Firro Lebanese Nationalism

Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha
Author(s): Kais M. Firro

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 5 (Sep., 2004), pp. 1-27
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Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From
Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha
KAIS M. FIRRO
This article attempts to trace Lebanese nationalism as a national ideology

and term of discourse developed by Christian intellectuals and politicians
before and after 1920. From its very beginning, Lebanese nationalism was
formulatedto confront Arabism that had come into existence in Syria and
Lebanonat the end of the nineteenthcentury.Although Lebanese Christians
were among the first intellectualsto exhibit and articulateArabism, or Arab
Syrianism, another group of Lebanese - mainly Maronites - saw both
Arabism and Syrianism as a danger which would put an end to their
'ancient particularism'.Thus they used nationalist ideas to postulate their
traditional particularismin nationalistic terms. But these terms were not
formulated before 1920 as coherent ideas challenging Arabism and
Syrianism. This article argues that Lebanese nationalist ideas could be
consolidated only after borrowingthe basic argumentsof intellectuals who
called for a non-Arab Syrianism. Since both the non-Arab Syrianists and
the Lebanese nationalists relied on the same arguments, most of these
Syrianists found themselves after 1920 shifting their political affiliations
from the idea of GreaterSyria to the idea of GreaterLebanon. The article
argues further that the non-Arab Syrianists and the Lebanese nationalists
had followed the guidance of their Jesuit teachers at the University of Saint-
Joseph in Beirut and in the colonial circles in France whose territorial
division of the Levant had a great impact on Syrianist and Lebanese
nationalist ideology and discourse.
The idea of Greater Syria as watan (homeland) began to take shape

through the writings of Lebanese intellectuals who were in touch with
Protestantmissionariesactive in Syria and Lebanonsince the 1830s. For the
missionaries, 'Syria' was a territorial unit (watan) whose culture,
ethnography and history had fostered the discrete characteristics of the
'Syrians'. One of the first Lebanese intellectualsto foirmulatethe arguments
Middle EasternStudies, Vol.40, No.5, September2004, pp.1 -27

ISSN 0026-3206 print/1743-7881online
DOI: 10.1080/0026320042000265657 C';2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

2 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
of the Syrian idea or Syrianism was Butrus al-Bustani. Although he saw

Syria as separate watan, al-Bustani emphasized that Arab culture was the
most important component in its historical formation. The Protestant
missionarynotion of Syria inspired other intellectualswho wrote books and
articles on Syria in the nineteenth century that later became a basis for
Syrianism which called for the establishmentof a single political entity -
Greater Syria.1
Whilst the Arab component is very strong in the Syrianism of
intellectuals influenced by Protestant missionaries, another Syrianism
emerged among groups of Lebanese intellectuals who had graduatedfrom
the Jesuit schools. Some of these intellectuals adopted a non-Arab
Syrianism while others took a stance similar to the Syrianism propagated
by Protestantmissionaries. The best representativeof the Jesuit institutions
to promote a non-Arab Syrianism was the University of Saint-Joseph in
Beirut. In 1843, in order to educate the local clergymen, the Jesuits
established a school in Ghazir on Mt. Lebanon. In 1875, eleven years after
the establishment of the Protestant American University in Beirut, the
school of Ghazir moved to Beirut to be transformed in 1881 into the
University of Saint-Joseph.In 1902 an OrientalFaculty was inauguratedat
the university teaching Semitic languages, archaeology, history and
geography. Teachers of the Oriental Faculty such as Father Pierre Martin
and Henri Lammens had 'discovered' Syria as an entity that was separate
from its Arab environment. However, because the Syria of Martin and
Lammens places Mt. Lebanon, the coast and Biqa' at the centre of Syria,
some Lebanese intellectuals who had graduated from Saint-Joseph
University used Martin and Lammens to promote the idea of Lebanese
nationalism separated from Syrianism. In his three volumes, Histoire
generale de la Syrie, Father Martin dedicated most of his historical survey
to Mt. Lebanon and its surroundingdistricts, whilst the Phoenician legacy
was dealt with at length. This may explain why his volumes on Syria were
translatedinto Arabic under the title, TarikhLubnan [History of Lebanon].2
Certainlythe courses and articlesof Henri Lammens(1865-1937) on Syria
and Lebanonsuppliedargumentsfor the Lebaneseintellectualsin their search
for a national identity. Although he sees Syria as a separatenon-Arabentity,
Lammens finds Mt. Lebanon and the surroundingareas a sub-entity going
back to the Phoenician era. Thereforehe inspired Lebanese intellectuals to
formulate a non-Arab Syrian or Lebanese nationalism. His articles and
courses before 1914 were expandedlater into two volumes, La Syrie, pre'cis
historique, published in 1921, one year after the establishmentof Greater
Lebanon.Althoughhis Syria continuedto constitutea single historicalentity,
he was the firstto referto the map drawnby the Frenchmilitaryexpedition in
1861 which became in 1919 a reference for the Lebanese delegations to the

LEBANESE NATIONALISM V ARABISM 3
peace conferenceof Versailles in their demandsfor extendingthe frontiersof

Mt. Lebanon to GreaterLebanon.3
Because Lebanon was placed at the centre of the non-ArabSyrianism of
the Jesuits, many Lebanese intellectuals inspired by Lammens and Martin
continuedto fluctuate,at least until 1920, between the idea of GreaterSyria
and that of Greater Lebanon. However the French decision to adopt the
division between GreaterLebanon and other Syrian territorieshad a great
impact on the stance taken by these intellectuals.
Until the arrival of the Lebanese delegations at Versailles in 1919, the
French were yet undecided on how to draw the borders of the territories
assigned for their Mandate.From 1915 until February1919, Frenchcolonial
circles were lobbying for Greater Syria including Lebanon. The main
institutionsto promotethe idea of GreaterSyriawere the FrenchChambersof
Commerce,notablythatof Marseilles.To convince the Frenchgovernmentto
keep Greater Syria undivided, the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce
mobilized all the French institutionsthat were involved in Syrian affairs. At
the beginningof 1915 this Chamberof Commercebegan to put pressureon the
Frenchgovernmentfor the creationof la Syriefranqaise, whose borderswere
to stretchfrom the Taurusin the northto Sinai in the south. On 6 May Baron
d'Anthouradde Wesservas, the French PlenipotentiaryMinister (Ministre
Plenipotentiaire) informed the President of the Marseilles Chamber of
Commercethat a Frenchcommissionhad been establishedto studythe future
of Syriaafterthe War.Membersof the famouscolonial institution,the Comite
de l'Asie Franqaise, and the ReverendPere [Lucien] Cattina principalfigure
of the OrientalFaculty of Saint-JosephUniversity in Beirut, composed the
commission for this study.The resultof the study 'was the adoptionof the idea
...that the French government[should] demand ... the whole of Syria from
Taurus [in the north] down to Egypt [in the south]'. In the same letter the
Baron d'Anthourademphasized the fact that the Reverend Pere [Lucien]
Cattin,the Chancellorof Saint-JosephUniversity,had received recommenda-
tions from Frenchsocieties and chambersof commercesharingthe view that:
'This Syriawhich Franceshoulddemandis not a Syriamutilatedand reduced,
but an integralSyria from Taurusto Egypt and from the Mediterraneanto the
Euphrates.'4In his note to the MarseillesChamberof Commerce,Pere Cattin
presentedthe historical argumentsto justify that France should demandLa
Syrie Franqaise. The correspondence of the Marseilles Chamber of
Commerce shows that not only were the French Chambersof Commerce,
Saint-JosephUniversity and l'Asie Francaisemobilized for this goal, but also
the Lyons Society for silk production(sericicole et soie), the Silk Merchants
Union, the FrenchBank of Egypt, the GeographicalSociety of Marseillesand
the Missionary society of Africa.6 In its correspondence,the Chamber of
Commerce emphasizedthe ancient ties of Marseilles and Francewith Syria

from the time of the Crusadersuntil the establishmentof French 'colonies' in

the Levant during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the great
investments of French capital in the nineteenth century within Syria. In
addition to these historical reasons, the Marseilles Chamberof Commerce
asked the Frenchgovernmentto 'take accountof the economic considerations
from the dual perspective of the French interests and Marseilles interests
which, in [this] case ought not to be separated'.7
The Lyons Chamberof Commercehad sharedwith that of Marseilles in an
effort to organize, at the end of the war 'the French economic and
commercial mission' to Syria. It was the Lyons Chamberof Commercethat
appointedM.P. Huvelin, Professorof Law at the University of Lyons, as the
directorof this mission. In its correspondencewith the governmentand other
Frenchinstitutions,the Lyons Chamberof Commerceemphasizedthe role of
Lyons not only in the silk industry but also in the Jesuit missionary
institutionsof Syria.8
In January 1919, the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce organized a
'scientific conference' on Syria. A number of French scholars who were
specialists in the history, geography,archaeologyand economy of Syria came
together to form the Congresfranqais de la Syrie. Among these specialists
were two Lebanese intellectuals,ShukriGhanim(ChekriGanem)and George
Samne. Soon afterwardsthe Marseilles Chamberof Commercepublishedthe
papersof the conferencein threevolumes in orderto justify la Syriefranqaise
which the commercialcircles and politicians had been reclaimingfor France
since 1915.9
Ghanimand Samnebelonged to a groupof intellectualswho had emigrated
to Egypt and Franceand who were associatedwith societies organizedduring
the war to propagatethe idea of GreaterSyria. These societies were in touch
with French colonial circles and Jesuit institutions.The most eager to adopt
the idea of GreaterSyria was the Comite CentralSyrien establishedin 1917
in Parisby ShukriGhanimas its presidentand George Samne as its secretary.
It was supported and financed by French colonial circles. Ghanim also
presided over the Comite Libanais de Paris established in 1912. This may
explain why some historianssee Ghanimas a Lebanesenationalistand others
as a Syriannationalist.10 Ghanim'sposition was typical of those taken up by
many other Lebanese Christians during the war years when the political
future of the area was still uncertain.He rejected Arab nationalistdemands
for a single Arab political entity to be established in the former Ottoman
provinces underthe Hashemitedynasty of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, who led
the Arab Revolt that erupted in 1916 against the Ottomans. Like many
Christianemigres, Ghanim was of the opinion that: 'Damascus is at least
1500 kilometers from Mecca. To annex Syria to Arabia would be to do
violence to the very soil from which its history has sprung.'l1

