The Feminine and Nihilism Luce Irigaray With Nietzsche and Heidegger

The Feminine and Nihilism:
Luce Irigaray with

Nietzsche and Heidegger
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Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................... 7
INTRODUCTION....................................................................... 9
CHAPTER I: Reading Irigaray and the Question of

Appropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CHAPTER II: Theoretical Preliminaries ............. . . ...... .. . ...... 31

.. . .
CHAPTER III: A Lover's Discourse? Echo and

Narcissus Re vi sited ........................................... 53
CHAPTER IV: Woman's (Un)Truth:

The Dionysian Woman ... ... ........... ..... ...... . ...... 97
. .
CONCLUSION ... . ............. .... ....................... ....... ............... .. . .. 137

. .
NOTES ········· · · · · · · ····· · · · · · ····· · · ····· ··································· · 145
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY .. . ...... ..... ......... ... ........ ... ....... ... . . 164
. . .. . .
Acknowledgements
The publication of this book has been made possible in part due to
a grant awarded by the Norwegian Research Council for Science
and the Humanities.
I would like to thank Professor Prospero Safz, Department of
Comparative Literature, University of Wisconsin-Madison, for
providing an intellectual climate in which my work has thrived.
His astute criticism as well as his continuous support and friend
ship have been invaluable in this laborious process. I would also
like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Elaine Marks,
Department of French, University of Wisconsin-Madison, who first
introduced me to Irigaray's work and who has been a true intel
lectual as well as personal inspiration. I am also indebted to Pro
fessor Toril Moi, Department of Romance Languages, Duke Uni
versity, and Professor Margaret Whitford, French Department,
Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, both of
whom have read earlier versions of the book and whose comments
have been most helpful in reworking the manuscript.
In addition, I want to salute my colleagues, friends and family,
both in the U.S. and in Norway, whose love and encouragement
have helped me through the trials of this project. In this regard, I
especially want to extend my thanks to Babette Wainwright, Mary
Jo Bona, Sandra Adell , Paal Bj�rby, Birger Angvik, Hans-Erik
Aarset, Anka Ryall and Roy-Tommy Eriksen .
Bergen, June 1994
Ellen Mortensen
Introduction
When Luce lrigaray pronounces that sexual difference constitutes

the most pressing question which remains to be thought in our
epoch, she bases her argument on Martin Heidegger's insight that
"each age is preoccupied with one thing, and one alone". 1 If we
consent to thi s statement, then we must pay heed to how the
question is posited. In order for a question to be posited, Martin
Hei degger2 argues, the answer has to be to pre-understood. Irigaray
envisages that, for the question of sexual difference to be thought,
a new fertility of thought, in her words, a new poetics,3 would have
to emerge. She claims that al l previous attempts by philosophy, by
science or by rel igion to raise the question of sexual difference
have only occulted the problematic. However, in order
[f]or the work of sexual difference to take place, a revolution in

thought and ethics is needed. We must re-interpret the whole
relationship between the subject and discourse, the subject and
the world, the subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the
macrocosmic. 4
One of Irigraray's most famous pronouncements from Speculum

of the Other Woman5 reads as follows: "Every theory of the subject
is always already appropriated by the masculine." By this she sug
gests that the feminine remains repressed, silenced, invisible and
unheard within the phallogocentric discourses of philosophy, relig
ion and science. The task of thinking lies therefore in the re-inter
pretation of what she nominates the technological machine of man
made languages. Thus, there is in her thinking a strong belief in the
10 THE FEMININE AND NIHILISM
interconnectedn ess between the current global state of affairs and

the domin ant mode of thinking in the West. Some of the ecologi
cal, political and economic proble ms of our planet can in part be
explained by this Western mode of thinking, which she sees as
molded upon a morphology of the masculine sexual libidinal econ
omy.
In the West, says Irigaray, there is a predomin ance of a mascu
line "hom(m)osexual" economy, which she defines as an exclu
sively masculine culture founded on a genealogy of the father and
the son.6 There exists a religious, legal, cultural, spiritual and
libidin al bondin g which symbolically un ites men an d which
systematically excludes women or an y manifestations of a sym
bolic of the femin in e. The only function prescribed for women is
as reproductive objects of exchange within this econ omy. For
Irigaray, the masculine subject comes to represent all that is valued
as positive within the binary system of meaning in Western think
ing: con scious, rational, unified, solid, visible, eternal, spiritual,
lofty, mon olithic, etc. Conversely, the femin in e (non-subject)
figures as his n egative Other, above and again st which the mascu
line subject finds form and expression. Thus, within the sign ifying
structures of the West, there exists no sexual difference of the
subject. There is but one, the self-same, the masculine.
But if there is but one subject, it becomes n ecessary to inquire
into what lrigaray coins the Other, otherwise n ominated as the
feminine, or le feminin. Irigaray speaks of the femi11ine as a noth
ing that resists representation. Nevertheless, le feminin finds a
variety of expressions throughout her work. S he refers to it as that
which is repressed, fluid, mucous, near, tactile, material, elemental,
aerial, marine, dark, silent, multiple, temporal, earthly, divine,
nurturing, creative, ethical, etc. But it is necessary to investigate
whether or not this (multiple) positing of le feminin remain s locked
within the comfortable boundaries of the metaphysics that she
claims to subvert.
The eclectic threads of discourses at work in lrigaray's writings
are all intertwined into Western philosophical discourses rangin g
from the Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel,
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Uvinas to Derrida. In addition , she inserts
herself into a variety of other and implicated theoretical paradigms
INTRODUCTION ]]
such as Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, linguistics, Marxist

pol itical/economic theory, structuralist anthropology, French
feminisms, Anglo-American feminisms, and other contemporary
political and legal discourses.
Irigaray emphasizes the crucial role played by the Greeks for
the destiny of Western thought. Greek literature and mythology
form a core of resonance in her writing. Like Martin Heidegger,
she believes that the coming of a new age of thinking necessitates
a re-tum to the questions raised by the Pre-Socratics, and in ancient
mythology. lrigaray insists that this enormously rich Pre-Hellenic
epoch still hides enigmas that remain pressing for us to think
about. Furthermore, in her search for a new eth ic of the feminine,
which she posits as key to the creation of a new thinking, Irigaray
insists on the necessity of scrutinizing the religious discourses we
have inherited. Thi s implies an invention of new, as well as a
resurrection of ancient, female deities. Contrary to masculine
deities, these female deities will honor the feminine symbolic and
will, she hopes, effect the end of sexual in-diff e rence in religion
and mythology as well as in language.
In lrigaray's hermeneutic of sexual difference, much emphasis
is placed on the task of interpretation, or more specifically, re
interpretation. In her prophetic statements about the implications of
the work of sexual difference, lrigaray claims that a/J is to be
reinterpreted. However, the question of the Being of interpretation
per se will have to be addressed. Thus, we will have to inquire
whether or not the revolutionary work of this new thinking pre
sumably finds its ground in interpretation or if, on the other hand,
Irigaray seeks an-other foundation for her thinking.
Thi s pivotal question of what constitutes the Being of interpre
tation needs to be addressed in order to determine the path of
questioning that will follow.7 lrigaray's strategy of re-interpretation
raises the question of the status of the speaking/writing subject. In
her retracing of Western metaphysics, be it in the form of a reread
ing of among others, Plato, Freud, Hegel , Descartes and Kant in
Speculum of the Other Woman, or, of Lacan and Sade in This Sex
Which ls Not One,8 lrigaray attempts to subvert the comfortable
position attributed to the masculine subject in an effort to open up
a space for sexual diff e rence within the subject. However, it is
important to ask how Irigaray understand s the ground or the B eing

of the subject and the implications this might have for her project
of (re)interpretation.
While reluctantly ascribing to the (Lacanian) psychoanalytic
view in regard to the construction of the subject, Iri garay laments
the fact that the feminine does not have an imaginary of its own
upon which the female subject might construct its "mirror i mage".9
Thi s imago later serves as a foundation for the construction of the
sexed subject. The absence of such an imago is, in her opinion, one
of the reasons why there is but one subject, namely the masculine.
Irigaray asks what happens if we open up the q uestion of an
(absent) feminine subject for thought. Will this inquiry necessitate
a different language, she asks. Implicit in her questioning is a
proposed strategy for di scursive action that would eventually
undermine the sedimented language of metaphysics. In the fo l l ow
ing, she sketches out what such a strategy might entail:
Then ... Turn everything ups ide down, inside out, back to front.
Rack it with radic al convulsions, carry back, rei mport, those
cries that her "body" suffers in her impotence to say wha t di s
turbs her. Insist also and deliberately upon those blanks i n di s
course which recall the places of her exclusion and wh i c h , by
their silent plasticity, ensure the cohesion, the a rticu lati on , th e
coherent expansion of established forms. 10
In thi s projected "radical convulsion" of language, Irigaray

sketches out the contours of a deconstructive strategy . However,
while she denounces phal-Jogo-centric language, she e n v i sions a
strategy which exceeds the mimetic. Her proposed intervention
rests partly on the (female) subject's intentional subversion of these
functions and structures. But her intervention relies primari ly on
the workings of uncon scious effects . By effecting a release of
some of the repressed (feminine) carnal excesses into language ,
Irigaray predicts that woman's unconscious w i l l cause t h e walls of
the phall i c logic to crumble.
She furthermore denounces the present state of affairs i n theory
(under which she subsu mes phi losophy) and seems to distance
herself from all of the dominant discursive practiccs.11 Her diag-
INTRODUCTION 13
nosis of the malaise of contemporary philosophy ironically and

indirectly points both to Derridean deconstruction and Heideg
gerian ontology. Irigaray emphasizes the need to find other foun
dations and other works which will bring about a different logic
from that of the first philosophy which has hitherto governed our
horizon.
This book does n ot intend to cover all of Irigaray's work. It is
primarily a close reading of her poetico-philosophic work, Marine
Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche. i2 Through a lover's discourse
on/with Nietzsche, Irigaray mimics and parodies the aphoristic
grand style of the late(st) philosopher. Implicit in her inquiry into
Nietzsche's texts is her search for the feminine, which she, like
Derrida, understands within the question of ecriture, as the possi
bility of an-other gaze, an-other speech and an-other language than
those which have hitherto governed Western metaphysical think
ing.
By strategically insertingherself in the openings of Nietzsche's
writings and by listening to the silentmater-ial ground upon which
he erects his philosophy, Irigaray retrieves that which has been
muted in his discourse. This silence then serves as a potentiality for
her exploration of sexual difference, or, for what she refers to as le
feminin.
My reading will venture to deconstruct Irigaray's deconstructive
reading of Nietzsche. In this double deconstructive gesture, I hope
to make resonant some of the multiple inter-texts13 that are put into
play in her discourse, particularly Plato, Nietzsche and Heidegger.
Attempts will be made to i mplicate Irigaray's questioning into the
nihilism problematic as it is thought, primarily, by Nietzsche, and
subsequently by Heidegger.
In Marine Lover Irigaray confronts the basic constituents of
Nietzsche's thinking. As such it can be read as a meditation on
Nietzsche's philosophy of will to power a philosophy which for
-
her may prove to be partially fruitful in providing her with new

paths of thinking in the quest for sexual difference.14 However, by
unveiling Nietzsche's apparent complicity in Western metaphysics,
Irigaray's deconstruction of his oeuvre also warns against prema
ture and facile appropriations of Nietzsche in the name of any
"-ism".
But when Irigarary sets out to think through Nietzsche's ph i
losophy of will to power in all its complexity, the question of

(sexual) diff e rence is inserted at the heart of her inquiry. How
does/does not Nietzsche think (sexual) difference, Irigaray asks.
And if he does, - how does (sexual) difference figure within his
philosophy?
I will argue that it is illuminating to read lrigaray' s med itati on
on Nietzsche in light of the nihilism problematic. Nietzsche defines
nihilism as the historical movement whereby "all values hitherto
have been devalued".15 Thi s means that man has lost the ground
upon which his moral and reason-able universe h ad been erected.
No longer can he be assured of the existence of universal truth or
absolute value. Nietzsche provides an answer to thi s un fortu nate
state of affairs through his conception of will to power, wh e rei n
man finds the i mperative to shape his own existence and hi s un i
verse through an act of transvaluation.16 Thi s transvalu ation , w hich
revalues all previou s values, has no universal validity . Ho wever,
Nietzsche's transvaluing subject has gai ned the pow er to defi ne his
own being as value, without being restrained by any un i ve rsal
(moral/epistemolog ical) law. Man wi lfu lly inscribes the circu m
ference of his own being through his perspectival perc epti o n of
what is.
It will be important to uncover whether she, in her reading of
Nietzsche, identifies the sexed subject as a problem related to
propositional thinking, or, whether she, i nstead, approaches it as an
ontological question . For Irigaray, the subject's Bein g is ultimately
grounded in the materiality of the body which provides the matrix
for the con struction of every subj ect. We will have to ask whether
or not this implies an evasion of the quest i on of an ontolog ical
ground and whether she operates within the derivative framework
of an already exi sting metaphysical Platonic division between the
materi al and the s p iritual
.
Or, does lrigaray's thinking on th i s primary locus of the

(M)Other in any way reside in the proxi mity of Heidegger's think
ing on the question of t he ontological difference between Being
and beings? "Language is the house of Being in which man exists
by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of Being, guardin g it,"
Martin Heidegger writes in his "Letter on Humanism".17 Irig aray
INTRODUCTION 15
refers to this quote by Heid egger and the link between the su bject
and language when she makes an i n s ightfu l obser v at ion on the
relations hip between Lacan and Heidegger:
It is pr obab ly from this co nception of the relationsh ip between

the subject and l ang u age that Lacan has taken his definition of
the unconscious. The expressio n "The unconscious is struc
tu re d like a language" i s quite close to th at put forth by Martin
H ei de gger : "Man acts as t hou g h h e were the shaper and master
of language, while in fact la n guag e remains the master of man. "
(cf. "Poetically Man D we l l s in Poetry, Language, Thought,

"
tr ans . by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971,

p. 215)18.
Another question to be pursued i n relation to lrigaray s work, i s

'
that o f the Being o f langu age in her texts. For e x ample what is the
,
pre u n d erstan ding that informs the following statement co n cerni n g

-
language:
La n g u age no matter how formal it is, h as nourished itself by

,
blood, by flesh, by elemental matter(s). By whom and by what

has it nourished itself? How to repay thi s debt? Are we forced
to produce increasingly formal mechanisms, tec h n i ques which ,
tum ag a inst man? Is such an inverted result caused by this

mother who has given him a living body? And whi ch he fears
accordingly as the unp aid (debt) between her an d him.19
In another p assage from the same work, Irigaray invokes (in a

parenthesis) Hei d egger s Heraklitus-seminar20 i n which he st ate s
'
that Western metaphysics has not even begu n to say what the re
mi g ht be to the body. I ri g aray argues that the body constitutes this
first "house" which man receives and which d e te r m i nes the pos
s i bi l it y of his coming to the world an d the po ssi ble opening of a
horizon of thought, of poetry, and of celebration with the g od( s ) .
Heid egger s contribution reveals the difficulties involved in any

'
appropriative rea d i n g of text s It also serv es to a lert atte ntion t o t he

.
p rob l e ma tic of la n g ua ge as it intrudes up on an y the oret ic al i nte r

ro g at ion As su ch his wo rk has lai d the fo u nda tio n and pav ed the
. ,
way for both Lacanian psychoanalysis and Derridean deconstruc

tion.
By reflecting on Heidegger's thinking on the relationship of
Dasein to its Being-in-the-world with Others,21 Jacques Lacan
developed his understanding of the speaking subject's relation to
the symbolic order which is again in thrall to the Phallus/Other.
Lacan carefully stud ied Heidegger's t h inking on the logos22 before
working out what has been nominated his early Dasein psycho
analysis. As the above quote i ndicates, lrigaray clearly makes the
explicit connection between Heidegger's thinking and that of
Lacan when it comes to the question of language.
It should be noted that lrigaray is herself a trained linguist,23
and that a substantial part of her work deals with the problem of
language, be it as part of her broader philosophical concern in
reading the philosophical tradition, be it in her contributions t o the
psychoanalytic debate through her controversial readings of Freud
and Lacan, or be it in her specific work in linguistics.
It is my conviction that Heidegger's work constitutes the vei led
sub-text which informs not only Irigaray's reading of Nietzsche,
but also those readings of the two dominant father figures that are
echoed in her work, namely Derrida and Lacan. And, perhaps most
i mportant ly, I believe that the Heidegger-Nietzscbe nexus consti
tutes the most overlooked and silenced part of the appropriations
of Irigaray's work. In my critical intervention, I hope to be able to
dwell in the proximity of Heidegger's thinkin g and thereby care
fully integrate some of his most pondered questions into my dis
cuss ion.
CHAPTER I:
Reading Irigaray and the Question of
Appropriation
As Nietzsche has become the battleground on which the philo

sophic pole mos has taken place in the 20th century, so lrigaray has
become the target for and a symptom of feminist1 appropriations in
the United States and in Brita i n , as well as on the European
Continent. But for the most part, recent appropriations of Luce
Irigaray have tended to enframe her writing into one dominant
i nterpretat i ve model, namely psychoanalysis.
One of the most prolific appropriators of lrigaray in the United
States, Ja ne Gallop, has entitled her work The Daughter's Seduc
tion: Feminism and Psychoanalysis.2 In this work, she introduces
Luce Irigaray playing the female lead, opposite Lacan. Gallop here
performs an imaginative reading of This Sex Which Is Not One, in
which Irigaray figures in the role of the (feminist) daughter of the
father figures of psychoanalysis, Freud/Lacan.
Likewise, in her review of Amante marine de Friedrich
Nietzsche, Elizabeth L. Berg exclusively emphasizes the psycho
analytic dimension of her work when she asserts that "[all] of
Irigaray's work is in some sense to be understood as a dialogue
with Lacan, although his name is spectacularly missing from her
books".3
For the most part, the reception of lrigaray's work has been
limited to the two texts that were first translated into English,
namely Speculum of the Other Woman and This Sex Which Is Not
One. Tori! Moi's Sexual/Textual Politics4 constitutes yet another
comprehensive read ing of lrigaray's work to date. However, even
though she includes re fere nce s to the entire body of Irigaray's
writi n gs she relegates to the margins her treatment of Irigaray's
,
18 THE FEMININ AND NIHILISM
philosophical works, and, like most of her predecessors, focuses

instead on Irigaray's psychoanalytic work in Speculum and in This
Sex.
Only a few scholars, like Margaret Whitford, 5 Elizabeth
Grosz,6 and Naomi Schor,7 have attempted to tackle her complete
work. Among these, the work of Margaret Whitford stands out in
its rigorous treatment of Irigaray's text from a philosophical, as
well as a psychoanalytic, perspective. Whitford argues in her
assessment of lrigaray for "the psychoanalytic dimension of lriga
ray's work to be taken seriously".8 But in Whitford's groundbreak
ing work, Luce Jrigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, a lucid and
engaging reading of Irigaray's whole corpus, Whitford also argues
for the necessity to treat Irigaray as a philosophical thinker. In
addition, with the publication of The lrigaray Reader, Whitford
introduces the Anglo-American reader to a broad specter of lriga
ray's texts. At the same time, Whitford provides an excellent intro
duction to the major tenets of Irigaray's thinking.
Elizabeth Grosz' reading of Irigaray provides yet a nother
refreshing perspective in the reception of Irigaray. Like Whitford,
Grosz emphasizes the philosophical nature of Irigaray's project, but
attempts at the same time to discuss the political implications of
her work.
In my view, Irigaray's writing can best be characterized as a
philosophical intervention. That is not to say that psychoanalysis
does not figure centrally within her body of work. True, as a
trained and licenced psychoanalyst, Irigaray practises her trade
(despite being expelled from Lacan's ecole freudienne upon her
publicat ion of Speculum).9 And, in her writing, she certainly pur
sues an inquiry into (Lacanian/Freudian) psychoanalysi s even as
she ventures to deconstruct its discursive foundation.
However, there has been a certain blindness to the complexity
of her work and the intricate inter-texts that constitute the fabric of
her thinking. For me, Irigaray is aspiring to be a thinker, in the
sense that she foresees "the e n d of metaphy sics" and the "task of
thinking"10 that lie ahead. In order to do justice to this complex
web of textuality, into which the major philosophemes of our
Western metaphysica l tradition are interwoven, careful attention
must be given to her p a i ns t ak ing meditation on this tradition.
READING I RIGARY AND THE QUESTION OF APPROPRIATION 19
It is interesting to note that few critics ha v e seriously attempted

to address her readings of the Pre-Socratics, of Plato and Aristotle,
of Descartes, of Kant and Hegel, of Nietzsche, of Heidegger, or of
Uvinas. With the exception of Whitford, Grosz, and Schor, almost
all interpretations have exclusively concentrated on her ps ychoana
lytic work. Her philosophic work, which constitutes the better part
of h er production, has for the most part been silenced or ignored . I
therefor e contend that the majority of the approp ri ator s of Irigaray
have remained deaf to the profundity and breadth of her thinking ,
due to this selective focus. Through a simplistic enframing of her
texts into an already limited scope, most readers of Irigaray fail to
pay heed to some of her most thought-provoking questions.
Someti mes , these readings have instead produced a series of
ideological debates, 11 most of which are critical of her contribu
tion.12 One of the most pervasive criticisms of lrigaray's work has
centered around the question of essentialism. In her essay, "This
Essentialism Which Is Not One", Naomi Schor con vincingly
exposes the c onfusion that reigns in relation to what essentialism
suppo s edly bespeaks. She delineates four different forms of essen
tialism and reveals h o w each form trails with it a set of presuppo
sitions and questions asked.13 However, this debate has failed to
raise the appropriate questions that could address Irigaray's philo
sophic concerns. Due in part to this i nabilit y to read her thinking
on difference within the context of the dominant philosophemes in
our tradition and due partly to the preoccupations of the theoretica l
and political/ideological agendas of the respective appropriators,
much of l r i gara y ' s work remains obscurely veiled for most Anglo
American readers.
Irigaray has also been critici zed for her mimetic strategy in her
deconstruction of W e stern metaphysical language. Toril Moi,
among o th ers, warns of the political dangers associated with Iriga
ray 's mi metic strategy. In add it ion , she accuses Iriga ray of attempt
ing to define "woman"14 in the process. But lrigaray never claims
to be able to reflect k .fhninin. Acco rding to I rigaray , what woman
or t h e matern a l might be, cannot possibl y be reflected in theoreti
cal or philosophical language, since its edifice rests on the s i l e n c
ing of the primordial g.round from whic h al l beings em erg e . Thus,
when she mimes and mimics this metaphysical language, she does
20 Tl-!E FEM ININ AND NIHILISM
not adhere to the demarcations and the categories through which it

operates. Rather, she attempts to listen to that "other" meaning
which has been silenced, or which has escaped the mirror alto
gether.
This does not mean, however, that she claims to have created
another language that is true to a feminine mimetic. Rather, she
aligns herself with Lacan in his assertion that there is but one lan
guage, namely the one which speaks a phallic symbolic. How, and
in what way woman as a subject enters into this symbolic and how
she could possibly subvert its solidity, constitutes an important part
of her work. However, in order to investigate this problem fully,
the question of appropriation has to be broached.
Furthermore, what is approached in Irigaray's i nquiry is the
question of the Being of language. It is not merely a question of a
subjective positionality guided by (a political) intentionality, which
either attests to the good or the ill will of the subject. Rather, for
Irigaray, what is at stake is the ontological possibility of parter
femme in Westem languages. And this question cannot be
broached through or subsumed under any ideological or historio
logical concem.15
In my reading, Irigaray does not exclusively understand the
problem of positionality in ideological terms. Rather, she raises the
problem as an ontological foundational question concerning the
Being of the speaking subject. And she knows full well that the
philosophical discourse functions as a foundational discourse for
all scientific and political discourses.16 Her questions are: Can
there be a feminine subject in Western languages? How could
woman possibly emerge and be heard? By what strategy can we
make this absence appear?
In "This Essentialism Which Is Not One", Naomi Schor
responds to Moi's denunciation of Irigaray as an essentialist by
adding a different emphasis:
My argument is contrario: that Irigaray's production of a posi

tive theory of femin inity is not an aberration, a sin to extend the
theological metaphor, rather the logical extension of her
deconstruction of the specular logic of saming. [ ] For finally
...
the question posed by Irigaray's attempts to theorize feminine

