappeared on November 11th, 1918,' he said to
me. The corollary was that the prospect might reappear when
a second war commenced. Bukharin and others held to this
thesis, but Stalin frowned on it.
Litvinov would always accept a compromise if the alterna-
tive meant hurting the nation for a principle. Yet he is a
fighter and several times refused to yield to Stalin; indeed,
Soviet foreign policy between 1929 and May, 1939, followed

the pattern of Litvinov's mind more than his chiefs. In the
last two years during which Litvinov was Foreign Minister-
1937 to 1939- this was due to inertia and the absence of an
opportunity to launch a different policy.
Litvinov's foreign policy was to avoid trouble. Truest revol-
utionist, he wished to keep Soviet Russia at peace so it could
develop internally. He did not want to spend money on a Red
fleet, he told me. He sought to develop Soviet foreign trade.
He endeavoured to enhance Moscow's prestige by Soviet
participation in conferences, pacts, and agreements, Disar-
mament was his 'baby'. Chicherin never liked it. Assistant
Commissar Litvinov fought for Soviet adherence to the Kel-
logg pact. Chicherin, the Commissar, fought against this. The
Soviets adhered. It did no good, and Litvinov did not expect
war to be outlawed. But he wanted Moscow to appear on the
world stage. 42
After Chicherin's enforced retirement in 1930, Litvinov was
promoted to the post of Commissar. Karakhan, however, con-
tinued to exert his influence over policy in the Far East. Karakh-
an's dislike of the Japanese was as evident as was his commit-
ment to the new China; this inevitably affected his position on
the Manchurian crisis.
The Soviet Union was, of course, ultimately run from Stalin's
office. Officially the Politburo alone made decisions on policy
and neither Litvinov nor Karakhan were members. In practice,
however, under Stalin - not infrequently distracted by ques-
tions he felt he better understood - the power of decision,
though not of ultimate decision, was often delegated to those
with some knowledge of foreign policy matters; or, more accu-
rately, to those Stalin believed had some knowledge of foreign
policy matters (which included Molotov). This meant that Sta-
lin's precise position on any given issue remained unclear and
that disputes over policy could and did arise within the upper
reaches of the state and party apparatus; a process Stalin delib-
erately encouraged as a means of retaining ultimate control. In
terms of diplomacy it meant that although Litvinov had con-
siderable leeway in the conduct of day-to-day issues and essen-
tially had Stalin's commitment (until 1939) to his diplomatic
strategy, he nonetheless faced intermittent opposition from other
quarters that Stalin never entirely inhibited. The amiable but

rather slow-witted Commissar for Military Affairs Voroshilov
never presented a problem; indeed, during the early 1930s, he
and Litvinov got on rather well. The sly and devious Armenian,
Anastas Mikoyan, who took a direct interest in foreign trade
matters from his vantage-point in the Politburo, appreciated
Litvinov's understanding of the outer world. Lazar Kaganovich,
Stalin's ghoulish henchman and general troubleshooter, was
unlikely to present a problem while Stalin's own commitment to
Litvinov's position was clear, though his instincts certainly took
him in the opposite direction from Litvinov. The chief antagonist
was much more formidable, indeed at times an immovable
obstacle, Vyacheslav Molotov.
Born on 9 March 1890, Molotov joined the Bolsheviks at the
early age of sixteen. He never became part of the foreign emi-
gration. Instead he underwent intermittent arrest and exile
within Russia. This undoubtedly narrowed his world-view, as it
did that of Stalin, with whom he became closely associated on
becoming a secretary of the Central Committee in 1921 and
Politburo member in January 1926. Possessed of no direct ex-
perience of the outside world and no competence in any foreign
language, Molotov nonetheless falsely assumed he knew some-
thing of foreign policy after Stalin put him in temporary and
reliable custody of the Comintern in 1928-29 to keep his rivals
out. 43
Molotov soon came into collision with Litvinov. Personal
relations between the two, always bad, soon became acrimoni-
ous. Litvinov regarded him as a durak (fool) and did not hesitate
to say so. 44 The fact that Molotov was a Politburo member and
Litvinov merely a member of the Central Committee made no
difference to Litvinov's attitude. The fact that, knowing of this
enmity, Stalin gave Molotov, from December 1930 chairman of
the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), a role in
foreign policymaking, vividly illustrates Stalin's technique of
man-management. Traditionally Molotov, like his colleagues
Kaganovich, and later Zhdanov and Malenkov, has been viewed
as a nonentity who slavishly agreed with everything Stalin said
and did. But Molotov's behaviour after Stalin's death in advo-
cating a foreign-policy line independently of his rivals always
threw doubt on such a facile assumption. Now strong evidence
has emerged from two authoritative sources which indicates
Molotov did, indeed, have a mind of his own, and was certainly
perfectly capable of fighting his corner against even Stalin, much
as was Litvinov. It is apparently only because we have been
denied access to Politburo minutes and Stalin's papers that we
have hitherto known nothing of this. 'I would say', Khrushchev
recalls, 'that he [Molotov] was the only person in the Politburo,
who opposed Stalin on this or that question for the second
time.' 45 And in the opinion of Zhukov, who observed Molotov
with Stalin at close quarters for the first time in 1940-41,
Molotov 'exerted serious influence over Stalin, particularly in
questions of foreign policy, in which Stalin then, until the war,
considered him [Molotov] competent'. And when attacked by
Stalin, 'Molotov by no means always remained silent.' Indeed
'at times it reached the point where Stalin raised his voice and
even lost all self-control, and Molotov, smiling, rose from behind
the table and held firm to his point of view' .46
Normally such disputes were kept scrupulously secret. Those
which arose over relations with Japan and Germany were the
exception to the rule. This was no accident. Not only were these
the most crucial issues to be faced, but attitudes to Germany and
Japan were also closely interrelated: those who favoured a hard
line against Japan leaned towards a policy of appeasing Ger-
many; and those who favoured appeasing Japan more often than
not advocated a hard line against Germany. A further compli-
cating factor was that, as with Chicherin in the 1920s, the
Rapallo orientation in Soviet policy towards Europe went hand
in hand with a policy of fostering revolutionary nationalism
(backed by Communist Parties) in the Far East. Litvinov had
never felt comfortable with the Rapallo orientation and he had,
like Stalin, consistently discounted the prospects for world revol-
ution (Stalin contemptuously referred to the Comintern as the
lavochka). More than that, Litvinov also saw revolutionary agita-
tion abroad as a critical hindrance to stable relations with the
capitalist world. Although there was no personal animosity
between them (their families lived in the same building and their
wives were good friends), Karakhan and Litvinov occupied
opposite ends of the spectrum of opinion in Moscow. The
ultimate source of power, Stalin, was agnostic with respect to
diplomacy: more preoccupied with domestic issues and the
maintenance of his own personal supremacy, which was under
increasing attack with the famine and demands for a more
moderate agrarian policy, than distant though troubling issues

of international affairs.
The first sign of tensions at the top reached the French
embassy early in 1932. Ambassador Dejean informed Prime
Minister Pierre Laval in Paris of the clash between those advo-
cating a forward policy in the East, including Karakhan, and
those who pressed for a more passive line, above all Litvinov.
Stalin, beset with critical problems at home, favoured Litvinov's
line. Dejean reported: 'The two currents are now in balance [sic]
and Mr Karakhan, to whom the task falls to liquidate in the
name of the Soviet Government the policy of expansion of which
he had himself been - since the fall of the Tsarist regime - the
principal instrument, is manoeuvring as much as he can while
appearing to be resigned, in his heart of hearts, to make Stalin's
views his own.' 47 But the manoeuvring continued. A report was
despatched to Rome from the Italian ambassador in Berlin on 20
December 1932 that Litvinov had suggested Karakhan return to
China as polpred; Karakhan is said to have refused. 48 In February
1933 Karakhan dined with Sir Esmond Ovey, the British am-
bassador to Moscow. When challenged on Soviet military
vulnerability in the Far East, Karakhan shot back: 'We are not
so weak as people think'. 49 Similar views were expressed by
Troyanovsky, who told the commercial counsellor at the British
embassy in Tokyo 'that there was no danger of war for the next
four years .... He added that, if hostilities had broken out last
year [1932], the Japanese would have experienced unpleasant
surprises, owing to the insufficiency of their equipment in the
light of the necessities of modern warfare. ' 50 Soon more evidence
began to emerge. News of the Soviet offer to sell the CER came
as 'a rude shock' to the Chinese ambassador in Moscow. When
Yen questioned Karakhan, the latter denied an offer had been
made. Litvinov then confirmed the existence of the offer and
explained that he had not told Karakhan: a somewhat surprising
admission to the representative of a foreign Power, but Litvinov
was always nothing if not candid. Yen reported 'that Mr. Karak-
han, who had signed the Chinese Eastern Railway Agreement
with Dr. Wellington Koo, was naturally strongly opposed to
see[ing] that document become a scrap of paper through the
policy of Mr. Litvinov, made a desperate attempt to maintain its
integrity, and until the final die was cast ventured to say to me that
no such proposal had been made to the japanese Ambassador by
his Chief. He lost the fight, however.' 51 Later that month (May
1933) the British embassy reported 'that ... Litvinov's "pacific"
policy - treaties of non-aggression etc: - was not to the taste of
Karakhan'. 52
On 3 March, with Litvinov moving swiftly towards an accom-
modation with the capitalist democracies and with the League of
Nations requesting Soviet cooperation with respect to Japan,
Karakhan had outlined his alternative line in a letter to the
Politburo. 'It seems to me,' he wrote, 'there can be no two
options, that the most ideal way out of the crisis and from the
situation that has come about in the Far East for the USA and
for the other [sic] European Powers would be war between the
USSR and Japan. They will draw and push us into one.'
Karakhan thus appealed to the fundamentalist proposition that
ideological antagonisms between Soviet Russia and the capitalist
democracies would inevitably predominate over antagonisms
between capitalist democracies and the Fascist powers; it was
precisely this sort of fundamentalism that also made him and
others (including Molotov) averse to aligning with the democ-
racies against Nazi Germany. Speaking of the League of Na-
tions, upon which Litvinov increasingly hoped to rely, Karakhan
wrote: 'In the event of war all the existing resolutions, combi-
nations of Powers, the anti-Japanese front- all this will go to
the devil and only one problem will remain: how to make use of
the war that has arisen to extricate themselves from the crisis
and from the contradictions in the capitalist world at our
expense.' 53
This was Karakhan's swansong, however. Litvinov was in-
creasingly gaining influence over Stalin and others in the Polit-
buro. It was at this time that, in the course of a conversation
with Stalin on Far Eastern policy, Litvinov let slip the remark
that he feared Karakhan would not agree; whereupon Stalin said
there was no need to worry about Karakhan. 54 By the time the
Japanese decided to accept the CER offer- 23 May- word was
out that supervision of Far Eastern affairs had been removed
from Karakhan's control. 55 On 26 May Litvinov secured the
appointment of Grigorii Sokol'nikov (ni Briliant), a former
'rightist' and from 1929 to 1932 polpred in London. Sokol'nikov
had not much enjoyed London. He was not suited to diplomacy.
And neither he nor his wife- an aspirant writer- could speak
English fluently. 'They spent most of their leisure in the British
Museum reading room. Certainly they are strange members of

the diplomatic circle. The Ambassador would be more at home
as tutor in the WEA [Workers' Educational Association]', noted
Beatrice Webb, far more perspicacious about people than about
politics. 56 But whatever his flaws, Sokol'nikov's lack of expertise
in Far Eastern matters worked to Litvinov's advantage. For by
the time Sokol'nikov was appointed it was an accepted com-
monplace that Karakhan was 'notoriously on bad terms with
Litvinov', and the Japanese were as aware as everyone else of
their sharp differences over Far Eastern policy. 57
In what was most likely his last instruction as Deputy Com-
missar for Far Eastern Affairs to former me;:;hraionets Konstantin
Yurenev, who had replaced Troyanovsky as polpred in Tokyo,
Karakhan outlined the official rationale for selling the CER.
Yurenev had arri.ved in Tokyo in January 1933, and came with
views of the threat from Japan that were far more pessimistic
(and mainstream in Moscow) than those of his predecessor.
Born Konstantin Krotovskii in 1888 into the family of a railway
worker, he had joined the revolutionary movement in the heady
days of 1905. Three times he was arrested and exiled, including
several years' hard labour. After joining the Bolsheviks with the
other me;:;hraiont.ry in August 1917 and participating in the revolu-
tion in November, his efforts were directed towards the military
protection of the new state. He became a member of the col-
legium of the Commissariat for Military Affairs and served as a
member of the Eastern and later the Western front in 1919. In
June 1921 he was, like many others, surprised to find himself
transferred to diplomatic work. And after serving in Latvia,
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Persia and Austria as head of mission, he
moved to Tokyo. He was widely regarded by his foreign counter-
parts as 'skilful, amiable, tactful and apparently comparatively
honest' as a diplomat. 58
Karakhan wrote:
Our offer ... was aimed at not only liquidating this standing
source of misunderstandings and conflicts ... but was also
aimed at another no less important goal.
In Japan there exist two tendencies in relation to us. The
one- warlike, which Araki [War Minister] and a significant
section of the military represent, which favours war with
us .... And the other line, a line of peace with us, which is
represented by part of the government and, evidently, Saito

[Prime Minister] himself and a range of influential industrial-
ists and financiers, circles in the navy department and, in all
likelihood, a significant proportion of diplomatic represen-
tatives.
The offer to sell the CER was thus explained as a means of
undermining 'the proponents of war' and of buttressing 'the
proponents of peace'. Karakhan could not, however, resist con-
cluding the letter with reservations that in fact reflected his own
position:
The other side of our offer consists in the fact that it makes it
possible for the Japanese to evaluate our move as a sign of
weakness and could give them a basis for pressure on other
questions: on fisheries, the Sakhalin concessions .... The
Japanese must be made to understand that the CER and
questions tied to Manchuria, i.e., problems beyond the bor-
ders of our territory, are one issue; their claims concerning
questions within the borders of the issue are another matter. 59
These fears were echoed in rumours - most likely unfounded
- that Voroshilov objected to those advocating sale of the CER
as peace at any price, even at the price of Vladivostok. 60 But
opposition evidently continued even after the opening of the
CER negotiations on 26 June. An article appeared in the Party
theoretical journal Bol'shevik on 31 July signed 'Kuznetskii' -
most likely the pseudonym for an authoritative figure at the
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs located at Kuznetskii Most in
Moscow. The article justified selling the railway. But it also
aired the same fears that Karakhan had earlier expressed. 'Kuz-
netskii' made a point of attacking articles in the japanese press
which had described the Soviet Government's position 'as
"withdrawal" of the Soviet Union from the shores of the Pacific
ocean, as "the liquidation" ofthe Soviet Far East, as a readiness
to sell Japan the Ussuri railways, Vladivostok, Sakhalin, Kam-
chatka and so forth'. More cautious elements in Japan were
saying that even 'if agreement to sell the CER does not yet mean
a complete re-evaluation of Soviet positions in the Far East, it
would in any case ultimately lead to that through the force of
some sort of inexorable logical development'. 'Kuznetskii' also
attacked leaders of the Second (Socialist) International for
presenting the Tokyo talks 'as the capitulation of the Soviet

Union in the face of world imperialism in general and in the face
of Japanese imperialism in particular .' 61
Such talk was circulating in Moscow, otherwise it would not
have been necessary to rebut such arguments in Bol'shevik. This
gives some credence to the recollections of former officer in the
Red Army Eric Wollenberg, who remembers 'Red officers ...
"in despair" at the meek spirit in which the Soviet Government
swallowed all the provocations ofJapanese imperialism and thus
sacrificed the Chinese Revolution. The phrase "opening the
front" was coined to express the passivity of the Soviet foreign
policy towards Japanese aggression, i.e., Stalin was considered
to have "opened the front" of the Chinese Revolution to Japan-
ese imperialism.' 62 Yet Stalin's native caution in such matters
made him reluctant to identify too closely with any particular
line in foreign policy; as a result disputes continued to smoulder
even after the Politburo had apparently reached a firm decision.
REJECTION OF APPEASEMENT
Negotiations on the sale ofthe railway opened on 26June with a

Russian demand for 250 million roubles; the Manchukuo-
Japanese delegation offered 50 million paper yen - about one-
tenth the Soviet figure. 63 The Japanese decided to bring down
the Soviet price by other means; as a result Litvinov's policy
suffered a severe blow. On 19 September the Japanese Consul-
General in Harbin instructed thejapanese ambassador in Man-
chukuo that the decision had been taken to arrest six Soviet CER
employees. 64 The Russians knew what was afoot: they had
broken the Japanese code. On 21 September Sokol'nikov warned
Ota, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, that his government
had 'reliable information' that on the instructions of the
Japanese Government the Manchukuo authorities intended to
infringe Soviet rights on the railway 'within the next few days' .65
The Russians warned that this would reduce the talks to
nothing; 66 and Sokol'nikov's statement was duly published in
/zvestiya on 22 September. Undeterred, two days later the Man-
chukuo authorities arrested the six men. Yurenev warned the
new Foreign Minister of Japan, Hirota, that Moscow might
Negotiatif!n: From Weakness to Strength 23
publish the information it had that the arrests were pre-planned
by the Japanese. 67 This warning was published in hvestiya on 30
September. That day in Tokyo Zheleznyakov, secretary to the
Soviet delegation at the negotiations, blocked the suggestion
from the Manchukuo secretary, Sigihara, that the talks be resumed:
'the Soviet delegation considers the convocation of meetings in
the situation created by the Harbin conflict to be pointless and
impossible' .68 The Japanese were thunderstruck; for the first
time since the Manchurian incident the Soviet Government had
taken a firm stand against Japan. Something had clearly
changed in Moscow. What had emerged was a new conscious-
ness of power in the Soviet Union - a surge of self-confidence
resulting from the first effective results of industrialisation, a
successful harvest, the substantial reinforcement of Soviet milit-
ary capability in the Far East, and an end to Soviet isolation in
the region with the prospect of diplomatic recognition by (and
hopes for an alliance with) the United States.
The new thinking was outlined in a letter to Yurenev from
Sokol'nikov on 17 October 1933. Sokol'nikov now sounded much
like Karakhan. 69 Faced with the prospect of a conflict with the
United States, the Japanese would face a choice between settling
relations with the Soviet Union on peaceful terms or launching a
preventive war against the Russians. Sokol'nikov felt that the
'military-fascist grouping' in Tokyo was moving to the option of
preventive war. At the very least they were counting on obtain-
ing from the Russians what they needed through the threat of
force, so that a preventive war would prove unnecessary; an
indispensable precondition envisaged by the Japanese was, of
course, 'the withdrawal or the most extensive reduction in our
armed forces in the Far East'. Sokol'nikov continued:
Undoubtedly thoughts of this kind are taking shape in the

minds ofJapanese politicians .... Faced with such a situation,
our policy, while maintaining our basic orientation towards
peace, cannot be a position of concessions and sufferance
towards the Japanese military and of painting over provo-
cations and outrages which the Japanese Government indul-
ges in. We are planning and will implement a firm line of
resistance to Japanese importunities, a decisive line com-
pletely exposing Japanese provocations, clarifying for the
whole country and, above all, for the whole world the true
character of Japanese policy in the Far East in relation to the
Soviet Union. Such a line stems from an awareness that if
worst comes to worst and the Japanese military actually
carried out an attempted attack on the Soviet Union, we could
completely successfully drive them back. The situation is now
truly different from what it was l t-2 years ago, and we feel
far from defenceless .... Should the intention of the Japanese
military to prosecute a preventive war against the USSR be
final, then concessions on our part could make sense only in
the event of our being prepared to consider these concessions
inevitable and ... our being prepared to go all the way in
these concessions. Feeding the bird of prey with tid-bits will
only increase its appetite and reinforce its confidence in going
unpunished and in the superiority of its strength. There is no
way we are going to sustain such false illusions. In adopting a
firmer position we increase the chances of peace, we put on
notice all those circles inJapan who do not want war, we force
the proponents of military adventures to adopt a more cau-
tious mode of behaviour. 70
The letter marked a turning-point m Soviet policy towards

Japan. The harvest of 1933 promised to exorcise the spectre of
famine. It bolstered the economy, revived morale and gave Stalin
and his circle an unprecedented willingness to assert Soviet power
in world politics. Only then did the enormous exertions and agonis-
ing sacrifices, extracted by brutality and at massive human cost,
begin to pay serious devidends. This was most apparent in the
growth of Soviet military power in the Far East.
WAR PREPARATIONS
Stalin had always conceived of rapid industrialisation as the

ultimate defence against the capitalist world. The development
of an autarchic heavy industry would ultimately reduce to a
minimum Soviet reliance on other countries and simultaneously
lay the basis for a military capability commensurate with that of
the USSR's most threatening adversary. But this was a long-
term projection. In the short-term Stalin had little sympathy for
increased military expenditure which might cut into the
necessary investment in the foundations of the planned econ-

omy. This became apparent in 1928 when Deputy Chief of Staff
Mikhail Tukhachevsky pressed for a deep-penetration capability
for the armed forces and a high degree of mechanisation to
achieve it. He was transferred to take charge of the Leningrad
military district. But from there on 11 January 1930 he repeated
his request in writing. Stalin reacted vehemently: acceptance of
these proposals would completely undermine socialist construc-
tion and would substitute for it a kind of 'red militarism' .71
It would clearly take a near-emergency to bring Stalin around
to Tukhachevsky's viewpoint. In March 1931 Soviet Intelligence
intercepted a telegram from Lieutenant Colonel Kasahara,
Japanese military attache in Moscow. Kasahara pressed the case
for 'a speedy war with the Soviet Union' before the five-year plan
succeeded. 72 His proposals were not accepted, but such ideas
were not completely at odds with opinion within the Japanese
Government. For instance Hiranuma, vice-president of the Privy
Council, was insistent upon 'a decisive Russo-Japanese show-
down in order to achieve a complete settlement of the Man-
churia-Mongolia problem'. 73 It is not clear precisely how much
of this reached Moscow. But, thanks to the successful entrap-
ment of the previous military attache, the Russians could read
Japanese army ciphers (seep. 115) and one authoritative Soviet
source suggests that Richard Sorge, agent of Soviet Military
Intelligence (GRU) operating in Shanghai from January 1930,
sent Moscow 'important information about the initiation of
Japanese intervention in North-Eastern China' .74
Sorge was to assume an important role in Soviet policy
towards Japan in the years that followed. Born near Baku on 4
October 1895 to a German father and a Russian mother, and
educated in Germany, Sorge became involved in the fledgling
German Communist Party in the critical months after Ger-
many's capitulation in the autumn of 1918. 75 He soon took to
work underground in the years of attempted revolution that
followed. A visiting delegation from the Comintern executive
committee led by Dmitrii Manuilsky in April 1924 suggested he
come to work in Moscow, and by the end of the year he had
arrived in his new homeland, where he took Soviet citizenship
and enrolled in the Soviet Communist Party in March 1925.
During the following four years Sorge wrote extensively on inter-
national relations for Party, Comintern and academic journals
under various pseudonyms including I.K. Zorge, lka, Zonter,

Adol'f, etc. Whether he was actually engaged in underground
work for the Comintern at this early stage is unclear. Certainly
his association with Soviet military intelligence (GRU) dates
only from 1929 and took place on the recommendation of Yan
(sometimes Pavel) Berzin, its director. 76
It is not clear precisely when Sorge's reports reached Moscow,
or on what day Stalin may have learned ofKasahara's despatch.
But on 11 March 1931 the Council of People's Commissars
passed a resolution providing privileges for those released from
service in units of the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army
who had settled in the region. 77 Its commander, Vasily Blyukh-
er, had by all accounts been pressing for such measures for some
time and, as a result, rumours - again, most likely unfounded -
circulated that he had been placed under house arrest. 78 Then
Stalin took the unusual and dramatic step of calling Tukha-
chevsky back from Leningrad and on 11 June making him
Deputy Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Deputy
Chairman of the Revvonsovet and Chief of Armaments of the
Red Army. 79 As Tukhachevsky's official biographer has noted:
'In the Far Eastjapan rattled its sabres. Stalin had to reconsider
his position vis-a-vis Tukhachevsky's memorandum, which he
had previously described as rubbish [akhinee].' Nikulin, the
biographer, goes on to say that Stalin still disliked Tukha-
chevsky but that there was no one else who could be relied upon
to ensure adequate rearmament with the latest technology. 80
Indeed it took Stalin until May 1932 to apologise to Tukha-
chevsky for the contempt he showed in 1928 and 1930. 81 The
Politburo had instructed the Revvoensovet to be guided by the
following criteria: '1. With respect to numbers - not to be
inferior to our likely adversaries in the chief theatre of war; 2.
With respect to technology- to be stronger than the opponent
in the decisive forms of armaments: aeroplanes, artillery and
tanks.' 82
In July 1931 Commissar Voroshilov took a tour of inspection
through Siberia and the Soviet Far East. 83 On 23 August a key
decision was taken by the Revvonsovet providing for sole respon-
sibility for commanders on both military and political matters: a
measure critical to efficiency in the field of battle. 84 And from 13
to 26 September- as the Japanese began to occupy Manchuria
Negotiation: from Weakness to Strength 27
- military exercises were conducted in Western military dis-
tricts of the Soviet Union along the lines of the strategy Tukha-
chevsky recommended. 85 At the end of the year, and following a
review of these exercises, Tukhachevsky sent a letter to Voroshi-
lov proposing to introduce tanks into infantry and cavalry divi-
sions; the proposal was accepted. 86
The importance of these moves was underlined by the begin-
ning ofJapanese aggression in Manchuria on 18 September and
by the subsequent assessment made by the Kwantung Army
command of Soviet fighting power. At Kwantung headquarters
in Mukden the prevalent opinion - based on accurate Intelli-
gence assessments - was that the Soviet Union was in no
condition to risk war with Japan; 'internal conditions in Russia
would seem to be such that it could not do much more than
engage in propaganda work', a report concluded. 87 In the light of
this, it was decided that should - contrary to expectations - the
Russians cross the Manchurian frontier, then 'The best strategy
is to take the initiative, fight, and use all our resources to arrive
at fundamental solutions. If the government [in Tokyo] does not
accept this view, we should not care if it fell as a result.' 88 This was,
of course, precisely the kind of philosophy which had led to the
Japanese occupation of Manchuria: 'On s'engage, et puis on voit.'
The reinforcement of Soviet forces in the Far East took on a
real sense of urgency early in 1932. In Otpor the Russians set up
a military Intelligence group to improve their knowledge of
Japanese intentions and capabilities. 89 The Russians had no fleet
in the Pacific nor air power, and the Special Far Eastern Army
set up on 6 August 1929 to repossess the CER from the Chinese
was in no condition to fight the Kwantung Army. Before the end
of 1931 the Politburo had issued a directive 'On the State of the
USSR's Defences'.
The forces in place were restructured: a Maritime Province
group was set up under the command ofPutna, who was recalled
from his post as military attache in Berlin. In the spring the
Transbaikal group offorces was reorganised. On 13 January 1932
the defence committee of the Council of People's Commissars had
issued a directive raising the number of troops and provided for
the re-equipment of the Far Eastern Army - now called the
Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. Reinforcements were
brought in from the central military districts to the Far East. 90
Four new infantry divisions were then created in European

Russia. 91 The Far Eastern region also acquired an air force. This
had to be flown in from European Russia. 'The flight-path was
unfamiliar, there were insufficient airfields, the state of the
weather en route promised all kinds of surprises.' 92 By the
beginning of February, however, 160 planes had been brought in
to the area and the 78th fighter and 105th heavy bomber
squadrons had been formed. 93 Sixty trainloads of equipment
were ready for transport from Moscow to the Far East by 20
February. By mid-March the Far Eastern Army consisted of up
to seven infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades and two or
three battalions of tanks. Including air force personnel and
technicians, this amounted to no less than 100 000 men. 94 On 21
April the foundations were also laid for a Pacific Fleet. 95 By June,
British Military Intelligence estimated that east of Irkutsk in
Siberia Soviet forces had grown to just over 200 000 men,
excluding border troops. 96
This was attained at an exorbitant price, however, and prob-
lems remained. Some divisions were up to 80 per cent below
establishment in terms of transport. 97 And the economic back-
wardness of the region meant that almost all the supplies for war
had to be drawn in from elsewhere, exacerbating existing short-
ages. In Moscow boots and clothing suddenly disappeared from
the shops. A petrol shortage occurred. 98 Industrial production
was rapidly shifted to military output - most evident in the
partial transformation of locomotive and tractor factories into
plants for the production of heavy and light tanks. 99 The five-
year plan was thereby further thrown off course by the immedi-
ate emergency. Worse still was the impact of the war-scare on
the countryside. The peasants had destroyed reserves of live-
stock and horses (vital to the military) in the opposition to forced
collectivisation in 1929-30. The harvest of 1930 was good. But
the harvest of 1931 was disastrous; and the army's grain reserves
had been depleted to feed the cities and fill export quotas to
balance a foreign exchange budget that was overburdened by the
massive importation of capital goods vital to industrialisation. 100
The situation in the Far East was in many respects worse than
elsewhere, because whereas much of the land collectivised in
European Russia had at least in the past been associated with
villages and therefore had some collective identity, the land in
the Far East was almost entirely farmed on the basis of individ-
ual pioneers, least given to the collectivist spirit. The level of

destruction of livestock and crops was thus significantly higher
and the number of willing hands had always been extraordi-
narily low.
The Soviet authorities were therefore forced into making
concessions to the peasant in the Far E~st well before any such
concessions were envisaged in European Russia. On 16 March
1932 the Politburo had to order the creation of a special collec-
tive farm corps to 'reinforce Soviet Far Eastern frontiers, bring
the richest new virgin lands under the plough, guarantee sup-
plies for the population of the Far East and the army, cut the
exportation of grain and fats from Siberia to the Far East
significantly and develop the economy of the Far East' . 101 This
hopefully provided for the long term. Meanwhile food was
forcibly requisitioned from the countryside in European Russia
and the Ukraine. In March orders reportedly went out that
sizeable amounts of grain had to be collected for the army. 102 In
1932 108 279 tons of wheat were imported into the Soviet Far
East through Vladivostok alone; from June to December 1933,
120 000 tons of grain were shipped to Vladivostok from Black
Sea ports; and early in 1934 another 100 000 tons came the same
route. Livestock were also imported in considerable quantities:
in 1932 43 299 cattle and 364 426 sheep and goats were sent to
the Soviet Far East; and in 1933 the figures were 13 142 and
169 489 respectively. 103
The demands of the armed forces were thus added to the
demand for grain for vital export. Both came to a head at the
very moment of spring sowing and much of the seed grain was
taken alongside the regular supply. The Italian military attache
in Moscow, Lieutenant-Colonel De Ferrari, noted:
It is ... claimed that at various locations in the USSR large
deposits of grain, livestock and fodder are currently being put
together for future requirements for mobilisation. This fact,
when put together with the consequent requisition of numer-
ous means of transport and the unsatisfactory results of last
year's harvest represents one of the main reasons for the
current, very severe, worsening of the state of food supplies for
town and country. 104
The grain requisitions exacerbated a shortage of food that soon
resulted in widespread famine, above all in the Ukraine; worse
still, from the army's viewpoint, the requisitions at the expense

of the peasants' own food supply had a damaging impact on the
morale of the troops. As we have seen, a directive from Bulin,
deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, issued
in April 1932, warned of attempts by kulak elements to conduct
agitation among Red Army men. 105 Yet the requisitions con-
tinued through the failed harvest of 1932.
Other preparations for war were under way. Two Americans
who spent three years in Vladivostok working as experts in
salmon-canning conveyed their experiences to the US Consul-
General in Tokyo in February 1933. They spoke of the intense
military preparations, the large quantities of troops and aircraft
in the region. Gas masks were being distributed to Party mem-
bers and others in official positions. One canning specialist
reported 'that the whole factory staff of one of the canneries
under his charge was conscripted during the early fall of 1932'.
Trains on the Trans-Siberian Railroad were 'being run con-
stantly, bringing in fresh supplies and war munitions'. A Red
Army officer told one of the Americans 'that the Army was in
possession of food supplies sufficient to last them for 5 to 8 years
without further importations from European Russia in the event
that the trans-Siberian Railway should be blocked' . 106
Progress made in the reinforcement of Soviet military power in
the Far East was, by the autumn of 1933, increasingly reflected
in the outspoken and pugnacious comments of the long-suffering
Soviet head of mission in Tokyo. At a dinner he gave to foreign
correspondents early in September, Yurenev lashed out at the
Japanese press and denounced its warlike propaganda directed
at the Soviet Union. Moscow was, he said, near the limits of its
patience. The Soviet Union was more than capable of dealing
withjapanese aggression, and was sufficiently strong to cross the
frontier into Manchuria if necessary . 107
US DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
In addition to the growth of Soviet military power on new

industrial foundations and the improved harvest of 1933, a
further boost to Soviet self-confidence came with diplomatic
recognition of the Soviet regime by the United States on 16
November. The Russians had worked hard, and to no avail, for
more than a decade to obtain recognition. They had expanded

trade with the United States in the late 1920s largely to win over
the US business community as a lobby for recognition. When
this failed to work, in the autumn of 1931 they cut purchases
from the United States in a deliberate attempt to hold trade
hostage to recognition. As a result US exports to the Soviet
Union - a significant market during the Great Depression -
dropped from over 180 million roubles in 1931 to 24.8 million in
1932, and the US share in the turnover of Soviet foreign trade
dropped from a height of 12.2 per cent in 1929 to a mere 3.8 per
cent in 1932. 108 By 1933, with Franklin Roosevelt elected Presi-
dent, US industrialists and Democrats in Congress were actively
pressing for recognition. On 29 October the new Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, himself no great enthusiast for recognition in
a department similarly unenthusiastic, warned of pressure 'put
forth by the various interests which believe that they can get a
large market for American products in Russia, financed by
government money, to push the matter of government recog-
nition and a large loan'. 109 The main source of pressure for
recognition within the new administration came from Henry
Morgenthau, acting secretary of the Treasury, supported by
other friends of the President closely tied to New Deal economic
priorities. 110 Other factors were also at work. Roosevelt had
always regarded non-recognition as foolish and unrealistic.
Moreover, given the growing danger of war from both japan and
Germany, non-recognition of Russia tied America's hands.
Within the State Department enthusiasm for recognition was
noticeably absent, but the fact that the USSR faced the immedi-
ate prospect of war with Japan, and had difficulty paying for
imports without loans, augured well for an agreement with the
Russians on American terms; provided, of course, the talks were
not appropriated by the New Dealers, who were prone to ignore
State Department advice. 111
Roosevelt pressed ahead and invited a senior Soviet official to
visit the United States to discuss recognition. Commissar Litvi-
nov took matters in his own hands, hoping to pocket recognition
and elicit Roosevelt's support for the Soviet position in the Far
East. Only two months after the Japanese began overrunning
Manchuria the Russians had dropped heavy hints to the Ameri-
cans of joint action to contain Japan. On 19 November 1931
polpred Karsky told Fullerton, US charge d'affaires in Kovno,
'that it was unfortunate that our [US] policy did not envisage
recognition of his [the Soviet] Government - which, he said,
would permit of a cooperation in the Far East mutually advantageous to
the two countries ... '. Karsky 'said that he considered war be-
tween the United States and Japan inevitable unless we [the
United States] formed some kind of protective alliance with the Soviet
Union governing the status quo in the Far East ... '. 112 It is amazing
how quickly the immediate threat of invasion impelled the
Bolsheviks to drop all ideological qualms and seriously consider
the idea of an alliance with a capitalist Great Power. However,
Secretary of State Stimson had been rebuffed by the British when
he sought cooperation against Japan; and with the spirit of
isolationism still predominant in Congress, Karsky's demarche
had little prospect of success.
But now that recognition was on the cards, Litvinov took up
where Karsky had left off. He came via Paris en route to New York
accompanied by the Narkomindel's general secretary Ivan
Dvilkovsky along with friend and head of the press department
Konstantin (Kostya) Umansky. In Paris Soviet concern about
Japan was only too apparent; the Russians were interested in a
Franco-Soviet alliance encompassing Asia as well as Europe.
Litvinov told Premier Paul-Boncour 'that we have to think not
only about the West but also about the East and that France
must have an interest in our not facing complicatior,s in the
East' . 113 This set the tone for Litvinov's negotiations with
Roosevelt. Arriving in New York by boat from France on 7
November, Litvinov was due to be disappointed.
Just as the French were loath to alienate the Japanese merely
to please the Russians- a replay of the Franco-Russian alliance
negotiations in 1892-93 - so too were the Americans reluctant
to ally with a power on the verge of war with Japan. At lunch
with Roosevelt on 8 November, Litvinov took Roosevelt's care-
less conversation too seriously. Together, Roosevelt misleadingly
suggested, the United States and the Soviet Union 'could, per-
haps, forestall these dangers' (from Japan and Germany). The
President appeared to accept Litvinov's argument that matters
such as pre-revolutionary debts, Comintern activities, and the
rights of US citizens in Russia, were 'complete trifles compared
to the global significance of the establishment of relations and of
co-operation between us'. 114 But Litvinov was later taken aback
by Roosevelt's evasiveness and the manner in which he, as
ComJ,Tiissar for Foreign Affairs, was shunted off to the State

Department for talks on these troublesome and (to Litvinov)
trifling issues which State officials were determined to settle to
US advantage while they still held recognition hostage. Litvinov
reported back to Moscow that Secretary Hull and his four
assistants were complicating the talks with 'materials hostile to
us'; there was disagreement between both sides 'on all
questions' . 115
The two chief issues at stake were the settlement of pre-
revolutionary debts and US objection to Comintern activities in
the United States. On neither of these issues had the Russians
ever made substantive concessions to any power, and State
Department hopes that they might actually force the Russians
into cutting off Comintern operations in the United States
proved illusory. Settlement of debts was another sphere in which
US hopes ultimately went unrealised. The Russians were willing
to facilitate indirect compensation for debts incurred by the
Kerensky Provisional Government of 191 7, but only in return for
a substantial loan. Since no other country was owed sums from
the Kerensky era, such a limited settlement did not break
precedent. However, Congress was unlikely to permit a loan
when it was legislating to prevent any form of government-
supported credit to countries which had defaulted on debts or
confiscated US property without adequate compensation: this
was the Johnson Bill, which became law on 13 April 1934.
The irony of US-Soviet relations now became apparent for
the first, and certainly not the last, time. Just as Litvinov and the
Narkomindel had no authority to negotiate away Comintern
activities which were nominally controlled by the Party and not
the government, neither did the US administration have the
authority to grant financial concessions to the Russians without
the support of Congress. Both sides were thus ultimately nego-
tiating ad riferendum: in both systems the ultimate control (or veto
power) over foreign policy lay outside the hands of the agents
primarily concerned with the conduct of diplomacy. In this
situation, both plain misunderstanding and deliberate deception
were difficult to disentangle, as was demonstrated all too fre-
quently in the decades which followed.
During November 1933 the Russians rightly calculated that
Roosevelt was taking the larger view, and was not ready to
sacrifice the international impact of recognition upon Japan and
Germany in order to obtain complete satisfaction on what were

to him lesser issues. By circumventing the State Department and
relying on the advice and tactics of William Bullitt, an old friend
and in 1919 Woodrow Wilson's unofficial emissary to Soviet
Russia, along with Henry Morgenthau, also a strong proponent
of recognition, Roosevelt effectively ensured that the larger pol-
itical interests would prevail. From further discussion with the
President, Litvinov drew the conclusion that provided the issue
of debts was settled and any untoward incidents involving US
citizens in Russia were avoided, 'we could establish quite good
relations with Roosevelt'. There was, however, no realistic pros-
pect of a US-Soviet axis against Japan, the Russian priority:
when Litvinov asked Roosevelt 'what he thinks of an agreement
with us on joint action in the event of a danger to peace', the
President insisted that the United States could take only unilat-
eral action; bilateral, indeed multilateral, obligations were
simply out of the question. 116 At this point, with recognition a
fact, the Americans had for the time being outlived their useful-
ness to Litvinov; at least until Washington was ready to con-
template an entangling alliance.
Diplomatic recognition was thus secured in an exchange of
notes on 16 November 1933. 117 In return, Litvinov committed
the Soviet Government 'Not to permit the formation or residence
on its territory of any organisation or group- and to prevent the
activity on its territory of any organisation - or group, or of
representatives or officials of any organisation or group- which
has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow
of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or
social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its
territories or possessions' . 118 The Russians had also agreed to
settle debts. But when the Johnson Bill became law, it cut across
plans for offering credits to the USSR; the entire settlement of
debts therefore collapsed. And with the collapse of the debts
settlement and the realisation in Washington that the clause
which was supposed to forestall further Comintern activity in the
United States was not worth the paper it was written on, the
brief honeymoon led within months to bitter disillusionment on
the part of the US opinion and inevitable talk of divorce.
Coming at a time of such severe tension with Japan, US
recognition was nevertheless a triumph for Soviet diplomacy.
Stalin greeted it as an act of'the most serious significance' for the

entire international system; 119 but it was also clear that the
Russians would still most likely face Japanese forces entirely on
their own. In December Moscow was rife with rumours that
Japan would invade once the snows melted. Polpred Ivan Maisky
returned to his post in London certain that the Japanese would
break off relations with the USSR. 120 Litvinov told Bullitt, US
ambassador designate, 'that the Soviet Union considered an
attack by Japan this Spring so probable that it felt it must secure
its western frontier in every way; that it did not fear an immedi-
ate attack by either Poland or Germany but that if the probable
war with Japan should drag on for two years he anticipated a
joint attack by Poland and Germany, acting in concert with
Japan'. Bullitt, back from handing in his credentials in Moscow
and now quartered in Paris, commented: 'Attack by Japan upon
the Soviet Union is regarded as certain by all members of the
government and communist party with whom I talked in Mos-
cow.' Stalin had introduced Chief of Staff Commander Yegorov
to Bullitt as 'the man who will lead our army victoriously against
the Japanese when they attack us' . 121 And he told the New York
Times that 'we are afraid ... the bellicose elements [in Japan]
may push a sensible policy into the background. That is where
the real danger lies and we are compelled to prepare for it.' 122
Those preparations continued throughout the winter. Despite
the intense cold, work on double-tracking the Trans-Siberian
railway was speeded up. At the end of January 1934 a separate
military construction corps of the People's Commissariat of
Heavy Industry was attached to the Far Eastern Army, formed
from military-construction units of the Moscow and Leningrad
military districts; it included fifteen construction battalions. 123
Such measures formed the ominous backdrop to the 17th Party
Congress which convened on 26 January 1934. There Molotov
underlined the importance of creating heavy industry as the
basis for the technical re-equipment of the entire economy, and
exaggerated the significance of the 1933 harvest. But very soon
he turned to the situation in the Far East, which, he stated,
required 'our vigilance and readiness to defend the great
achievements of the October revolution'. And when he expressed
particular concern for the military capability ofthe Red Army he
received 'stormy applause' } 24 Not surprisingly Voroshilov in
turn paid extensive attention to affairs in the Far East and the
state of the armed forces. It is here that the real state of the
economy emerged with much greater clarity than from the
mouth of Molotov.
First he emphasised the need for greater attention to agricul-
ture- horse-breeding, in particular, since 'both now and in the
future our army will require horses in great numbers'. It was
thus clear that the hoped-for mechanisation of the army still had
a long way to go. The lack of horses - killed by desperate
peasants in revolt against the forced collectivisation of agricul-
ture and as a ready source of protein in the famine - placed even
greater dependence by the army on the country's transportation
network. And here Voroshilov voiced his complaints. Transport
was, he said, 'the brother of the Red Army'. 'Our army is now
not like the army of former days .... All this places on transport
significantly increased demands.' Transport would play a 'mas-
sive role' in the next war. The third area of criticism was in
relation to industrial output. Voroshilov chided Ordzhonikidze,
Commissar for Heavy Industry, for the inadequate quality of
industrial production. All this formed the preface to his remarks
on the growing threat from the East. 'For the past two years the
Central Committee, and above all comrade Stalin, has been
incessantly preoccupied and is now preoccupied with the Far
East.' He went on to give details of the reinforcement of the
armed forces in the region, which were subsequently cut from
the accounts of the speech given in the press. 125
Aside from Voroshilov, the most important speaker on the Far
East - excluding Stalin, of course - was Blyukher. Without
offering any overt criticism, he underlined how 'cautious' Soviet
policy in the region had been. But, acknowledging 'Our tanks
and our air force' as 'offspring of our first five year plan', he
emphasised the significance of the reinforcement of the Far
Eastern army by the 'best cadres' and, by implication, indicated
that Stalin was committed to even further measures toward the
completion of this process. 126 Stalin himself, somewhat uncertain
of his own popularity after the excesses of the past four years,
played on the new Soviet patriotism engendered by the threat of
war from hated Japan. The government had, he said, to make
every effort to protect itself against 'surprises' and 'be prepared
to defend itself against attack'. And, speaking bluntly, with no
one in any doubt that he meant the Japanese and now confident
of the likely reception of his words, he concluded that those who

wanted good relations with the Soviet Union could have them
'but those who try to attack our country will receive a crushing
repulse to teach them in future not to poke their pig snouts into
our Soviet garden (thunderous applause).' 127
2 Deterrence and
Attempted Detente,
1934-36
Growing Soviet self-confidence in the Far East could be seen not
only in Moscow's belligerent attitude towards Japan, but also in
its treatment of the United States. Having secured diplomatic
recognition from Washington, but certain the United States was
uninterested in an entangling alliance, the Russians turned their
backs on US demands that they repay pre-revolutionary debts.
Even the Commissariat of Foreign Trade had no vested interest
in appeasing the Americans: the Johnson Act had effectively
prevented the US Government underwriting loans to the Rus-
sians as a quid pro quo for debt repayment. The American diplo-
mats who arrived in Moscow early in 1934, expecting to find
their new partners pliant, instead found them polite but coolly
indifferent.
This indifference was reinforced as the threat from Japan
seemed to recede. In retrospect the threat itself, which hung like
a pall over the Soviet horizon from 1932 to 1934, appears to have
been more apparent than real. The Kwantung Army command
was as Russophobic as ever. However, Tokyo was spending
more money not on reinforcing the Kwantung Army for war
against the Soviet Union but on the navy instead. Whereas the
army traditionally looked north to the Russians, the navy looked
south and east to the Americans. And the army was never a
coherent whole: a part looked also to expanding further into
China and southwards, as a more pressing priority than Russia
to the north. In these circumstances the illusion of an imminent
conflict with the Russians had been fostered by the bellicose
rhetoric of Araki, the War Minister, a passionate exponent of the
'Imperial Way'. This approach emphasised morale over ma-
teriel. The threatening speeches that resulted and so alarmed the
Russians into bolstering their defences - and the Russians were
not alone in taking these words literally - in fact concealed the
absence of necessary war planning and preparations on the part
of the Japanese. On 22 January 1934 Araki was succeeded as
38
Deterrence and Attempted Detente 39
War Minister by Hayashi and there followed a more sober

assessment of Japanese capabilities. With Araki's departure
went much of the heat from the stormy atmosphere in Soviet-
Japanese relations. Thus by the time ambassador Bullitt arrived
in Moscow and met Litvinov on 14 March- the Commissar had
been confined to bed since late February with an influenza that
soon led to bronchitis and laryngitis 1 - he found his negotiating
position had crumbled. Litvinov 'said that he was less apprehen-
sive of an immediate Japanese attack than he had been in
December'; though he 'still regards the situation as extremely
serious'. 2 Barely a month later the ambassador wrote to
Roosevelt:
Moscow has turned out to be just as disagreeable as I antici-
pated. The honeymoon atmosphere had evaporated com-
pletely before I arrived. As Wiley [Counsellor at the US
embassy] says, 'The Japanese have let us down badly.' The
Russians are convinced that Japan will not attack this spring
or summer and, as they no longer feel that they need our
immediate help, their underlying hostility to all capitalist
countries now shows through the veneer of intimate friend-
ship.3
This impression hardened as the year went on. In a letter to
Assistant Secretary of State Moore on 8 September he wrote:
I am convinced that the chief obstacle both to a successful

conclusion of the negotiations with regard to debts and claims
and to the establishment of really frank and friendly relations
between our two Governments is Litvinov himself. He has, as
you know, thrown out of the Foreign Office recently both
Sokolnikov and Karakhan - strong men who were very
friendly to the United States, and seems to believe that he can
afford not to make any effort to maintain warm relations
between the Soviet Union and the United States. My guess is,
from many slight indications I have had in conversations with
him, that he is convinced that we will not enter into any
special agreements with the Soviet Union directed against
Japan or obliging us to take any action in the Far East and
that he believes further that in case of war between Japan and
the Soviet Union we would inevitably be drawn in on the side
of the Soviet Union, and that it would make no difference
whether our relations with the Soviet Union prior to such an

event were warm, tepid or cold. His entire attitude is based on
the belief that any real rapprochement between the United
States and Japan is impossible. 4
Litvinov was, of course, right. Certainly he did not regard the