The ComiteCentralSyrien of Parishad a branchin Egypt called Le Comite'

Libano-Syrien. Two activists deserve our attention - Edgard Tawil and
Abdalla Sfeir (Sfayr) Pasha.Tawil publisheda book in 1919 entitledLa Syrie
in which he reiteratedthe ideas formulatedby the Jesuit scholarson the non-
Arab identity of Syria, highlighting his claim of the Phoenician ancestry of
the Syrians.12 Sfeir, in his book Le Mandat Franqais written in 1922,
acceptedthe territorialfait accompli createdby the Frenchin 1920. However,
he continued to see non-ArabSyria as a single entity.13
George Samn&'sbook, La Syrie, was published in 1920, at a time when
the French had decided to abandonthe idea of la Syriefranqaise following
the agreement they reached with the British on the final division between
them of the former Ottomanprovinces. The introductionto Samne's book
written by Shukri Ghanim reflects the impact of the change in the French
position after 1919 on the Lebanese intellectuals who supportedthe idea of
Greater Syria. Although he still used the term 'Syria' as French colonial
circles applied it before 1919, Ghanim now accepted the fact that any new
French policy might well bring about a territorialdivision of the Mandate
into several entities. He finds justification for this in the historical religious
divisions:
Due to its present religious divisions and the state of mind among its
populations,its heritage of tyrannyfor several centuries, Syria cannot
but be formed into three parts, or four - if Palestine has to remain
separate. GreaterLebanon or Phoenicia, the region of Damascus and
that of Aleppo.14
In this introductionGhanimnever omits the term 'la Phenicie' whenever he

mentions 'le GrandLiban'. He also finds room to praise Charles Corm, the
founderand directorof La Revue Phe'niciennearoundwhich he had gathered
'a fine constellation of young writers'.15In 1920 Ghanim's le Grand-Liban
ou la Phenicie seemed more realistic than his la Syriefranqaise or Greater
Syria of the year before. For Ghanim,as long as France controlledthe area,
the territorialissue would be resolved in the best interestof le GrandLiban
which would then affect other parts of Syria:
The GreaterLebanon or Phoenicia which should comprise almost the

entire coastal area, already has an embryonic constitution, but a
commission establishedby the High Commissionaireof Francehas yet
to complete and ameliorateit. Undoubtedly,other commissions in the
other parts of Syria will be draw their inspirationfrom it. Be that as it
may, France is here to guide, to advise and to place everything in
equilibrium.16

Unlike Ghanim who is a Maronite from Mt. Lebanon, Samne is a Greek

Catholic from Damascus. This fact may explain his rejection of the fait
accompli of GreaterLebanon in 1920. For him, Syria was a cultural entity
different from that of the Arabs. Surveying 'the origins' of the Syrians in
the 'first period' of their history, Samne is content to review the origin of
Lebanon in a mere five pages, focusing on the multiracial'fusion' of it. The
first period of 'the origins' was one in which many 'races' blended, among
them being 'the Phoenicians, a branch of the grand Semitic emigration,
after making a stay around the Persian Gulf, they settled in the valley of
Canaan and along the Mediterraneancoast'.17 The second period for him
was the Arab conquest and the Crusaders.With the third period, 'from the
12th century to 1860', the history of Syria becomes the history of Mount
Lebanon and the Maronites. The brief fourth period, 'the events of 1840-
1860', presents Samne's version of the civil wars which culminated in the
creation of the autonomous Lebanon 'le Liban autonome'. In his
interpretationof the historical developments within the Ottoman Empire,
he describes in great detail how Lebanon developed from 1861 onwards,
blaming the violation by the Ottomans of les rieglementsorganiques of
Lebanon's autonomy and the resulting economic pressurefor having caused
'the mass exodus of mountain dwellers towards countries more prosperous
and hospitable'.18 He then inserts, without further comment, a map of
Ottoman Greater Lebanon entitled 'The map of Lebanon and the regions
which have been detached from it'. It was drawnup by ShukriGhanim and
Habib Mas'ud, who claimed they had based it on a map of 'the French
General Staff in 1860'.19
Consistent with his Syrianism, Samne strews his text throughoutwith the
terms 'Syria' and 'the Syriannation'. Consistentalso is the way he refers to
the three 'tendencies' that divided the Lebanese emigres before 1919.
Accordingto him, there may have been four or five individualswho 'demand
with hue and cry the incorporationof Lebanoninto a HejazianEmpire'.Then
therewas 'a minority'with whom he sharedat least what he describedas 'the
fear of seeing their mountain administered by the Bedouins'. The third
tendency representedthe majorityof the emigres for whom Lebanonwas an
integral part of Syria20while they vehemently opposed the projects of the
British to divide Syria between the Bedouins of Hejaz in Damascus and the
Zionists in Palestine.21
Although Samne called his book La Syrie, he actually pays little
attention to the Syrian territories of Damascus, Aleppo, and so on, but
deals in depth and detail with the economy and administrationof Greater
Lebanon. The following passage, echoing Lammens' 'Lebanon is for Syria
what the Nile is for Egypt', represents Samne's new nationalist ideology
in a nutshell:

Today Lebanon demands altogethermore space for breathing,living,

and material development ... For us, the question has been resolved
from the beginning. An autonomousGreaterLebanon will be for the
whole of Syria an assuranceof its integraldevelopment.In fact nothing
is betterthan an example; Syriannationalismhas alreadyemergedfrom
Lebanese nationalism.22
Although Samne advocates non-Arab Syrianism, his historical survey of

Lebanon was later used to foster Lebanese nationalism separate from
Syrianism. The arguments of Samne and Ghanim on the non-Arab
characteristicsof Syria inspired Lebanese intellectuals to formulate their
non-Arab Lebanism. At the beginning of the 1920s Ghanim himself fully
shifted his allegiance in support of Lebanese nationalism and Greater
Lebanon.
Among those who advocated a GreaterSyria in accordancewith French
colonial circles was Nadra Moutran.Like other Lebanese Christianemigres,
Moutranparticipatedin the Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913 to discuss
the futureof the OttomanArab provinces.Althoughhe was a graduateof the
University of Saint-Joseph,Moutran opposed separatistideas of non-Arab
Syrianism. Despite his conviction of the Arab origin of the Syrians, his
geographicalstance towardSyria was close to that of the Frenchcommercial
and colonial circles. In his La Syrie de demain,publishedin 1916, he defines
Syria as an entity while Lebanonis an integralpartof this entity: 'Lebanonis
an integralpartof Syria. From the historical,ethnographicaland commercial
point of view, they should not be distinguished.'23
It is worth noting that Moutran'sLa Syrie de demain was published at a
time when GreaterSyria, known as la Syriefranqaise, was gaining currency
in French colonial circles such as the French Chambersof Commerce, the
missionaryinstitutionsin the Levant and among certainmilitaryand political
officials. Although he mentions the different political tendencies and the
various religious communities in Syria, 'Syrians' for Moutranare generally
those who have the true interestsof the populationat heart and yearn for the
creation of a new Syria following the victory of the French:
The Syrians desire, first of all, the victory of the French armies, not
only because they fight for the most noble motive [and] for the most
just cause, but also because the future of their countrydepends on the
French victory.24
Aware that the non-Christianpopulationmight not warm to this new Syria

under French 'protection' and realizing that the Christiansof Lebanon may
fear Muslim domination, Moutrancounters that the Muslims, though they

make up two-thirdsof the population,are too divided among themselves to

pose a threat:
Yes, the Muslims constitute two thirds of the populationin Syria. But
among them are the Druze, who receive their ordersfrom London.The
day they know that it is with the approvalof England that the French
are landing their troops in Syria, they will be on the side of France ...
There are also the Shi'ites ...Nusayris and Isma'ilis.25
Moutran adds that in the new Syria there is no cause for the Lebanese
Christiansto be fearfulas the Muslims would never be able to have the upper
hand:
[T]he common government imposed on Syria does not give

preponderanceto the Muslim majorityof the country ... Fear of them
will be shared by all the non-Muslims of Syria without excepting the
Nusayris, the Druze and the Shi'ites.26
Moreover, the Lebanese Christians could rely on the French, who had
provedtheir supportfrom 'FrancisI to the presentgovernment'.27 Because of
its ancient ties with France,la Syriefran4aise would guaranteethe economic
dominance of the Christians, notably the Lebanese, even though the
Christiansformed only one-thirdof the population:
...they have, over a significant part of the Muslim population, a real

and effective control:the tradeand a greatportionof the propertyare in
their hands. Moreover, Lebanon is Christianand French. Lebanon is
therefore the strategic key to Syria, all the more because the Syrian
ports are in its zone.28
Moutran depicts those who want full independence for Syria, whether
Christianor Muslim, as idealists who lack all sense of political realism:
Undoubtedly,among the Syriansthere is a partywhich still believes in