READING IRIGARY AND THE QUESTION OF APPROPRIATION 21
specificity - which is not to be confused with "defining"

woman, a task she writes is better left to men - is the question
of difference within difference. Irigaray's wager is that differ
ence can be reinvented.17
For Schor, when Irigaray invokes the term mim esis it is as part
,
of a strategy of miming, a masquerade to which women have

traditionally been subjected, but which within this new affirmation
might be reappropriated in order to pursue a radical new differ
ence. Naomi Schor refers to the following passage in This Sex in
which Irigaray delineates her strategy:
There is, in an initial phase, perhaps only one "path", the one
historically assigned to the feminine: that of mimicry. One must
assume the feminine role deliberately. Which means already to
convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to
begin to thwart it. [ . . ] To play with mimesis is thus, for a
.
woman, to try to recover the place of her exploitation by dis

course, without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it. It
means to resubmit herself - inasmuch as she is on the other side
of the "perceptible" of "matter" - to "ideas", in particular to
ideas about herself, that are elaborated in/by a masculine logic,
but so as to make "visible'', by an effect of playful repetition,
what was supposed to remain invisible: the cover-up of a pos
sible operation of the feminine in language. It also means "to
unveil" the fact th at, if women are such good mimics, it is
not simply resorbed in this function. They also
because they are
remain elsewhere: another case of the persistence of "matter'',
but also of "sexual pleasure".18
In her parodic stance against and within masculine discourse,

Irigaray appropriates mimesis, not as a reflective device to mirror
le feminin, but instead as a deconstructive strategy to break discur
sive integrity of this specular language by listening to the excesses
of the sensible/material which it cannot reflect, but which resides
"elsewhere".
Most importantly, Schor insists on another meaning of the
polysemic word mimesis in lrigaray's work, namely that which
connotes a Nietzschean notion of transvaluation. Read in this
22 THE FEM ININ AND NIHILISM
sense, the strategy of mimesis follows Nietzsche's thinking on the

workings of nihilism in Western metaphysics, which attests to the
devaluation of all values. However, through the act of transvalu
ation, which embraces the workings of nihil ism by miming its
effect, Nietzsche at the same time affirms a different value,
whereby that which has been devalued becomes trans-valued.
Zarathoustra, as the over-man, can in this contex t be seen as a
transvaluation of the "human, all-too- human" man.
Similarly, femininity as it has been defined within this tradi
tional metaphysical framework, which posits an opposition
between the "sensuous" and the "supra-sensuous", has been de
valued as inferior to mascul init y . Femininity was attributed less
value than masculinity since it was associated with the "sensuous"
and "material", which is subject to change and de-formation by
temporality. Masculinity, on the other hand, was valued through its
supposed proximity to the "supra-sensuous" which remains solidly
eternal and permanent in its "ideality". By miming femininity, and
by embracing the nihilism that permeated these categories, Irigaray
has produced its transvaluation: le feminin.
Schor's reinterpretation of lrigaray's use of mimeticism has
provided a new avenue towards understanding Irigaray's writings
in the light of a broader philosophical inquiry. As she also points
out, Irigaray's quest is not for the essence of femininity, but rather
an attempt to pursue a different understanding of mater-ialism that
has not always already been predetermined by the Platonic schema
of the dichotomy between the "sensuous" and the "supra-sensuous".
In her projection of an elemental cosmology, Irigaray instead
invokes the forgotten memory of the Pre-Socratics, whose onto
logical thinking on the elements becomes a poin t of departure for
her thinking on le feminin in its materiality.
lrigaray's writings, a l ong with those of Helene Cixous and Julia
Kristeva, have had a tremendous impact on the feminist inq u iry in
literature and theory during the last decade. Due to the widespread
interest in their works, a new trend in literary/theoretical produc
tions has taken p l ace which has sought to detect "difference" in
numerous (predominantly female) texts. What I find somewhat
disquieting in regard to this activity, is a reducti on of Irigaray's
work into an applied methodology of reading.19
This pa rt i cula r form of appropr iatio n treats her work as a tool

for in terp re tat ion t o b e a ppli e d on other texts. The result is us ual ly
a difference in sameness, which for the most part claims to have
discovered a feminine difference in texts which have hitherto been
blind to sexual difference. The problem I detect in such a pract ice
is that none of the a p p ro p ri at or s deal with lrigaray's que st i on of
sexual difference, but focus instead on what they believe to be the
answer, found i n t he texts that are being read .
What is lost in thi s form of app r op riati on is the complex medi

tation undertaken by I r igaray in re lat ion to these q uestions We are
.
left with an army of ( s ome ti mes) well-intentioned readings , which

make claims to have freed the feminine from its discursive con
finements. But, what happens if we take seriously Irigaray's as
su mp tion that d ifference/le feminin is not present? What would
happen to these benevolent read i ngs that seek to iden t i fy difference
if what lr igaray attempts t o think is an aletheicfeminin? Wou l d not
these readings crumble, when the foundations of their appearance
fall to nothi ng?
11
In the above synoptic assessment of what I consider to be some of

the most i m p o rta n t and i nfluential appr op riat ors of lrigaray, I h ave
predominantly focused on a descriptive approach to t hese
appropriations. What seems to be l ac ki ng in my treatment of these
fig u re s as well as in t he i r re spect i v e r eadings of Irigaray, is the
question of a pp ro p riati on per se. Whether the dominant interest in
the a p pro pr iation is motivated by a q ue st for a meth od a discou rse
, ,
a m od ality of stu d y , or represen tation s of "woman", the question of

a founding for these app ropriat i on s still remains to be addressed.
As I hav e attempted to show, most of the appropriators read
I r i garay ideologically, a dimension that certainly is at work in her
w ri ti n gs . However, in Irigaray's appro p riati o n of Ni etzsche as well
as in the above mentioned appropriations of her work, the issue of
fou n d at ion is skirted.
Much of Heidegger's meditation on Ereignis20 at te mpts to
broach this complicated question. ln his work On Time and Being,
24 THE FEMININ AND�IHILISM
Heidegger deliberates on the privative aspect of what appears, in

the sense that there is an absentive component to Being itself and
to all beings. Ereignis is temporal in its structure and as such it
speaks to the presencing and absencing of that which is. Because
you cannot say what Being is or what Time is, what presences
itself cannot be fully dis-closed. Rather, Being is given, Time is
given and the only way we can approach this "givenness", is by
awaiting :
Presence means: the constant abiding that approaches man,

reaches him, is extended to him. But what is the source of this
extending reach to which the present belongs as presenci n g,
insofar as there is presence? True, man always remains
approached by the presencing of something actually p resent
without e xplicit l y heeding presencing itself. But we have to do
with absence just as often, that is, constantly. For one thing,
there is much that is no longer present in the way we know
presencing in the sense of the present. And yet, even that wh ic h
is no longer present presences immediately in its absence - in
the manner of what has been, and s til l concerns us. What has
been does just not vanish from the previous now as does that
which is merely past. Rather, what has been presences, but in
its own way. In what has been, presencing is extended.21
Something is given now, and this something is Ereignis. Thus,

any kind of process involves a wi thold ing of the past from the
future and right now. Witholding is therefore an essential compo
nent of "now".22 For Heidegger, howe ver, Ereignis s i gnal s the

withdrawal as the event o f the proper, which is experienced as
someth i ng that is negative, a Nichts. Yet, it is not absol utel y noth
ing. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the orig in al
nature of time is still veiled due to the technological appropriation
of time and the Aristotelian standard o f ti me thought a s a sequen
tial progression. "True time" points instead to the arr i val of th at
which has been, thought as a gathering of essential Being, before
t h e given moment:
For time itself is nothing temporal, no more than it is something

that is. It is thus inadmissable to say t hat future, past and pre -
sent are before us "at the same time". Yet they belong together
in the way they offer themselves to one another. Their unifying
unity can be determined only by what is their own [eigen]; that
they offer themselves to one another.23
What they offer is not h ing other than themselves, that is, the
p resenc i ng that is gi ven i n them. But with this presencing a time ,
space opens up. But time in this c ontext does not denote a succes
sion of a sequence of nows. Rather, ti me space instead speaks to-
the " open n ess

which opens up the mutual self-extending of futural
app ro ac h, past a n d p re sen t . 24 In its found ational nature, this open
"
ness provides the p rimordia l space that allows space as we usually

know it to unfold. Thus, it is prespatial, and as such can make
room for space.
In trad itional me tap hysica l la ng uag e , time-space is thought in
terms of the distance measured between two time-points, and as
such, it is t h e result of calculation. However, for Heidegg er, true
time h a s no t hing to do with calculated time and is not merely
three-dimensional in its op enness He a dds a fourth dimension:
.
But the dimension which we call four in our count is, in the
nature of th e matter, th e first, that is, the giving that determines
all. In fu ture in past, in the present, that giving brings about to
,
each its own presencing, holds them apart thus open ed and so
holds them toward o ne another. For this reason we call the first,
orig inal, l i teral ly inc i pie nt e xt ending in which the unity of true
time consists "nearing ne arness "nearhood" (Naheit), an early
",
word still used by Kant. But it brings future, past and present
near to one another by dist ancing them. For it keeps what has
been open by d eny ing its advent as present. This nearing of
nearness keeps open the ap pr oach co ming from the future by
withholding the p re s en t in the app roach Neari n g nearness has
.
the character of denial and withholding. It uni fies in adva nce

the ways in which what has-been, what is about to be, and the
p resent reach out toward each other.2�
Thus, what is being said about the eve nt of Appropriation""
must he thought absolutely negatively. W hat is he re i n Ereignis is

already not here. In this sense, it is useless to approach thi s guiding

path of thinking through logic or through technological thinking.
Ereignis therefore cannot be named, nor transposed into proposi
tional thinking, but can only serve in the service of thought. Writes
Heidegger:
Appropriatio n is not the encompassing general concept under

which Being and time could be subsumed. Logical classifica
tions mean n ot hing here. For as we think Being itself and fol
low what is its own, Being proves to be destiny's gift of pres
ence, the gift granted by the giving of time. The gift of presence
is the property of Appropriatin g. B eing vanishes in Appropria
tion. In the phrase "Being as Appropriation", the word "as"
now means: Being, letting-presence sent in Appropriating, time
extended in App ropr iatio n . 26
For Heidegger, Ereignis is the unique and ultimate a p riori27

from whence things might emerge. But, just as you cannot derive
the source from the stream, Ereignis does not designate another
meaning of Being. Rather, it holds together possible meanings of
Being, encompassing in it all of identity, comprised of differences.
Until this a priori has been addressed, beyond any metaphysical
notions of space and time that we have, we cannot even start to ask
the question of human b eing . No philosophical discussion can
approach Ereig nis, and, therefore, it is completely useless precisely
because it is preparational and foundational.
Heidegger's rad ical p h e n o me nology cannot be represented, and
the word Ereig nis can n ot represent it, since it is only a word for
"the unique". But how can something "unique" be? According to
Heidegger, time is essential to it. He proposes the contemporane
ous of the three possible temporal ecstasies/ex-stasies: first, the
past ; second, the unfolding of the past in the present (pre-sent, in
the sense of a fore- sen di ng and a gi ft ) ; and third, what is still ahead
of us because of th is u n fol d i ng of the past. 2s
In Being and Time,29 Heidegger furthermore develops this
prox i mity between time a n d Being in App ro pr iat i o n when he pur
sues the essential belon ging to geth er of man and Being. Our only
possible power lies, according to H ei deg ger, i n death, which sig-
READING I R IGARY AND THE QUESTION OF APPROPRIATION 27
nals one's total and defi n ite impotence. However, the sense of one's
i mman ent possible i m p oten c e is a power and constitutes all of
one's exi stence as one's potentiality for Being.
Thi s power wh e reby we can sen se our mortality is for He ideg
ger the most u nca n ny [ Unheimlich] and the most u n i q ue and the
most far-reac h i n g power in one's life a s power. Through the pos
sibi l ity of death, man s en se s his ownmost homelessness and his
strangeness. At the same time, man can only affirm himself/herself
as mortal , which is the most negative experience and which antici
pates nothingness. However, its effect i venes s is comp l etel y p os i
tive.
Through t h e formu la of the "po ssib i l i ty of an impossibility",
Heidegger establishes the relationship that constitutes all of our
instrumental ities and activities . In the ant i ci pation of our own
imp otence and di sappearance lies our utmost affirmation. But
l an guage i s i m p l i cated in this p rob l e m ati c . In technological think
i ng, a metap h y s ic s of B e i n g h as e merg ed , which enframes and thus
con stitutes itself as Gestelt.30 According to He i deg ger, language
has become part of this Gestell. In Western metaph y sics Bei n g has
been thought as idea, as k i n es is , and as dynamis, a Gestell that is
disclosed in s a yi n g as speech. In Ereignis, B e i ng is approp riated
and appears e n fram e d in la n g u age :
Speec h understood as the fu llness of its mean i n g transcends -

and does so a l w a y s - the physical-sensible s i de of p hon eti cs .
Language, as sen se that is sounded and written , is in itself
supra- sensuous, someth i n g that co n stan t l y transcends the
mere l y sen sible. So understood , la n g uage is in itself metap h y s i
cal . J I
Just l i k e s u bj ect i v i ty appears i n the e ar of t he other, so lang ua ge

is thi s otherne s s . W h at i s heard is what is. How e v e r , in order for
m an to h e a r Erei�ni.I' , he has to l is ten to that which is u n s po k e n in
the speak i n g . Through t he enfram i ng [ Gestell] , modem man only
hears the i n forma t i o n t hat (s)he can gather from propositional
th i n k i n g that de l i vers a n o bj ect of k n o wl ed g e to th ou ght . Heideg
ger, on the o t her h a n d , wants lang uage to b e del ivered to its free
dom w here by t he a ppropriat i n g u ncovers.
However, inthe age of techn ology , scientific and theoretical

agend as demand that language deliver in its enframe me n t. As such,
it commands that man be u niform ally informed (t h rough, for
example, the cy bern etic machi n ery) . 32 Language has therefore
become formalized a n d depends on the c al cu lated availability of
saying. In ou r attempt at formalizing language in pursuit of our
theories, we have object ified language itself and have made of it
another object of stu dy . 33 Heidegger speaks to this impu lse in the
following:
In order to be where we are, we human beings remain commit

ted to and within the b ei ng of language, and can never step out
of it a n d look a t it from somewhere else. Thus we a l ways see
the nature of language only to t he extent to which language
itself has us i n view, has appropr i ated us to it. That we cannot
know the nature of langu age - know it according to the tradi
tional concept of knowledge defined in terms of cogn i tion as
represe nta ti o n - is not a defect, however, but rather an adva n
tage by wh i ch we are favored wi th a s pecial realm, that realm
where we, who are needed and used to speak language, dwell
as mortals. 34
For Heidegger, traditional p h ilosophy cannot get at that which

language hides from modern man . As the pre-thematic a priori,
Ereignis cannot appear in theoretical discourse. Instead, accordi n g
to Heidegger, we have to tum our ears to the sayings of the Pre
Socratics in t heir thinking on aletheia, logos and phusis. Or, we
might follow Plato's advice, and l isten to the poets (an advice that
Heidegger chooses to follow in h i s read i ngs of, for instance, HOl
derlin, Trakl and Rilke).
In his medi tat ion on "s ay i ng " [logos], Heidegger never claims
to capture it in an y of his statements. O n l y in the silence of t h e
word can the approp r i ati n g appear, as the sh owi n g movement
w i thin the being of language. However, this silence i s n ot captured
in a d el ib erat i on on silence. Rather, saying resi des in Appropria
t io n , as qua showing, is the most approp r i ate mode of appropri at
ing:
For appropriating Sayi n g brings to light all present beings in

terms of their properties - it lauds it, that is, allows them into
thei r own, their nature. [ . . . ] Language has been called "the
house of Being" . It is the keeper of bein g present, in that its
coming t o l ig h t remains e n t rusted to the appropriating show of
Saying. Language is the house of Being because language, as
Saying, is th e mode of Ap propriati on . 35
Ill
But what implications can we draw from Hei degg er' s meditation
on Ereignis in re l at ion to the above-mentioned feminist appro
pri ations of I ri g a ray , as well as to my app ropri ation of these appro
priat ors and of Iri garay ? Ob vio u s ly , they are manifold. First, there
is the expl icit te n de nc y in all of the above to treat Irigaray ' s texts as
facts which are a tt ri buted an unquestionable presence an d bei n g,
and w h ich therefore a re " re a d y-at-ha n d " to a p propri ate and inter
pret. Lost in t h i s approac h is any consideration of how this text
appears or what i t s on t ol o g i c al status is.
In thi s sen se, the e m p i r i c al unfo l d ing of words on the page are
taken to be a te s t i m o n y for its being. At best, these words are gi ven
a p o l ysemic value, w h i c h , however, pro vi d ed we have the appro
priate hermeneutical too ls, can be dec iphered and accou nted for.
Thus, if the text at any t i me vei ls s o methi n g from our view, it is
our con v icti on th at, by usi n g an effective methodology, we can
gain access to t h i s h i dden material. It is in this context that I
u n de rstan d the pri vi leg i n g of t he psychoanalytic model by these
appropriators, si nce it promi ses to d i sc l o se the u n c onscious
dimensions of the text.
Se c o n d l y , i n all of t h e above approaches ( i nc lu ding my own),
l a n guage i s considered i n strumentally, that is, as an obj ect of
know ledge that can be repre se n te d and which can y ie l d answers to
al l quest i o n s pos i ted . W h at it fai l s '.o acknowledge, h o w ever , i s
tha t langu age i s o u r col lec t i ve dwelling-place, and that we cannot
separate o u r se l ves from i t . I n stead, l an guage speaks us more than
we speak i t . Th u s , l a n guage has a l way s already po s it ioned us, in so
far as i t has u s i n v i e w . and our be i n g has been both s pat i al ly and
temporally pre-understood in terms of how these have epochally

appeared in language, prior to our indi vidual coming to be i n l an
guage. 36
But, what remains hidden from view, is the Ereignis that pre
dates all of these occurrences and which in its foundational Being
al lows all of these epochal presencings of temporal and spatial
concepts to be. As Hei degger has pointed out, language has
claimed us in a particular way i n Appropriation long before we
come to language . And, in the wake of Platonism, the memory of
th i s enigmatic way in which we belong to language has been for
gotten. We could therefore say that al l that is said and done in
language - be it our pursuit of "pure reason" or of a different
representation of woman - al l of these endeavors speak i n a certain
sameness in relation to the ontol ogi cal difference that occurs i n
Ereignis as the "event of appropri ation".
CHAPTER II :
Theoretical Preliminaries
I n Spurs: Nietzsche 's Styles, 1 Jacques Derrida explores the

i n terr elat io n sh ip between art, st yle and truth i n Nietzsche' s writ
ings. For Derrida, this pro blem at i c cannot be disassociated from
the quest i o n of w o m a n . However, wi th i n this problematic, the
" "
ques t io n of what "woman" is will forever be postponed . Writes

Derrida:
It i s i m po s sib l e to di sassoci ate the q ues t i o n s of art, style and

truth from the question of the woman . Nevertheless the ques
t i o n "what is w om a n ?" is itself suspended b y the simple formu
lation of their c o m mon problematic. One can n o lon ger seek
her, no more than one could search for woman s feminin ity or
'
female sexuality. A n d she is certainly not to be found in any of

the fami liar modes of c o n cept o r k n ow l edge Yet it is impos
.
sible to resist l o ok i ng for her. 2
Anyone seek ing an s w er s to these q uest i o n s will necessarily be

caught in this p arad o x ic a l situation. Even if the seeker acknowl
edges the i m p o ssi bi l i t y of fi n di n g answers within the confines of
con ventional epi ste mo l o gica l di scourse, he/she can not resi st the
compulsion to look for them. When Nietzsche claims that "truth is
the lie that we cannot l i ve without" , he l ikens woman to truth . In
t h i s sense, N ietzsche e m b r ace s "woman"f'truth" as the simulacrum
that remai n s re s i sta n t to any determi nable identities . Derrida poi nts
to this u ntruth in truth, that i s, the d i ve r gen ce within, i n the follow
i n g way :
32 THE FEMININE A N D NIHILISM
The divergence within truth elevates itself. It is elevated in

quotation marks (the screeching machinations of a hooker, or
crane (grue), its flight and clapping claws). Nietzsche's writing
is compelled to suspend truth between tenter-hooks of quota
tion marks - and suspended there with truth i s - all the rest.
Nietzsche's writing is an inscription of the truth. And such an
inscription, even if we do not venture so far as to call it the
feminine itself, is indeed the feminine "operation". Because
'
woman is (her own) writing, style must return to her. In other
words, it could be said that if style were a man (much as the
penis, according to Freud is the "normal prototype of fetishes"),
then writing would be a woman .3
Thus, writing becomes the new signature for "woman". But, by

putting "woman" in quotation marks, that is, relegating her being
to the realm of writing whereby she inscribes/writes herself as a
woman-in-effect,4 Derrida understands [ 'operation feminine solely
within the confines of language. For Derrida, ecriture (writing) i s
the tracing and marking o f difference, a n activity which h a s been
repressed and devalued for its fundamental absence in a culture
which has privileged unity, coherence and mastery through its
notion of "Being as presence".
In his critique of Western metaphysics, Derrida positions the
deconstructive strategy as a means to disclose the "phonologo
centric" closure around which our whole conceptual and episte
mological framework is constructed . By pri vi leging speech above
writing, the Aristotelian logos above corporal materiality, and
coherent sameness above fragmented difference, we have become
enclosed within these h ierarchical binary oppositions which form
the foundation of our phi losophical tradition . Writing (ecriture), as
the locus w here difference might emerge thus stands at the margins
of epistemological discourse, but can never be completely disas
sociated from it.
Differance thought as the "systematic play of differences, of the
traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which e lements
are related to each other" ,5 becomes another word for the infinite
production of (self)difference, while also incorporating a spacial
and temporal position i n g . The spacial posi tioning involves the
TH EORETICAL PRELIMINARIES 33
spacing in writing by which every elemen t depends on the space

within itself of the trace of the "other" through which it constitutes
itself via difference. Likewise, the temporal positi oning involves
the tracing of the always-already-there6 as well as announcing the
always-to-become in whatever manifests itself as "present" .
Additional terms such as dissemination and deference connote
ways in which the process of writing differs from itself. In a
simpl ified vocabu lary , one could say that dissemination al ludes,
among other things, to that which escapes signification or which
does not "bear sign ificant fru it'' , but which instead eludes mastery ,
return to t h e same, or teleological contro l . Deference resembles
di ssemination in that it undermines any notion of writing as refer
ential or transparent; mean ing in writi ng is deferred, much like the
effect of the psychic i mpulse is pos tponed and devi ated from any
conception of l i nearity .
I n fact, Derrida rel ates h i s theory o f writing to Freud's theory of
the unconscious and the dream work.7 D i stortions in the process of
signification - produced by mechan i sms of displacement, conden
sation and overdetermi nation as well as postponement and repeti
tion - all of these phenomena divert the written text away from any
sedi mentation of meaning. Together they serve to emphasize the
Derridean notion of verbal free-play, of expenditure and excess
inherent in the very texture of writing.
In Spurs, Derri da rai ses the question of "woman", of ecriture
and the sty les of Nietzsche by return ing to what he cal l s "a certain
Heideggerian land scape"8 in order to pursue his interpretation of
Nietzsche's texts. However, Derrida admits that i n order for his inter
pretation to take place, there i s the Heideggerian reading of Nietz
sche that must be accounted for. Heidegger's "mighty tome", Nietz
sche, thus pro v i des the si lent g round on wh ich Derrida's medi
tations on Nietzsche's styles rests. Furthermore, the question of
N ietzsche's style is closely in terconnecte d with the question of
interpretation per se . For Derrida, the Heideggerian legacy is therefore
of such magn itude that it cannot be ignored if one is to pursue
rigorously any act of interpretation, be it of N ietzsche's texts or any
other text:
I n tak i n g t he me a s u re o f that q uest i o n , however, t here i s st i l l

the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche which must be ac

counted for. Whatever the allowances that have been made for
it, whatever the efforts that have been exerted (and for recog
nizable reasons) in France to conceal, evade or delay its falling
due, this account too remains unsettled.
Until now I have often repeated the word castration without
ever appearing to attach it to a text of Nietzsche. Thus it is that
I shall return to it here, proceeding, perhaps somewhat start
ingly, from the plenums and lacunas, projections and indenta
tions, of a certain Heideggerian landscape. The arguments of
Heidegger's mighty tome are much less simple than is generally
admitted. It opens, of course, with the problem of the will to
power as art and the question of the "grand style". 9
11
Interpretation and Understanding