United States as a likely or necessary trading partner. In a letter
to I van Maisky, polpred in London, on 19 April he wrote: 'The
negotiations with America have for now ground to a halt. The
Johnson Act has as good as halted our trade with America,
although in the final analysis this will depend upon Roosevelt.
The notorious statement by the board of the Export-Import
Bank was aimed at exerting pressure on us to accept the Ameri-
can scheme for regulating the Kerensky debt, but we have firmly
stated that we will not give in to pressure and that we can exist
without American trade.' 5 And Bullitt may have expected
greater Soviet interest in the United States without fully con-
sidering the consequences of US isolationism. Chief of the divi-
sion of Far Eastern affairs at the Department of State Hornbeck
noted on 3 January 1935:
We should be cautious ... about any movement towards the
developing of political bonds or [the] appearance of [a] diplo-
matic rapprochement between ourselves and the Soviet Govern-
ment. Developments of those types [sic] would give us nothing
upon which we could definitely rely and would, on the other
hand, increase suspicion among the Japanese of our intentions
with regard to the Far East, thereby injecting a new cause of
irritation into our relations with Japan; and they might also be
misleading to the Russians, causing them to expect more in
the way of support from us, in the event of their getting into
difficulties with Japan, than would be warranted. 6
Not all in the Soviet Government were of one mind, however.
The military, congenitally more pessimistic about Japanese
plans, appeared to favour a more positive attitude to the United
States. And, from his new post in Washington, polpred Troya-
novsky - himself a former soldier - soon identified with the US
position and attempted to circumvent Litvinov by communicat-
ing directly with Molotov and Stalin - ultimately to no avail. 7
But Litvinov caught the mood in Moscow. US diplomats were
somewhat startled to find the likes of Karl Radek and Nikolai
Bukharin, the former running the foreign section of Stalin's

secretariat, the latter editor of /zvestiya, as optimistic as Litvinov
vis-a-vis japan, though for different reasons.
Litvinov saw japan from the top down. His aim was to deepen
divisions within the ruling caste, winning over the moderates
and isolating the militarists through timely concessions, thereby
lessening the likelihood of war. The Party faithfuls, especially
those associated with the Comintern, had a different approach.
Both Radek and Bukharin told Bullitt 'that, in addition to
communist workers, at least one-half the professors in the japan-
ese universities and schools are now secret members of the
communist party'. Radek and Bukharin expressed the belief
'that if war can be delayed for a few years a social upheaval in
japan may not be out of the question'. 8
Radek and Bukharin were whistling in the wind, however.
The Japanese Thought Police had in 1932-33 all but wiped out
the Communist Party in a series of arrests and through the use of
agents provocateurs within the movement, which caused members
to turn on one another. 9 And in March 1935 the last remaining
member of its Central Committee at liberty, Hakamada, was
arrested. The Central Committee thus ceased to exist. That
month an official of the Ministry of Interior commented: 'The
Communist movement is now in a state of complete decay.no
But, whether one shared Litvinov's view or that of Radek and
Bukharin, appeasement of the United States was clearly not a
vital necessity.
If there was little to be expected from the United States, there
was certainly no more to be expected from the other leading
Power in the Pacific, Great Britain. Until 1931 'the most import-
ant and dangerous factor in the Far Eastern situation' faced by
the British was 'the growing force of Chinese nationalism'. The
Japanese had since displaced the Chinese nationalists as 'the
dominant force in the Far East' . 11 But because of their extensive
trade and financial interests in China, Hong Kong in particular,
the British were reluctant to challenge the Japanese bid for
predominance in the Pacific. 'Negatively .. .', a senior British
official noted, 'it is a major British interest not to antagonize
Japan, and still more not to be made the spear-head of oppo-
sition to her aims.' 12
In Europe the British rated Soviet-German tension more
acute than Anglo-German friction. Similarly in Asia the British
tended to assume that a Russo-Japanese war was more likely

than an Anglo-Japanese war. A good summary of the British
position was written in January 1936:
Japan is bent on as great a degree of domination in China and
the Far East generally as she can achieve. Coupled with this is
the expectation of having to settle accounts with Russia, we
may even say the desire to do so, for reasons of security to
Japan and Manchukuo and in order to remove the ultimate
check on domination of China which Russia's strategical
position and strength afford. An exaggerated fear of the spread
of Communism is an additional incentive to her efforts to
disable Russia in the Far East. It is with this purpose in view
thatJapan is anxious to cover her rear by understandings with
us and with the United States.
In the event of Britain coming to an entente with Japan, she
could be expected to lose influence and therefore commercial
advantages in China, as well as badly damage her relations with
the United States. Turning to Russia, the memorandum con-
tinued:
Further than this, we should have encouraged Japan to pursue
an aggressive policy against Russia. Sir R. Clive [ambassador
to Japan], in a recent despatch, observes that a political
agreement between us and Japan would fall like a bombshell
on Russia, and we must weigh the consequences very carefully
before we do anything to alienate the Soviet Government and
weaken her as a counter-poise either againstJapan in the Far
East, or perhaps still more important, against Germany in
Europe. While uneasy relations betweenJapan and Russia are
to our advantage as a check on Japanese aggression, it would
not be to our advantage to do anything to encourage hostilities
between them, and this could hardly fail to be the result of
making Japan feel that she had made the initial step to
securing her rear. 13
It was taken for granted that 'British interests would be best
served by a continuation of a certain, but not a dangerous,
tension between Japan and Soviet Russia'. 14 The assumption
was that 'the negotiation [by Japan] with Russia of a non-
aggression pact might provoke a modification ofJapanese policy
in China, which, however temporary, would seriously embarrass
our vested interests there. A liberation from the fear of Russia on

her northern flank would probably increase Japan's chance of
securing in China a privileged position for her interests which
might well render her independent of the vagaries of more
remote markets ... '. The inevitable conclusion was that 'we
would, I suggest, be compelled to regard the prospects of a
Russo-Japanese rapprochement with mixed feelings' . 15 It was
also well understood that 'while we are not anxious for relations
between Russia and Japan to be too good, the converse is
probably true of Russia as regards relations between us and
Japan'. 16
Indeed, the Soviet position in some respects mirrored the
British position, but also became somewhat distorted as the light
was refracted through a Marxist-Leninist prism. From London
Maisky advised that 'English ruling circles' responded to Japan-
ese aggression in 1931 'with relative equanimity, since they
considered that all Japan's aggressive energy would be expended
in a northerly direction. They have even, in the course of the past
year and a half, cautiously urged Japan to move against the
USSR.'~ 7 And Maisky was, by comparison with both colleagues
and superiors - with the notable exception of Litvinov - the
most Anglophile of them all. The logical consequence of these
suspicions - and Stalin was at times given to the darkest
suspicion- was that the Soviet Union had to act alone in Asia.
The critical element was to build up Soviet military power East
as well as West to such a level that a war on two fronts was a
practicable proposition. This would deter the Japanese from war
and might ultimately bring them to the bargaining table on
Soviet terms. By the end of 1934 estimated Soviet strength East
of Chita amounted to between 200 000 and 250 000 men, as
against 70 000 Japanese (not counting reinforcements, of
course). 18 But until a war could safely be contemplated on two
fronts Litvinov's policy of appeasing the moderates in Japan
through the sale of the CER made good sense to Stalin.
Litvinov's strategy of negotiation to win a breathing-space
was not easy to sustain, however, and not merely because of
internal opposition. Innumerable frontier incidents and the de-
tention and torture of Russian employees of the CER tested
Soviet patience to the limit. Matters came to a head in autumn
1934 as the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations in
fulfilment of conditions laid down by the French for a mutual
security pact. Litvinov's dull but reliable confidante, Boris Sto-

monyakov, had taken over supervision of Far Eastern affairs
from Sokol'nikov earlier in the year. He advised Yurenev: 'The
unprecedented - even in the history of Soviet-Japanese re-
lations - campaign of blackmail, pressure and threats, was
undertaken primarily to force us to capitulate in the negotiations
over the CER.' He suggested that these actions were also de-
signed to convince anti-Soviet elements in the West 'that the
position of the USSR is not yet so secure that it faces war in the
Far East and that as a result it is a disadvantageous partner
whether for the League of Nations or the Eastern Pact' [the
alliance system encompassing France and Eastern Europe with
which the Russians hoped to block German expansion]. In
Stomonyakov's view, and he was generally an optimist on Far
Eastern matters, the eventual conclusion of an agreement on the
CER would certainly not remove all danger in relations with
Japan. 'While there exists in Japan a strong military party
dreaming about expansion on the Asian mainland and, in par-
ticular, in our Far East, the Far Eastern problem will not lose its
urgency and acuity for the USSR.' 19
The pact signed with France in May 1935 was restricted to
Europe. At least this promised to promote Soviet security on one
front and in so doing made it easier to contemplate resistance on
the other front. The Russians had always hoped against hope
that France would commit itself under the forthcoming security
pact not merely in Europe but also in Asia, but they finally had
to accept, as in 1892-93, that Europe was all that could be
obtained. The French were not about to risk their possessions in
south-east Asia to assure Russia against a two-front war, even if
by neglecting to do so they ultimately complicated the Soviet bal-
ance with Germany. And, however much Soviet commentators
might argue to the contrary, entry into the League merely gave
the illusion of greater security against unprovoked aggression.
China, too, afforded little help to the Russians and little
resistance to the Japanese. In Manchuria partisans, covertly
aided by the Russians, carried out sabotage behind Japanese
lines. But this was a small-scale enterprise. And the signing of
the Tangku truce between the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomin-
tang) and the Japanese Kwantung army command on 31 May
1933 effectively ended the hostilities that started in September
1931. Moreover, under the influence of a pro-Japanese faction
led by Wang Ching-wei, the Nationalist Government in Nanking

began making friendly overtures towards Japan. By the begin-
ning of 1935 full negotiations were underway with Tokyo. This
was reflected in a ban on the publication of anti-Japanese
speeches in Chinese newspapers on 20 February 1935; and on
18 May it was announced that China and Japan would exchange
ambassadors.
The Russians learned of the negotiations well before agree-
ment to exchange ambassadors had been reached. On 28 Janu-
ary Spil'vanek, charge d'affaires in China, telegraphed the
Narkomindel with the news that the Japanese envoy in China
had offered a Sino-Japanese alliance. 'Chiang Kai-shek did not
go for this, but the Wang Ching-wei group favours an alliance.' 20
On 14 February the Chinese charge d'affaires in Moscow as
good as admitted to Stomonyakov that talks were underway with
the Japanese but emphasised that they involved only 'some
Chinese military leaders'. 21 When the Chinese ambassador re-
turned, Litvinov raised the matter. This was 15 March. Yen
began by denying that there were any negotiations. When chal-
lenged, he said the negotiations were only local. Litvinov then
cited the evidence of conversations with China's ambassadors in
various other capitals, whereupon Yen acknowledged that Wang
Ching-wei was indeed conducting talks with the Japanese but
that the information about them that had leaked to the press was
inaccurate: 'Japan was not asking for anything special for itself.
Hirota intends to visit Nanking at the end of the month.' 22
Since the Russians were themselves negotiating with the
Japanese and the puppet state of Manchukuo for the sale of the
Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - in the teeth of Chinese
opposition- they were scarcely in a position to protest with any
degree of credibility. Hirota was now pressing the Russians for a
reduction in armaments in the Soviet Far East. But, having
decided to sacrifice the CER after considerable internal con-
troversy, the Russians hardened their stance vis-a-vis Japan
rather than softening it in the way Hirota had hoped. Addressing
the Congress of Soviets on 28January 1935 Molotov emphasised
the danger of war. It was not the Soviet Union's fault that it had
failed to secure a non-aggression pact with Japan. For the past
four years in its relations with Japan it had 'demonstrated ...
patience and the necessary pliability', aimed at removing all causes
of trouble. 'We hope that our efforts towards an improvement in
Soviet-Japanese relations and the maintenance of peace in the

Far East will have its positive results.' 'But', Molotov added, 'we
have no grounds whatever for complacency. Aggressive, militar-
istic elements in Japan are not laying aside [their] weapons.
They have recently been speaking openly about war against the
Soviet Union .... We cannot ignore these facts, all the more so
because we remember the Japanese were the last to leave our
territory in the war of intervention. Only at the end of October
1922 did the Japanese leave Vladivostok and this was the
departure of the last interventionists from the Soviet Union.' 23
Indeed, the Russian section of the second department of the
Japanese General Staff under Lieutenant-Colonel Kasahara had
been busy planning operations against the Soviet Union under
the codename OTSU. 24 OTSU was finalised by Lieuten-
ant-General Imai, chief of the first department: It was submitted
to and sanctioned by the emperor in March 1935. 25 These plans
were, however, predicated on the attainment of a two-to-one
superiority against the Russians; 26 and it was precisely for these
reasons that the Soviet military build-up in the Far East was
proceeding with such vigour.
These preparations notwithstanding, Molotov had not closed
the door to a non-aggression pact. But the onus was on the
Japanese. In January 1935 the Japanese Minister of Communi-
cations Tanomogi had suggested to Yurenev that after the sale of
the CER the two sides could move towards a non-aggression
pact. However, there was one important precondition. The
Russians had to withdraw their forces from their Far Eastern
frontiers. 27 This was also the position taken by ambassador Ota
in conversation with Yurenev on 21 February. Ota confirmed
what the Russians already knew: the Japanese were particularly
worried by the threat to the home islands from Soviet bombers
deployed in the Maritime Province. 28 The Soviet military
build-up was evidently having a salutary effect on Japanese
ambitions.
These approaches were followed up by Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter Shigemitsu on 8 February in conversation with Clive, the
British ambassador, who passed the message on to Yurenev.
What Shigemitsu suggested was that if both sides of the Soviet-
Manchurian border were demilitarised, a non-aggression pact
could be signed 'immediately' .29 The Russians were suspicious.
These suspicions seemed justified when Yurenev protested to
Hirota at the Japanese transferring Russian counter-revol-

utionaries to frontier regions in Manchuria. In reply Hirota said
nothing of a non-aggression pact and spoke only of the need for
the Russians to reduce their forces in the region. Yet on 4 March
chairman of the upper house oftheJapanese parliament, Konoe,
raised the Shigemitsu formula in conversation with Yurenev. 30
Finally Litvinov took action. Four days later he cabled Yurenev
instructing him to see Konoe and tell him 'that once signature of
the CER agreement convinces us of the seriousness of Japan's
peaceful intentions, we will by no means refuse to discuss the
question raised by Konoe of a mutual reduction or mutual
withdrawal for a certain distance of units of [our] armed forces
in the Far East. Don't go into any detail.' 31
Three days later the CER agreement was initialled in Tokyo.
Litvinov then agreed to an interview with two Japanese Moscow
correspondents, published in /zvestiya on 15 March. There he
stressed that any progress towards demilitarisation of the Soviet
Far East depended upon Japan, which should dispel 'those
unfavourable impressions that were formed as a result of the
negative position of the Japanese Government towards the
Soviet Government's proposal to conclude a non-aggression
pact'. 32 But the Japanese military were simply not prepared to
countenance such a move. 33 And when Hitler announced com-
pulsory military service in Germany on 16 March, the Japanese
welcomed the disruptive impact this would have on Soviet
military planning. Yurenev reported: 'Hitler's action has had a
massive impact on Japan and has given all groups hostile to us
new hopes that we will, more or less in the immediate future, get
bogged down on the Western frontier. Even people such as
Konoe and Yoshizawa cannot conceal their pleasure at the
forthcoming - in their opinion - complications in Europe. ' 34
When Hirota spoke to Yurenev on 22 March, the news that the
Privy Council had, in the Emperor's presence, unanimously
consented to the signature of the CER agreement - was some-
what overshadowed by Hirota's ominous insistence 'that at a
time when it was "becoming noisy and troubled" in Europe,
peace and quiet reign in the Far East'. 35 It did not take much
imagination to see that the deterioration in the European situ-
ation threatened to negate the advantages that accrued to Mos-
cow from the massive rearmament effort in the Far East.
The sale of the CER on 23 March 193536 thus did not do as
much for relations with Japan as many, mostly in the West but
also in Moscow, expected: an armed truce was now in place,
little more. The continuation of frontier incidents testified to the
unease which marked Soviet-Japanese co-existence along the
Amur-U ssuri border. The reinforcement of troops on both sides
of the divide was bound to exacerbate the problem, particularly
along a frontier that was inadequately delimited. Hitherto fron-
tier problems had been confined to the Manchurian border with
the Soviet Union. But, with growing Japanese interest in Inner
Mongolia and North China, the scope of border conflicts grew
rather than diminished after the sale of the CER. The thinking of
the Japanese military emerges from this exposition by Chief of
Kwantung Army headquarters Itagaki:
Outer Mongolia is a secret zone. The Czarist Regime had
already stretched out its evil hand and had made this secret
zone a protectorate.
Since the revolution the Government of Soviet Russia has
adopted the same policy and succeeded in winning over this
country. As is quite evident if we look at the map of East Asia,
Outer Mongolia is of importance from the point of view of
J apanese-Manchukuoan influence today because it is the
flank defence of the Siberian Railroad which is a connecting
line between Soviet territory in the Far East and in Europe.
If Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchu-
kuo, Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very
dangerous condition, and it is possible that the influence of the
Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed almost with-
out fighting. Therefore, the Army aims to extend Japanese-
Manchurian power into Outer Mongolia by all means at hand
and as its first step, to establish normal and complete diplo-
matic relations between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia
regarding the latter as an independent country ....
. . . But if Outer Mongolia should set at nought our mod-
erate intentions as stated above and should invade Manchu-
kuo with Soviet Russia, the Imperial Army is ready to hold
fast to each foot and inch of territory with firm resolution in
[the) light of the spirit of the protocol between Japan and
Manchukuo.
The next issue was that of Western Inner Mongolia (Chahar
and Suiyuen Province):
Should the said zone be placed in the sphere of Japanese and

Manchurian influence, it means that will be a base for pacifi-
cation of their brothers of the same race in Outer Mongolia,
moreover that the influence of Soviet Russia which comes
from HSING-KIANG (Sinkiang], as well as a land link
between Soviet Russia and China, will both be blocked,
fundamentally frustrating the plan of the Third International
movement against China. In a passive sense the said zone will
be the shield against Communization of the establishment of
peace and order in Manchukuo. If the said zone should not be
placed in the sphere of Japanese and Manchurian influence,
but left to natural tendencies, it is obvious that Bolshevization
will immediately close in on the western frontier of Manchu-
kuo through Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang district. 37
Two significant consequences followed from this kind of think-

ing: first, the Japanese expanded into Inner Mongolia and North
China; second, this achieved, they began to exert pressure on
Outer Mongolia.
Rather than risk a Sino-Japanese agreement that might com-
promise Japanese control over Manchuria, the Japanese army
began to press for hegemony over North China. On 16 February
head of the Intelligence Division of the Japanese General Staff
Major-General Doihara arrived in Shanghai. After surveying
conditions in North China Doihara's report to the Kwantung
army resulted in a recommendation to delay agreement with
Nanking, expand into North China and support the 'southwest
clique' of Nationalist generals against the Nanking government
through military and economic assistance. 38 Infuriated by the
exchange of ambassadors between Tokyo and Nanking an-
nounced in May, the Kwantung army now searched for a con-
venient pretext to justify expansion into North China. And after
a series of skilful political manoeuvres, Doihara finally succeeded
by the end of the year in creating a puppet Anti-Communist
Autonomous Council in East Hopei. With this at least a part of
North China was added to effective Japanese control. While this
process was under way, in the summer of 1935 Litvinov made a
vain approach to ambassador Bullitt. 39 Predictably Litvinov's
suggestion of a demarche by Britain or the United States to warn
off the Japanese met with no response. At every turn the Rus-
sians were reminded that the security of their Far Eastern
possessions could simply not be obtained through collaboration

with the democracies. Worse still, Litvinov's preferred line of
making concessions to the Japanese in order to hold firm in
Europe increasingly broke on the rocks of Kwantung army
belligerency, made the worse by the fact that those officers
involved in criminal attempts to seize power and assassinate
politicians at home were not infrequently exiled to the Kwan-
tung army.
An incident between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia at
Halha in January 1935 was the first omen ofJapanese designs in
that quarter. A conference between the Manchukuo and Outer
Mongolian representatives that opened on 1 June to resolve the
dispute finally broke down on 25 November in the face of
demands for the recognition ofManchukuo. 40 By then the Soviet
military were straining at the leash. At the end of October Rink,
a former officer of the Tsarist army and now military attache in
Tokyo, told Bullitt: 'It is very lucky for Japan that the Soviet
Union is not Czarist Russia.' 'If the Soviet Union were not
dedicated to a policy of peace,' he added, 'we should unquestion-
ably attack Japan at the present moment. The entire balance of
forces in the Far East has been changed during the past two
years.' The Japanese were far behind the Russians in the mech-
anisation of their armed forces. 'We really should attack Japan
now, but our Government, of course, will not do it'; 41 though
from this it certainly appears they were under pressure to do so.
On 12 December a large delegation from Outer Mongolia
arrived to ostentatious hospitality in Moscow for discussions. 42 A
Soviet official 'close to the Kremlin' told members of the US
embassy that the Soviet Government would regard any aggression
by Japan against Outer Mongolia as a threat to the territorial
integrity of the Soviet Union. 43 A week later, as if to test Soviet
resolve, Japanese-Manchukuo forces burnt down an Outer
Mongolian frontier post. The fighting on the border resumed in
1936 and soon resulted in a critical Soviet decision to stand firm.
In his interview with Scripps-Howard on 1 March Stalin had
emphasised that Japan rather than Germany was the primary
danger: 'For the time being the Far Eastern hotbed of danger
shows the greatest activity.' 44 This was perhaps only natural
after the border incidents and the putsch by young officers in
Tokyo on 26 February 1936. Karl Radek had sounded the alarm
in Le journal de Moscou: 'Each Japanese Minister can be seen to

be constrained to take decisions with a revolver of the young
officers at his temples.' That, he concluded, was 'the alarming
meaning of the Tokyo events'. 45 Yet when Stalin was asked
about the likely consequences of the putsch by young officers for
the situation in the Far East, he said the picture was not yet
clear. 46 The signals were, indeed, mixed and the picture re-
mained obscure for some considerable time.
However, in reply to a question which Howard had evidently
been primed to ask, namely what the Soviet Union would do if
Japan attacked Outer Mongolia, there was no doubt or equivo-
cation: Stalin bluntly stated that the Soviet Government 'will
have to assist the Mongolian Peoples' Republic' as they had
done in 1921 (with the Red Army). 47 The question was evidently
prompted by a further build-up of Japanese forces along the
Mongolian frontier. The Japanese ambassador, Ota, attempted
to reassure Litvinov that all was well, that the two sides should
press ahead to resolve outstanding disputes. But Litvinov raised
the issue of Japanese pressure on Outer Mongolia. And, prob-
ably reflecting criticism of his Far Eastern policy from within the
Politburo, he pointed out that 'Here we have the impression that
the more we give way, the more demanding Japan becomes.
After our major concessions on the CER up came the demand to
revise the border, and the offensive against Mongolia.' 48 To deter
the Japanese these warnings were followed by signature of a
protocol of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and
Outer Mongolia on 12 March. 49 It formalised a gentleman's
agreement reached on 27 November 1934 and provided for joint
effort to deter and prevent the threat of attack by a third party,
and for aid in the event of attack, after speedy consultation.
In so far as they understood what was happening, the Rus-
sians did not see Premier Hirota - who had become Prime
Minister in March- bent on war with the Soviet Union. On the
contrary he appeared 'an unprincipled careerist' balancing be-
tween 'military-fascist groups' on the one hand and 'the court
and business circles' on the other. And in order to strengthen his
position and 'free his hands for an aggressive policy in China', he
had taken the initiative towards the creation of border commissions
to alleviate tension with the Soviet Union. He had been blocked
by the military. Moscow was none the less fairly sanguine in its
evaluation of the immediate future. Deputy Commissar Stomon-

yakov advised Y urenev on 28 March:
One can also expect a trail of zig-zags in Japanese policy
vis-a-vis the USSR on the part of Hirota in the future; however,
in the short term the general orientation would seem to be
towards a lessening of existing tension and the creation of
some kind of more peaceful transition period in our relations,
which would allow Japan to complete its rearmament and
simultaneously, of course, pursue a more expansionist policy
in China.
Success was attributed to the effectiveness of Soviet military
power in the area. 'The Ulan-Bator protocol [of 12 March] is a
new link in a chain of resolute actions with which we are
checking Japanese aggression against the M[ongolian] P[eople's]
R(epublic]. Now Japan is certainly in no doubt that taking over
Mongolia would lead to war with the Soviet Union .... I think
one may now expect serious action by Japan against Mongolia
only when Japan takes a final decision on war with us.' 50
For the Russians the defence of Mongolia was important. But
China was critical. If the Soviet Union itselfwas to avoid a direct
collision with Japan while Germany increasingly loomed as a
threat on the horizon in Europe, and if the Western Powers were
unlikely to challenge the Japanese head-on, then a renewed
Sino-Japanese conflict was Moscow's best hope for distracting
and ultimately wearing down Japanese power. Although the
Russians showed no interest in an alliance with the Kuomin-
tang, they certainly envisaged providing material aid as well as
moral support to the Chinese in the event of a full-scale war. In a
briefing given by the commander of the Byelorussian military
district to a meeting of the Western regional committee of the
Komsomol at around this time, commander (first rank) Ubore-
vich gave a sober assessment of the international situation.
China was incapable of resisting Japan. In China the Red Army
was 'still weak', Soviet power was 'very weak'. The 'only' force
in the Far East capable of blocking the expansion of Japanese
capitalism was the Soviet Union with its powerful armed forces.
Yet Uborevich saw potential in China. There the national
movement was 'insufficiently strong, but in alliance with us it
may grow and become a threat' to Japan. He pointed out that
'the Japanese militarists know that this national movement in

China, should we in the event of war render it technical and
military assistance, will grow into a threatening force .. .'.!) 1
Uborevich did not say as much, but a key condition for any
Soviet aid to Chiang Kai-shek was the formation of a united
front with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
3 The Chinese Communist
Party and the Comintern
Whether in Europe or Asia, Soviet foreign policy amounted to
more than diplomacy. There was also the Comintern which,
although an international organisation of Communist Parties,
was under the ultimate control of the Soviet Communist Party
and therefore could not afford to ignore the interests of the Soviet
state. In the conflict with Japan, Soviet needs were pressing; but
those needs were extremely hard to meet. The Japanese Com-
munist Party (JCP) had been suppressed almost to the point of
extinction and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was oflittle
use. From the Manchurian incident in 1931 untill934 the CCP,
concentrated in Kiangsi, a province to the south-west of Shang-
hai, was too far from the Japanese front to offer any resistance.
And Kuomintang (KMT) encirclement of these soviets made
any enlargement of Communist power most unlikely. Indeed
Chiang Kai-shek's campaign very nearly succeeded in wiping
them out. On 16 October 1934 the Communists escaped by
forced march - the Long March - to the north and west. Under
the direction of Mao Tse-tung, who secured his supremacy en
route at Tsunyi in January 1935, battered remnants of the Red
forces reached the poverty-stricken province of northern Shensi
that October.
They had lost contact with Moscow by the time they em-
barked on the Long March. Contact had been maintained by
radio transmitter with the Bureau of the Central Committee in
Shanghai. 1 Shanghai also unwittingly hosted the secretariat of
the Pan-Pacific Trade Union (with a branch in Tientsin) and,
more importantly, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. 2
The Bureau, located at 49c Nanking Road, was raided by the
British-administered Shanghai Municipal Police on 15 June
1931. 3 They arrested Paul Ruegg (alias Hilaire Noulens), a
Swiss Communist and Comintern agent who had arrived to take
charge of the Bureau in March 1930. 4 The police were acting on
information from two sources: a Chinese Comintern agent ar-
rested in Hankow and interrogated; 5 and Comintern agent
Joseph Ducroux (alias Serge Lefranc), arrested in Singapore by
54
The Chinese Communists and the Comintern 55
British colonial police on 1 June 1931. Ducroux had been sent to

re-establish contact with the fledgling Communist Parties of
south-east Asia (for more, see pp. 156--62). 6 Among his papers
was the copy of a telegram addressed to 'Hilanou1, Shanghai'. 7 It
did not take long for the Shanghai police, habitually surveying
the comings and goings of likely agents from Moscow, to trace
the recipient to Nanking Road. He was arraigned in court on 29
June and handed over to the Chinese for trial in Nanking, which
took place on 5 July and resulted in a death sentence (com-
muted) on 19 August. 8 Ruegg was eve.ntually released on the eve
of the Japanese occupation of Nanking. 9
As soon as news of Ruegg's arrest reached Moscow a substi-
tute was sent. On 2 August 1931, barely two months after
Ruegg's capture, 'Oswald Donitz' arrived in Shanghai assigned
to reorganise the Far Eastern Bureau. He left on 25 December,
his work apparently accomplished, for the Bureau was soon back
in operation. 10 The CCP Central Committee proper was trans-
ferred to J uichin in central China early in 1933. But radio
contact between Juichin and Shanghai nonetheless allowed
GRU officer and chief military adviser to the CCP, Manfred
Shtern, to keep the Party informed of the KMT campaign to
crush Red forces; he was also empowered to issue strategic
directives for CCP military operations.
Shtern had arrived in China via Europe, the United States
and Japan at the beginning of 1933 to enable Communist forces
to extricate themselves from the KMT siege. His mission was
technically subordinate to the Far Eastern Bureau, now headed
by the mild-mannered German Communist Arthur Ewert and
his Polish deputy, Rylski. Shtern was an experienced conspirator
of no mean ability, fluent in various European languages, in-
cluding English (he later served in Spain as General Kleber). As
such he fitted in well with the cosmopolitan milieu of the
International Settlement in Shanghai and proved adept at ex-
ploiting the contacts open to him there in assessing KMT
activities. His subordinate was also German, a man named Otto
Braun who worked in the field under the Chinese nom de guerre Li
Teh. While Shtern remained in Shanghai issuing general direc-
tives by radio, in the spring of 1933 Braun was sent into the field
in central China to advise on tactics. 11 Fortuitously he therefore
became the only foreigner to accompany Red forces on the Long
March. Radio contact was broken in the autumn of 1934 - the
last directives from Shanghai reached the CCP in September -

when KMT security police uncovered and arrested the Shanghai
Bureau and seized the radio station that also served as the link
with Moscow. 12 Shtern left for Moscow and no new instructions
reached the CCP until autumn 1935. 13
The bulk of Red forces went on the Long March to the
comparative safety of the north-west. But there also existed a
much smaller concentration of Communist fighters in Man-
churia, whose contact with Moscow was easier to maintain
through the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the CCP in
Harbin, the Far Eastern Propaganda Department in Khaba-
rovsk and the Far Eastern Regional Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party at Vladivostok. 14 And it was in Manchuria
that the Russians first insisted on a true united front between
Communist and nationalist elements. This change in tactics was
apparently not decided upon until a meeting of the Chinese
department of the Comintern in February 1933. 15 In May, Li
Yao-k'uei was sent to Manchuria to act as secretary of the local
Party committee to ensure implementation of the new line. 16 But
the task was an impossible one. Not only were there conflicting
instructions from Kiangsi from 1931 to 1934, where the priority
was still that of class warfare not national resistance, but the
Japanese made short work of breaking up the Party through
widespread arrests and detention. Li himself was caught that
October, 17 and in April1934 the rest of the structure was broken
through mass arrests. 18
The main body of the Party was thus out of touch with
Moscow when the 7th Comintern Congress met in August 1935
and laid down a policy of cooperation with the KMT against the
Japanese. Information as to what had become of the CCP was
poor. Not until after the Congress did a CCP delegation arrive,
headed by Chen Yun, a member of the Politburo, who had
participated in the Long March as far as Szechuan. Chen briefed
the Comintern secretariat on the latest news which, after editing
by Shtern and junior Comintern China specialist Afanasii Kry-
mov, was published in Kommunisticheskii Internatsional as a special
article on the Long March. 19 But news of the Congress took a
while to filter through to the survivors of the March. Renewed
contact was then bound to lead to a certain amount of friction
between the conflicting demands of Soviet Realpolitik - which
required the speediest unification of resistance against the Jap-
anese - and the vital concern of the CCP leadership to survive

the onslaught by the KMT and ultimately expand at its expense.
This conflict of interests had been evident in CCP history
since the days of the united front in 1925-27, which had been
established to rid China ofWestern imperialists and had ended
in a massacre of Communist cadres in the Treaty Ports of China
at the hands of the KMT. Moscow's demand for a return to the
united front not surprisingly threatened to split the Party be-
tween those who regarded Moscow's word as law and those who
saw Chinese interests pointing in another, more independent,
direction. Stalin saw the future of China essentially as a bour-
geois but anti-imperialist force in world politics because the
country was, at its current stage of development, unlikely to fall
to the CCP. The indigenous Party leadership, on the other hand,
expected a genuine Communist revolution in China based on the
peasantry and the working class. Soviet tactics matched Stalin's
pessimistic assessment of the prospects for Communism in
China (which he acknowledged to be mistaken only much later,
in July 1949). The preferred tactics of the CCP leadership
matched the more optimistic hopes of those who expected the
revolution in their own lifetime.
The leading proponent of the Chinese way was Mao Tse-tung.
The leading proponent of the Soviet position - whether from
opportunism or conviction is difficult to determine - was Wang
Ming (Ch'en Shao-yu) who, trained in Moscow, had briefly
served as CCP secretary after the enforced return of errant Li
Li-san in 1931. Having ensured a policy more in conformity with
Soviet interests, Wang returned to Moscow on 7 November 1931
and three days later became the CCP representative on the
Comintern executive committee.
But when, in the summer of 1934, the Comintern executive
committee debated Dimitrov's proposals for a new line aimed at
a united front against fascism - and by implication against
Japan- Wang Ming stood with the orthodox element alongside
Bela Kun, Simon Lozovsky and Wilhelm (Knorinsh) Knorin. 20
Wang had unwittingly overstepped the mark. Stalin had ac-
cepted Dimitrov's recommendations for a united front in Europe
by autumn 1934. It was thereafter merely a matter oftime before
the new line was applied to Chinese conditions as well. Yet
Stalin took little direct interest in Comintern matters except
when decisive action was required because of their immediate
impact on Soviet Realpolitik. Policy-formation was more often

than not left to Dimitrov and others, among whom the most
influential figure on Chinese issues until May 1937 was Pavel
Mif.
Mif was a nom de guerre constructed from the first two letters of
his first name and the first letter of his last name: Mikhail
Fortus. Born on 3 August 1901 he was still a teenager at the time
of the Bolshevik revolution. After action in the civil war this
good-looking, intelligent and ambitious young man became a
research fellow at the Communist University of the East, which
served as a training-ground for young revolutionaries from the
colonial and semi-colonial world. By 1926 Mifwas pro-rector at
the University of the Toilers ofChina named after Sun Yat-sen,
the father of the Kuomintang. It was here that Wang Ming and
other 'returned students' were schooled in Soviet views and
Soviet methods: 'bolshevised', in the terminology of the time. It
was here that Mif proved his worth as an opponent of Trotsky-
ism - combating, and in 1927 replacing, rector Karl Radek.
Radek was a mercurial supporter of the opposition who by the
end of the decade had betrayed his comrades to find favour with
Stalin. If anything Mif was a 'rightist'; yet his star continued to
rise even with the shift to the Left in Comintern policies from
1928. He became defacto head of a small China research institute
which was housed at the Sun Yat-sen University until the
university was abolished in 1930. 21 The institute was then moved
into the colonial department of the Institute of World Economy
and World Politics headed by Hungarian economist Eugene
Varga. This came as no great shock: the institute was already
something of a 'think-tank' for government and the Comintern.
In March 1928 Mif was also appointed deputy head of the
Comintern's eastern secretariat and he played a major role in
preparing the resolutions on China for the 6th Comintern Con-
gress. In 1930 it was Mif who, on behalf of the Comintern, went
to China to deal with the errant Li Li-san. 22
As Soviet historians have noted, during the discussions at the
Comintern's preparatory commission in 1934-35 Mif and
others from the eastern secretariat 'made a serious contribution
to the formulation of the CCP's new course'. After the seventh
Comintern congress, and during the last week in August, a
meeting of the CCP delegation was held to examine the means of
implementing a united front policy; Mifparticipated. And by the
end of 1935 he had risen to become Dimitrov's personal assistant

on China. 23 But, as the discussions during the meeting with the
CCP delegation must have shown, the implementation of the
united front policy was fraught with intractable difficulties.
Moscow might dictate policy, but only the Chinese in the field
could make such pronouncements a reality.
When it became clear that opposition to the united front line
was a losing cause in Moscow, Wang Ming wasted no time in
adhering to the winning line. Before the 7th Comintern Congress
convened, an 'Appeal to all fellow-countrymen regarding resist-
ance to Japan and the Salvation of the homeland', which called
for a united front in China, was issued on 1 August in the name
of the CCP Central Committee and the Chinese Soviet Govern-
ment (who knew nothing about it); it had been drafted by Wang
Ming and others in Moscow. 24
But in his speech to the Comintern congress on 7 August
Wang Ming still referred to Chiang Kai-shek as one of the
'traitors of the nation'; the united front excluded the KMT
regime in Nanking. It did not rule out dealing with some KMT
generals, however. In the encirclement campaign of 1934 the
Commander-in-Chief of KMT forces on the northern front in
Kiangsi, General Chen-chen, had demanded that Chiang break
off the war against the Communists. He had been dismissed as a
result. 'Under these circumstances,' Wang Ming declared, 'the
Communist Party of China ought to have addressed itself to
General Chen Chen [sic] and his troops and to all remaining
troops who wish to fight against Japanese imperialism with still
more concrete proposals. We ought to have continued dis-
cussions with Chiang Kai-shek in order finally to expose him
before the army and the people as a national traitor.' 25 The
united front policy at this stage entailed splitting the KMT.
This policy appears to have represented a compromise be-
tween Soviet demands for some sort of united front and Chinese
opposition to any collaboration with the hated KMT. As Soviet
sources now emphasise, it was the Comintern executive com-
mittee which had 'recommended' the new line to the CCP
delegation; 26 the differences were then smudged with ambiguous
phrasing. Dimitrov made reference to 'the inclusion of all organ-
ised forces on Chinese territory which are ready to wage a real
struggle for the salvation of their country and people' .27 This, of
course, left open the definition of who precisely was 'ready' and
when they were determined to be 'ready': a matter evidently

destined to be decided in the field. Similarly a congressional
resolution on China held out the prospect of expanding the CCP
within the context of a united front: 'the expansion of the
movement in favour of soviets and the enhancement of the Red
Army's fighting capacity should go hand in hand with the
spreading of the popular anti-imperialist movement throughout
the country.' 28 In the circumstances the KMT was unlikely to
join, but only this sweetener could make the pill easier for the
CCP to swallow. Yet even this limited degree of Chinese Com-
munist interest in a united front inevitably strained credulity;
both Wang Ming and Manuilsky, Soviet representative on the
Comintern executive committee, therefore hastened to assure
everyone that this change of tactics was not 'just one more
manoeuvre'. 29 But why should the KMT agree to allow so
obvious a Trojan horse in through the gates? This was the
unanswered question.
RESPONDING TO THE KUOMINTANG
A combination of factors now impelled the KMT towards the

Soviet Union and drew the Russians, via the Comintern, to
pressure the CCP into implementing a real united front, even
with Chiang Kai-shek. Tokyo's moves to form an 'autonomous'
government in northern China had excited anti-Japanese opinion,
particularly among the student population in KMT-held areas.
Some time early in the autumn of 1935 the editor of the journal
China and the USSR Simon Chun-hua, and head of the KMT
organisational department Ch'en Li-fu (one of Chiang's con-
fidants) told members of the Soviet embassy that, within certain
circles of the KMT, opinion favoured cooperation with the CCP.
Ch'en went so far as to tender specific proposals for KMT-CCP
collaboration: an end to the civil war; the integration of the Red
Army into the KMT army, and the transformation of the
(KMT) central government into some form of 'national govern-
ment' along the lines suggested by Wang Ming at the Comintern
Congress. Such a government would then resist the Japanese. 30
The Soviet embassy was located in Shanghai. It was headed
by polpred Dmitrii Bogomolov. Born in 1890 and a diplomat
from 1920, Bogomolov served in Austria and Germany before
coming to Britain as first secretary in 1925. 31 He had served as

an officer in the First World War, had been taken prisoner, and
spent the rest of the war in the company of British POWs, from
whom he gained a thorough knowledge of English. 32 This stood
him in good stead. By 1932 he had risen to become counsellor at
the Soviet embassy at Chesham House in London. Ivan Maisky,
who had served as Bogomolov's immediate superior at Chesham
House in the 1920s and then reappeared as polpred in the autumn
of 1932, very much liked him: 'Here was an intelligent, culti-
vated, even-tempered man of good character and with a fine
knowledge of the English language.' 33 He was appointed polpred
to China in January 1933 and lived at 24 Whangpoo Road,
Shanghai.
On 9 October 1935 Kung Syan-si, deputy chairman of the
executive Yuan and Finance Minister of the central government,
asked Bogomolov whether the Soviet Government could supply
arms via Sinkiang should the KMT take up armed resistance to
Japan. When Bogomolov next saw Kung on 18 October no reply
had yet been received. Because of the delicate nature of the issue,
word had to be sent to Moscow by diplomatic courier instead of
by wire to avoid interception and possible decryption by the
Japanese. At the same meeting Chiang also spoke to Bogomolov
and in so many words suggested the conclusion of a secret
military agreement between Nanking and Moscow. Bogomolov
was evasive. 34 As he noted in a further cable to Moscow: 'From
all my conversations with the Nanking leaders, I am left with the
impression that they would like to precipitate a possible conflict
between ourselves andJapan'. 35 Such fears were offset only by an
equal concern to avoid driving the KMT into the arms of the
Japanese, who were at this time putting heavy pressure on
Chiang to recognise Manchukuo and reach an entente directed
against both the CCP and the Soviet Union; just as there were
pro-Soviet elements, so too were there pro-Japanese elements in
Nanking.
Moscow was, however, now embroiled in a crisis on the other
side of the globe. In Europe, under Litvinov's inspiration and
direction, the Soviet Union was pursuing a forward policy to
secure the containment of Germany. In May 1935 the Soviet
Government had signed a mutual assistance pact with France.
Litvinov hoped to draw in other powers, including Britain and
Italy, in due course. But Italy attacked Abyssinia at the beginning
of October 1935 and the conflict threatened to erupt into an

Anglo-Italian war which would once and for all destroy any
hope of a common European front against Nazi Germany. 36
A forward policy simultaneously pursued in China without
close support from the United States or any of the colonial
powers might well bring the Russians to blows with the Japan-
ese. Even were the Soviet Union powerful enough to contain
Japan unilaterally, any such conflict would expose the Russians
in Europe and make allies such as the French wary of closer
cooperation against Germany. The Russians thus faced the
difficult task, only too familiar to Britain and France, of bal-
ancing interests in Asia against interests in Europe. In these
calculations Asia usually got the worst of it. Litvinov, for one,
had little faith in the United States and even less in the KMT;
his brusque and dismissive response to entreaties from the
Chinese ambassador concerning japanese moves to take over the
greater part of northern China betrayed his true order of
priorities. 37 Karakhan's removal to the post of polpred in Ankara
left the Chinese without vociferous support at the Narkomindel.
Stomonyakov had taken over from Sokol'nikov as Deputy Com-
missar for the East; he knew nothing about Asia and was
essentially a creature of Litvinov's. The Narkomindel was thus
unsympathetic. But Litvinov did not have the final word. The
Red Army also took a direct interest in the Far East, and the fact
that Dimitrov had now taken Mif on board as his personal
assistant for Chinese affairs testified to Comintern determination
to activate its China policy, as soon became apparent.
By mid-November 1935 the danger of an Anglo-Italian war
had receded over the horizon. The Soviet leadership now took
the crucial decision of meeting Chiang's request for arms. The
decision was conveyed to Bogomolov by wire in elliptical form
on 19 November. 38 The more awkward and potentially explosive
issue of a secret agreement then had to be faced. Not until nearly
a month later and evidently after searching debate did Stomon-
yakov cable Bogomolov on 14 December that the Soviet Union
was not against an agreement with the KMT. 39 But this rep-
resented an acceptance in principle only. The details did not
follow by letter until 28 December (couriers took anything up to
a fortnight to come and go). When the letter arrived, it became
evident that the Russians were not prepared there and then to
sign a mutual assistance pact. Stomonyakov explained:
We are ready to render feasible support to China if it really

embarks on a war against japan. We, however, think that,
despite the undoubted dissemination in China of the idea of
fighting Japan, perhaps the moment is not yet ripe to commit
ourselves to an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek on the ques-
tion of rendering mutual assistance in the event of armed
aggression on the part of Japan.
What gave the Soviet Government pause for thought was that:
Chiang Kai-shek still, although to a lesser degree than before,
makes concessions to the demands of the japanese imperial-
ists. Although it is possible that at the present time he is
making these concessions merely for the purpose of ma-
noeuvre, to play for time, in the hope of changing the balance
of forces to China's advantage ... one cannot rule out the
possibility that he may yet come to terms with Japan, at-
tempting to make use of negotiations with us, in particular,
with this end in mind.
Thus before proceeding any further the Russians wanted evi-
dence of Chiang's 'true intentions', and it soon became clear that
the test was his treatment of the CCP.
Moscow first wanted to know precisely what were Chiang's
plans to defend China against Japan and how he envisaged
Soviet assistance. 'This is all the more necessary because we are
assured from various parties that the Nanking Government is
banking exclusively upon a war of the other Powers with Japan
and that it does not consider itself able to fight it [Japan].'
Stomonyakov then raised the delicate issue of the CCP:
Special emphasis must be laid upon the problem of Chiang
Kai-shek's relations with the Chinese red armies. You must
point out that this question interests us because we are unclear
as to how Chiang Kai-shek can conceive of armed struggle
against Japan if the greater part of his armed forces are busy
with the Chinese red armies. We are convinced that without
the realisation of a united military front of Chiang Kai-shek's
forces with the units of the Red Army, China is incapable of a
serious struggle against japanese aggression.
Should Chiang Kai-shek begin to speak to you of the
desirability of our mediating between him and the Chinese
Communist Party with the aim of establishing a united front
against Japan, point out that we cannot take on such a role

but that he has every opportunity of coming to terms directly
with the Communist Party.
Elsewhere Moscow might try to hide the interconnection be-
tween Soviet Government and Comintern policies behind the
fiction of their being completely independent entities, but in
China complete candour was required to secure the goals the
Russians sought. Once again all correspondence on these mat-
ters was relayed by courier. Chiang was also asked 'not to send
anyone or anywhere telegrams in connexion with these talks'. 40
DRAWING THE CCP INTO LINE
As far as Stalin was concerned, the Comintern was there to serve

Soviet interests. It was therefore not long before united front
directives from the Comintern were brought into line with the
Soviet negotiations in Nanking. In October 1935 discussion at
the secretariat of the Comintern focused on the overriding im-
portance of uniting all anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese forces
in China; in this context CCP revolutionary measures to liqui-
date the kulaks and traders were criticised as a hindrance to the
broad anti-imperialist front. 41 On 25 November the CCP delega-
tion drew up an appeal calling for a national conference 'so that
discussions on the forms and methods of putting up a united
resistance to Japanese aggression may begin immediately'. 42 But
Chiang Kai-shek was still anathema. Not until 9 December was
the united front opened to include him. On that day Kommunisti-
cheskii Internatsional published an article by Wang Ming, a section
of which ran as follows:
Concerning Chiang Kai-shek personally, we frankly say: if he
truly ends the war against the Red Army and turns his
weapons against the Japanese imperialists, then, in spite of his
innumerable crimes against the people and the country, the
CCP and the [Chinese] soviet government will not only give
him the chance to expiate his sins against the people and the
country, but are also ready to fight on a common front with
him and his forces against Japanese imperialism. 43
This statement sat awkwardly with the rest of the article, which
argued that 'all those who oppose exploiters and oppressors of
the Chinese people cannot but direct their weapons above all
against Japanese imperialism and the Nanking Government'. 44
The fact that the article went to the typesetter just a week after
the Soviet leadership decided on arms sales to Nanking suggests
that the change ofline on Chiang was inserted at the last minute,
leaving insufficient time to adjust the remainder of the text to
harmonise with this anomalous but crucial insertion.
The appearance of this item may have prompted Chiang to
instruct the Chinese military attache in Moscow to approach
Wang Ming to discuss prospects for a united front. 45 But the
CCP proper still did not even know of the decisions of the
Comintern congress, let alone the latest innovation in policy
made on its behalf. Mao and the CCP Politburo were then at
Wayaobao in northern Shensi. A special delegation sent from
Moscow to convey the news had attempted to cross into Chinese
territory disguised as merchants. But they had been attacked
and murdered by bandits earlier in the autumn of 1935. 46 Not
until late November or early December did Lin Yu-ying, Chin-
ese representative to the Profintern, and Liu Ch'an-shen, fly in
from the north. They brought neither documents nor codes for
secure radio transmission, but between them they had memor-
ised the contents of the relevant resolutions and decisions of the
Comintern congress and the subsequent executive committee
meetings, though neither could yet have known of the sudden
change of line regarding Chiang Kai-shek. 47
The news from Moscow could not have been welcome. It
threw the Chinese Politburo into prolonged debate. But advice
from the Soviet Union still carried enormous weight; the leader-
ship therefore accepted recommendations they had been sent,
and on 25 December the consensus was summed up in a 'Deci-
sion on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party'. The
need for a united front was acknowledged; but, in the spirit of the
Comintern's earlier pronouncements, the 'Decision' also spoke
of combining the 'civil war with the national revolutionary war' 48
and proposed that the CCP continue the struggle on two fronts:
against 'Japanese imperialism and the main traitor of the Chin-
ese people, Chiang Kai-shek' .49 The attitude towards the KMT
as a whole was to take advantage of the 'Waverings and splits'
which had 'increased in the counter-revolutionary camp': 'a
section of the bourgeoisie, many kulaks and small landowners
and even part of the warlords may assume the position of
well-wishing neutrality or even join the new national movement

now under way.' 50 This tactic was made explicit: 'The Party has
to exploit the contradictions and clashes between these cliques
and do its utmost to get at least part of the counter-revolutionary
forces to abstain from active measures against the anti-Japanese
front for the time being.' 51
Two days later, also at Wayaobao, on 27 December Mao
outlined the need for a united front in a speech to Party activists,
once again explicitly excluding Chiang Kai-shek. The relevant
section ran as follows:
The big local bullies, the big bad gentry, the big warlords, the
big bureaucrats, and the big compradors have long made up
their minds. They have said and are still saying that revolu-
tion (of whatever kind) is after all worse than imperialism.
They have formed a camp of traitors ... and their chief of
chiefs is none other than Chiang Kai-shek. The traitors of this
camp are the sworn enemies of the Chinese people .... They
are the jackals of imperialism.
Mao attacked what he called 'closed-door sectarianism' but at
the same time closed the door on the Nanking government,
evidently still ignorant of Moscow's recent shift of position. 52
The absence of sustained radio contact, due to lack of ciphers,
which lasted into the summer of 1936, inevitably also gave Mao
freedom of manoeuvre to interpret the united front line in his
own terms.
Although only halfway to a united front, the Wayaobao deci-
sions represented a crucial turning-point in the Party's fortunes.
It took time for this to become apparent, however. In the
meantime the contradictions in the new strategy became glaringly
apparent. The Comintern resolutions had assumed that the
expansion of the soviets and the creation of a united front could
go hand in hand. Yet the one was certain to upset the other. Mao
had insisted that the Party seek a united anti-Japanese front; but
he had also insisted that the aim was that of winning
'hegemony'. 53 How was class warfare to be squared with
national unity? Here Soviet diplomacy had a critical role to play.
The Russians were still exploring the ground in Nanking. On
22 January 1936 Bogomolov gave Moscow's more detailed reply
to the proposals for a secret mutual assistance pact. The two
sides were as far apart as ever. Chiang had been negotiating not
only with Moscow but also with Tokyo. It was said that he had
accepted Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota's three principles:
cessation of all unfriendly acts towards Japan; recognition of
Manchukuo; and cooperation against communism. Bogomolov
naturally pressed Chiang on this point. But Chiang gave no clear
response and evidently expected Soviet concern to increase his
leverage in the negotiations for a treaty with Moscow. 'Twice he
repeated to me the following evasive reply: ''Japan demands
talks, and we must go to them since Japan is strong, but should
we reach agreement with you, all our talks with Japan will cease
to mean anything"', Bogomolov reported. Soviet suspicions
were not allayed by Chiang's inability to give details of any plans
to offer armed resistance to Japan or to say what he intended to
do with Soviet armaments. Chiang said Soviet military assist-
ance could be given in the event ofJapan seizing Mongolia [sic],
Suiyan or Shansi. In reply to Bogomolov's questions, he empha-
sised the importance of Chinese Communist forces as the vital
issue: 'Should we succeed in coming to terms on this question,
the rest will resolve itself. ... The USSR must use its authority
to ensure that the Red Army recognises the fact of the govern-
ment, and then the Chinese Government could offer resistance to
Japan.' In other words, would the Soviet Government end the
civil war in Chiang's favour? Bogomolov once more insisted that
Moscow could do no such thing. 5 4 Stalin might have little faith in
the CCP's ability to win a revolution, but the option of throwing
the Party to the wolves was evidently unacceptable.
In the absence of any progress, Mao's forces took the offensive.
The base in northern Shensi was not only isolated and besieged:
it also yielded little sustenance. In February under the slogan
'going east to fight the Japanese', Red forces attacked western
Shansi. They brought back tons of badly-needed food supplies
and half-a-million silver dollars; but the ultimate aim of the
campaign was to extend the soviets as far as possible. Chiang
countered by bringing in reinforcements which drove Red forces
back into northern Shensi; and by the end of April he had
successfully established a blockade of the Shensi-Kansu border
area. 55
Annoyed at Chiang for apparently conceding to Hirota's three
principles, but confident that sooner or later he would be back to
the table, the Russians now took a firm line with Nanking. On
29 February Stomonyakov instructed Bogomolov that the USSR
could scarcely guarantee the provinces of North China when