the possibility of an independent Syria. There are even [some] who
want to restorethe ArabEmpire. . . Nevertheless all these projectshave
no supportersbut intellectuals, idealists who have no experience of
political realities.29
Thus, Moutran's Syria is hardly different from that envisaged by French

colonial circles and the Chambersof the Commercebetween 1915 and 1919.
The fact that he was a Greek Catholic from Zahla probably reflects his

oppositionto the separationof Lebanonfrom his Syria.However, in referring

to the Maronites,he alludes to their non-Arab origin as descendents of the
Marada or the Assyrians and especially the Phoenicians from whom they
inheritedtheir commercialabilities.30Although there is little informationon
Moutran'sposition after 1920, one can assume that his education at Saint-
JosephUniversity and his emphasison the Christianinterestsof Syrianotably
those of Lebanon, led him to accept thefait accompli of GreaterLebanon.
More than Moutran and Samne, Khairallah Khairallah emphasizes the
historyof Mt. Lebanonin his volume on Syria.Writtenbefore the outbreakof
the First World War, Khairallah'sbook, La Syrie focused on the historical
ties of MountLebanonwith the Phoenicians,and on the principalityof Mount
Lebanon,which Khairallahsaw as 'Lebanese'ratherthanDruze. Althoughhe
preachestolerancebetween the religious communities,the Muslims in Syria
are almost entirely omitted from his historicalsurvey. His main message was
to liberate the Syrians from Ottoman despotism. His historical narrative
allowed Lebanese writers to conclude that Mount Lebanon and its environs
were the principalpartof Syria. Thus some of them suggestedthat Khairallah
was in favour of GreaterLebanon.31
ProbablyJacquesTabet's book, La Syrie (1920) is the best example of this
literaturein which non-Arab Syrianism could lead to Lebanism. Like his
colleagues in Franceand Egypt, Tabet was a scion of a rich family in Beirut.
He was educated at Saint-JosephUniversity and maintainedclose relations
with the Frencheconomic institutionsin Beirut.At the beginning of the First
World War, he escaped to Egypt where he found time to formulatehis ideas
about what he had absorbedat the University of Saint-Joseph.Drawing his
references from Lammens, Tabet continued to be loyal to the Jesuit legacy
concerning the non-Arab and Phoenician origin of the Syrians. More than
anyone else Tabet identifiesla Syrie with la Phe'nicie,that is, Lebanon.Tabet
began writing his book in 1916 when la Syrie franqaise was still on the
political agenda of Frenchcolonial circles and 'Syro-Lebanese'intellectuals.
Althoughhe felt no need to adjustthe title of his book, the territorialdivision
of 1920 meant that 'Syria' and the 'Syrian nation', took on a different
meaning for him. Accordingto Tabet, at the end of the Ottomanperiod there
were three peoples, or 'nations', in search of independence,the Phoenicians
(that is, Syrians), the Armeniansand the Arabs:
...there exist enslaved nations, the Phoenician,Armenianand Arabian

which had for a long time played a great role in the history and could
not forget their past ...The Armenian question has for a long time
occupied the chancelleries of Europe and was discussed in numerous
studies. The Syrianquestionwhich is far less known has been wrongly
confused with the Arab question.32

To settle the question of the difference between the Syrians (Phoenicians)

and the Arabs, Tabet resorts to geography and history, and finds that
'Lebanon is the core around which the Syrian question is being grafted'.
The openness of the Lebanese and their ability to absorbnew ideas are for
Tabet testimony to their Phoenician origin: 'The Lebanese who were the
first to receive the seeds of liberatingideas resemble the Phoenicianswhose
history shapedby the agents of ideas.'33Then Tabet summarizesthe history
of Mount Lebanon from 1860 to 1913 as a manifestation of Syrian
(Phoenician) nationalist aspirations. In a brief comment on the Arab
influence, he argues that although the Arab Empire unified the Yemen,
Nejd, Mesopotamia and Syria, it never succeeded in altering the 'soul' of
Syria or Phoenicia:
It is true that the Arab conquest had grouped all these different
countries into a single Caliphate; but the political label which is
imposed on the nations by force, just as it cannot change the natureof
their soil and climate, so it cannot change their spirit and mentality;it
will fall down by itself when the Arab arm is broken.Politically, Syria
is no more Arab than it is Ottoman.Syria is Syrian and Phoenician.34
Tabet sees Lebanese Christianemigres in Egypt who supportArabism as

collaboratorswith Egypt and Britain, whose position is contraryto that of
France,the true protectorof the Syrians.However, 'our compatriotsin Egypt
do not at all sully the unshakeableloyalty of the majorityof Syrianstowards
France'.35Marginalizingthe Muslim role in the history of his 'Syria', Tabet
distinguishestwo contrarypolitical projects:that of the Muslims, who dream
of an Arab revival, and that of the Christians,for whom governmentmeans
economic prosperity:
The Muslim element still dreams of an Arab renaissance, and the

Christianelement aspires only for a governmentalpower which will be
the most profitablefor economic progress and more lucrative for the
indigenous population ... It seems that the Muslims incline towards a
dangerousand fruitlesssatisfactionof theirpride,and the Christiansare
disposed to abandonwithout regret the political tedium of politics to
the guardian nation in order to become entirely devoted to material
projectswhich [France]had preparedfor it. Between the xenophobiaof
the Muslims and the mercantilismof the Christianswhich is similar to
the Phoenicians,there is, undoubtedly,a way more conformableto the
political givens of the question,just as it is for the sake of and for the
true interests of the country. The Muslims should consider that,
geographicallyas well as politically, Arab unity is an impossibility.36

As to the Phoenicianorigin of the Syrians,he arguesthat 'Historydoes not

take more leaps than does nature;everythingthere is connected by a logical
and well orderedchain, in which nothing created emerges from nothing.'37
After having placed Phoenicia historically at the heart of Syria, Tabet notes
how it had brought civilization to many parts of the ancient world - and
despite the remains left by occupation under diverse empires, the cultural
legacy of Phoenicia continued to play an importantrole in history, which
'deserves, above all, the acknowledgmentof the Syrians'.38 He explains how
the Phoenicians had been able to preserve their legacy despite foreign
dominationthroughthe parallel history of Mount Lebanon:
But since Roman rule, throughoutthe political vicissitudes of which

Syria had been the arena, Lebanon was ... the privileged region ...
which had always enjoyed independence.39
Having placed the geographical location of this 'independence' in

Lebanon, he turned to the Maronites,who continued to live their own life
and completely succeeded in safeguardingtheir nationalexistence. While he
considers the ancient Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs and
Ottomansas forces of occupationand oppression,he portraysthe Crusaders
as liberatorsof the heartlandof Syria-Lebanon:
The period of the Crusadersbrought the people of Lebanon and in

particularthe Maronites an increase of privileges and liberties. The
Crusaderswere received graciously as liberators.40
In a chapteron ethnography,Tabet is keen to show how the Syrian 'race'

had been preserved. As he tells it, long before the Seleucids (312-64 BC)
there existed a Syrian race which had maintained its 'ethnographic
purity'.4' Subsequent occupation by foreigners had only a limited impact
because these had controlled the country militarily and politically but had
intermixedonly slightly with the local population.As to the Arab conquest
of Syria, while admitting that the gradual infiltration into the region by
Arabs before the rise of the Islam had facilitated their conquest of Syria,
Tabet avers that
it would be an error to believe that the local population had been

completely submergedby the invasion. Apart fom the regulararmy of
the Caliphs, the Arab conquest had also brought from the cities of
Arabia their noble clans and their merchants, but like their
predecessors, the new conquerors denied the pillaging tribes of the
desert any access into the inhabitedterritories.42

At the same time, Tabet maximizes the impact of the Crusaderson Syrian
ethnography:
The Crusades seem, at first, to have introducedinto Syria a foreign

element of certain importancein view of their numbersand the period
of their occupation(1096-1270) ... [But] the majoritywent back ... to
Europe;a very small numberwere dispersedin the country,mainly in
Lebanon,where the Maronitesgave them refuge.43
Distinguishing between 'race' as the outcome of natureand 'nationalite'

as a productof homopoliticus, Tabet concludes:
Nationality is a political denominationwhich has no common feature

with race and which conquerorsimpose for raisons d'e'tatupon totally
different peoples. Whilst race is a work of nature, the product of a
certainhumantype of a specific countrywhich cannotbe transplanted,
without losing its proper characterand its distinctive qualities ... In
Syria ...the various elements ... throughthe different conquests have
lost all the original qualities incompatible with the Syrian country,
acquiring,in the course of many centuries,all the qualities that the air,
the sun, the water and the produce of Syria had imparted to its
inhabitants.44
Because the language of the population of Syria is Arabic, Tabet has to

play down the role of language as a constitutive element of nationalism.
Since he identifies Syria with Lebanon,or, more correctly,with the Lebanon
of the Christians,he argues that Arabic will soon be facing competitionwith
French:
In reality the Arabic language remains the universal language in the

country. [But] it will soon find itself face to face with a new language:
French. This new language, with its richness, beauty and organization,
is certainlymore powerful than the Turkishlanguage ... [T]he Syrians
had, at first, spoken all the languages:Phoenician,Egyptian,Chaldean,
Hebrew and Greek; modem Arabic is very different from the pre-
Islamic Arabic ... These continual transformationshad singularly
reduced .. ., the nationalvalue of languagesconcerningthe characterof
people.45
For Tabet, France entered Syria in order to 'liberate' the Syrians.