It seems appropriate at this point to evoke Heidegger's meditations
on the question of interpretation . Heidegger's thinking on
interpretation would automatically implicate both Irigaray as well
as myself as an inquiring subject in this problematic . The question
becomes: what is it, in effect, that summons us in the interpretati ve
endeavor? According to Heidegger, it is first and foremost lan
guage that claims us in Ereignis. In Being and Time, Heidegger
speaks to this problem in his treatment of "Understanding and
Interpretation":
As the appropriation of understand ing, the interpretation oper

ates in Being towards a totality of involvements which i s
already understood - a Being which understands. When some
thing i s understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an
act of appropriation, and this is always done under the guidance
of point of view, which fi xes that with regard to which what is
understood is to be interpreted. In every case interpretation i s
grounded i n something w e see in advance i n a fore-sight . 1 0
-
When an interpretation occurs, w hat happens is fo r the most

part veiled . Thus, in the traditional dialog ical situation, we affi rm
TH EORETICAL PRELIMINARIES 35
o ur p ropos iti o n al s u bj ec tivity in an objectifying gesture i n t he act

of interpretation a process w h ereby the "other" is appropriated by
-
the s u bj ec t as so m eth i n g "ready-to-hand" . What remain s u nthou g h t

in this approac h , is the Being of th at which is bein g i nterpreted, for
i n stance , the text in front of us. Furthermore, wh at also continues
to be veiled, is the understanding, th e fore-having w h i ch is onto
l og i c a l l y necessary for any i nterpre tatio n to pos si b l y take p l ace .
This becomes a problem i n any attempt at textual interp re tation .
Heidegger articulates what ha p p ens in the follo w i n g w ay :
If, w h e n one is engaged in a p art icu l ar concrete kind of inter

pretation, in the sense of exact textua l Interpretation, one likes
to appeal to what "stands there" , then on e finds that what
"stands there" in t he first instance is not h i n g other than the
ob v iou s undi scussed assumption [Vormeinung] of the person
who does the interpreti n g . In an interpretative ap p roac h there
lies such an assumption, as that which has been take n for "
granted" ["gesetzt"] with the i nte rp re tati o n as such that is to -
say, as that which h a s been presented in our fore-having, our

fo re s i g h t and our fore c on c epti o n . 1 1
- , -
Furth e r m o re, wh at ac tu a lly co n s t i tutes i n terpret atio n , is the that

"which is u n ders t oo d i n u n ders ta n d i n g , in our fore-having, and can
be made to explicitly stand out as such" . In H e ideg ger s words : '
" th e as makes up t h e structure of the explicitness of somethi n g that

is u n derst oo d It con stitutes the i n terp retati on
. ." 12
This bri ngs u s i nto the question o f the hermeneutic c i rcle, since,
accordi n g to Heidegger, " [any] in terp reta ti o n which i s to contri
bute u n d er st a n d i ng must already have unde rs tood what is to be
,
u ndersto od " 1 3
.For Heidegger, who attempts to think outs i de the
subject-object paradig m in his analytic of Dasein, thi s circle is the
ex p ressi on of the exi stential fore-structure of Dasein itself, i n
wh ich i s h idden a "pos i t i ve possibil ity o f t h e mos t p r i m ordi a l kind
of knowi n g :"
The circle in understandi n g belongs to the structure o f me an i n g ,

and t h e latter p h e no m e n on is roo ted in the existential structure
of Dase i n - that is, in the unde r s t a n d in g w h i c h interprets. An
36 THE FEM ININE AND NIHILISM
entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an

issue, has ontologically, a circular structure. 14
The problem involved in any form of propositional, assertive

interpretation is further complicated by the fact that assertion is a
derivative form of interpretation. By assertion in this context is
meant "a pointing-out which gives something a definite characte r
and which communicates". 1 5 Assertion always already implies a
fore-having, which is constituted prior to any assertive proposition
ing. Thi s is what defines its derivative character. Theoretical
statements must therefore likewise be thought of as being deriva
tive, since! they are grounded i n primordial interpretation which
occurs in an action of circumspective concern. This interpretation
happens prior to any presence of words, but that does not discount
the fact that an interpretation has indeed taken place. The moment
the assertion gives a definite character to something present-at
hand, when "it says something about it as a 'what;' and this 'what' i s
drawn from that which is present-at-hand a s such", 1 6 then this as
structure of interpretation has undergone a modification . The
modification has thus changed the "as-structure" of circumspective
interpretation which reaches out to a totality of invol vements of
Dasein as Being-iri-the-world into the as with which presence-at
·
hand is given a defin ite character. To mark this decisive difference,
Heidegger distinguishes between two forms of interpretation : "the
primordial 'as' of an interpretation which understands circumspec
tively we call the "existential-hermeneutical 'as"' in distinction
from the ap ophan tical 'as"' of the assertion" . 1 1
"
For Heidegger, this difference is intrinsically connected to the

problematic of la ngu age as "the house of Being". Why i s it that in
the West, assertive theoretical language in the form of metaphysics
has attained a privi leged pos i t ion a language which is grounded in
,
deri vative i nterpretation? Heidegger attributes this to the structure

of logos itself and sees as inevitable the modification that occurs
whereby the apophantical "as " emerges in some form or another.
Re-turning to Pre-Socratic thinkers like Heraclitus, Parmen ides
and Anax i mander, 1 8 Heidegger attempts to retrieve what has been
lost in the development of Occidental thought of this primordial
circumspecti ve interpretation i n the wake of the emergence o f the
THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES 37
apophantical "as ". It is important to note that Heidegger does not

attribute this state of affairs to any flaw that can be accredited to
any philosopher or period, but rather finds its source in the "error
in Being" that governs the destiny of the meaning of Being. West
ern languages will thus always already hide the ontological status
of the meaning of Being while at the same time the apophantical
"as"-structure in the sense of its "whatness" will presence in its
epochal character.
However, the destiny of logos in the West announces a signifi
cant change that has taken place in regard to the way in which the
meaning of Being comes to be thought. Heidegger identifies this
decisive modification of the "existential-hermeneutical 'as"' as taking
place already in ancient ontology, and that with Aristotle, logos i s
seen a s a n entity in the sense of both "synthesis" and "dieresis".
But he also claims that "along with the formal structures of
'bindi ng' and 'separating"' - or, more precisely, the unity of these,
we should meet the phenomenon. But the problem with Aristotle's
understanding of logos is articulated by Heidegger as follows:
If the phenomenon of the "as" remains covered up, and, above

all, if its existential source in the hermeneutical "as" is veiled,
then Aristotle's phenomenonological approach to the analysis of
logos collapses to a superficial "theory of judgement", in which
judgement becomes binding or separating of representations
and concepts. 1 9
In the development o f Western metaphysics, Aristotle's under

standing of logos comes to guide subsequent thinking and the
Aristotelian "binding and separating" have further evolved into a
"relating" whereby judgement gets dissolved logistically into a
system of "co-ordination". This again, according to Heidegger,
becomes the object of calculus, rather than a theme for ontological
interpretation . The culmination of this developmental direction is
seen in the phenomenon of the copula, which has come to be the
standard for any interpretation today .
The far-reaching implications of the above outline of the prob
lems connected to the appropriating event in any interpretation, be
it in relation to Heidegger's project, mine or that of Irigaray's, first
and foremo st demonstrate the difficulties involved in making

assumptions as to the Be i n g of the text in q u est ion . What actually
hap pen s in the i nte rp ret at i v e act is that language claims us instead
of, as customarily thoug ht, the writing/speaking s ubje ct m a ste ri ng
the mean i n g (s) of the text. What speaks in the in te rp re tatio n is
language itself and the meaning of Being is always already pre
understood and lodged within language, even if it remains hidden
from the appropriating subject.
Moreover, the event of appropriation in i nterpretation speaks of
this two-fold movement whereby what is to be understood in the
text is not its Be i n g , but rather our own p rec o nce i v e d n otion s of
w h at i ts Be in g is, while at the same time our preconceived notions
about the meaning of Being does not be lon g to ourselves, but
rather to language. As a result, our illusions as to the pow er
accredited to an inq u iri n g subject is radicall y underm ined . Lan
guage does not belo ng to any subject, rather, we all belon g to it
and find our Being in it.
Consequently, when Luce Irigaray inserts herself into the dis
cursive field of the Nietzschean oeuvre, the inquisitive path that
she attempts to follow has already been trodden by Derrida and by
He i de gger before h i m. In this sense, the lan g ua ge into which she
attempts to position herself has always already dete rm i ned the
destiny of her inquiry. It rem ai ns to be decided whether she has
already been summoned to l an gu ag e in a particular way , namely in
the way which understands Bein g in terms of the subj ect-object
oppo si t i o n , or, more specifically, Being understood as a copula.
Likewise, it sh ou ld be pointed out that my own re-presentation of
lrigaray's project is partly predicated upon an obj ec tifi cati o n (even
i n its difference) of her text that is guided by the same problem.
Th us, in any interpretation, be it Derrida's, Hei d e g ge r's , Irigaray's,
or my own, language always already g u ide s the de s t i n y of the
i nq u iry . And in the case when an attempted representation occurs,
what has happened is that the existential-hermeneutical "as" has
been reduced to an apophantical "as" that remai ns under the sway
of the copula. As such , i t can on ly speak to the whatness of the
text, and w i l l be obli vious to the question of the meaning of Bei n g .
In this derivative form of interpretation, the ontol o g i cal q uestion a s
t o the Be i n g of the text will necessari l y be obsc u red .
One could object to this claim by saying that deconstruction , i n

i t s practice (which is usually what i t i s reduced to in contemporary
appropri ations of Derrida), defies simple objectification and seeks
in stead to probe at the vul nerable points in a text where its own
excessi veness resists coherence and i dentity. Without at this point
broachi n g the complex question s attached to the Being of decon
struction, or, for t h at matter, the text, suffice it to say that in o rder
to speak to Nietzsche's phi l o so ph y , Ereignis, or the event of ap
p ro pri at i o n , has alw ay s already occurred . As such, it would
necessitate that all of Nietzsche's writing could be subsumed under
the category "ph i l osophy", and that Nietzsche would have to be
appropri ated as a figure to which one has attached a system of
thought. Even i n an attempt to poke holes at thi s system, the sys
tem w i l l at one point have to have been conceived in i ts totality i n
order fo r t h e lacks to b e identified. I t would therefore b e my con
tention that n o de-constructi ve gesture could be possible without
an inherent representational gesture , even if this representation i s
s ubseque n tl y put u nder erasure, be i t through grarnmatology or the
decon structi ve strategy .
lll
The Nihilism Problematic

At this j u n c tu re, let us explore the problematic of nihilism within
Nietzsche's ph ilo s ophy of will to p ow er. In Nie tz sc h e s post '
humous work, The Will to Power20 he writes: "What does n i h i l i sm

mean ? That the highest values devaluate the ms e l ve s The aim i s.
l acking ; ' w h y ' fin d s no an swer. " 2 1 B ut, in Thus Spoke 'Zara
thoustra, 22 when Zarathoustra descends from the mountain s to
teach the people h i s newfound wi sdom by ann ou nc i ng that "God i s
dead", h e becomes the laugh i n g- stock o f the crowd, who perceives
him as a madman. But with thi s prophetic pronouncement, Zara
thoustra becomes the fi rst to recogn i ze and embrace n i h i l i s m .
U nfo rtu n atel y no sooner had N ietzsche ' s pronouncement been

,
made, before it was subjected to gross m i sunderstanding and

tri v i al i zation by a pp ropri at ors of his p h i lo soph y . Th is error is most
often ex pressed in the (mis)understanding of n i h i l i s m as a Weltan-
40 THE FEM I N l N E A N D N I H I LI S M
schauung , that i s , as a s u bj ec t i v e be l ie f, a d o g m a , a viewpoint or

.
an i de olo gy to w h ic h someone c h ooses to a d he re Th i s is clearly
n ot what Nietzsche at tempt ed to ponder. For h i m , n i h i l i sm appears,
b u t not as a re s u l t of a s u bj ec t i ve cre a t i o n o r a s a cau se of "social
d i stress" or "psy c h o l og i c a l dege n e ra t i o n " . N i et z s c h e posi ts that
when n i h i l i s m "sta n d s at t h e door" , one can o n ly ask : "w he nce
c o me s th i s unc ann iest of al l g ue s t s ?" n I ns tead of l o o k i n g for �he
answer in o� e of i t s symptoms, N i et z sc h e p ro v i des the startb ng
answer : "it i s in one p art i c u la r i n te rp re tati o n , t he Ch ri s t i an - moral
one, that n i h i l i s m i s rooted . "24
�s
.
W h e n at te mpt i n g to s et up t h e proble mati c of n i h i li s m , it

i mperat i ve to know h o w to ask a b o u t the B e i n g of n i h i li s m . 'f!1 1s
_
question i s for the most part ig no re d by pro v i d i n g a de sc n pti �
e
representa tion of the basic c o n s t i tu e n t s of n i h i l i sm . B u t th

is
des c ri pt i o n can only spe a k to t h e whatness of n i h i l i s m as so m e
t h ing " ready-to-hand" . W ha t i s mo re i mpo rt an t i s t o a t te mp t t o get
at the essence of n i h i l i s m , w h i c h req u i re s , h owe ver, a m ore c aref�
l
q uesti o n i n g . Hei deg ger h as attempted to do e x ac t ly t h at i n hi s
g rand livre on Nietz sche.
. Nih il·
. In his fo u rth v o l u me of h i s " m i g h ty tome" o n N et z s c h e
i
ism,25 Heidegger re ads the pheno menon of n i h i l i s m i n th e fo llow
.
ing way :
e
Nietzsche uses n i h i l i s m as the name for the h i st ori ca l m ov
v
ment t h at he was the fi rst to re c o gn i ze and that al re ad y go
e,
erned the p reviou s century w h i l e d efi n i n g the ce n t ury to co m
h e
th e m o ve men t w h os e es sen t i a l i n te rp retati o n conc en trates n � �
terse s e n t e n c e : "God is d e ad . " That i s to s ay, the "Ch ns t 1 an
God " h as lost His power over bei n g s a n d over th e d ete rm i n a

tion of man. "C h r i st i a n God " a l so stand s for the " tra n sc en de nt "
i n g e nera l and its various mean i n g s - for " i d ea l s " and " norms",
"pri nc i ple s " and "ru l e s ' ' , "ends" an d "value", which are set
"above" the b e i n g , in o rder to g i ve be i n g as a w h o l e a p u r p ose ,
an order, an d - as it i s succinctly e x pressed - " m ea n i ng " . N i h i l
ism i s th at hi sto r ical process w hereby t he d o m i nance of t h e
"tran scendent" be c ome s n u l l a n d v o i d , so that al l be i n g l oses it s
worth and me a n i n g . 26
THEORETICAL P R ELIMINARIES 41
If, by re v e a l i n g how the tra n s cend e nt i s dev a l ue d a n d t hu s

" "
fa i l s to up h old and reason-able universe within which

the mo r a l
man has previously d efined h i mself, how and on the b a s i s of w h at
c an man now understan d h i s e x i s tence? Nietzsche p ro v i d e s the
ans we r throug h h i s c onc ep t i on of will t o power, wherein man fi nds
the i m pe rative to shape his ow n existence and his own universe
through an act of trans valuation :
Insofar as Nietzsche e xpe r i e n ce s nihilism as the hi story of the

devaluation of the h ighe s t val ues, and thi n k s the overcomi ng of
n i h i l i s m as a cou ntermovement in the form of th e revaluation of
all prev i o u s values, and d oes so in terms o f t he ex press ly
ackn ow l edged p r i n ci p l e of va l uat i o n , he is d i rect l y th i n k i n g
Being ; th at is, bei n g s as such ; and in this way he understands
n i h i l i s m med iate ly as a h i s to ry i n w h i c h s o m et h i n g happens
w i t h b e i ng s as s u c h . 21
What is at s tak e i n n i h i l ism, i s thinking a history i n w h i c h bei n g

as s u c h stands. To say i t with He i deg g e r : "In its o w n way, the
name nihilism n a m es the Being of beings." 2 8 As such, Nietzsche's
n ih i l i s m comp letes metaphysics, He i d e gge r asserts. It d oe s not
overcome it. Thus, in a tte mp t i n g to th ink the essence of n i hi l is m, it
has to be thought w i thi n the parameters of metaphysics, and not as
a ph en o me n o n e x t er io r t o i t.
For N i etzsche, i n t h e age o f nihilism, art is w orth more than

truth , and mus t be striven for in a rig orou sly di s ci p l i ned g ran d "
style". Life thought as a continuous process of bec o m i n g in a

perpe t u a l movement of self-overcoming and s e lf- c re at i o n n o
l o n ger has to answer to the rules of te l eol o g y or aetiology, but can
only be affirmed within the co n fi n e s of perspectival subjectivity of
man thought as the a rt i s t N i etz sc h e g i ve s an account of what has
.
happ ened i n t h e fol l o w i ng :
What has h appen e d , at bottom ? The fee li ng of val ue les sne s s

was reached with the re a l i z at i o n that the overa l l character of
e x i s ten c e may not be i n te rp re te d by mean s of the concept of
"truth " . Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity
i n the p lu ra l i t y of events is l ac k i n g : the character of existence is
not "true", i s false. One sim p l y lacks any reason for conv incing
o neself that there is a true world . B riefly : the c a teg o ries "aim",
"unity", " b ei n g " which we u sed to proj ect so me value into the
w orl d - we pull out agai n ; so the world looks valueless. 29
For Nietzsche, nihilism is an i n e v i table and inescapable p h e

nomenon in the late 1 9th century . However, n i h i l i s m i s also am
biguous:
A. Nihilism as a si g n of i n cre as e d power of the spiri t : as active

nihilism.
B. Nihi lism as d ec l i ne and rece s s i o n of the po wer of the spi rit:
as passive n i h i l ism. 30
As such, reactive n i h i l i s m can only surv i ve through ressenti

ment and an ap peal to the already crumb l i n g moral and legal l aws
in a de spe rate attempt to atta i n will to power. N ietzsch e p lac e s the
prie st , the phi losopher, the C hri st i a n , the J e w , the B uddhist, the
socialist, an d the feminist w i t h i n thi s fo r m of p a ss i v e n i h i l i sm . Thi s
weary n i hi l i s m is t o Nietzsche a s i g n of weakness that s i g n a l s that
the strength of the sp i r it has been exhausted :
The wil l to power appears

a. among the oppressed, amon g slaves of a l l k i n d s , as w i l l to
''freedom" : merely g e t ti n g free seems to be the g oal ( re l i g io
morally: "respon sible to one's own conscience al one"; "evan
gelical freedom", etc.)3 1
Active n i h i l i s m, o n the other hand, embraces the state o f affa i rs

created by nih i l i s m and b o l d l y faces the t e rro r of sel f- affi rmation :
"Ni h i l i sm" a n ideal of t h e h i ghe s t d eg re e o f po w e r fu l n e ss of the

sp i rit , the over-richest life - partly destructive, partly i ron i c. 32
Zarathoustra, as the teac he r of the Overman , is the spi ritual

e mb o dime n t of the w i l l to pow e r a n d the i l l u stri o u s proponent of
affi rmati ve/acti ve n i h i l i sm . B y remai ning faithfu l to the earth ,
Zarat hou s t ra re-values and tran svalues that w h ic h h as been pre v i
ously dev a l u e d . In t h e proj e c t i o n of a transce nde n t world outside
THEORETICAL PRELIM INARIES 43
and beyond the material world, Western metaphysical man has

c re ated what Nietzsche cal l s "despi sers of the b ody , of the earth
"
as well as of life. Platonism in conjunction w ith Christianity and

the moral system that th i s union created are to be held resp onsib l e
for this state of affa i r s, claims Ni etzsche. But, like every other
moral value system, Chri stian ity ended in nihilism:
"Whither i s God ," he cried. "I s h a l l tell you. We have killed him
- you and I . All of us are h i s murderers . But how have we done
th i s ? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the
sponge to w i p e away the enti re hori zon ? What did we do when
we unchained the earth from its sun?33
Wi ll to power as art, as opposed to morality and knowledge,

will in its staunch n i h i l i stic stance destroy this degenerate moral
system in a celebration of d e s tru ct ive creativity that w i l l allow for
i l lusion, intoxication and multiplicity. B ut th is new ground for
exi stence is founded on the body i n stead of havi ng a spiritual
fo undat i o n :
Essential : to start from the body and em pl oy it as a guide. It i s

t h e much richer phenomen o n , which allows of clearer observa
tio n . Belief in the body is better established than belief in the
spi ri t . 34
However, for Nietzsche, the body does not provide another new
foundati o n for "truth" in the tr aditi o nal sense of the term . All ph e
nomena, i n c l u d i n g the body, are subject to w i l l to pow er and i s as
such alw ay s already caught up in n i h i l i sm.
N i h i l i sm, therefore , i s the inev itable cond ition under which
modern Western man i s destined to l ive, and Nietzsche envi sions
n i h i l i s m at its most extreme to take the fol l owi n g form:
Let us t h i nk th i s thought in its most terrible form : exi stence as it

is, wi thout mean ing or aim, yet recurr ing inevitably without a ny
fin ale of n o th i n g ne ss : "the eternal recurrence".
Th i s i s the most extre me form of n i h i l i s m : the no t hin g (the
" mean i n g less" ) , etern a l ly . 35
When Zarathoustra transvaluates the mean i n g of the earth, the

chtonic meaning of which had previously been devalued, he
simultaneously alludes to the figure of the ancient Greek god,
Dionysus. In his primordial connection to the earth , Dionysus is
the god of intoxication, but also of primordial (tragic) pain. The
spirit of music that bespeaks the power of will to power finds its
expression in Zarathoustra's singing and dancing on the mountain.
This stance should be understood in the context of the following
quote :
The overman is the mean ing of the earth . Let your will say : the
overman shall be the meaning of the earth ! I beseech y ou, my
brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not be lieve tho se
who speak to you of otherworldly hopes ! Poiso n-m ixe rs are
they , whether they know it or not. Despisers of life are they•
decaying and poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is weary :
so let them go. 36
Furthermore, it should be placed in conjunction with Nietzsche's

emphasis on the struggle between the old Chris tian metaph ys ic al
man who has to be overco me and the dawning of the ove rm an as
the force of Becoming. The earth , the body and over- abu n dan t life
will come to replace the spirit and the soul , which were p rev io us ly
valued. In the age of the overman , however, to s i n again st the e�
becomes the highest crime. Danger and destructi on bei ng hi s
vocation, Zarathoustra destroys th is moral defi nition of man and
provide s instead a new definitio n :
Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman - a rope ov er an

abyss. A dangerou s across, a dangerous on-the- way , a dan ger
ous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping.
What is great in man i s that he is a bridge and not an end :
what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going
under.37
The question sti ll remains to be determi ned, however, a s to how

Nietzsche thinks Being in his meditation on nihi l i s m . In the above,
we have attempted to outl ine the basic con stituents of his ph iloso
phy of will to power in the age of nihilism. The question sti l l
stands: how and i n what way doe s Nietzsche think the meaning of
Being? He i d egge r po n der s this question and prov i des the i n si ght
that Nietzsche remains firm l y lo dged within the confines of meta
p h y sic s and therefore doe s not succeed in overcoming met ap h ys
ics. Metaphysics, for He i de gg er is the trad i t i o n that thinks the
,
Being of beings as a whole. Nietzsche, in th inki n g B e i ng as

B ec o m in g a nd t hin king will to power i n terms of eternal rec u rre n ce
of the same, does not overcome nihilism in fact, he compl ete s it.
-
At th is j un ct u re I wou ld like to include He id eg g er s medita