Chiang himself allowed the Japanese to take these areas without
resistance. Bogomolov was also told Moscow could not be ex-
pected to mediate between the CCP and the KMT. Further-
more, if Chiang complained again about the evasive responses to
his requests, he was to be told that 'our statements match the
indeterminate stance which he himself is taking' .56
Moscow acted on the assumption that the Japanese would
continue making demands on China, and that therefore the
Chinese would ultimately be forced to resist; any exacerbation of
the situation in Japan was therefore expected to have a salutary
effect on Nanking. On 26 February 1936 several leading mem-
bers oftheJapanese Government were assassinated by rebellious
soldiers. The Prime Minister just escaped with his life. As a coup
d'etat it failed but, as Stomonyakov remarked in a letter to
Bogomolov, 'The recent events inJapan ... will in any case lead
to an increase in the influence of military-extremist elements in
Japanese politics, which will above all mean a speeding up of
Japanese aggression in China'. This was reason for optimism,
however, since 'both internal developments in China and recent
events in Japan will bring matters to a head in the sense of
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanking Government taking a definite
position regarding Japanese aggression.' 57
Stomonyakov's facile reasoning was challenged by Bogomo-
lov, who tended to be pessimistic about any prospect for a united
front without substantial concessions from the CCP. He con-
tinued to press Moscow for permission to secure agreement with
the KMT even at the expense of the Communists. On
19 December 1935 Chiang had suggested basing Sino-Soviet rela-
tions on the Sun Yat-sen--joffe declaration, which represented a
rejection by Moscow of its revolutionary aims in China. The
crucial paragraph had stated: 'Dr Sun Yat-sen holds that neither
the communistic order nor the Soviet system can actually be
introduced into China, because there do not exist here the
conditions necessary for the successful establishment of either
communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr
Joffe .. .'. 58 Anxious to get results from Nanking, Bogomolov
suggested it would be helpful 'to speed up our response to
Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to base Soviet-Chinese relations on
the Sun Yat-sen-Joffe declaration. Our positive response to his
proposal will to a certain extent substitute for the absence of real
results in our discussions'. 59 But nothing was further from the

minds of those ~n Moscow. The Comintern's Popular Front
strategy had already caused a good deal of unrest in Communist
ranks, as had the signature of the mutual assistance pact with
bourgeois France. Stalin might dismiss the notion that the Soviet
Union was exporting revolution as a farcical misunderstanding;
but he had no intention of selling out the CCP for such an
uncertain return. In this sense the Soviet Union was structurally
locked into a revolutionary process regardless of the preferences
of its leadership. Stomonyakov's response to Bogomolov was
therefore uncompromisingly negative: 'The basis of this declara-
tion was recognition on the part ofJoffe of the inapplicability to
China of soviet structures and communist organisation. You
yourself know that our confirmation of this thesis - and Chiang
Kai-shek would certainly not fail to publicise it, especially in
those regions where the Chinese red armies are fighting - would
truly be a stab in the back of the heroic Chinese Communist
Party and the Chinese red armies. For us such a proposal is, of
course, not open to discussion.' 60
These 'heroic' forces still had no direct radio contact with
Moscow. Discussion in the Soviet capital therefore remained
superfluous. Wang Ming had the difficult task of reporting on
and presenting proposals for the CCP at the Comintern execu-
tive presidium on 23 March 1936. The analysis and the consen-
sus which emerged from the discussion were published, as usual,
in the form of an article in Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, on
25 April. As Stomonyakov's letter to Bogomolov indicates, Moscow
was by no means unsympathetic to the plight of the CCP, even
though the Party continued in its strategy of 'overthrowing
Chiang to fight Japan'. 'The old enmity has impeded the open-
ing of negotiations not only for the Kuomintang but also for the
Red units', Wang Ming lamented. 61 These enmities had to be
overcome: 'the situation in China is changing so rapidly that we
must learn how to change our tactics equally rapidly and flex-
ibly'. This entailed outwitting Chiang at his own game: 'he
states that the Communists want to conclude a united front with
all parties and with all forces ... with the exception of Chiang
Kai-shek's men and with the exception of Chiang Kai-shek
personally, and therefore, he says, he is forced to fight the
Communist Party of China and the Chinese Red Army' .62 At the
Comintern executive committee Wang Ming also stressed the
importance of ending calls for the downfall of the Nanking

Government. 63
But Mao, Chou En-lai and the others, now quartered in
Pao-an, had no intention whatever of dealing directly with
Chiang. An opening had occurred: a split within KMT ranks.
The possibility of overthrowing Chiang loomed on the horizon.
Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, warlord of Manchuria, whose
father had been assassinated by the Japanese, and who had been
forced out of his domain under Japanese occupation, had since
1935 been working with Chiang to drive the Reds out of the
north-west. But the student anti-Japanese movement, which
came to a head on 9 December 1935, had impressed him with the
need to resist the Japanese who were moving to take over North
China; and evidence of Communist patriotism brought him
around to seeing the united front proposals as genuine. Up to
this time the Communists 'used to think that Chang Hsueh-liang
was an even more evil reactionary than Chiang Kai-shek',
former CCP leader Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls. 64 But the oppor-
tunity to turn Chang into an ally seemed too good to miss.
Chang had recently made a name for himself and his Tungpei
army by providing refuge in Sian to students persecuted by
Chiang's police for their anti-Japanese activities. And with the
retreat of the Red Army to Shensi in April, the time was ripe for
action. In Chang Kuo-t'ao's picturesque phrase: 'From remote
Pao-an, Chou En-lai had seen sunlight through the small win-
dow of Sian.' 65
THE SIAN INCIDENT
The CCP slogan was still that of 'Resist Japan and Oppose
Chiang Kai-shek'. This did not change until May 1936. The
accompanying strategy was that of 'making use of all the strifes
[sic], rifts and contradictions inside the enemy [KMT] camp for
the purpose of fighting against the chief enemy [Japan] at the
present stage'. 66 The Wayaobao resolution thus meant a united
front with some KMT elements directed against both Japan and
Chiang. Moscow was unable to change this state of affairs. It
was events within the KMT that led to a fundamental recon-
sideration of CCP strategy.
There were two key figures the Communists sought to win
over to their side: General Chang Hsueh-liang of the North-

Eastern Army, whom we have already encountered, and General
Yang Hu-ch'en, of the North-Western Army in neighbouring
Shansi province. Both were entrusted by Chiang Kai-shek with
suppressing the Reds in Shensi. Of the two, Yang was regarded
in Pao-an as the most likely candidate for conversion. He had
become friendly with some CCP members in the 1925-27
revolution. Two Party members, in particular, had held import-
ant positions under him during this period: Wei Yechou, one of
the founders of the Shansi Party organisation, who died in 1928;
and Nan Hanchen, a senior figure in the Shansi Party from 1930,
but who worked undercover as an official in the local KMT
administration. Yang had shown himself willing and eager to
fight the japanese when they invaded Rehe Province in 1933; he
also concluded a non-aggression pact with the local Red forces.
In the autumn of 1935 Nan Hanchen sent an agent to brief
General Yang on the declaration of 1 August. The response was
favourable. In December Mao sent Wang Fen to Sian with three
letters addressed separately to General Yang, one of his aides,
Du Bincheng, a known sympathiser, and Geng Baoshan, direc-
tor ofYang's provisional headquarters in Hansu province. Wang
stayed for over a month in Sian and saw Yang three times. The
approaches to Chang Hsueh-liang were less direct: in contrast to
Yang, there was no history of collaboration, and suspicion of him
ran high in Pao-an. In January 1936 Mao, Chou En-lai and
Chu Teh issued a 'Message to All Officers and Men of the
Northeastern Army', calling for a ceasefire preparatory to joint
action against Japan. Contact was made through senior officers
of the army who had been taken prisoner, enlightened as to
Party interest in a united front against the foreign invader, and
released to their own side. As a result a meeting with Chang was
arranged in February.
Li Kenong, who was in charge of the Party's security organs
and simultaneously director of the Party's liaison bureau set up
on arrival in northern Shensi, was sent to meet Chang. A further
meeting was held in March. Certain areas were designated for a
ceasefire. These soundings were thus limited. But Chang wanted
to see Mao or Chou En-lai. 67 Before long Chou became the
mastermind behind the united front negotiations during the
years ahead. Possessed of an acute intelligence, an extraordinary
fortitude and a willow-like flexibility, Chou knew the West,
Moscow and Chiang Kai-shek: a combination of talents and

experience unique in the CCP. Chang Hsueh-liang flew into
Yenan, then still in the hands of the North-Eastern Army. On 9
April Chou arrived with Li Kenong. The talks took place in the
strictest secrecy in a Roman Catholic church. Chang still had
misgivings. 68 The CCP was still against cooperation with Chiang
Kai-shek. Movement had to be made on this front before cooper-
ation could be achieved. Nevertheless Chang did agree to a
truce, a non-aggression pact, and mutual assistance. Trade
relations were opened and an exchange of liaison missions
between Pao-an and Sian was established. The only outstanding
problem was, of course, Chang's initial insistence that the united
front be extended to include Chiang Kai-shek.
Chou En-lai duly referred this awkward issue back to the
Politburo and, in their concern to grasp the only straw held out
to them, the leadership conceded. The irony was that what
Moscow had been unable to accomplish, Chang had temporarily
succeeded in bringing about. The new slogan was thus that of
'compelling Chiang to fightjapan'. 69 Accordingly on 5 May the
CCP leadership sent an open telegram in the name of the
Chinese Soviet People's Republic and the Military Revolution-
ary Council of the Red Army addressed to the Military Com-
mittee of the Nanking Government and all organisations, calling
for an end to civil war and declaring a willingness to halt
hostilities within a month and reach a peace settlement with all
forces fighting the Red Army. 70 Talks then opened with rep-
resentatives from Nanking. Chou, accompanied by Pan Han-
nien (representing the Comintern), arrived in Shanghai to see
Chang Chun, secretary-general of Chiang's office. 71
The negotiations quickly came to nothing and before long the
CCP reverted to its old stance of attempting to split the KMT.
But the move towards Nanking evidently satisfied Chang Hsueh-
liang, who had to find other means of bringing the two sides
together. The Communists had proved cooperative; Chang thus
came round to seeing Chiang as the true obstacle to a united
front against the Japanese. The question which then arose was
how to 'push Chiang to fight Japan'.
News of Chang's initiative had reached Moscow unusually
rapidly. Bogomolov was evidently asked to explain what was
going on in Shensi. On 3 May he sent a letter - by courier, for
obvious security reasons - to Stomonyakov in Moscow. He
explained: 'Chang Hsueh-liang is not only in principle in favour
of an agreement with the red armies for a common struggle
against Japan but has in fact concluded a truce with the Reds.
All his groupings and his generals are in favour of resistance to
Japan. Confirming this and worthy of note is the fact that when
recently some delegates from student organisations in Peking
arrived in Sian for their own kind of propaganda in favour of
resistance to Japan . . . the commander of the forces in Sian,
General Yan Hu-ch'en, not only gave the student delegates a
good reception, but even invited them to deliver speeches at a
meeting of officers, which they did.' 72
The talks with Nanking were fruitless. Thus when another
rebellion against Chiang broke out in the provinces ofKwantung
and Kiangsi, the CCP in Pao-an lost no time in reverting to their
previous stance of supporting dissentient elements within the
KMT. The CCP issued a resolution on 13 June entitled 'The
Contemporary Political Situation'. This characterised the war of
the south-western warlords as 'possessing a degree of national
revolutionary significance'. The resolution continued: 'This war
is directed against the chief national traitor Chiang Kai-shek. In
the current situation war against the Japanese invaders is in-
separable from war against Chiang Kai-shek .... We must
encourage, support and expand this war, so as by mobilising all
the forces opposing the Japanese invaders and national
traitors ... [to] create a government of national defence and an
anti-Japanese united army, with the [Chinese] Soviet People's
Republic and the anti-Japanese Red Army as their pivot.' Un-
fortunately for the CCP the southern warlords refused the offer
and eventually came to terms with Chiang in exchange for
certain concessions. 73 The CCP had overestimated the depth of
divisions within the KMT. Its actions did nothing to enhance
the credibility of the Party line and it inevitably made Chiang
even more suspicious of Moscow's intentions.
Chiang was wrong to see Moscow behind CCP moves. In fact
Pao-an's actions cut directly across the Comintern strategy. In
Moscow Dimitrov called on the Comintern secretariat to issue
new directives to the CCP. A meeting of the secretariat was held
on 23 July. Flattering Wang Ming and other Chinese present
with the recollection that for the past two years he had been
reverential in his treatment of the CCP given its heroic achieve-
ments, Dimitrov nevertheless pointed out that such deference
had made them too uncritical of the 'brave' Chinese comrades.

Wang Ming had delivered some critical remarks, but these
criticisms 'to a great extent' also applied to 'Wang Ming himself'
and they had yet to be reflected in the 'speeches, documents and
articles of our Chinese comrades here': 'The task in China', he
continued, 'now consists not in expanding soviet regions and
expanding the Red army, but ... in seeking the opportunity,
seeking the means and the appropriate slogans, the appropriate
methods to bring about the unification of the greater part of the
Chinese people against the Japanese aggressors.' The CCP
should be the 'pioneer and initiator' in the struggle against the
Japanese. 'Everything else must be subordinated to this funda-
mental task.'
From this premise Dimitrov attacked the CCP's 'incorrect
political stance vis-a-vis Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang' as 'relics of the past', 'two-three years out of
date'. 'But better late than never', he added. Dimitrov acknowl-
edged that 'Chiang Kai-shek personally does not want a united
front, fears a united front, but one has to create such a situation
in China, such a movement among Chiang Kai-shek's forces,
among the Kuomintang, that Chiang Kai-shek would be forced
into such an anti-Japanese united front .. .'.In the days to come
Chiang would throw his forces against the soviet regions. 'Use
must be made of this.' This was as far as Dimitrov would take his
recommendations, in the absence of 'genuine, live information'. 74
The Comintern had received a copy of the Wayaobao resolution
and telegrams updating them briefly on the situation in China,
but there was still no personal contact that would facilitate a
more detailed discussion of the issues and a more definitive
response.
Together with Wang Ming, Dimitrov and his staffworked on
a telegram with instructions for the CCP. It was not sent untill5
August - apparently in the hope that a CCP emissary would
arrive with a more accurate account of affairs. The telegram was
tactful but firm. It reassured the CCP that the united front
policy 'does not presuppose a weakening of the Soviets, the
dissolution of the Red Army into a general anti-Japanese army
and the Communist Party into any form of general political
league of China'. Cooperation with other institutions on a com-
mon platform was envisaged together with 'maintenance of their
full political and organisational independence'. Cooperation was
similarly envisaged on the military level between the Red Army

and other formations whereby 'each of these forces will maintain
their own independence, will answer for their own sector of the
front, but will be subordinated to a joint command in the
execution of tasks of the common war plan'. Indeed, the tele-
gram went out of its way to emphasise that 'the correct line
towards the creation of a joint anti-Japanese national front
presupposes the strengthening of the Party and the Red Army in
every possible way'. But, the message continued, 'It is for this
reason that we are especially worried about your decision that all
who wish to, regardless of their social origins, can be accepted
into the Party; that the Party does not fear penetration of its
ranks by some careerists; and also your stated intention to accept
even Chang Hsueh-liang into the Party.'
Pao-an was thus advised against mass admission of members.
Moscow also advised against accepting into the Red Army
students and officers from other armies without careful screen-
ing. And, while agreeing that the CCP should avoid confiscation
ofsmallholdings or of land owned by those fighting theJapanese,
Moscow nevertheless warned against allowing 'representatives
of the property-owning classes' to govern Soviet regions. The
Comintern thus favoured greater flexibility in managing an
alliance with the Kuomintang, while favouring a more tra-
ditional line in CCP domestic policy; the CCP, on the other
hand, had a strong inclination to adopt a firm line against
Chiang Kai-shek, while conceding much of substance on the
domestic front in order to enlarge its ranks. From this asym-
metry arose increasing concern in the Soviet leadership about
the class pedigree of the CCP and its degree of responsiveness to
the geopolitical needs of and loyalty to the USSR.
Moscow reacted strongly against the CCP tactic of divide-
and-rule within the Kuomintang. 'We think that it is incorrect to
place Chiang Kai-shek on the same level with the Japanese
aggressors. This stance is politically mistaken - for the main
enemy of the Chinese people is Japanese imperialism, with
whom the struggle at the present stage must take precedence
over everything else.' Thus the Comintern called on the CCP to
issue an official offer to the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek to
enter into talks immediately for the cessation ofwarfare and the
conclusion of a concrete agreement on joint struggle against the
Japanese. 'The Communist Party and the Red army command
must announce their readiness to send a delegation without

delay for these talks or receive a delegation from the Kuomin-
tang and Chiang Kai-shek in Soviet regions.' The CCP's de-
mands were listed as follows:
(I) Cessation of civil war and the unification of all the armed
forces of the Chinese people for a genuine struggle against
the Japanese aggressors.
(2) The establishment of a common command and the elabor-
ation of a common war plan against Japan, while maintain-
ing the complete political and organisational independence
of the Red army, responsible for a particular sector of the
front in the struggle against Japan.
(3) The Red army must be offered the appropriate territorial
bases and the necessary armaments and supplies.
(4) The freeing of imprisoned Communists and the cessation of
the persecution of Communists in Kuomintang regions.
Of course, should such attempts fail and Chiang continue to
attack the Red army, then the latter could take necessary defens-
ive measures while continuing to call for negotiations towards a
united front.
But the telegram resolutely condemned the CCP declaration
supporting the 'actions of the south-western group against
Chiang Kai-shek. It would be politically more correct to come
out decisively against further inflammation of the internal civil
war, provoked by the Japanese imperialists, and concentrate fire
chiefly against the latter'. Entirely consistent with this was
advice to be wary of Chang Hsueh-liang. 'Contact with Chang
Hsueh-liang needs be maintained, making use of it to extend our
work in Chang Hsueh-liang's army, to reinforce our positions in
all of its units .... However, Chang Hsueh-liang must not be
viewed as a reliable ally. Especially after the defeat of the
south-west it is quite possible Chang Hsueh-liang will waver
again, or even directly betray us.' 75
At around the same time Wang Ming also sent separate
advice which underscored the same points with greater crudity:
'The Communist Party and the Chinese people not only want an
immediate cessation of war between the Red Army and Kuomin-
tang forces, but demand an end to the internecine wars between
various groupings within the Kuomintang for example between
Chiang Kai-shek and the south-west. In current conditions all
internecine warfare in China facilitates the dark and dirty cause

of the Japanese predators. The openly provocative activity
which the Japanese aggressors are carrying out in the armed
conflict between Nanking and the south-west is the clearest
evidence of this. ' 76 This was not the first nor the last time those in
Moscow would ascribe actions breaching the united front policy
to Japanese agents; the 'show trials' were opening in Moscow
and Stalin's rule of terror would soon stir up a frenzy offalse and
absurd accusations of this kind. In the circumstances, therefore,
Moscow's rebuke to Pao-an was remarkably mild. The Comin-
tern firmly but cautiously advised: 'It would be more correct to
act decisively against the whipping-up of internecine war pro-
voked by the Japanese imperialists.' 77
Into this uncertain atmosphere trekked the intrepid and in-
quisitive American journalist Edgar Snow. His journey was
arranged thanks to the help of Sun Vat-sen's widow, sympath-
etic to the Communist cause. When Snow arrived in Pao-an,
friction between Mao and Moscow had reached a new height.
Mao had been criticised by Moscow for his activities aimed at
splitting the KMT. In his interview with Snow (not published in
Shanghai until February 1937) he gave the orthodox Comintern
line: 'the Red Army is not seeking the hegemony of power, but a
united China against Japanese imperialism'. However, when
questioned about the CCP's relationship with the Comintern,
Mao incautiously, but clearly not without premeditation, over-
stepped the bounds of filial propriety: 'We are certainly not
fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country
over to Moscow!', he exclaimed. He added: 'Only where the
interests of the Chinese masses coincide with the interests of the
Russian masses can it be said to be "obeying the will" of
Moscow.' 78
Although an accurate description of relations with Moscow,
Mao's distinction between Soviet and CCP interests was out-
right heresy in the Communist movement of the time. Naturally,
when these comments were published, they were not well re-
ceived in Moscow. With Wang Ming due to depart for China in
November 1937 Dimitrov told him to advise CCP members not
to associate with bourgeois journalists like Snow. 79 Despite his
open display of independence, Mao continued to take Moscow's
advice seriously. In response to the Comintern telegram of 15
August, and evidently after no little discussion, the CCP
Politburo finally issued an open letter to the KMT on 25

August. 80 In line with Dimitrov's recommendations the letter
called for the formation of 'an all-Chinese united government of
national defence' and a single 'democratic Chinese republic'.
'The key to cooperation between the Kuomintang and Commu-
nist Party lies in your hands', the letter declared. 'We for our
part have long been ready to send our plenipotentiary anywhere
and at any time for practical, concrete negotiations with your
plenipotentiaries, to attain as soon as possible a concrete agree-
ment on an anti-Japanese front for the salvation ofthe country,
and we will firmly observe such an agreement.' 81
But Chiang was not listening. Instead he sent word to KMT
provincial headquarters in Shansi to arrest certain Communists
working underground in the North-Eastern Army. On 29 August
Chang Hsueh-liang responded by raiding the KMT provincial
headquarters. 82 Meanwhile the CCP leadership was losing
patience. On 17 September the CCP Politburo decided instead
to 'force the Kuomintang Nanking Government and its army to
take part in a war of resistance against Japan' .83 On 5 October
Mao and Chou wrote to Chang Hsueh-liang once more calling
for an end to the civil war and unity against Japan. They asked
that this be conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek. 84 But Chiang Kai-
shek now resolved to liquidate the CCP once and for all. In late
October he flew to Sian to pressure generals Chang and Yang
into suppressing the Reds. But the two generals unexpectedly
tried to talk him into a united front against the Japanese. Chiang
responded with threats and then flew to Luoyang to mobilise for
a final campaign against the Communists in an attempt to
circumvent the generals' recalcitrance. He then sent in his best
forces to attack the Reds. 85
In a hurried telegram to Stomonyakov sent from Shanghai on
6 November Bogomolov outlined the interconnection between
the situation in the north-west and the negotiations on a mutual
assistance pact between Moscow and Nanking:
Chiang Kai-shek has formed the opinion that it would not be
possible to come to terms with us without prior agreement
with the Red Army. However, since he will accept agreement
with the Red Army only on the basis of the latter's recognition
of the unity of military command, without discussing the
fundamental political questions (united front, etc.), which is
unacceptable to the leadership of the Red Army, he is evi-

dently attempting to eliminate the Red Army from our
negotiations. . . . Chiang Kai-shek knows about Chang
Hsueh-liang's agreement with the Red Army leadership and
therefore, having no trust in him, he has decided to carry out
an offensive against the Red Army with his own forces
exclusively. 86
Chiang's forces were defeated on 21 November. A further
engagement with Communist forces led to a humiliating retreat.
Chiang still needed Chang's support. A confrontation between
Chang and Chiang was therefore inevitable. Chiang flew into
Sian on 4 December to revitalise the anti-Communist offensive.
He told generals Chang and Yang that, if they did not join his
campaign, he would transfer their armies elsewhere. Given their
determination to abstain from war against the Communists and
to remain in the north-west, the generals were left with little
alternative but insurrection. Just over a week later, on 12 De-
cember, in order to forestall the sixth campaign and to force him
into forging the united front against the Japanese, Chang and
Yang placed Chiang Kai-shek under house-arrest and then
cabled Pao-an with the request that a CCP delegation be sent to
Sian to discuss further action. 87
This sensational news took everyone else by complete sur-
prise. Neither the CCP nor Moscow appears to have had any
idea of Chang's intentions. But the reception of the news in the
respective Red capitals could hardly have been more different.
By all accounts when the CCP leadership received Chang's
telegram announcing the arrest, they were elated; though, ac-
cording to Chang Kuo-t'ao, who rarely gives Mao the benefit of
any doubt, Mao was guarded in his response. It was decided to
cable Moscow for advice. 88 At the Narkomindel and the Comin-
tern there was no urge to rush to judgement until all the news
was in. There was also some understanding of the CCP predica-
ment and real sympathy for Chang's position. But Stalin over-
reacted. There were several factors which appear to have
prompted a near-hysterical response which came from Moscow.
First, there was the atmosphere of acute suspicion which had by
now enveloped Moscow since the first show-trial in August. 89
Second, there was very little clear information as to what
precisely moved Chang to act so precipitously. Third, under
pressure from growing anti-Japanese sentiment, to which both

his wife, Soong Mei-ling, and his brother-in-law, T.V. Soong
(both Sun Vat-sen's offspring) were susceptible, Chiang Kai-
shek had rebuffed Tokyo's latest demands at the talks between
KMT Foreign Minister Chang Ch'un and ambassador Kawa-
goe which took place between 15 September and 3 December;
the abduction could thus be seen as an attempt to sabotage the
progress made within Nanking towards the adoption of an
anti-Japanese stance. Fourth, the fact that the pro-Japanese
KMT defence minister reacted to news of the abduction by
mobilising a punitive expedition and by cabling Wang Ching-
wei, the leader of the pro-Japanese faction, to return from his
recuperation in Italy only confirmed the Soviet leadership's
worst suspicions. Fifth, and perhaps not least in order of import-
ance, the Japanese claimed Chang had concluded an alliance
with the Soviet Union; the implication being that Moscow was
deeply embroiled in the kidnapping.
Last but not least, the kidnapping followed closely on the
conclusion of the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact on 25
November. The months of secret preparation went unnoticed by
the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, prompting a reprimand from
Stomonyakov: 'By the way it appears we have never received
from you serious information about Japanese-German re-
lations. We would welcome you and the embassy devoting more
attention to this problem and that you try to get hold of and send
us information.' 9 ° Fortunately the Russians were not dependent
on the embassy alone. Thanks to Sorge - who secretly photo-
graphed the text and sent it on to Shanghai, where a courier
collected it and accompanied it to Moscow91 - the Soviet
leadership was fully informed about the pact. The text contained
a secret protocol providing that should either signatory 'become
the object of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by the
USSR', the other signatory 'obligates itself to take no measures
that would tend to ease the situation in the USSR'. And in the
event of aggression or the threat of aggression, the two signa-
tories would 'immediately consult on measures to safeguard
their common interests'. Both sides also agreed to 'conclude no
political treaties with the USSR contrary to the spirit of this
agreement without mutual consent'. 92 'We have the text', senior
political counsellor at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, Raivid, told
a member of the German embassy. 93 And Litvinov went so far as
to warn ambassador Shigemitsu that the Japanese Foreign Min-

ister, Arita, should not insist on denying the existence of the
secret protocol, which explicitly mentioned the Soviet Union as
the object of the agreement, 'because we might in the end decide
to publish the documents ... ' .94 The Japanese were soon looking
to obtain China's accession to the pact which, in the circum-
stances, made the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek and allega-
tions of Moscow's involvement seem alarmingly provocative.
Pravda thus appeared on 14 December with an extraordinary
editorial innocuously entitled 'The Events in China'. Its con-
tents were certainly approved, if not actually composed by
Stalin, whose dark suspicions lurked behind the rambling accu-
sations that litter the text. Pravda found an explanation for events
'in the intrigues of the pro-Japanese elements in China' and
found it 'no accident' that the name of the 'known Japanese
agent Wang Ching-wei' was 'closely associated' with Chang
Hsueh-liang's uprising. According to Pravda Wang Ching-wei
took advantage of anti-Japanese sentiment among Chang's
troops to launch the uprising. 'This version, explaining what lies
behind the scenes of the uprising, is the most plausible', Pravda
argued implausibly. The editorial strenuously denied the 'Ma-
licious, provocative lies' spread by the Japanese newspaper
Nichi-nichi concerning the existence of an alliance between Mos-
cow and Chang, and concluded by emphasising that the USSR
was totally opposed to 'a policy of setting up "independent
governments", puppet-states which are implanted by theJapan-
ese imperialists with the aim of seizing Chinese territory'. 95 In
direct contrast /zvestiya was more cautious. The influence of the
Narkomindel over the 'lzvestintsy' was that much greater than
over those who worked at Pravda. 96 Instead of the more authori-
tative unsigned editorial, Izvestiya appeared with an article
signed 'VIGILIS' on the front page and entitled 'Chang
Hsueh-liang's Uprising'. The greater part of the article focused
not on Chang's supposed motivations but on the results of his
actions. 'It is clear that although Chang Hsueh-liang acted
under the anti-Japanese banner, in the current situation these
actions objectively merely benefit Japanese imperialism.' Chang
was thus attacked for his tactics, not his intentions: 'It is per-
fectly evident that in these conditions Chang Hsueh-liang's
actions are not the appropriate method of uniting the vital forces
of the country in the struggle against the external enemy.'
The more rational element in the hvestiya commentary came

from the Narkomindel. This is evident from Litvinov's conver-
sation with the Chinese ambassador, Ch'ian Tin-fu, on 15
December. 'I do not believe that Chang Hsueh-liang acted
directly in contact with the Japanese', Litvinov said, 'and I am
much more inclined to concede that he fell prey to someone's
unfortunate and bad advice.' He assured the ambassador that
the Soviet Government 'has always stood for the unification of
China and never sympathised with the domestic struggle of the
Chinese generals'. 'I fear thatJapan might take advantage of the
recent events for new aggression', he added. 'In any case the
Japanese Government, which in recent days has been in a
critical position, may be saved by these events.' The ambassador
then pressed Litvinov for Moscow's assistance in resolving the
problem, but Litvinov was evasive. 97 Action was nevertheless
taken. After consulting Stalin, Dimitrov edited and signed a
telegram - evidently composed by Mif- which was cabled to
the CCP Politburo on 16 December:
In response to your telegrams we recommend the adoption of

the following position:
( l) Chang Hsueh-liang's action, whatever his intentions, can
objectively only harm the drawing together of the Chinese
people's forces into a united anti-Japanese front and spur on
Japanese aggression against China.
(2) In so far as this action is a fait accompli, and one must deal
with the reality of facts as they stand, the Communist Party of
China will come out decisively for a peaceful resolution of the
conflict on the basis of:
(a) reorganisation of the government through the inclusion
within the government of several representatives of the anti-
Japanese movement, of supporters of the integrity and inde-
pendence of China;
(b) guaranteeing the democratic rights of the Chinese people;
(c) ending the policy of wiping out the Red army and the
establishment of cooperation with it in the struggle against
Japanese aggression;
(d) establishment of cooperation with those countries that
are sympathetic to the liberation of the Chinese people from
the onslaught of Japanese imperialism.
Finally, we do not advise raising the slogan of alliance with

the USSR.
Secretariat98
Liu Shao-ch'i is reported to have commented in March 1942
that 'Some comrades were opposed to a peaceful settlement of
the lncident' 99 and, according to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Moscow's
recommendations came as 'a bolt from the blue'. 'We agreed
that if we did not act in accordance with the instructions of
Moscow', he recalls, 'we could not get any support from the
Soviet Union and would be encircled and attacked by various
forces at home and abroad.' 100 Yet by the time this telegram had
arrived (16-17 December), Chou En-lai was already en route to
Sian via Yenan - he had left on 14 December - with instruc-
tions to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. He did not arrive in
Sian until the evening of 16 December. 101 The talks with Chang
Hsueh-liang began immediately. Each day telegrams went back
and forth between Chou and Mao. 102 A prime mover behind the
kidnapping had been Miao Feng-shan, who was close to Marshal
Chang. Nym Wales (Edgar Snow's wife and a journalist in her
own right) recalls his saying that 'When Chou En-lai first came
to Sian he wanted a people's assembly to try Chiang Kai-shek,
but a wire came from the Comintern and Chou changed his
mind.' 103
But the terms laid down by the Russians and elaborated upon
- evidently after much heated debate - did not reach Chou
until 21 December: at least four days after receipt of the Soviet
telegram in Pao-an. 104 The KMT delegation arrived in Sian on
22 December. Negotiations were then opened between Chou, Po
Ku and Ye Jianying (for the CCP) and T.V. Soong, Soong
Mei-ling and Chiang Ting-wen (for the KMT). Chiang 'hinted'
to Soong 'that he would reshuffle the government, hold a
national salvation conference' in three months' time, 'reorganise
the Kuomintang and approve an alliance with Russia and
cooperation with the Communist Party' . 105 The proposals put
forward by the CCP delegation consisted of the four points
stipulated in the Moscow telegram augmented by two additional
demands:
(a) Stop fighting and withdraw the Kuomintang troops to
east of Tongguan.
(b) Reorganise the Nanjing government, expel the pro-

Japanese faction and bring in people who are for resistance to
Japan.
(c) Release political prisoners and guarantee democratic
rights.
(d) Stop the suppression of Communists, unite with the Red
Army to resist Japanese aggression and permit open activity
by the Communists. (The Red Army is to retain its indepen-
dent organisation and command. Pending the convocation of
a democratic national assembly, the Soviet areas should con-
tinue to function as usual, but the words 'Anti-Japanese' or
'National Salvation' may be added to their names.)
(e) Convene a national salvation conference representing all
parties, groups, sections of the population and armies.
(f) Cooperate with all countries that sympathise with China's
resistance to Japan.
Chou reported that Soong agreed to these conditions for a united
front. 106 Chiang Kai-shek agreed to them in modified form and
was far less explicit than Soong. He said he would negotiate
directly with Chou upon returning to Nanking. Soong 'insisted'
that the CCP trust him and 'was willing to assume full responsi-
bility for implementing' the terms of the understanding. Before
Chou could take further action, Chang Hsueh-liang agreed to
accompany Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanking. They left before
Chou could move and as a result the CCP lost any remaining
leverage. Making the most of the situation, Chou insisted that
'there was a real change in Chiang Kai-shek's attitude', that 'He
is sincere in delegating matters to T.V. Soong, and Soong is
really determined to resist Japan and make arrangements for the
reorganisation of the Executive Yuan. Therefore, although it is
regrettable that Chiang was allowed to leave and Zhang
[Chang] went with him, things have generally taken a turn for
the better.' 107 In Chou's opinion the Sian incident and its peace-
ful resolution marked 'a division and re-alignment of class
forces':
(a) The anti-Japanese forces have been strengthened and
at least partially legalised;
(b) A fatal blow has been dealt to the pro-Japanese faction;
and
(c) The middle-of-the-roaders are beginning to draw closer
to the left wing (although haltingly and slowly as before, that

is, trying to retain their middle position).
Our policy should be to combat the pro-Japanese faction,
strengthen the left wing with the north-west as its centre, and
influence and draw in the middle-of-the-roaders. 108
None of this meant the CCP was giving up its ambitions. 'We
should transform all Party work, adapting it to the new circum-
stances, so that the Party becomes the leader in the political life
of the country', Chou insisted. Indeed the new Chinese govern-
ment headed by Kung and Soong was to be regarded as purely
'transitional'; the north-west would be turned into 'an anti-
Japanese base area and a model united front area'; the Red
Army would be retained; Party work would be revived 'in the big
cities' and, although Chou envisaged cooperation with 'the
left-wingers in Nanjing' and winning over 'the middle-of-the-
roaders', he also envisaged allying 'with various groupings out-
side Nanjing and, with the north-west as our centre and resist-
ance to Japan as our precondition and objective' the CCP would
'act as a force pushing Nanjing to the left'. The extent of Party
ambitions was only too evident in Chou's talk of moving the
CCP Central Committee 'to an area where it will be better able
to give leadership to the political life of the entire country .. .' . 109
In these circumstances it was scarcely surprising that Chiang
Kai-shek did his best to minimise implementation of the under-
standings reached at Sian.
Indeed, on 19 January 1937 the Comintern reprimanded
Pao-an: 'We see the peaceful settlement of the Sian events as
especially significant', the telegram began. 'However, its resol-
ution may be undermined not only as a result of the intrigues of
the Japanese imperialists and their agents ... but also due to the
mistaken steps of your party.' Previous errors- in particular the
attempt to build a united front by isolating Chiang Kai-shek and
bringing down the Nanking Government- were now, according
to Moscow, more counter-productive than ever. But, the Comin-
tern complained, the CCP 'still has not completely freed itself
from this mistaken stance' in spite of the adjustments made in
recent policy. This was evident from the directives issued from
Pao-an after Chiang Kai-shek's release. The Party was in fact
aiming at the defeat of the KMT 'and not at cooperation'. The
disagreement with Chiang Kai-shek was looked upon as his
capitulation and cooperation with those in Sian was directed

against Nanking and not against the common enemy. This
played into the hands of'pro-Japanese elements'. In particular,
Moscow advised against open Communist activity in Sian;
against celebrating the concessions extracted from Chiang in
Sian; against demands for the immediate declaration of war
against Japan; and against the slogan of an alliance with the
USSR. Of course, should Chiang despatch a punitive expedition,
the Chinese Communists would have to defend themselves, 'but
you yourselves must in no way give the slightest excuse for such
an outcome'. Having warned against the 'intrigues ofTrotskyist
elements', Moscow went on to caution: 'The behaviour of Agnes
Smedley seems to us quite suspect. She must at long last be
deprived of the possibility of speaking in the name of the Com-
munists and as their apparently trusted representative. Her
conduct must be criticised in the press as well.' The Comintern
was waiting to hear of 'concrete measures in the spirit of the
current instructions' . 110
Something of a publicity-seeker, Smedley was yet another
freelance American journalist, a dedicated anti-imperialist and
more avowedly to the left than Snow, who had arrived in Sian
when news broke of Chiang's kidnapping. There she had begun
broadcasting triumphalist reports in English on a daily basis to
the rest of China from the safety of Chang Hsueh-liang's head-
quarters. 111 It was the tone of these reports and the apparent
authority with which Smedley delivered them that Moscow
found so provocative. By the end of January, at Moscow's
behest, the US Daily Worker was openly attacking her. By then
she was en route to Y enan - the new capital of the Communist
base area - but Moscow's strictures caught up with her via
telegram and when, in March-April, she asked to join the CCP
she was- to her astonishment- refused. Thus she left Yenan
that autumn a disappointed woman and, as her biographers
have noted, 'her mission would remain only a self-appointed
one'.ll2
On 20 January yet another telegram arrived at CCP head-
quarters. Would not the CCP consider it opportune to move
from the soviet system in the occupied areas to a 'national-
revolutionary' form of government 'on democratic foundations'?
This would require turning the Soviet government into a
'national-revolutionary government'; turning the Red army into
a 'national-revolutionary army'; maintaining soviets only in

urban centres as mass organisations but not as a form of govern-
ment; and calling an end to 'general land confiscation'. The
Comintern suggested this proposal be considered 'in the most
serious manner'. Then the CCP Politburo's opinion should be
relayed to Moscow, where it could be subjected to 'detailed
discussion' . 113
Moscow's prompting, based on the assumption that a modus
vivendi could be established with the KMT, eventually had the
desired effect. The change in Nanking's policy, which began
during the Chang Ch'un-Kawagoe negotiations, continued and
was clearly expressed in the Third Plenary Session of February
1937. 'At this meeting Kuomintang policy showed real change in
various fields ... its attitude to Japan became stronger and a
policy of internal peace was formally adopted, i.e. no civil war',
Mao Tse-tung acknowledged on 22 June. 114 By that time five
negotiating sessions had been held between the KMT and CCP:
three at Sian, one at Hangchow, and one at Kuling. And, as
Chou En-lai readily recognised on 23 June: 'Nanking has ended
military attacks on the Red Army. It has lifted the economic
blockade on our region and is now supplying three-fifths, or
$300 000 of the $500 000, of the monthly food allowance due to
our troops as units of the national army. If the talks succeed, we
expect our forces will receive the full amount.' 115 The decade-
long civil war was thus at an end; though the exact terms of the
peace and the creation of a comprehensive united front had yet
to be attained.
4 The Sino-Japanese War
and Soviet Aid to China,
1937-38
Extremely uncertain of its position in Europe and before long
gravely weakened economically and militarily by Stalin's terror,
the Soviet Union was not about to take any uncalculated risks in
relation to Japan in 1937. Yet the maintenance ofthe status quo in
the Far East - with Manchuria securely in the hands of the
Japanese and with the Western Powers loath to intervene- was
not to Soviet advantage either. Moscow therefore did its best to
revive Chinese resistance to Japanese occupation, and in the
spring of 1937 renewed its offer of arms to the KMT as a means
to that end. 1 For Chiang Kai-shek, however, there was little to be
gained by accepting such an offer if it provoked theJapanese into
further aggression. Nothing therefore came of the proposal.
Furthermore the prospects for involving the Western Powers in a
collective security system to contain Japan appeared as bleak as
ever in Soviet eyes. Britain, under its new Prime Minister,
Neville Chamberlain, used the growing crisis in Europe as a
reason for appeasing Japan in Asia, and the threat fromJapan to
British colonies in Asia as a reason for appeasing Germany in
Europe. France was now reeling from the belated impact of the
Depression on its economy; it was increasingly polarised be-
tween left and right under the impact of the civil war in Spain;
and its forces were self-evidently incapable of deterring both
Germany in Europe andjapan in Asia. Roosevelt was by nature
an internationalist, but his country was still stubbornly iso-
lationist; thus although the United States unquestionably had
the naval power to act against Japan, it lacked the will to
intervene.
Last but not least on 12 June Soviet newspapers carried the
startling assertion that Marshal Tukhachevsky and the greater
part of his colleagues in the Soviet high command had been shot
for treason. This decision, prompted by Stalin's intense and
irrational suspicions concerning their loyalty which had, in turn,
been exacerbated by differences over policy, left the USSR more
88
Sino-Japanese War and Soviet Aid to China 89
vulnerable to attack than it had been for years. 2 Commander of

the Far Eastern Army Vasilii Blyukher was spared the sword
and, as British Military Intelligence noted: 'The Russian Far
Eastern Army ... has been least affected by the various execu-
tions and degradations of many of the most able Russian of-
ficers.' Nevertheless industrial production had dropped as a
result of the terror. The Trans-Siberian Railway was double-
tracked only to Khabarovsk - 400 miles short of Vladivostok -
while the railway lines in the hands of the Japanese enabled
them to concentrate their forces in any one area. And the
Japanese had increased their garrisons in Manchuria from 150 000 to
about 250 000, which gave them a slight numerical advantage
over the Russians. The conclusion drawn by British military
Intelligence was that whereas the Japanese were ready for war in
the Far East- and there was 'a considerable body of opinion in
Japan favourable to war against Russia in the near future'- the
Russians were not. 3
The terror had had the effect of undercutting the morale of the
Soviet Far Eastern Army. Now a Marshal, Blyukher had sat on
the tribunal that condemned Tukhachevsky and the others to
death for treason. This macabre experience had driven him to
drink excessively and to voice his discontent more openly. Re-
ports of his dissatisfaction are said to have been relayed back to
Moscow by, among others, his chief political officer Gamarnik; 4
if true, it certainly did not save Gamarnik when Blyukher fell
under suspicion. 5
Moscow's new sense of caution became evident when, on
the afternoon of 30 June (Pacific time), an incident took place
on the navigable channel between the islands ofChinamuho and
Kanchatzu on the Amur river involving Soviet warships and
Japanese batteries. 6 The dispute very soon turned into a major
diplomatic row and threatened to blow up into something much
worse. The very day preceding the incident, Litvinov had been
negotiating the dispute along the Amur with the Japanese am-
bassador Shigemitsu/ who, on the strength of information from
Tokyo that may well have been false, saw this as a deliberate
Soviet provocation. This is what he put to Stomonyakov on 30
June after the Russians had lodged a protest claiming the
Japanese had bombarded Soviet vessels on the Amur from the
shore. 8 Within a short time Shigemitsu and Stomonyakov were
accusing the other party of lying, and the logic of events
appeared to be taking both sides into open confrontation verging

on war. It was in these alarming circumstances that the Russians
reached an agreement with the Japanese providing for mutual
withdrawal. And when, a few days later, Japanese-led forces
reoccupied islands in the channel that both sides had agreed to
evacuate, the Russians did not press the matter. 9 Clearly Mos-
cow had no wish to come into collision with the Japanese at such
a delicate moment. And this was the message the Japanese
understood. Others interpreted Soviet actions in the same light.
The British embassy in Japan commented: 'The "purges" in the
Union and the weakness shown by the Soviet Government in
connection with the Amur incident in June 1937 satisfied the
Japanese military mind that they need have no apprehension of
attack from that Government.' 10
THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE INCIDENT
These were the unpropitious circumstances that faced the Soviet