Accordingly, 'In this matter there are neither conquerors nor conquered,
neither vanquishersnor vanquished.'46Although he justifies the demands of

the 'Lebanese' for le GrandLiban, he wants to maintainthe political unity of

Syria under decentralizationbecause of the economic benefits this would
entail for the Christians of Syria in general and those of Lebanon in
particular. They can 'be spread throughoutthe surroundingsand largely
participatein the country's life and its progress'.47Returningto Lebanon
after 1920, Tabet adapted the new political constellation leading him to
abandon his former Syrianism. He was one of those who initiated the
establishmentof the National Museum to disseminatethe Phoenicianlegacy
of the new Lebanon.
Although non-Arab Syrianism contained the historical argumentson which

Lebanese nationalism would rely, some intellectuals among the Lebanese
emigres began from 1908 to formulatethe basic ideas of such nationalism.As
for the non-Arab Syrianists, 'Phoenicia' offered these emigrantsan escape
from Arabismthat often overtly bore Muslim aspects and that was gradually
developing in Syria and Lebanon.However, to justify their separatismvis-a-
vis Syria, Lebanese nationalistintellectualswere not satisfied with recalling
the 'Phoenician past of Lebanon'. They also began to draw on historical
narratives describing the resistance of Mt. Lebanon's inhabitants against
Arab and Turkishoccupation. Inspiredby the historical perceptions of two
Maroniteclergymen and chroniclers,Gabriel(Jubra'il)Ibn al-Qila'i (d.1516)
and Istifan Duwayhi (d.1704), the Lebanese nationalistwritersbolsteredthis
view with the claim of Mardaite ancestry for the Maronites, not just to
counter Arabism but to create a myth of Maroniteresistance to the 'Arab-
Muslim invaders' of Lebanon in the seventeenthcentury.48
The Mardaites were added to the Phoenician legacy in 1902 when, in
addition, Henri Lammens brought in another group that early Muslim
chroniclershad called al-Jarajima- the Arabic name for the Mardaiteswho
fought against the Arab-Muslimsin the seventh century. According to him
the Mardaitesor al-Jarajimawere broughtto Mt. Lebanonby the Byzantines
to help defendthe coastal region of Syria againstthe Arabinvaders.Although
Lammens argues that some Mardaiteswho remained in Mt. Lebanon had
been integrated with the Maronites, he considers the two to be separate
groups. The most prominentdebatersat the time had been Yusuf Dibs and
Joseph Dirian, who were both keen on tracing the early history of the
Maronites. Using the same sources of Lammens but reaching the opposite
conclusion, Dibs holds that Mardaites(Arabic for marada- insurgentswho
revolted against the Byzantine Empire)was anothername for the Maronites.
According to Dirian, the Mardaiteswere the people of mardyinwho came to
Mt. Lebanonfrom Armenia, 'the land of the Mardaites',and they are neither
Maronitesnor al-Jarajima.Dirian then argues that Mardaitesand al-Jarajima

at one point merged to become the Maronitepeople. Dirian's interventionin

the debate led Dibs later to add that al-Jarajimawere Maronitestoo.49
Although it never put an end to the otherversions of that early history, the
historical debate enabled many later historians and intellectuals to use the
triple combination of Maronites, Mardaites, and al-Jarajimaas additional
historical justification for their Maronite-Lebanese nationalist discourse.
Like Phoenicia, the Mardaitesand al-Jarajimaserved to disclaim any link
with Arabism. Aware that these historical perceptions more or less cancel
each other out, scholars from 1917 onwardssuggested a compromisewhich
argues that the Mardaitesor al-Jarajimahad taken refuge in Mount Lebanon
and so had become absorbed within the Maronite descendants of the
Phoenicians. For example, Yusuf al-Sawda, whose books were popular
among the Lebanese Maronites,at one point writes: 'Whateverthe origin of
the Mardaites... their historical record is related to the historical record of
Lebanon ... in the same manner as ... the Phoenicians.'50 In his book, Fi
Sabil Lubnan [For Lebanon], al-Sawda praises the resistance of the
'Lebanese Mardaites' against the Arab-Muslims:'Instead of respecting the
inclination of its [Lebanon's] people for freedom and independence ... by
their desire for domination and conquest, they [the Arabs] seized every
available opportunity to engage in war against the Lebanese', whose
resistance prevented the Arabs from achieving their goal to occupy
Constantinople,the capital of Byzantium.5'
Although the Phoenician,Mardaitesand al-Jarajimapast had been related
to the historicalrecord of the Maronitesand Lebanon,Lebanese nationalism
as national ideology and discourse could be crystallized only after the
creation of GreaterLebanon. In her PhD dissertationon the origins of the
Lebanesenational idea, Carole Hakim-Dowekdrawsthis conclusion. From a
textual analysis of Lebanese writings since 1840 until the First World War,
Hakim-Dowekarguesthat Lebanese nationalist'ideology and movement did
not exist priorto the establishmentof the LebaneseState in 1920, . .. [though]
some core ideas and basic historical myths, around which Lebanese
nationalism eventually crystallized, were formulatedby ... the clerical and
secular elite' in the second half of the nineteenthcentury.According to her,
these core ideas matured into a coherent nationalist project only after the
collapse of the OttomanEmpire.52AlthoughKamal Salibi refersto Lebanese
nationalismfrom the point view of geographyand political entity, he arrives
at a conclusion similar to that of Hakim-Dowek. 'Since the turn of the
century ... the Maronites pressed for the extension of the small Lebanese
territory[of 1861] to what they arguedwere naturaland historicalboundaries
... of GreaterLebanon.'53
Although the basic mythological argumentson the nationalist character-
istics of the Lebanese had been developing since 1908, the geographical

boundaries of such Lebanese nationalism were still in debate among

Lebanese writers. Through the 'geography of Lebanon' the Lebanese
nationalist writers continued to formulate their nationalist ideology and
discourse.
The first volume to define the similar geography of Lebanon was La
Question du Liban by M. Jouplain,the pseudonym of the francophileBulus
Nujaym and publishedin Paris in 1908. His historical survey begins with the
Lebanese 'resistance' against the Arab invasion of Mount Lebanon in the
seventh centuryand ends with the emergenceof the 'democratic'spiritof the
Maronitesduringthe upheavals of the nineteenthcentury which resulted in
the establishmentof Mt Lebanonautonomousdistrictcalled mutasarrifiyyain
1861. Surveying the historical events of the nineteenth century, Nujaym
portrays the Maronites of Lebanon as champions of the democratic spirit
struggling against the feudality of the Druze and the conspiracy of the
Ottomans.54Summarizingthe contributionof Nujaym to foster a Lebanese
entity, Albert Hourani writes that for Nujaym 'there has been a Lebanese
nation since the beginning of history' and the mutasarrifiyyawas 'no more
than a stepping stone towardsreal independence,which would some day be
achieved with the help of Europe'.55 Nujaym wanted to see the
mutasarrifiyyaextended so that it included Beirut, the fertile plain of the
Biqa', Bilad Bshara, Marj'iyunand al-Hula in the south and 'Akkar in the
north.56The historical and geographicalargumentsof Nujaym on Lebanon
had become a basis of 'the national aspiration' of some intellectuals and
politicians whose argumentsformulatedthe demands the Lebanese delega-
tions presentedto the 1919 Versailles Peace Conferencefor an independent
state of 'Lebanon' whose 'naturalfrontiers'would be similar to those of the
imara of Fakhral-Din and the Shihabi amirs.S7
Nujaym may have elaboratedthe ideas of FerdinandTayan who in 1905
published a pamphletunder the title La nationalite'maronite. Although his
geographyof Lebanonremainsthat of MountLebanon,Tayan arguesthatthe
Maronitesconstitute a separate 'nation' within an Empire controlledby the
Turks.58Extendingthe geographyof Lebanonbeyond Mt. Lebanon,Nujaym
adopted arguments expressed by Henri Lammens on the geography of
Lebanon.In 1902, in the Jesuitjournal of al-Mashriq,Lammenspublisheda
series of articles under the heading 'Tasrih al-Absar fi ma Yahtawihi Jabal
Lubnanmin al-Athar' [Overview of Lebanese Archaeological Sites]. He set
out his views on Lebanon's geography,history, archaeology and population
movements, arguing that Mount Lebanon was only one part of 'Lebanon',
which actually covered an area that extended from the Mediterraneanin the
west to al-'Asi (the Orontes) in the east, and from al-Nahr al-Kabir in the
northto al-Litaniin the south.59But 'a Lebanonfor Syria is like the Nile for
Egypt' 60