, '
tions on t h e p rob l e m of valuation as it pertains to the question of

subj ectivity, and by i mp l i cat i o n to metaph ysi c s an d ni h il i sm B y
.
pay i n g heed to Heidegger's th i n k i ng on th i s problematic as he

articulates it in h i s Nihilism vo lu me on Nietzsche, I hope to be ab l e
to situate more p roperl y the k i n d s of q ue st i ons that have to be
raised in re l ati on to Ir i g ara y s quest for a different s ubject au
'
feminin.
Acc o rd ing to Heidegger, when N i et zsch e believes that he h as
overcome n i hi l i s m he has in fact completed it. With Nietz¢sc he s
, '
p osi ting of "revaluation of al l values", he effects a definite shift in

value th i n k i n g in Western metap hy s ic s "Revaluation" not only
.
indicates that "all values hitherto" are devalued and fall aw ay but ,
Nietzsche also s ig n a l s that the very place for prev i ou s values dis
appears. Within this new c on fig u rati o n Heidegger sees Nietzsche's
,
re va luat i on as thinking B ei n g for the firs t time as val ue From now

.
on, metap h ys i cs i s articulated in terms of value thi nkin g .
Thi s observation becomes a maj or argument in Hei d eg ger 's

p os i t io n o f v i ew i n g Nietzsche's p h il o s o ph y as the fu lfi l l ment of
Western metaphysics. Nietzsche's value th i n k i n g not only i m pl ie s a
re va l u a ti on of all v al u es , but i t also re q u i res a new principle for
g ro u n d i n g b e i n g s as a whole in a new way. Thi s grou n d cannot be
drawn from any recourse to a tran scen dent (God, the Good,
ldea (l) s ) , but must be found in beings themselves. Thi s l e ad s
He i degger to make the following claim:
If the essence o f metap hys i cs consists in grounding th e truth of

being as a whole, then the revaluation of al l values, as a
grounding of th e pr in cip l e for a new valuation, i s itself meta
p h y s ic s . 3 8
46 THE FEM ININE A N D N I H I LISM
Will to p ow er becomes the bas i c ch aracte r of being as a whole,

whic h is likewise concei ved as the essence of po w er . Nietzsche
e st abli shes a cruci al co nnec t i on betwee n w i l l to power and value
think i n g when he affi rms p ow e r as w h at p osi ts , validates, and
j u stifie s values. In th i s respec t , power i s power o n ly in so far as it
enhances power an d recogn i ze s no other worth a n d va lue outside
of itself nor any end outside of bei n g as a whole.
Thus for N i e tz sc he , a new essence of man i s ann ounced
throug h thi s ne w type of man who fi n d s h i ms elf cha llen g ed w ith
th e task of reevaluatin g al l prior values . Thi s new t ype finds
expres si o n in the " Overman ", which consti tutes th e s u p re me con
figu rati o n of purest w i l l to power. He i s the me an i n g (th e ai m) of
what alone has bei n g ; n amely the earth . Heid egge r exp lai ns:
The Ov erman simply leaves the man of tradi t i on al v a lu

es
be h in d , overtakes him, and tran s fers the j u s t i fi c a t i on fo r al l
la ws and t he p o s i t i n g of al l values to the emp owe ri n g of p ow er.

t
An act or acc o m pl i s h m e n t is val i d as s u c h o n l y to the ex ten
39
that it serves to equip, nurture , a n d enhance w i l l to po wer.
r-
He id e g g er furthermore i ns i sts t hat "n i h i l i s m" mu s t be u n de
e
stood within its conj uncti on with "revaluation of all val u e s " , "th
" O v er
will to power", "the e te rn a l recu rrence of the same" a nd
:
ma n ', and within the e s se n ti a l toge t h ern es s of the se fi ve e sse nt ia
. o ld
l
rubn c s of Nietz sche's th o ug h t . To thi n k n i h i l i s m i n its mani f

truth , means for He i degger "to th ink the h i story of Wes te rn meta
p h ysic s as the gro und of our o w n h i s tory ; that i s, of fu tu re
deci si ons".40 In th i s context, Hei degger atte mp t s to pon de r
Nietzsch e's st ateme n t that " t h e re is noth i n g to B e i n g " . 4 1
He id egger reve als how N i e t z sc h e ' s fo rge tfu l n e s s of the q ue s
tion of Bei ng i mpl i c ate s hi m in Western m e tap hy s i cs as the pro
cess of thought which "t h i n k s t h e B e i ng of be i ngs ", b ut ne ver
thinks B ei ng in its essence. Thu s , i n its forget fulness of the on to
l o g i c a l differe nce between B ei n g and beings, Western phi lo sophy
has bus ie d itself with categori z i n g b e i n g s w i t h o u t a sk i n g on wha t
its g rou n d rests. That "there is n o t h i n g to bei n g s " bec o me s Nietz
sche's great di sco v e ry , but l i kew i se that " th e re is noth ing to Being"
be co me s for He i d eg g e r t h e s tartling assertion within N ie t z sc h e ' s
w ri t i ng which i s the most worthy of thou g h t .
THEORETI CAL PRELI M I N A R IES 47
For Hei degger, the enti re h i story of me taphysic s from Plato on

is seen a s i m p l icated in the hi story of n i h i l i sm . S ince Nietzsche
understands n i h i l i s m purely in terms of valuative thought, and his
metaphysics i nterprets bei n g s as a whole as w i l l t o power, the
subjectum as wel l as the object of metaphysics is w i l l to power
(which again provi des the essential definition of man). A s suc h ,
n i h i l i sm h a s to b e u n derstood as t h e hi story of valuation, b e it in
the form of po s i t i n g of the uppermost values, their subsequent
d eva lu atio n and fin al l y the revaluation of these values as the new
,
positing of values. Thus n i h i l i s m takes on the character o f a his

tory . But for Heidegger, th i s does not mean that it has a h i story but ,
that n i h i l i sm is h i s to ry :
In Nietzsc he's se nse it consti tutes the essence of Western

h istory because it co-determines the lawfu l n e ss of t h e funda
and their relation ships. B ut the
men tal metaphysical position
fundamental metaphysical positions are the ground an d realm
of what we know as h i story . Nihilism d ete rm i ne s the hi storic ity
of h i story .42
i mp orta n t to reiterate Nietzsche's view that the hi sto ry of

It is
metaphysics i s tacitly the metaphysics of w i l l to powe r , ap peari n g
as valuative th ou gh t Thus N ietzsc he's "revaluation" is i n the last
.
in stance a reth inking of a l l determinations of be in g on t he basis of

values. Th i s mean s that " b ei ng ," " p u rp o se ", and "truth" are fun
damentally v a l u e s that human beings h av e p rojec ted . However,
Nietzsche also cal l s th e m "categories of reason'', a me an i n g that,
according to Hei degger, was attributed to t h e m by Kant, Fic h t e ,
and Hegel . "Reason" as used within German ideal i s m i s

S c he l l i n g ,
to b e understood as t h e essence of subjectivity.
Thu s , m et aph y s i c s establishes itself as anthropomorphism, that
i s , as t h e "formation and ap p rehe n s io n of the world ac co rdin g to
man' s i m age".43 In Nietzsche' s v a l u ati v e tho u gh t be i n g as s u c h i s
,
interpreted after the fash ion of hu man Being. A n d m odem meta

physics ch aracteristically attributes a ce n tra l role to t he hum a n
s u bj ect and appeals to the s ubj ec t i v i t y of man. In thi s context,
He i d e gg er i de n t i fies D e scarte s s t at e me n t
' " e g o co gito ergo sum" ,
,
"I thi n k , therefore I am", as what i n i t i ate s the beg i nn i n g of modern

48 THE FEM I N I N E A N D NIHILISM
philosophy: the self-consciousness of the human subj ect who

forms the unshakable ground of al l certainty . N ietzsche thus
merely carries out the final development of Descartes' doctrine.
Heidegger makes the following observation:
If metaphysics i s the truth concern i n g bei n g s as a whole, cer

tainly man too belongs within them. It w i l l even b e admitted
that man assumes a special role in metaphysics inasmuch as he
seeks, develops, grounds, defends, and passes on metaphysical
knowledge - and also d i storts it.44
With the dominance of the subj ect in the modem age, Hei deg
ger identifies a shift from the traditional guidi n g questi on of me �
physics : "What is the bei n g ?" to a question about method . I n thi s
way, the most important question establishes the path alo ng wh ich
man has to seek the essence of truth about himself and ab o ut h is
object(s) of knowledge. However, the ground of this ne w m odem
age is sti ll to be found in metaphysic s . But with Desca rtes , th e
specularization of man's sal vation finds its ground in "m a n's lib
eration in the new freedom of self-assured sel f-legi sl ati on" .45
Within this new metaphy sical system, man h i mself con sti tutes
the new ground on which h i s certitude i s base d . H i s doctri ne eg o
"
cog ito (ergo) sum" is usually translated as "I thin k, therefore I am" .
In Heidegger' s reading, however, Descartes' cogito i s freq uently
substituted by percipe re, which connotes "to take pos sessi on of a
thing, to seize somethi ng, i n the sense of presenting -to-o nes elf by
way of representi n g-before-oneself, representing".46
What this mean s i s that with every "I represent" there occurs a
co-representing of the representing I as "something towards which,
back to which, and b efore which every represented thing is
placed" .47 The subject i s thus co-represented and represented
"along with" the object, that i s, hu man consciousness is essentially
self-consciousness:
The consciousness of things and objects is essentially and in its
ground pri mari ly self-consciousness; on ly as self-consci ousness
i s consciousness of ob-jects possible. For representation as
described, the self of man i s essential as what lies at the very
ground. The self is sub-iectum . 48
T H EO R ETICAL PRELIMINARIES 49
Descartes lays down the absolute principle o f the subiectum

expressed through cogito sum , and as such, it is the determination
of Being as repres e nte d n e s s . A cc o rding to Heidegger, Nietzsche
does not distance himself from Descartes, but m e re l y fulfills the
determinations of the subiectum that Descartes laid dow n .
Nietzsche already u nd e rsto od this m et aphysi c a l l y in terms o f h i s
positing o f t h e "Overman" .
Thi s new principle of t he subiectum fi n d s its expre ss io n
thro u gh the essence of "subj ecti v i ty", w h i c h alone defines the
essence of the truth of beings, Heidegger says. It now becomes
important t o determi n e the method or t h e proc ed u re for securing
the truth as c e rt it u d e , wh ich is then affixed to the e s s en c e of sub
jectivity. Man, as t h e subiectum, now c o n t ro l s the whole of being
since he p ro v id e s the measure for the Being of each being. The
subject is " su bj ec t i ve " with respect to its de-limitedness , and as the
mi d po i nt of being s as a w h o l e , the subject is " pro g res s in g towards
limitless representing and rec k o n i n g disclosure of beings".49
When it comes to disti n gui s h i n g Nietzsche's th o u ght from that
of De sc a rtes , Heidegger e mp h a s ize s t h e nec e ssi ty to examine
care fu l l y Nietzsche' s im p l icat io n in Cartesian subjectivity even
when he vehemently opposes Descartes' positi on . Nietzsche basi
cally refutes s u bj ect i vi t y as a product of metaphysical l o g ic , and
understands it as such as a fiction . However, t h e historical connec
tion between the two thinkers in terms of their sameness is infi
nitely more important than their differences.
A cc o rd i n g to Heidegger's read in g o f the two, Nietzsche's
understanding of the subj ect is definitely modem, that is, he
understands it in terms of the human "I" . And e ven though it is
n ow thought as w i l l to power, Nietzsche nevertheless adopts Des
cartes' position whereby he eq uat es B e i n g with representedness
and the l atte r with truth. But since truth is a lie, representedness
only gi ves semblance of truth, which on ly serves as a necessary
value for w i l l to power. N i etzsche thus i nterprets ego cogito as ego
volo in the sen se of w i l l to power, w h i c h is the basic character of
beings.
Nietzsche's d i fference in relation to Descartes is to be found in
his understanding of suhjectivity i n terms o f the body a nd not, like
Descartes, as conscious t h ought or the soul . However, in Heideg-
ge r s v i e w , th is al ter s n ot h i n g i n the fu n d a me nta l metaph ysical

'
po si ti on determined by Descartes . Th u s N ie tz sc h e s me tap hy sics is

, '
viewed not only as be i n g indebted to Descartes' po s i t i o n histori

cally, but it constitutes a fu l fi l l ment of Descartes' me tap hy sics . As
s u c h it fulfills it in terms of re p rese n t a ti o n and c o n s c i o u sn e s s as
we l l as in terms of a tra ns fere n ce to the "real m of appetitus or
drives, an d t h o ug ht ab so l utel y i n te rms of the p h y s i o l o g y of will to
pow er 50 ".
Let us return now to Nietzsche's statement that i n it i al ly i n s pi red

He i de g ger s decad e l o n g meditation : "there is n ot h in g to B e i ng .
' - "
In light of the above e x p o s i ti on o f t h e p roble m o f N i etzs che's

v al uati v e t h ou g h t Heidegger rewrites t h i s p h ra s e so that it reads:
,
The not h i n g i n B e i n g itself is sealed i n the i nterpre tat i on of

B e i n g as value . It bel o n g s to t h i s se a l i n g that it u nde rstand s
itself as the new y e s to be i n g s as such in th e sen se of w i � l �o
" "
power , th at it understand s its e l f as the o vercom i ng of nt h tl

ism . 5 1
In He ide gg er s thinking on the default o f B e i n g i n N iet zs che's

'
discourse , h e d oe s n ot i de n t i fy th i s as an " i l l w i l l on the pa rt of

�
"
the Nietzschean subj ect For h i m the nihil i n Bein g , wh ich spea s
. ,
to the essence of nihilism, is not a problematic th at ori g i n ate s 1 0

the s ubj ect but rat her i n B e i n g i t se l f:
,
The e s sen ce of nihilism c o nta i n s n ot h i n g n e g ati v e in th e form

of a dest ructive e lement that ha s its seat in hu man senti men ts
and circu lates abroad in human activities. The essence of n i h i l
ism i s not at all the affai r of man , but a matter o f Bei ng i t se l f ,
and thereby of course also a matter of the essence of ma n , and

on l y i n th a t sequence at the t i me a h u man c on c e rn An d pre
.
s u m ab l y not merely one a m o n g others. 52
Metap h y s i c s and n i h i li sm, as the i nauthenticity i n t h e default of

B e i n g in its u nconceal ment, is the work of hu man thought . But, the
re lat i o n s h i p o f B ei n g to the essence of man is d ete r m i ned by
B ein g which a l s o determi nes that this o m i s s i o n takes place i n and
,
through hu man thought. However, when Nietzsche bel i e ves that he

can overcome nihilism, he fai ls to un derstand that th i s i s n ot a

que stion that can be con trolled by the willing subject:
If we heed the essence of n i h i l i s mas an essence of the hi story

of Being i tself, th e n the plan to overcome nihilism becomes
s uperfluous, if by overcoming we mean that man i n dependently
subject that history to himself a n d yoke i t to his pure w i l l i n g .
Such overcoming of n i h i l i sm is a l s o fallacious i n be l i e v i n g that
h uman th ough t should advance upon the default.53
CHAPTER III :
A Lover' s Discourse?
Echo And Narcissus Revisited
It is within this pro blemat i c of nihilism as it concerns Western

metap h y s i c s that Irigaray's i nqu iry i n to Nietzsche's philosophy of
will to power will be situated. As initially noted, the "why"
question of n i h i l i s m , as the fundamental question of metaphysics,
finds no answer. Nietzsche can only "ruminate" on what has hap
pened and try to assess the imp lic at io n s of th i s for mo dem man .
Th e rumi nation provides the abysmal field of thought in which
Irigaray attempts to "graze".
The title of this fi rst section of Marine Lover: of Friedrich
Nietzsche, "Speakin g of Immemorial Waters" , addresses Nietz
sche's forgetfulness of the sayings of the p rofou n d waters that
cannot be represented in metaphysical l ang uage but which never
,
theless constitute t h e pri mordial source for all that is. In her posit
ing of an elemental c o s mol og y of the earth , the sea, the air, and the
sun, 1 Irigaray i nterprets Za rath oust ra s flight to the mountains in h i s
'
search fo r wisdom as a repression and a denial of the primordial

indebtedness of h i s being to these elements and to the maternal and
nocturnal waters. Attempts will be made to detennine the multiple
meanings that Irigaray attributes to these "seas'', w h ic h might be
preliminari ly understood in terms of an originary nurturing force/
element, or a mat ri x
" ".
In the fi rst paragraph of h i s first section , Irigaray initiates a

lover's discourse between an "I Ue)" and a "you (vousltu)".
According to Iri garay , it was necessary for "all of you (tous vous)",
to have bereft "me" of eyes and for it to retreat in order for " I'' to
be able final l y to re-turn with an-other gaze . If we were (even if it
can not be done ) to attri bute any referential identity to the signifier
54 THE FEMININE AND NIH ILISM
"you" in this part, i t would have to po i nt to the chorus of m asculine

ph il osophi cal su bj ect s in language that con stitute the canonical
speculati ve system of sam en es s in the West - a chorus that con
verges around t he figu res of Plato, Aristotle, Plotin us, Descartes,
Kant, Hegel (and Freud), to name the most prolific ones. 2 Thu s, the
" y ou " could be read as referri ng to th i s c o l l ect i v e effort by Western
p hi l osop h ers to den y gaze, voice, and l an g u age to th e "I'', who has
had to exist c l andes t i n e l y in the s h adow of these figures. It i s,
however, prec i se ly because of its n on - bei ng within the m etaphysi
cal language that the "I" is now able to emerge and to re - ap p roac h
them i n order to return wi th an-other p ossibil ity .
But from wh ence d oes this "I" spe ak ? The "I" asserts :
I was your resonan c e . Dru m. I was mere ly the d rum in you e �

se nd ing back to itself its own truth . [ . . . ] Tod a y I wa s thi s
woman, tomorrow that one . But never the wo man , wh o, at the
echo, holds herself back. Never the beyond you are li steni ng to
right now.3
Cou ld this "I" as resonance be u n ders too d in th e co nte xt of

Ec h o as s he is portayed i n Ovi d ' s Metamorphoses? O vid spe aks
thus o f Ec ho ' s nature :
A ny m ph whose way of talki ng was pec u l i ar

I n t hat she could n o t start a con versat ion
Nor fail to answer ot h er pe op le t a l ki n g .
Up to this time Echo sti l l had a bod y ,
She was n ot mere l y a voice. She li ked to chatter,
But had no power of s p eech except the power
To answer in the w o rds she h ad l a s t h e a rd . 4
If the "I" is that which assures the " y o u " its own resonance in
its sameness, then Echo would be an appro p r i at e fi gure t h ro ug h

wh ich we can u n de rs t an d th is "I" . Echo's destiny, h o we ver , i s
trag i c i n that she is i n t ri n si c a l l y c au g h t up in a parasitic relation
sh i p with an-other's v oice. Furthermore, her des i re for t he un
obtainable a n d self- lovi ng Narcissus, who c l a i m s that "I w o u l d die
before you get a chance at me" , cau ses her b o d y to sh r i v e l up an d
to "live" as a disembodied voice for eternity:
A LOVER'S DISCOURSE? ECHO AND NARCISSUS REVISITED 55
"I give you a c hance at me ," and that was all

S h e ever said thereafter, spurned and hiding,
Ashamed, i n the leafy forests, i n lonely caverns.
But s ti ll her love c l i n g s to her and i ncreases
And grows on sufferi n g ; she cannot sleep,
S he frets and p i nes, becomes all gaunt and ha gg ard,
Her body dries and shri vels till voice only
And bones remain, and then is voice only
For the bones are turned to stone. She hides in woods
And no one sees her now a l on g the mou ntains,
But all may hear her, for her voice is l i v i ng 5
.
Echo's trag i c story may serve to understand the complex prob

le ms i n volved in Irigaray's undertak i n g . On t h e one hand, the story
m ig ht be seen as an exemp l i fication of Irigaray's an a l ys i s of the
female subject's trad i tional re l at i on sh i p to language, which could
be char acteri zed as a trag ic one . On the other hand, ho wever,
Ech o's story might l ikewise be read as a w arn ing for Irigaray' s own
p roject in t h at it speaks of an i n h eren t tragic desire on the part of
both Echo' s amorous pursuits of Narci ssu s as wel l as Irigaray' s
pursu it of Nietz sche.
In an attempt to re-affirm woman's body and her sexua l i ty while
refusing to e stab l i s h an antagon istic relationship b et ween herself
and her "beloved", Irigaray woos Nietzsche instead of attacking
him. It remains to be seen , however, i f this loveis in fact a tragic
one like that of Echo for it be that Irigaray
Narcissus. Or, might
h as found a strategy w here by she will, both carnally and v ocal ly,
be c apable of celebrating thi s n ew kind of love? If this be true ,
then another q u e st io n inevitably emerges as to what the B e i ng of
thi s love cou ld be .
It shou ld be noted , however, that Ir ig aray has hersel f al luded

to t he fig u re of Echo in h e r essay "Plato's Hystera" i n Speculum
of the Other Woman . I r i garay re surrects thism y t h o l o g ic al tale
within her decon st ruction of Platonic trut h po i nt i ng to the fact that
,
"even the voice is taken away from Ec ho" in t h i s platonic scheme.