Government when an incident outside Peking on the Marco Polo
Bridge sparked open warfare between Japan and China. This
occurred on 7 July 1937. It took some time before it became clear
that full-scale hostilities would ensue. But once it became appar-
ent that Japan was enmeshed in all-out war with China, Moscow
inevitably breathed a sigh of relief. Indeed, the Germans, who
had committed themselves to the anti-Comintern pact only eight
months earlier, were incensed at the Japanese for this very
reason. Foreign Minister von Neurath pointed out to the Japan-
ese ambassador in Berlin that the Japanese Government
'must ... take into consideration the fact that armed clashes
with China now would benefit the Soviet Union exclusively'. He
'could imagine that the Bolshevik Government precisely at the
present moment were keenly interested in keeping Japan busy in
order that she could not take it into her head to exploit the
weakening of the Russian Army that had been caused by the
execution of so many Russian officers'. 11
Barely a week after hostilities opened, Sun Fo, the Chinese
Premier, asked to see Bogomolov. This was 13July. Without any
instructions from Moscow, Bogomolov had nothing to say to
Sun's enquiries as to the likely Soviet reaction to a Sino-Japanese
war, even though he personally favoured intervention. 12 Yet
nothing was further from Stalin's intentions, as became clear

when China's ambassador to Moscow, Ting Fu-tsiang, met
Litvinov on 15 July. Outspoken in his condemnation ofJapanese
aggression, Litvinov nevertheless indicated that the Soviet
Union would do little more than wait upon the West. Should the
United States, Britain and France make a proposal for collective
action, the Soviet Government would 'subject it to scrutiny';
and, when confronted with the direct question of Soviet military
intervention 'in the event offuture complications between Japan
and China', Litvinov responded evasively that this issue was 'too
serious and crucial' for an immediate answer. 13
This was a highly sensitive issue, as was apparent from
Litvinov's reaction to news that, in conversation with the Chinese,
Bogomolov had entertained the possibility of a Sino-Soviet pact
of mutual assistance in an exchange with China's Foreign Minis-
ter on 5 June. 14 'You are wrong to speak to the Chinese of our
readiness to conduct talks on a bilateral pact of mutual assist-
ance', Litvinov reprimanded Bogomolov on 19 July; 'we have
not agreed to this, but have spoken only of the possibility of a
transition to bilateral talks in the event of multilateral talks
failing' . 15 Soviet fears were hard to hide; Litvinov warned three
days later: ' in forcing this question at the present moment the
Chinese are trying to get us involved in a war with Japan'. 16
Word of these differences of opinion reached foreign govern-
ments. Lieutenant-Commander Smith Hutton of US Naval In-
telligence reported on the 'wide divergence of opinion among
Soviet Russian officials in China and in the Soviet Government'.
He specified that both Bogomolov and Major-General Lepin,
the Soviet military attache, were actively working to persuade
Moscow to aid Nanking. 17 But the unfortunate Bogomolov, like
his counterpart in Spain, Rosenberg, perished in the terror
after being recalled in September. 18 The Soviet Union's inter-
national position was far too exposed to allow for potentially
costly personal initiatives by Soviet diplomats abroad; and in
the atmosphere of insane suspicion reigning in Moscow, an
excess of zeal might easily be, and not infrequently was,
interpreted as treason.
As we have seen, the Soviet military attache joined his head of
mission in pressing for a forward policy in China. Despatches
from the French embassy in Moscow speak of rumours that
Blyukher was similarly inclined. 19 After conversations with
Soviet officers, a British diplomat reported that 'in military

circles ... the defeat of 1905 still rankles, and one thing that the
Soviet army desires is good relations with Europe, in order that
they may have their hands free to get their own back on japan as
soon as possible' .20 Others were also reported to be unhappy at
recent Soviet concessions to the japanese in frontier disputes. 21
And it was undeniably true, as Deputy Commissar Vladimir
Potemkin later told the French ambassador, that 'the weakening
of Japan' resulting from extensive military action in the heart of
China would 'have the effect of reducing the pressure which it
exercises on our Manchurian frontier' .22
After a considerable delay following the transmission of Chinese
request for assistance, the Soviet leadership finally met to discuss
matters along with Deputy Commissar Stomonyakov on 29
July. 23 Not until two days later did Litvinov inform Bogomolov of
the decision. The Politburo had reiterated its objections to a
bilateral pact; such a pact would mean an immediate declaration
of war on japan. It had, however, agreed to provide arms on the
firm proviso that the KMT first conclude a non-aggression pact
with the Soviet Union. 24 No mention was made of the negotia-
tions still underway between the KMT and the CCP for a united
front.
AID TO CHINA
The arrangements were to be kept strictly secret. The only

outward sign was an otherwise oblique reference in the Narkom-
indel weekly Le Journal de Moscou to the fact that the Chinese
could count on the 'help of all those in the forefront of humanity
and progress'. 25 But the Chinese had no reason for discretion.
Even before the non-aggression pact was signed - on 21
August2 6 - the Chinese Government began despatching emis-
saries to Moscow from all over Europe; an act which aroused
intense anxiety in the Soviet Union over the attendant
publicity. 27
Chiang faced severe problems in the war with Japan. He was
particularly concerned to counter overwhelming Japanese air
superiority; for this he needed fighters and heavy bombers from
the Russians. 28 In his original proposals on 14 August, Chiang
asked for 350 planes, 200 tanks and 236 heavy guns; of which 300
planes, all tanks and 136 guns were needed within one month
after signature of the contract. He also wanted Soviet pilots,
aviation technicians, artillery officers and tank specialists com-
manding Chinese forces. 29 In the event they received less, and
later, than they wanted. Two hundred planes and 200 tanks
(only half the latter actually materialised) were the most the
Russians could offer. 30 These and other items supplied later were
given on a credit of$500 million; in return the Russians received
minerals vital to war production, including wolfram and
tungsten. 31
The problem of transportation was considerable. Planes were
flown in via Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia; by October 1938,
477 aircraft of various types reached their destination. 32 But
other items had to come mainly by sea- until the French closed
the route through Indochina- or caravan through Central Asia.
The latter route was always the most difficult, certainly at the
outset in the absence of proper roads. The first consignment for
delivery by land arrived at Sary-Ozek station - then little more
than a goods van and a siding off the main track - on the
Turkestan- Siberian (Turksib) railway in October 1937. There
a convoy of new ZIS-5 and ZIS-6 trucks led by First Lieutenant
Volnov and composed of newly-conscripted drivers totally ignor-
ant of their whereabouts, let alone their final destination, loaded
up air bombs, weighing a ton a piece, three to a vehicle. Dressed
in civilian clothes they embarked under cover for Lanchow,
nearly 3000 kilometres away across Sinkiang in distant China.
At Dzharkent on the Sino-Soviet border they were given strict
instructions to address officers as 'master'; they in turn would be
addressed as 'mister'. What faced them was a gruelling journey
on minimal rations along a godforsaken caravan route through
sandstorms, salt-marshes, up steep mountain slopes and across
deserts and icy rivers in extremes of heat and cold. 33 This route
carried heavy items such as air bombs and fighter planes.
Despite the Japanese blockade of the greater part of the Chinese
coast, the bulk of the heavy cargo came by ship despatched from
the Black Sea and arriving via Haiphong in French Indochina or
Canton and Hong Kong in southern China: a route which was
severely curtailed within a year. 34
In spite of the logistical nightmare, from September 1937 until
June 1941 the Chinese received a total of 904 planes (318
medium and heavy bombers, 542 fighters and 44 trainers, 82
tanks, 602 tractors, 1516 automobiles, 1140 heavy guns, 9720

light and heavy machine-guns, 50 000 rifles, about 180 million
cartridges, 31.6 thousand bombs, about 2 million shells and
other equipment). 35 There were also 'military advisers', anum-
ber of whom had seen service in China during the revolution of
1925-27. Soviet pilots arrived in Nanking at the beginning of
December 1937 to join other military specialists under the
supervision of the newly-arrived military attache, Dratvin, who
replaced the unfortunate Lepin who had, in turn, disappeared
along with polpred Bogomolov, victims of Stalin's terror. 36 By the
end of the year there were 450 Soviet pilots in China; 37 and from
the autumn of 1937 until mid-February 1939 a total of 3665
military specialists had come and gone. 38 These included the
reinforcement of advisers to Chiang in the summer of 1938
following the complete withdrawal of the German military
mission. 39 In contrast to Spain, where Soviet assistance proved
insufficient to prop up the Republic, the Russians seemed opti-
mistic in China. In May 1938 Coulondre, the French ambassa-
dor in Moscow, reported:
Mr [Vladimir] Potemkin [now Deputy Commissar for Foreign
Affairs] calls the situation in China splendid. He is counting
on resistance by this country for several years, after which
Japan will be too enfeebled to be capable of attacking the
USSR. This opinion appears to be shared by the Soviet
leadership. 40
POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN
With respect to Japan the Russians sought to avoid direct

confrontation. But they were also now totally averse to making
any gestures of appeasement. What they hoped for was that by
stiffening the backbone of Chinese resistance, they could keep
the Japanese bogged down in China indefinitely. On 27 July
1937 Mikhail Slavutsky was appointed polpred in Tokyo. Born in
1898, he had served as first secretary for the RSFSR in Bokhara;
in 1920-21, as vice-consul and then consul-general in Herat
(Afghanistan); in 1921-23, as rapporteur and deputy head of
the Narkomindel's Near Eastern department; in 1923-24, as
first secretary and charge d'affaires in Iran; in 1928-29, as
deputy head of the Middle Eastern department; in 1930--31, as

Narkomindel representative in Tashkent; and from 1931 as
consul-general in Harbin. The pattern of his career suggests not
only broad experience in Central Asian affairs (which in Soviet
eyes made him an orientalist) but also - likely as not - a
background in Intelligence. 41 On 30 August he wrote to the
Narkomindel requesting instructions. 42 The reply he received
was as follows: 'Should Hirota draw the conversation onto our
current attitude towards the question of concluding a Soviet-
Japanese non-aggression pact, then say in an indifferent tone
that, as far as you know, after repeated and categorical refusals
by the Japanese Government to conclude a pact and also after
the well-known agreement between Japan and Germany [the
anti-Comintern pact], the Soviet Government has long con-
sidered this question out of date'. 43 The other side to this policy
was voiced when the Sino-Japanese war appeared on the League
of Nations agenda in September. Litvinov, only too aware of the
need for decisive action but equally concerned not to step out of
line, wrote to Moscow for guidance:
Discussion of the Chinese question begins on Monday. There
is no sign of willingness to help China, but someone has to
urge on the other states. I personally think that this is a role
we must fulfill and this will not worsen our relations with
Japan; but I have no directive to this effect. I would like to
know how far we can go in our proposals: merely the demand
that Japan be declared an aggressor or also talk of financial
and even economic sanctions . . . sanctions would deprive
Japan of fuel and would only require the agreement of
America, England, Holland and the Soviet Union. Can we
raise such an idea in private discussions or in meetings of the
committees and sub-committees as well? Please send a direc-
tive immediately. 44
But the reply came as a disappointment:
Although we would like Japan to be pronounced an aggressor
and effective sanctions taken against her ... given the evident
passivity of the other states, which you have indicated, we do
not consider it politically advisable for the Soviet delegation to
adopt a leading role, with the risk of worsening relations
between the USSR and Japan even more and further fuelling
accusations against us of incitement. If, however, serious

resolve to put the question of Japan's responsibility and of
pronouncing her an aggressor emerges from other members of
the League of Nations, you must actively support such
efforts. 45
Moscow's pessimistic prognosis proved correct. Any hope that

the League might be mobilised against Japan was stillborn.
Everything now centred on the United States. Neither Britain
nor France would contemplate even minimal measures against
the Japanese without sure knowledge of US backing. Hopes
therefore rose when, on 5 October, Roosevelt delivered his
famous 'quarantine' speech at Chicago, which compared 'world
lawlessness' to a disease: 'When an epidemic starts to spread, the
community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in
order to protect the health of the community against the spread
of the disease.' 46 The forthcoming conference of the Washington
Treaty Powers in Brussels (boycotted by Japan) was therefore
awaited with keen anticipation. In the winter of 1921-22 nine
Powers had met in Washington DC and agreed upon the prin-
ciples underlying their relations in the Far East. These Powers
had not included the Soviet Union, which had not been invited,
but had included Japan. They had collectively agreed to respect
the sovereignty of China, amongst other matters.
The intention was more to conciliate than to condemn. The
Russians, of course, being completely at variance with the spirit
of appeasement- having tried it vis-a-vis Japan and having failed
- saw matters differently. Le Journal de Moscou congratulated
Roosevelt on his courageous assessment of'the threat thatJapan
is creating for peace as a whole' and expressed the opinion that
the realisation of his proposals at Brussels would mark 'a real
step' forward on the road to world peace and the 'reinforcement
of international security' Y But such hopes were a delusion.
Norman Davis, Roosevelt's unofficial emissary, pointed out early
in November: 'The reaction to Roosevelt's Chicago speech was
at first highly favourable but then, even given total sympathy for
China and dislike of Japan, Americans began to ask themselves
whether they would not once again be drawn into a war by
England and France.' 48
The Russians therefore went to the Brussels conference, which
opened on 3 November, with no great expectation. From
Sino-japanese War and Soviet Aid to China 97
Washington Troyanovsky wrote to Moscow for information as to

what was going on in the corridors of Brussels. Stomonyakov
replied that the British and Americans were aiming 'at whatever
the cost' to secure mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict. They
intended to set up a special committee invested with the role of
mediator. By 10 November, when Stomonyakov wrote, all the
negotiations were focused on the issue of the committee's com-
position. 'The Powers are letting it be known that they do not
want our participation on this committee, for they fear Japan
will use this to reject mediation.' The Russians did not insist on
participation provided only the British, Americans and Belgians
constituted membership of the committee. Should Italy, France
and others demand inclusion, then the Russians would also
insist on inclusion. No Power was well-disposed towards the
Soviet presence - except, of course, the Chinese - but the US
delegation seemed the most hostile. Although Norman Davis
appeared friendly to Litvinov personally, Litvinov learnt from
some diplomats and journalists that 'the American delegation is
not very favourably disposed towards the USSR'. 49 When chal-
lenged, Davis insisted that the Soviet Union was of 'exceptional
significance' in the resolution of the Far Eastern problem and
denied there was any hostility towards the Russians. 'However,'
Litvinov reported, 'I gained the impression that Davis was not
being honest, particularly since he more than anyone has tried to
turn the conference into a meeting of the Washington Treaty
Powers, and has succeeded in getting a statement to Japan in
their name alone and has in fact cut us out.'
Davis 'acknowledged that he was against our being invited to
the conference,' Litvinov wrote, 'and aired the idea that at the
present stage of the conference we are in general not needed and
we may be needed only in the future, evidently when the use of
force is required against Japan'. Davis ascribed this view to the
British, but Litvinov had 'no doubt that Davis would go to any
lengths at our expense if any talks with Japan depended on it'.
What Litvinov did not know was whether such attitudes were
shared by Roosevelt and Hull. 50
Litvinov had left Brussels for Moscow on the evening of 9
November. He told Eden that he 'thought it desirable to re-
establish contact with the Soviet Government, who might other-
wise be puzzled by proceedings here'. He said 'he had not been
altogether happy at the turn events had taken in relation to the
formation of the Committee of the Conference'. He pressed Eden

on the issue of aid to China and insisted that Soviet aid to the
Chinese 'must inevitably be small owing to the very great
difficulty of transport'. He concluded by emphasising that others
were also threatened by Japan and arguing, as he had done so
many times before both in public and in private, that 'there were
two alternatives before the world, either the Powers who had
territorial possessions and no territorial designs must draw
closer together than they had done hitherto and combine their
action, or Germany, Italy and Japan would one day virtually
dominate the world, and Britain and France would be reduced
to playing the role of second-class Powers in Europe'. U nderlin-
ing the role that others must play in the Far East, Litvinov
stressed that 'the Soviet Government were willing to cooperate
in any international action that might be decided upon, provided
the necessary guarantees were given by all participants'. 51
Vladimir Potemkin, who had replaced the unfortunate Kres-
tinsky as Deputy Commissar for the West, took charge of the
Soviet delegation. Not that there was any love lost between
Litvinov and Potemkin, just as between Trotsky and Potemkin:
Trotsky used to insult Potemkin by insisting that his name was
an abbreviation for potomstvennyi dvoryanin ('hereditary noble-
man'). Potemkin's great advantage over most of his contempora-
ries was that since he had no compromising revolutionary past
he was unlikely to be suspected ofTrotskyism. In April 1937 the
US embassy in Moscow learnt that his substitution for Kres-
tinsky represented a compromise. 'When Litvinov discovered
that Krestinski must be transferred from the Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs because of the latter's relationship with Trotski
many years ago he asked that Yurenev, the Soviet Ambassador
in Japan be made his First Assistant', a Soviet official told the
US charge d'affaires. 'The Kremlin, however, was not willing to
permit Yurenev to be brought back from Japan to the Commis-
sariat for Foreign Affairs and suggested the names of a number of
other persons, none ofwhom was agreeable to Litvinov. Finally
Potemkin was decided upon, although his nomination was not
altogether pleasing either to Litvinov or to the Kremlin.' 52 This
overstates Litvinov's enthusiasm for Potemkin, whose oppor-
tunism elicited Litvinov's open contempt. At a meeting of the
Narkomindel Party committee in 1937 Potemkin challenged
Litvinov to say what he thought of the Krestinsky trial, given
that Krestinsky had been Litvinov's first Deputy Commissar.
Litvinov replied: 'Read the newspapers. Everything is recorded
there. Or do you want me to say more than the newspapers? Is it
that you don't believe the newspapers?' 53
Litvinov sent instructions from Moscow. The delegation was
generally told to vote with the other Powers - little advantage
was seen in marching out of step, but the delegation had no
illusions. The prospects for any kind of collective security in Asia
were as bleak as ever. In a telegram to Litvinov on 15 November,
Potemkin noted: 'Next is the question of material aid to China
and economic sanctions against Japan. The French state that
they are ready for both if England and America will do the same.
The English nod in the direction of America, and what it all
leads to is that the latter restricts itself to Platonic decisions.' 54
Summing up this situation in a letter to Troyanovsky on 26
November, two days after the conference closed, Litvinov com-
mented: 'From the very beginning we were sceptical about the
possible results of the Brussels conference and held to a very
cautious position. I told Davis that our experience with the
Great Powers in Geneva at the time of the anti-Italian sanctions
and especially on the London committee [on non-intervention in
Spain] obliges us to continue to adopt a wait-and-see position
until such time as we are certain that we are witnessing real will
and determination on the part of others to organise peace in
general on a collective basis and resolve one urgent international
problem or another.' The conclusions clearly depressed Litvi-
nov, who was already bitter at the execution of colleagues in his
Commissariat: 'The conference ended its existence even more
shamefully than it was possible to expect .... We, of course, will
now be still more cautious than before. The English and the
Americans will now merely wait for the moment to intervene as
mediators, no longer in the name of the conference or the League
of Nations but in their capacity as states.' 55 The French am-
bassador, Coulondre, not surprisingly found Litvinov both bitter
and discouraged. 56 Litvinov naturally restricted himself to im-
precations against the democracies but it could not have escaped
his notice that the very isolation that he was doing his utmost to
relieve his country of in the international system was partly
self-inflicted by those at home who were largely out of sympathy
with the thrust of his diplomacy. The terror confirmed the
suspicions of those in London and Paris who had other reasons
to doubt the Soviet Union's complete commitment to world

order.
The failure of the Brussels conference not only struck a blow
against Soviet hopes in Asia: it also shifted the balance within
the KMT leadership back towards an accommodation with
japan. On 8 August Bogomolov had telegraphed Moscow of the
arrival from Tokyo of Kawagoe who, en route to Nanking, had
already been attempting 'to negotiate in Shanghai with the
Chinese about a common basis for possible agreement' .57 And
even after the signature of a Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact
these talks continued. On 25 August Bogomolov telegraphed:
'Despite the signature of the pact with us the Chinese are
conducting talks with the japanese. According to our infor-
mation the former Foreign Minister Chan Tsyun and the Indus-
try Minister Wu Tin-chan are conducting talks with Kawagoe in
Shanghai. Our pact might be used in its way as a means of trade
with the aim of showing where China will go in the event of
japan being unaccommodating.' 58 Nothing came of these
soundings, but when the Brussels conference failed to produce
satisfactory results the KMT responded positively to attempts at
mediation by Oskar Trautmann, the German ambassador to
Nanking. 59 The Germans were caught between the Chinese and
the japanese. They were China's third largest trade partner after
the United States and japan. And the expansion of their influ-
ence had been secured by providing the military aid Chiang
Kai-shek needed to drive the Communists out of central China.
But they had also aligned themselves through the anti-
Comintern pact to japan. There was no way they could win from
a Sino-Japanese war, particularly if the war dragged on inde-
finitely and distracted the Japanese from the common adversary
to the north - the Soviet Union.
On 17 November the Soviet charge d'affaires in China,
Melamed, informed Moscow that through the German ambassa-
dor Tokyo had made a peace offer to the Chinese on the basis of
five conditions, including Chinese accession to the anti-
Comintern pact and the appointment of officials to the 'northern
provinces' who were friendly to japan. The Chinese had rejected
these demands and had decided to fight to the end. 60 But the
Brussels conference closed without providing China with even
the hope of Western support. The first clear sign from China of
renewed appeasement of japan appeared on 3 December when
Melamed informed Moscow of the statement issued by the

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui to the effect that:
China values the attitude towards China of the Brussels
conference Powers; however, this conference did not produce
any results. In so far as China did not want war and is now
engaged in only a defensive war, any kind of mediation is
desirable. In view of this, Germany's offer of mediation will be
taken into consideration.
When pressed as to whether this meant China accepted the
German offer, the secretary of the Foreign Ministry, charged
with delivering the message as Wang was unwell, said yes, after
a certain amount of equivocation. 61 Further clarification was
forthcoming on 13 December when Wang Chung-hui invited
Melamed and Dratvin, the military attache, in for a discussion.
Wang told them Trautmann had offered only mediation and
'had not yet made any concrete offers'. 62
Moscow was clearly disturbed. Further information from
Tokyo was needed. On 14 December Sergei Gendin, deputy
head of the GRU, sent Stalin a despatch from Sorge which had
arrived that day. Since the arrest that summer of Sorge's chief,
Berzin, his own loyalty and therefore his credibility were in some
doubt. 'The source does not have our complete confidence,'
Gendin cautioned Stalin, 'however, some of his information
deserves attention'. What Sorge communicated was inside infor-
mation gathered from the German military attache, Colonel
Eugen Ott, whom he had made it his business to befriend on
coming to Tokyo. Sorge warned that 'action by Japan against
the USSR may follow in the near future ... '. His assessment was
based on briefings Ott received from the Japanese General Staff
who very much needed a speedy end to the war in China on
acceptable conditions 'in order that Japan's armed forces con-
centrated on the continent could be thrown against the USSR'.
The likely form of assault would be a 'surprise attack' on
Vladivostok and the Maritime Province. Second, there were
signs that opposition to the army's plans had 'significantly
weakened'. Third: the terror had had a major and negative
impact on Japanese perceptions of Soviet military capability,
though Sorge was not as explicit about this as he might have been.
The idea was gaining currency, he wrote, that it was 'now or
never' the time to attack the Soviet Union. The liberal-minded
I 02 The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East
grandson of Prince Saionji spoke of the 'ridiculous underesti-

mation of the USSR's power'. Sorge continued: 'For example,
serious conversations take place to the effect that there are
grounds for counting on the separatist sentiments of Marshal
Blyukher, and therefore as a result of a decisive first strike it
would be possible to attain peace with him on conditions favour-
able to Japan. ' 63
By the time the new polpred Luganets-Orel'skii arrived in
China, the Japanese had seized and raped Nanking on 12-13
December with such devastating brutality that any talk of peace
with Tokyo was impractical. Luganets-Orel'skii had been born
in what was now Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) in 1899. After
service in the civil war he joined the Party in 1920. 64 After further
instruction at the military academy he entered the border guards
- a branch of the OGPU (after 1934 NKVD). Thereafter his
career is something of an enigma. KMT Intelligence placed him
as a consul in Urumchi (Chinese Sinkiang) under another name.
'Others affirm he was formerly a military commander of rela-
tively high rank', noted Clark Kerr, Britain's ambassador to
China. But all agreed as to his qualities. The secretary in charge
of the British diplomatic mission in Chungking - the KMT
capital in 1938- described Luganets-Orel'skii as 'bear-like and
genial ... giving an impression of friendliness and as being far
more approachable than the average Soviet diplomatist'. Clark
Kerr thought he looked like 'an overgrown lumbering peasant' .65
A colleague from the NKVD, perhaps more accustomed to
differentiating between cultivated and less than cultivated lum-
bering peasants, remembers him as 'highly cultivated ... a tall,
well-built man ... charming company combining austerity and
simplicity with great devotion to Party principles and tact' .66 He
presented his credentials to Chiang on 28 December. Chiang
revealed the latest offer passed on by Trautmann - which
differed little from the earlier offer except that it did not provide
for participation in the anti-Comintern pact - and emphasised
that 'China will leave this offer unanswered and will continue
resistance to the end'. But the Russians were unsure whether to
believe him, and Chiang was well aware that this was the only
leverage he had. He insisted: 'The situation is such that should
the USSR not intervene openly and militarily in support of
China, then China's defeat is inevitable. Japan has now already
set up a puppet government in North China and ... offers China
peace on cheap conditions. As a result, in Chinese public opinion,

especially among the intelligentsia, the feeling is beginning to
grow that, in so far as hopes for military intervention by the
USSR appear to have been without foundation, defeat is inevi-
table and it is better to back a pro-Japanese government.' 67 In
the course of this two-and-a-half-hour discussion Chiang ex-
patiated at length on the need for direct Soviet military inter-
vention and pressed for much greater supplies, including the
provision of staff officers.
THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
The failure of the Brussels conference thus threw Chiang's

commitment into doubt. This prompted increased Soviet mili-
tary aid and had a direct impact on the Comintern's directives to
the Chinese Communist Party. The resurgence in Soviet activity
in turn exacerbated Japanese hostility towards the Soviet Union.
The Narkomindel recognised this to be the case. But the Rus-
sians had no intention of cutting aid merely to please the
Japanese; the policy of abject appeasement pursued in the early
1930s had left an unpleasant stain on Soviet memory.
On the day after the incident at Lukouchiao (the Marco Polo
Bridge), 8 July, the CCP hastily published a manifesto which
included the appeal: 'Let the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party closely cooperate and resist the new attacks of the Japan-
ese aggressors!' 68 There was no immediate response. But by 15
July the CCP and KMT had come to terms, at least in a
preliminary way, on the establishment of bi-partisan cooper-
ation. And on 17 July Chiang-Kai-shek issued a statement from
Lushan that amounted to an ultimatum to the Japanese to
accept a settlement of the incident without any concessions from
China. But Chiang still did not issue the agreed statement on
cooperation, as expected, recognising the legal status of the
CCP. And Chiang's continuing reluctance to come to terms with
the Communists was matched in Yenan by Mao's continued
reservations. 69 Still awaiting an announcement from Lushan, on
23 July Mao delivered a speech to an open meeting in Yen an in
which he outlined further terms for cooperation against the
Japanese. 70 These terms had almost certainly not been cleared
with Moscow, for they included a demand that stood in flat
l 04 The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East
contradiction to both the spirit and the letter of Soviet policy on

China.
The thrust of Mao's demands was that the Kuomintang must
make the national government truly representative of the people
by bringing all political parties into the structure of government
at all levels. Moscow could not welcome the fact that Mao was
laying down additional conditions for joint resistance to Japan.
More provocatively Mao demanded that Chiang Kai-shek 'Im-
mediately conclude a military and political alliance with the
Soviet Union and closely unite with the Soviet Union, the
country which is most reliable, most powerful and most capable
of helping China to resist Japan'.
Cooperation thus made a faltering start. On 22 August Red
forces in the Shensi region commanded by Chu Teh and Peng
Teh-huai were renamed the 8th Route Army as part of the
national war effort (Red forces south of the Yangtse and com-
manded by Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying became the 4th Route
Army on 12 October). On 25 August an expanded Politburo
meeting was held in Lochuan, northern Shensi, to discuss how
the integration of Communist and KMT armies should proceed.
Chou En-lai and Chu Teh spoke in favour of limited reorganis-
ation of Communist forces, including the acceptance of some
staff officers assigned by Nanking. Mao and Jen Pi-shih insisted
on complete autonomy and maintenance of the existing internal
structure. The general-secretary of the CCP, Chang Wen-tien,
put forward a middle position essentially amounting to formal
reorganisation but de facto independence; no staff officers from
Nanking would be accepted except for liaison in Yenan. And
whereas Chu Teh, backed by Chang Kuo-t'ao, favoured cooper-
ation with the strategic plans of Nanking and of Communists
fighting alongside KMT forces in a traditional war, Mao fa-
voured independent action along guerrilla lines. The compro-
mise was that Chu's option should be followed initially, but if,
when the 8th Route Army moved into northern Shansi, the
Japanese succeeded in driving them back, then Mao's strategy
should be adopted. 71
Mao's tough stance, as against the flexibility of Chou En-lai
and the seemingly capitulationist position towards the KMT of
Chang Kuo-t'ao, is not hard to understand, and not merely
because of the preceding years of bitter struggle to survive
Chiang Kai-shek's punitive expeditions. Not until 22-23 Sep-
Sinojapanese War and Soviet Aid to China 105
tember, when the situation at the front became critical, did

Chiang release the agreed statement of 15 July. And by then
Mao's attitude was hardening still further. On 29 September he
announced that 'The present government is still a one-party
dictatorship of the Kuomintang and not a government of the
national democratic united front. In the absence of a govern-
ment of the national democratic front,' he warned, 'it is imposs-
ible to carry out the Three People's Principles and the Ten-Point
Programme.' 72 Yet by then Soviet military assistance was flow-
ing to the Kuomintang. CCP priorities, as conceived of by Mao,
were inevitably in collision with Moscow's priorities. And bitter-
ness about Soviet aid being directed to Nanking instead of
Yenan was expressed in phrases such as 'Weapons for the
bourgeoisie, but books for the proletariat'.
From 9 to 11 November the cities of Shanghai and Taiyuan
fell to Japanese forces. Mao immediately addressed Party acti-
vists in Yenan on 12 November and launched into an attack on
the 'war of partial resistance' fought by the KMT. 73 He warned
cadres against 'abandoning their principles' by taking KMT
protestations at face value. Before the Japanese attack inJuly, he
claimed, the main danger had been '"Left" closed-doorism';
now the main danger was 'Right opportunism, that is, capitu-
lationism', by which he meant 'the tendency towards unprin-
cipled accommodation with the Kuomintang in the united
front'. Mao had restored the political commissars in the army,
who had been abolished in an attempt to meet Chiang halfway
in the summer. He had 'initiated and staunchly carried out the
new strategic principle of "independent guerrilla warfare in the
mountain regions with the initiative in our own hands"'. He had
'rejected the Kuomintang's demand that its members should be
sent to the Eighth Route Army as cadres' and 'upheld the
principle of the absolute leadership of the Eighth Route Army by
the Communist Party'. And he had 'introduced the principle of
"independence and initiative within the united front" in the
revolutionary anti-Japanese base areas'.
Mao had regained ascendancy within the leadership. The only
substantial challenge now came from Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang
Ming) who had left Moscow on 14 November and arrived in
Yenan on 29 November accompanied by Chen Yun, Kang
Sheng and Tseng Shan. 74 The plane flew into Yenan via Sin-
kiang with a huge radio transmitter and some anti-aircraft guns
also on board. Hitherto Moscow had not taken an active part in

CCP affairs since the onset of the terror and the dismissal of Mif
in May. On 10 October the Comintern executive committee-
obsessed with rooting out Trotskyists and distracted from the
realities of the world - passed an opaque resolution on the
Chinese question that, on the one hand, argued that the CCP
had to become 'a powerful all-Chinese political factor [sic]' and
ensure the cohesion and growth of the Red Army within the
all-Chinese army; on the other hand it insisted that 'It is es-
pecially important to carry out the policy of a united anti-
Japanese front firmly and resolutely and do everything for the
all-round reinforcement of this front, as the most important
precondition to victory over the Japanese militarists.' 75 It there-
fore left the fundamental dispute between Mao and his oppo-
nents unresolved.
But Wang Ming claimed to bring him clearer instructions. At
a meeting of the Politburo on 9-13 December he conveyed a
message from Dimitrov who had, he said, recommended that the
CCP 'study the French Communist Party's popular front experi-
ence'. Dimitrov had also suggested the following slogans: 'subor-
dinate everything to the united national anti-Japanese front' and
'everything through the united national anti-Japanese front'. 76
These recommendations matched Moscow's explanation for the
setbacks suffered in the war of resistance. In the Soviet view -
echoed by Wang Ming- these setbacks were due not to 'some
military reverses and territorial losses' but to the activities of
'Chinese traitors and pro-Japanese elements' and vacillations
'within the anti-Japanese front'. Wang added that 'the signs
portend an internal disunity that is far more serious than the
external peril'. 77
Faced with the danger of appearing to break ranks with
Moscow and falling victim to the vicious campaign against
'Trotskyists', Mao skilfully retreated and adopted Moscow's
position. Thus the Comintern line was explicitly endorsed with
the publication of a manifesto on 25 December emphasising the
priority of strengthening the united front. 78 At the same time
Mao ensured that although Wang Ming was now included at the
top of the Party leadership, the re-allocation of posts left himself
at the helm. An intriguing footnote to this episode was the
arrival of the 'Lincolnesque' American marine, Captain Evans
Carlson, President Roosevelt's unofficial agent. Carlson reported
from Hungtung in Shansi province that the CCP was 'the best
integrated political group in China'. He was particularly im-
pressed by its original military tactics (guerrilla fighting) during
his fortnight in the field with Chu Teh. 79 So far so good. But from
military tactics which, as a marine, he did know something
about, Carlson graduated to political strategy. By March 1938
Carlson formed the distinct impression - as a result of Mao's
clever manipulation - that the Chinese Communists were in
fact 'a group of Liberal Democrats, perhaps Social-Democrats' .80
The self-deception of the Webbs in Soviet Russia was thus
mirrored by the likes of Carlson in north-western China. Mao
certainly had nothing to learn from Stalin on this point.
The dangers of a successful German mediation between the

Japanese and the Chinese soon diminished. But renewed con-
cern arose over the revival of British determination to appease
Japan after the resignation of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary
in February 1938. On New Year's Eve Eden had unexpectedly
invited Maisky to visit him at the Foreign Office. Maisky sus-
pected Eden's reawakened interest in the Russians arose directly
from the realisation that the United States was not about to
intervene in the Far East. 'From the overall context it was
perfectly clear that Eden ... would like to ascertain whether the
USSR was inclined towards "activating" its policy in the Far
East and, if so disposed, then on what conditions', Maisky
noted. 81 In fact the Soviet leadership- and not just Stalin- was
increasingly restive at their own policy of restraint towards
Japan. One sign was the candid acknowledgement in /zvestiya on
30 December that the Soviet Union was supplying arms to
China. Ideally, from the Soviet point ofview, Russia should not
have to face Japan alone but in concert with the democracies.
But Eden's resignation was expected to weaken British pressure
onJapan82 - as indeed it did. The growth of German aggression
in Europe unfortunately enhanced Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain's pre-existing disposition, only haltingly curbed by
Eden, to seek peace in Asia. And by April the British appeared
to be moving closer to the Japanese with financial assistance to
stabilise the Yen. 83 Moscow saw Chamberlain's motives for
the worst: 'Conservative England fears a strengthening of
Communists within China and a future rapprochement between

China and the Soviet Union.' 'England is interested in a speedy
end to the war', Stomonyakov warned Luganets-Orel'sky in
China, 'and it will exert pressure on China to this end.' 84
The only bright light on the British horizon was Winston
Churchill - whose influence Maisky (and along with him Sta-
lin) tended to overrate. Maisky saw Churchill on 12 May:
'Churchill . . . greatly praised our tactics in the Far East:
maintenance of neutrality and simultaneous aid to China in
weaponry. That is for the best. Open military intervention with
the USSR on China's side, prompting an outburst of anti-Soviet
sentiment in various parts of the world, would merely ease
Japan's position and would make more difficult the establish-
ment of a "grand alliance" in which Churchill now sees the only
means of saving mankind.' 85
Stalin was, however, far too cautious to shut the door on
Japan, particularly given the thrust of Chamberlain's initiatives.
On 12 May Maisky contacted the Narkomindel. Yoshida, the
Japanese ambassador in London, had made an informal ap-
proach, expressing an interest in improving relations. 86 It is
striking that it was not Stomonyakov or Potemkin who replied -
Litvinov was in Geneva - but Stalin. On 14 May Stalin in-
structed Maisky: 'Do not avoid meeting Yoshida and in the
event of encountering him listen to him attentively. Ask him to
outline concrete measures for improving relations between
Japan and the USSR. Tell him that the USSR is also striving for
an improvement in relations. Inform us as to what follows.' 87 But
Yoshida talked of ending Soviet aid to China, which was Mos-
cow's only guarantee ofkeepingJapan tied down, and seemed to
want the Russians to take the initiative. 88 Yoshida had a repu-
tation for indulging in highly imaginative scenarios for which he
had little or no authorisation from Tokyo.
Moscow certainly did not overestimate Japanese strength. As
Stomonyakov told China's Premier, Sun Fo, on 19 May: 'At the
moment serious disagreements have arisen within the Japanese
Government in so far as many politicians led by Prime Minister
Konoe, fearing that the consequences of a protracted war in
China might be a serious economic crash and social unrest, insist
on the despatch of a large quantity of forces to China, to smash
as soon as possible the resistance of the Chinese people. These
proposals are opposed by the military, who point out that, in the
event of complications arising with the Soviet Union, japan

would prove vulnerable, having despatched its main forces to
China.' 89
Hence the importance of the war in China: Potemkin de-
scribed the situation there as 'splendid'. He counted on resist-
ance continuing for 'several years', 'after which japan will be too
weak to be able to attack the USSR'. 90 Yet despite this much-
vaunted optimism, Chinese forces led by the Kuomintang met
with defeat after defeat - punctuated only briefly by the oc-
casional, short-lived victory- as the japanese pressed resolutely
along the railways from north to south and along the banks of
the Yangtse river to the west: winning Nanking in December
1937, then Canton and, finally, Wuhan- a key communications
centre - in October 1938. Yet the Konoe Government had made
a fatal blunder. On 16 January 1938 it had issued a statement,
after the failure of the Trautmann mediation, refusing to deal
with Chiang Kai-shek. 'No large amount of intelligence is
necessary to point out that the policy was a serious mistake. I
myself fully admit it was a failure', Konoe later recalled. 91 But
this was an unexpected gift to the Russians and the CCP,
ensuring at a stroke the maintenance of a genuine united front of
resistance through the greater part of the year.
MOSCOW HARDENS ITS STANCE
Hitherto hidden in the wings, strident anti-japanese sentiment

suddenly reverberated through Moscow early in 1938. Andrei
Zhdanov, Kirov's successor as Leningrad Party Secretary, was
now a candidate (non-voting) member of the Politburo, chair-
man of a foreign affairs committee of the Supreme Soviet and
charged with overall supervision of the Comintern. Zhdanov was
consistent in both his ignorance and his deep distrust of other
countries. Whereas Litvinov tended to be anti-German and
pro-British, and Molotov pro-German and anti-British, Zhdanov
distrusted both equally. Stalin remained characteristically au
dessus de la melie, encouraging others to argue the issues, and in
this instance vent longstanding frustrations, before taking a
stand of his own. Evidently with a wink from Stalin, Zhdanov
now took the opportunity to launch a full-scale verbal assault on
'defects' in, and the 'seamy sides' to, a number of Commissariats
on 17 January 1938. 92 He made it clear that no one could criticise

the Soviet Government's peace policy or 'our respected People's
Commissar', but he attacked the Narkomindel for delaying the
expulsion offoreign consulates from Soviet soil. The second issue
he raised for 'clarification' was that of 'impudent, hooligan and
provocative tricks by agents of Japan and the so-called puppet
state, Manchukuo'.
The issue was a minor matter: detention by the Japanese of a
Soviet postal plane on 19 December 1937, forced off course and
obliged to land on Manchurian territory; an incident reported in
Pravda on 25 December. The Soviet consul in Harbin had failed
to secure its release. In Tokyo Slavutsky had asked the Japanese
Foreign Ministry to look into the matter; but to no result.
Evidently after further prompting from Moscow, Slavutsky then
presented a note of protest to Hirota on the eve of Zhdanov's
speech. 93 Zhdanov nevertheless saw this as a convenient peg on
which to hang his dissent with existing policy towards Japan:
Comrades, looking at the development of our relations in the
Far East, we can all see that a day rarely passes when some
sort of ... provocative onslaught by agents of Japan and
so-called Manchukuo does not occur on our eastern frontiers.
Evidence can be found in the most recent instance of a
completely unlawful and crude violation and flouting of gener-
ally recognised norms of law and intercourse between nations
- the instance is that of the provocative detention of our
civilian aeroplane which carries passengers and mail. As far as
we know, up to now no effective measures have been taken
with respect to returning the aeroplane and its contents.
It seems to me that it is the general and unanimous opinion
of all toilers in our country that diplomatic means be utilised
to take effective measures towards the regulation of relations
on our eastern frontier in such a manner that any provocative
onslaught by hooligan agents ofJapanese imperialism is made
impossible once and for all. (Noisy assent.) 94
Molotov who, as chairman of the Council of People's Commis-
sars, had to respond on behalf of the Commissariats criticised
- the attack being a veiled assault on himself among others- 'on
the whole' agreed with these criticisms. Yet he took pains to
emphasise that both he and the Supreme Soviet 'fully' supported
the government's foreign policy. 95 Action had anyway been
taken with respect to the postal plane, as Molotov pointed out;

but Japan rebuffed Soviet protests and in retaliation the Rus-
sians temporarily suspended the postal exchange agreement of
November 1931. 96
What gave Zhdanov the confidence to call for a more assertive
stance towards Japan were the reports coming into Moscow that
the Japanese were running into severe difficulties in China. First,
an analysis of the Japanese press at the Narkomindel revealed
that the war was damaging the Japanese economy far more than
expected; 97 and, second, from Tokyo Sorge advised
Moscow: 'On the basis of numerous materials and consider-
ations that I have previously enumerated, one can draw the
following conclusions: war against the USSR will not begin in
either the spring or summer [of 1938] .' 98 But no drastic action
was yet taken against the Japanese, and the grave deterioration
in the European situation convinced the Japanese of Soviet
vulnerability.
5 Frontier Fighting: Lake
Khasan (1938) and
Khalkhin-Gol ( 1939)
In the absence of foreign diplomatic support and in the face of
only limited resistance to the Japanese from China, much still
depended upon the deterrent value of Soviet military power in
the Far East. Since the 17th Party Congress in February 1934
the reinforcement of the Soviet armed forces in the region had
continued apace. By 1939 capital investment in the region stood
at many times the level of 1928. 1 The railway line from European
Russia had been doubled as far as China by the autumn ofl934. 2
By the end of 1935 the Far Eastern army was reported to be able
to fight alone for at least six months. 3 Nonetheless British
military Intelligence (MI2) pointed out in October 1935 that
Soviet railway capacity strictly limited the quantity offorces that
could be maintained in the Far East and meant that the Soviet
rate of mobilisation was seriously inferior to that of the
Japanese. 4 For supplies the Russians were still dependent upon
'slow moving and vulnerable columns of horse transport'. 5 By
December 1937, however, the Amur railway line- a continu-
ation of the Trans-Siberian - was double-tracked to Khaba-
rovsk, 400 miles short of Vladivostok. 6 Between 1934 and 1939
the number of tanks in the Far Eastern army was doubled; the
number of armoured cars rose by a factor of eight. 7 In 1938 a
further 105 800 men were added to the Far Eastern army. 8 And
the construction of 120 fortified zones had been completed 9
(anything up to 60 000 troops had been drafted in for construc-
tion work in 1935-36). 10
The massive reinforcement of Soviet military capability in the
Far East was, however, seriously weakened by the terror that cut
a deadly path across the tundra to Eastern Siberia and the
Maritime Province. But it took a significant clash of arms with
the Japanese along the frontier for this to become evident.
Such reports as these were reaching Moscow from the head-
quarters of NKVD border forces in the Far East by the end of
June 1938:
112
Frontier Fighting: Lake Khasan to Khalkhin- Got 113
With the aim of guaranteeing themselves the opening blow in

the first days of war with us, the Japanese have placed the
study of the immediate frontier zone on a broad footing. The
Japanese have recently been carrying out persistent - un-
ashamed in their choice of means - military reconnaissance of
the approaches from the frontier boundary to our roads and
railroads in the immediate vicinity; they attempt to seize our
border guards with the aim of checking data about our frontier
zone ... they seize hill-tops and erect military installations;
they are ceaseless in surveying our forces on both land and
sea; they put a great deal of work into the preparation of white
guard intelligence, subversive and terrorist groups and bands,
to dump on our territory .... 11
What the editors of this document apparently excised was any

reference to the recent defection on 13 June of Lyushkov, officer
commanding NKVD forces in the Far East. 12 This defection was
undoubtedly an unexpected coup for Japanese Intelligence and,
correspondingly, a disturbing blow to the Russians. Lyushkov
appears to have defected to avoid being tortured and shot in the
terror that now hit the Soviet Far East in full force.
The first victim had been Blyukher's Chief of Staff, com-
mander Sangurski, who in April 1937 had been summoned to a
Party conference in Moscow on short notice, only to be arrested
en route. Others then fell to the axe: Khakhan'yan- chief of the
army's political directorate; Deribas - commissar of state se-
curity (first rank); Krutov- chairman of the regional executive
committee; Kalmykov - head of the Khabarovsk garrison;
Lapin - head of the army's air force; Derevtsov - chief of
armoured forces; Pokus - a close comrade-in-arms; Sadovnikov
- secretary of the Party organisation of the army staff; Malkis -
military procurator; Dzyza - Blyukher's assistant for supply;
and others. By the time Lyushkov defected, the purge was
spreading ever more indiscriminately throughout the Far East-
ern region. 13
The damage wrought by Stalin on the army his regime had
hitherto done so much to strengthen was now fully apparent to
the Japanese, as were the details of Soviet deployments in the
Far Eastern theatre. The danger of attack by Japan had in-
creased substantially. On 1 July and 'in connexion with the
increasing threat of a military offensive by Japan', the Far
Eastern army was reorganised into 'the Far Eastern front'! 4

Moscow was thus exceptionally alert to infringements of the
frontier, and at a time when the Japanese were spoiling for a
fight. A historian of the incident basing himself solely on Japan-
ese sources informs us that: 'Kwantung Army signal monitors
intercepted a pair of significant front-line messages on 6 July
from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region
which were addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Kha-
barovsk. Decoded and translated, the items revealed ... a rec-
ommendation to higher headquarters that Russian elements
ought to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of
Khasan.>~ 5 This appears to be true, but incomplete. A report
from the Soviet Far Eastern border headquarters contains the
following: 'In connection with the arrival in the Digasheli Khomok
region ofJapanese to platoon level, who have begun to construct
telephone lines and also survey our territory in this region, which
had not been surveyed prior to 6 July, a detachment was given
the order on 8 July to hold the hill-top with a permanent detail,
which was carried out at 7.00 on 9 July by troops of the reserve
post amounting to 30 men, which have been billeted in open
trenches .... The implementation of these measures in taking
the hill-top is bound up with preventing the Japanese from
taking this hill-top, advantageous as it is for continual surveil-
lance of our territory. There was no breach of the frontier.>~ 6
In Tokyo the Imperial Army's request to use force to take the
hill-top met with a favourable response from activists at Imperial
Headquarters who wished to test Soviet resolve through a con-
trolled strike. 17 The Foreign Ministry opposed this and sought a
Soviet withdrawal by negotiation. Thus on 14 July charge d'af-
faires Nishi asked to see Stomonyakov who, with Litvinov's
assent, delayed the meeting until the following day. Nishi in-
sisted that Soviet forces had seized Manchukuo territory . 18 Later
that day- 15 July- after checking with the Far Eastern region
and after consulting the relevant maps, Stomonyakov replied
with a statement denying the charge and quoting from the
relevant document governing the border, the Hunch'un protocol
of 1886, in defence of the Soviet case. 19 This, the first diplomatic
skirmish in what became a series between Japanese and Soviet
officials, ended inconclusively. Throughout the ensuing crisis the
Russians held firmly to their position, in contrast with their
posture during the summer of 1937 over a previous frontier
dispute on the Amur.
Frontier Fighting: Lake Khasan to Khalkhin-Gol 115
This new resolve can partly be explained by the kind of

complaints made by Zhdanov about kow-towing to the Japan-
ese. But it is also explicable in terms of the Intelligence reports
reaching the centre not only from the Sorge ring in Tokyo.
Whether the Russians had access to the Japanese diplomatic
cipher at this critical moment is a matter of conjecture. But they
almost certainly had access to critical military ciphers. The 23rd
division of the Kwantung army was commanded by Lieutenant-
General Komatsubara Michitaro. A Russian-speaker and Intel-
ligence officer, he had served as assistant military attache to the
White forces in Russia in 1919-21. In 1927-30, following
Japanese diplomatic recognition of the Soviet regime he returned
to Russia as military attache. 20 It is here that alcohol, sex and
illicit financial dealings brought him to the attention of Soviet
counter-Intelligence (KRO). The KRO (Kontrrazvedyvatel'nyi
otdel) of the NKVD was headed by Artur Artuzov (born
Frauchi), the man who had masterminded the 'Trust' in the
1920s that had duped the Secret Intelligence Service and the
'Whites' into funnelling money and men into a bogus counter-
revolutionary campaign in Soviet Russia. Aided by his assist-
ants, Puzitskii- who was to organise the notoriously successful
abduction of the 'White' General Kutepov from Paris in 1930 -
Tubala, Chibisov, Pudin, Gudz' and others, Artuzov arranged
the entrapment of Komatsubara. It was not difficult. On one
occasion Komatsubara was so drunk the keys to his safe were
easily taken from him. The evidence of his misbehaviour
gathered without difficulty, Komatsubara and his assistant were
ready to agree to 'anything' provided no news of their activities
reached Tokyo. 21 This certainly gave the Russians an enormous
advantage when the Japanese planned operations against the
Soviet Union. And if Komatsubara remained vulnerable to
Soviet pressure- and his career continued to develop after the
Moscow posting - then the NKVD were able to continue to
draw upon him for inside information. From 1932 to 1935 he
headed the Harbin branch of the Imperial Army's secret Intelli-
gence agency in Manchuria. There he was promoted to the rank
of Major-General in August 1934 and, as commander of a
garrison in November 1937, to Lieutenant-General in November
193 7, before taking command of the 23rd division in July 1938.
By then Artuzov had fallen victim to the terror; he was arrested
on 13 May 1937. 22 Komatsubara did not play any part in the
incident at Lake Khasan but he played a leading role in tht>
fighting at Khalkhin-Gol in the following year and his knowl-

edge of Japanese military communications and Intelligence ap-
preciations of the Soviet Union will have been invaluable at any
time.
In addition, Sorge reassured Moscow from Tokyo: 'This
incident [at Lake Khasan] will not lead to war between the
Soviet Union andJapan.' 23 These reports were sound in so far as
they reflected opinion at court and in the Prime Minister's
entourage; the Emperor had himself refused to sanction the use
of force, and the Japanese troops along the Soviet frontier were
so instructed on 20 July. 24 Knowing this, Li tvinov advised Soviet
missions on 25 July that the Japanese would not carry out their
threats, 'fearing that this would precipitate conflicts along the
entire frontier'. 25 What he failed to take into account, however,
was that Japanese Army officers habitually took matters into
their own hands and acted, as in 1931, on their own initiative
with incalculable consequences for Japan as a whole.
Evidently on instructions from Moscow, ignorant of the Sorge
reports, and confronted with restrictions on the deployment of
the Far Eastern Army, 26 Soviet border forces watched with
mounting anxiety as the Japanese showed every sign of prepar-
ing to attack. On 26 July at 11.30 p.m., Grebennik, head of the
Posetsky border detachment, reported: 'The Japanese are aim-
ing to seize the heights right along the frontier.' 27 On the evening
of27 July- evidently after consultation with Moscow- the Far
Eastern command made ready. 28 At 4.00 p.m. on 29 July, the
first attack materialised. 29
By now Stalin was more confident. From Moscow the French
ambassador reported that although Stalin rejected any notion of
'military adventures', he was 'receptive to the idea that, to
reassert its prestige, the USSR must from now on increasingly
demonstrate its will and its power'. 30 A protest was immediately
despatched to Tokyo. 31 Meanwhile Blyukher, almost certainly
not privy to the Intelligence at Stalin's disposal and only too
aware of the low state of morale of his officers and the general
disruption caused by the terror, was desperately trying to fore-
stall an apparently open-ended conflict with the Japanese.
Blyukher, well-acquainted with the institutionalised mendacity
of the NKVD, in fact suspected that Soviet border forces had
provoked the fighting. As a Soviet report later recorded: 'Acting
in secret from member of the military council comrade Maze-
pov, his chief of staff comrade Grigorii Shtern, Deputy Commis-

sar of Defence comrade Mekhlis and Deputy Commissar of
Internal Affairs comrade Frinovskii, at that time in Khabarovsk,
comrade Blyukher sent a commission to the Zaozernaya heights
[above Lake Khasan] and without the participation of the head
of the border forces in the sector carried out an investigation into
the actions of the border troops. Set up on such a presumption of
suspicion the commission uncovered a "violation" by our border
troops on the Manchurian frontier by 3 metres [emphasis in the
original] and, consequently, "established" our "guilt" in the ori-
gins of the conflict on Lake Khasan.' 32 He was therefore morally
as well as materially reluctant to see men die in this cause. In
what in retrospect appears to have been an act of folly, as well as
an act of integrity and bravery, Blyukher sent a telegram to
Voroshilov reporting the results of his investigation and deman-
ding the immediate arrest of the head of the border forces in the
Lake Khasan sector and others 'guilty of provoking the conflict'
with the japanese. This telegram was sent without the know-
ledge of Mazepov, Frinovskii and Mekhlis. 33 But Stalin saw
things differently. Evidently at Stalin's behest, Commissar for
Defence Voroshilov then instructed Blyukher to bomb and wipe
out the japanese on the two hill-tops. On the evening of the 27th
the Far Eastern Army command began serious preparations.
But Blyukher still held back. Stalin, impatient for action, phoned
Blyukher. The conversation, as noted from the archives by Sta-
lin's Soviet biographer, ran as follows:
Stalin: Tell me, Blyukher, why the directive from the People's
Commissar of Defence for an aerial bombardment of all of our
territory occupied by the japanese, including Zaozernaya, has
not been carried out?
Blyukher: My report is as follows. The planes are ready to take
off. Take-off has been delayed because of unfavourable
meteorological conditions. This very minute Rychagov [com-
manding the air force of the Maritime group of the Far
Eastern Army] has given the order, regardless, that the planes
take off and attack .... The planes are now taking off, but I
fear it is evident that in this bombardment we will harm
[zadenem] both our units and Korean settlements.
Stalin: Tell me honestly, comrade Blyukher: do you truly wish
to fight the japanese? If you do, tell me frankly as befits a
communist; and if you do, I would have thought that you

should leave for the place immediately.
I do not understand your fear of harming the Korean
population, and also your fear that the planes will be unable to
carry out their mission because of fog. Who forbade you in the
conditions of a military skirmish with the Japanese not to
harm the Korean population? What does any cloudiness
matter for Bolshevik planes if they truly wish to defend the
honour of their Motherland? I'm waiting for an answer.
Blyukher: The planes have been ordered to take off, and the
first formation will take off at 11.20am - fighters. Rychagov
promises to have attack planes [take off] at l.OOpm. In an
hour and a half Mazepov [member of the military council in
the Far East and soon to become head of the political director-
ate] and myself, and Brendinskii himself will take off earlier,
will together fly out to Voroshilov. We accept your directives ...
will carry them out with Bolshevik precision. 34
But to ensure Blyukher did precisely what he was told, Mekhlis
accompanied by Frinovskii and Mazepov confronted Blyukher
at his home. After they had gone Blyukher took a stiff drink,
commenting: 'the sharks who want to gorge themselves on me
have arrived .. .'. 35
The Japanese launched a further assault early in the morning
of 31 July. 36 By 2 August Moscow saw the situation as follows:
'Tokyo is trying to avoid complications, but the local military is
presenting its government withfaits accomplis; in order to obtain
approval it sends false information about our imaginary moves
across the frontier as attacks on Japanese forces, etc. 137 Despite
these complications, the Sorge evaluation proved correct; after
heavy fighting the Japanese soon decided to withdraw. 38 A
ceasefire was agreed on I 0 August, taking effect from noon the
following day. Blyukher was finished, however. The first clear
sign came with the victory celebrations. The crowds in the
streets were not given his portrait to carry. And when first
secretary of the regional Party committee Sobolev delivered his
speech, Blyukher's name went unmentioned. By the end of
August he was summoned to Moscow to attend the Chief Mili-
tary Council- formed on 13 March- that was investigating the
events at Khasan and, in particular, his role in them. 39
A MORAL AND POLITICAL VICTORY
Victory went to the Soviet Union. This was not a military

success, however, but a moral and political victory. Tokyo was,
in fact, reluctant to risk a full-scale conflict at a time when its
forces were tied down in China. The episode thus underlined the
importance to Moscow of correct Intelligence of japanese inten-
tions. At the same time the conflict - the first between the
USSR and a major power since 1922 (when the Japanese finally
evacuated the Soviet mainland) - revealed serious deficiencies
in Red Army combat. This was certainly the view of informed
foreign observers such as Lieutenant-Colonel Brownjohn of
British Military Intelligence who had concluded: 'there can be
little doubt that the Soviet troops gave a very indifferent display
- with the exception of the artillery' .40 It was also Stalin's
opinion. On 31 August the Chief Military Council convened.
Those present were: Stalin, Deputy Commissar for Defence
Shchadenko, Marshal Budenny, Chief of the General Staff Sha-
poshnikov, Chief of Artillery Kulik, Chief of the Air Force
Loktionov, Blyukher and Chief of Armoured Forces Pavlov;
Molotov, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,
and Frinovskii, as head of NK VD border forces, also attended.
Voroshilov chaired the session.
The meeting found 'massive inadequacies in the condition of
the Red Banner Far Eastern Front'. The general conclusion was
that 'the Far Eastern theatre is badly prepared (roads, bridges,
communications) for war'. At lake Khasan this was exacerbated
by the failure to carry out 'the most important directives' of the
Chief Military Council and the Commissar for Defence for 'an
extended period of time'. As a consequence 'in this relatively
small conflict significant losses were suffered - 408 men killed
and 2807 wounded'. Blyukher and officers 'at all levels' were
held responsible for inadequate preparedness and he was re-
minded that at the Council on 28-31 May he had assured those
present that his forces were well-prepared and in all respects
ready for battle. Equally seriously, in those times of paranoid
suspicion, he was accused of concealing a multitude of 'enemies
of the people' behind his back, who were carrying out 'criminal
work disorganising and demoralising the Red Banner Far East-
ern front', when in fact that is precisely what Mekhlis and the
NKVD had been doing. 41 But this could scarcely be said. On 4
September Blyukher was relieved of his command and Voroshi-

lov offered him and the family his datcha in Sochi for a vacation.
On 22 October they came for him and the family. He was
tortured to death - despite attempts from Stalin's brother-in-
law to obtain clemency- on 9 November 1938. 42 The destruc-
tion of Blyukher brought Soviet prestige in the Far East to its
nadir. Moreover, the discovery of the failings in the Far Eastern
Army confirmed Stalin in his reluctance to contemplate the
prospect of war with Japan. 'The USSR will enter a war with
Japan only on the following three conditions', wrote Deputy
Commissar Potemkin on 8 September: '(a) if Japan attacks the
USSR; (b) if England or the USA joins in a war with Japan; (c)
if the League ofNations obliges the Pacific Powers to enter a war
with Japan'. 43
But, provided he had the correct Intelligence - as he had at
Lake Khasan - Stalin was willing to take a calculated risk to
teach Tokyo a lesson. In this respect in Asia as in Europe and
with Litvinov's encouragement, he was, in the right circum-
stances , prepared to bluff. In this respect the apparent victory-
political rather than military - at Lake Khasan was still of
considerable importance. 'Japan has received a lesson, convinc-
ing it of our firmness and capacity for resistance, and also in the
illusory nature of aid from Germany', Litvinov pointed out in a
telegram to polpreds abroad. 44 Ignorant of the Soviet Intelligence
successes that had enabled the Soviet Union to take Japan to the
brink, impressionable foreign observers were forced to recon-
sider the pessimistic assessments of Soviet military power that
had been reinforced by the apparently disastrous impact of
Stalin's terror. Favourable comments from the Western press
were given front-page coverage in both Pravda and b::,vestiya on 13
August. On the 21st anniversary of the October Revolution
Voroshilov warned: 'we do not know how strong the memory is
of these gentlemen [the Japanese], how well they learn lessons.
But should the obvious lessons at Lake Khasan be insufficient,
should the enemy be in a condition to forget the devastating
power of Soviet weapons and the heroism of red fighters and
their commanders, we have to tell them: gentlemen, what you
received at Khasan are merely "blossoms"; the "berries", the
real "berries", still lie ahead. (Applause) ... we are by no means
always obliged to limit the activities of our forces to regions
which the enemy attacks imprudently and in an underhand way.