Although Lammens continued to see Syria as an integral entity, his

argumentson Lebanon had probably inspiredNujaym and others. The best
representativeof Lammens' ideas on the Lebanese geographywas Yusuf al-
Sawda, a Lebanese emigrant in Egypt since 1907. Like many of his peers
among the Maronite intellectuals, al-Sawda had studied in the Oriental
Faculty of Saint-Joseph University under the Jesuit teachers such as
Lammens.In his volume Fi Sabil Lubnan[For Lebanon],al-Sawdadedicated
the first two chaptersto the history of Mount Lebanon where the Lebanese
'nation' preserved their independent spirit since the Phoenicians until the
reign of the princes of the Ma'n (1516-1697) and Shihab (1697-1840)
families. In these two chapters,the historyof Lebanonconcentrateson Mount
Lebanon,though Fakhral-Din al- Ma'ni (1590-1633) 'extended its frontiers
... from Jerusalemin the south to Aleppo in the north' and the Bashir al-
Shihabi 'restored Beirut and the Biqa' and annexed Ba'lbak and Wadi al-
Taym to [the Mountain].61The first edition of this volume was published in
1919 when the frontiers of Lebanon were still under discussion between
France and the Lebanese delegations in Versailles. In order to justify the
extension of the Lebanese frontiers into a Grand Liban, al-Sawda quotes
Lammens who puts the southern border along the Litani River.62 In the
second edition in 1924, the quotationfrom Lammens has disappeared.Thus
al-Sawda in this edition welcomed France's decision to expandLebanoninto
GreaterLebanon:'from al-Nahral-Kabir[in the north]to Naquraof Acre [in
the south] and from the sea [in the West] to al-'Asi and the Anti-Lebanonin
[the East]'.63 According to him:
When the Lebanese demanded the independence of Lebanon, they

meant the geographical one created by nature and not the truncated
Lebanon ... [of] 1861 ... The restorationof the severed territories[the
coast, Biqa', 'Akkarand the south] is a naturaland undisputedright, in
addition to its vitality. Depriving [Lebanon of this right] means
economic suicide.64
It seems that even among the emigrantswho called for the extension of
Lebanon,the idea of GreaterLebanondid not take its final shapebefore 1919.
Hizb al-Ittihadal-Lubnani(Party of the Lebanese Unity) was probably the
first Lebanese society to call for the extension of the mutasarrifiyya.That
society was formed in Egypt by Lebanese emigrants in 1908 - Yusuf al-
Sawda, Iskanser 'Ammun, August Adib, Antun al-Jumayl and others. Al-
Sawda claimed that since 1909 the partyof the LebaneseUnity had presented
its demand for 'a guarantee by the Powers for absolute independence of
[Greater]Lebanon within its natural frontiers'.65Since al-Sawda wrote his
book a few years later, it is difficult to ascertainwhetherindeed al-Ittihadal-

Lubnanihad already adopted in 1909 what in 1919 became the 'nationalist

ambitions' of these Lebanese societies for GreaterLebanon.What is certain
is that more than any otherLebanese society, from 1912 and notably in 1919,
al-Ittihad al-Lubnani carried the expansion of Lebanon as its banner.
However the term 'GreaterLebanon' was not used before 1918. The first to
use this term was Daud 'Ammun, in a letter to his wife at the end of 1918.66
Ammun, a memberof the administrativecouncil of al-mutasarrifiyyaheaded
a delegation to the peace conference in Versailles in 1919 which presented
the demand to extend the frontiers of al-mutasarrifiyyato create Greater
Lebanon.
Investigating the position of other emigrant societies suggests that
'Lebanon's natural frontiers' had not been defined until 1919. In August
1911 Na'um MukarzilfoundedJam'iyatal-Nahdaal-Lubnaniyya(Society of
Lebanese Renaissance)in New York. Initially the goal of the society was to
guaranteethe autonomyof al-mutasarrifiyyaand to ensureit had access to the
Mediterranean.At least until 1913 Mukarzil's idea on Lebanon was still
vague, since he was one of the participantsof the ArabCongressheld in Paris
in 1913 which called for the autonomyof the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire including Mount Lebanon.Mukarzilcame aroundto an idea similar
to that of al-Sawda on the geography of Lebanon only in 1919, when
Lebanese delegations arrived in Paris to promote the idea of Greater
Lebanon. Mukarziljoined these delegations notably that of the Maronite
patriarch,Iliyas Huwayik who reiteratedthe demand for 'the restorationof
Lebanon to its naturaland historical frontiers' in accordancewith the map
drawnup by 'the commanderof the French [military]expedition to Syria in
the years 1860-1861'.67 Mukarzil's shift from Arabismto Syrianismand to
Lebanese nationalism characterizesmany intellectuals among the Lebanese
emigres. Duringthe First World War, Lebanese and Syro-Lebanesesocieties
of these emigres were still debating over the geographicalfrontiersof their
homeland. While the idea of Greater Syria could be traced back to the
ninteenth century, the idea of GreaterLebanon was formulatedonly in the
decade before the First World War.68
Because Lebanese nationalism as a subject for political discourse was

initiated by Maronite intellectuals who, for this purpose, 'annexed' the
history and, to some extent, the culture of other areas to Mount Lebanon,
their Muslim peers were quick to denounce the establishment of Greater
Lebanon as a French act serving 'Maronite interests'. For several Muslim
leaders and intellectuals the French were guilty not only of having divided
Syria but also of having served some 'separatist elements' among the
Maronites.69Sharp opposition came even from those Muslim leaders who

had acceptedthe territorialfaitaccompli of 1920. In an effort to attenuatethis

opposition and to encourage Muslims to cooperate with the new state,
Christian-Lebaneseleaders set out to modify Lebanese nationalism and
somehow adapt it to Lebanon's multi-communalcharacter.They began to
search for common denominatorsamong the diverse communitiesthat could
be incorporatedin Lebanism,without renouncingits basic concepts, such as
the 'historical continuity' of Lebanon.
The main motivating force behind this search was undoubtedly Michel
Chiha. He was born in September1891 and studied in the Jesuit schools. His
father,AntunChihabelonged to Lebanon'stiny Chaldeancommunityand his
mother, Adma Far'un belonged to one of the richest family among the
merchantsof Beirut.In 1914 throughbusiness and family ties with the Far'un
family and with Bshara al-Khuri, a leading politician of the Maronite elite
who was to become independentLebanon's first presidentin 1943,7?Chiha
left for Egypt to be integratedin the circle of the Lebanese intellectuals,such
as al-Sawda,HectorKlat and others.The literaryactivities of these emigrants
had a great impact on Chiha writings and ideas. Returningto Beirut in 1919,
he began his career as politician and journalist. Besides his economic
activities as the director of the Chiha-Far'unbank he wrote articles in Le
Re'veil,the pro-Frenchnewspaper.In 1921 he joined a groupof supportersof
the French Mandate to establish a political party whose slogan was 'for
Lebanon with France'. Meanwhile he joined 'the new Phoenicians' a group
of intellectuals headed by Charles Corm who re-established La Revue
Pheniciennne. Unlike his Lebanese nationalistpeers, Chiha believed in the
possibility of integrationbetween the Maronitesand other communities.As a
scion of a merchantfamily and a successful banker,he maintainedramified
relations with Muslims as well as Christians.Thus he realized early on how
importanteconomic ties could be as an instrumentfor modifying people's
attitude and behaviour. Moreover, because of the good relations he had
cultivatedwith the FrenchauthoritiesChihawas able to interveneactively in
Frenchdecision-makingduringthe firstyears of the Mandate.In 1926, during
the criticaltime of the Syrianrevolt (1925-1927), when Maroniteleadersand
intellectuals feared the Frenchmight be amenable to a territorialrevision in
favor of the Muslims, Chiha was the most dominant member of the
committee the French had charged with drafting the new Lebanese
constitution.71Chaired by Musa Nammur, one of the powerful leaders of
the Maronitesand with the membershipof Chiha and representativesof the
Lebanese communities,the committee startedits work at the end of 1925. On
19 May 1926 the committee presented a draft constitution to the
RepresentativeCouncil, and within four days, on 23 May, (that is without
giving memberssufficient time to discuss the draft),the High Commissioner
approvedit as final.72

The outcome of the committee's work suggests that, as a means of

reducing communal dissatisfaction and enhancing 'the guarantee of the
future', it did see confessional representation,or, as contemporaryLebanese
authorsprefer to call it, 'corporatefederalism' as a solution.73
By ensuring proportional representationof Lebanon's different ethnic
communitiesand the equality of all Lebanese before the law, the constitution
was designed to create a basis for power sharing as part of the process of
nation-building.With this balance in place, Chihano doubtbelieved that the
Lebanesenationalismwhich the Christianintellectualshad articulatedduring
and after the First World War could unite the various discrete communal
loyalties into one single national loyalty. Chiha's search for a Lebanese
nationalismthat would be acceptable to all Lebanese citizens can be traced
through the many articles he published in Le re'veil,after 1920, and in his
daily paper,Le jour, after 1936.
His book Liban d'aujourd'hui [LebanonToday] (1942) is a synthesis of
these ideas. As such, it reflects the formation of Lebanese nationalist
discourse in which Christianintellectuals and leaders sought to find a basis
for their Lebanese nation. Right from the start, Chiha connects the new
Lebanonwith Phoenicia: 'Lebanon of today, more than five thousandyears
old, cannot be more astonishing when one says of it that it is young ... for
that reason it justifies its nother name of Phoenicia.'74He adds that: 'With
regard to our territory,the Lebanon of today has become almost identified
with the metropolitanLebanon-Phoeniciaof the past',75 though he realizes
that the Phoenicia of 'yesterday' stretchedall the way from Mount Carmel
in the south to the isle of Arwad and Tartus in the north. Although he is
willing to let go of the Galilee or the 'Alawi Mountain, he asserts that
Mount Lebanon and Biqa', have always been an integral part of the
Phoenician coast.76
Chiha then sets out to refute the 'Arabism' of Lebanon along the same
lines as Tabet, Samne, al-Sawda and others. Unlike them, however, Chiha
does not restrictracial origin and Phoenicianismto the Christianpopulation
of Lebanon. Answering the question: 'Who among the people now living
constitute the Lebanese people today?'77 Chiha follows Western scholars,
such as Lammens, and claims that the origin of the Lebanese population
should be sought in the blending of races over the course of centuriesbefore
the emergence of Phoenicia. But only with Phoenicia did 'the ethnography'
of Lebanon become 'more known and clear' and distinctive, 'not only from
the point view of frontiersbut also of the political methods'. Since this was
accompanied by economic prosperity, it strengthened the 'national'
characteristicsof the Phoenicians before they succumbed to the successive
invasions of Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greek-Macedonians,Romans
and Muslims.78