P l ato s hystera,
' w h i c h lri g aray understands as the matrix/womb
that comes before any denomi nation of trut h , has to remain v i rg i n al
56 TH E FEMININE AND NIHILISM
and mute in order for the self-same pronouncements of the image

makers to ring true:
The proj ections of the statufied emblems of men's bodies will

be design ated by the term t ru t h only if they can be lent voices,
echoes of the words pronounced by the magicians-im age
makers . [ . . . ] A l l of thi s demands , of course , that both a para
ph ragm and t h e back serve as v i rginal and mute screens and
thus keep the strategies op erati ng su c c essful ly . 6
But to return to Irigaray's initial p arag ra p h , the "I" is also

understood as that which assures the vocal mediation between
these mascu l i ne voices . As such , "I" would constitute an abysmal
nothingness that a l lows medi ation to take place as well as provid
i n g the i n v i sible air7 which allows the transmission of sonoric
i m p u l ses . In each case, however, the funct ion of the "I" is to
p revent these narcissi stic voices from falling into forgetfulness and
to guarantee a truthful resonance and return of the sameness emit
ted by the "you".
In this silent complicity, the "f' still has to love the "you" in order
to remember and to project the movement of its own past/present/
future. Thus, only by retaining a lover's p ro x i mity can "I" possibly
be able to trace the tracks of its own coming-to-be. An-other path
for futu re existence and escape from this state of affairs can
therefore only occur through a re-tracing of that w h ic h is, namely
Western meta p h ysi c al discourse as sung by thi s choru s . But the
indifference, or even hate , on the part of thi s "you" towa rd any
other "I", potentially different from their own, continually stifles its
birt h . Because t h i s "you" can only tum in the circle of its own
sameness and cannot fathom the p ossi bi lity of a deviation from t h i s
circle , anything other t h an itself i s expelled and forced outside.
However, the "I" is ret u rn ing from th i s other l oc u s far away,
which is located outside the bo u ndary of the circle of the "you" . In
thi s re-tum , the "I'' will no longer be the echo of the "you" nor its
double in reflection . The mirror which the "you" has hitherto
attrib u ted to the "I" h as now been steeped in "the waters of forget
fu lness", from which the "you" has p rotected itself in order to
retain its truthful sameness:
And farther away than the p lace w here you are beginning to be,
I have turned back. I have washed off your masks and make up,
scrubbed away your multicol ored p roj ections and designs,
stripped off your veils and wraps that hid the shame of your
nudity . I have even had to scrape my woman ' s flesh clean of the
insignia and marks you h ad etched upon it.8
The answer to the previous question starts to take form, that is,
from whence
,
d oes the "I" speak ? No longer does i t speak from the
resonance or the reflected i mage of the "you". Instead, it claims to
have found an-other voice fro m outside the deli mitation s of the
"you" . It remain s to be establ i shed what empowers this voice to
speak and to determine exactly from whence it speaks. If it i s
located outside o f t h e confi n e s of t h e trad itional subj ect position as
defined b y Western p h i l os oph y , then w here is its locus ?
Irigaray g i ves a n i n d ication o f the source o f th i s new "I" : "All
that was left - bare l y - was a breath , a h i nt of ai r and blood that
said: I want to li ve."9 Th i s not h i n g (ness) from whence the will to
life o rig i n ate s i s t ho u g h t of as elemental : air and blood. In Iriga
ray's scheme, these fl u i d e l ements have the capacity to elude the
totalizing de- l i mitation s set by the "you'' , a totalizing that to her
represents d e a t h : "As for me, your death seems too base and
miserly to satisfy my m ob i l i ty . " 1 0 Irigaray interrogates this nothing
and projects in th i s q u e s ti o n i n g a p os s i b i lity that the nothing could
be a source of i n fi n i te reb i rth and rene wal :
Noth i n g ? Th i s whole that al ways and at every moment was thus

becoming new? N o t h i n g ? Th i s endless coming into life at each
moment? Noth i n g ? Th i s w h o le that laid by the man tle of long
sleep and was rev i v i n g a l l my senses? Nothing, this unfathom
able we l l ? 1 1
Th u s , in the true sense of t he word "occi dent" as the l and of the

setting su n , Ir i g a r a y d i scovers in N i etzsche the potential for an
other l i fe , for an-other " I " and perhaps a n - other l a n g uage . At this
j unctu re, she prese n t s the fo l l ow i n g quest i on :
And wou l d t h e g o l d o f t he i r set t i n g sun hel p me fi n d the

stre n gth to say t o t h e m : here is the fu t u re , in t h at past that you
never w a n t ed . 1 �
58 THE FEMININE A N D NIH I LISM
There are several possible i n te rp retati o ns that c o u l d be sug

g e s te d in relation to this q u e s ti o n . Fi rst , th i s n oth i n g from which
Western metaphysi c s has atte mpte d to protect its edifice signals the
l i m i t of it s own po ssi b i l i ti e s . As the " Ot h e r" in relation to which it
can separate a n d differentiate itself, be it eternity, death or le
feminin, the n oth ing has been c on s trued as that which cannot be
i nc l uded in m e t a p hysics. But it is e x ac t l y t h i s noth i n g(ness ) from
whe n ce "I" envisions t he rebi rth of an-other voice, an -o ther gaze
a nd a n -o ther l a n g u a ge .
Second, the q uo te also announces that Nietzsche, t he last phi
l o s o p he r of Western me t a p hysics , is the one who, at the "end of
phi losophy " , creates Za rat h ou stra , the ov e rman . Thus , as the
p h i l o s op h e r of n i h i l ism, N i e t zsc h e is the last one, the s e tt in g sun of
Western me ta p h y si cs whose figure of Zarathoustra will allow us to
find the force in the say i ngs of his predec e ssors : "here i s the future ,
the p as t which you rejected." In the shad ow of this go l d e n sun of
Western metaphysics, the "I" laughs . W o n d eri ng whether or not it
is po ss i b l e to transgress this love of go l d e n death , "I " e merg es
from th e earth, with " e n l i ghte ned eyes".
At th is p o i n t, there occurs a s h i ft in t h e pronoun in the dialogue
from vous to tu i n the French te x t . In the remainder of thi s s ection,
"Speak i ng of Immemorial W a te rs" , the "I" add re sses this "you
(tu)", a si gn i fi e r which in my re ad i n g will be connected to the
fig u re of Ni e t zsche . What s ee mi n g ly ta kes p l ace, is a s hi ft from a
co llec t i ve address to an i nt i mate ex c han ge between "I" an d "you ;"
a quas i -d i a l og u e wh ich in fact turns out to be, like most d i alo gu e s ,
a d i s g u i se d monologue. In the form of an i ntimate wooin g of
Nietzsc he, the lover's d i sc o urs e e mbark s o n th e di ffi c u l t j ou rn e y
t h ro u g h the man y - s pl e n d ored p a th s of N i e tz sc he' s text.
However, in th i s p ro n o un ce d intimacy be t ween the I and the " "
"y o u ' ' , there is also a q uestioning of what c o n sti tutes i de ntity and
d i ffe re n c e . I n the fo l lo wi n g passage, the "I" identifies herself wi t h
"y o u " even as she differentiates herself from h i m :
D i ffere nt bodies, that n o doubt makes the likeness . For, i n the

o th e r , how i s one to find oneself except by al so throwing o n e ' s
selfsame (son meme) t h e re ? And bet wee n you (tu) and me, will
there not always be this fil m that k e e p s us apart? 1 3
A LOVER'S DISCOlJRSE? ECHO AND NARCISSUS REVISITED 59
Traditionally, d iffe re n ce has been understood in metaphysical

discourse as d i a le c t i ca l ly defined, that i s , through the act of n e ga
tion of the "other". What Ir i g aray proposes, in stead , i s that the o ne
must and will a l way s be i n t ri n s ica l ly incl uded in the o t h e r and vice
versa, as a d ifferen c e with i n . 1 4 Th i s , however, pos e s a serious
thre at to what is u su al ly thought of as " i dent it y ". Se l f- i de n t i ty as it
is th ou ght from Plato onwards requires that t he one be separate,
coherent and free from a n y contamination by the " o t her" . It is with
thi s concern in mind that we have to a p proach lri garay 's i n s i st e n c e
on the pl u ral nature of the fe m i n i n e , w h i c h embraces d iffere n ce
instead of paran oi c a l ly s h u n n i n g i t .
Iri garay ' s attempt to w h i s pe r "sweet l i ttl e nothings" i n to
Nietzsche's ear ought t h e refo re to be understood , as I have prev i
ou sly stressed, in the co n te x t of her exploration i n to the p ossi b i l i ty
of an-other lan g u ag e . By re - t r a c i n g Za ra tho u s tra ' s o d y sse y , and i n
p arti c ular the l ac u n a s and dark spots with i n his se a rc h fo r w i s do m,
Irigaray draws attention to e x ac t l y th i s n ot h i ng from w h e n c e the
"I" might speak in order to effect a d i ffe re n c e . When , ac co rd i n g to
Irigaray, "you" h a s depri ved "I" of her p r op er constitu t i ve i m a g e s ,
this lack does not on l y become a pri son-house for " you " in that he
cannot partake of her i ma g e s as s he partakes of h i s, but it l i kew i se
becomes ''I"'s e n c l os u re . The task be c o m e s one in w h i c h "I" can
make thi s difference heard w i t h i n Nietzsche, who, perhaps more
than any p re v i ous ph i lo so p h e r, is suscept i b l e to t h i s new th i n k i n g
that emerges from " t h e bowel s of t h e earth". H o w e v er, Iri garay' s
read i n g simultaneous l y exposes t h e l i m i tations w ith i n N ietzsc he's
philosophy, even thou g h it a n n ou n c e s a revolution ary break i n
relati on to the pre v io us met a p h y s i c a ltradition.
Irigaray que s t i on s N ietzsche's ph i l osophy of w i l l to power
th rou g h the fi g u re of the c i rc l e . The c i rc l e - he it in t h e form of t h e
sun at noon celeb rated by Zarathou stra as the pe rfect star of i l l u
mination , or, i n the form of t he c i rc l e o f the serpent a ro u n d t h e
neck of Zarat h ou s tra ' s eag le a s t he sy mbol of t he etern a l recurrence
of the same, or, fi n a l l y , i n the fon n o f the subject 's rnncentrk
perspective - s i g n i fi e s for I r i g aray N i ct zschl• ' s obse s s i on w i t h
sameness a n d con seque n t l y a d e n i a l o f d i ffe rence . Thu s her s t rat
egy is to probe i n t o t h e Be i n g o f t h i s L'i rr k , w h i c h i n hl'r v iew
constitutes a para n o i r c o n s t ru ct i o n o n t hl' part o f t h e ( mascu l i ne )
s ubj e ct. In thi s way he attempts to differentiate and separate him

self from the (M)Other as t h at which cannot be permitted to exist
within his self-created c i rc l e . Her read i n g of Nietzsche focuses
u po n th i s n o th i ng, which both constitutes the core a s well as that
which surrounds this circle, as that which is left unthought. Yet,
t hi s n oth i n g is eq ui pri m ord i al to the circle itself, be it at the i nteri
o r i t y of the circle or at the exteriority of it.
Acc ord i ng to Irigaray, when Zarathoustra worships th e sun as
the perfect and illustrious star which i n its inevitable se tt i ng speaks
of the pri n c i ple of the ete rn a l recurrence o f the same, he remains
finnly lodged within a specular hel i osco pt i c lo g i c In so do i ng , not
.
only does he c ele b rate the circular perfecti o n of the sun at noon,
which pro v i de s clarity of vision and illu minates his ideas, but he
also affirms the treasures of t h e night and i ts darkness that the
se tt i n g sun bri n g s :
For that I must descend to the depths, as yo u do in the evening

wh e n you go be yo n d the sea and sti l l b r i n g l i g h t to the under
world, you overrich star. t s
B u t fo r Iri garay, the fi g u re o f the sett ing sun also serves to

i l lu s trate the i n here n t pri nciple of dec li ne dege nerat i o n and final
,
ity in the eternal rec u rre n ce of the same, the necessary constituent
in the p rocreati v e process of will to power. The circularity o f the
sun bec o me s a me tap ho r for Nietzsche's appropriatin g specularity,
viewed as a n et of entrapment of al l that is "other" to it. B ut, the
sun al w a ys casts a shadow, e v e n at noon , thus this "other" i s
necessarily present, even i f it fal l s o u t s i de t h e realm of t h e appro
p r i at i n g gaze. Li kew i se , when it is n oon for Zaratho ust ra it is n i ght
,
at the other side of the earth or in the dep th of the seas :
The s u n ? Which sun? And why s ho u l d it h i de the s u n from us

unless it i s the same sun that you have taken o v e r as the proj ec
tor of your c i rcle? l 6
Thu s , i n its p ri vat i ve presence, b ot h its p rese nc e and

its absence
exist, e ven though this shadow m i ght exceed Zarathoustra's self
centered perspective:
A LOVER'S DISCOURSE? ECHO A N D NARCISSUS REVISITED 61
But this torch, your lamp, makes shadow . Even (meme) at

noon. Even/self (meme) seeing itself. Your n oon leaves in t h e
darkness the oth e r side of the eart h , and its ins i d e and the ,
depths of the sea. 1 7
Irigaray views th i s logic o f exclu sion a s symptomatic of

Nietzsche's thinking on the q ues t i on of d i fference. That which
cannot be appropriated w i t hi n Zarathoustra' s willing subjectivity ,
falls t o noth i n g However, t hi s i n herent d ege ne ratio n i s c elebrat ed
.
by Ni etzsche Zarathoustra hi m se l f, as the l as t man, will therefore

.
necessarily perish as he te ach es the overman as the o v erc o mi n g of

man. For Nietzsche, t h e differentiating fo rc e i s th e abysmal noth
ing:
You fold the memb rane between u s in y our own way. Either it
is right up and thru st out, or turns fa l t e r i n g back i nto yourself.
For holes mean only t h e aby ss to you. A n d the fu rther you
project you rse l f the farther you fal l . There is noth ing to st op
,
your pene t rat i o n outside yourself - n o t h i n g e i ther more or less.

Unless I am there. 1 8
She, on the o t he r hand , res i sts N i etzsc h e ' s penetrati o n . Fol low
ing in a Derridean ve i n of thou g h t . l r i g aray q uestions N i etzsc he's
understanding of the Being of d i ffere nce. At th i s j un c t u re it m i g ht ,
be fruitful t o evoke Derrid a s med itations on the me t ap h or of t h e

'
"hymen" in o rde r to e l ab o r at e on l rigaray's u se of the word

"membrane" . D e rri d a makes u se o f t h e term i n one of h i s strate g i c
ways of thinki n g d i fference. D e r r i d a ponders :
The hymen, t he con s u m m a t i o n of d i ffe re n c e s . t h e cont i n u i ty

and confusion of c o i t u s . me rges w it h w h at i t see ms to he
derived from : the h y men as prot ec t i ve sc ree n . t h e jl· w e l hox of
virgin ity, the va g i n a l part i t i o n , t h e fi ne . i n v i s i h l e ve i l w h i c h . i n
front of t h e hystera , st a n d s hl'IW<'t'll l h l' i 1 1 s i lk a n d t h e ou ts i dl'
of a woman, a n d c on s e q u e n t l y lwt Wl'l' ll dcs m· a n d fu l fi l l me n t .
Neither future nor prese n t . b u t lwt Wl'l' ll t il l' t w o . It i s t l w h y m e n
that des i re dreams of p i l' rr i n � . o l h ur st i n r, . i n a n a(t o f v i o k mT
that is (at the same t i me or s 1 1 1 11l· w l w n· l w t wct• n ) l n \l' a n d n m r·
der. If either one did t ; 1 k l' p l ac c . t h l· n· w o u l d lw 1111 h v ml' n H u t
62 THE FEM ININE AND NIH ILI SM
neither would there simply be a hymen in (case events go) no

place. With all the undecidabi lity of its meaning , the h ymen
only takes place when it doesn't take place, when nothing really
h appens, when there i s an al l-con suming consummation with
out violence, or a violence without blows, or a blow w i th out a
mark (a margin), etc . , when the vei l i s , without being , tom , for
example w h en one is made to die or come laughing . 1 9
Without considering the complex philosoph ic as well a s the

psychoanalytic i mplicat ions of the above quote, it is p ossi ble to
assert that the "hymen ", as i t i s thought by Derrida, makes a con
nection between the wo man's body and the que stio n of d ifference.
Derrida approaches the "hymen" as an openi n g in to Mallarme' s
writing and uses i t as an analogue for the stru cture of th e text
which l i g h ts up a space and re-mark s a spaci n g as a no thi ng or a
blank space. As M a ll a rm e put i t : "Man pursue s black on wh ite" ;
or, to parap h rase it - l i fe is to be read in the blan k of differe nce
between two lines. As such , w riting becomes the dra matiz ati on of
theatre itself as mime. T he stage i s that which remain s w he n sp a e �
comes to double the stage and the miming of m i ming, th at i s vo id
of any reference.
Likewi se , the "hy men" becomes the name for the fus ion of two
bodies during the fusion of marriage as a sign wh ic h si gn ifi e s
difference. However, the "hymen" also leads to supp ressi on of
difference, that i s , to a confusion of i n terior/exteri o r in the ve ry
breaking of that membran e that differentiates the m. Furt herm ore, it
i s also a fold of m u c u s membrane which partly c loses the orifice o f
the vagina. Derrida also th i nks the "hymen" as an effect of the
medi u m of poetry . As suc h , it is an o peratio n of un decidabil ity
wh i c h di ssemin ates and thus s o w s confusion by emphasizing the
si lence, the not h i n g , or, the stasi s of that which stands between.
The i n - between-ness of the "hymen" comes then paradox ically
to stand for s om et h i n g that con summates d i fferences in the very
marking of it: between male and female or, for that matter,
between the "bod ies" of Irigaray a n d Nietzsche. As a figure, it
alludes to the conti n u i ty and c o n fu si on of i n te rc o u rse and thereby
al l udes to the vei l that stan ds i n-between t h e i n s ide and t h e outside
of the woman .
Ironically, the h y men " c a n only take place when nothing really
"
happens. The fusion bec o mes an "all-consuming co n su mm ati on "
without rapture , or a mark w ithout a remark that is without being,

since it cannot have being w ithout being form. A reflection without
pen et rat io n is made possible by the double structure of the
"hymen". As such, it c o ns ti t u tes a textual mark as re-mark. Derrida
speaks of a mi me of a mime or of the "hymen" as that which
initiates imitation as an endless procedure of copying itself. Its
space reduplicates nothing but the mi m i ng of mime and refers to
no t hi n g This figuration is for Derrida privative through and
.
through. It is without being.

It is with Derrida's remarks in mind t h at I read Irigaray's attempt
to understand the membrane that supposedly demarcates the differ
ence between "I" and "you" i n the passage quoted above.20 When
Irigaray posits that which separates the two from each other as that
which stands i n-between , she sees them not as mutually exclusive,
but instead as equally partaking in the space that separates them.
For her, however, this space has been appropriated by "you (tu)" as
the abyss and as de at h .
Like Irigaray, Derrida acknowledges the impossibility for

woman or femi n ini t y to emerge within t he conventional constraints
of epistemologial discourse, from which woman must by necessity
be absent. But in the pregnant space of the entre, thought as that
locus where the differentiation takes place, Irigaray hears the reso
nance of the c a v e/w o m b (antre)"21 that is always already anterior
"
to any proposit i on a l positioning. Derrida asserts, however, that

even if one cannot find w o m an fe mi n i n ity or feminine sexuality,
,
one can nevertheless not resist the temptation to seek for her figu
rations. 22 A g a i n these (con)figurations can only be negative.
Through her deconstructive reading of Nietzsche, she is thus able
to reveal how "your" proj ecti o ns and appropriations are contingent
upon ''I"'s presence as nothing, as absence, as death and as the
abyss.
When Nietzsche appropriates otherness as death and the abys
sal, he also creates God out of t h is absence, Irigaray argues. In
positing this i m p l ication, she simultaneously signals how she
understands God within the Nietzschean schema. God in this sense
64 THE FEM ININE A N D N I H I L I S M
comes to stand for Being as t he fi rst c a u se , as that which grants

Being to al l bei ng s , e ve n if it is th o u g h t negati vely. In thi s sense,
Ni et zsc h e affirms a negat i ve theology w h e re by God comes to
den ote that which i s vo i d and e mpty ; i t b e c o m e s the Nothi ng.
Even though his problemati zing of the q uestion is different
from that of Irigaray, He i de gg er s a n a l y s i s of Nie tzsche's onto·
t h eo l o gy in h is Nihilism v o l um e s e e ms to coinc ide w i th Irigaray ' s
'
concJusion :
A s a n ontology, even N i e tz sc h e s me taphysics i s at the sam_e

time t h eo l o g y , al th ou g h i t s ee m s fa r rem o ved fro m sc ho lastic
'
metap hy sic s . The o n tol og y of bei n g s a s suc h think s essentia as

w i l l to power . Such ontology t h i n ks t h e existentia o f be i ng s as
f
s u c h a nd as a who l e t heo l ogi c a l 1y a s the e tern al recu rren ce. o
the same . S uc h metap hysical theology i s of cou rse a ne � au ve
e
th eo l ogy of a pec u l i ar ki n d . Its negati vity i s re vea l e d in th
_s
e x p res s i on "God i s dead". T h at i s an e xpre ss i o n no t o f a_th�� m
b ut of ontothe o l ogy, in th at metaphysics in wh ic h m hi h s m
proper i s fu lfi l led . 23
In the Nietz sche an schema, i f G od stands for t he "trans cen d e n�"

as it i s t h o ug ht i n m et ap hy sic s from Plato on wards , th en G °d IS
d
. .
v acu o u s . B ein g bec o m e s fo r Ni e t z sc he syno n ymou s wi th G o d , a n

d
is l i ke wi se t h o u g ht as a vacu o u s N ot h i n g . H e i d e gge r s u n d e rs tan
in g of Bei ng, h owever, sho w s ho w B e i ng i s b oth t h e e mpt ie st an d
'
the most mean i n gfu l :
Bein g i s w h a t i s emptiest a n d at the same time it i s abu n danc e,

o ut of whic h a ll b e i n s known a n d e x perienced, o r u n k n o �n
g
and y e t to be experie n c ed, are end o w e d each w ith the e sse n tta l
,
form of its own individual B e i n g . 24
B ein g is the most u n i vers a l , the most c o m m o n , an d the most

sai d , s i nce in every conj u gated verb , B e i n g is a l w ays u ndersto o d .
However, even t hough B e i n g i s w h at i s t h e most rel i ab l e i n every
day e x i stence, B e i n g c a n n ot pro v i de a g rou n d . Writes Hei degger:
A n d yet Being o ffers n o gro u n d and no bas i s - a s bei n g s do -
to which we can t u m , on w h i c h we can b u i l d , and to which

we can c l i n g . B e i n g i s the rejection [Ab-sage] of the role of

such groun d i n g ; it ren o u n ces al l g rounding, is abyssal [ab
griindig] . 25
Nietzsche's destructi v e pos i t i o n , w i t h i n w h ich she understands

his fl irtation with death and et e rn ity w h i l e seemingly transval u i n g
l i fe a n d the earth , i mplies a soliciting of the nothing in a star-gaz
ing, extra-terre strial search for mastery all the while i gnoring the
secrets of the earth :
But if your God d i e s , how keen is your d istress. Endless i s your

despai r and your rage to destroy even the very beg i n n i n g of thi s
noth i ngnes s . The more you seek out the source of danger and
strive to control it, the more aby ssal i s the tomb. Before, when
you gazed at the stars , at least you left earth the chance of her
secret. Now you d i g i n to the earth to recover someth ing she has
taken or w i t h h e l d from you . B ut not h i n g is hidden from you by
th i s ground that k ee p s your footsteps.26
By focus i n g on death , the not h i n g and eternity i n their so-cal led

celebration of the bod y , of l i fe and of the earth, Nietzsche's
"superi or men '' see m to flee that which they wish to reevaluate,
claims Iri garay . Th e y are on earth , but have no love for it. In fact,
Iri garay sees their true passion to be their necrophilic l ove for
deat h :
And that your raptures taste of death because y o u refuse t o taste

death - this he a l ready knows who beyond your l i fe and your
death pursues h i s w a y . 21
By a l l u d i n g to the fo l l o w i n g passage i n Th us Spoke Zarathoust

ra, "The Seven Seal s (or: The Yes and Amen Song)", lrigaray
poi nts to N i etzsche's amorous leap int o the transcendent realm:
Never y et have I fou n d t h e woman from whom I wanted child

re n , u n l e s s it be t h i s woman whom I l ove: for I love you, 0
etern i t y . 2x
66 THE FEM ININE AND N I HILISM
Nietzsche here affirms eternity as the sole woman lover for

him, which for lrigaray indicates that he is departing from the
earth . This declaration of love i mplies a forsaking of the sensuous
realm of the body for that of the supra-sensuous. Asks Irigaray:
But if your only love is for eternity, why stay on this earth ? If
pleasures and mortifications, for you, are perpetually bound
together, why don't you give up living? If birth amounts to a
beginning of death, why drag out the agony?29
But how does Irigaray in the above quote understand

"woman"� If "woman" is here to be understood as that which is
deprived of material existence and as a biological, thus empirical
entity, then this quote will indeed become cruci al. "Woman" as
lover, biologically speaking, is then seen as that which Nietzsche
shuns. In this sense, he becomes for Irigaray yet another in the
anny of Western truth-seekers who have excluded Jiving women in
search of a "higher love".
Similarly, if "woman" here signifies transcendence in the sense
of an other-worldly entity, then Nietzsche can be added to the rest
of the line of idealist philosophers who can only think woman as
an idealized space. But, finally, if what Nietzsche has in mind by
nominating "woman" eternity is another figure through which he
understands will to power and eternal recurrence of the same, then
it might be contended that "woman" as conceived by Nietzsche in
fact is very close to Irigaray's notion of le feminin, thought as that
procreati ve nothing from whence everything emerges. The differ
ence that I might point out would be that Nietzsche thinks this
nothing destructively as well as productively, whereas Irigaray
seems to have reservations when it comes to the destructive aspect
of will to power.
Irigaray therefore concludes that the earth and night cannot
provide for Zarathoustra anything different from what his day has
already provided him. In this sense, the wisdom that the secrets of
the night were to reveal, cannot be heard, because he can only hear
the same:
And nothing is in store for him at mid-night except what, at his

midday, he stored away. A n d if m id-n i ght be even darker t han

his day had im ag i ned, that i s the w ay h i s star still ri ses to per
fect his circ le . Jo
Return i n g to t h e figure of the circle, Irigaray introduces the

image of the sp i de r to i llustrate the concentric edifice th at Zara
thou stra creates in h i s appropriation of the universe, including the
earth and the n i gh t . But, the teacher of the overman becomes
caught i n his own net, because he is forced to remain withi n the
world that he has created for himself. Furt he rmo re , lrigaray ques
tions the matter from which h i s thread has been spun. From
whence does it come ? :
And your l a st dream is that some spider weaving her web

around you is after your blood. For you are caught in her web .
And no spi de r exi sts but the one you wove to make your circle.
And yet you drew the s tu ff of y o ur web from the womb of a
(fema l e ) o th er , d i d y o u not? 3 1
The pro bl e m becomes one of o r i g i n . What grants the B e in g of

this circle ? Nietzsche's reply would be that will to power grants its
Being. Irigaray c al l s t h i s a c i rc ul a r argument, and the circle is
prec i sel y the fi g u re t h a t she a tt e m pt s to b reak open . For lrigaray , it
is the si lence, the absence and the deep i mmemorial waters that
seep t hroug h t h e t i g h t l y formed circle and slowly dissolve it th at
have the cap ac i ty to c reate a rift in this neat l y defined circle
w hereby the Nietzschean subject i s capable of appropriating al l
that i s :
The o l d , deep m id-n i g h t to whom o n e may not speak aloud i n

the day-time. A n d wh ose many v o i ces rise up when the tumult
of yo ur heart is st i l l .
And thus the u n heard speaks to yo u , and slips into your
nocturnal soul w h i c h , t h i s once, i s not s l eep i n g . And says : "Oh
man ! take care . "32
So w h e n Za rat houst ra j u mps h ig h and da n c es around in t h e

mountai ns, l r i g aray secs h i m as at tempt ing to fl y away from t hese
nocturnal voices of a different n i ght than the one he has seen

illuminated by the sameness of the light of h i s d ay . If Zarath ou stra
is the meaning of the earth , then why does he atte mpt to fly from it,
asks Irigaray ? His desire is to take off into eternity, that is, to enter
the circle of eternal recurrence, instead of listening to th e deep
secrets that the earth could provide for him. But in the center of
this endless repetitive motion of the circle, there remain s a captive,
n amel y "je:"
That, fo r y ou r etern ity, everyth ing should always turn in a

circle, and that within that ri n g I should remain - your booty.33
One of the questions at stake in this section , is the question of

temporality. lrigaray accuses Nietzsche of freezing time into an
endlessly recu rri ng circle of repeti tion, thus denying the po ssib i l i ty
of difference and un iqueness. S he claims to propose a different
unfolding of time:
For every hour, in its fi rstness, its uniqueness , plea ses me .