On the contrary, it is more convenient and easier for us to annihi-
late the enemy on his own territory.' 45 The resultant publicity
enhanced the Soviet Union's reputation as a power to be reckoned
with, and Litvinov played his card for all it was worth (and more)
in his efforts to mobilise the West against German claims at the
expense of Czechoslovakia in September 1938.
Unfortunately, the attempt to form a solid wall against Ger-
man expansionism collapsed at Munich at the end of September. 46
From Tokyo US ambassador Joseph Grew noted that the Mu-
nich conference 'is taken here to mean that no obstacles will be
interposed against German pressure upon the Soviet Union' .47
The Japanese saw Russia as internally weakened and externally
isolated. And Baron Hiranuma, now Premier, had long been
associated with those devoted to war with the Soviet Union.
Grew added: 'long years of open talk of a Russian war have
served to give body to the thought and to transform it into a
definite expectation. Practically every Japanese is of [the] opinion
that, in the course of time, a war against the Soviet Union is
inevitable.' 48 Once again the interconnection between events in
the Far East and events in Europe became apparent. And a sure
sign of the weakening ofLitvinov's influence was the arrest ofhis
friend and subordinate Stomonyakov, on 3 August, when he was
relieved of his responsibilities; it was whispered that when
they had come for him, he decided on suicide but only wounded
himself. 49 That day Litvinov returned from abroad and pleaded
with Stalin, saying he could answer for Stomonyakov, to which
Stalin gave the curt and chilling response: 'Comrade Litvinov,
you may vouch only for yourself .. .'. 50
THE FALL OF WUHAN
Meanwhile in China matters had gone from bad to worse despite

Soviet military assistance. The only consolation was the error
made by the Konoe Government in Tokyo when, on 16January
1938, it declared its refusal to deal with Chiang Kai-shek. 'We
meant that the Japanese Government would no longer deal with
the Kuomintang Government. ... No large amount of intelli-
gence is necessary to point out that the policy was a serious
mistake', Konoe recalled years later. 51 He blamed Hirota. Ja-

panese obstinacy thus inadvertently cemented the KMT-CCP
united front. It also underlined the importance of Soviet military
assistance to the KMT Government. Having rejected negotia-
tions with Chiang and in the absence of an alternative interlocu-
tor, the Japanese effectively sought to solve the China problem
purely through force. In March 1938 - the month the Germans
annexed Austria and began their campaign for the Sudetenland
- the Japanese launched a new offensive in Shantung. They
were temporarily driven back to Taierchuang on 7 April, but
successfully took and occupied Suchow on 19-20 May, Anking
on 12 June and Kiukiang (further up the Yangtse river) on 26
June. From there they moved west along the Y angtse towards
Wuhan. Here they met with stubborn and bloody resistance for
four months. Situated at the strategically critical junction of the
Kaifeng-Hankow, Canton-Hankow railway lines (running
north-south) and the Yangtse river (running east-west),
Wuhan consisted of three cities - Hankow, Han-yan, and
Wu-ch'ang- that lay at the very heart of China and formed a
centre of communications vital to the success of both sides in the
war. The Japanese had also been pressing south-west from
Amoy (seized on 10--ll May) in their drive towards the key
southern port of Canton. Together with neighbouring Hong
Kong it handled 80 per cent of China's arms supplies, which
were then loaded on to the Canton-Hankow railway for ship-
ment north. By occupying the area north of Hong Kong on 11
October and by taking Canton on 21 October and then Hankow
on 25 October, Japan successfully severed a major artery sus-
taining the life of the Chinese war effort.
The fall of Canton highlighted the significance of the remain-
ing routes supplying Chiang Kai-shek's beleaguered regime,
now forced to retreat further west to the new stronghold of
Chungking. One route opened in October 1938 ran from Burma
to Yunnan in south-western China: a rough and dangerous
road that could carry only limited traffic. This lay in the hands of
Britain, the colonial power ruling Rangoon. A second route ran
from Haiphong in French Indochina: a railway extending north-
west to Kunming in Yunnan province. In October 1937 the
French Government had formally banned the transportation of
arms and munitions across Indochina except those ordered
before 15 July 1937. In fact supply intermittently continued with
the permission of Mandel, the French Minister for the Colonies,

but only in the teeth of fierce opposition from the Quai d'Orsay,
acting under strong pressure from Japan. 5 2
It was as a result of this pressure- most evident from June
1938 as the battle ofWuhan opened- that France seems to have
cut the flow of arms that autumn to a trickle. The Quai's hope
was that by appeasing Japan it might allow its European policy
greater freedom of manoeuvre and simultaneously secure French
interests in southern China- shattered by the seizure of Canton
- and maintain dominance over Indochina unhindered. What
caused France to reconsider was Japan's unexpected seizure of
Hainan island facing Haiphong in the Gulf of Tongking. In
March 1939 Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet informed his
ambassador in London of the decision to implement the ban of
October 1937less rigorously, and simultaneously ban the export
of iron ore to Japan. 53 The Japanese were then told in April that
they were to be denied the iron ore and, as to armaments, the
French considered themselves restricted only by the rules of
in tern a tiona} Ia w. 54
Due to uncertainties over the route through Indochina and the
limits imposed by geography on the amount of aid that could
come through Burma, the air and land routes from the Soviet
Union became the most important source of supply. Chinese
lobbying for more and more from Moscow intensified as the
battle of Wuhan proceeded. 55 Attempts to get the Russians to
impose economic and financial sanctions against Japan failed,as
had the attempt to elicit direct Soviet military intervention a
year before. Chinese threats to capitulate should Soviet aid not
increase do not seem to have been effective, however. 56 But it was
still in Soviet interests to sustain Chinese resistance. The Polit-
buro therefore decided to expand the volume of aid. 57 Under the
first credit agreement signed on 1 March 1938, China received
military equipment and support to the value of $49 293 221. By
June 1938 this had been exhausted. On 27 June China's am-
bassador opened negotiations for more, and on 1July he signed a
second deal to the value of$50 million with a five-year period for
repayment. In fulfilment of the agreement two contracts were
signed and led to supplies amounting to $27 172 541 between 5
July and 28 September; the second was concluded on 20 June
1939 (simultaneously with a full trade agreement) and totalled
$19 409 773. 58 The extent of Soviet aid was such that Henry
Morgenthau, Roosevelt's energetic and influential Secretary of

the Treasury - who had his own agents in China - complained
(29 November 1938): 'there is no country in the world today
with the exception of Russia, that is doing anything, and we all
sit by here [in the United States], and we are just driving them
in the hands of Russia ... and, in return, they [the Russians]
will get plenty .... Russia is just sending their people in and
taking control of everything'. 59
Chiang's chief military adviser was Aleksandr Cherepanov.
Born in 1895 and a member of the Communist Party since 1926,
he had begun his career in the Red Army in January 1918,
evidently after service in the Russian army in the First World
War. From 1923 to 1927 he served as a military adviser to the
Kuomintang. He later commanded the first Pacific Ocean divi-
sion which secured the CER from the Chinese in 1929. And in
the summer of 1938 he was sent back to China as chief military
adviser to Chiang. After the fall of Canton and the loss ofWuhan
in October, Cherepanov organised counter-attacks that, while
not throwing back the enemy significantly, did at least raise the
cost offurther advances. The front stabilised. The japanese then
turned their attention northwards to the Communist base areas.
In the breathing-space the Russians set about the construction of
a secure road from Sary-Ozek, along the caravan trail via
Sinkiang to Lanchow in Hansu province, 2925 kilometres dis-
tant. The project had been discussed with the Chinese back in
October 1937. 60 A year later little apparently had been done,
when the loss of the southern ports for transit made the issue
urgent. The battle ofWuhan had also forced the Russians to take
swift action to improve air communications. From a special base
area in Alma Ata, Soviet Kazakhstan, eleven intermediate aero-
dromes were now constructed and supplied to meet the much-
expanded needs of Soviet aircraft on their still perilous, stag-
gered route across mountains and desert to Lanchow in China. 61
The aircraft were either destined for Chinese use- I-15 and I-16
fighters (carried part of the way by road) or SB and DB-3
bombers - or were transport aircraft carrying lighter munitions
or personnel (including on one occasion the new polpred
Luganets-Orel'skii). Heavier items had, of course, to come over-
land. Construction of the new road from the Turksib to Lanchow
was carried out by special military units under the supervision of
a new department set up for the purpose in the People's Com-
missariat of Defence under Colonel Slavin. 62 But construction

was a massive project that was painfully slow to complete. By
the summer of 1939 the Russians were still discussing with the
Chinese the route from the Soviet border through Sinkiang. 63
The military supplies provided for under the June 1939 agree-
ment and delivered between June and September had to arrive
by air. 64 This suggests that, from the Soviet side, the road had
not covered much more than the 230 kilometres to the Chinese
border. From there it was another 1530 through Sinkiang and
another 1165 through to Lanchow. Back in November 1938
Chen Te-cheng, the Kansu Commissioner of Reconstruction,
had briefed Professor Buck, one of Morgenthau's agents in
China. The information he gave illustrates the extent of the
problems that lay ahead. Buck reported that Chen 'has ma-
cadamised the Lanchow-Sian road to Pingliang on the
Lanchow side - about one half the distance. He has also been in
charge of the new road west of Lanchow through Sinkiang. Not
more than one-tenth of this road is macadamised. It is entirely
an earth road through Sinkiang. He described the road as
'passable'. This I judge is a good description, as one-half the
distance from Lanchow to Liangchow is still an old cart road,
and it takes two days to travel the distance of 160 miles. From
Lanchow to Sinsinghsia is a distance of 711 miles. Sinsinghsia is
a border town of Kansu and Sinkiang, and is the place where the
Russians take delivery of the Chinese wool. It is apparently the
border for Russian entry into China.' 65
The delivery of heavier items from the Soviet Union thus met
with delays. But the fact that Soviet aid was so extensive awak-
ened Chinese Communist expectations that were, as usual, to be
thwarted. Buck reported to Morgenthau: 'The Chinese Reds
strongly demanded extension [of] their territory to Lanchow,
but were met with [a] flat refusal. ... There was an attempt on
the part of the Russians to supply arms directly to the Eighth
Route Red Army, but this was prevented, and the Russians were
told that all arms must go to the Central Government for
distributions.' 66 Before long the Communists began intercepting
arms shipments and disappearing off into the hills with all that
they could carry. Chiang thus once again began to contemplate
renewed campaigns to curb his erstwhile enemies.
Within the CCP, the fall of Wuhan struck a mortal blow at
Wang Ming's position based, as it was, on the precarious line
laid down by the Comintern of close cooperation with the KMT

and focusing on the working-class of the cities under siege rather
than the peasant hinterland under Japanese occupation. In
retrospect it is clear that the sixth plenum of the CCP Central
Committee, which met from 28 September to 6 November,
marked Mao's successful displacement of Wang Ming as the
arbiter of the future Party line. Mao was by no means alone in
instinctively rejecting what amounted to KMT hegemony over
the CCP. Liu Shao-ch'i, a Politburo member since 1932, had lost
a wife in the civil war in 1933 and now headed the northern
bureau of the CCP. 67 In November 1937 he had spoken out
strongly, urging independence within the united front: 'We must
vigorously oppose the dangerous Rightist tendency which, aris-
ing out of a fear of displeasing or frightening away our allies,
manifests itself in abandoning or weakening our leadership of the
mass struggle ... in the fear of openly mobilising the masses in
the name of the Eighth Route Army and of the Party, thereby
blurring the political identity of our Party.' 68
Formally the sixth plenum went Wang's way. After speaking
he was entrusted with the task of drafting the concluding
resolution. 69 This was based on a resolution of the Comintern
executive committee of 11 June 1938. 70 It had expressed 'its
complete agreement with the political line of the Communist
Party.' It had approved the expulsion from the Party of Chang
Kuo-t'ao - Mao's longstanding rival for the leadership who had
fled to the KMT camp. 71 It had underlined the importance of
strengthening the united anti-Japanese front on the basis of Sun
Vat-sen's three principles. It emphasised the need to oppose
pro-Japanese and appeasement-minded elements within the
KMT. It also allowed for a struggle against conservative forces
within the KMT and for the reinforcement of the CCP. 72
Yet no sooner had Wang Ming left for Chungking - the new
KMT capital - to attend Chiang Kai-shek's National Political
Council to discuss the next phase in the united front strategy
than Liu Shao-ch'i stood up to oppose the line of conciliation
towards the KMT. We still do not have the text ofLiu's speech.
But what he wrote later suggests an attack on the failure to adopt
an alternative strategy in Wuhan and elsewhere: 'Because we
did not have regular army units in central China, all political,
economic and cultural affairs were under Kuomintang control.
The masses in Wuhan and other places did not have the strength
to rise directly for the defence of Wuhan.' 73 At the plenum he

attacked the slogan brought back from Moscow by Wang Ming
in November 1937 of 'everything through the united national
anti-Japanese front' as equivalent to 'everything through Chiang
Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan'. 74 This attack doubtless struck a
chord among the audience. In his concluding remarks delivered
on 5 November Mao enthusiastically endorsed Liu's remark:
'The Kuomintang is the party in power, and up to now it has not
allowed the united front to assume an organisational form.
Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i rightly said that if "everything" simply
means "through" Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan, then that
will only be the submission of one side to the other, and not all
"through the united front" .' 75
Chou En-lai was, like Wang Ming, absent in Chungking when
Mao weighed in on the side ofLiu Shao-ch'i. But in retrospect he
too came to see the Wuhan strategy as fundamentally flawed,
and it is perhaps the acceptance of these unpleasant realities that
ultimately assured Mao's supremacy. In 1945 Chou reflected: 'in
Wuhan we made mistakes also. Comrades in leading positions
there, including myself, believed unduly in the ability of the
Kuomintang forces to win victory and neglected the develop-
ment of our own forces ... '. 76
A further factor was also at work. Since Wang Ming had been
a protege of Mif's and Mif had been imprisoned as a one-time
associate ofRadek (tried injanuary 1937), his association with
former 'enemies of the people' undoubtedly weakened whatever
support there was for him at Comintern headquarters, itself
ravaged by NKVD raids. 77 Moreover Mao had moved to estab-
lish a firmer foothold in Moscow. Early in 1937 Wang Chia-
hsiang had gone to Moscow ostensibly for medical treatment.
That November he replaced Wang Ming when the latter flew to
Shensi. Together with Ren Bishi, who took over at the Comin-
tern in April 1938, Wang Chia-hsiang pressed Mao's case at
Wang Ming's expense. Chinese historiography tends to exag-
gerate the extent of their success. 78 Nonetheless the campaign
was not without results. A Soviet sinologist, basing himself on
evidence from Soviet primary sources, tells us:
Returning from Moscow for the opening of the work of the VI

plenum of the CCP CC, Wang Chia-hsiang, who had at the
beginning of 1937 been sent there by Mao Tse-tung in the
capacity of his personal emissary, has asserted that the

Comintern executive committee recommended that Mao be
elected general secretary of the CCP CC. In fact there was no
such opinion in the Comintern. In the words of Wang Chia-
hsiang himself, the Comintern considered Chang Wen-t'ien
[Lo Fu], then general secretary of the CCP CC, not Mao
Tse-tung, as the theorist of the CCP. At that time Wang
Chia-hsiang, carrying out Mao Tse-tung's instructions and in
conversation with various of those working at the Comintern,
said that the CCP CC considered it necessary to choose Mao
Tse-tung as general secretary of the CCP CC. But the Comin-
tern executive committee did not make any recommendations,
believing such a question had to be decided by the VII
Congress of the CCP. Nevertheless this trick by Mao Tse-tung
and Wang Chia-hsiang was to some extent successful. Many
believed this fiction. As a result Mao Tse-tung's position in
the CCP leadership was strengthened. 79
After the fighting at Lake Khasan the Soviet Government had

withdrawn a proportion of its forces from the Far East -
doubtless in anticipation offurther trouble in Europe during and
immediately after the Czechoslovakian crisis - leaving two
separate armies and one northern army group directly subordi-
nate to Voroshilov. But in the first three-and-a-half months of
1939 there were more than 30 infringements of the frontier by the
Japanese, who were also busy reconnoitring the Outer Mongo-
lian border. 80 Stalin and the Politburo thus faced an increase in
tension on two fronts simultaneously. Andrei Zhdanov, as a
member of the Leningrad regional military council, had been
active in pressing for better defences (at the expense of the
Finns) in the Leningrad region. 81 At the end of March, in his
capacity as a member of the Navy's main military council, he left
for the Far East to inspect the situation and take the necessary
measures to reinforce defences. Zhdanov arrived in Vladivostok
to view the fleet on 7 April. 82 A storm was brewing on the other
side of the frontier. That month the Kwantung army command
drafted 'Principles for the Settlement of Soviet-Manchurian
Border Disputes'. It was presented to Japanese corps com-
manders on 25 April. It outlined objections to the high com-
mand's injunction 'not to invade, even if we are invaded'. But
the 'Principles' also included the following: 'In areas where the
border lines are indistinct, the defense commander shall deter-
mine a boundary on his own.' The commander was permitted 'to
invade Soviet territory temporarily, or to decoy Soviet soldiers
and get them into Manchukuoan territory' .83
As tension mounted in Europe as well as Asia, and Britain

displayed official indifference to the requirements for collective
security, Stalin's patience with Litvinov came to an end. 84 On 27
April Litvinov, together with polpred Maisky, was summoned to
the Kremlin. Maisky recalls: 'For the first time I saw how
relations had taken shape between Litvinov, Stalin and Molotov.
The atmosphere was about as tense as it could get. Although
outwardly Stalin appeared at peace, puffing at his pipe, I felt
that he was extremely ill-disposed towards Litvinov. And Molo-
tov became violent, colliding with Litvinov incessantly, accusing
him of every kind of mortal sin' .85 Then on the night of 3-4 May
the Narkomindel building on Kuznetskii most was surrounded
by NKVD troops. When morning broke, Molotov, Malenkov
and Beria arrived to tell Litvinov he had been dismissed. At
10.00 a.m. Litvinov left for his datcha, where the NKVD had
already arrived and were removing the vertushka - the government
phone that connected him to the Kremlin. 86 'Molotov took over
the Narkomindel. As assistants, Molotov retained First Deputy
Commissar for the West, Vladimir Potemkin, and took on
Semen Lozovsky, a leftist, formerly head of the Red Inter-
national ofTrade Unions (Profintern) as First Deputy Commis-
sar for the East, and Vladimir Dekanozov, a secret policeman, as
a third Deputy Commissar. Almost all the remaining Litvinovtsy
were removed, including the head of the Far Eastern division,
Kozlovskii. 87 Their places were taken by men who knew nothing
about their work, including the young, obedient, and hard-
working but intellectually limited Andrei Gromyko, who speedily
moved in to head the American Department on the basis of
experience in Komsomol propaganda and a limited knowledge
of English acquired in training for postgraduate research. 88
It thus fell to Molotov on 19 May to summon the Japanese

ambassador, Togo, who had taken over from Shigemitsu, to
inform him that Japanese and Manchurian forces had violated

the Mongolian frontier. These forces had, he asserted, begun
attacking Mongolian units in the Nomon-Han-Burd-Obo and
the Dongur-Obo regions on 11-12 May. Aircraft had also
participated in the assault. Molotov reminded the ambassador of
the Soviet Union's commitment to the defence of Mongolia
under the mutual assistance protocol of 1936. He warned that 'to
all patience there is a limit, and I ask the ambassador to relay to
the Japanese Government that there will be no more of this'. 89
The attacks along the Mongolian frontier continued. On 22 May
newly-reinforced Japanese units launched another assault but
were driven back to the frontier. On 28-9 May the attack was
renewed, this time with additional tanks, armoured cars, artil-
lery and a large number of aircraft.
Again they were driven back. Then publicly at the Supreme
Soviet on 31 May Molotov reiterated his warning to ambassador
Togo almost word for word: 'the Soviet Government will not
tolerate any provocations on its frontiers on the part of Japan-
ese-Manchurian military units. It is now necessary to draw
attention to this in relation to the frontiers of the Mongolian
People's Republic .... We will defend the border of the Mongo-
lian People's Republic ... as decisively as our own border ....
It is high time to understand that to all patience there is a
limit.' 90 The Italian ambassador to Moscow, Rossi, noted: 'The
final part [of the speech] dedicated to relations with Japan was
enunciated in a more vehement tone, giving the impression that
at present the USSR is particularly preoccupied by the East.' He
also pointed out that the remarks as a whole left 'all doors
open'. 91
A pause ensued before the Japanese were ready to re-engage.
The Russians now sought to distract them in China. On 16 June
the chief Soviet military adviser to the Kuomintang, Aleksandr
Cherepanov, proposed to Chiang Kai-shek a major operation
against the Japanese in the Yangtse valley; four days later the
plans were presented to the Chinese military council. 92 On 22
June about 120 Japanese aircraft went into action, and again on
24 June. That day Sorge reported from Tokyo on the fact that
talks between Germany and Japan on a military pact were
continuing. Ambassador Ott, whom Sorge had befriended when
the ambassador had been a mere military attache, told him that
the latest Japanese offer contained a critical clause: 'In the event
of a war between Germany and the USSR, Japan will automati-

cally enter into a war against the USSR'. And in the event of a
war involving Italy and Germany on the one side, and Britain,
France and the USSR on the other, Japan would 'automatically'
join Germany and Italy. 93 On 26-7 June the Japanese renewed
their air-assault on Mongolian positions. Sorge sent a reassuring
message: 'Military action by Germany and Japan against the
USSR in the near future is not likely. Germany is wholly
preoccupied with preparations for the seizure of Poland and the
struggle with England.' And as to Japan itself: 'The Japanese
armed forces, army, fleet and air force require fundamental
reorganisation that would take 1.5 to 2 years more; i.e., Japan
will be ready for a big war no earlier than 1941. ' 94 Indeed the
Japanese high command was vainly trying to rein in the Kwan-
tung army, which was acting and continued to act- as it had
done in 1931- against the express wishes ofTokyo. 95
At first the leadership in Moscow appeared to believe Sorge.
On 30 June Molotov cabled Surits, polpred in Paris, explaining
the significance of the fighting on the Far Eastern frontier. 'The
provocative activities oftheJapanese and Manchurians in Mon-
golia are, according to our information, an attempt to display
Japan's military power that was carried out at the insistence of
Germany and Italy. The aim of these actions by Japan was to
hinder the conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement, to
scare away England and France from this agreement. The
evident failure that has befallen the Japanese in this enterprise
cannot but have a significance contrary to the aims of the
Germans and ltalians.' 96
But the Kwantung army did not give up so easily. After
considerable reinforcement of their troops in the region to a total
of 38 000 men, 135 tanks and 225 planes, establishing a three-
to-one superiority in infantry and artillery and a 4.5 to l superiority
in cavalry, it invited foreign military attaches and corres-
pondents to observe a further attack launched on 2-3 July. In
the first engagement they lost most of their tanks, a significant
amount of artillery and about 10 000 men. 97 Nonetheless the
Japanese put the word about that the Soviet military were in a
bad state. 98 By now Stalin believed the Japanese might, indeed,
be in earnest. On 5 July the main council of the Red Army
resolved to form a front-group of forces with its headquarters in
Chita, which would control all Soviet forces then deployed in the
Far East. It was placed under the command ofGrigorii Shtern, a

member of the military council. 99 Barely a week later the Japan-
ese renewed the assault.
To draw Japanese fire from the Mongolian frontier on 9 July
Stalin followed up Cherepanov's proposals - which had yet to
be acted on - with a personal letter to Chiang Kai-shek empha-
sising the opportunity for launching the proposed offensive. In
this letter he also sounded optimistic about the negotiations
involving Britain, France and the Soviet Union for an alliance
and misleadingly suggested this would lead to a united front in
the Far East as well as Europe. 100 But Chiang still held back.
And the Japanese kept coming. A further build-up of the Japan-
ese contingent then prompted the reinforcement of Soviet posi-
tions. By mid-July the reorganisation ordered on 5 July was
completed with the reformation of the 57th special corps in
Mongolia into the 1st army group under the command of div-
isional (after 31 July, corps) commander Georgii Zhukov. 101 And
by mid-August Soviet forces in the area numbered 57 000 men,
498 tanks, 385 armoured cars, 542 artillery pieces, 2255 rifles
and 515 fighter planes. 102
In the knowledge that the Japanese would launch a 'general
offensive' on 24 August and after preparations conducted in the
strictest secrecy and camouflaged by various forms of deception,
Zhukov attacked on 20 August. 103 At 5.45 a.m. 153 bombers
went in; half an hour later heavy artillery opened fire on Japan-
ese positions. And after nearly three hours of bombardment
Soviet infantry, cavalry and tanks went into action. Before long
the surprised Japanese forces were surrounded and on 31 August
the last resistance collapsed. The Kwantung army then sought
to regain air superiority but lost 71 planes in the process. 104 By
the time hostilities ceased on 16 September, the Japanese had,
since May, suffered 18 500 dead and wounded - one of the
highest casualty-rates they had received in any engagement
since the turn of the century . 105 The Russians lost 9824 men -
significant in absolute numbers but, given massive Soviet superi-
ority, few in relative terms. 106 This was the first major action
involving mechanised forces and unquestionably boosted Soviet
confidence that the Red Army had recovered from the devasta-
tion wrought by the terror. That bubble did not burst until the
winter war with Finland. Correspondingly, on the Japanese side
it was unlikely that Tokyo would thereafter take Soviet weakness
for granted or that they would commit themselves to a war with

Moscow in the near future without the certainty of a German
attack on the Russians from the West. The prestige of the
Kwantung Army had suffered a devastating blow and the Rus-
sians had secured a new breathing-space.
The likelihood of a German attack was ruled out by signature
of the non-aggression pact and secret protocol with Germany on
23 August 1939. Hitherto the Russians had had good reason to
fear the formation of a tripartite alliance between Germany,
Italy and Japan - an idea that had been in circulation since the
conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936. After
Munich, negotiations towards such a treaty appeared to gather
pace. As early as 27 January 1939 Litvinov had informed his
friend polpred Shtein in Rome: 'We have precise details on the
treaty .... At issue is a treaty of military alliance betweenJapan
and Germany, but Italy at one time dragged out the negotia-
tions. Shortly before Chamberlain's arrival, Italy began to move
more quickly towards signature of the treaty, but this time Japan
is evasive: disagreement arises from the fact that Japan would
like to aim the treaty primarily against the USSR, while both
Germany and Italy insist on directing it also at France, England
and the USA; Italy generally says that it is not interested in a
conflict with the USSR.' 107 Luckily for the Russians these differ-
ences of interest persisted, with the net result that Germany and
Italy concluded their pact independently ofJapan on 22 May. 108
Thereafter the talks with the Germans that shadowed the Soviet
negotiations with Britain and France in the late spring and
summer of 1939 were guided in no small measure by the linger-
ing concern to outflank the Japanese diplomatically.
The Germans were, of course, well aware of Soviet concerns
regardingJapan. From Berlin the Soviet charge d'affaires Astakh-
ov reported a conversation with the head of the East European
section of the German Foreign Ministry. This was 26 July 1939.
Schnurre emphasised that as far as Germany was concerned:
'Friendship with Japan is a fact. But we consider that this is no
obstacle to the establishment of friendly relations between the
USSR and Germany. In addition it seems to us that relations
between the USSR and Japan may also change for the better.' 109
This was a not unimportant bargaining chip for the Germans.
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop also underlined the linkage be-
tween Soviet-German relations and Soviet-Japanese relations
in his talks with the Russians.ll 0 And, reflecting on the double-

edged significance of this linkage, on 12 August Astakhov re-
minded Foreign Commissar Molotov: 'By the way, the prospect
of drawing Japan into the German-Italian alliance remains a
reserve option for Berlin in the event of our [Soviet] agreement
with England and France.'ll 1 Certainly, Soviet concern to solve
the Japanese problem played its part in causing Stalin - some-
time in mid-August - to come down off the fence in favour of a
deal with Germany and to turn aside from, and therefore
against, Britain and France. The Soviet record of Molotov's
blunt conversation with German ambassador Schulenburg on 15
August indicates as much: 'Comrade Molotov remarks that now
we must talk in more concrete terms. We are counting on a
positive outcome from the Soviet-German economic negotia-
tions. As far as Soviet-Japanese relations are concerned, com-
rade Molotov asks whether Germany can exert influence on
these matters or whether it would be inadvisable to raise this
question at the moment. Schulenburg replies that although there
is nothing said about this in the instructions, Ribbentrop re-
marked to Astakhov that he has his own conception ofJapan and
that Ribbentrop in turn told the ambassador that he could exert
his "own not insignificant influence on Japan's position" .' 112
6 The Tables are Turned:
Japan Appeases Russia,
1939-41
THE IMPACT OF THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT
At the very moment when the Japanese were fighting the Rus-
sians on the Mongolian frontier, they were hit by nothing less
than a diplomatic typhoon on 23 August when the German
Government signed the non-aggression pact (and secret proto-
col) with the Soviet Union. On the following day the Soviet
charge d'affaires in Tokyo reported: 'News ofthe conclusion of a
non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany has had a
stunning impact here, leading to obvious confusion especially
among the military and the fascist camp.' 1 The Russians noted:
'Just two weeks before the signature of the Soviet-German
non-aggression pact the Hiranuma Government decided to
strengthen the "Anti-Comintern" pact. The signature of the
Soviet~German non-aggression pact which was unexpected for
Japanese ruling circles overturned all their calculations. ' 2 The
Marquis Kido, for one, wrote that 'this action may well be
characterised as treachery'. 3
As a result of both the Khalkhin-Gol victory and the non-
aggression pact, the balance of power between Russia and Japan
shifted decisively to Soviet advantage. This gave the Russians
new leverage in negotiations with the Japanese and enabled
them for the first time to look beyond the limitations enshrined
in the Peking convention of 1925 which had established full
diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tokyo on the basis of
the ignominious treaty of Portsmouth of 1905.
In the short term the Russians had four general aims in mind:
first, to prevent a Japanese attack; second, to exploit 'inter-
imperialist contradictions' to prevent the formation of an al-
liance directed against the Soviet Union; third, to continue
supplying aid to the Chinese resistance, while doing everything
to avoid being drawn by the Chinese into direct conflict with
135
Japan; and, fourth, to forestall a German-japanese ax1s at

Soviet expense. 4
The Germans had negotiated the non-aggression pact and
secret protocol in the strictest secrecy. The Japanese were in-
formed only on the night of 21 August- barely two days before
the agreement was signed. There was therefore no time to
prepare the country for the shock. Five days after signature, on
28 August, the Hiranuma cabinet resigned in disgrace. A new
cabinet came into being under General Abe on 30 August.
Reacting against German 'treachery', it proclaimed 'an indepen-
dent foreign policy'. 5 The Russians were now gratified to find
themselves beneficiaries of Japanese disillusionment with Ger-
many and German attempts to secure a Russo-japanese entente.
The day before the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed (22 August)
Deputy Foreign Commissar Semen Lozovsky expressed his wish
to Togo, Japan's ambassador, for the normalisation of relations.
If Japan had a concrete proposal in mind, then the USSR was
willing to study it. 6 Three days later an indiscreet remark by a
Japanese diplomat in Moscow indicated to the British embassy
that the Russians had approached the Japanese 'with an offer of
a non-aggression pact'; 7 though this may, of course, merely have
been an echo of Lozovsky's conversation with Togo. On 4
September Togo finally received a telegram instructing him to
'Break the ice and start negotiations to achieve an overall
adjustment of diplomatic relations. Parallel with this, try to
settle the Nomonhan [Khalkhin-Gol] Incident quickly.' 8 The
Germans were now working to the same end. In Berlin on 5
September Foreign Minister Ribbentrop offered ambassador
Oshima German mediation to secure a Russo-] apanese agree-
ment.9 In Tokyo on 9 September Abe told the press that his aim
was to conciliate the United States, Britain, France and Russia;
in Moscow Togo told Molotov his government intended to
negotiate a ceasefire and to move on to an overall settlement of
Soviet-Japanese relations. 10 Talk of a Soviet-Japanese rappro-
chement was in the air, though an influential section of the
Japanese military was still loath to accept such a prospect.
What this amounted to was that although the japanese Govern-
ment was prepared to patch up . differences with the Soviet
Union, only limited concessions were yet possible. First the
fighting at Khalkhin-Gol had to be brought to an end. After talks
between Togo and Molotov from 9 to 15 September the two sides
Japan Appeases Russia, 1939-41 137
came to terms on an armistice. Molotov called this 'the first step

towards an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations'. 11 But
with a further change of cabinet at the end of September, when
Admiral Nomura became Foreign Minister, the Anglo-
American faction gained the upper hand within the Japanese
Government. This meant that although theJapanese considered
some degree of adjustment desirable, they had 'no intention of
concluding a non-aggression treaty' with the Russians. 12 The
furthest they would go was to offer a trade agreement. A draft
was presented to Molotov by Togo on 4 October. It proposed
most-favoured-nation status for both sides with respect to im-
ports and exports. But Molotov was none too enthusiastic. The
draft would have to go to the People's Commissariat of Foreign
Trade (Narkomvneshtorg) for further scrutiny. A reply would
come shortly. 13
THE RUSSIANS HOLD FIRM
The Japanese had a long wait. Despite Molotov's positive words

about the Japanese trade proposals at the Supreme Soviet on 31
October, progress here was dependent upon progress elsewhere. 14
On 13 November the Japanese showed they had understood.
Togo issued a statement to the Narkomindel listing issues the
Japanese were eager to resolve: a fisheries convention, a trade
agreement, and the establishment of commissions to define
frontiers and settle frontier disputes. The aide-memoire included
draft agreements covering border issues. 15 This move was fol-
lowed two days later by further action. The former Soviet charge
d'affaires, a newcomer to diplomacy as recently as 1937, had
now been appointed head of mission. Konstantin Smetanin had
arrived back in Tokyo on 21 September, but had yet to present
his credentials. On 15 November Nomura gave Smetanin a draft
agreement on the functions of the frontier commissions provided
for under the agreement of 15 September. He also gave him a
draft convention on fisheries, with an eight-year duration. Nomura
then expressed his wish 'actively to facilitate a settlement of the
question of payments for the CER' which had been an issue since
Manchukuo refused to meet the final bill of 5 981 625 yen on
23 March 1938. 16 Nomura wanted Moscow to know that his
government was anxious to speed up talks on a trade agreementY
Given Soviet toughness and the Nomura cabinet's priority of

settling relations with the United States rather than the Soviet
Union, progress towards the normalisation of Soviet-Japanese
relations was inevitably slow. But the Russians were initially in
no hurry. On 19 November agreement was finally reached on the
functioning of the border commissions and the first round of
talks was due to open on 7 December in Chita. 18 The Soviet
Government also issued a statement to the Japanese linking
settlement of a trade agreement with the resolution of disputes
concerning Japan's failure to meet Soviet commercial orders in
the past. An agreement signed with the Japanese firm Matsuo
Dockyard on 18 September 1936 for the construction of three
ships was not carried out. And on 12 March 1938 the firm
refused to return the Soviet downpayment of 1 647 750 yen. 19
The Japanese ministries concerned refused to act. The Japanese
law courts would do nothing either. The Russians therefore
sought redress by linking resolution of the issue to resolution of a
trade agreement. They said they were not interested in basing a
new convention on a draft proposed by the Japanese on 19
November 1936. This draft had been repeatedly rejected by the
Soviet side in 1936, 1937 and 1938. In addition they made clear
that no fisheries convention would be signed until the bill for the
CER had been paid. 2° Fisheries, as ever, were an issue of minor
and only symbolic importance to the Russians. As Togo re-
marked in conversation with Molotov on 1 December 1939: 'The
fisheries question within Japan and outside Japan has always
been looked upon as a barometer of relations between Japan and
the USSR.' 21
In this and other matters raised by the Japanese, the Russians
adopted a firm position backed by an entente with Germany in
Europe and the knowledge that Soviet forces had proved their
worth against the Japanese in the Far East. An aide-memoire
Molotov handed Togo on 15 December underscored the Soviet
determination to link trade and fisheries to larger issues. Molo-
tov followed it up with the typically blunt comment: 'If the
Japanese Government understands our point of view, all well
and good, if not, that is their business.' 22
Faced with such stubborn resistance, the Japanese backed
down. On 31 December Manchukuo agreed to pay the rest of the
bill for the CER and on that day a fisheries agreement was
signed. But this was not the eight-year arrangement sought by
Tokyo. 23 The hard line had yielded concessions from Japan. But
the Japanese were now resolutely opposed to going any further
to appease the Soviet Union; the cabinet was still oriented
towards an understanding with the democracies. The 'Principles
of Foreign Policy' adopted by the Abe cabinet on 28 December
1939 envisaged a non-aggression pact with the Russians - now
advocated by Togo and others in both the army and the Foreign
Ministry - only on two preconditions, neither of which was
likely to find acceptance in Moscow: 'the cessation of Soviet aid
to China and the abandonment of menacing military prepara-
tions againstJapan and Manchukuo'. Any immediate interest in
relations with the Russians was merely to 'simulate an atmos-
phere of a Japanese-Soviet rapprochement' in order 'to deal
more advantageously with the United States'. 24
The Soviet-Japanese frontier commissions duly met in Chita
from 7 to 25 December. They reconvened at the Novyi Harbin
hotel in Harbin on 7 January 1940. Progress was slow, however.
Moreover a new cabinet formed in Tokyo on 16 January under
Admiral Yonai, with the anti-Soviet Arita Hachiro as Foreign
Minister, promised no real change of heart with respect to
Soviet-Japanese relations. The government's orientation was
still towards the English-speaking powers rather than the Axis
and the Russians. Despite honeyed reassurances from Arita,
there was no possibility of progress under him without major
Soviet concessions. 'A non-aggression treaty is a matter for the
distant future and is not very useful', Arita declared. 25 Both sides
in the relationship now expected the other party to back down. A
confrontation was thus once more in the making. On 28 Febru-
ary Smetanin called on Arita to protest against the Japanese
breach of the understanding of31 December 1939. The commer-
cial department had delayed permission for firms to meet the
orders placed by the Soviet trade mission in payment for the
CER. The Chosen Bank refused to transfer one-third of CER
payments to the Soviet state bank. And the Matsuo Dockyard
dispute had yet to be settled. 26 Thus when Molotov addressed
the Supreme Soviet on 29 March, after outlining Japanese
recalcitrance over CER payments, he emphasised that 'In Japan
they must finally understand that the Soviet Union will in no
case allow the infringement of its interests (Continued applause).
Only if this is understood can Soviet-Japanese relations
be satisfactorily developed.' He went on to ridicule the
suggestion by one Japanese parliamentary deputy that the Rus-

sians sell their Maritime Province and other territory as a means
of ending conflicts between the two countries. Referring con-
temptuously to these 'stupid questions', Molotov went on to
suggest that ifJapanese deputies were really interested in trade,
they should consider selling South Sakhalin. 'I have no doubt',
he added, 'that buyers could be found in the USSR (Laughter,
applause).' 27 The Japanese further angered the Russians by
spreading rumours that the Soviet Government was making
further soundings towards Japan from a position of weakness.
This was the 'simulation' agreed on by the Abe cabinet at the
end of December 1939 and designed to bolster Tokyo's bargain-
ing position vis-a-vis Washington. On 20 April these rumours
prompted a firm rebuttal from Moscow:
The Japanese press, in connection with the recent reception
by the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A.N. Mikoyan
of Japanese ambassador Mr Togo concerning questions of
Soviet-Japanese trade, has put about rumours that the USSR
is seeking agreement with Japan at any price in order to free
its hands in the south-east and in Europe in general. TASS is
authorised to state that these rumours do not conform in any
way to reality and are ridiculous, since the Japanese cannot be
unaware of the fact that in view of the known situation in the
Far East it is rather they above all who need an agreement
with the USSR and not the other way around. 28
The fate of Soviet-Japanese relations was also dependent
upon Tokyo's relations with the Axis powers. Since the Japanese
Government aimed to appease the English-speaking powers -
and Arita considered this the priority- there was less incentive
to come to terms with the Russians. But Germany's spectacular
and unexpected victories in Western and Northern Europe,
which culminated in the fall of Paris early in June, signalled the
possibility of German occupation of French and Dutch colonies
in Asia. It had now become evident that if Japan did not assert
itself in south-east Asia at the expense of the defeated imperial
powers, Germany might well become a rival colonial power in
Japan's backyard. The collapse of the Netherlands and France
facilitated Japan's expansion to the south. German ambitions
impelled the Japanese in the same direction. The force of cir-
cumstance was thus driving the Japanese Government back into
cooperation with the Axis powers and, given continuation of the

Soviet-German entente, a return to the Axis camp would
inevitably also entail a Soviet-Japanese detente. And by April
1940 the Japanese General Staff was recommending talks with
the Russians. 29
TOWARDS A NEUTRALITY PACT
The General Staff's about-face can in part be explained by the

priority of expansion southwards, which required a secure rear;
but it can also be attributed to the impact of the battles at
Khalkhin-Gol, which shattered all confidence in the fighting
power of the Kwantung Army. The quality of Soviet forces in the
Far East exceeded that of the Japanese; 30 this was particularly
true of aircraft and tanks. 31 As a result, estimates of what would
be required to defeat the Russians were revised upwards. On 20
December 1939 Chief of the General Staff Prince Kan'in and
War Minister Hata had issued a review of the army's state of
readiness which suggested an increase in divisions on land to 65
in order to allow for 46 divisions to confront Soviet forces on the
Asian mainland; at the time, the Japanese had a total of only 41
divisions in all. 32 Thus more than 70 per cent of all existing
Japanese land forces would be needed for a war with Russia. In
these circumstances there was no way Japan could contemplate
a war on two fronts.
Foreign Minister Arita was therefore pressed into negotiating
with the Russians. But he did so in the spirit of the decisions of
28 December- demanding substantial and unobtainable Soviet
concessions- rather than along the lines of army thinking. Arita
instructed Togo to ask the Russians to halt aid to the KMT and
cooperate with the Japanese puppet Wang Ching-wei. 33 Togo's
thinking was in fact at odds with that of his Minister and closer
to that of the General Staff. He used the opportunity presented
by Arita's instructions to send his second secretary to Tokyo to
persuade officials of the need to offer the Russians a non-
aggression pact. Arita was thus increasingly isolated in his
opposition to an understanding with Moscow.
Meanwhile the signature of a border agreement with Japan on
9 June 1940 eased tension along the Soviet frontier in the Far
East. 34 The number of incidents had already declined significantly
after Khalkhin-Gol, in comparison with all previous years since

the Japanese occupied Manchuria. 35 The border agreement in
turn made possible renewed talks on fisheries, and by now
Arita's objections had been completely dismissed by the General
Staff. Together with Gaimusho officials they drafted a Soviet-
Japanese neutrality pact which Togo presented to Molotov on
2 July. What Japan proposed was that the pact be based on the
Peking treaty of 1925; that neutrality would be observed by the
other party in the event of war involving the first party; and that
the pact last for five years. 36 The evidence also suggests Togo
once again raised the issue of Soviet aid to China as an obstacle
to progress. On 3July the Japanese Army Ministry and General
Staff underwrote the proposals with the call for a rapid improve-
ment in relations with RussiaY In these circumstances the
balance of advantage had shifted decisively towards the Russian
position. Moscow could now afford to hold out for the best
possible terms. And Soviet behaviour throughout the rest of the
summer indicated that the Russians were well aware of this
precious margin of advantage; they sought to exploit it to the
full.
A few days after Togo tabled the proposal, Molotov responded
positively but with certain reservations. The Soviet Government
did not like the suggestion that it should cease aiding Chiang
Kai-shek. Its polpred in Tokyo, for one, was none too optimistic
about Chiang's prospects. Smetanin 'thought that Chiang Kai-
shek might be forced to withdraw to some mountain retreat
towards the West as he would not be able to remain at Chung-
king much longer, but that a collapse of Chinese resistance
would not necessarily follow'. 38 Molotov denied that the Soviet
Union was giving aid, claiming the Russians had no weapons to
spare; this was patently untrue. Molotov also rejected any
preconditions such as settlement of fishery and oil concessions in
North Sakhalin to Japanese advantage. 39 This was an informal
response; the Japanese had to wait more than a month for the
formal reply.
The precise reasons for the delay are unclear, but it appears
that Moscow was still debating Japanese intentions. Since late
spring the Russians had watched the reorganisation of the
Japanese army and its reinforcement (including the introduction
of compulsory military service in Manchukuo in April) with
some nervousness. These fears were not unfounded. In March
japan Appeases Russia, 1939-41 143
the new plans for war against the Soviet Union, for an attack
from Lake Hanka towards Khabarovsk to separate the Maritime
Province from the rest of the Union, were submitted by the chief
of the first department of the General Staff, Tominaga, to his
superiors and were approved by the emperor that same month. 40
US Treasury attache Nicholson reported to Secretary Morgen-
thau from China on 9 May: 'Early in April the Japanese Military
Command in Shanghai invited (Ataman Grigorii] Semenoff [a
leading cossack in the Russian emigre community in Dairen] to
come to Shanghai to discuss military affairs in Manchuria.
Semenoff spent several days in conference with Japanese Mili-
tary Officers and the old subject of the organisation of a "White"
Russian Army for operations on the Siberian border was dis-
cussed. Semenoffwas required by the Japanese to submit a plan
of possible operations of such a "White" army in the event the
present European war extended to the Near and Far East.' 41
Word of such activities evidently reached Moscow fairly
promptly, though not from Sorge. The instructions from Soviet
Military Intelligence (GRU) to Sorge on 25 May indicate a
degree of irritation at the lack of timely information on changes
in Japanese defence and foreign policy. 42 And only two days after
Togo offered Molotov a neutrality pact the GRU cabled Sorge:
'It is said that the Japanese Army is carrying out a nationwide
general mobilisation of reserve soldiers. Find out the purpose
and report the result.' 43 Taking no chances, the Soviet Govern-
ment ordered the re-establishment of the Far Eastern front by 1
July, and a significant number of troops were despatched to
reinforce that front. As a result more than one-fifth of Soviet land
forces and one-third of all Soviet tanks were deployed in the Far
Eastern theatre. 44
Soviet uncertainty aboutJapanese intentions soon came to the
attention of the Japanese embassy in Moscow. On 22 July the
Yonai cabinet resigned and a new government was formed under
Konoe. Matsuoka became Foreign Minister. He had once served
as second secretary at the embassy in pre-revolutionary Petro-
grad. He later became head of administration of the South
Manchurian Railway and was certainly not known to be pro-
Soviet. The signs were therefore mixed. On 1 August Molotov
indicated Soviet interest in pursuing Togo's initiative. He told
the Supreme Soviet of 'certain signs of a willingness on the part
of the Japanese to improve relations with the Soviet Union'. At
the same time he pointed out that 'there is still a lot that is not
clear about the real political aims of these Japanese circles ...
with respect to Soviet-Japanese relations' .45 It was not merely
that Moscow did not trust Tokyo. It was also that the signature
of a pact with Japan would inevitably further damage Soviet
relations with Britain and the United States; and in China it
would surely undermine Chiang's already doubtful will to resist
the Japanese. The question was whether such damage was worth
a paper guarantee from Tokyo.
Molotov finally gave his reply to Togo's proposal on 14
August. He argued that the proposal was 'in actuality an agree-
ment pledging non-aggression and non-participation in any
coalition hostile to the other country'. The Japanese needed such
a pact more than the Russians since the pact would enableJapan
to expand to the south. 'In contrast, the Soviet Union would
gain few advantages. We would also expect complicated prob-
lems to arise in relations with other countries. By concluding a
neutrality treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union would run the
risk of damaging its relations with China and other countries
greatly concerned with the Pacific and the South Seas. In this
connection, we would like to know what measures the Japanese
government is prepared to take to minimise the damage it is
feared the Soviet Union would sustain through participation in
such a pact.' 46
These considerations, which were doubtless paramount through
July while Stalin waited nervously to see whether Britain caved
in to German pressure, were no longer predominant by August.
The British announced they would fight on and the United
States was assisting them. As Molotov noted in a speech to the
Supreme Soviet on 1 August: 'On 19 July the Reich Chancellor
of Germany once more turned to England with a call for peace
talks, but the English Government, as we know, turned down
this proposal. The English Government interpreted this pro-
posal as a demand for England's surrender and replied with the
announcement that it would continue the war to victory ....
The end of the first year of the European war is approaching but
the end of this war is still not in sight. It would be truer to say
that at present we are on the ve,rge of a new stage in the
exacerbation of the war between Germany and Italy, on the one
hand, and England, whom the United States is aiding, on the
other.' 47 Would the United States enter the war? 'One should not
get carried away by predictions,' head of the Institute of World

Economy and World Politics Eugene Varga cautioned, 'but in
this case on the basis of Leninist-Stalinist teaching on imperi-
alism one can give a positive reply.' 48 The Russians now had the
confidence required to raise the price to the Japanese for peace-
ful co-existence. Molotov told Togo that the Soviet Government
could accept a neutrality pact only on condition that all refer-
ences to the Portsmouth treaty were removed.
THE BID TO REVISE THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY
These changes would in no way alter the essentials of the pact.