After a cursorydescriptionof the pre-Islamicinvasion, Chihaportraysthe

Arab conquest in much the same manneras the Christianintellectuals who
first formulated Syrian and Lebanese nationalism versus Arabism, but he
introduces a new element when he adds that Islam replaced the 'national'
nature of Phoenicia with confessionalism, implying that it is this part of
Muslim legacy that forms the main obstacle to the 'rebuildingof the nation':
By the force of circumstances,with nascentIslam, the principallabel of

individuals which had been national under the domination of
Byzantium has become confessional.9
He then tells us that from both the ancient coast of Phoenicia and the
Mountain'the populations,maltreatedand dispersed,were drivenmany times
to rebellion [againstthe Muslims], until the adventof the Crusaders,many of
whom never retumedto Europebut throughintermarriagebecame partof the
Lebanese people.80During the Muslim periods, persecutedminorities found
refuge in the Lebanese mountainranges, among them the Isma'ilis, 'Alawis,
Druze, and Shi'ites. Meanwhile, in the coastal cities, Mamluks, Saljuqs,
Mongols and others who ruled or invaded the area were assimilatedinto the
population. During the Ottoman period, the Lebanese people were able to
establish their own political entity in the form of Ma'ni and Shihabi
principalities.81
This way of representingLebanon's history enabled Chiha to refute the
claim of Semitic ancestry for the modern Lebanese. The Lebanese are the
descendantsnot only of the Phoenicians but also of many other 'races' that
throughoutthe centuries merged in 'Lebanon'; neither the Semitic race nor
Semitic culture ever predominatedin the melting process. After eliminating
any one particulardescent in which Arabists could ground Arabism, Chiha
assumes that his task of putting Lebanese nationalism before Arabism had
been achieved. 'After that, can one say thatLebanonof today is Semitic? Can
one say it is Arab? Everyone can judge.' Aware of the geographical and
ethnographicties that, historically, have always linked Lebanon closely to
Syria, Chiha next embarkson undercuttingthe Arabismof Syria. For this he
resortsto Lammens' notions of Syria: 'FatherLammensto whom, I suppose,
we grantsome authority,had challengedthat even Syriawas Arab.For him it
had an original character, it was Syrian.' But he quickly realizes that if
Lammens'notion of the 'originalcharacter'of Syria also applies to Lebanon,
this would deprive his Lebanese nationalism of its own uniqueness. Thus
history and ethnographybecome secondarycomponentswhen Chihaseeks to
establish the uniquenessof his Lebanese nationalism,broughtout only when
they help to reinforce his denial of the Arab connection but marginalized
when they are liable to obfuscate the difference between Lebanese

nationalismand Syrianism.In a passage in which he shows himself to be as

adept as Lammens, if not more so, at discursive formation,he writes:
For our part we say anew with the most decisive arguments,that the
population of Lebanon on the whole is simply Lebanese, and with
reservations about its very recent naturalizations, it is no more
Phoenician that it is Egyptian, Aegean, Assyrian or Medean, Greek,
Roman, Byzantine, Arab, with or without consanguinity,or European
by alliances, or Turkish for example. At most, we can say that it is
probablyof the least decipherableMediterraneanvariety. It has its own
particular,no other. And one cannot explain the Lebanon of today
without taking it to be exactly as it is.82
On the one hand, Chiha here seems to abandon Phoenicianism and

historical arguments on which the Lebanese nationalism of 1908-1920
rested; on the other, by stressing the diverse racial origins of 'Lebanese
nation', he envisions that the new Lebanese, steeped as they are in
Mediterraneanculture,will revive the characteristicsof the Phoenicians,who
also were a mixture of races and who equally fostered their national identity
throughtheir Mediterraneanism.
Finally, Chiha also finds his way around the fact that Arabic is the
language of the Lebanese: although Arabic 'is a magnificent language' it
alone cannot be the national language of a nation that strives for the wider
horizons of economic and cultural prosperity.The new Lebanese, like the
Phoenicians, should be polyglot. 'Lebanon-Phoenicia can only be
polyglot.'83
Chiha called his book Liban d'aujourd'hui,but in effect, as in his other
articles and lectures, he ignores the presentwhen he invents a past of which
the main elements will be reconstitutedonly at some point in the future.This
past and futureare both determinedby the geographyof a land at a crossroads
which, as it allowed Phoenicia, will allow Greater Lebanon to be
cosmopolitanin cultureand economy. One almost senses that by postulating
this cosmopolitanism Chiha is stretching his Lebanese nationalism to the
breakingpoint, though for him it seems to have been no more than one more
ideological construct to eliminate the 'threat' of any form of Arabism
becoming the nationalideology of modem Lebanon.Alluding to this threatin
ambiguous language,84he demands 'a sufficient understandingof [Leba-
non's] geographical position ...; and then, of the nature of the different
groupingswhose partnershipconstitutesthe Lebanese people'.85
Just as his Phoenicia, through its geography, succeeded in forging a
cosmopolitan nation from the various populations it came to contain, the
same applies, under certain conditions, to the new nation. This focus on

Lebanon's geography has led Fawaz Traboulsi to consider Chiha a

geographical determinist.86But here we should recall that Chiha was a
merchant-banker,who saw laissez-faire as the economic essence of
cosmopolitan Lebanon, and an intellectual, who envisaged western culture,
values and political systems as the means whereby the disparatecommunities
that throughthe ages had found refuge in Lebanon could be blended into a
single nation. Geography, with this cosmopolitan aspect, determined the
future only if the 'Lebanese people' successfully handled the 'inconve-
niences' that still posed a threat:
We do not deny that the route on which we find ourselves and the
refuge-bastion dominating it have had for us advantages which can
continuegrowing from the intellectualand economic point of view. But
it clearly shows that this situation has serious inconveniences, posing
for us a constant danger on the social and political level.87
The main 'inconvenience' that stood in the way of Lebanese nationalism

was the traditionalparticularismof the minoritygroups. As within the unity
of the 'nation', Chiha's Lebanese nationalism leaves room for the
communities to exist as different entities. His approach is 'syncretistic',
and aims, as TheodorHanf states, 'neither for unity nor for diversity at any
cost, but for unity in diversity'. This unity in diversity can be obtained by
adopting a political pluralism, particularlyparliamentarianism,as the arena
for debate among the representativesof the 'syncretistic' (ethnic) groups or
the associated confessional minorities. While Chiha calls for a Lebanese
nationalismthat can unite all Lebanon's populations,he acknowledges that
'la diversite est notre destin'.88 Because it is a 'country of associated
confessional minorities, Lebanon would not be able to hold together
politically for long, without an assembly that would be a place of meeting
for the union of the communities,with a view to the common control of the
political life of the nation'.89Narrowingthe gap between the social classes,
and solving the problem of external 'covetousness [of the Arab Syrian
nationalists]' and 'irredentism[of the Lebanese Muslims]' is broughtabout
by the adoption of an economic and political system based on westem legal
models. The most suitable model for Lebanonis Swiss, because of the great
similarity between Lebanon and Switzerland not just in the mountainous
geography they share, but more significantly in the diversity of their
multicommunalpopulations.90
Where Chiha's Lebanese nationalismdiffers from that of the founders is
that it offers a blueprintfor building a nation within the territorialstate that is
Lebanon, whereas theirs, first and foremost, was meant to create 'Lebanon'
and justify it as a territorialstate. Although both reject Arabism, Chiha's

nationalism,in the way it combines the multicommunalentities, suggests a

formula by which the Maronite elite could try to persuade the elites and
intellectuals of the differentcommunitiesnot only to recognize the Lebanon
they had created but also to be involved in power sharing. While the
Lebanese nationalism of the founders hardly went beyond serving as a
justificationof the 'nationalaspiration'of the 'Lebanese', Chiha's Lebanese
nationalism tackles both sides of the coin - political power sharing and
ideological justification for Greater Lebanon. From 1926 this became the
political discourse of the ruling elite to regulate Lebanon's 'diversity'.
In actual fact, as formulated by Christian or more narrowly Maronite

intellectuals,Lebanesenationalismremainedlimited to and acceptedonly by
communalsegments only, even within the Christiancommunities.Thatit was
only partially successful in raising the national consciousness of Lebanese
Christian intellectuals means that we can expect a number of other
controversial interpretations of the group identity that the Lebanese
nationalistdiscourse set out to constructand of the power relationsit wanted
to entrench. There are those who reject its historical, geographical and
ethnographictenets and consider the Lebanese nationalism of the founders
and of Chihaas the ideological expressionof mere parochialconfessionalism,
far removed from the nationalist discourse that could negate exactly these
parochial loyalties that typify Lebanon's ethno-religious communities and
absorbthem within a wider 'meta-loyalty' of the nation. Others,who accept
the Lebanese nationalistdiscourse, continue to defend it on two fronts. One
stressesthat it is no differentfrom othernationalismsfound in otherterritorial
states in the Arab world, where loyalty to state nationalism (wataniyya) is
deeper than that to the 'undefined and ambiguous' pan-nationalism
(qawmiyya)that is meant to transcendexisting borders.The other highlights
the importanceof Lebanesenationalismfor the way it confrontsthe two main
'dangers'in the Middle East:Arabnationalism,which has become politically
Islamicized;and the various Islamic movementsthat seek to build an 'Islamic
empire' where secular nationalismwill never have a chance. This 'defence'
againstthe two 'dangers'of Islam and Arabismcharacterizesmany Lebanese
Christianwritings, from the foundersof Lebanese nationalismto the present.
For example, Nabil Khalifa resortsto the same argumentsof the foundersof
Lebanism, Chiha and others, to underpinhis claims for the uniqueness and
integrity of the history and geography of GreaterLebanon.As to the 'racial
origin' of the Lebanese people, Khalifa relies on Ruffie Jacques and Talib
Nagib's Etude hematypologique des ethnies libanaises (Paris, 1965) to
illustrate the 'great difference' between the Lebanese and the Arabs of
Arabia. On the cultural level, Khalifa considers the modem Lebanese, like