And when everyth ing starts agai n , already (I) am go ne
elsewhere . Whole (I) shall be at every moment, and every
whole moment. And he who repeats so that time wi ll c ome
back has already separated h i mself from time . 34
The difficult question of temporality in Nietzsche is too c o m

plex for us to be able to d o j u stice to at th i s point. But Irigaray has
pointed to a crucial question in w h at c o u l d be defined as
Nietzsc he's mechan istic view of time. B ased on a predominantl y
1 8th and 1 9th century system of thought, Ni etzsche' s eternal recur
rence of the s a m e might be seen as gro u n d e d in a trad ition of
thought that fo u n d its o r i g i n in the Newton i an J a w of grav i ty .
Ne w t o n ' s n otion o f t h e solar system a s a set of mob i le points that
are di stributed in space g ove rne d by t he law of gravity inform s th i s
me c h a n i stic system. I n t h i s co n cep t i o n , t i me is fu l l y re versi b l e .
Irrespect i ve of the d i rect i o n , the system w i l l remain i ntact. What i s
furt h e rmore i m p l i ed i n t h i s k i n d of system i s its perfect perpetual
movement. The system operate s and depends o n time, but it is not
i t s d i recti v e .
A LOVER'S DISCOU R S E? EC HO AND NARCISSUS REVISITED 69
Irigaray's rethinking of the question of time could be better

understood in the context of the change in the notion of time that
occurred in the wake of the industrial revolution, namely due to the
second law of thermo-dynamics. This law invalidates any possibil
ity of a perpetual motion as in the Nietzschean scheme. Movement
is rather seen as one that is directed towards entropy, that is, the
moment when energy turn s back upon itself as a movement toward
stillness. Time is now endowed with a specific direction that is not
reversible. In this conception of time, there is a recovery of much
philosophy of first causes, understood in the sense of the Greek
"Kaos". It is also possible to detect a drift from difference to dissi
pation .
In thermo-dynamics, 35 we can differentiate a system that is both
isolated and closed. For i nstance, in reference to the organism,
there is both a micro and a macro level of understanding. Within
this system, no flow of matter or heat crosses the wall that defines
it. If it does, then the system can no longer govern itself. As such,
the system has to be a closed one. Thus, we can assert that all of
the systems through which time has been thought to date end in
closure, be it the mathematical-logical system, the mechanical or
the thermo-dynamic system. It is in this context that we can under
stand Derrida' s _statement that al l traditional methods of thinking
close off reading. When you try to open it up, you have to retrace
the tradition until you reach the closure.
Thought in this way, it is possible to understand Nietzsche's
thinking on nihilism as the path by wh ich he unveils the closure of
the mathematical-logical system, while Freud's thermo-dynamic
model undermi nes the e x istence of the Nietzschean mechanical
model. Thus, by implication, Irigaray's reading of Nietzsche's mechan
istic notion of time as eternal recurrence of the same follows in the
Freudian p a t h of critique of the models that dominated philosophy
and science at the ti me when psychoanalysis was in its infancy .
But, in the fo l l o w i n g quote from The Ethics of Sexual Differ
ence36, lrigaray attacks Freud's pri vi legi ng of thermo-dynamics as
the scienti fic model t h rough which sex uality, and by i mpl ication
time, ought to be thought. In her view, the principles of thermo
dynamics seem to be more isomorphic to masculine male sexuality
than to that of the fe m i n i ne :
Psychoanalytic science i s founded o n the two fi rst principles of

therm odynami c s , which upho l d the model of the libido accord
ing to Freud . Now these two pri n c iple s appear to be more
i somo rphic to masculine sex u al ity than to feminine sexuality.
Feminine sexuality being less submi ssi ve to alte rn ati o n s of
tension-discharge, to the conservation of energy req u i red, to the
maintenance of states of equ i l i br i u m , to functioning i n clo sed
circuits and reope n i ng by satu rati on , to reve rs ib i l i ty of time,
etc . 37
Irig aray seems instead to cal l for a mo di fi cati o n of the thermo

d yn am ic model by invoking the work of Prig o gi ne : 38
Female sexuality harmonizes perhap s better - if it is necessary

to evoke a scientifi c model - with that whi ch Prigo gine calls
" di ssi pati ve " structures. These fu n c t io n through exch an ge with
the exterior world, which proceeds by plateau s of en ergy an d
whose order does not am o u nt to a search for eq u i l ib ri u m , bu t
effects instead a t rave r s ing of th re s ho l d s whic h corre s po n d s to
an ov e rc omi ng of di sord e r or of entropy with o ut di sc h a rg e .39
Prigog i n e ' s scientific model of " d i ss i pation " s uggests for

Irigaray a p o s sib i l i ty for breaking open the enclosed circularity of
the dominant models that have pre vio usl y dominated scientific as
well as p hi l o so p h i ca l t h ought . Closeted in Iri g aray ' s argument, I
moreover detect remnants of a political d i s c o u r se of inclu sion, as
oppo sed to a Nietzschean notion of exclusiveness and s eparati o n .
Whi le contesting Freud's pri vileging of the t h e rm o - dynamic model
in conceptualizing the (male) l ibido, which she claims is still
froz e n i n th e fi gu re of the circle of e x c lu s i v i ty , Irigaray not only
at te mp ts to provide an-other b as i s for ( fem inine ) sex u ali t y , but s he
i s l i k e w i se engaged in fi nding a n ot her vision on which she can
base her "new" c onc ep t i on of time, o f love and of e x i stence that is
n ot fou n de d on a logic of th e circle and its e q u i l i b r i u m . It i s i n this
context that I read her concern with her "amorous " ap proac h to
Nietzsche, an approach that is c h a rac te r i ze d by i ncl u s i on , tog eth
e rness and p ro x i mity i n stead of exclusion, se p aratio n an d d i stance :

A LOVER'S DISCOURSE? ECHO AND N ARCISSUS REVISITED 71
And if your hour ends when mine begins, that gives me no

pleasure. For I love to share, whereas you want to keep every
thing for yourself.40
It is paramount for lrigaray to pass "outre" or outside the circle

in order to decipher a possibility for another economy, another
order, or another possibility for thinking Being and Time. Most
importantly, however, in lrigaray's proposed modification of
thermo-dynamics, is the insistence on a dissipation of sameness, of
the self-same, and of identity .
In h is Nihilism volume, Heidegger approaches the question in
the following manner:
Now, because all being as will to power - that is, as incessant

self-overpowering - must be a continual "becoming", and
because such "becoming" cannot move "toward an end" out
side its own "farther and farther", but is ceaselessly cau gh t up
in the cyclical increase of power to which it reverts, then being
as a whole, too, as this power-conforming becoming, must itself
always recur again and bring back the same.41
Moreover, when Nietzsche later states that : "To impose upon

becoming the character of being - that is the supreme will to
power",42 Heidegger understands him as c ompleti ng this meta
physical conception of ti me. Through his conception of Being as
Becoming in terms of eternal recurrence of the same, Nietzsche
creates a system of constanc y in i nconstancy.
For Irigaray, the question remains one of a forgetfulness of a
memory of the first "female c reator (creatrice)" that remains hid
den in Nietzsche's perpetual self-created circle. In her view it is the
resentment of thi s i ndebtedness that is the true source of the will to
"overcome" and to "surpass" . She cal l s this will to become an
illness of man, in which he vomits this "first wet-nurse (premiere
nourrice)" from which he has drunk blood and milk. It is in this
context that she understands the will to destruction, the will for an
eternal recurrence of the same, which for her constitutes a dream of
not having been created , and not to be continually created, at each
instant, by an-other:
72 TH E FEM IN I N E AN D NIH I LIS M
A n d in y o u r wi ll to d e s t ro y , t h e w i l l to red uce t o n ot hin gn ess

th a t m i g h t tie y ou to me by a necessity of first and last
an y th i n g
h ou r . To d e s t ro y ac t i ve l y wha t y ou h a d to gi v e up in order to be
a man . To ann i h i l ate t h e bo dy that gave you l ife , and that still
ke eps y o u l i v i n g . 4 3
The mask-like i de nt i t y of t h e Nietzschean su bject d oes not

show itself as endless metamorphoses w h ich m i me s , at the same
time as it a n n i h i l ates , the movement of n at u r al ge s tat i o n . Removed
from , an d different from th i s p ro d u c t i o n of the s u bj e c t as artifact,
Irigaray po s i t s the elusive (n o n )app ea ra n c e of the o ri g i n a ry m atri x:
Nature can not be i m i tate d. The m o b i l i ty of her growth is never

fixed i n a s i n g l e form that c a n s e rv e a s temp l ate . And is nature's
creation not destroyed when one of her m o me n t s is taken out
an d recreated as permane nce?44
Here, lrigaray uses m et a m o rph o se s as a metap h o r for the true

movement of nat u ral g e n e rat i o n . Th i s is a paradoxical s tate men t.
On the one hand she asserts that "nature's g e s ta t i o n" cannot be
m i me d . Yet at the same time she posits me t am o rp h o se s as the
c h o se n fig u re in thinking l i fe a n d g e s ta t io n . Are we to u n d e rs t and
thi s with i n t he context of Orph ic poetry of de- neg a t i o n and death,
as in Ov i d ' s Metamorphoses? 45 Or i s it, d esp i te her insistence of
the co n t ra ry , rat h e r to be a pp ro a c h ed in te rm s of a model for
"n at ur a l time"? If i t i s truly to be thought as a model, then we are
s ure ly to treat it a s a category that is al re ady i n fu sed w i th mean
i n g ( s ) and value(s) .
However, what unwitti ngly seems to be at stake here, i s the
question of t h e Be i n g o f b ei n g s , t h o u g h t as appearance . Th i s
p ro b l e m open s up an i nq u i ry that can lead us into a web of th i n ke rs
from Parmen ides t h ro u g h Husserl and H ei d e g g e r. Without
p re te n d i ng to be able to g i v e a s at is fact o ry e x p o si t io n of the h i story
o f the problem of appeara nce in i t s o n t o l o g i ca l as wel l as
�pi stemol ogical comple xity, al l we can do at this p o i n t is to rec oi l
m front o f t h i s e n o rmo u s q uestio n and
to annou nce some of t h e
i mpl icati ons at work in Ir i g ara y ' s treatm
ent of the q uestion .
Her polem ical i nterv entio n i s p a rt l y con necte
d to w ha t s he se e s
A LOV ER'S DI SCOU R S E ? ECHO AND NARCISSUS REVISITED 73
a s Nietzsche' s adherence to a heliopocentric logic whereby beings

are thought in terms of visibility, that is, in their solar specularity.
But for Nietzsche, appearances are always already artifacts, that is,
always already subjected to interpretation and are as such neces
sarily removed from the "natural" sphere. Nietzsche's appearances
are thus created by the "light" of his artistic subjectivity, which
Irigaray sees as his attempt to imitate or parody the natural sun. In
this endeavor, what he creates instead, is "a chasm of darkness (un
gouffre d'dbscurite)".46 According to Irigaray, authentic appear
ances cannot disclaim their indebtedness to the natural element:
Nothing comes into appearin g that has not dwelt originally in

the natural element. That has not first taken root in an environ
ment that nourished it undi sturbed by any gaze. Shielded from
the unveiling of any fixed form.47
Irigaray attempts to undermine the privi leging of visibility in

this specul ar logic. S he questions the primacy of the gaze i n t h e
constitution of appearances in Nietzsche's philosophy in particular
as well as i n Western metaphysics in general, - be it thought as the
gaze provided by the natural light o f the sun , or, as the arti ficial
interi or light of Nietzsche's circular s ubj ect i vi ty
.
In her projected elemental cosmology, the "material" is under

stood specifical l y as "earth, water, air, and sun". As such, th e
elemental i s thought as a " wet-nurse (nourrice)lmatrix" that gives
life as a gift that is pre-sent, prior to all a p pearan c e s vi sibly deter
mined:
Before comi n g into the light, life is already living. It is germi

natin g long before it responds t o yo u r s un s ray s
' .
And obviously, beh ind every appearance hides an infinite

number of others. But, behind all appe arances, there remai n s an
irreducible life that cannot be captured by appearance. Unless it
8
withers away.4
The dominant metaphor in use in her d i scourse i s that of

gestation, that is, of natural child-birth given to a child b y a
mother. Thi s matri x could also be nominated "mother earth" in thi s
context. In this sense of the elemental, Irigaray seems close to the

Roman appropriation of the Greek word for appearan ce, phusis.
The Romans tran slated ph u sis into natura, connoting "to be born".
Heid egger speaks to this decisive moment in Western metaphysics
when the Greek terms were translated into Latin and the subse
quent shift that occurred in the th i nkin g of these terms:
In the age of the e ar l iest and crucial unfo l ding of Western phi
losophy among the Greeks, who first ra i sed the authentic ques
tion of the essent as such in its e n t i rety , the essent was cal led
phusis . Th i s basic Greek word for the essent is customari l y
translated as "natu re". Th is derives from the Latin tra nslation,
natura, which properly means "to be born", "birth". But with
the Latin tra nslat i on the original me anin g of the Greek word
phusis i s th ru st aside, the actual philosophical force of the
Greek word i s dest royed. This is true not only of the Latin
translation of this word but of all other Roman translations of
the Greek phi losophical lang uage. What happened in th is
translation from the Greek into Latin i s not accidental and
harmles s ; it m arks the first stage in th e process by which we cut
ourselves off and alienated ou rselves from the origina l essence
of Greek phi losophy.49
Th i s transfo rm a tio n of the Greek word h ad then later been

taken over by Christianity and the Middle Ages, which constitutes
the bridge between ancient Greek philosoph y and modem philoso
ph y . As such, the Roman translations have established the
foundational ground upon which modem philosophy rests as well
as p ro v idin g the g lossaries through which we approach the
begin n in g s of Western philosophy.
We should not underestimate the tremendous i mpact that thi s
process of tran sl ations has had fo r the desti ny of Western meta
physics in general a nd for lrigaray i n particular, who, of course,
works within the confines of the Romance language, namely mod
em French. 50 Thus, in my interpre tation of Irigara y's appropriation
of natura in her conceptuali zation of the mat rix , I read her positing
of this (M)Other as confo rmi n g to this Roman translation of phusis
as natura .
A LOVER'S DISCOU RSE? ECHO AND NARCISSUS REVISITED 75
In h i s extensive meditation on the Pre-Socratics, He i d e gge r

resurrects the ancient Greek t er m of ph usis tog eth er with logos and
aletheia when atte mptin g to re t h i nk the quest i on of ontological
difference. Hei de g ge r d e fi n es on t o l o gi c al d i ffe re n ce as fol l ows :
We speak of th e difference between Being and beings. The step

back goes to what is u nth ou g h t , from the difference as suc h ,
i nto what g i v e s us th ou g h t . That is the oblivion of the differ
ence. Th e obl ivion here to be th ou gh t is t h e veiling of the dif
ference as suc h , thought in terms of concealment; th i s v e i l in g
has in turn withdrawn itself from the b e g i n n ing . The o b l i vi o n
belon g s to the d iffe ren c e because the difference belongs to the
oblivion. The oblivion does not happe n to the d i ffe ren ce o n l y
afterwards, in c on seq u e n ce of the forgetfulness of human
thinking . 5 1
It seems to m e that w h at Ir i g aray attempts t o ra i se through her

deconstruction of Nietzsche, is the q u e sti on of ontological d i ffe r
ence, but an o n tol ogi c a l difference that i s a l w ay s already marked
by sexual di fference . Iri g a ray thus reveal s how N i et zsc h e is forget
ful of the vei l i n g that has already taken place of the ground from
which th e N i et z s c h e a n s u bje ct emerges. However, Irigaray does
not think phusis in conj unction w i th ale th e ia or log os in their
essential belonging-together, as d o es H ei deg g er .
Accord i n g to H e i d egg e r , the Greeks ca ll e d the e mergi n g and
rising in itself a n d i n al l t h i n g s , phusis. Ho wever , for the G ree k s ,
their learning what phusis i s , wa s not attai ne d through natural
phenomena , but rather t h rou g h a fundamental poet i c and intellec
tual exper i ence of bei n g . It was t h i s p oe t i c and i ntellectual discov
ery that allowed them a gli mpse i n to nature in the restricted sense,
and not the other way around. S a y s He id e g ger of phusis:
It clears and i l l u m i n ates , al s o , that on which an d fo wh ic h man

dwelli ng. We call t h i s g ro u n d the earth . [ . . . ] Earth is
b a s e s his
that whence th e ar i s i n g br in g s back and shelters e v e ry t h i n g that
ari ses without violat i on . In al l things that ari se , earth is p res e nt
as the s he l te rin g a g e n t . s 2
As the process of aris i n g, of emerging from t h at which is hid

den , phusis is that whereby the hidden is first made to stand. In this
sense, it is closely i n tercon n ecte d with aletheia".
However, what remains i mp o rt an t to Irigaray i n her assessment
of Nietzsche, is to point to his (hidden?) ressentiment to w ards the
"mother"-figure, which may account for his apparen t oblivion of
this link/thread to a maternal matrix, necessary for the artist's
po te n t ial i ty of "eternal recurre n ce " . I rigaray poses the q u esti on of
whether or not Nietzsche's idol of the artifact by necessity o rig i
n at es fro m t h e "de pt hs of t he seas/mothers (fond des mers)" . The
homophony between "mer" (sea/water) and "mere" ( mot her) is
evide ntl y at work i n th i s formulation . However, these maternal
waters never tota lly appear in a un i q ue and formed manifestation,
and t h us can never be s u bj ect to represe n tati on. S ays Irigaray:
And imitating that was the impossible part of your dream. How
is o n e to mimic s o methi n g that has no i dent i ty ? That is fix ed i n
n o form. Can no t be enc o mpassed. El udin g capture and catalog,
except for the mask - de ath . SJ
"Mer/Me re" therefore bec o mes the si g n i fier that undermines

N ie tz sc he's l o fty odyssey. Th o u g h t in terms of an e l ement that can
ne ver be fully present to the Nietzschean spec ular su bject , the
nocturnal s u bte rra n e a n waters resist h ierarchy, v al ue judgements ,
differentiation in her obscurities:
And these s u rfaces are all equally deep and superficial. Unle ss
one of them is made in to a brid ge that holds a person up, pre
vents him from s i n ki n g , that crosses over but never penetrates.
And they all reflect the same (le meme), if they are fo u n d at
the s ame time a n d pl ace. Which is both necessary an d i mpos
sible. They move together, but they cover each other over and
are never s eparate d from one another.54
However, for lrigaray, these waters nevertheless come to stand

for some pri m ord i al form or arche , or ori g i n from whence life
e merge s , be it o f the overrnan or of the ph i losop he r. Not on ly does
the dep t h of these w ate rs undermine any attempt at a measured
representation , but they also re si st light, the privileged element
A LOVER'S DISCO U R S E ') ECHO A N D N A R C I S S U S R EV I S ITED 77
within the Platonic as we l l as the Nietzschean schemas . These

waters create a specu l ar alchemy w hereby air that ri ses from their
surfaces sol i difies into ice a n d/ o r mirro r. The specular surface of
this ice/mi rror is in tum b rok e n when the ice me l ts into a rippled,
fluctuatin g form. All of these metamorphoses belong to the prop
erty of the mer/mere.
The call of these waters is stronger than any hero' s w i l l , but it
should not be h eard for fear that man mi gh t lose sight of h is telos.
While evoki n g the tragic con sequences of the most hardy seafarer s
as they were met by the
sirens' seductive call in Homer' s Odyssey,55
Iri garay warns of the dangers that their call may bri ng to the man
of mi ssi on . Th us, the ever-curious Odysseus has to be strapped to
� e mast i n orde to li sten to the si re ns ' song without j eop ard iz ing
r
his own telos or the
l i ves of h i s men , who in order to shut out this
da gero s c a l
n u l must put wax i n their ears.
Irrespecti ve of the den ial and fear of the
dangerous force and
pull of thi s primordial
song from the dept h s of the sea s, the waters
n
remai i n t and u n corrupted by t he trespasse rs who on l y want to
tac
surmou n t it "by
dint of spurs". In h i s work on Nietz s c he , Spurs,
Derrid a write s :
Thus the style wou ld seem to advance in the manner of a spur

of sorts (eperon). Like the p ro w , for e x ample , of a sa il i n g ves
sel, its rostrum, the projection of the hip which surges ahead to
meet the sea's attack and cleave its hostile surface. Or yet again,
and still in nau t ical terminology, the style might be compared to
that rocky point, also called eperon, on which the waves break
at the harbor's entrance . So, it seems, style also uses its spur
(eperon) as a mean s of prot ec t io n against the te rri fy ing , blind
i ng, mortal threat (of that) which presents itself, which obsti
nately thrusts itself into view . And s t y le thereby protects the
presenc e , the content, t he thing itself, meaning, truth - on the
condition at least that it sh o u l d not already (deja) be that gaping
chasm which has been deflowered in the unveiling of the dif
ference. Already (deja), such i s the name for what has been
effaced or s ubt racte d beforehan d , but w h i ch has nevertheless
left beh ind a ma rk , a s ig n atu re which is retracted in that ery
th in g from wh i ch it is withdrawn . Withdrawn from the here and
78 T H E FEM ININE A N D NIHILISM
now, the here and now which must be accounted for. But such
an operation cannot be simplified, nor can its fine point be
honed in a single stroke (d'un seul coup).56
In Derrida, as in Irigaray, "the spur (eperon)" speaks in the

forging ahead of the multiple and ever-changing marks/stylettos of
styles whereby it embraces and discards various simulations, mas
querades, imitations, and parodies in order to create the "grand
style". For Derrida, it is in the spurs of these temporary and fleet
ing artifacts that woman (dis)appears, as that which g i ves rise to,
yet veils the lack of ground that undermines their very bein gs.
"Spurs" thus becomes, on the one hand, the style that protects
against the terrifying, blinding and mortal threat of that which
appears, precisely in the withdrawal of this (horrific) difference.
On the other hand, "the spur" is at the same time the name for the
rocky point against which the force of the wave breaks at the
�
entrance o f the protected harbor. The always-already -structure
that remains hidden becomes, in Irigaray's vocabu lary , th e aby ss al
depths of the mer/mere. While it threatens to annih i late that wh ich
it grants as presence or appearance, it nevertheless leave s its mark
in that which appears, as the absence or the w ithdrawal th at is
present in any privative presence .
Thus, like the sailboat which glides and forces its ways throug h
the adverse surface of the waters, the mark that i s left from its path
(dis)appears and is veiled by that which grants its path in the first
place. For Irigaray, however, the ship's spur can but pen etrate the
surface of the waters, and can never reach its profun dity. La
mer/mere remains intact:
Even as their ships cross over her, yet she remains . The same.
Incorruptible. And she laughs as they move onward, seeking
the secret of their truth . When they get close to it, they don't
notice it. They just keep moving on, in search of something that
offers a solid resistance and opposition to their wandering. That
offers a rampart to beat back their thought. 5 8
In spite of the tireless attempt made by the navigators of the

past and the present, la mer/mere cannot be reduced to the
A LOVER'S DISCO U R S E ? ECHO A N D N A R C I S S U S REVI SITED 79
discourse o f truth. Instead , it i s by v i rt u e of the e n i g m a that thi s

matrix still holds that hu man be i n g s may in fact retai n the very
possibili ty of a future . The elemental waters is that which in its
"truth" resists any appropriations and as such preserves i t s
who leness :
But it may be that wh o l l y (route entiere) she is not yet theirs.