But the implications for the Japanese were ominous: the Soviet
Union was serving notice that Soviet-Japanese relations could
no longer be based on the Portsmouth treaty. As already noted,
under this treaty Tsarist Russia had lost South Sakhalin and the
South Manchurian Railway to Japan. The Russians were remind-
ing the Japanese that without a non-aggression pact between the
two countries this property might well be reappropriated through
force or the threat of force (as indeed they were in 1945). The
dramatic contrast between extreme Soviet concern to sign a
non-aggression pact with Japan in December 1931 and for
nearly two years thereafter on any terms they could get, at a time
when Soviet power was at its nadir, and apparent Soviet indiffer-
ence without the revision of the Portsmouth treaty in August
1940, marked the resurgence of the Soviet Union as a Great
Power in the Far East and as the self-conscious heir to the legacy
of the Tsars.
A firm advocate of an understanding with the Russians, Togo
recommended acceptance. But when Togo outlined the position,
the new Foreign Minister Matsuoka instructed him to return
home and close the negotiations. This took the Russians aback.
There was always a tendency on the part of Molotov to lurch
from heady self-confidence to near-panic. Evidently at Stalin's
bidding Molotov repeatedly interrogated Togo about the new
Konoe cabinet's attitude to the proposals. 49 Despite Togo's
reassurances the Russians seemed disorientated by what was
happening; Smetanin's conversations with Matsuoka in Tokyo
on 27 July and 24 August had elicited nothing concrete from him
-merely easy expressions of goodwill. 5°
Molotov's demands threw the Japanese into indecision. Mat-

suoka wanted his ambassador replaced. Togo left Moscow at the
end of August and did not return. His place was taken on 23
October by Tatekawa, a Lieutenant-General who had been
implicated in the Mukden incident and had never been known to
be pro-Russian. But he was prominent in the National Alliance
for the Reconstruction of East Asia which, because it advocated
expansion to the south, necessarily found itself pressing for an
accommodation with the Soviet Union to the north. 51 The delay
in Tatekawa's arrival was due to the fact that the Japanese
wanted to bolster their bargaining position before resuming
negotiations with the Russians. This they did by concluding the
Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on 27 September, which
established the primacy ofJapanese interests in Asia and created
a united front against the English-speaking powers. Thus the
Soviet issue temporarily took second place, though not for long.
At an Imperial Conference on 19 September Matsuoka outlined
the reasoning behind the pact. In answer to Naval Chief of Staff
Prince Fushimi's question, 'To what degree will this alliance
contribute to the adjustment of Japanese-Soviet relations?',
Matsuoka responded: 'we can have high expectations that Ger-
many will use its good offices to adjust our relations with Soviet
Russia'. 52
But it was not just good offices that the Japanese expected of
the Germans and this fitted in with their conviction that war
with the Russians was inevitable, sooner or later. On 26 Septem-
ber Matsuoka reassured an investigative committee of the Privy
Council that 'We are not ruling out war with the Soviet Union.
Even if we observe an improvement in Russo-Japanese relations,
it would scarcely last longer than three years. We will have to
reconsider relations between Japan, the Soviet Union and Ger-
many in two years.' 53 He also pointed out that he 'would con-
sider it a correct policy if Germany increased the threat it posed
to the USSR even further and if we could use this to settle our
relations with the Soviet Union'. 54
The British had no wish to see Soviet power and influence
increased. Indeed, head of the Foreign Office Far Eastern de-
partment Ashley Clarke accepted as a commonplace the notion
'that joint hostility to Russia and Communism is the basis on
which the best chance of closer Anglo-Japanese relations may be
founded'. 55 Nonetheless the British shared the Soviet concern to
ensure that resistance to Japan in China continued. They had

closed the Burma road briefly in 1940 under Japanese pressure,
only to reopen it within a few months when the damage to
Chinese morale became apparent. They were therefore some-
what alarmed at the prospect of a Soviet-Japanese non-
aggression pact. Would the Chinese react by suing for peace
with Japan? Britain's frustrated new ambassador to Moscow,
Stafford Cripps, thus received instructions from London 'to see
Molotov and inform him that the British Government feels that
a Soviet-Japanese agreement at this time would be very unde-
sirable as it would probably result in the collapse of Chinese
resistance and that consequently should the Soviet Government
find it necessary to make any such agreement the British Govern-
ment hopes that it will rend[er] it possible to eliminate any
reference to or even indirect indication of the withdrawal of
Soviet aid to China'. 56
His confidence boosted by signature of the Tripartite Pact
with Germany and Italy, Matsuoka now proposed a Soviet-
Japanese non-aggression pact. This was put to Molotov on 30
October. Tatekawa told Molotov that the talks on a neutrality
pact were over; the talks on a non-aggression pact could begin
anew. Moreover the Japanese wanted disputes between the two
powers set aside until the pact was signed. The duration of the
pact, he suggested, should be ten years. Molotov replied that the
issues in dispute had to be settled first, as Togo had been told
that summer. 57 Once more the Russians kept the Japanese
waiting before delivering a formal reply, which did not arrive
until more than a fortnight later, on 18 November. Molotov was
preoccupied with his visit to Berlin on 12 November, which was
intended to clarify Soviet relations with Germany. Molotov
returned from that visit confirmed in the conviction that Hitler
was still bent on the destruction of the British empire and that
therefore the Soviet Union was safe for the foreseeable future. 58
The Russians thus took up negotiations with the Japanese with
renewed confidence. The only action taken in the interim had
been the publication of a denial that an agreement had been
reached between Moscow and Tokyo on a division of spheres of
influence in the Far East. Foreign observers in Moscow specu-
lated that the denial may have been issued to calm the evident
anxieties of Chiang Kai-shek. 59
On 20 November Molotov once more raised the issue of the
Portsmouth treaty. To obtain a non-aggression pact Japan

would have to return South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The
Soviet Union was ready to sign a neutrality pact, however, but
only if the Japanese oil and coal concessions on north Sakhalin
were liquidated. In return the Russians would supply Japan with
100 000 tons of oil a year over five years at commercial rates.
The suggested duration of the pact was also five years, with
automatic renewal for a further five if the agreement were not
abrogated one year before the expiry date. 60
Tatekawa was personally sympathetic to the proposal of a
neutrality pact. But Tokyo found this unacceptable and the
Russians were so informed on 21 November. Instead the Japan-
ese reiterated the suggestion previously ridiculed by Molotov:
that the Russians sell North Sakhalin 'to put an end to quarrels
between the USSR and Japan'. Moscow did not dignify this
tactless suggestion with an official response. But in retaliation
the Russians stepped up harassment oftheJapanese working the
Sakhalin concessions, taking a leaf from the Japanese book.
Protesting at this heavy-handed pressure to Smetanin on 19
December, Deputy Foreign Minister Oshima suggested that 'the
position of the Soviet authorities makes no sense' .61
In fact it made a great deal of sense. The Japanese also needed
a fisheries agreement - for 1941 - and the Russians now
insisted that the Soviet Union be compensated for the fall in the
value of the yen. They also persisted in their complaint against
the Matsuo Dockyard. Finally on 30 December, with no new
fisheries convention in sight, Tatekawa told Molotov that Tokyo
had agreed to make Matsuo Dockyard return the advance from
the Soviet Union and pay a 30 000 yen fine; whereupon Molotov
characteristically insisted the payment be increased to compen-
sate for the falling yen. 62 Agreement was reached on a fisheries
convention on 20 January 1941, the Matsuo Dockyard issue
having been settled once and for all. 63
By now the issue of a non-aggression pact had become top
priority in Tokyo. Relations with the United States were de-
teriorating at an alarming rate. Not all were convinced of the
need to appease Moscow, however. General Araki and the
Ministers of Internal Affairs and Justice were still opposed. But
the Deputy Foreign Minister kept insisting to Smetanin that
Japan did, indeed, want a pact. On one of these occasions - a
lunch at the German embassy in Tokyo on 3 January 1941 -
Smetanin emphasised the importance of the Portsmouth treaty

as an obstacle: it was what the Versailles treaty had signified for
Germany, he insisted. The Deputy Minister was diplomatic:
Japan could never tolerate its abrogation but, he added, it would
be 'possible to maintain its form yet making corrections in its
substance'. 64
A NEUTRALITY PACT IS SIGNED
Matsuoka decided to act. On l February he had an audience

with the Emperor. The Marquis Kido recorded in his diary that
Matsuoka 'said that he would visit Soviet Russia in order to
adjust Japanese-Soviet relations. The foreign minister then said
that he would like to effect peace with China by April, and then
concentrate all of Japan's energy on a solution of the southern
problem. Without such a solution, the China problem cannot
really be solved. The foreign minister added that, therefore, the
southern problem is the greatest one.' 65 After also securing the
support of the government and the General Staff, on 12 February
Matsuoka told Smetanin he would travel to Berlin and Rome via
Moscow, and that signature of trade and fisheries agreements
before he reached the Soviet capital would make negotiations on
a pact that much easier. 66 He duly left for Europe exactly a
month later and on 24 March in Moscow he tried once more to
persuade the Russians into a non-aggression pact. Again he met
with failure. 67 He went on to Berlin but returned to Moscow on 8
April, again suggesting a non-aggression pact and Soviet sale of
North Sakhalin. The Russians were blunt. A neutrality pact was
all they could offer and only on condition that the Japanese
abandon the north Sakhalin concessions. The talks continued for
three days. As Matsuoka recalled: 'I met with Molotov three
times, but because he stuck to his opinions and would make no
concessions I thought that the Pact could not be agreed upon. I
therefore expressed my ideas to him rather bluntly and gave him
a letter in English for future reference. That evening, I received a
phone call saying that Stalin could see me any time the following
day, so I made an appointment with him for five o'clock the next
afternoon.' 68 The Russians had relented - in form - on the issue
of the North Sakhalin concessions, suggesting that a neutrality
pact be supplemented by a letter from the Japanese undertaking
to resolve the issue of the concessions within several months.

Growing tension in relations with Germany clearly moderated
the Soviet stance. Thus it was that on the eve of Matsuoka's
departure, 12 April, agreement was reached, and on 13 April the
pact was at last signed. 69
Under the terms of the pact both parties agreed to maintain
neutrality in the event of military action by any other power or
powers against either signatory. The only major Soviet con-
cession was to pledge 'to respect the territorial integrity and
inviolability of Manchukuo', which was bound to harm Mos-
cow's relations with Chungking. According to Japanese Intelli-
gence reports, Manchurian Communists were evacuated back
into Soviet territory in February 1941 and the conclusion was
that 'penetration into Manchuria may have been abandoned' in
order not to harm relations withJapan. 70 The Chinese were, not
unnaturally, indignant at Soviet recognition of Manchukuo -
though recognition was certainly de facto since the conclusion of
the sale of the CER in 1935. But since Moscow was still the main
source of arms for Chungking, Chinese protests were muffled by
concerned self-interest.
CIVIL WAR IN CHINA
In negotiating with the Russians the Japanese also aimed to halt

Soviet aid to China. In China Chiang Kai-shek was fighting to
prevent the extension of CCP power and influence at the same
time as he continued to receive Soviet military aid destined for
the anti-Japanese front. As they had done since the mid-thirties,
the Russians used military assistance as a lever on the KMT
government. As a result of major battles between the KMT and
CCP troops in February 1940 Moscow cut back the supply of
weapons to Chungking. This, together with increasing discon-
tent within the KMT camp, forced Chiang into an offer of talks
with the CCP on 4 April. 71 Negotiations ended in agreement in
July, defining a line between the north-east border region under
Communist control and the domain of the KMT; it also pro-
vided for the size of the Communist Eighth and New Fourth
Route Armies. Chiang nonetheless continued blockading the
north-east and prevented the arrival of aid provided for in the
agreement with the CC P of 193 7. For their part the CC P had no
intention of forgoing expansion at KMT expense. In effect the

united front against Japan was a matter of form rather than
substance.
It was, however, still in Soviet interests to keep Chiang
Kai-shek from joining Wang Ching-wei who had, in 1939,
reached an accommodation with the Japanese and on 30 March
1940 set up a rival regime in Nanking under Japanese protec-
tion. On 5 July at the KMT central executive committee plenum
pro-Soviet elements, such as Sun Fo, argued that China de-
pended upon Soviet aid and that to develop links with the USSR
and continue receiving Soviet aid, the KMT had to come to
terms with the CCP. In conversation with the Chinese military
attache in Moscow on 20 September 1940 the new Commissar
for Military Affairs, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, argued that
the shortfall in Soviet aid was due to the 'vacillation and lack of
clarity in the political orientation' of the government in
Chungking. 72 Why, then, did Moscow not provide more aid
directly to the Communists?
It might appear that the Chinese Communists are closer to us
than Chiang Kai-shek. It might appear that the bulk of the aid
should go to them [Stalin told General Chuikov in a briefing
for the new chief military adviser to the KMT in late Novem-
ber or early December 1940]. But this aid would give the
impression of exporting revolution to a country with which we
maintain diplomatic relations. The CCP and the working-
class are still too weak to lead the struggle against the aggressor.
Time is needed, how much it is difficult to say, to win the
masses to our side. Besides, the imperialist Powers would
scarcely permit Chiang Kai-shek's replacement by the Chin-
ese Communist Party. The position of the Communists in
China is still unstable within the country. Chiang Kai-shek
can easily unite with the Japanese against the Communists;
the Communists cannot unite with the Japanese. Chiang
Kai-shek receives aid from the USA and England. Mao Tse-
tung will never be supported by these powers while the
communist movement remains the same.
And Stalin fully expected Britain and the United States to
increase aid to Chungking. 'This inspires hope that with our aid
and aid from English and American allies Chiang Kai-shek can
if not repel, then attenuate Japanese aggression for a lengthy
period.' Some Chinese Communists believed that if the Japanese

beat Chiang, then the CCP could dominate China, Stalin said,
adding that this was a mistake; threatened with defeat, Chiang
would come to terms with the Japanese, like Wang Ching-wei.
Chuikov's task was to tie Japanese hands. 'Only then, when the
hands of the Japanese aggressor are tied, can we avoid war on
two fronts, if the German aggressors attack our country', Stalin
said. 73
After a briefing from the Chinese military attache in Moscow,
who expressed concern at the CCP-KMT clashes, Chuikov left
Moscow with 15 other military specialists, none of whom knew
China or Chinese. They departed with additional weaponry for
Chungking, including 150 fighter planes, 100 high-speed bom-
bers, about 300 guns and other items. 74 They left by train for
Alma-Ata and flew from there to Chungking via Sinkiang and
Lanchow. 75 Chuikov's task was next to impossible. He found chaos
in Chungking. There were now three senior military figures from
the Soviet Union at the embassy: the military attache, the chief
military adviser (now Chuikov) and his deputy for Intelligence
liaison ('a very intelligent, courageous worker, [who] knew
China well and had established promising links with the
Chinese, and also with the English and Americans.') The prob-
lem was that there was no institutionalised coordination between
the three staffs; this ensured that the real decisions were made in
the Soviet Union and not at the embassy in Chungking: 'All
three apparatuses were subordinated directly to the Centre- in
Moscow.' At the embassy itself differences of opinion were
widespread. But almost everyone differed with Moscow's opinion.
'Moscow considered that the Kuomintang was not heading in
the direction of exacerbating relations with the Communists;
that the whole problem was lack of activity by the Chinese at the
front.' But, 'Here, in Chungking, everything turned out to be
more complicated.' 76
Not least of the embassy's problems was lack of information.
Even the Soviet military advisers knew nothing about Chiang's
autumn 1940 campaign against the CCP. 77 Indeed the frustra-
tions endured by the Russians in Chungking were almost ident-
ical to those later experienced by the Americans, particularly
'Vinegar' Joe Stilwell, once the Pacific War got underway. 78
Chiang Kai-shek was a past master at playing both ends against
the middle, though time spent on tactics ultimately cost him the
entire game. When Chuikov met Chou En-lai and other rep-
resentatives from the CCP, they were completely negative about
Chiang. Chuikov had arrived to unite all against the Japanese
but found a civil war in progress and had little or no leverage to
change the situation. 79
Throughout, the CCP was never a passive entity. Ever since
the agreement of 1937 Mao had been working with extraordi-
nary perseverance to expand beyond the limits of the north-east
border region. As Chuikov noted: 'The growth of CCP regular
forces and the Communist Party's efforts to establish new Liber-
ated regions in Central China especially alarmed Chiang Kai-
shek and his generals.' 80
Whenever CCP forces liberated an area from the Japanese, they
took it under Communist control. In October 1940 they took an
area around Nanking in the lower Yangtse valley. Chiang issued
a threat to Chou En-lai demanding that the CCP relinquish
control. By the time Chuikov arrived in Chungking, Chiang had
already- on 19 December- issued an order to destroy the New
Fourth Army. This appeared to confirm Communist suspicions.
On 27 November Chou En-lai had told the assistant US military
attache in Chungking 'that even if the new Fourth Army com-
plied with the instruction of the National Government to remove
to Northern China it would probably be attacked by Govern-
ment forces'. 81 In January the fighting began. On 12 January a
section of the Army amounting to some 7000 troops was smashed
and disarmed as it headed south at Anhwei instead of going
directly north across the Yangtze. The commander Yeh Ting
and other senior officers were gaoled in Chungking. 82 The Rus-
sians intervened. Chuikov coordinated action with Alexander
Panyushkin, a young and energetic divisional commander re-
cruited to diplomacy from the Frunze military academy in 1939,
and now polpred in China since August 1940.
On 15 January Panyushkin spoke to Chou En-lai. For the
Soviet envoy to deal directly with a leading Communist was a
conscious breach of etiquette, to say the least. But the crisis in
relations between the KMT and CCP required urgent measures
and it is unlikely that Panyushkin acted without explicit instruc-
tions from Moscow. The message to the CCP was that it should
maintain the united front at all costs. Panyushkin told Chou: 'I
consider that the main enemy of the CCP at present remains, as
before, Japan. If the CCP begins active military measures
against the KMT, then this will only facilitate the expansion of
the civil war in China; that is not in the interests of the anti-
Japanese war. At all costs cooperation must be maintained .. .'.
In particular, Panyushkin wanted Yenan to be clear that Chiang
Kai-shek should not be blamed for what had occurred. 83
On the following day Panyushkin then called on US ambassa-
dor Johnson to introduce his new military attache and 'seized
the opportunity' to 'sound' him out on the 'communist Chinese
question'. Johnson came away with the clear impression that the
Russians would not intervene. 84 But, as we have seen, he was
mistaken. The Russians had put pressure on the CCP, and once
the CCP issued 12 demands to the KMT on 22 January calling
on Chiang to reverse himself, the Soviet embassy decided -
almost certainly with Moscow's approval - to hint at the
possibility of cutting off aid. On 25 January Panyushkin warned
Chiang that 'the attack on the New Fourth Army weakens the
military effort of the Chinese people, and this plays into the
hands of the Japanese invaders'. 85 In Moscow this message was
reinforced by Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Simon Lo-
zovsky - formerly head of the Red International of Trade
Unions (Profintern) and one-time opponent of the Popular Front
line. Lozovsky complained 'mildly' to Shao Li-tzu, the Chinese
ambassador, of Chiang's behaviour. 86 But none of this was to
any effect. Chiang had been surreptitiously stockpiling Soviet
and US arms to safeguard against precisely this sort of pressure
from Moscow.
In January the CCP set up a revolutionary military council to
direct the Eighth Route Army and they reformed the Fourth
Route Army independently of Chiang. A period of more or less
open confrontation between the KMT and CCP now opened.
The Russians were apparently helpless onlookers. Chuikov had
no direct contact with Mao in Yenan, and when he tried to get
information from Chou En-lai he met with silence. The only
consolation was that his deputy Roshchin found the British and
Americans equally disapproving of Chiang's errant behaviour.
The Russians had been working more actively to forge US-
Soviet cooperation in the Pacific since the late autumn of 1940.
True, the Americans, like the British, far preferred that Japan
strike north; and the Russians, in their turn, would far rather the
Japanese strike south. But all thre~ Powers were interested in
tying the Japanese down in China. The Americans drew the
conclusion they should keep the Soviet presence in China for

that very purpose. At cabinet on 19 December 1939 Roosevelt's
views were noted: 'President wants China to continue to play
with Russia. To keep Russia and Japan apart' .87 That summer
he had suggested to Morgenthau that the Treasury work out a
three-way deal (China-Soviet Union-USA) by which the United
States could buy strategic raw materials from the Russians, who
would in turn use the dollars to aid Chiang Kai-shek. 88 This
would help China without the United States directly antagonis-
ing Japan, simultaneously reinforcing Soviet involvement in the
Chinese resistance and widening the gap between Tokyo and
Moscow. But the freezing of Baltic assets in the United States
after Stalin's conquest of the Baltic states made the entire
scheme impracticable.
Konstantin Umansky was now, at the early age of 38, polpred
in Washington. He had been appointed counsellor under Troya-
novsky in 1936, evidently so that Litvinov could keep an eye on
Troyanovsky, who had been seeking to undermine his authority
at the Commissariat. Umansky's 'mental agility, his excellent
knowledge of several foreign languages, including English, his
ability to fence with newsmen in their own language, and his
success in soothing or subduing them as the situation required'
were qualities viewed not entirely benignly in Washington.
Unlike Troyanovsky he seemed too much the convinced Com-
munist for US diplomatic tastes. Secretly Hull 'was apparently
irritated' by his 'mannerisms' and was at times 'almost abrupt
with him'. 89 He was thus generally restricted to audiences with
Hull's under-secretaries. On this occasion- 27 November 1940
-he called on Under-Secretary Sumner Welles. Welles empha-
sised that the United States sought the independence of China.
Umansky took the opportunity to state 'that he was authorized
likewise to say that the policy of the Soviet [Union] with regard
to China was identical with that of the United States. He agreed
that insofar as Russia and the United States were concerned,
there was no conflict of interest between them in the Pacific .. .' .90
And on 28 December Secretary Hull had instructed ambassador
Johnson to 'make inquiry of General Chiang in regard to re-
ported difficulties with the Chinese Communists and express to
him this Government's continuing interest in Chinese unity
which has, as you (Johnson] are aware, comprised one of the
principal factors in our [US] policy toward China' .91 But, like
the Russians, with whom they were working along parallel lines,
the Americans were wary of alienating Chiang. US and Soviet
aid continued, Soviet aid being well above that of the
Americans. As Chiang told the US ambassador: 'he had received
frequent enquiries from the Soviet Ambassador as to what
materials were being supplied [by Washington] and that Rus-
sian advisers remarked sarcastically to Chinese officers that
supplies would be available from the United States when the war
was over' .92 Even after the Anhwei incident Soviet stocks of
heavy artillery and munitions were still coming through via
Lanchow and destined for the KMT, though no new agreements
had been signed since the previous year. Chiang Kai-shek told
ambassador Johnson 'that up to at least April 16 the Soviets
were continuing to extend aid and apparently he did not expect
this aid to stop .. .' .93 In the absence of sure guarantees in the
region, Stalin bet on every horse in the race: the KMT, the CCP,
the Americans and, last but not least, the Japanese as well.
INDOCHINA: AN ADDITIONAL ANTI-JAPANESE

FRONT
A further instrument held in reserve that might at least slow the

progress ofJapanese expansionism was the fledgling Communist
Party of Indochina. With the fall of France in June 1940 French
colonies were ripe for the picking. In the autumn Tokyo suc-
ceeded in forcing the colony of Indochina to accept Japanese
garrisons in T ongking and this became the signal for a call to
arms by the Comintern.
By then the Indochinese Communists had survived a rough
and testing ride on the rollercoaster of success and failure
through the 1930s. The creation of the Indochinese Communist
Party in the heady days of anti-French revolt on 3 February 1930
had failed to live up to promise when the resulting repression by
the colonial authorities broke up the Party's leadership through
arrests and imprisonment. 94 Between 3 and 14 April 1931 the
police captured the entire Central Committee. The colonial
powers had made a breakthrough in intelligence-gathering.
What followed was coordinated action by both the French and
the British that threatened to smash the entire Comintern net-
work along coastal China and in south-east Asia. It began with

the arrest of Joseph Ducroux (alias Serge Lefranc) on 1 June in
Singapore. Ducroux was an 'inspector' from the Comintern
surveying the state of the revolutionary movement in south-east
Asia. The arrest was so unexpected that he had no time to
destroy documents detailing Comintern activities and agents in
the area. Among these documents were almost certainly the
names and location of agents that made possible another series
of arrests: the arrest of Ho Chi-Minh (alias Sung Man-chao) in
Hong Kong on 6 June, and the arrest of Paul Ruegg (alias
Noulens) in the International Settlement in Shanghai on 15
June. 95
It is worthy of note that the Comintern documents unearthed
in the raid on Ruegg's offices furnished to the British 'a cumu-
lative impression, as regards Indo-China, that, while local ardour
for the Communist cause was apparently considerable, it was
tinged with a fierce nationalism, had been largely uncontrolled
either from Moscow or Shanghai, and, from the Communist
standpoint, was grievously off the party "line" .' 96 One message,
in Ho Chi-Minh's curious prose, sent to the Comintern in
Moscow on 21 February 1931 contained a loud lament: 'Because
there is no voice come from the Communist International, the
RILU [Red International of Labour Unions], or the Krestintern
[Peasant International], the MOPR [International Workers'
Aid Organisation), or the French Communist Party, and masses
of Indo-China feel that their suffering, their struggle, their
sacrifice of thousands of arrested and hundreds of deads [sic] are
completely ignored by our organisations, that they are forsaken,
forgotten and lone, that they have no backing from international
solidarity.' This was followed - in the absence of any response
-by a complaint from Ducroux in March: 'He [Ho Chi-Minh]
writes and his friends write and the months pass. Since October
they have not had any concrete directions. It is intolerable.' 97
The Comintern did, however, actively campaign for Ho's
release and, in 1933, after effective intervention in the British law
courts, his release was secured. He moved to Shanghai in the
hope of contacting the Kominternovtsy who had been working
there under cover and on instruction from the Comintern's Far
Eastern secretariat: Arthur Ewert, Otto Braun and Manfred
Stern. But contact proved impossible to establish. 98 Ho's only
chance was to find a berth from Shanghai to Vladivostok. But, a

stranger in a hostile land, he badly needed help. His patience
brought its own reward when a delegation of European par-
liamentarians arrived to organise the struggle against imperialist
war. The delegation included Paul Vaillant-Couturier, whom
Ho had known since 1920. In 1931-32 Couturier had been
working at the Comintern in Moscow. 99 With his help, Ho was
secretly put on board a Soviet merchant vessel in port for
repairs. When he arrived in Vladivostok he was asked who could
vouch for him. 'Mif and Vasil'eva', he answered. Mif had by
then replaced Petrov as head of the Eastern secretariat under the
overall supervision of Kuusinen; Vasil'eva also worked in the
secretariat, with responsibilities for Indochina. 100
After reaching Moscow and a well-earned rest in a sanatorium,
on 1 October 1934 Ho, at Comintern recommendation, entered the
International Leninist School on Vorovsky Street under the alias
Lin. These studies were combined with work at the Comintern's
Eastern secretariat, where a new sector on Indochina was
soon established; and work at the Scholarly Research Institute
for National and Colonial Problems, set up in 1932. 101 Before
long all were absorbed in preparations for the seventh Gamin-
tern Congress, the first since the foundation of the Indochinese
Party. A delegation of three arrived from Vietnam, led by Le
Hong Phong, who headed the external or 'standing' committee
of the Party set up in Macao in 1934. In March 1935 they had
been among those who held the first congress of the Party and
elected a central committee. But this was a tiny party: less than
3500 members; and they were not yet fully briefed on the
forthcoming resolutions of the Comintern congress. They
worked on the speeches together with Ho. Le Hong Phong was
to deliver the main statement and was chosen as a candidate
member of the Comintern executive. Ho was not even given a
place on the delegation. Yet he addressed the congress on 16
August as a delegate with non-voting status, and from the first
established himself as the respected voice of authority behind the
scenes. 102
In May 1936 the Communist-backed Popular Front had
formed a government in France. Ho saw this as a rare oppor-
tunity to exploit and planned to return to Indochina covertly via
Berlin and Paris. But the Spanish civil war broke out and these
plans were aborted. Le Hong Phong had gone on ahead and was
before long arrested. The other two members of the delegation

prepared to leave in March 1937. 103 Ho's advice was that, in
view of the opportunities thrown up by the ruling Popular Front
in France, the Central Committee of the Party based in Macao
should return to Vietnam, leaving a minimal number of mem-
bers behind. With them they carried dire warnings not to allow
any collaboration with Trotskyists, who had traditionally been
allies with the Moscow-orientated Communists. Within a year,
as the Comintern was under a devastating onslaught by the
NKVD, the executive committee recommended that all other
Vietnamese return home. On 29 September 1938 Ho asked the
executive to release him too. A new route was mapped out:
Moscow-lrkutsk-Gobi desert-U rumchi-Sian-Yenan-Vietnam.
Ho took the train from Yaroslavskii station in October for the
first stage of the journey . 104
In Ho's absence Le Hong Phong had summoned the first
plenum of the Party's central committee to meet in Shanghai. Its
purpose was to ensure implementation of the new united front
line. The plenum removed the slogan calling for the overthrow of
French imperial power and the confiscation and redistribution of
land. The Party would struggle for the creation of the broadest
democratic front, including nationalist reformist parties. This
entailed a fight to expand the scope for legal agitation while not
ruling out intensive struggles at the workplace for better wages
and working conditions. 105
The tactics of the Indochinese Communists were thus suc-
cessfully harmonised with the Popular Front line conducted by
the French Communist Party. And now that, with the expansion
ofjapanese aggression into central and southern China, contacts
between the Indochinese Communists and their Chinese com-
rades were temporarily weakened, the French Communists re-
turned for the time being to their role of overseeing their colonial
proteges. Yet Indochinese Party tactics were no mere pale reflec-
tion of the tactics of the metropolis. They were also adjusted to
meet the needs of Soviet interests in the Pacific. In March 1937 at
the second Central Committee plenum, as the Russians moved
closer to the Kuomintang with the offer to supply arms, the
slogan became that of unification in a democratic front against
likely Japanese aggression. Along with this strategic adjust-
ment went further efforts to lower the communist profile of the
movement: the term 'red' was to be removed from the title of
Communist organs. 106 Side by side with these blatantly revision-

ist gestures the Party carefully expanded its network through
both legal and extra-legal means, including penetration of the
ranks ofthe military. 107 This line was confirmed at the expanded
plenum that opened on 25 August and closed on 4 September
1937. 108 Clearly the Russians had no intention of allowing Com-
munist agitation in Indochina to upset the delicate balance in
France. At the same time they saw the value of spreading the
influence of the Indochinese Communist Party as broadly as
possible, so that in the event of French betrayal or Japanese
occupation, Moscow's fifth column could be sent into battle to
do its part for Soviet interests as well as those of the international
movement as a whole.
Early in 1940 Ho arrived from Yen an in Kunming, bordering
on Vietnam, under the alias of Ho Quang and as an instructor in
the Eighth Route Army. Kunming was now the site of the
Indochinese Communist Party's overseas branch. 109 From there he
was able to coordinate activities within Vietnam with the CCP
representatives in Chungking. By then the Nazi-Soviet pact
had spelt the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the policy of
collaboration with Britain and France. The Daladier regime in
Paris had banned the French Communist Party on 25 September
1939, soon after the outbreak of war in Europe. The ban was also
extended to cover Indochina. The Comintern was anyway about
to instruct all Communists to oppose the war as an imperialist
war and to sabotage it by every means at its disposal. So,
although contact between Ho and Moscow had become more
difficult to sustain with the outbreak of war, the situation itself
determined a change in tactics for his Party. The colonial police
moved to suppress all manifestations of the Communist pre-
sence. The Party was caught unaware, the bulk of the central
committee were arrested, and contacts between the centre and
the periphery were badly disrupted. At the sixth plenum of what
remained of the central committee on 6 November 1939, it was
resolved that national liberation - against the French - was the
primary task of the Indochinese revolution. It called for prepara-
tions for a national uprising as soon as conditions proved
favourable. 110
The fall of France and the advent of the Vichy regime
hastened the advance of the Japanese into south-east Asia in
search of raw materials critical to their survival and for the
expansion of the empire as the Americans tightened their em-

bargo against Tokyo. As early as the beginning of 1939 Japan
had seized the Spratley islands offshore from Vietnam. In June
1940 General Nisihara led a mission to Indochina with demands
for military bases, control over the means of communication
(including the route to China from Haiphong) and the right to
garrison critical areas. Vichy was unable to resist. Collaboration
became inevitable. By the autumn of 1940 Japanese troops were
in North Vietnam and the struggle for national liberation was
now directed at both the French and the Japanese equally.
Anti-Japanese uprisings began to break out with local Commu-
nist backing, which the central committee was unable to fore-
stall. The most serious of these began in the south on 23
November 1940, the local committees having failed to receive the
instructions of the seventh central committee plenum held at the
end of October to hold back until a countrywide offensive could
be organised. Their representative had been arrested in Saigon
on the way back from the plenum. The uprisings were easily
crushed. 111
Ho re-entered Vietnam for the first time in nearly twenty
years on 8 February 1941 at Pac Bo in the depths of the
countryside to take direct control over the Communist Party. 112
On arrival he immediately called an eighth plenum which met at
Pac Bo on 10 May 1941. 'The fate of the peoples oflndochina is
closely tied to the fate of the Soviet Union and the Chinese
revolution', the plenum resolved. 113 The front against the Japan-
ese and their French collaborators was to be broadened to the
maximum, as were the sources of external support. Hoang Van
Hoan was a Vietnamese Communist who had worked for the
Siam Committee of the Party in Bangkok in 1934 before transfer-
ring to China. 114 There he had been drawn into the creation of a
Vietnamese Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong
Minh): a revolutionary front organisation that early in 1936
succeeded in obtaining recognition from the KMT. By 1940 it
had run out of money and was an organisation in name only.ll 5
But it was a name registered with the KMT, and in the autumn
of 1940 Ho decided to make use of it as a patriotic front -
formally independent of the Communist Party - through which
the Communists could obtain financial support from the KMT. 116
It was at the eighth plenum that this idea became a reality, and
the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh, abbreviated for popular
usage to Vietminh, became the main vehicle for the revolution-

ary movement, whose edge was now directed against Japan as
the main enemy. 117
It was thus with the international Communist movement still

only an uncertain force for the defeat ofJapan that the Russians
signed the neutrality pact with Japan in April 1941.
The pact was a significant tactical victory, valued highly by
Stalin. Molotov recalls that when Matsuoka's visit came to an
end, 'Stalin made a gesture which attracted the attention of the
entire world; he himself came to the station to accompany the
Japanese minister. No one expected this, because Stalin never
met or saw anyone off. The Japanese, even the Germans, were
startled. The train was held up for an hour. Stalin and I gave
him a lot to drink, and all but had to carry him into the carriage.
These devices were worth it so thatJapan did not go to war with
US.' liB
News of the pact came as a great blow to Chiang Kai-shek and
an explicitly anti-Soviet lobby formed within the KMT. But
after reassurances from Molotov to the Chinese ambassador and
from Panyushkin to Chiang, the disturbance soon subsided. 119
For Stalin the need for a united resistance in China had lost its
urgency now that the danger of a war on two fronts had been
averted by Soviet diplomacy. As a logical corollary a number of
forces- unfortunately we have no figures- were now removed
from the Far Eastern theatre and sent to the European front
from 26 April to 22 June. 120
Given Hitler's immediate plans for invading Russia, Berlin
was not unnaturally dismayed by the conclusion of the Soviet-
Japanese neutrality pact. The Germans had at the last minute
tried to dissuade the Japanese from signing, but did not want to
reveal their plans for the invasion. As for the Japanese they -
and indeed others - remained blissfully unaware of Germany's
true intentions. As the Marquis Kido noted as late as 6 June
1941: 'Matsuoka intimated to me his opinion of prospects for
relations between the Soviets and Germany. According to him,
the probability of war was not great .. .' .'2' Unfortunately for
the Soviet Union this was also the firm and unalterable convic-
tion of Stalin. But that is the subject of the next volume.
Conclusions
The story of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East from 1933 to
1941 is, in a sense, the story of the war that never happened but
that long threatened to happen. The Japanese could not safely
expand to the north and to the south simultaneously. Going
north entailed invasion of the Soviet Union to expand into Siberia.
Going south meant colliding directly with the British empire and,
more importantly, the United States. The signature of the Nazi-
Soviet pact and the devastating blow to Japanese forces at
Khalkhin-Gol in August and September 1939 made the northern
option too expensive a choice. And the growth of US hostility to
Japan resulting from the war of conquest in China impelled
Japan southwards in a desperate bid to secure self-sufficiency in
strategic raw materials from the threat of an all-encompassing
US blockade. The war that had been anticipated since 1931 -
against the Soviet Union - therefore never materialised. In its
place the Japanese gambled all on the destruction of the US
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.
Nevertheless the war that never happened had a critical
impact on the development of Soviet policy in the region. The
indignities suffered at the hands of the Japanese in the early
1930s reinforced the deep-seated hostility rooted in the defeat of
1904-5 and subsequently confirmed by Japanese intervention in
1918-22. The Soviet response- the massive build-up of mili-
tary power in the Far Eastern theatre- had major implications
not only in blocking the route north for Japanese expansion but
also for the future security of the fledgling Japanese empire
against attack from a vengeful Soviet Union (which re-emerged
tempered by war in August 1945). And once Soviet power
overmatched the Japanese, Stalin and his supporters not unna-
turally moved to overturn the Portsmouth Treaty settlement of
1905 to Soviet advantage. The element of continuity with the
Tsarist past thus reasserted itself with vigour in the negotiations
with Japan in 1940-41 and with steely determination in nego-
tiations with the Americans in 1944-45.
Yet the forceful reassertion of Tsarist aims and ambitions in
the Far East did not call a halt to seemingly contradictory
Bolshevik aims and ambitions. Rather, the two came to be
163
combined in a potent and inflammatory mixture of traditional

Realpolitik and the subversion of the existing order of capitalist
and colonial societies. Tutelage over the Chinese Communist
Party - only intermittent but nonetheless ultimately effective
- expressed the revolutionary impulse in Soviet foreign policy,
even though what was frequently more apparent in the short
term were the instrumentalist and opportunist tactics rec-
ommended rather than the longer-term goals of the revolution.
Imposition of the united front strategy on the Chinese Com-
munists never proved easy to enforce. This was scarcely surpris-
ing. China was a long way away, and the united front was clearly
intended to serve Soviet interests by buttressing Chinese resist-
ance to Japanese aggression instead of directly advancing the
revolution.
Much of the problem- though certainly not all the problem
- stemmed from the complete absence of any prospect for
collaboration with the democracies. At least in Europe, hope of
collaboration did not entirely dim until the Anglo-Soviet nego-
tiations in 1939 proved intractable. But in the Far East the only
real ray of hope disappeared as early as November 1933, when
Roosevelt ruled out an entangling alliance against the japanese.
After Hitler came to power, neither Britain nor France was
willing to take a strong stand in the Pacific while still uncertain
about the prospects for peace in Europe. The resulting sense of
isolation - mitigated only by informal diplomatic contact and
exchanges of views between military attaches from July 1937 -
did nothing for the substantial amelioration of Soviet-American
relations, with damaging consequences for the longer term. It
reinforced within the Soviet leadership the view that, in the Far
East at least, sturdy self-reliance was the only option. The Soviet
leadership, of course, ultimately meant Stalin. And it is here that
Stalin's personal characteristics come into play: not merely his
deeply-rooted suspicion of others, but also his instinctively
brutal response to external threats, a response all too easily
elicited by the hated Japanese. In September 1939, reflecting on
the death of twenty thousand japanese soldiers at the hands of
Zhukov's troops, Stalin bluntly remarked: 'That is the only
language these Asiatics understand. After all, I am an Asiatic
too, so I ought to know.' 1 Thus unilateral military action and the
manipulation of local revolutionary movements came to pre-
dominate in the absence of any feasible alternative to the collec-
Conclusions 165
tive containment of Japan. And those very features of Stalin's

personality which had left such a bloody stain on Soviet domes-
tic politics yet had hitherto been restrained by force of circum-
stance in the conduct of foreign policy cast their dark shadow
over relations with the East. The net effect of all this was
ultimately to augment those aspects of Soviet policy and practice
that were to cause the greatest degree of trouble for the Western
Powers in the postwar world, and for which the West was least
prepared.
Notes
1 NEGOTIATION FROM WEAKNESS TO NEGOTIATION FROM
STRENGTH, 1932-34
l. Quoted in L. Kutakov, Rossiya i Yaponiya (Moscow, 1988), p. 275; for
more on this, see Kutakov, Portsmutskii mimyi dogovor 1905-1945 (Moscow,
1961) pp. 78-86.
2. For the text: B. Romanov, Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii russko-:Japonskoi
voiny 1895-1907 (Moscow, 1947), pp. 464-9.
3. For the text: ibid., pp. 473-5.
4. For the text: Dokumenty vneshneipolitiki SSSR (hereafter DVP SSSR), Vol.
VIII, ed. I. Kob1yakov et al. (Moscow, 1963), doc. 30.
5. Ibid.
6. Agreement signed at Yalta on II February 1945: [zvestiya, 12 February
1946; reprinted in Krymsko,ya koriferentsiya rukovoditelei trekh soyuznykh derzhav
- SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii (4-11 fevralya 1945 g.): Sbomik dokumentov, ed.
A. Gromyko (Moscow, 1984), doc. 27.
7. 'Obrashchenie k narodu', Pravda, 3 September 1945.
8. See C. Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far
Eastem Crisis of 1931-1933 (London, 1972).
9. Troyanovsky (Tokyo) to Karakhan (Moscow), 31 March 1932: DVP
SSSR, Vol. XV, ed. G. Deev et al. (Moscow, 1969), doc. 145.
10. Troyanovsky (Tokyo) to Karakhan (Moscow), 19 August 1932: ibid.,
doc. 328.
11. Bogomolov (London) to Litvinov (Moscow), 19 August 1932: ibid.,
p. 791.
12. Fullerton (Kovno) to Washington, 19 November 1931: Hombeck Papers
(Hoover Institution, Stanford University), Box 396.
13. Record of a conversation between the official delegate of the USSR at the
Soviet-Chinese conference with the plenipotentiary of China at the con-
ference, Mo Teh-hoi, 17 March 1932: DVP SSSR, doc. 127.
14. DVP SSSR, Vol. XIV, ed. P. Yershov et al. (Moscow 1968), doc. 401.
15. Ibid., doc. 2 (enclosure).
16. For a summary of Soviet moves - Litvinov (Moscow) to Troyanovsky
(Tokyo), 20 January 1933: ibid., Vol. XVI, ed. F. Dolya et al. (Moscow
1970), doc. 20.
17. The Japanese were informed of Soviet intentions on 4 January when
Troyanovsky handed Uchida, Japan's Foreign Minister, the Soviet reply
to Japan's note rejecting a pact: DVP SSSR, pp. 803-4 (note 9); also
Troyanovsky (Tokyo) to Moscow, 14 January 1933: ibid., doc. II; and
Troyanovsky (Tokyo) to Moscow, 19 January 1933: ibid., doc. 19. For
the Soviet note: ibid., doc. 2.
18. Editorial, 'Nasha vneshnyaya politika- politika mira', Pravda, 27 January
1933.
19. Speech to the first All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock-
Workers, 19 February 1933: ibid., 22 February 1933.
20. The Diary of Marquis Kido 1931-45 (Maryland, 1984), pp. 60 and 68.
166
Notes 167
21. DVP SSSR, doc. 63 (enclosure).

22. Ibid., doc. 63.
23. L. Mad'yar, 'Liga natsii i voina Yaponii v Kitae', Kommunisticheskii
Jnternatsional, No. 9, 20 March 1933, p. 20. Mad'yar (Mil'gorf) was a
leading Soviet China specialist. Having been imprisoned in Hungary for
participation in the abortive revolution of 1918-19, he was exchanged for
Russian counter-revolutionary prisoners and arrived in Moscow to join
the Com intern in 1922. From 1926 to 1927 he served as head of the press
bureau in the Soviet consulate in Shanghai. He returned to the Comin-
tern after the expulsion of Soviet officials from China in 1927: V. Niki-
forov, Souetskie istoriki o problemakh Kitaya (Moscow, 1970), pp. 141-4.
24. See Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy 1930--33: The Impact of the Depression
(London, 1983), Chapter 3 and Appendix l.
25. Directive from the Deputy Head of the Political Directorate of the Red
Army, Bulin, April 1932: Partiino-politicheskaya rabota v krasnoi armii: doku-
menry, iyul' 1929 g.- mai 1941 g. (Moscow, 1985), doc. 79.
26. Quoted from Haslam, 'Political Opposition to Stalin and the Origins of
the Terror in Russia, 1932-1936', Historical journal, 29, 2 (1986), p. 396.
27. Ibid., pp. 396--7.
28. Yegorov (Pogranichnaya) to Moscow, 16 April 1933: DVP SSSR,
doc. 123.
29. Published in h.vestiya, 18 April 1933: reprinted in ibid., doc. 121.
30. DVP SSSR, Vol. XIII, ed. G. Deev et al. (Moscow, 1967), doc. 466; ibid.,
Vol. 14, docs 154, 272 and 281.
31. Ibid., Vol. 15, ed. G. Deev et al. (Moscow, 1969), pp. 790-1, note 229.
32. FO 371/14887 (Public Record Office, Kew); E. Krutitskaya and L.
Mitrofanova, Polpred Aleksandr Troyanovskii (Moscow, 1975), pp. 6 and 55;
and A. Mikoyan, 'Dva mesyatsa v SShA', SShA, No. 11, November 1971,
pp. 75-6.
33. DVP SSSR, Vol. XVI, p. 832, note 115.
34. Ibid., pp. 831-32, note 114.
35. For a Soviet biography of Karakhan written by the deputy head of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry archive: V. Sokolov, Na boeuakh postakh diplomati-
cheskogo fronta: Zhizn' i deyatel'nost' L. M. Karakhana (Moscow, 1983). For
basic biographical data: Foreign Office, Confidential Print 15027, No. 10
(enclosure).
36. For the negotiations: E. H. Carr, Socialism in One Country 1924-1926, Vol. 3
(London, 1972 edition), pp. 696--9.
37. 'Statesman at Home', luy Lituinou Papers (Hoover Institution, Stanford
University), Box 4.
38. J. Carswell, The Exile: A Life of luy Lituinou (London, 1983), p. 48.
39. As 37.
40. I. Maisky,journey into the Past (London, 1962), p. 57.
41. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 10-15.
42. L. Fischer, Men and Politics (London, 1941), pp. 124-5.
43. For Molotov's role in the Comintern, see entries in Carr, Foundations of a
Planned Economy 1926-1929, Vol. 3 (London, 1976) and Twilight of Comin-
tern 1930--1935 (London, 1985).
44. Interview with Tanya Litvinov.
168 Notes
45. N. Khrushchev, 'Vospominaniya', Ogonek, No. 36, September 1989, p. 18.