their ancestors the Phoenicians, to be bilingual and polyglot. According to

him, although the Lebanese use Arabic, they do so with exclusive
associations based on the specific culture of Lebanon.91Another result has
been that some contemporaryLebanese writers have begun reassessing the
'historicalperceptions' of the first foundersof Lebanese nationalismon how
the Lebanese nation had withstood the Arab-Musliminvaders,reiteratingthe
'successive persecutions'and 'Christianresistance' from the Mardaitesto the
present day. Paradoxically,the nationalismthat for Chiha and others was to
create 'unity' with 'diversity' perpetuated confessional 'diversity' and
deepened the communal cleavage in Lebanon.92
NOTES
1. In additionto al-Bustani,the first notion of Syria can be seen in the writings of Khalil Khuri,
KharabatSuria [The SyrianRuins] (Beirut:al-Matba'aal-Suriyya,1860); Mikha'ilMishaqa,
in Asad Rustumand SubhiAbu Shaqra(eds.), 'al-Jawab 'AlaIqtirahal-Ahbab'[The Answer
for Lovers' Suggestion](Beirut:Mudiriyatal-Athar,1955); Iliyas Matr,al-'Uqudal-Duriyya
fi Tarikh al-Mamlaka al-Suriyya [The Pearly Necklaces in the History of the Syrian
Kingdom] (Beirut: Publicationsof Matba't al-Ma'arif, 1874); George Yanni, TarikhSuria
[Historyof Syria] (Beirut:Al-Matba'aal-Adabiyya, 1881). On Syria of al-Bustani,Matrand
Yanni, see Yussef M. Choueiri,Arab History and the Nation State:A Studyin ModernArab
Historiography1820-1980 (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp.25-54.
2. See Martin al-Ab al-Yasu'i, TarikhLubnan [History of Lebanon], tr. Rashid al-Khurial-
Shartuni,3rd edn, (Beirut: Dar Nazir 'Abbud, 1994).
3. On the University of Saint Joseph and its Orientalfaculty, see Rafael Herzstein, 'Universite
Saint-Josephde Beyrouth:Fondationet Fonctionnementde 1875 a 1914' (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Haifa 2002, pp.195- 201; see also Asher Kaufman,'Reviving Phoenicia:The
Searchfor an Identityin Lebanon'(Ph.D dissertation,BrandeisUniversity,2000), pp.55-62.
4. Archives of Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles (ACCM), dossier MQ.5.4, Commerce
international,Syrie et Liban - 1885-1926, Baron d'Anthouardto Presidentof the Chamber
of Commerceof Marseilles, 6 May 1915.
5. Ibid, Presidentof CCM to Baron d'Anthouard,27 July 1915.
6. See Archives of Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, dossier MQ.5.4, Commerce
international, Syrie et Liban, 1885-1926; Serie L. IX, no.774; Serie L, no.775 and
Correspondence & documents, nos. 37-50. In all these dossiers, one can find the
correspondence between the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles with other French
chambers of commerce, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and with other French
institutionsconcerning 'La Syrie, que la Francedoit reclamer',from Taurusto al-'Arish. In
the dossier Correspondence& documents,nos.37-50, there is a map 'Croquisde la Syrie et
de la Mesopotamie', showing this Syrie francaise.
7. ACCM, Correspondence& documents,nos.37-50, note sur la valeur economiquede la Syrie
(Marseilles, 1915).
8. See correspondence,Archives of Chamberof Commerceof Lyons, Syrie, Documentsdivers,
vol.2029 (1918-24); and Mission en Syrie, f.2029 (1919-20).
9. Archives of Chamberof Commerceof Marseilles, Congresfranqais de la Syrie, Seances et
Travaux, 3 vols. (Paris and Marseilles, 1919). The first volume contains Paul Huvelin,
'Compte rendude la mission francaiseen Syrie', in Que vaut la Syrie. The second volume
contains the 'Section d'archeologie, histoire, geographie et ethnographie',mainly dealing
with the 'traditionalrelation' between Franceand Syria from the time of the Crusaders.The
third volume contains the 'Section de l'enseignement', in which can be found valuable

informationon the role of the Frenchand western schools in Syria, Lebanonand Palestine;
Congresfranqais de la Syrie.
10. See Rabbath,Laformation historiquedu Libanpolitique et consitutionnel.Essai de synthese
(Beirut: Universite Libanaise, 1973), pp.279-80; Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern
Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p.23; 'Isam Khalifa, Abhath.fi TarikhLubnan al-
Mu'asir [Studiesin the Historyof Modem Lebanon](Beirut:Dar al-Jil, 1985), pp.74-5, 116.
11. Quoted in Zeine N. Zeine, The Strugglefor Arab Independence,2nd edn (Delmar, NY:
CaravanBooks, 1977), p.68, and then in Rabbath,La fornation historique,p.280.
12. EdgardTawil, La Syrie (Alexandria:[n.n.], 1919).
13. 'Abdalla Sfeir [Sfayr],Le MandatFranqais et les traditionsfranqaises en Syrie et au Liban
(Paris:LibrairiePlon-Norritet Cie, 1922).
14. Ghanim, 'Introduction'in Georges Samne, La Syrie (Paris:Bossard, 1920), pp.xvii-xviii.
15. Ibid., p.xi.
16. Ibid., p.xix.
17. Georges Samne, La Syrie, p.25.
18. Ibid., p.216.
19. Ibid. The map gives as the southernfrontierthe Qasmiyya river, p.224.
20. Ibid., p.230.
21. Ibid., Samne devoted large sections of his book to three factorshe sees as having destroyed
Syria: /'imperialismehedjazien,British policy, and the Zionist project,pp.375-581.
22. Ibid, p.254.
23. Nadra Moutran,La Syrie de demain (Paris:LibrairiePlon-Norritetlie,1996) p.97.
24. Ibid., 'Introduction',p.i.
25. Ibid., p.29.
26. Ibid., p. 137.
27. Ibid., 'Introduction',p.vi.
28. Ibid., p.30.
29. Ibid., p.33.
30. Ibid, p.358
31. KhairallahKhairallah,La Syrie (Paris:ErnestLeroux, 1912). Khairallah'soscillation led to a
debateamongLebanesehistorians.TouficTouma,in Paysans et institutionsfiodales chez les
Druses et les Maronites du Liban du XVIIe siecle a 1914, (2 vols, Beirut: Universite
Libanaise, Sections des Etudes Historiques, No. 21, 1971-2), writes that even though
Kairallahgave his book the title La Syrie, he was one of the supportersof GreaterLebanon,
vol. 1, p.680. Wajih Kawtharani,in al-Itijahat al-Ijtima'iyya wal-Siyasiyyafi Jabal Lubnan
wal-Mashriqal-'Arabi[The Social and Political Trendsin Mt. Lebanonandthe EasternArab
Countries],2nd edn, (Beirut:ManshuratBahsunal-Thakafiyya,1986, considersKhairallahto
be propagatingthe French colonial point of view on Syria and Lebanon, hinting that his
Syrianismwas no more than naz'a infisaliyya(an isolatistionisttrend)pp.99, 210-11. 'Isam
Khalifa, in Fi Mu'tarakal-Qadiyyaal-Lubnaniyya[On the Strugglefor the LebaneseCause]
(Lebanon:n.p., 1985) pp. 67-8, sees Khairallahas one of the first intellectualswho saw no
contradictionbetween GreaterLebanonand pan-Arabismand thus combined the Lebanese
nationalismof GreaterLebanonwith an Arabismthat would 'secure a dynamic Arab unity
based on common language and spirit, and on common strategy, economy and history'.
Khalifa considers Kawtharani'sinterpretationto be inspired by his confessional position,
thus lacking the necessary logic to back up his arguments,p.83, note 58.
32. Jacques Tabet, La Syrie (Paris:A. Lemerre, 1920), p.15.
33. Ibid., p.16.
34. Ibid., p.29.
35. Ibid., p.34.
36. Ibid., p.35.
37. lbid., p.44.
38. Ibid., p.58.
39. Ibid., pp.63-4.
40. Ibid., p.66.
41. Ibid., p.88.