That her mystery remains whole. Has yet to appear to them .
Becaus e her u l ti mate de p th does n ot return to the l i g ht of day.

And the voice of her ab y sses is not to be folded and g athere d
up into a s i n g le th ou g h t Rather it (elle) will bring down every
.
sail already chartered, if it makes itself heard .59
But what is the B ei n g of the elemental , or thi s abyssal d epth of

the mer/mere/matrix i n I ri g aray s proj ected c o smolog y ? Is it an
'
entity endowed with s i gn i ficat io n , or does it d w e l l outside the

realm of appe aran c es as the always-already structure that give s
appearance being? Does Ir i garay atte mpt to think Being in her
projection of her elemental cosmolog y ? I s "nature" to be th ou ght
as syn ony mo us with matri xl(nourricelcreatrice ) a n d as such a
word for th inking Being in its o n tologica l difference, but a differ
ence that has always alread y been marked by sexual difference?
But before approaching these questions in their speci ficity, let
us explore the interrogative g rou nd on wh ich these que sti on s
necessarily dwel l . What w e have to establish, fi rst o f a l l , i s h o w we
can reside in the prox i m i t y of the q uesti o n of Being w h i le interro
gating Irigaray s elemental c o s mo l og y
' of n ature . Heidegger s peak s
to this probl e m in hi s " Le t te r on Humanism":
But what "is" above all i s Being. Th i n k i n g acc o mp l i she s the

relation of Be i ng to t h e essence of man . It d oes not make or
cau s e the relati o n . Th inking brings this relation to Being solely
as something h anded over to it from Being. Such offering con
sists in the fact that th inking Bei ng comes to lan guage Lan .
guage is the house of Being.61>
Thi nking, for He idegger, is an attempt at a reflection that

persists in quest ion i n g . Con trast i n g l y , by the very use of
80 THE FEMININE AND NIH ILISM
propositional language, based on causal logic, the premises of our

inquiry already imprison our inquiry into the web of what
Heidegger nominates as "onto-theological metaphysics:":
Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks being as a

whole - the world, man, God, - with respect to Being, with
respect to the belonging together of beings i n Bei n g . Meta
physics thinks beings as being in the manner of representational
thinking which gives reasons. For since the beginning of phi
losophy and with that beginning, the Being of beings has
showed itself as the ground (arche, aition). [ . . ] As the gro u n d ,
.
Being brings beings to their actual presencing. The ground

shows itself as presence.61
For Heidegger, to raise the question of aletheia, as unconceal

ment as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth as it is
defined in Western metaphysics from Plato onwards. Heidegger
emphasizes instead another meaning of aletheia:
[A]letheia, as opening of presence and presenting in thinking

and saying, originally comes under the perspective of homoio
sis and adequatio, that is, the perspective of adeq u ation in the
sense of correspondence of representing with what is pre sent 62 .
In her essay on "Plato's Hystera" in Speculum, Irigaray i de nti
fies the workings of aletheia in Plato's di al o g u es as "a necessary

denegation between men". She elaborates her observation as fol
lows:
Aletheia will come into play when denomination occ u rs but i n

fact, si lently, it has determi ned the whole fu n ctio n i n g of the
l ang u age its terminology, its s yntax its dramati zation . Yet thi s
, ,
exorbitant power i s h idden in t he fact that it is also used a s a

met aph o r and evoked and recalled. Not without the ass i stance
of a (de)negation: the word is: a-letheia.63
For Irigaray, this formal i ty which determines all logic and

affirmative discourse by means of de n e gati o n has never been
-
A LOV ER'S DI SCOU R S E ' ECHO A N D N A R C I S S U S R EV I S ITED 81
question ed . In t he Platonic s c h e me , the m i m e ti c process by which

repre sentatio n s appear can only h a p pen t h ro u gh the workings of
ale th e ia , that i s , the u nconceal ment that conceals. For Plato, w h at
aleth eia conceals is the fact that t h e appearance (parousia) is but a
copy o f the one, eidos, th e perman ent, the identical, or, B e in g .
Accord i n g to Irigaray, th i s contention that al l appearances on l y
come to be th r ou g h th i s process of de - ne g a t io n still ensures the
essential sam.1ness in all appearances and does not undennine the
integri ty of this s a m e n e s s , but i n s t e ad solidifies it:
noth i n g can be named as " b e i n g s" except those same t h i n g s

which all the same men see in the same way in a setup that does
not allow them to s ee other things and which they will d e s i g
nate by the same names, on the basi s of the c on ver s ati on
between t hem . Whichever way up you tum these premi ses, you
a l way s com e back t o sameness.64
In he r re a d i ng of Plato, I ri g aray reve als the way in which

alethe ia becomes the modus ope randi wh e reby the "veils of
obl i v i on , error and m e ndac ity" are theoretically l i fte d . In thi s
uncoveri n g, w h at is bei ng revealed is the fact that every represen
tati o n in their denegation , ne c e s s ar i ly re pe at s t h at w hi c h tac i tl y
determ i n es them. However, for Irigaray, "their functi on as s imu la
tions will itself never be unveiled as cau s e , even, or especially , if it
i s de s i g n ated
by the term unveiling".65
Both Heideg ger and I r i g a ray here point to the Platonic under
stan d i n g of a l e th e ia as homoisis and adequatio, or correspondence.
Ho we ve r , most of Heidegger's m e d i t at i o n on t h e essential belong
ing toge the r of aletheia, logos and phusis attempts to retrieve a
Pre-Socratic thinking i n w h ich the three words are tho u g ht in their
essential belon g in g together. H e id e gge r does not accredit the fact
th at aletheia appears to man's ex peri e n c e and speaking only as
correctness and dependabi l ity to carelessness in human thinki n g .
Rather, he c l ai m s that sel f-concealing, Le th e, belongs t o a-letheia.
Furthermore , Heidegger o b s e rve s that "only what aletheia as
open ing grants is ex peri en c e d and thought, not what it is as
suc h".66 Just as aletheia has been app ropri ated as correctness an d
dependabi lity ( i n representatio n), so logos has been appro priate d in
metaphysics as ratio, as the measure or the l o g i cal in the sense of

what is consistent:
In each case, Logia i s the totality of a nexus of grounds

accounted for, within which nexus the objects of the sciences
are represented in respect of their ground, that is, are con
ceived. 67
In this sense of logos, the ground is thought as the original

matter of thinking, that is, as a first cause:
the causa prima that corresponds to the reason-g1vmg path

back to the ultima ratio, the fi nal accounting. The Being of
beings i s represented fundamentally, in the sense of the ground,
on ly as causa sui. This is the metaphysical concept of God.
Metaphysics must think in the direction of the deity because the
matter of thinking is Being; but Being is in being as ground in
di verse ways: as logos, heipokeimenon, as substance, as sub
ject. 68
Plato and all of onto-theological metaphysics have thought

logos in this sense, including Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche. Our task
will therefore be to ask the fol l owi n g question: is Irigaray ' s think
ing on the (M)Other inevitably lodged within this confinement or
does Irigaray perhaps attempt to follow Heidegger's Pre-Socratic
path? There are certainly expressed intentions on the part of Iri g a
ray that she would like to incorporate this Pre-Socratic heritage
into her elemental t h in kin g:
I wanted to create from the beginning a sort of tetralogy which

would approach the problem of the four elements: water, air,
fire, earth, applied to the philosophers closest to us, and also
i mplicate the phil o soph i cal tradition, more s peci fi c al l y, from
the v i ewpo i n t of the feminine. It is necessary to interrogate that
which, in a Pre-Socratic tradition, has been repressed, censured,
or forgotten, of the elementaI.69
However, logos as thought by the Pre-Socratics, speaks to

another aspect in which Being gives itself. Through a meditation
on Heraclitus' Fragment B 50 on the "Logos" ,70 He i degger reveals

a more parad o xical understanding of logos. Heraclitus thou g ht of
Being, in its o ntolo g i c al difference of perdurance as the manner i n
w h ic h B ei n g has cleared itself as logos, as the gro und . However,
Being becomes present as logos in the sense of gro u n d in a twofold
way. On the one hand it is the unifying One in the sense of the all
high est, that i s , Zeus. As such, it g ath er s everythi ng into the uni
versal. On the other h an d , logos a l so contains w ith in itself, as
Irigaray has noted in the above, the essential ori gin of the character
of all l an g u age, and i n that way determines t he manner of utteran ce
as a logical way.
"Log os as l etti ng so m ething be seen i n its togethe rn ess w i th
something , that is, letting it be seen as so meth i ng, speaks to its
apoph anti c a l signification. As i niti all y noted , u nder the d i sc u ssi o n
of u n derstandi n g and interpretation , 7 1 this as-structure which is an
i mpo rta nt c o mp onent of log os , is, however, not exhaustive in terms
of its pote n tial ity . Logos, in its apophantical n atu re also takes over
the p o s sibi l ity of covering up. In the secondary phenomenon of
logos as truth, d e fin e d lo g icall y as j u d g e ment or reason or re l ated
ness, what remains h idden and c o ve red up is the withdrawal of
B ei ng :
. . . that which re ma i ns hidden in an egregious sense, or which

relapses and gets covered up again, or wh ic h shows itself on l y
"in disguise", is not just this en t i ty or that , but rather the Being
of entities, as our pre v i o u s observations have shown . Th i s
B e ing can b e covered up s o e x te ns i ve l y that i t becomes forgot
ten and no qu e sti o n ari ses a b ou t it or about its mean i ng. 7 2
For Hei d egger , all disclosu re releases what is present from con
c eal ment . In that sense, disclosure needs concealment, and "logos
is in itself and at the same time a reve al i ng and a concealing".73
The q ue sti o n stil l re m ains : what i s t he Be in g of lrigaray' s
notion of the matrix/(M)Other and her p o s i tin g of t he mer/mere as
the forgotten grou n d of al l a pp ea ra n c e ? Does she align he r se lf with
the Heideg g e r i an inquiry and thus try to retri eve the Pre-Socratic
thinking on the logos, aletheia and phusis? Or, does s he instead
remain trapped w ithin a m etap h y s ic al u nderstand ing of appearance
84 THE FEMININE AND N I HILIS M
that grounds itself on the Latin appropriation of the Greeks and

thus understand mer/mere in the sense of natura? Furthennore,
does this Latin notion of natura in tum serve as the (hidden/
unspoken) presupposition for her appropriation of mere/mer as the
forgotten always-already structure on which the Nietzschean
edifice must by necessity be grounded?
There is an insistence in Irigaray on the question of birth as an
event that cannot be surpassed or transvalued. According to her
reading of Nietzsche, the ovennan has yet to start living, a claim
that she substantiates in his deni al of the truth of birth . In her
critique of Nietzsche's affirmation of the self as a self-created
entity, Irigaray posits that any existence of a body or a self is by
necessity always indebted to the (M)Other. In her view, the eternal
recurrence of the same thus constitutes an attempt to skip the
necessity of material birth. The silence which surrounds this prob
lem creates a hole in the Nietzschean circle:
Incapable of bringing yourself into the world, you hated the one
that gave you life, didn't you? And you reduced to nothin g th at
power that holds aloof from your art? And made deat h out of
your native li fe. 74
In Nietzsche, birth is reduced to the nothing. At the same time,

birth must be overcome. The thought of being immersed in the
"first matter (matiere premiere)" is what fuels Nietzsche's anxiety,
claims Irigaray. It i s precisely this angst which can account for the
absence of a maternal discourse:
Birth . La naissance. La Naissance? La? Naissance? And what if

that (fa) didn't mean anything in your language? If that/the id
meant nothing, in your language?
Birth ? An abstract phenomenon assumed by anyone coming
into existence. A dead skin imperceptibly wrapping anyone that
has just come into appearing. A proper noun permanently cov
ering over anyone who enters into his becoming. A deceit to be
worn through every change. An airy hiding place that encircles
al l becoming i n its vei l.75
A LOVER'S D ISCOURSE ? ECHO AND NARCISSUS REVISITED 85
This quote might suggest that Irigaray thinks mer/mere as that

which gives birth, that is, as natura in the Latin sense of the word.
On th e other hand, the very fact that it h as been silenced and as
such cannot be spoken in the language of will to power, suggests
that there is a logos that hearkens to that which is not in meta
physical language from Plato and onwards. In this sense, Irigaray
might be closer to a Heideggerian inq ui ry than what is customarily
thought. Even though the following quote evokes a biologistic
discourse, it might be read as an attempt at invoking the question
of ontological difference as Heid eg ger thinks it in terms of logos,
aletheia and phusis:
Where does difference begin? Where is it (elle)? Where am I?

And how can one face something that hides from appearing?
How can one master that dark place where you find birth?
Where you begin to be?76
Migh t we here detect a suggestion of an aletheic understanding

of appearence, whereby the withdrawal in the very presencing of
appearance connotes that which cannot be thought, namely the
(M)Other ?
It becomes paramount for us to investigate, however, whether
this is seen by Irigaray as a withdrawal that is willed and thus
intended by the Nietzschean subject, or, whether this withdrawal
must instead be understood, as does Heidegger, in terms of the
problematic of nihilism in Western metaphysics. Heidegger articu
lates the problem in the following way:
Thus matters stand with the concealment of Being in such a

way that the concealment conceals itself in itself. The staying
away of Being is itself this very default. Being is not segregated
somewhere off by itself, n or does it also keep away; rather, the
default of Being as such is Being itself. In its default Being
veils itself, which i s the way Being itself essentially occurs in
default, is the nothing in Be in g itself.77
For Heidegger, nihilism names the nihil as it applies to Being

itself. In its appl ication, it is thought as what happens in the history
of Being itself, whereby what essentially occurs in the history is

determined by Being itself, and not by a subject. The essence of
nihilism is therefore for Heidegger Being itself in default of its
unconcealment, a default that Being itself is.
The question then presents itself: if Irigaray u nderstands thi s
withdrawal of the (M)Other in terms o f a subjective problematic,
does she therefore envisage that thi s defective subject can be per
fected by letting a different subject speak, which would then bring
to language that which has been forgotten ? Or, does she instead
appropriate the Heideggerian meditation on the Pre-Socratic word
aletheia, phusis and logos i n order to reveal how Nietzsche's phi
losophy of will to power is i mplicated in t he forgetfu lness of the
(M)Other in Western metaphysics.
In either case, however, Irigaray has already equated Being
with the (M)Other or the mer/mere/matri x . Thi s constitutes a major
problem in itself. Even th o u g h , as Irigaray has pointed out, the
(M )Other only figu res in Western metaphysics as the nothing,
absence, the abyss or death , - does that mean that we can equate
th is with Being as it is thought by Heidegger? I think not. When
Hei degger ponders Nietzsche's pronouncement that "there is
nothing to Being" in metaphysi c s , this means th at Being i s thought
in terms of beings, and that the mean i n g of Being has been forgot
ten . Iri garay understands the (M)Other in terms of elemental
beings, that is, as the earth , the sun, air and the sea, or, more
specifically, the immemorial waters . Thi s i mplies that this elemen
tal ground is m etaphysica l th rough and through , since for Heideg
ger, meta ph ys ics thinks Being in terms of beings.
Iri garay reads Nietzsche's p reo cc u pati o n with overcoming as
his resentment against thi s primordial space. His annihilating
hatred is targeted against these deep waters of his own coming-to
be. Believing that he ha s elevated h imself beyond the immemori al
waters and the contamination that they bring, Zarathoustra charac
teri stically incarcerates hi mself in the horizon of the self-same
circle which he has created .
B ut in th i s murder of the Other, has there not si multaneously
occurred an abolition of the other, asks Iri garay. Confined within
the li mits of specu lar self-redoubling, Zarathou stra suppresses the
self - di ffe r i n g effects of h i s own i ntention s . S he conti nues :
For, in the other, you are changed. Become other, and without
recurrence. It is up to her to perpetuate your becoming, to give
it back to you or not, variously deformed. A trace of your pas
sage into her leaves a mark, in the flesh. That forever escapes
you .18
Even though Zarathoustra embraces the inevitable self-differing

flux of the artifact or fiction that i s called the self, and thereby
welcomes a certain loss of identity, Irigaray nevertheless sees him
as demanding the self- i dentical i n the eternal recurrence of the
same, a sameness through which she interprets the privileged
figures in Zarathoustra' s worl d :
Like a snake that endlessly enfolds t h e o n e o n the edge formed

or projected by its desire . Or a sun, whose rays might conceiv
ably bring back to their focus the illumination of all things. Or
the man who bri n g s back into hi mself the ecstasies of his will,
and projects his strength , his tension, his energy , his seed . . .
only s o that h e can possess the effects of those gifts and find
fresh nourishment, and new growth in them. A new birth, or a
survi val.79
How does Irigaray envisage that thi s difference should be spo

ken? What w i l l be the impl ications for Nietzsche' s project if this
silence/absence/n oth i n g were to come to language? By outlining
the last part of "S peaki ng of Immemorial Waters", an attempt will
be made to answer these questions. However, in so doing, we will
venture to pay heed to the abo ve questions, namely whether or not
Irigaray ulti mately understands th is withdrawal from language as a
result of the " i l l w i l l " on the part of the Nietzschean subject and/or
the choir of Western metap hysical fi gures from Plato onwards. Or,
does she instead u n derstand this in terms of the "history of an
error", to which Derrida refers in his work on Nietzsche,80 which
ulti mately accounts for n i h i l i s m as the defau lt in Being that has
characterized the hi story of Bei ng since the destining that occurred
at the dawn of Western metaphys ics .
In a six-part conc l u s i o n to " S peak i n g of Immemorial Waters",

respecti vel y i n trod uced by " For e xpressing (La dire), lrigaray
88 T H E FEMININE AND NIHILISM
interrogates what the implications of this "last thought", which

Nietzsche is not capable of thinking, would be were they to be
effected in language. Read grammatically, La, dire is composed of
a noun, dire, denoting a language, (perhaps a saying in the Pre
S ocratic sense of logos) with its determinate article Lti, which
would indicate that this noun h as been determined or marked by
the feminine. In this interpretation, does Irigaray's phrase suggest
the arr i val of a new language, perhaps without the previous with
drawal, that is, some language of fullness or of inclusion as
opposed to Nietzsche's discourse of exclusion and oblivion? Let us
first try to listen to what might be heard in her perhaps most poetic
section, La, dire.
The polysemy of the phrase might on the one hand suggest that
La, functions as a direct object whereas dire functions as a verb
without a subject. La, could then be read as that which is pre
sent/given in the act of speaking as the forgotten memories of these
immemorial waters, and as such would be marked by the
(M)Other/mer/matrix/feminine. The absence of a subj ect would in
this context be of great significance, since in some way it would
imply that Irigaray attempts to eliminate the subjective position
altogether, and her strategy would therefore have to be seen as
eludin g the subjective paradigm completely.
First, Irigaray ponders whether or n ot "speaking ( i n the femi
nine)" would affect the way in which difference is constituted. In
Margaret Whitford's excellent reading of Irigaray in her book, Luce
lrigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, 8 1 she uses the term " the
other of the other" for this new Irigarayan difference. This other
difference, which would no longer be confined to a mimetic reflec
tion, (in Whitford's terminology, "the other of the same"), might
have the potentiality to break open the circle of sameness. Thus, it
would be susceptible to "the play of chance and necessity".
Second, Irigaray asks if "speaking in the feminine" might not in
fact entail a breaking open of the ring (of eternal recurrence of the
same) in which the (masculine Nietzschean) subject stands, "thus
stripping it of matter, form, substance, end, power 8 2 It would
... ".
then be robbed of its chance at communicable stability, and noth

ing, except an empty frozen mask, deprived of its connection with
a continuous resource in the living, would remain.
Third, "for e x p ress i n g it (la dire) would require new means for
translatio n , which, she c l aims , N i etzsc h e ' s l an guage lacked. By
choosing the mask, which is l i mited to the frozen appearance of a
moment, and therefore i ncapable of capturing the "flux and meta
morphoses of time", N ietzsche favors Apol l o o ver D i on y s u s (cf.
The Birth of Tragedy) as well as i n terpretati on over "the movement
of life".
Fourth, la dire - was that not what Ni etzs c he ultimately strove
for, but failed t o accompl i sh , as k s I rigaray . And even if he would
have succeeded in b ri n g i n g le feminin to l an g u age , would there
have been interlocutors capable of hearing this k ind of sp eec h ?
Irigaray asks if Nietzsche d i d not ( u nwitt i ng l y ) foresee the neces
sity for a future deconstructive pose au feminin, a po se from which
lrig aray establ ishes her own reading strategy in relation to
Nietzsche's text.
Even th o u gh N i etzsche m ost probably would have res en ted
such an outc o m e of his thin k in g , he wa s n ot emp owered to control
the effects of h i s ow n thought. A cc o rd i ng to Irigaray, it is doubtful
that he would have embraced any future thin k i n g that did not
i nc lu de his own so l i ta ry will as an i nd i s pe ns able prolo gu e. B y the
same l og i c , he would not have condoned her read i n g of
"Nietzsche" .
S p eak i n g au feminin would surely mean, by re-enacting th em as
well as p l a y i n g around with Nietzsche's projective mechanisms, a
goi ng beyond . But once their foundations have been removed,
what hap pens is that N ietzsche's proj ections c ome back to haunt
h i m . In his project ive w i l l t o become D ionyso s , Nietzsche
(unwittingly) i n h a b i t s t he mask of the Crucified:
And, as an end, you s erve a s fo u nd at i o n for the i mages , the

figure, t h e role, that you un re m it t in gl y laid down in yo u r active
proj e c t . Hav i n g passi vely bec o me the m ask of C h r i s t . The
rea l i zation of your desti n y ? 83
But are the two fi g u re s rea l l y d ifferent, asks I ri g aray . In her

rea d i n g t he y " have the same h i rt h w i th i n [ his] u n i ve rs e"84 and are
of the s a m e gender and type. N i et zsche thus failed to se arch dee p
enough for d i ffe rence, a n d h i s projections of D i o ny s os a n d t h e
Crucified are but "sham phony contradictions" and products of a

subjective error whereby Nietzsche fai led to recognize the (un)true
origin of his own ressentiment.
Finally, La di re - How ? For was not Nietzsche already im
mersed in the gap between his projected figures and his speech? In
this breach, from which his agonizing screams emerge, Nietzsche
is bereft of language (as is his other au feminin). The abyssal
rupture that exists between the world of yesterday and the world of
today cannot be overcome. Except by a feminine operation .
Nietzsche has become this character, who wants to embrace thi s
other, whether he encounters her in the figure of Ariadne, D iotema
(or, for that matter, Lou Andreas-S a lom e).ss He wants to marry
her, to chai n her to h i m and h i s project, as the guardi an of his
household . B ut she refuses.
After hav ing been j i lted, Nietzsche searches for an equilibrium,
wh ich he fi nds in the eternal recurrence of the same. But the
autological movement of the circle of the eternal recurrence cannot
be reopened . Thus, he is forced to give h i mself a center, where the
other no longer plays the part of counterbalance or beam between
himself and "himself'. He is i ncapable of escaping from h i s circle,
and at that moment, he dies, when the oeuvre is perfected . All he
has to achieve at this point, is to sur-vive.
While keeping in mind Irigaray's six-fold "echo" of Nietzsche's
thinking as it concerns the possibil ity of La dire, let us retrieve the
question initially posed as to Irigaray's understanding of the with
drawal of mer/mere from this discourse . I would l ike to focu s on
two in stances in which I believe Irigaray commits herself to a
certain u nderstanding of the problem.
In the fourth part of her outline, she poses the following ques
tion : "Was this not the death plot which cannot hold beyond the
spec i fi c instant ?" 86 The question occurs in the midst of a discus
sion of a possible re-entry of "her" i nto "his" world. Only by
submitting herself to preservation and enhancement of "his" future,
for which she expends her energy while depleting the resources
needed fo r her own growth , can she hope to take part i n h i s econ
omy . The quote suggests that a conspi racy of death has taken
place. Even though the culprit of this cri me i s not expressly named ,
it is i m pl ied that the conspi racy has been plotted by them, that i s ,
Nietzsche and his ph i loso ph i cal c o mp l ice s This in terpretation

.
furthennore suggests that this conspiracy of death has been collec

tively cause d b y the masculine subject t h ro ugh an act of "ill will",
whereby "she" h a s been systematically excluded, deni e d , repressed
and forgotte n .
Moreover, in the fifth part of her concluding observation, Iriga

ray writes:
But were Dionysos and the Crucified One re al l y different? Did

they not, sec ret ly , have the same birth within your universe? If
so, yo u would have engaged and sought to overcome only a
sham phony contradiction - one created by a s ubj ec tive error.87
My in terve n t i on concentrates on the con ten t ion that the cont

rived will to overcome the c o ntrad i c t i o n between the tw o was
created by a subjective error. In my reading, lrigaray here identifies
the problem as one ori g i n a t ing in a defect connected to the s u bject .
B oth Di o ny s os and the C rucifi e d deny the matern al element ;

Di ony s os by h i s birth from Zeus' th i g h and Christ by his birth
inseminated by the Holy Ghost (which i s always to be understood
w ithi n the masculine triad of t he Father, the S on and the Ho ly
Ghost). What th i s entai ls, is that this denial or obl i v i o n of the mer/
mere has been cre a t e d by a s u bj e ctive error that has w i l l fu l ly
intended to exclude this indebtedness to the maternal. Nietzsche
has therefore not properly understood the true origin of his own
birth or of his own resentment. For I ri garay the mer/mere is what
,
is left unthought in Nietzsche.