46. K. Simonov, 'Marshal Zhukov (Zametki k biografii)', in Marshal Zhukov:
polkovodets i chelovek, Vol. 2 (Moscow 1988), pp. 201-2.
47. qejean (Moscow) to Laval (Paris), I March 1932: Ministere des Alfaires
Etrangeres (hereafter MdAE), Archives Diplomatiques, SDN 1917-40, 334.
48. Cerruti (Berlin) to Rome, 20 December 1932: Archivio del Ministero degli
Esteri (hereafter MAE), Russia, 1932, Busta 1.2, Pos. R.I.
49. Ovey (Moscow) to Simon (London), II February 1933: Foreign O.ffice
(hereafter FO) 371/17117.
50. Lindley (Tokyo) to Simon (London), 30January 1933: FO 371/17151.
51. W. Yen, An Autobiography (Shanghai, 1946), p. 363. Typescript in the
Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
52. Minute on Strang (Moscow) to Simon (London), 27 May 1933: FO
371/17251.
53. The original letter has not been published. But quotations can be found
in Istoriya vneshnei politiki SSSR, Vol. I, ed. A. Berezkin et al. (Moscow,
1980), pp. 290-1.
54. Interview with Tanya Litvinov.
55. Nishi memoirs, p. 158.
56. Entry, 20 February 1930: Diary of Beatrice Webb (Archives of the British
Library of Political and Economic Science), Vol. 44, p. 4883. For more on
Sokol'nikov: V. Genis, 'Upryamyi narkom s Il'inki (0 G. Ya. Sokol'ni-
kove) ', in Otkryvaya novye stranitsy ... Me:::;hdunarodnye voprosy: sobytiya i lyudi
(Moscow, 1989), pp. 123-42.
57. Strang (Moscow) to Simon (London), I June 1933: FO 371/17251; Payart
(Moscow) to Paul-Boncour (Paris), 30 May 1933: MdAE, Europe, 1930-40,
URSS, 1012.
58. 'Stranitsy istorii: Yurenev, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1888-1938)',
Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, No. 3 (37) 15 fevra1ya 1989g.,
pp. 55-6; also Foreign Office, Confidential Print 15892, No. 7 (enclosure).
59. Karakhan (Moscow) to Yurenev (Tokyo), 17 May 1933: DVP SSSR, doc.
152.
60. Word of opposition from the Red Army to the policy of appeasing Japan
had come to the attention of French diplomats more than a year before-
Dejean (Moscow) to Paris, 26 February 1932: MdAE, SDN, 1917-40, 334.
61. Kuznetskii, 'Kakov smysl tokiiskikh peregovorov o prodazhe KVZhD',
Bol'shevik, No. 14, 31 July 1933, pp. 65-71.
62. E. Wollenberg, The Red Army (reprint, London, 1978) p. 246. Not all of
the author's claims can be taken so seriously.
63. The best account of the talks is still G. Lensen, The Damned Inheritance: The
Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crisis 1924-1935 (Florida, 1974), pp.
237-334.
64. The instructions were printed in l:::;vestiya, 9 October 1933.
65. See Lensen, The Damned Inheritance, p. 279, note 33.
66. DVP SSSR, doc. 295.
67. DVP SSSR, doc. 306.
68. Ibid., p. 862, note 241.
69. Two Soviet historians have mistakenly attributed the letter to Karakhan:
V. Sipols, Sovetskii Soyu:::; v bor'be ;;;a mir i be:::;opasnost' 1933-1939 (Moscow,
Notes 169
1974), pp. 43-4; and V. Sokolov, Na boevakh, p. 159. Neither refers to the
fact that Karakhan lost control over Far Eastern affairs in May 1933.
Moreover Karakhan always addressed letters to his friend Yurenev as
'Konstantin Konstantinovich'; but this letter addresses Yurenev more
formally as 'comrade'. This is confirmed by Sokol'nikov's biographer:
Genis, 'Upryamyi' p. 238.
70. Deputy Commissar (Moscow) to Yurenev (Tokyo), 17 October 1933:
D VP SSSR, doc. 320.
71. Cited from the archives by Marshal Biryuzov, in M. Tukhachevskii,
hbrannye proizvedeniya, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1964), p. 12.
72. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 73.
73. Quoted by Seki Hiroharu, 'The Manchurian Incident, 1931', in Japan
Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, I928-I932,
ed. J. Morley (New York, 1984), pp. 188--9.
74. F. Volkov, Podvig Rikharda Zorge (Moscow, 1976), p. 19.
75. The best account of Sorge in English is still the lucid biography by F.
Deakin and G. Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge (London, 1966) as
supplemented by a biography of Sorge's collaborator Ozaki by C. John-
son, An Instance of Treason (London, 1965). I have relied upon both, but
have in addition used more recent Soviet works based on archival
documentation. See, for example, Volkov: cited above in note 74.
76. Volkov, Podvig, p. 15; also A. Egorov, 'Rikhard Zorge (k 90-letiyu so dnya
rozhdeniya) ', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 10, 1985, pp. 90-2.
77. 'Letopis' stroitel'stva sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil 1931 god (yanvar'-
aprel')', ibid., No.2, 20January 1977, p. 115.
79. 'Letopis' stroitel'stva sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil 1931 god
(mai-iyul')', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No.4, 21 March 1977, p. 123.
80. L. Nikulin, Tukhachevskii: biogra.ficheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1963), p. 169.
81. Tukhachevskii, hbrannye, p. 13.
82. From the archives: quoted in Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny, Vol. I (Moscow,
1973), p. 258. Confirmation can be found elsewhere. On 20 March 1940
the head of a directorate of the Soviet high command, Shchedenko,
alluded to the fact that 'From 1932 the Red Army began its development,
the pace of development speeded up' ('0 nakoplenii nachal'stvuyush-
chego sostava i popolnenii im raboche-krest'yanskoi krasnoi armii'),
hvestiya TsK KPSS, No. 1, January 1990, p. 177.
83. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 72-3.
84. 'Letopis' stroitel'stva sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil 1931 god (avgust-
dekabr')', Voenno-istoricheskikh zhurnal, No. 6, 20 May 1977, p. 109.
85. Ibid., p. 110.
86. Tukhachevskii, hbran'!Ye, p. 13.
87. Japanese Army General Staff archives, quoted in Shimada Toshihiko,
'The Extension of Hostilities, 1931-1932', in Japan Erupts, p. 262.
88. Ibid., p. 319.
89. M. Sladkovskii, Znakomstvo s Kitaem i Kitaiskami (Moscow, 1984), p. 193.
90. Krasnoznamen'!Yi dal'nevostoch'!Yi: Istoriya krasnoznamennogo dal'nevostochnogo
voennogo okruga (3rd edition, Moscow, 1985), pp. 104-ll.
91. Report by military attache Lt-Col. De Ferrari, enclosed in Attolico
170 Notes
(Moscow) to Rome, 15 March 1932: MAE, B. 5, URSS, Pos. 1. At this

time (until 1934) the Italians had a special relationship with their Soviet
counterparts; indeed some commented on how similar the two (Commu-
nist and Fascist) systems were. As a result information was not infre-
quently passed in confidence from Soviet to Italian officials. For this
reason the Italian Foreign Ministry archive contains a wealth of interest-
ing material on domestic as well as foreign policies of the Soviet regime.
92. A. Belyakov, 'Neizvedannymi putyami', in Komandiri krylatykh: Zhi;;;n' Ya.
1. Alksnisa- Sbomik vospominanii (Riga, 1967), p. 121.
93. As note 90.
94. As note 91.
95. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 83. For the formal birth-date of the Pacific
Fleet: Kalendar' uoin na 1987 god (Moscow, 1986), p. 21.
96. Ml2 (c) to DMO and 1, 8June 1932: War Office (hereafter WO) 106/5495.
97. As note 90.
98. W. Duranty, USSR: The Story of Soviet Russia (London, 1944), p. 191.
Duranty's memoirs contain matters he did not report at the time for the
New York Times; this is one example.
99. Italian Vice-Consulate in Kharkov to the embassy in Moscow and the
Foreign Ministry (Rome), 5 March 1932: MAE, Busta 5, URSS, 1.4.
Kharkov contained m,Yor tractor and locomotive factories.
100. For the facts and figures: V. Danilov, 'Kollektivizatsiya sel'skogo kho-
zyaistva v SSSR', Istoriya SSSR, No.5, Sept.-Oct. 1990, pp. 26-7.
102. Duranty, USSR, p. 192.
103. Memorandum by the Industrial Intelligence Centre, 'The Far East and
Siberia', 23 March 1934: Foreign Office, Confidential Print 14741, No. 41.
104. As note 91.
105. Partiino-politicheskaya rabota v krasnoi armii: dokumenty iyul' 1929g.-mai 1941g.,
ed. N. Smorigo et al. (Moscow, 1985), doc. 79.
106. Garrels (Tokyo) to Hull (Washington), 9 February 1933: US National
Archives, Department of State, 761. 94/593.
107. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record drawn from the Diaries and Private
and Official Papers of joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan,
1932-1942 (London, 1944), p. 94.
108. Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 123 and Vneshi!Jaya torgovlya v gody dovoen-
nykh pyatiletok (1929-1940): statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1968), p. 11. The
Russians also curtailed the absolute level of imports from all countries to
balance the foreign exchange budget.
109. Quoted in D. Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements: The American View
(Syracuse, 1965), p. 8; this is a much neglected but very useful piece of
research.
110. A Question of Trust. The Origins of US-Soviet Diplomatic Relations: The
Memoirs of Loy Henderson, ed. G. Baer (Stanford 1986), pp. 233-4. Hen-
derson appears in our text.
Ill. The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, pp. 6--7 and 9.
112. Fullerton (Kovno) to Washington, 19 November 1931: Hornbeck Papers,
Box 396.
Notes 171
113. Litvinov (Paris) to the Narkomindel, 31 October 1933: DVP SSSR,

doc. 332.
114. Litvinov (Washington) to the Narkomindel, 8 November 1933: ibid.,
doc. 342.
doc. 343.
doc. 370.
117. For the exchange of notes: ibid., doc. 366; Foreign Relations of the United
States: The Soviet Union 1933-1939 (Washington, DC, 1952), p. 27.
118. Ed. 0. Bullitt, For the President, Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between
Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (London, 1973), p. 50; DVP
SSSR, doc. 363.
119. XVII S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b): 26 yanvarya-10 fevralya
1934g.: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1934), p. 14.
120. Interview with Maisky, 9 December 1933: W. Crozier, Off the Record:
Political Interviews 1933-1943, ed. A. Taylor (London, 1973), p. 9.
121. Bullitt (Paris) to Hull (Washington), 24 December 1933: For the President,
p. 60.
122. DVP SSSR, doc. 438; /zvestiya, 4 January 1934.
123. Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1939--1945, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1973) p. 110.
124. XVII S"ezd Vsestryuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b), pp. 5-6.
125. Ibid., pp. 225-35.
126. Ibid., pp. 629-31.
127. Ibid., p. 14.
2 DETERRENCE AND ATTEMPTED DETENTE, 1934-36
1. Documents Diplomatiques Franfais 1936-1939 (hereafter DDF), 2e serie, Vol.

VI (Paris, 1970), note, p. 36.
2. Bullitt (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), 14 March 1934: FRUS, pp.
74-5.
3. Bullitt (Moscow) to Roosevelt (Washington), 13 April 1934: 0. Bullitt,
ed., For the President: Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D.
Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (London, 1973), p. 83.
4. Bullitt (Moscow) to Moore (Washington), 8 September 1934: For the
President, p. 97.
5. Litvinov (Moscow) to Maisky (London), 19 April 1934: DVP SSSR, Vol.
XVII, doc. 133.
6. Memorandum, 3January 1935: FRUS, 1935, III (Washington, DC, 1955)
pp. 829-37.
7. See Wiley (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), 18 November 1934: FRUS:
The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 163-5.
8. Bullitt (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), 16 April 1934: FRUS, pp.
109-10.
9. R. Swearingen and P. Langer, Red Flag injapan: International Communism in
Action 1919--1951 (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), Chapter 6; also Central Com-
mittee Japanese Communist Party, Sixry-Year History ofjapanese Communist
172 Notes
Parry 1922-1982 (Tokyo, 1984), Chapter 3.

10. Swearingen and Langer, Red Flag, p. 58.
II. Memorandum by Harcourt-Smith, 2 January 1934: Documents on British
Foreign Policy (DBFP) 1919-1939, 2nd Series, Vol. XX, ed. W. Medlicott et
al. (London, 1984), doc. 72.
12. Summary by Sir Victor Wellesley of memoranda on the situation in the
Far East, IS January 1934: ibid., doc. 77.
13. Memorandum by Orde, 22 January 1936: ibid., doc. 454.
14. Comment by Randall, c. I November 1934: ibid., p. 300.
15. Comment by Harcourt-Smith, 30 October 1934: ibid.
16. Minute by Orde on the Moscow visit [by Eden on 28-31 March 1935], 14
March 1935: ibid., doc. 257.
17. Maisky (London) to Krestinsky (Moscow), II May 1934: DVP SSSR,
doc 164.
18. 'Japan: Annual Report, 1934' enclosed in Clive (Tokyo) to Sir John Simon
(London), I January 1935: FO 371/19360.
19. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Yurenev (Tokyo), 8 September 1934: DVP
SSSR, doc. 326.
20. Spil'vanek (Nanking) to Moscow, 28January 1935: ibid., Vol. XVIII, ed.
Yu. Borisov et al. (Moscow, 1973), p. 626.
21. Stomonyakov's record of a conversation with the Chinese charge d'affaires,
14 February 1935: ibid.
22. Record of a discussion between Litvinov and Yen, 15 March 1935: ibid.,
doc. 112.
23. DVP SSSR, Vol. 18, ed. Yu. Borisov et al. (Moscow, 1973) doc. 27.
24. IMTFE, p. 7515; confirmed by General Ushiroku, then chief of the third
department of the General Staff ( 1934-5): ibid., pp. 7516--17.
25. Ibid., p. 7519.
26. J. Stephan, The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945
(London, 1978), p. 315.
27. Yurenev (Tokyo) to Moscow, 14 February 1935: DVP SSSR, p. 621.
28. Yurenev (Tokyo) to Moscow, 21 February 1935: ibid., dQc. 74.
29. Ibid., p. 621, note 50.
30. Ibid., p. 623, note 61.
31. Litvinov (Moscow) to Yurenev (Tokyo), 8 March 1935: ibid., doc. 103.
32. /zvestiya, 15 March 1935.
33. L. Kutakov, Istoriya sovetsko-yaponskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii (Moscow,
1962).
34. Yurenev (Tokyo) to Litvinov (Moscow), 20 March 1935: DVP SSSR,
doc. 124.
35. Yurenev (Tokyo) to Litvinov (Moscow), 22 March 1935: ibid., doc. 131.
36. For the text: ibid., doc. 134.
37. Dated some time in 1935. Prosecution document No. 1466, exhibit No.
761-A: IMTFE, pp. 7830-33.
38. For the full story: B. Winston Kahn, 'Dohira Kenji and North China
Autonomy Movement, 1935--1936' in China and japan: Search for Balance
Since World War I, ed. A. Coox and H. Conroy (Santa Barbara, 1978), pp.
177-203.
39. Hull (Washington) to Grew (Tokyo), 22June 1935: FRUS, Vol. III, 1935,
Notes 173
(Washington, DC, 1953) p. 272.

40. DVP SSSR, Vol. XVIII, pp. 649-50, note 172.
41. Bullitt (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), 29 October 1935: US National
Archives, State Department, 761. 94/858. Rink was at that time in Moscow.
42. Ibid., p. 666, note 242.
43. Henderson (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), 14 December 1935: FRUS,
pp. 489-90.
44. /zvestiya, 5 March 1936: DVP SSSR, Vol. 19, doc. 59.
45. K. Radek, 'L'Ordre regne a Tokyo', Lejournal de Moscou, 3 March 1936.
46. As 44.
47. Ibid.
48. The meeting took place on 4 March - Litvinov (Moscow) to Yurenev
(Tokyo), 5 March 1936: DVP SSSR, doc. 65.
49. Text: ibid., doc. 78.
50. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Yurenev (Tokyo), 28 March 1936: ibid.,
doc. 106.
51. 'Dva ochaga opasnosti (Vystuplenie komanduyushchego Byelorusskim
voennym okrugom komandarma I ranga J.P. Uborevicha na soveshchanii
v Zapadnom obkome VLKSM v 1936 g.)', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No.
10, 1988, p. 39.
3 THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE COMINTERN
I. A. Krymov, 'lstoricheskie portrety: Manfred Shtern - General Kleber',

Narody A<.ii i Ajriki, No. I, 1978, p. 61.
2. IMTFE: 'Outline of the Communist Movements in China and Man-
churia (as of December, 1932)', The Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Uapan) - Def. Doc. 959-C.
3. For the date of the raid: D. Hemery, Rivolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir
colonial en lndochine: communistes, trotskyistes, nationalistes a Saigon de 1932 a
1937 (Paris, 1975), pp. 25-6, note 10.
4. US National Archives, Military Branch, Central Intelligence Agency,
R263: Shanghai Municipal Police Finding Aids. General Headquarters, Far
Eastern Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff Appendices to: A
Partial Documentation of the Sorge Espionage Case. Miscellaneous Records: Special
Branch, Shanghai Municipal Police. Consecutive Exhibit No. 32, Part II,
Section A, G-2 Documents, doc. 30.
5. 'The Noulens Case', Shanghai Municipal Police Archives, Box 20, D2527 /41.
6. As note 3.
7. As note 4.
8. 'Hong Kong Naval, Military and Air Force Intelligence Report No.
19/37', 14 September 1937: WO 106/5815.
9. French police report No. 2147/S, 10 January 1938: Shanghai Municipal
Police Archive, Box 12, D2510.
10. General Headquarters, Far Eastern Command ... Part II, Section B, doc. 60,
and 'Consecutive Exhibit No. 33'.
II. Krymov, 'Istoricheskie', pp. 60-2.
12. 0. Braun, Kitaiskie zapiski (Moscow, 1974), p. 109.
174 Notes
13. Krymov, 'lstoricheskie', p. 65.

14. IMTFE, Defence Document 959-C.
15. Chong-Sik Lee, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria (Berkeley, 1983), p. 161.
16. Ibid., p. 190.
17. Ibid., p. 200.
18. Ibid., p. 231.
19. Krymov, 'lstoricheskie', p. 66.
20. Kommunisticheskii lnternatsional: Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1969),
pp. 379-80.
21. For an insider's account of the university: Yueh Sheng, Sun Yat-sen
Universiry in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account (New
York, 1971).
22. V. Nikiforov, Sovetskie istoriki o problemakh Kitaya (Moscow, 1970), pp.
136-7 and 144; A. Grigor' ev, 'Pavel Mif ( 190 1-1938)', Vidnye sovetskie
kommunisry-uchastniki kitaiskoi revo!Jutsii (Moscow, 1970) pp. 88-93; V.
Nikiforov, 'lz istorii sovetskogo kitaevedeniya', Voprosy istorii, No. 2,
February 1972, pp. 59-62. For the story of Moscow's dealings with Li
Li-san: E.H. Carr, The Twilight of Comintern, 1930-1935 (London, 1982),
pp. 319-43.
23. VidT!)Ie sovetskie, pp. 93-4.
24. The source of the appeal is clear from all the Soviet accounts: Van Min
(Wang Ming), Polveka KPK i predatel'stvo Mao Tu;e-duna (2nd edition,
Moscow, 1979), p. 69; Kommunisticheskii Intematsional: Kratkii, p. 388,
which refers to 'the most active participation of the IKKI' in the prepara-
tion of the document; K. Kukushkin, 'The Comintern and the United
National Anti-Japanese Front in China (1935-1943)', The Comintern and
the East, ed. R. U1yanovsky (revised edition, Moscow, 1979), p. 389.
25. International Press Correspondence (hereafter lnprecorr), II November 1935,
p. 1489.
26. A. Reznikov and A. Grigoriev, 'Georgi Dimitrov and the problems of the
United Anti-Japanese Imperialist Front', Georgi Dimitrov: An Outstanding
Militant of the Comintem (Sofia, 1972), p. 199.
27. Speech, 2 August 1935: VII Kongress Kommunisticheskogo lntematsionala i
bor'ba protiv fashizma i voiny (sbornik dokumentov), ed. K. Shirinya et al.
(Moscow, 1975), p.l71.
28. Reznikov and Grigoriev, 'Georgi Dimitrov', p. 201.
29. lnprecorr, 11 November 1935.
30. None of the relevant documents from Soviet diplomatic correspondence
has been published. It may be that the contacts were made with NKVD
or GRU officials at the Soviet embassy in Nanking- via a back-channel.
But the existence of the soundings is asserted by, among others, one of the
most reliable Soviet authorities on China - V. Nikiforov, R. Mirovits-
kaya and A. Titov, 'Obrazovanie edinogo natsional'nogo fronta v Kitae
(sentyabr' 1937g.)', Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, 1977, No.3, pp. 132-3.
31. Diplomaticheskii slovar', Vol. I, ed. A. Gromyko et al. (Moscow, 1984), p.
140.
32. I. Maisky, Vospominanrya sovetskogo diplomata 192~1945gg. (Moscow,
1971), p. 16.
33. Ibid., p. 121.
Notes 175
34. Bogomolov (Shanghai) to Moscow, 19 October 1935: DVP SSSR, doc.

389.
35. Bogomolov (Shanghai) to Moscow, 5 December 1935: ibid., doc. 441.
36. Haslam, The Soviet Union, pp. 60-79.
37. Litvinov's record of a conversation with the Chinese ambassador, Yen, 2
December 1935: DVP SSSR, doc. 429.
38. The entire telegram has not been reproduced but is quoted briefly in
ibid., p. 633, note 227.
39. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Shanghai), 14 December 1935:
40. Letter from Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Shanghai), 28 De-
cember 1935: ibid., doc. 455.
41. Kommunisticheskii lnternatsional: Kratkii, pp. 449-50.
42. Reznikov and Grigoriev, 'Georgi Dimitrov', pp. 201-2.
43. V. Min, 'Bor'ba za antiimperialisticheskii edinyi front i ocherednye
zadachi kompartii Kitaya', Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, No. 33-34, I
December 1935, p. 16. The article was typeset on 26 November and
published on 9 December.
44. Ibid., p. 10.
45. Van Min, Polveka, p. 69.
46. Nikiforov, Mirovitskaya and Titov, 'Obrazovanie', p. 129.
47. From the memoirs of the Comintern military adviser to the CCP: 0.
Braun, Kitaiskie, p. 206; also Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese
Communist Party 1928-1938 (Kansas, 1972), p. 444; and Van Min, Polveka,
p. 70. Chang gives early 1936 as the date of arrival but this is not correct
since it is accepted by other sources that the Politburo decision taken on
the united front in late December 1935 was based on the news brought by
the incoming Chinese. Chang was a senior figure and rival to Mao. He
subsequently defected to the KMT in 1938. Both Braun and Chang
mention only Lin Yu-ying (also known as Chang Hao), who was evi-
dently the senior of the two; but Wang Ming, who claims to have sent
them, also mentions Liu Ch'an-shen.
48. Reznikov and Grigoriev, 'Georgi Dimitrov', p. 202.
49. Nikiforov, Mirovitskaya and Titov, 'Obrazovanie', p. 129.
50. Quoted in extenso by V. Kukushkin, 'The Comintern and the United
National Anti-japanese', p. 393.
51. Ibid., p. 394.
52. Mao Tse-tung, On the Tactics of Fighting japanese Imperialism (Peking,
1953), pp. 6-7. As the editors noted: 'At the time of this report Chiang
Kai-shek was giving away North China after giving away the Northeast
and continuing his frenzied war against the Red Army. Therefore the
Chinese Communist Party had to do its utmost to expose him as a traitor.
Naturally Chiang could not in these circumstances expect to be included
in the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Communist
Party.'
53. Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Tactics', p. 14.
54. Bogomolov (Shanghai) to Stomonyakov (Moscow), 22 January 1936:
DVP SSSR, Vol. XIX, ed. G. Deev et al. (Moscow, 1974), doc. 24.
55. Braun, Kitaiskie, pp. 217-18.
176 Notes
56. Stomonyakov to Bogomolov, 29 February 1936: quoted in DVP SSSR,

p. 723, note 15.
57. Stomonyakov to Bogomolov, 29 February 1936: quoted in ibid., p. 727,
note 29.
58. This controversial section was never published in the Soviet Union, then
or later; but the late Louis Fischer obtained a copy from the Narkomindel
archive and it is quoted in Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Vol. 3
(London, 1953), pp. 533-4.
59. Letter from Bogomolov to Stomonyakov, 23 March 1936: quoted in DVP
SSSR, p. 740, note 83.
60. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Shanghai), 19 May 1936: ibid.,
doc. 159.
61. Van Min, 'Bor'ba za antiyaponskii narodnyi front v Kitae', Kommunisti-
cheskii Internatsional, No. 8, 25 April 1936, p. 30.
62. Ibid., p. 28.
63. Quoted in K. Shirinya, Strategrya i taktika Kominterna v bor'be protiv fashizma
i voiny (1934-1939gg.) (Moscow, 1979), p. 255.
64. Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise, p. 468.
65. Ibid., p. 469.
66. Luo Ruiqing, Lu Zhengcao and Wang Bingnan, A Turning-Point in Chinese
History: Zhou Enlai and the Xi'an Incident -An Eyewitness Account (Beijing,
1983), pp. 17-18.
67. Ibid., pp. 26-30.
68. Ibid., p. 30.
69. From an article by Geng Yun based on the reminiscences of Li Xin,
published in Li Shi Yan Jiu, No. II, 1979. Miao Feng-hsia, political
adviser to Chang, later told Edgar Snow that 'Chang wanted to ...
yung-Chiang k'ang-Jih ... (use Chiang to fight Japan) while Chou
wanted to ... tao-Chiang k'ang-Jih ... (overthrow Chiang to fight
Japan)' - E. Snow, Random Notes on Red China (1936-1945) (Cambridge,
Mass., 1957), p. 6.
70. Kukushkin, 'The Comintern', pp. 399-400; also Geng Yung, op. cit.
71. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York, 1957), pp. 72-3.
72. Bogomolov to Stomonyakov, 3 May 1936: quoted in DVP SSSR, p. 740,
note 84.
73. Quoted in Kukushkin, 'The Comintern', pp. 400-1; also referred to in
Braun, Kitaiskie, p. 227.
74. 'Vystuplenie G. Dimitrova na zasedanii Sekretariata IKKI po kitai-
skomu voprosu', 23 July 1936: Kommunisticheskii lntematsional i kitaiskaya
revob'utsrya: Dokumenry i materiab' (Moscow, 1986), doc. 64.
75. 'Telegramma Sekretariata IKKI Sekretariatu TsK KPK', 15 August
1936: ibid., doc. 65.
76. These opinions were expressed at the Comintern executive committee in
July and then published by Van Min, '15 let bor'by za nezavisimost' i
svobodu kitaiskogo naroda', Kommunisticheskii lnternatsional, No. 14,
August 1936, p. 92.
77. Braun, Kitaiskie, p. 228.
78. Snow, Red Star Over China (revised and enlarged edition, London, 1972),
pp. 504-5.
Notes 177
79. V. Min, Polveka, p. 183.

80. Quoted in extenso in Reznikov and Grigoriev, 'Georgi Dimitrov', pp.
204-6. The letter itself was drafted in Pao-an and not by the CCP
delegation in Moscow: A. Titov, '"Dvizhenie 9 dekabrya" - Nachalo
novogo etapa natsional'noi bor'by kitaiskogo naroda (1935-1937gg.)',
Problemy Kitaya (Moscow, 1978), p. 75, note 5.
81. 'Otkrytoe pis'mo TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Kitaya gomindanu',
25 August 1936: Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, No. 18, December 1936,
pp. 79-84.
82. Luo, Lu and Wang, A Turning-Point, p. 39.
83. Quoted in Kukushkin, 'The Comintern', p. 405.
84. Luo, Lu and Wang, A Turning-Point, p. 31.
85. Ibid., pp. 41-3.
86. Bogomolov (Shanghai) to Stomonyakov (Moscow), 6 November 1936:
87. Snow, Red Star, pp. 425-30; Luo, Lu and Wang, A Turning-Point,
p. 52.
88. Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise, pp. 479-81.
89. For the background to the terror: Haslam, 'Opposition to Stalin and the
Origins of the Terror in Russia, 1932-1936', The Historical Journal, 29, 2
(1986), pp. 395-418; R. Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Lon-
don, 1990).
90. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Yurenev (Tokyo), 22 October 1936: DVP
SSSR, doc. 326.
91. Kolesnikova and Kolesnikov, Zhim', p. 145.
92. Deterrent Diplomacy, Appendix I.
93. Dirksen (Tokyo) to Berlin, 23 December 1936: DGFP, Series C, Vol. VI
(London, 1983), doc. 105.
94. Litvinov's record of a discussion with Shigemitsu, 8-9 December 1936:
DVP SSSR, doc. 402.
95. 'Sobytie v Kitae', Pravda, 14 December 1936.
96. For the close relationship between the Izvestintsy and the Narkomindel,
see Haslam, The Soviet Union, pp. 233--4.
97. Litvinov's record of a conversation with the Chinese ambassador, 15
December 1936: DVP SSSR, doc. 413.
98. 'Telegramma Sekretariata IKKI Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kompartii
Kitaya o neobkhodimosti mirnogo razresheniya sian'skogo konflikta',
Kommunisticheskii Internatsional i kitaiskqya, doc. 66.
99. From a pamphlet quoted in Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai: China's Grqy
Eminence (New York, 1968), p. 257, note 24.
100. Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise, p. 484.
101. Luo, Lu and Wang, A Turning-Point, pp. 58-9 and 64.
102. Ibid., p. 73.
103. 'Notes on the Sian Incident, 1936': Nym Wales Collection (Hoover Institu-
tion), Box 17, p. 101.
104. Ibid., p. 75.
105. Telegram from Chou En-lai, 23 December 1936: Selected Works of Zhou
Enlai, Vol. I (Beijing, 1981), p. 86.
106. Ibid., pp. 86-7.
178 Notes
107. Telegram of 25 December 1936: ibid., p. 90.

108. Ibid., p. 91.
109. Ibid., pp. 91-2.
Kitaya otnositel'no kursa rukovodstva KPK posle sian'skikh sobytii', 19
January 1937: Kommunisticheskii Internatsional i kitaiskaya, doc. 67.
Ill. J. and S. MacKinnon, Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an American
Radical (London, 1988), pp. 177-9.
112. Ibid., pp. 186 and 194.
Kitaya', 20 January 1937: Kommunisticheskii Internatsional i kitaiskaya,
doc. 68.
114. Interview with Mao Tse-tung, 22June 1937: T. Bisson, Yenan injune 1937:
Talks with Communist Leaders (Berkeley China Research Monographs, No.
II, 1973) p. 51.
115. Interview with Chou En-lai, 23 June 1937: ibid., p. 44.
4 THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND SOVIET AID TO CHINA,

1937-38
I. DVP SSSR, Vol. XX, ed. F. Dolya et al. (Moscow, 1976), pp. 701-2; for
Chiang's reaction - Bogomolov (Shanghai) to Moscow, 3 April 1937:
ibid., doc. 93.
2. Although there is little agreement as to the precise nature of the differences,
there is no disagreement as to their existence: see Haslam, The Soviet Union,
pp. 137-9; also Wollenberg, The Red Army, pp. 214-15 and 24&-7; and
the memoirs of Tukhachevsky's sister-in-law, L. Nord, Marshal M.N.
Tukhachevskii (Paris, 1978), pp. 117-19 and 127-8. For official Soviet
confirmation that the charges levelled at Tukhachevsky were completely
unjustified and for details of the plot to liquidate him and his colleagues
taken from KGB and Party archives, see 'V Komissii Politburo TsK KPSS
po dopolnitel'nomu izucheniyu materialov, svyazannykh s repressiyami,
imevshimi mesto v period 30-40-x i nachala 50-x godov: Delo o tak
nazyvaemoi 'antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii v Krasnoi
Armii', hvestiya TsK KPSS, 4 (291), April 1989, pp. 42-62.
3. MI2 assessment, 21 December 1937: WO 106/5536. The Ml2 report
calculated the new total ofjapanese forces at 270 000. I have adjusted this
figure in the light of criticisms made of this calculation by Major-General
Piggott, British military attache in Tokyo.
4. From General Lyushkov's testimony: Kai<;o, April 1939. I am grateful to
Robert Conquest for this reference.
5. Blyukher's widow describes how he, along with one of Gamarnik's long-
established friends, first secretary of the Far Eastern district committee
Lavrent'ev, went to see the apparently ailing Gamarnik on 31 May 1937 but
found him in good health, only to learn that, not long after he and Lavrent'ev
had left, Gamarnik committed suicide and was denounced in the press as an
enemy of the people: G. Blyukher, 'Vospominaniya', pp. 79-80.
Notes 179
6. For an account largely reflecting the Japanese point of view: A. Coox,

Nomonhan: japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford, 1985), pp. 101-19. For the
Soviet view: record of a conversation between the head of the Second
Eastern Department of the Narkomindel, Kozlovskii, with the First Secret-
ary from the Japanese embassy in Moscow, Miyakawa, 30June 1937: DVP
SSSR, doc. 219.
7. Coox, Nomonhan, ibid.; /zvestrya, 30 June 1937.
8. The protest was presented by Kozlovskii to Miyakawa: see note 5. For
Stomonyakov's stormy interview with ambassador Shigemitsu later that
day: DVP SSSR, doc. 220.
9. Coox, Nomonhan, ibid.; also, hvestrya, 2, 3, and 9 July 1937.
10. 'Japan: annual report, 1938': FO 371/23570.
II. 'Memorandum by the Foreign Minister, 14July 1937': Documents on German
Foreign Policy, 191~1945, ed. M. Lambert et al., Series C, Vol. VI (London,
1983), doc. 465.
12. Bogomolov's record of the conversation in Shanghai, 13 July 1937: DVP
SSSR, doc. 240.
13. Litvinov's record of the conversation is not reproduced in full, but is
quoted: ibid., p. 735.
14. J. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nation-
alism (New York/Oxford 1988), p. 19. Garver is, however, wrong to suggest
Bogomolov acted on instructions from Stalin. The evidence is that he took
his own initiative. See below. It is not uncommon for scholars to underesti-
mate the extent to which those working under Stalin were prepared to take
risks out of a commitment to their country and in disregard for their own
personal safety. Some, of course, did this in the tragically mistaken belief in
Stalin's sense offair play, as Blyukher's behaviour was to demonstrate (see
below). Garver's book is based on Chinese sources and those Soviet
sources available in English. For the Russian evidence - Bogomolov
(Shanghai) to Moscow, 16 July 1937: ibid., doc. 246.
15. Litvinov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Shanghai?), 19 July 1937 - quoted:
ibid., pp. 737-8.
16. Litvinov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Shanghai?}, 22 July 1937: Joe. cit.
17. For reports of Bogomolov's outspokenness- Henderson (Moscow) to Hull
(Washington}, 21 December 1937: US National Archives, State Department
761.93/1627. China was Bogomolov's last posting before his demise:
Diplomaticheskii slovar', Vol. I (Moscow, 1971}, p. 215. Typically, the
NKVD also blamed Bogomolov for not predicting the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese war. For evidence, there is a memorandum by Molotov, 27
November 1940: A. Ledovskii, 'SSSR i Kitai v 1937-1949gg. Zapiski
sovetskogo diplomata', Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, No. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1990,
pp. 85-6.
18. Haslam, The Soviet Union, p. 143.
19. Coulondre (Moscow) to Delbos (Paris}, 19 October 1937: DDF, 2e serie,
Vol. VII (Paris, 1972), doc. Ill.
20. Comment by Walker on Hayes (War Office) to Collier (Northern Depart-
ment), 20 December 1937: FO 371/21102.
21. Believing the Russians to have been in the right, French diplomats in
180 Notes
Moscow were also struck by the moderation shown on the Soviet side -
Coulondre (Moscow) to Delbos (Paris), 12July 1937: DDF, Vol. VI (Paris
1970), doc. 217.
22. Coulondre (Moscow) to Delbos (Paris), 19 October 1937: DDF, Vol. VII,
doc. Ill.
23. A reference to the meeting appears in Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Bogo-
molov (Nanking), 29 July 1937: DVP SSSR, doc. 268; Bogomolov had
communicated the Chinese request for aid on 19 July in a despatch to
Moscow: ibid., doc. 253.
24. Litvinov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Nanking), 31 July 1937: ibid., doc. 274.
25. Argus, 'L'Armee Japonaise Menace Ia Chine', Le Journal de Moscou, 3
August 1937.
26. DVP SSSR, doc. 300; heralded in Lejoumal de Moscou as an 'Instrument of
Peace', 31 August 1937.
27. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Nanking), 21 August 1937: DVP
SSSR, doc. 30 I.
28. In conversation with Bogomolov, 18 August 1937- Bogomolov (Nanking)
to Moscow, 18 August 1937: ibid., doc. 297.
29. Ibid., p. 743.
30. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Bogomolov (Nanking), 22 August 1937: ibid.,
doc. 305; and Bogomolov (Nanking) to Moscow, 27 August 1937: ibid.,
doc. 313.
31. M. Sladkovskii, Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii SSSR s Kitaem
(1917-1974) (Moscow, 1977), p. 128.
32. Ibid., pp. 129-32. For the Chinese figures: Garver, Soviet-Chinese Relations,
pp. 45-6.
33. Testimony of Ivan Minka, 24 November 1988: Far Eastern Affairs, No. 3,
1990, pp. 176-84.
34. Sladkovskii, Istoriya, p. 127.
35. As note 32. The figures given to the Americans by General Chang Chung
in the autumn of 1940 were: 1000 planes, 200 tanks, 1480 field guns, and
I 200 000 rifles - Nicholson (China) to Morgenthau (Washington), 6
September 1940: Morgenthau Diary (Roosevelt Library and Archive), Book
303, p. 73.
36. S. Slyusarev, 'V vozdushnykh boyakh nad Kitaem', Na kitaiskoi :r.emle:
Vospominaniya sovetskikh dobrovol'tsev 192!r1945 (Moscow, 1974), pp. 194-5.
37. Sladkovskii, Istoriya, p. 131.
38. Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1939-1945, Vol. 2, ed. G. Deborin et al. (Moscow,
1974), p. 73.
39. G. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II
1937-1939 (London, 1980), pp. 174 and 181.
40. Coulondre (Moscow) to Bonnet (Paris), 3 May 1938: DDF, Vol. IX
(Paris, 1974), doc. 275.
41. Lejoumal de Moscou, 3 August 1937.
42. Slavutsky (Tokyo) to Moscow, 30 August 1937: DVP SSSR, doc. 316.
43. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Slavutsky (Tokyo), I September 1937: ibid.,
doc. 317.
44. Litvinov (Geneva) to Moscow, 25 September 1937: ibid., doc. 341.
45. Reply dated 26 September 1937- quoted: ibid., pp. 752-3.
Notes 181
46. Quoted in D. Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938
(London, 1964), p. 381. This book is essential to an understanding of US
policy. But it is strange that the Soviet Union does not merit the slightest
reference.
47. Editorial, 'La Conference de Bruxelles', Lejoumal de Moscou, 2 November 1937.
48. Litvinov (Brussels) to Moscow, 5 November 1937: DVP SSSR, doc. 401.
Moscow's disappointment found an echo in Molotov's bitter denunciation
of those 'states which pretend to pass as democratic countries' (speech, 6
November 1937): Lejournal de Moscou, 16 November 1937. Although not a
signatory to the Washington treaties of 1922, the Soviet Government was
nevertheless invited to attend the conference as an interested party.
49. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Troyanovsky, 10 November 1937: DVP SSSR,
doc. 404.
50. Litvinov to Troyanovsky, 13 November 1937: ibid., doc. 408.
51. Sir R. Clive (Brussels) to Foreign Office (London), 9 November 1937:
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 2nd series, Vol. XXI (London,
1984), doc. 343.
52. 'Memorandum of Statements Made by a Soviet Official Reputed to be in
the Confidence of the Kremlin to Mr. Henderson, Charge d'Affaires at
Moscow, on April 12, 1937.'- enclosed in Henderson (Moscow) to Hull
(Washington, DC), 17 April 1937: US National Archives, Department of State
861.01/2128.
53. Testimony of Gnedin, then head of the Narkomindel press department:
Sheinis, Maksim Litvinov, pp. 350-53.
54. DVP SSSR, p. 760, note 231.
55. Litvinov to Troyanovsky, 26 November 1937: ibid., doc. 421.
56. Coulondre (Moscow) to Delbos (Paris), 29 November 1937: DDF, Vol.
VII (Paris, 1972) doc. 290.
57. DVP SSSR, p. 748, note 184. For the background to these soundings: Hata
Ikuhiko, 'The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937' inJ. Morley, The China
Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent 1933-1941 (Selected trans-
lations from Taiheyo senso e no michi: kaisen gaiko shi) (New York, 1983), pp.
243-86.
58. Ibid.
59. On the Trautmann mission: J. Fox, Genna'!)' and the Far Eastern Crisis
1931-1938: A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology (Oxford, 1982), Chapter ix.
60. D VP SSSR, p. 766, note 250.
61. Melamed (Hankow?) to Moscow, 3 December 1937: ibid., doc. 428.
62. Melamed (Hankow?) to Moscow, 13 December 1937: ibid., doc. 438.
63. 'Zapiska S.G. Gendina I.V. Stalinu, 14 dekabrya 1937g.', marked 'top
secret': hvestiya TsK KPSS, No. 3, 6 March 1990, pp. 213-15. Sorge is not
named but the internal evidence pointing to him as the source is fairly
conclusive.
64. Pravda, II July 1939.
65. 'Annual Report on the Heads of Foreign Missions to China', 26June 1939:
FO 371/23466.
66. S. Konstantinov, 'Stranitsy proshlogo', Po dorogam Kitaya 1937-1945: Vos-
pominaniya (Moscow, 1989), p. 253. Also A. Cherepanov, 'Itogi Ukhan'skoi
operatsii', ibid., p. 15.
182 Notes
67. Luganets-Orel'skii to Moscow, 29 December 1937: DVP SSSR, doc. 460.

68. Quoted in 'The Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting the
Japanese Invasion', 23 July 1937: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2
(London, 1954) pp. 57-8.
69. See Shum Kui-Kwong, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-
Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945 (Oxford, 1988), Chapter 3; J.
Garver, Chinese- Soviet Relations 1937-1945 (Oxford, 1988), Chapter 3; W.
Kuo, Ana!Jtical History, Vol. 3, Chapter xxviii.
70. 'The Policies, Measures and Perspectives of Combating Japanese In-
vasion', Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2 (London, 1954), pp. 57-66.
71. Kuo, Ana!Jtical History, Chapter xxviii.
72. 'The Urgent Tasks After the Announcement of Kuomintang-Communist
Co-operation', Selected Works, p. 86.
73. 'The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of
Shanghai and Taiyuan', Selected Works, pp. 105-15.
74. Wang Ming, Mao's Betrayal (Moscow, 1975), p. 71.
75. Resolution on the Chinese question by the secretariat of the Comintern
executive committee, 10 October 1937: Kommunisticheskii lntematsional i
kitaiskaya revo!Jutsrya, doc. 73.
76. Wang Ming, Mao's Betrayal, pp. 71-2.
77. Wang Ming's speech, 'The Current Situation and Tasks in the War of
Resistance', reprinted in Kuo, Ana!Jtical History, Vol. 3, p. 312.
78. 'The CCP Manifesto on the Current Situation', reprinted in ibid., pp.
368-71.
79. Carlson (Hungtung) to Lehand (Washington), 24 December 1937: Evans
Carlson Papers, PPF 4951 (Roosevelt Library and Archive). Miss Lehand
was Roosevelt's private secretary. For more on Carlson: J. MacKinnon
and S. MacKinnon, Agnes Smedley, pp. 238-9; also H. Snow, My China
Years, pp. 87-8.
80. Carlson to Lehand, 4 March 1938: ibid.; also Carlson to Lehand, 15
August 1938: ibid.
81. Maisky (London) to Moscow, 1 January 1938: DVP I SSSR, Vol. XXI
(Moscow 1977) doc. l.
82. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Slavutsky (Tokyo), 8 March 1938: ibid.,
doc. 66.
83. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Slavutsky (Tokyo), 8 April 1938: ibid.,
doc. 120.
84. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Luganets-Orel'skii (Shanghai), 17 April 1938:
ibid., doc. 135.
85. Maisky (London) to Moscow, with a copy to Litvinov in Geneva, 13 May
1938: ibid., doc. 176.
86. Maisky (London) to Moscow, 12 May 1938: ibid., doc 174.
87. Stalin (Moscow) to Maisky (London), 14 May 1938: ibid., doc. 180.
88. Maisky (London) to Stalin (Moscow), 17 May 1938: ibid., doc. 188.
89. Stomonyakov's record of a conversation with Sun Fo, 19 May 1938: ibid.,
doc. 192.
90. Coulondre (Moscow) to Bonnet (Paris), 3 May 1938: DDF, Vol. IX
(Paris 1974), doc. 275.
Notes 183
91. Konoe memoir (Hoover Institution archive).

92. Pravda, 18January 1938.
93. Note dated 16January 1938: DVP SSSR, doc. 16.
94. As note 92.
95. Molotov's speech, 19January 1938: Pravda, 20January 1938.
96. DVP SSSR, p. 700.
97. Referred to in Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Slavutsky (Tokyo), 8 March
1938: ibid., doc. 66; see! also 'Six mois de l'Agressionjaponais en Chine',
Le Journal de Moscou, II January 1938.
98. The precise date of the message is not given, but it would appear to have
been sent some time during the winter of 1937-38: Volkov, Podvig Rikharda
Zorge, p. 36.
5 FRONTIER FIGHTING: LAKE KHASAN (1938) AND
KHALKHIN-GOL (1939)
I. Krasno.cnamen'!)'i, p. 109.
2. Col. Ismay (MI2) to Deputy Director of Military Operations and Intelli-
gence, 7 September 1934: WO 106/5499.
3. Ismay (London) to Steward (Hong Kong), 7 October 1935: ibid.
4. MI2, 'Appreciation of the probable plans of operations and initial deploy-
ment in a Russo-Japanese war', October 1935: ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Minute by MI2, 21 December 1937: WO 106/5536.
7. Krasnoznamennyi, p. 127.
8. Istoriya vtoroi, p. 210.
9. Ibid., p. 211.
10. Krasnoznamen'!)'i, p. 112.
II. Pogranichnye voiska SSSR 192~1938: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (hereafter
PV SSSR), ed. P. Zyryanov et al. (Moscow, 1972), doc. 620.
12. He was presented to foreign and domestic journalists to answer permitted
questions early in July: The Japan Advertiser, 4 July 1938.
13. See the memoirs of Blyukher's widow: 'Vospominaniya o lichnom',
pp. 79-80.
14. Krasno.cnamennyi, p. 118.
15. A. Coox, The Anatomy of a Small War: The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for
Changkufeng!Khasan 1938 (London, 1977), p. 12.
16. Report by Colonel Fedotov of the Far Eastern border forces headquarters,
14 July 1938: PV SSSR, doc. 623.
17. Hata Ikuhiko, 'The japanese-Soviet Confrontation', ed.J. Morley, Deter-
rent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR 1935-1940 (New York, 1976),
pp. 142-3.
18. Stomonyakov's record ofthe conversation, 15July 1938: DVPSSSR, doc.
259.
19. The relevant passage runs as follows: 'From line T the border runs to the
north-west along the hills on the western side of Lake Khasan and
reaches the northern extremity of the sandy ridge where the secondary
marker No I has been placed.'
184 Notes
20. A. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, p. 175.