42. Ibid., p. 94.

43. Ibid., pp.94-5.
44. Ibid., pp.96-97.
45. Ibid., p.151.
46. Ibid., pp. 257-8.
47. Ibid., p.259.
48. On al-Qila'i and al-Duwayhi, see Ahmad Beydoun, Identite confessionelle et temps social
chez les historiens Libanais contemporains (Beirut: Lebanese University Press, 1984),
pp.161-208; Kamal Salibi, House of Many Mansions;TheHistory of LebanonReconsidered
(London:I.B.Tauris, 1985), pp.77-86.
49. See Beydoun, pp.161-208.
50. Yusuf al-Sawda, TarikhLubnanal-Hadari [Historyof Lebanon's Civilization] (Beirut:Dar
al-Nahar, 1972), p.153.
51. See Yusuf al-Sawda,Fi Sabil Lubnan [For Lebanon], 1st edn (Alexandria:n.p., 1919), 2nd
edn (Beirut: Dar al-Arz, 1924), 3rd edn, (Beirut: Publicationsof Dar Lahd Khatir, 1988),
pp.44-8.
52. Carol Hakim-Dowek,'The Originsof the LebaneseNational Idea, 1840-1914', Ph.D. thesis,
St. Antony's College, Oxford University, 1997.
53. Kamal Salibi, House of Many Mansions, p.25.
54. Nujaym dedicates about half of his book to a historical narrativeon the Maronite-Druze
conflict in the nineteenth century which reflects the struggle between the 'progress' of the
Maronitesand the 'feudality' of the Druze, see M. Jouplain[Bulus Nujaym],La questiondu
Liban, etude d'histoire diplomatique et de droit internationale (Paris: Arthur Rousseau,
1908) (2nd edn, Jounieh, 1961).
55. Albert Hourani,Arabic Thoughtin the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Oxford:OUP, 1962; repr.
Cambridge:CUP, 1988), p.275.
56. Jouplain(note 54), pp.589-90; 2nd edn (Jounieh, 1961) p.545.
57. Ibid, 2nd ed., p.582. On the relationshipbetween Jouplain's argumentsand the creation of
GreaterLebanon, see MarwanBuheiry, 'Bulus Nujaym and the GrandLiban ideal 1908-
1919', in MarwanBuheiry (ed.), Intellectual Life in the Arab East (Beirut:Centrefor Arab
and Middle East Studies,AmericanUniversityof Beirut, 1981); Hakim-Dowek,pp.291-332;
and Beydoun (note 48), pp.367-87.
58. FerdinandTayan, Sous les cidres du Liban: La nationalite maronite, (Paris: Librairiede
Montligeon, 1905), pp.2-6.
59. Henri Lammens, 'Tasrih al-Absar fi ma Yahtawihi Lubnan mina al-Athar' [Overview of
Lebanese Archaeological Sites], al-Mashriq, Revue Catholique Orientale Bimensuelle
(1902), vol.5, nos. 1, 2, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 (pp.21-6, 106-14, 361-7, 440-5, 584-8,
640-6, 759-63, 804-9, 826-31, respectively). Lammens'articleswere laterpublishedin two
volumes underthe same title, Tasrihal-Absar,2nd edn, (Beirut:Dar al-Ra'id, 1982) and 3rd
edn, (Beirut:Dar Nazir 'Abbud, 1995).
60. al-Mashriq,vol.5, no.10, p.441.
61. Yusuf al-Sawda, Fi Sabil Lubnan, 3rd edn, (Beirut:Dar Lahd Khatir, 1988), pp.157-8.
62. Ibid., 1st edn (Alexandria, 1919) pp.290-1.
63. Ibid., 3rd edn, Beirut, 1988), p.327.
64. Ibid, pp.326-7.
65. Yusuf al-Sawda,Istiqlal Lubnanwal-Ittihadal-Lubnanifi al-Iskandaria[The Independence
of Lebanon and the Party of Lebanese Unity in Alexandria](Alexandria:n.p., 1922), p.49.
For a surveyof the latter'sactivities, see the reportsof the Frenchdelegates in Egypt in 'Isam
Khalifa,Abhath,pp.100-9.
66. See Fawaz Traboulsi,Silat bila Wasl,Michel Chiha wal-Aidiulujiyyaal-Lubnaniyya[Ties
without Connection,Michel Chiha and the LebaneseNationalistIdeology] (Beirut:Riad El-
Rayyes Books, 1999), p.19.
67. Le Matin, 23 Aug. 1919, quoted in Rabbath,La formation historique,p.304. On Mukarzil's
activities, see Khalifa, Abhath,pp.110-5.
68. See Rabbath,La Formation historique,p.281.

69. See MuhammadJ. Bayhum, LubnanBayna Musharriqwa-Mugarrib,1920-1969 (Beirut:
n.p., 1970), pp.14-50.
70. Chiha's sister was marriedto Bsharaal-Khuri;Chihahad marriedthe sister of Henri Far'un,
his partnerin the Far'un-Chihabank they owned together.(From 1919 till his death in 1954,
Chiha was the directorof the bank.)
71. For furtherdetails on his life, see Fawaz Traboulsi,Silat bila Wasl, pp.15-32; Fawaz N.
Traboulsi, 'Identites et solidarites croisees dans le conflit du Liban contemporain',(Ph.D.
thesis, University of Paris VIII, Paris, 1993), pp.298-363.
72. For furtherinformationand details on the historical backgroundto the constitution, see
Rabbath,La formation historique,pp.365-86.
73. See Antoine N. Messarra,Theoriegenerale du systemepolitique libanais (Paris:Cariscript,
1994), pp.60- 3.
74. Michel Chiha, Liban d'aujourd'hui(1942), (Beirut: Editions du Trident, 1949), p.7.
75. Ibid, p.13.
76. Ibid, pp.13-15.
77. Ibid, p.23.
78. Ibid., pp.30-9.
79. Ibid., p.39.
80. Ibid., pp.41-2.
81. Ibid., pp.43-8.
82. Ibid., pp.48-9.
83. Ibid., pp.54-6.
84. See especially ibid., pp.62-6.
85. Ibid., p.66.
86. Traboulsi,Silat bila Wasl,pp.37-60.
87. Chiha, pp.62-3.
88. Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in WartimeLebanon, Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation
(London:Centre for Lebanese Studies and I.B.Tauris, 1993), pp.28-9, 70.
89. Chiha, Le Liban d'aujourd'hui,p.66.
90. Ibid., pp.67-73.
91. See Nabil Khalifa,Al-Kata'ib wa-'UrubatLubnan, 2 vols. (Beirut:n.p., 1983), vol.1, pp.45-
68, 68-78.
92. A good example of this approachis a book by Walid Pharis,Lebanese ChristianNationalism
(Boulder, CO: L. Reinner, 1995), pp.11-92.


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Firro Lebanese Nationalism

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Lebanese Nationalism versus Arabism: From Bulus Nujaym to Michel Chiha

Author(s): Kais M. Firro

This content downloaded from 62.122.72.154 on Sun, 22 Jun 2014 15:27:51 PM

This article attempts to trace Lebanese nationalism as a national ideology

The idea of Greater Syria as watan (homeland) began to take shape

Middle EasternStudies, Vol.40, No.5, September2004, pp.1 -27

This content downloaded from 62.122.72.154 on Sun, 22 Jun 2014 15:27:51 PM

of the Syrian idea or Syrianism was Butrus al-Bustani. Although he saw

This content downloaded from 62.122.72.154 on Sun, 22 Jun 2014 15:27:51 PM

peace conferenceof Versailles in their demandsfor extendingthe frontiersof

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from the time of the Crusadersuntil the establishmentof French 'colonies' in

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The ComiteCentralSyrien of Parishad a branchin Egypt called Le Comite'

In this introductionGhanimnever omits the term 'la Phenicie' whenever he

The GreaterLebanon or Phoenicia which should comprise almost the

This content downloaded from 62.122.72.154 on Sun, 22 Jun 2014 15:27:51 PM

Unlike Ghanim who is a Maronite from Mt. Lebanon, Samne is a Greek

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Today Lebanon demands altogethermore space for breathing,living,

Although Samne advocates non-Arab Syrianism, his historical survey of

Aware that the non-Christianpopulationmight not warm to this new Syria

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make up two-thirdsof the population,are too divided among themselves to

[T]he common government imposed on Syria does not give

...they have, over a significant part of the Muslim population, a real

Undoubtedly,among the Syriansthere is a partywhich still believes in

Thus, Moutran's Syria is hardly different from that envisaged by French

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oppositionto the separationof Lebanonfrom his Syria.However, in referring

...there exist enslaved nations, the Phoenician,Armenianand Arabian

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To settle the question of the difference between the Syrians (Phoenicians)

Tabet sees Lebanese Christianemigres in Egypt who supportArabism as

The Muslim element still dreams of an Arab renaissance, and the

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As to the Phoenicianorigin of the Syrians,he arguesthat 'Historydoes not

But since Roman rule, throughoutthe political vicissitudes of which

Having placed the geographical location of this 'independence' in

The period of the Crusadersbrought the people of Lebanon and in

In a chapteron ethnography,Tabet is keen to show how the Syrian 'race'

it would be an error to believe that the local population had been

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The Crusades seem, at first, to have introducedinto Syria a foreign

Distinguishing between 'race' as the outcome of natureand 'nationalite'

Nationality is a political denominationwhich has no common feature

Because the language of the population of Syria is Arabic, Tabet has to

In reality the Arabic language remains the universal language in the

For Tabet, France entered Syria in order to 'liberate' the Syrians.

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the 'Lebanese' for le GrandLiban, he wants to maintainthe political unity of

Although non-Arab Syrianism contained the historical argumentson which

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at one point merged to become the Maronitepeople. Dirian's interventionin

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boundaries of such Lebanese nationalism were still in debate among

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Although Lammens continued to see Syria as an integral entity, his

When the Lebanese demanded the independence of Lebanon, they

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Lubnanihad already adopted in 1909 what in 1919 became the 'nationalist

Because Lebanese nationalism as a subject for political discourse was

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