21. Material from the NKVD: T. Gladkov and N. Zaitsev, lya emu ne mogu ne
verit' . .. (Moscow, 1983), pp. 215--16.
22. B. Viktorov, "'Zagovor" v Krasnoi Armii', Pravda, 29 April 1988. Vik-
torov was appointed deputy chief military procurator in January 1955 to
consider the rehabilitation of those purged in the 1930s.
23. Volkov, Podvig, p. 145.
24. Ikuhiko, 'The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation', p. 145.
25. Litvinov (Moscow) to polpreds in France, Britain, the USA, Czechoslova-
kia, Germany, Italy, Turkey, China, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia,
Sweden, Afghanistan and Iran, 25 July 1938: DVP SSSR, Vol. XXI,
doc. 270.
26. On 20 July the deputy head of the Pos'etsky border detachment, Alek-
seev, asked headquarters why support forces had been withdrawn when
they were needed for the defence of the disputed hilltop. The reply was
that the withdrawal came by order of Blyukher himself, who expected
border troops to deal with any conflict prior to army involvement; a clear
indication that no serious Japanese action was expected: PV SSSR, docs.
630 and 631.
27. Ibid., doc. 644. This sense of self-confidence was reflected in an editorial
published on 2 August: 'It would be difficult to suspect that Japan really
wants to unleash a war against the Soviet Union at a time when it is up to
its neck in China. - 'Les provocateurs japonaises a l'anniversaire de Ia
guerre mondiale', Lejournal de Moscou, 2 August 1938.
28. Ibid., doc. 647.
29. Ibid., doc. 649.
30. Coulondre (Moscow} to Bonnet (Paris), 31 July 1938: DDF, Vol. X
(Paris, 1976}, doc. 308.
31. Stomonyakov (Moscow) to Smetanin (Tokyo), 29July 1938: DVPSSSR,
doc. 279.
32. 'Sovershenno sekretno: Prikaz narodnogo komissara oborony Soyuza
SSR, No. 0040', 4 September 1938: G. Blyukher, 'Vospominaniya'
(enclosure}, p. 86.
33. Ibid.
34. Quoted in extenso by D. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediya: Politicheskii portret
I. V. Stalina Moscow, 1989}, pp. 272-3.
35. Quoted by Blyukher's widow: Blyukher, 'Vospominaniya', p. 81.
36. Report from the NKVD border and internal forces headquarters to the
Politburo, 4.30 am, 31 July 1938: PV SSSR, doc. 659; report, 7.00 am,
31 July 1938: ibid., doc. 660. For a description of the battle from the
Japanese side: Coox, The Anatomy, Chapter 12.
37. Litvinov (Moscow) to polpreds in Britain, France, the USA, Italy, Czecho-
slovakia and China, 2 August 1938: DVP SSSR, doc. 284. The false
reports are referred to in lkuhiko, 'The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation',
pp. 14S-9 and 153.
38. DVP SSSR, pp. 729-30; Ikuhiko, 'The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation',
p. !53; for the order to Soviet troops: PV SSSR, doc. 703.
39. Blyukher, 'Vospominaniya' pp. 81-2.
40. Brownjohn also criticised published Reuter reports of the battle as
Notes 185
inaccurate - Memorandum by Lt-Col. Brownjohn, 13 October 1938:

wo 106/5624.
41. Blyukher, 'Vospominaniya' (enclosure), pp. 84--7. The damage this
report did to Blyukher's lasting reputation can been seen from the
remarks of Marshal Kon'ev who, interviewed by Konstantin Simonov,
reiterated some of these criticisms to support his assertion that Blyukher
was a man of the past, unsuited to the conduct of war in contemporary
(1941) conditions: 'Besedy s marshalom Sovetskogo Soyuza I.S.
Kon'evym', K. Simonov, Glazami cheloueka moego pokoleniya: ra::_myshleniya o
I.V. Staline (Moscow, 1990), pp. 304--5.
42. Blyukher, 'Vospominaniya', pp. 82-3. On 17 October the military
newspaper Krasnaya ;:.ue;:.da reported a purging of the Far Eastern Army,
and on 28 October Komsomol'skaya pravda announced Blyukher's replace-
ment; also see Chilston (Moscow) to Halifax (London), I November
1938: FO 371/22287. For the manner of Blyukher's death: entry listed
under 'Kandidaty v chleny TsK VKP (b)' in '0 sud'be chlenov i
kandidatov v chleny TsK VKP (b), izbrannogo XVII s"ezdom partii',
huestiya TsK KPSS, No. 12, 8 December 1989, p. 100. For the precise date
of death: Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slouar' (Moscow, 1983), p. 84.
43. Potemkin (Moscow) to Luganets-Orel'skii (Nanking), 8 September 1938:
44. Litvinov (Moscow) to polpreds in Germany, France, the USA, Czechoslo-
vakia, Italy, China, Japan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Greece, Finland,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ll August 1938: ibid., doc. 298.
45. huestiya, 8 November 1938.
47. Grew (Tokyo) to Hull (Washington), 13January 1939: FRUS, 1939, Vol. 3
(Washington, 1955), pp. 1-2.
48. Ibid.
49. V. Sokolov, 'Zamestitel' narkoma inostrannykh del Boris Stomonyakov',
Otkryuaya no!D'e stranitij>, p. 293.
50. Z. Sheinis, Maksim Maksimouich Lituinou: reuo{yutsioner, diplomat, chelouek
(Moscow, 1989), p. 350. This was in proof in 1977 but was blocked from
publication.
51. Konoe memoir.
52. See DDF, 2e Serie, Vol. XII (Paris, 1978), docs 80, 223, 232, 263 and
307. Buck, an American adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and agent of US
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau reported: 'Arms and ammunition were
freely transported through the territory (by both routes (via Yunnan
and Kwangsi]) until diplomatic pressure was brought to bear, after
which an official ban has been published, activities have been hustled,
and amount much reduced. The authorities have shown willingness to
continue admission of these articles to the extent of not jeopardising their
own position' - Buck (Haiphong) to Morgenthau (Washington),
30 December 1938: Morgenthau Diary, Book 158, p. 195.
53. Bonnet (Paris) to Corbin (London), 13 March 1939: ibid., Vol. XIV
(Paris 1980) doc. 305.
54. Bonnet (Paris) to Henry (Tokyo), 8 April 1939: ibid., Vol. XV (Paris
1981), doc. 305.
186 Notes
55. Litvinov's record of a conversation with Yan Tse, 15 October 1938: DVP
SSSR, Vol XXI, doc. 422.
56. For example, Maisky's conversation with China's ambassador to London
- Maisky (London) to Moscow, 22 October 1938: ibid., doc. 435.
57. F. Polynin, 'Vypolnyaya internatsional'nyi dolg', V nebe Kitaya 1937-1940:
Vospominan!J>a sovetskikh letchikov - dobrovol'tsev (2nd edition, Moscow,
1986), p. 52.
58. Sladkovskii, lstor!J>a, p. 131.
59. Statement, 29 November 1938: Morgenthau Diary, Book 153, p. 303.
60. Ibid., p. 139.
61. Polynin, 'Vypolnyaya', V nebe Kitaya, pp. 52-3.
62. Sladkovskii, lstor!J>a, p. 139.
63. Ibid., p. 133.
64. Ibid., p. 131.
65. Buck (Lanchow) to Morgenthau (Washington}, 9 November 1938: Mor-
genthau Diary, Book 153, p. 270.
66. Buck (Lanchow} to Morgenthau (Washington), 15 November 1938:
ibid., p. 271.
67. E. Snow, Red China Today: The Other Side of the River (London, 1970),
p. 333.
68. 'Independently Lead the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War in North China',
15 November 1937: Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Vol. I (Beijing, 1984),
p. 105.
69. Wang Ming, Mao's Betrayal, p. 72.
70. Shirinya, Strateg!J>a i taktika, p. 381.
71. Kommunisticheskii lnternatsional i kitaiskaya, doc. 74. This is only part of the
resolution, taken not from the archives but from the version published at
the time in Kommunisticheskii Intematsional, No. 7, 1938, pp. 127-8.
72. Shirinya, Strateg!J>a i taktika, p. 381.
73. 'Report on Experience Gained in Six Years ofWork in North and Central
China', March 1943: Selected Works of Liu, p. 272.
74. Quoted by Wang Ming in Mao's Betrayal, p. 72.
75. 'The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United
Front', concluding statement at the CC 6th plenary session, 5 November
1938: Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2 (London 1954}, pp. 264-5.
Wang claims it was all Mao's 'invention', that Liu made the speech on his
'instructions'. Yet Liu is consistent in his views, as the quotations above
demonstrate. Mao may merely have seized the opportunity as it arose:
Wang Ming, Mao's Betrayal, p. 75.
76. 'On the United Front', 30 April 1945: Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, p. 220.
77. Dimitrov is reported to have explained this to Chou En-lai on his visit to
Moscow in 1939-40: Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, p. 133.
78. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, pp. 76-7.
79. A. Titov, 'Bor'ba dvukh linii v rukovodstve KPK v pervyi period voiny
soprotivleniya Yaponii (1937-1939}', Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka, No. 3
(39), 1981, p. 110.
80. Istor!J>a vtoroi, p. 215.
81. Haslam, The Soviet Union, pp. 208 and 236.
Notes 187
82. Admiral (retd) S. Zakharov, 'Nezabyvaemye vstrechi', Voenno-istoricheskii

;chumal, No. 2, 1986, p. 91.
83. Hata Ikuhiko, 'The Soviet- Japanese Confrontation', p. 159.
85. Quoted in Sheinis, Maksim Maksimovich Lituinou, p. 362.
86. Ibid., p. 363.
87. Grummon (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), 6 July 1939: FRUS, The
Soviet Union 1933-1939, pp. 771-2.
88. A. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. I (Moscow, 1988), p. 67.
89. Record of a conversation between Molotov and Togo, 19 May 1939: SSSR
u bor'be za mir nakanune utoroi mirouoi uoiny (senryabr' 1938 g.-august 1939 g.):
Dokumenry i materiary ed. A. Gromyko et al. (Moscow, 1971), doc. 299. For
an exhaustive account of the battles that followed, relying largely on
Japanese sources: A. Coox, Nomonhan.
90. Ibid., doc. 314.
91. Rosso (Moscow) to Ciano (Rome): Documenti diplomatici italiani, 8 Serie
Vol. XII (Rome 1952), doc. 77.
92. A. Kalyagin, Po ne;cnakomym dorogam: Vospominanrya uoennogo souetnika (Mos-
cow, 1969), p. 344.
93. Sorge (Moscow) to the General Staff(Moscow), 24June 1939: SSSR, doc.
342.
94. Typically this telegram, which does not support the case that the Japan-
ese were moving to a full-scale war, was not published in the Soviet
documents series. But this quotation can be found in Volkov, Poduig,
p. 39. To his credit Volkov has always attacked those who have stuck to
Stalin's line on Japanese intentions in 1939.
95. Hata, 'The Soviet-Japanese', p. 165.
96. Molotov (Moscow) to Surits (Paris), 30 June 1939: SSSR, doc. 356.
97. lstorrya utoroi mirouoi voi'!)', Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1974), p. 215.
98. Umansky (Washington) to Narkomindel, 2 July 1939: SSSR, doc. 359.
99. P. Zhilin (ed.), Pobeda na reke Khalkhin-Gol (Moscow, 1981), p. 16.
100. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, p. 89; also Garver, Chinese-Soviet
Relations, p. 37.
101. Pobeda, p. 18.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., p. 19. For the details: Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Vospominanrya
ra;cmyshlenrya, Vol. I (Moscow, 1978), pp. 200-9.
104. Pobeda, p. 21; lstorrya Vtoroi, p. 218.
105. 18 000 dead was the figure admitted by the Japanese War Office on
3 October: 'Japan: Annual Report, 1939', in Craigie (Tokyo) to Halifax
(London), 1 January 1940: FO 371/24743. The number cited in Hata
(8440) is absurdly low: Hata, 'The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation',
p. 175. The first Soviet history of the Great Patriotic War gives a figure of
25 000: lstorrya Velikoi Otechestuennoi uoiny Sovetskogo Soyu;ca, 1941-1945 (Mos-
cow, 1960), Vol. I, p. 244. This figure is contradicted by the Soviet
history of the Second World War, which gives 18 500 for dead and
wounded from May to September 1939: /storrya Vtoroi, p. 219.
106. M. Kapitsa et al (eds), SSSR i Yaponrya (Moscow, 1987), p. 170. This
188 Notes
section of the book was written by Leonid Kutakov, whose extensive

writings on the history of Soviet-Japanese and Russo-Japanese rela-
tions are based on Soviet archives.
107. Litvinov (Moscow) to Shtein (Rome), 27 January 1939: God kri;;isa
193~1939: Dokumenry i materiary, Vol. I, ed. L. Il'ichev et al. (Moscow,
1990), doc. 121.
108. For the story: M. Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Baltimore,
1967).
I 09. Astakhov's record of the conversation, 26 July 1939: God kri;;isa, Vol. 2,
doc. 503.
110. Astakhov (Berlin) to Molotov (Moscow), 3 August 1939: ibid., doc. 523.
Ill. Astakhov (Berlin) to Molotov (Moscow), 12 August 1939: ibid., doc. 542.
112. Molotov's record of his conversation with Schulenburg, 15 August 1939:
ibid., doc. 556.
6 THE TABLES ARE TURNED: JAPAN APPEASES RUSSIA, 1939-41
I. Generalov (Tokyo) to the Narkomindel, 24 August 1939: SSSR u bor'be ;;a

mir nakanune utoroi mirouoi uoiny (senryabr' 1938 g.- august 1939 g.): Dokumenry i
Materiary, ed. A. Gromyko et al. (Moscow, 1971), doc. 442.
2. U. Khayama, '0 vnutripoliticheskom polozhenii Yaponii', Mirouoe kho-
zyaistuo i mirovaya politika, No. 2, February 1940, p. 79.
3. Entry, 22 August 1939: The Diary of Marquis Kido, p. 222.
4. P. Sevost'yanov, Pered velikim ispytaniem (Moscow, 1981), pp. 54--5. This
book is based on material from the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive, from
which the Russians have published few documents for the 1939-41
period.
5. For a contemporary Soviet assessment: E. Zhukov, 'Novae yaponskoe
pravitel'stvo i vneshnyaya politika Yaponii', Mirouoe khozyaistuo i mirouaya
politika, No. 10, 21 November 1939, pp. 106--20; also U. Khayama, '0
vnutripoliticheskom polozhenii Yaponii', ibid., No. 2, February 1940,
pp. 80-1.
6. Nishi memoirs, pp. 197-8.
7. Sir William Seeds (Moscow) to Foreign Office (London), 25 August 1939:
FO 371/23558.
8. Quoted from the Japanese archives by Hosoya Chihiro, 'The Japanese-
Soviet Neutrality Pact', in The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast
Asia 1939--/941, ed. J. Morley (New York, 1980), p. 18.
9. Ibid., p. 19.
10. Ibid., pp. 19 and 22.
11. Speech to the Supreme Soviet, 31 October 1939: Pravda, I November
1939.
12. From a cabinet memorandum drafted by vice-minister Tani on 4 October
1939, as quoted in Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', p. 27.
13. Sevost'yanov, Pered Velikim, p. 272.
14. Pravda, 1 November 1939.
15. Sevost'yanov, Pered Velikim, pp. 272-3.
16. hvestiya, I January 1940.
Notes 189
17. As note 15.

18. Kutakov, Istoriya sovetskrr-yaponskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii (Moscow,
1962), p. 238.
19. Pravda, 18 August 1939.
20. Sevost'yanov, Pered velikim, p. 272; Kutakov, Istoriya, p. 239.
21. Quoted in Sevost'yanov, Pered velikim, p. 274.
22. Ibid., p. 275.
23. h.vestiya, l and 4 January 1940; Kutakov, Istoriya, p. 241.
24. Quoted in Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', p. 28.
25. Ibid., p. 30.
26. Kutakov, Istoriya, p. 251.
27. Speech to Supreme Soviet, 29 March 1940: Pravda, 30 March 1940.
28. h.vestiya, 20 April 1940. It is possible that the reason why Hosoya could
find no evidence of Soviet approaches to Japan is that there were none.
29. Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', p. 34.
30. A. Savin, Yaponskii militari;:.m v period vtoroi mirovoi voi'!)' 1939-1945 gg.
(Moscow, 1979), p. 42.
31. Ibid., p. 46.
32. Figures are from Japanese official sources cited in A. Arkad'ev, 'K
voprosu o planakh napadeniya militaristskoi Yaponii na SSSR v
1939-1941 gg.', Voenno-istoricheskii ;:.hurnal, No. 9, September 1976, p. 95.
33. Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', pp. 33-4 and 37.
34. h.vestiya, 10 June 1940.
35. Noted in the annual report from the head of NKVD border forces (the
Maritime Province), Major-General Stakharov, dated not earlier than 31
December 1940: Pogranichnye voiska SSSR 1939 - iyun' 1941: Sbornik do-
kumentov i materialov, ed. P. Zyr'yanov et al. (Moscow, 1970), doc. 782.
37. Hosoya Chihiro, 'The Tripartite Pact', in Deterrent Diplomacy: japan~
Germany and the USSR, 1935-1940 (New York, 1976), p. 208.
38. Grew (Tokyo) to Hull (Washington), 26 August 1940: US National
Archives, Department of State, 761.94/1210.
39. Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', pp. 42-3. But Hosoya may well be
incorrect to imply that Molotov gave his response on the same day the
offer was made. See Kutakov, Istoriya, p. 257.
40. IMTFE, p. 7526.
41. Nicholson (Shanghai?) to Morgenthau (Washington), 9 May 1940:
Morgenthau Diary, Book 260, p. 345.
42. G. Prange, Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring (New York, 1984),
p. 308.
43. Ibid., p. 333.
44. S. Isaev, 'Meropriyatiya KPSS po ukrepleniyu dal'nevostochnykh
rubezhei v 1931-1941 gg.', Voenno-istoricheskii ;:.hurnal, No.9, 1981, p. 67.
45. Pravda, 2 August 1940.
46. Quoted in Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', p. 45.
47. As note 45.
48. E. Varga, 'Obzor mezhdunarodnykh sobytii (sentyabr' 1940)', in Mirovoe
khozyaistvo i mirovaya politika, No. 9, 24 October 1940. This was an
abridged version of a lecture given to the Party cell of the Moscow city
190 Notes
Party committee. It was submitted for publication on 28 August.

50. Ibid., p. 262.
51. Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', p. 54.
52. Hosoya, 'The Tripartite Pact', p. 249. This was a point made by Ger-
many's ambassador, Ott, in a letter to Matsuoka on 27 September, the
day the pact was signed: Deterrent Diplomacy, p. 300.
53. Kutakov, Jstorrya, pp. 273-4.
54. Ibid., p. 274.
55. Comment on Craigie (Tokyo) to London, 18 January 1940: FO
371/24724.
56. Steinhardt (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), 22 October 1940: US
National Archives, Department of State, 761.94/1230. Steinhardt was briefed
by Cripps.
57. Kutakov, Istoriya, p. 275; and Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', pp. 54-5.
58. Volkogonov, Triumj, Vol. 2, Pt I, pp. 64 and 67.
59. Rosso (Moscow) to Ciano (Rome), 16 November 1940: I Documenti
Diplomatici ltaliani, 9 serie, Vol VI (Rome 1986), doc. 114. For the text of
the denial: 'Soobshchenie TASS', b:.vestrya, 15 November 1940.
60. Tatekawa (Moscow) to Rome, 20 November 1940: US National Archives,
RG457. Records of the National Securiry Agency. Box 8. SRH 018. 'Collection of
Japanese Diplomatic Messages 12 July 1938-21 January 1942: Department of the
Army Intelligence Files', p. 12. Kutakov, Istorrya, p. 276; Hosoya 'The
Japanese-Soviet', pp. 62-3; also, Ott (Tokyo) to Foreign Ministry
(Berlin), 21 November 1940: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945,
Series D, Vol. XI, ed. P. Sweet at al. (Washington, DC 1960), doc. 371.
61. Kutakov, Istoriya, pp. 276-7.
62. Ibid., p. 278.
63. b:.vestrya, 21 January 1941.
65. Entry, I February 1941, The Diary of Marquis Kido, p. 264.
67. Ibid., p. 283. Hosoya, in implying that Matsuoka did not raise the issue
at this time - Hosoya, 'The Japanese-Soviet', pp. 71-2 - appears to be
in error.
68. '20th Liaison Conference, April 22, 1941 ',japan's Decision For War: Records
of the 1941 Policy Conferences, ed. Nobutaka Ike (Stanford 1967), pp. 21-2.
69. Kutakov, Istorrya, pp. 286-8; b:.vestrya, 15 April 1941.
70. Hsinking to Tokyo, 28 April 1941. Intercepted and deciphered by US
Intelligence and reprinted in US Department of Defense, The 'Magic'
Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 1 (Washington 1977), doc. 354.
71. Istorrya vtoroi, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1974), p. 177. Brief mention is also made in
V nehe Kitaya 1937-1940: Vospominanrya sovetskikh letchikov-dohrovol'tsev (2nd
edition, Moscow 1986), p. 14.
72. Sladkovskii, Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii, p. 154; and V nehe
Kitaya, p. 14.
73. V. Chuikov, Missrya v Kitae (Moscow, 1983), p. 52. For an account
of Chiang's moves towards Japan: Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations,
pp. ll0-11.
74. Ibid., p. 55.
Notes 191
75. Ibid., p. 56.

76. Ibid., pp. 58-61.
77. Ibid., p. 63.
78. See B. Tuchman, Sand Against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience
in China, 1911-45 (London, 1981).
79. Chuikov, Miss!Ja, p. 64.
80. Ibid., p. 65.
81. Johnson (Chungking) to Hull (Washington), 29 November 1940: FRUS
1940, Vol IV (Washington, 1955) p. 452.
82. For an account of the incident: G. Benton, 'The South Anhui Incident',
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XLV, No.4, August 1986, pp. 681-720. Also,
L. Van Slyke, 'The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-
Japanese War 1937-1945', Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Republican
China 1912-1949, Part 2, pp. 665-71.
83. Ledovskii, 'SSSR i Kitai v 1939--1949 gg.', pp. 88-9.
84. Johnson (Chungking) to Hull (Washington), 17 January 1941: US
National Archives, Department of State, 893.00/14630.
85. Quoted in Dubinskii, 'Pomoshch' SSSR kitaiskomu narodu v period
yapono-kitaiskoi voiny (1937-1945) i pozitsiya rukovodstva KPK', Nar-
ody Azii i Afriki, No. 6, 1972, p. 77.
86. Chuikov, Miss!Ja, p. 93.
87. 'Notes on Cabinet, 19 December 1939': Morgenthau Diary, Book 230,
p. 48.
88. Referred to in Welles to Morgenthau, 23 July 1940: ibid., Book 285,
p. 295.
89. Henderson, A Question of Trust, pp. 496 and 500.
90. Memorandum of a conversation by Under-Secretary of State Summer
Welles, 27 November 1940: FRUS 1940, Vol. III (Washington, 1958)
p. 415.
91. Hull (Washington) to Johnson (Chungking), 28 December 1940: ibid.,
Vol. IV, p. 476.
92. Johnson (Chungking) to Hamilton (Washington), 17 Aprill941: Morgen-
thou Diary, Book 390, p. 5.
93. Ibid.
94. See Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy 1930--33, pp. 34-7; also, C. McLane,
Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin
and Stalin (Princeton 1966) pp. 147-52.
95. D. Hemery, Rivolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonial en Indochine: commu-
nistes, trotskyistes, nationalistes a Saigon de 1932 a 1937, pp. 25-6, note 10;
Khong Kha (Hong Ha), Kho Shi Min v strane sovetov (Moscow, 1986),
p. 160; E. Kobelev, Kho Shi Min (Moscow, 1983), pp. 148-9.
96. Shanghai Municipal Police Archive, Box 20, D2527 /41.
97. Ibid.
98. Kobelev, Kho, p. 159. For the background to the Shanghai bureau: E.H.
Carr, Twilight of Comintern, pp. 356 and 358.
99. Kobelev, Kho, pp. 160-61; Kong Kha, Kho, pp. 169--70.
100. Khong Kha, Kho, p. 170; Kobe1ev, Kho, p. 166.
101. Ibid., p. 165.
102. Khong Kha, Kho, pp. 175-8.
103. Ibid., p. 189; Kobelev, Kho, p. 187.
192 Notes
104. Khong Kha, Kho, p. 192.

105. S. Mikhataryan and T. Mikhataryan, V'etnamskaya revolyutsiya: voprosy
teorii i praktiki (Moscow, 1986), p. 90.
106. Ibid., p. 97.
107. Ibid., p. 98.
108. Ibid., pp. 97-8.
109. A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's Revolutionary Reminiscences (Beijing,
1988), p. 108.
110. Mikhataryan, V'etnamsktrya, p. 112; Kobelev, Kho, pp. 188--9.
Ill. Mikhataryan, V'etnamskaya, pp. 120-l; Kobelev, Kho, pp. 186-7.
112. Mikhataryan, V'etnamskaya, p. 122.
113. Ibid., p. 123.
114. A Drop, pp. 76-7.
115. Ibid., pp. 86-91.
116. Kobelev, Kho, p. 191.
II 7. Mikhataryan, V'etnamskaya, pp. 123-6; Kobelev, Kho, pp. 189--93; and A
Drop, p. 134.
118. Chuyev, F. (ed.), Sto sorok besed s Molotovym (Moscow, 1991), pp. 29--30.
Unfortunately Molotov's memoirs are reportedly still buried in the Cen-
tral Committee archives.
119. Chuikov, Missiya, p. 140; alsoJohnson (Chungking) to Hull (Washing-
ton), 10 May 1941: FRUS 1941, Vol. IV (Washington, 1956) pp. 182-3.
120. Voenno-istoricheskii ;:.hurnal, Vol. 9, 1981, p. 68.
121. The Diary of Marquis Kido, p. 279.
CONCLUSIONS
l. Witnessed by Gustav Hilger, the German diplomat: G. Hilger and

A. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German- Soviet Relations
1918-1941 (New York, 1953), p. 305.
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Peattie, M., Ishiwara Ka,Yi and Japan's Confrontation with the West (Princeton,
1975).
Pobeda na reke Khalkhin-gol (Moscow, 1981).
Prange, G., Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring (New York, 1984).
Reynolds, D., The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41 (London, 1981).
Romanov, B., Ocherki diplomaticheskoi istorii russko-yaponskoi voiny 189!"r1907 (Mos-
cow, 1947).
Ruiqing, Zhengcao, Bingnan, A Turning-Point in Chines11 History: Z.hou Enlai and
the Xi'an Incident- An Eyewitness Account (Beijing, 1983).
Savin, A., Yaponskii militarizm v period vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1939-1945 gg. (Moscow,
1979).
Sevost'yanov, G., Podgotovka voiny na Tikhom Okeane 1939-1941 (Moscow,
1962).
Sevost'yanov, P., Pered velikim ispytaniem (Moscow, 1981).
200 Bibliography
Sheinis, Z., Maksim Maksimouich Lituinou: Reuolyutsioner, Diplomat, Chelouek (Mos-

cow, 1989).
Sipo1s, V., Souetskii Soyuz u bor'be t;a mir i bet;opasnost' 1933-1939 (Moscow, 1974).
Shirinya, K., Strategiya i taktika Kominterna u bor'be protiu fashit;ma i uoi'!Y
(1934-1939 gg.} (Moscow, 1979).
Shum Kui-kwong, The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese
National United Front 1935-1945 (Oxford, 1988).
S1adkovskii, M., Istoriya torgouo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii SSSR s Kitaem
(1917-1974) (Moscow, 1977).
Sokolov, V., Na boeuykh postakh diplomaticheskogo fronta: Zhit:.n' i deyatel'nost' L.M.
Karakhana (Moscow, 1983).
Stephan, J., The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile 1925-1945 (London,
1978).
Swearingen, R., Langer, P., Red Flag in japan: International Communism in Action
1919-1951 (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).
Thorne, C., The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern
Crisis of 1931-1933 (London, 1972).
Toscano, M., The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Baltimore, 1967).
Trotter, A., Britain and East Asia 1933-1937 (Cambridge, 1975).
Tuchman, B., Sand Against the Wind: Stilwell and the American Experience in China
1911-45 (London, 1981).
U1yanovsky, R. (ed.), The Comintern and the East (revised edition, Moscow,
1979).
Van S1yke, L., Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History
(Stanford, 1967).
Vidnye souetskie kommunisry- uchastniki kitaiskoi reuolyutsii (Moscow, 1970).
Vo1kogonov, D., Triumf i tragediya: Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina (Moscow,
1989).
Vo1kov, F., Podvig Rikharda Zorge (Moscow, 1976).
Weinberg, G., The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II
1937-1939 (London, 1980).
Yur'cv, M., Voorut;hen1!Jie sily KPK v osvoboditel'noi bor'be kitaiskogo naroda: 20-40-e
gody (Moscow, 1983).
Index
Abe 136, 139-40 136, 144, 146-7, 151-2, 154,
Abyssinia 61 157, 160, 163-4
Afghanistan 94 Brownjohn 119
Aid (to China) 92-4, 121, 123, Brussels conference 96-7, 99-101,
139, 14-2, 150-2, 154-6 103
Alekseev 184 Buck 125, 185
Allied war of intervention Budenny 119
(1918-19) 3 Bukharin 14, 41
Alma Ata 124, 152 Bulin 30
Amoy 122 Bullitt 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 49-50
Amur (see also Ussuri) 48, 89-90, Burma 122-3, 147
114 Byalistok 13
Anglo-] apanese alliance ( 1902) 2
Anhwei incident 153-4, 156 Canton 93, 109, 122-4
Ankara 62 Carlson 106-7
Anking 122 Chahar 48
Anti-Comintern pact ( 1936) 80, 90, Chamberlain 88, 107, 133
95, 100, 102, 133, 135 Chan Tsyun 100
Araki 7, 20, 38, 39, 148 Chang Ch'un 80, 87
Arita 81, 139-42 Chang Chun 72
Armenia 12 Chang Hsueh-liang 70-3, 75-6,
Artuzov (Frauchi) 115 78-82, 84, 86, 176
Astakhov 133-4 Chang Kuo-t'ao 70, 79, 83, 104,
Austria II, 20, 60, 122 126, 174
Chang Wen-tien 104
Baku 25 Ch'en Li-fu 60
Baltic states 155 Chen-chen 59
Bangkok 161 Chen Te-cheng 125
Belgium 97 Chen Yun 56, 105
Berzin 26, 10 I Cherepanov 124, 130, 132
Black Sea 29, 93 Ch'ian Tin-fu 82
Blyukher 26, 36, 88, 91, 101, 113, Chiang Kai-shek 45, 53-4, 59-69,
116-20, 178, 184-5 72-3, 76, 78-81, 84-6, 88, 92,
Bogomolov 60, 62, 66-9, 72, 78, 94, 100, 102-5, 121-2, 124-7,
90-2, 94, 100, 179-80 130, 132, 142, 144, 147, 150-6,
Bokhara 94 162, 175-6, 185
Bonnet 123 Chiang Tin-wen 83
Boothby 7 Chibisov 115
Braun 55, 15 7 Chicago 96
Brendinskii 118 Chicherin 13, 14, 15, 17
Brest-Litovsk 13 Chinamuho 89
Britain/England 4, 5, 13, 14, 41-3, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) I,
49, 60, 62, 88, 91, 95-9, 107-8, 4,53,54-87,100,103-7,
112, 120, 122, 129, 131-2, 134, 125-8,150-6,160,164,175
201
202 Index
Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) 4, Eastern Europe 44

5, 10-13, 18-21, 27, 43-8, 51, Eastern pact 44
124, 137-9, 150 East Hopei 49
Chita 43, 112, 131, 138-9 Eighth Route Army (see Red Army,
Chou En-lai 70-2, 78, 83-5, 87, Chinese)
104, 127, 153-4, 176, 186 Eden 7,97-8,107
Chuikov 151-4 Ewert 55, 157
Chukotka 3
Chungking 102, 122, 150-3, 160 Famine (Soviet) 10, 24, 29
Chun-hua 60 Far Eastern Army/Far Eastern
Churchill 108 Front 26-9, 35-6, 43, 88,
Chu Teh 71, 104, 107 112-20, 143, 162
Chuyev 192 Far Eastern Bureau
Clark Kerr 102 (Comintern) 54-5
Clarke 146 Finland 132
Clive 42, 46 Fischer 14, 177
Collectivisation of agriculture 10, Fisheries 137-8, 142, 148
28 Five Year Plan 9, 28
Communist International Fourth Route Army (see Red Army,
(Comintern) 3, 16, 25, 32, 33, Chinese)
41' 49, 54-69, 72, 74, 77' 79, France 5, II, 32, 43, 44, 62, 69, 88,
83, 85-7, 103, 106, 109, 125, 91, 93, 96-9, 122-3, 131-2, 134,
127-8, 156-60, 167 136, 140, 158-61, 164
Coulondre 94, 99 Franco-Russian alliance 32, 44
Cripps 147 Franco-Soviet pact 32, 44, 61
Czechoslovakia 20, 121, 128 French Communist Party
(PCF) 106, 157, 159
Dairen 143 Frinovskii II 7, 119
Daladier 160 Fullerton 31
Davis 96-7, 99 Fushimi 146
De Ferrari 29
Dejean 18 Gaimusho (Japanese Foreign
Dekanozov 129 Ministry) 142
Derevtsov 113 Gamarnik 89, 178
Deribas 113 Gendin 101
Digasheli Khomok 114 Geng Baoshan 71
Dimitrov 57-9, 62, 73-4, 77-8, 82, Georgia 12
106, 186 Germany 17, 19, 25, 31, 32, 34, 35,
Doihara 49 41, 42, 44, 47, 50, 52, 60-2, 80,
Dongur-Obo 130 88, 90, 94, 98, 100-1, 107, 120-
Donitz 55 1, 130-1, 133-6, 138, 140-1,
Dratvin 94, 101 144, 146-7, 149-50, 162
Drummond 9 Gnedin 181
Du Bincheng 71 Gobi desert !59
Ducroux 54-5, 15 7 Gostorg 12
Duranty 170 Grebennik 116
Dvilkovsky 32 Grew 121
Dzharkent 93 Gromyko 129
Dzyza 113 GRU 25-6, 101, 143, 174
Index 203
Gudz' 115 Japanese Communist Party

(JCP) 54
Hainan 123 Jehol 9
Haiphong 93, 122-3, 161 Jen Pi-shih 104
Hakamada 41 Joffe 68-9
Halha 50 Johnson 154-6
Hangchow 87 Johnson Bill/Act 32, 34, 38, 40
Hanka 143 Juichin 55
Hankow 54, 122
Hansu 71, 124 Kaganovich 16
Han-yan 122 Kaifeng 122
Harbin II, 13, 22, 23, 56, 95, II 0, Kalmykov 113
115, 139 Kamchatka I, 3, 21
Hata 141 Kanchatzu 89
Hayashi 39 Kang Sheng I 05
Herat 94 Kan'in 141
Hiranuma 9, 25, 121, 135-6 Kansu 67, 125
Hirohito 47, 116, 149 Karakhan 6, 8, 12, 13, 15, 17-21,
Hirota 22,45-7,51-2,67,95, 110, 23, 39, 62, 167-9
121 Karsky 8, 31-2
Hitler 47, 147, 162, 164 Kasahara 25-6, 45
Hoang Van Hoan 161 Kato 7
Ho Chi-Minh 157-61 Kawagoe 80, 87, 100
Holland (Netherlands) 95, 140 Kazakhstan 124
Hong Kong 41, 93, 122 Kerensky 33, 40
Hornbeck 40 Kerr 102
Hsiang Ying I 04 Khabarovsk 56, 89, 112-14, 143
Hull 31, 32, 97, 155 Khakhan'yan 113
Hunch'un protocol 114 Khalkhin-Gol 112, 116, 132-3,
Hungary 167 135-6, 141-2, 163-4
Hungtung 107 Kharkov 170
Khasan (see Lake Khasan)
lmai 46 Khrushchev 17
Indochina 5, 93, 122, 156-62 Kiangsi 54, 56, 59, 73
Indochinese Communist Kido 8, 135, 149, 162
Party 156-62 Kiev 14
Industrial Intelligence Centre 170 Kirov 109
Inner Mongolia 9, 48-9, 67 Kiukiang 122
Intelligence (see also GRU) 27, 28, Kleber (see Shtern, Manfred)
49, 88, 91, 95, 102, 112, 115-16, Knorin 57
118, 120, 150, 152, 178 Koiso 7
International Leninist School 158 Komatsubara 115
lnukai 5 Komsomol 52, 129
lnvergordon 5 Kon'ev 185
I ran (see Persia) Konoe 47, 108-9, 121-2, 143, 145
Irkutsk 28, 159 Koo 18
Itagaki 48 Korea 2, 117-18
Italy 18, 20, 61-2, 80, 97-9, 131, Kovno 31
133-4, 140--1, 144, 146-7, 170 Kozlovskii 129, 179
204 Index
Krestinsky 98-9 89, 91-2, 95, 97-9, 109, 114,

KRO 115 116, 120-21' 129, 133, 154
Krutov 113 Liu Ch'an-shen 65, 175
Krymov 56 Liu Shao-ch'i 83, 126, 186
Kulik 119 Lochuan 104
Kuling 87 Loktionov 119
Kun 57 London naval conference (1930) 6
Kung Syan-si 61, 85 Long March 54-6
Kunming 122, 160 Lozovsky 57, 129, 136, 154
Kuomintang (KMT /nationalists/ Luganets-Orel'skii 102, 108, 124
Nanking government) 4, 9, II, Lugansk 102
44, 49, 52, 54-60, 62, 65-73, Lukouchiao (see Marco Polo Bridge)
75-80, 83-5, 87-8, 92, 100, Lushan 103
102-5, 109, 121-2, 124-7, 141, Lytton commission 9
150-4, 156, 159, 161-2, 175 Lyushkov 113
Kuriles 3, 148
Kutakov 188 Macao 158-9
Kutepov 115 Mad'yar 167
Kuusinen 158 Maisky 14, 34, 39, 42, 60, 107, 129
'Kuznetskii' 21 Ma1enkov 16, 129
Kwantung 73 Ma1kis 113
Kwantung army 5, II, 27, 38, 44, Manchukuo 9, 10, 22, 23, 42, 45,
48-50, 114-15, 128, 131-3, 141 48-50,61,67, 110, 114, 128,
137-9, 142, 150
Lake Khasan 112, 114-17, 119-20, Manchuria (see also Manchukuo) I,
128, 183 5-8, 11, 15, 21, 22, 23, 25-7,
Lanchow 93, 124-5, 152, 156 30, 31, 44, 46-9, 54, 56, 70, 88-
Lapin 113 9, 92, 110, 115, 117, 128, 130-1,
Latvia 20 142-3, 150, 186
Laval 18 Mandel 122
Lavrent'ev 178 Manui1sky 25, 60
League of Nations 9, 19, 43, 44, Mao Tse-tung 54, 57, 65-6, 70-1,
95-6, 99, 120 77-9, 83, 87, 103-7, 126-8, 151,
Lefranc (see Ducroux) 153-4, 175
Lehand 182 Marco Polo Bridge 90, 103
Le Hong Phong 158-9 Maritime Province 27, 46, 101,
Lenin 3, 13 112, 139, 143
Leningrad 10, 25-6, 35, 109, 128 Matsuo Dockyard 138-9, 148
Lepin 91, 94 Matsuoka 143, 145-7, 149-50, 162,
Liangchow 125 190
Li Kenong 71-2 Mazepov 116-18
Li Li-san 5 7-8 Mekh1is II 7-18
Li Teh 55 Melamed 100-1
Li Yao-k'uei 56 Mezhraiontsy 13, 20
Lin Yu-ying 65, 175 Miao Feng-hsia 176
Lithuania 8 Miao Feng-shan 83
Litvinov 9, 12-20, 22, 31-4, 39-41, Mif (Fortus) 58, 62, 82, 106, 127,
43-5, 47, 49-51, 61-2, 80, 82, 158
Index 205
Mikoyan 16, 140 Ota 12, 22, 46, 51

Minseito 5 Otpor 27
Miyakawa 179 OTSU 46
Mo Ten-hoi 166 Ott 101, 130
Molotov 15-17, 19, 35-6, 40, 45-6, Outer Mongolia 2, 9, 25, 48-52,
110-11 ' 119' 129--31 ' 134' 136- 93, 128, 130-2, 135
40, 142-9, 162, 181 Ovey 18
Mongolia (see Inner, and Outer
Mongolia) Pac Bo 161
Moore 39 Pacific fleet (Soviet) 28
MOPR 157 Pacific war (1941-45) 2, 152
Morgenthau 31, 34, 123-5, 143, Pan Han-nien 72
155, 185 Pan-Pacific Trade Union 54
Moscow military district 35 Panyushkin 153-4, 162
Mukden 5, 27, 146 Pao-an 70-1, 73, 83, 177
Munich settlement 121, 133 Paris 140
Paui-Boncour 32
Nan Hanchen 71 Pavlov 119
Nanking 45, 55-6, 59, 61, 64, 84, Pearl Harbor 163
94, 100-1, 109, 151, 153, 174 Peking convention ( 1925) 2, 135
Narkomindel (People's Commis- Peng Teh-huai 104
sariat of Foreign Affairs) 6, 33, Persia 20, 94
39, 62, 79, 81-2, 92, 95, 98, Petrov 158
108-11, 129, 137, 155 Piggott 178
Narkomvneshtorg (People's Pingliang 125
Commissariat of Foreign Pogranichnaya II
Trade) 12, 38, 137 Po Ku 83
Navy (Soviet; see also Pacific Pokus 113
fleet) 128 Poland 35, 131
Netherlands (see Holland) Popular Front 69, 106, 158-9
Neurath 90 Port-Arthur 3
New Deal 31 Portsmouth Treaty (1905) I, 2, 4,
New Economic Policy 12 5, 135, 145, 148-9, 163
New York 32 Posyet 114
Nicolson 143 Potemkin 92, 94, 98-9, 108-9, 120,
Nikulin 26 129
Nishi 114 Profintern 65, 129, 154, 157
Nisihara 161 Pudin 115
NKVD 102, 112-13, 115-16, 127, Putna 27
129, 159, 174, 179 Putsch (Tokyo, 1936) 50-1, 68
Nomon-Han-Burd-Obo 130 Puzitskii 115
Nomura 137-8
Northern Sakhalin 21, 142, 148-9 Radek 12, 40, 41, 50, 58, 127
Noulens (see Ruegg) Raivid 80
Rangoon 122
OGPU 10, 102 Rapallo treaty ( 1922) 17
Ordzhonikidze 36 Red Army (Chinese) 52, 60, 63,
Oshima 136, 148 69, 74-6, 78-9, 82, 84-7, 104,
206 Index
Red Army - continued Shtern (Manfred) 55-6, 157

106,125-6,150,153-4,160,175 Sian 70-1, 73, 79, 83-6, 125, 159
Red Army (Soviet; see also Far East- Siberia 26, 28, 29, 112, 143, 163
ern Army) 10, 30, 35-6, 51, Sigihara 23
62, 90, 124, 128, 131-2, 141, Simonov 185
163, 168 Singapore 54
Rehe 71 Sinkiang 49, 93, 102, 105, 124-5,
Ren Bishi 127 152
Revvoensovet 26 Sino-Japanese war (1937-45)
Ribbentrop 133-4, 136 90-111
RILU (see Profintern) Sino-Soviet agreement (1924) 13
Rink 50, 173 Sinsinghsia 125
Roosevelt 31-4, 39, 40, 88, 96--7, SIS 115
124, 155, 164, 182 Slavin 125
Roshchin 154 Slavutsky 94, 110
Rosen berg 91 Smedley 86
Rossi 130 Smetanin 137, 139, 142, 145, 148-9
Ruegg (Noulens) 54-5, 157 Smith-Hutton 91
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) I, 3, Snow(E.) 77,83,176
7-8, II, 12, 92 Sobolev 118
Russo-Japanese Treaty ( 190 7) 2 Sochi 120
Rychagov 117-18 Sokol'nikov 19, 20, 22, 23, 39, 62
Rylski 55 Sokolov 114
Soong Mei-ling 80, 83
Sadovnikov 113 Soong (T.V.) 80, 83-5
Saito 20 Sorge 25-6, 80, 101, Ill, 115-16,
St Petersburg 13, 14 118, 130-1, 143, 169, 181
Saionji 102 South-east Asia (see also
Sakhalin (see also Southern Indochina) 55, 140, 157, 160
Sakhalin) 6 Southern Sakhalin I, 3, 140, 145,
Sangurski 113 148
Sary-Ozek 93, 124 South Manchurian Railway I, 5,
Schnurre 133 143, 145
Schulenburg 134 Sovnarkom (Council of People's
Scripps-Howard 50 Commissars) 16, 26--7, 110,
Semenov 143 119
Shanghai 25, 54-6, 60-1, 72, 77-8, Spain 88,94
80, 100, 104, 143, 157-9, 167 Special Red Banner Far Eastern
Shanghai Municipal Police 54 Army (see Far Eastern Army)
Shansi 67, 71, 78, 104, 107 Spil'vanek 45
Shantung 122 Spratley islands 161
Shao Li-tzu 154 Stalin 2-4, 7, 10, 12, 14-17,22,
Shaposhnikov 119 24-6, 35, 40-1, 43, 51, 57-8, 64,
Shchadenko 119 69, 79, 81-2, 88, 91, 94, 101,
Shensi 54, 65, 67, 71-2, 104, 127 107-9,113,116--17,119-20,
Shidehara 6 128-9, 131, 134, 144-5, 149,
Shigemitsu 46--7, 81, 89, 129 151-2, 156, 162-5, 179
Shtein 133 Stilwell 152
Shtern (Grigorii) 117,132 Stimson 31
Index 207
Stomonyakov 44, 52, 62-3, 67-9, 19, 23, 30-4, 38, 39, 42, 49, 55,
72, 78, 80, 89, 92, 97, 108, 114, 62, 88, 91, 95--7, 99-100, 107,
121 120, 124, 136, 138, 144, 148,
Strachey 7 151-2, 154-6, 160, 163
Suchow 122 Urumchi 102, 159
Suiyan 67 Ussuri 21, 48
Suiyuen 48
Sun Fo 90, 108, 151 Vaillant-Couturier 158
Sun Yat-sen 13, 58, 68, 77, 80 Varga 58, 144
Surits 131 Vasil'eva 158
Suzuki 9 Versailles treaty 149
Switzerland 1, 11 Vichy 160
Szechuan 56 Vietminh 161-2
Vietnam 158-61
Taierchuang 122 Vladivostok I, 2, 13, 21, 29, 30,
Taiyuan 105 45, 56, 89, 101, 112, 128, 158
Tanaka memorandum (1927) 6 Volnov 93
Tangku truce 44 Voroshilov 8, 9, 16, 21, 26, 27, 35--
Tanomogi 46 6, 117-18, 120, 128
Tashkent 95 Voroshilovgrad I 02
Tatekawa 146--8 Vorovsky I
Tbilisi 12
Tientsin 54 Wakatsuki 5
Timoshenko 151 Wales 83
Ting Fu-tsiang 91 Wang Chia-hsiang 127-8
Togo 129-30, 136--47 Wang Ching-wei 45, 80-1, 141,
Tominaga 143 151-2
Tongguan 83 Wang Chung-hui 101
Tongking 123, 156 Wang Fen 71
Trans-Siberian railway 30, 35, 48, Wang Ming (Ch'en Shao-yu)
88, 112 57-60, 64-5, 69, 73-4, 76--7,
Trautmann 100-2 105, 107, 125--7, 175, 186
Trotsky 13, 98 Washington Treaties (1922) I,
Troyanovsky 5-7, II, 18, 20, 40, 96--7, 181
97, 99, 155, 166 Wayaobao 65--6, 70, 74
Tseng Shan 105 WEA 20
Tsunyi 54 Webb 20, 107
Tuba1a 115 Wei Yechou 71
Tukhachevsky 25--7, 88-9, 17 Welles 155
Tula II Wiley 39
Tungpei army 70 Wilson 34
Turksib railway 93, 124 Wollenberg 22
Wu-ch'ang 122
Uborevich 52 Wuhan 109, 122-7
Uchida 166 Wu Tin-chan 100
Ukraine 28
Ulan-Bator 52 Yalta conference ( 1945) 2
Umansky 32, 155 Yan Hu-ch'en 73
United States of America I, 5, 6, Yang Hu-ch'en 71, 78-9
208 Index
Yangtse 104, 109, 122, 130, 153 Yoshizawa 4 7

Yegorov 35 Yunnan 122
Yeh Ting 104, 153 Yurenev 20, 22, 23, 30, 44, 46-7,
Ye Jianying 83 51, 98
Yen 18, 45
Yenan 72, 83, 86, 103, 105, 154,
159-60 Zozernaya 117
Yen Hsi-shan 127 Zhdanov 16, 109, Ill, 115, 128
Yonai 139, 143 Zheleznyakov 23
Yoshida 108 Zhukov 17, 132, 164

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STUDIES IN SOVIET HISTORY AND SOCIETY

General Editors: R.W. Davies, Emeritus Professor of Soviet Economic

Malcolm R. Hill and Richard McKay

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of

First published 1992 by

Negotiation from Weakness to Negotiation from

3 The Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern 54

fornia, San Diego); Tanya Litvinov; two young research assis-

advantage, expand to the north and jeopardise rail communi-

Japan began its aggression against our country as early as

More than once Stalin emphasised that 'the defeat of Russian

(CCP) and Nationalist (Kuomintang) forces, with the CCP as

land. The planting of a bomb on the South Manchurian Railway

The leading figure in the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs

The foreign policy programme of Japanese imperialism has

Troyanovsky tried not to sound entirely pessimistic, however.

had unexpectedly offered stiff resistance to Japan; and along the

1904-5 and of the Japanese war of intervention in 1918-22 still

the behaviour of the Japanese, Voroshilov warned that 'we

that was destined to provide the Soviet Union with a heavy-

use of the railway to transport troops to the battlefront against

Soviet policy on the CER had to be reconsidered. Continued

Japanese, Lev's father moved the family out to Harbin in Man-

quartermaster's store, where he educated himself further; and it

Soviet foreign policy between 1929 and May, 1939, followed

quarters that Stalin never entirely inhibited. The amiable but

moderate agrarian policy, than distant though troubling issues

Museum reading room. Certainly they are strange members of

represented by part of the government and, evidently, Saito

presenting the Tokyo talks 'as the capitulation of the Soviet

Negotiations on the sale ofthe railway opened on 26June with a

Undoubtedly thoughts of this kind are taking shape in the

The letter marked a turning-point m Soviet policy towards

Stalin had always conceived of rapid industrialisation as the

necessary investment in the foundations of the planned econ-

under various pseudonyms including I.K. Zorge, lka, Zonter,

Four new infantry divisions were then created in European

ual pioneers, least given to the collectivist spirit. The level of

still, from the army's viewpoint, the requisitions at the expense

In addition to the growth of Soviet military power on new

more than a decade to obtain recognition. They had expanded

ComJ,Tiissar for Foreign Affairs, was shunted off to the State

Germany in order to obtain complete satisfaction on what were

Stalin greeted it as an act of'the most serious significance' for the

of the likely reception of his words, he concluded that those who

War Minister by Hayashi and there followed a more sober

I am convinced that the chief obstacle both to a successful

whether our relations with the Soviet Union prior to such an

Litvinov was, of course, right. Certainly he did not regard the

Bukharin, the former running the foreign section of Stalin's

tended to assume that a Russo-Japanese war was more likely

our vested interests there. A liberation from the fear of Russia on

security pact. Litvinov's dull but reliable confidante, Boris Sto-

led by Wang Ching-wei, the Nationalist Government in Nanking

Soviet-Japanese relations and the maintenance of peace in the

Hirota at the Japanese transferring Russian counter-revol-

Should the said zone be placed in the sphere of Japanese and

Two significant consequences followed from this kind of think-

possessions could simply not be obtained through collaboration

in Le journal de Moscou: 'Each Japanese Minister can be seen to

evaluation of the immediate future. Deputy Commissar Stomon-

'the Japanese militarists know that this national movement in

British colonial police on 1 June 1931. Ducroux had been sent to

last directives from Shanghai reached the CCP in September -