The s ay i ng s that is, the dire of thi s primordial locus La in the
,
sense of a th e rene s s that can n o t be seen or h eard , thus makes us

" "
reminiscent of the i n i tial analogy suggested between Iriga

ray/Nietzsche and Echo/Narc i ssus. la's voice is forever trap ped in
th e echo of the o the r that i s , of Narcissus. The t ru th of her voice
,
cannot be h e a rd - it has been withdrawn . Narci ssus characteristi

c a l ly withers a way in h i s d e s i re to consummate the un ion with his
own mirror i mage. H ow e ver , as Ovid points out, the p rocess of
metamorphose s w i l l eventual ly sei ze him, and time intervenes to
effect h i s death and thus to transform him into a flower. Narc i ssu s t
h as therefore hccn s u bj ected to the destructive powers of nec es si ty
and chance, and his desire to freeze his image against the forces of
temporality has therefore proven futile.
Likewise, we can in this context read Irigaray's orphic logic
whereby she reveals the i mpossibility inherent in Nietzsche's pro
jected sameness and permanence in "eternal recurrence of the
same". When confronted with the destructive powers of the
mer/mere, which governs the process of metamorphoses, the
artificial masks of the overman's simulated identities dissolve, like
the mirror image of Narcissus.
The crucial question seems thus to have found an answer.
According to Irigaray, the state of affairs whereby the mer/mere
has withdrawn from Nietzsche's discourse can be found in the
collective conspiracy of death and in a "subjective error". Further
more, Irigaray posits in the following the strategy by which will
she bring about a change:
Was it left for her to interpret? To try to undo the work in its
last pose? To invent a different relation to the same and the
other? That deconcentrates the circle and permits an as yet
unen c o untered play in the re l ation ship ? Other music, other
graphics, othe r plastic art of h ym en - and within language
too.88
The task at hand becomes one of i nterpretation. This interpre

tation w i l l have to attempt to undo the philosophical oeuvre in its
last posture, the Nietzschean stature, as the work of the "last phi
losopher" All of the verbs attached to t h i s interpretation, "invent
.
(inventer)", "undo (defaire)", "decentralize (deconcentrer)" and

"create (creer)" are all active verbs that require a subjective agent.
Thi s i n terpre tat i o n will, however, have to c al l for an-other morpho
logic of difference in language that might hearken the
"immemorial waters" of the mer/mere .
In h e r negative stance, "she" h a s always re p resented the l imit of
phi los o phical discourse. Her figuration as absence, death and the
abyss has furthermore been predicated on the forgetfulness of the
withdrawal of the mer/mere . W i th in these paradi gms, every theory
of the subject has always alre a dy been marked by the masculine.
I rigaray explains:
We can assume that every theory of the subject has al w ay s been

appropriated by the "mascu l i ne". When she submits to (such a)
theory, woman fails to realize that she is renouncing the speci
ficity of her own rel at i onshi p to the i maginary . S ubj ecting
herself to obj ecti vization in discourse - by being "female" . Re
objectivizing her own self whenever she claims to identify
herself "as" a mascul ine subj ect. A "subject" that would re
search itse lf as lost ( maternal-feminine) "object"?89
Without delvi ng into a psychoanalytic problematic at this point,

it is necessary to retrieve Irigaray's indebtedness to psychoanalytic
the ory in her proposed thesis that every theory of the subj ect has
always al ready been marked by the mascul i ne . Understood in this
clai m is the Lacan i an psychoanalytic notion that the subj ect is
con stru cted in languag e Furthermore, according to her reading of
.
th e ph ilo sophic al tradition, this so-cal led universal subject has a

mo rph o-lo gical similitude to the mascu l ine sexual organ . In its
symboli c fi g u ratio n the phallus i s c haract erized by unity, (visible)
,
form, ident it y, erect ion e tc .

How ever, t h i s morpho- logic d o e s not translate the femin ine
se xual orga n , w h i c h is a l w ays multiple, and can therefore only be
repre sente d i n this mascu l i n e d i scourse as absence, or, as a
"hole" .90 It is t herefore i mp os s i b le to c apture this plural ity in a
discourse o f unity. B y u s i n g the e x a m p le of the female sexual
org an as that wh ich has both an i n side and an outside, vi sible and
inv isible part s as we l l as a d o u b l e l ayer of l i p s that are always more
th an on e , I r ig a ra y develops h e r a rg u me n t that the "feminine"
would require a different l a n g ua g e in o rd e r to speak .
The pro b l e m i s , however, that t h e l a n g ua g e that s h e env i s a g e s
would stil l remain operat i v e w i t h i n a subjective paradigm. Fo r her,
the imaginary, or t he m i rror phase as it i s th e o rized by La c a n ,
consti tutes a necessary pre req u i s i te f o r t h e subject t o construct
itself. Irigaray c l a i ms th at one of t h e re a s o n s the fe m i n i n e is not
present i n Western d i scou rse i s that the female subj ect has been
deprived of h e r own " i m a g i nary " . B y be i n g t rapped w i th i n the
mirror- i mage of t h e ( v i s i b le ) u n i ty o f the mascu l i ne subject , she
has bee n a l i e n ated fro m her s pec i fi c i t y t hat cou ld not he c a ptured
w i th in th i s re str icti v e specu l a r i mage. That w h i c h is not, that i s , t he
invisible vagina, has been repressed as has all that which exceeds
the limits of this mirror. B ased on this observation, Irigaray claims
that women do not h ave an u nconscious, but they are the uncon
scious. 9 1
Nietzsche's subjective proj ect i o ns would o f course b e impli
cated in this problem. But how, within her own projections, can
this situation be remedied? Iri g aray outlines the task at hand, the
task of subjective re-interpretation:
It i s true that it would require a revol u t i o n i n thinking as well as

in ethics in order for the work of sexual difference to take
place. Everyth ing remai ns to be i n te rp re ted in the relationship
between the subject and discourse, the s u bj ec t and the wo rld,
92
the subject and the cosmic, and the micro and the macroc osm .
But the q uestion arises : What difference can be identified in

I ri g aray s theorizing on
' the possibility of a different subj ect from
Nietzsche's re e valua t i n g subj ect? They certainly embrace d ifferent
-
values, but what they have in common, is the emphasis on re

interpretation and re-valuation as a principle of affi r mi n g their
subjectivity . 93
If we reenter Irigaray's quest for a different subject onto this
arena, it becomes evident that her understanding o f the s u bj ec t
coi ncides to a great extent with that of Nietzsche. Even tho u g h she
points to the forgetfulness of mer/mere as the primordial g rou n d
for the N ietzschean subject, and as such reveals the overman's
willing concentric subjectivity, she fa i l s to see th is as a problem
con nected to nihi lism. In fact, the word nihilism never appears in
h e r treatment of Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathoustra.
Part of t h e reason fo r h e r bli ndness when it c o me s t o the ques
tion of nihilism, is to be found in her own inadequate treatment of
the q uest i o n of Being. As previously demonstrated, her under
stan d i n g of B ei n g, wh ich is equated with mer/mere, is metaphysi
cal throug h and through. Defi ned with i n her elemental cosmology ,
B e i n g comes to stand for the earth , the s u n , the sea and the air. In
short, t he y become values that must be posited to devalue pr i o r
val ues, i n c l u d i n g those of Nietzsche, who only seemingly places
any worth on the m at e r i a l Furthermore, by valuing a lo gi c of
- .
fluidity as opposed to the previous valuation of solidity, Iri garay

h opes to affirm a "new" subject that is fluid, mul ti ple, changing
and tempo ral .
In so doing, however, all of the Nietzschean metaph ysics
remains intact, and her understanding of this n ew s ubj ectivity does
not radically alter from the Cartesian ground that was operative for
Nietzsche.94 Nietzsche can partly be seen as a precursor to the
modification of the Cartesian subject that occurred in p syc h o
an aly si s by insisting on the unconscious workings in the fictive
projections of the self in will to power. For Irigaray, however, it is
Lacan' s rereading of Fre ud that pro vi des the basic understanding of
her view of s u bj ecti vity, even th oug h she reads Lacan as being
trapped within a phallogocentric understanding that is based on a
logic of solidity .95 Nevertheless, Irigaray a ccep ts the fundamental
pri nc i p les involved in Lacan's theory of the construction and posit
ing of th e (sexed) subj ect.
But has Lacanian psychoanalysis divorced itself completely
from a Cartesian understanding of the subj ect ? The s tructuratio n of
the subj ect in Lacan is subject to the order of the Other, that is, the
unconscious that has always already been marked by the p h al lus .
For Lacan, the unconscious is, however, structu red like a language.
The subject comes to be in language, where it sl i p s away under the
succession of signifiers. Suspended from signification, the subj ect
is subj ect to the unco n s cious . This means that it is not a living
substance, it is not a substance in the metap h ysical sense · of the
word, it i s not a being of k now l edge , nor is it a logos i ncarn ate . For
Lacan, the I is the Cartesian subject w h ich appears temporally
" "
when doubt is recognized as certi tude of the thinking "I''. The

subjec t is thus ex-centrically centered and agi tated by the Other
throug h slips of the tongue, j okes, dreams, - in short, the ex ce s si ve
workings of the signifier that has freed itself from the s ignified .
Lacan draws r i goro u s con sequences from this. First, if the
exercise of la n g u a ge constitutes the foundation of subj ecti v i ty,
then the "I" i s a m o me n t in d i sco u rse. The speaking s ubj ect is thus
sustained by the chain of s i gn ifi cat i o n . Second, since Lacan
re mains within a n ot i o n of t h e sign and of s i g n i fi c ation , the "I"
rep res e n t s something for s o m eo n e . The s ignifier represents a
su bject for another s i gn i fi e r . Therefore , its g round i s in language.
96 THE FEM I N I N E A N D N I H ILISM
In th i s l o gic , the subject i s born in so far as in the field of the

Other, the s i g n i fier emerges . However, like N a rc i ss u s , it is victim
to te m p ora ! i ty and to death, and as such, i t i s n o t h in g .
If in the La ca n ian psych oanalytic u nde r s t an d in g of t he subject,
its u n it y and self-sameness is underm i ned , it does not follow th at
the Cartesian subj ect i s c o mpletely rejected . I n st ead , what has
taken place is that the subject is t empo ral l y o n ly parti all y p resent
and g rou n ded in i ts sel f-certitude. Only through t h e process of
i11terprl'tatio11, that is, through a hermeneutics of t he signifier of
the O t her , can tota li t y be restored . What is at stake is the met hod of
ret rie v i n g th i s lo s t me mory . The a ss u mptio n i s , however, that
psychoanalysis can restore the part ial o b l i v i on that i s not present to
the subject.
It is in t h i s context that we have to approach Irigaray ' s t h i n k i n g
on the subj ect i n '' S p e a k i n g of I m mem o ri al Waters" . As the return
of the repressed, the mer/mere can be retrieved and i n c orp o rat ed
into a fu l l and different subj ect, through a critical ap p r o p ri at ion of
Ni etzsche, Lacan (and Heidegger) . However, what has been for
g ott e n in the process, i s the q uestion of nihilism itself as it penne
ates in the language where th i s retrieval is sup p o sed to occur. What
h appens to Iri garay's proj ect if the new, multiple "I" that will La
dire is al w ays already subj ected to the workings of nihilism and as
such i s on l y an e p oc h a l symptom of the essential nature of aletheia
i n language - that i s , the withdrawal of Being in unconcealment.
CHAPTER II :
Woman's (Un)Truth :
The Dionysian Woman
In Beyond Good and Evil, 1 Nietzsche writes on the question of

woman and truth and the follow i n g quote can be i nterpreted as
analogous to his pronouncement concern ing the "rag i n g d i scor
dance between art and t ruth' ' , 2 :
From the begi n n i n g , noth i n g h a s been more alien , repugnan t ,

and hostile t o woman t h a n truth - her great art i s t h e l ie, her
highest concern i s mere appearance and beauty . 3
When lrigaray q uotes t h i s passage in her o pe n i n g paragraph of

"Veiled Lips", her second chapter of Ma rine lover, she vehe
mently di sagrees with N ietzsche's fu ndamental presupposition in
making his remark, n amely t h at "noth ing has been more al ien [ ]
. . .
to woman than truth" . To Irigaray the l ie, appearance and beauty

are not foreign to truth, but are in fact proper to it. It is rather a
question of sameness; d i fference u n de rstood as binary oppositions
can never speak of d i fference . It i s opposite to , but nevertheless
determined by, s ameness . What would tru l y be alien or foreign to
truth, wou ld have to be found " e l se w h ere " . However, w i t h i n
Nietzsche's economy of truth, t h i s poss i b i l i t y has b e e n forgotten .
Irigaray's decon struct io n o f the m u l t i p l e figurat i o n s o f woman
in Nietzsche reveal s his com p l i city i n Western metaphysic s .
Pointing to Nietzsc he's co mpl ic ity i n Plat o n i c m i me s i s, l ri garay
demonstrates how N iet zsche ' s u n de rstand i n g of woman re ma i n s
confined with i n t h e para d i g m of Ec h o o f Narc i ssus, i n w h i c h Ec ho
cannot be percei ved as ot her than i t s dou b l e . Ec ho's fu nct ion i n
Ovid's mythical poem i s t o accompany t he movement of N a rc i ssus'
98 THE FEMININE A N D NIHILISM
self-reflection, to adorn and to deploy his self-representation, while

keeping the integrity of the image intact. In this sense, woman's
femininity, defined within thi s narcissistic "echo-nomy", ensures
the smooth workings of this mimetic machinery.
But woman cannot be reduced to femininity, says Irigaray:
But woman? Is not reduced to mere femininity. Or to false

hood, or appearance or beauty. Short of staying out of it, (idem,
p. 232) and projecting at (from) a distance that other of the self
to which truth is, from the outset, hostile: falsehood, as well as
beauty and appearance, .. . Although femaleness has taken
it/them as part of her forms, although she cannot do without
it/them if she is to pass for what it is: the truth.4
Within the philosophic discourse of truth as we know it from

Plato onwards, woman has become the incarnation of that which is
erroneous, deceitful, but nevertheless beautiful, like Helen of Troy.
For Plato, woman's materiality and her sensuousness are the cause
of her imperfection, whereas man's self-image, generated within
the principle of eidos5 as the idea(l) i mage of truth, accounts for his
perfection.
Conversely, for Nietzsche, woman's beauty exists precisely in
her material imperfection and as such exemplifies the superior
principle of illusion as opposed to truth. But in Plato as well as in
Nietzsche, woman's femininity has always already been appropri
ated as the negative counterpart to the masculine economy of truth.
Femininity i s consequently a necessary element for this economy
to be operational. Woman does not enter into this economy other
than as the negative function in a binary opposition, which says
nothing at all about her potentiality for being.
In fact, the aphorism in question from Beyond Good and Evil
seeks to ridicule woman's attempt to "find herself' within the
scientific discourse of truth that Nietzsche so much despises. When
Nietzsche claims that "nothing is more alien to woman than truth",
we have to understand his statement within the context of his own
position with regard to truth.
If woman in a Socratic gesture seeks to enlighten herself and
others about herself, her gesture becomes equally as futile and
WOMAN'S (UN)TRUTH: THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 99
nihilistic as that of the pedantic scientist so often ridiculed by

Nietz sche . When woman likewi se puts on airs of the philosopher,
she becomes an easy target for Nietzsche's ironic scrutiny .
Nietzsche's position thus questions woman's ability to actually
desire enl i gh te n men t about herself. Given that for Nietzsche she
embodies the simulacrum, the illusion and everything that he views
as alien to this kind of reasoning logic, if woman is "true" to he r
"untrue" self, (which i s, of course, a paradox in itself), then she
can no t po s sibl y desire to e n l ighte n herself nor anyone else about
herself. Irigaray's contention i s , however, that the very economy of
truth, which in its essence requires the "echo-nomy" of the lie as its
opposite, are both forms of sameness . In her assigned function
within this m i metic economy, woman has had to assume this
i dentity of un -t rut h i n order for this p aradi gm to uphold itself. As
such, her identity could not do without (s 'en passer) this lie that
she herself is s ai d to embody in o rder for her to pass herself off as
(passer pour) t h e other of the same.
In his st a n ce against Platonism and Christianity, Nietzsche
transvalues the Platonic and Christian devaluation of the body and
the s en suo u s and instead welcomes woman as the material em
bod imen t of se n s u o u s being. In either case, Irigaray holds that
woman's feminin ity thus defined says no thi ng about what woman's
being might potentially be, b u t says e veryth i ng about the function
of fe mi n ini ty within th i s economy of masc u l i ne truth and same
ness.
But we keep forget t in g , claims Irigaray, that these significations
d o not speak of woman's (sexual) difference, but are instead results
of a philosophical construct that has appropriated her (potential)
bei ng into an ass i g n ed po s i t i o n withi n a paradigm that e s sen ti ally
embraces sameness a n d can not to le rate (sexual) difference. For
lri garay it m a tte r s little th at N ietzsche transvalues woman's mate
ria l ity and thus elevates her alleged affinity with lying (as o pposed
to truth), appearance (as opposed to P l at on ic reality) and be aut y (as
opposed to u g l in e ss ) into the principle of will t o power as art.
The comic effect that Nietzsche aspires to in his ridiculing of
this scientific endeavor on the part of woman , is of course aimed at
undermi n i n g the foundat ion for the feminist movement emergin g
at that ti me. In the true fas h ion of most c i v i l rights mo vemen t s, the
I 00 THE FEMININE AND NIHILISM
feminists sought to leg i t i m ize their plight within the parameters of

the Enlightenment tradition. Thus, he mockingly refers to the Kan
tian aspect of their advocacy:
Woman wants to become self-reliant - and for that reason she

i s beginning to enli ghte n men about "woman as such:" this is
one of the worst developments of the ge neral uglification of
Europe. For what must these clumsy attempts of women at sc i
entific sel f-e x p os ure bring to light !6
It is interesting to note that Nietzsche in his aforementioned

a phorism opposes the noise of these contemporary female voices to
that of "holy Aristophanes".7 While l a me n tin g the fact that women
now have taken up this (to him despicable) scientific project that
had p re vi ou sl y been reserved to "man's lot", wo m an has become
"untrue" to herself, and Nietzsche cannot help but be suspicious of
her ability to "write ab ou t 'woman'". For him, it is fundamentally
contrary to her nature to desire enlightenment about herself, just as
it is contrary for art to want to enlighten itself about itself. It is in
the light of th ese considerations that we must interpret the follow
ing provocative and ironic statement: "And I think it is a real friend
of women that councils them today : mulier taceat de muliere
[woman should be si lent about woman] ."8
The question then arises: Who should speak about w oman ?
Since Nietzsche himself never seems to shy away from any pro
nouncements on the q ue st i on of woman, one must assume that it is
completely appropriate that he speaks when he so desires. Like
wise, Aristophanes seems to have an eq ua l god-given right an d has
even acquired the e p i t h et " hol y " in light of his treatment of the
s ubj ect .
It is interesti ng to note that Nietzsche h i ghl igh t s A ri stop han e s '
contribution, s i n ce his play Lysistrata9 has in the most recent past
been (pe r h aps e rro n eou s l y ) a p p ropri a ted within the feminist
struggle. In his comedy , A ris to ph a ne s playfully dramatizes how the
women of Athens o rgan i z e a se x - strike i n o rde r to stop the war
ec o n om y of the city . However, in order for the women to be effec
tive, they have to seize the "phallus", that is, they have to seize the
Acro p o li s as well as to mobilize an army , ar med with w e ap o n s
WOMAN'S (UN)TR UTH: THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1Q1
made of household items. M ore ov e r Ly s i s trata the "most v i ri l e of

''
, ,
women , 10 assumes the role of the leader of the u p ri s i n g .
In Aristoph an e s account of the "femi n i ne" menace , it is s ho w n

'
that in order for women to act and to speak w ith i n th i s economy,

they have to as sume a mimetic ro le w h ich means t h a t t h e y mu st
,
mime the order of the "phal lu s" . E ventual l y , w hen e v eryt h i ng i s

said and done, however, the w a r ends, a n d t h e women are victori
the same. The w o m e n retu rn to their
ous, but the order still re m a i n s
prior dome s ti c roles and the men ret u rn home as the uncontested
leaders and life res u me s as p re viou s l y .
This return to established order is a state of affairs that i s

alway s repeated i n comedy , a n d i s perh aps intri nsic to t h e comic
gesture as such. In the (happy) e n d i n g of c o m e d y the polis a l w a y s
,
remains intact, whi le i n tragedy , the very foundat ion of t h e polis i s

undermi n ed and t he hero i s i rretrievabl y destroyed . 1 1 One m i g h t
therefore que st i o n the stance taken by the femi n i st m o ve m e n t i n
regards t o Lysistrata, w h ich has previous ly bee n seen as a n a n c i e n t
"femin ist" play . In my re a d i n g , I wou ld l i k e to e mphas i ze the con
serv ative el eme n ts i n co me d y i n ge n era l an d in Lysistra ta i n par
ticular. If a feminist u p r i s i n g can o n l y be effected w it h i n the mas
culine eco n o my and its outcome i s the sol i d i ficat ion of t h i s order.
,
then does thi� pl ay tru l y speak i n the i n tere st of fe mi n i s m '? Fur

thermore, it is difficult to u nderstand wh y N i etzsche hai led Ari sto
ph ane s in l i g h t of this re a d i n g The on l y reason t hat comes to m i n d
.
i s that he rev e a le d the mimetic n a t u re of the women ' s rebel l ion. and
ultimatel y its fu t i li ty .
lrigaray spe a ks to the quest ion of the comic in terms of "the
comedy of the o t h e r (la comedie de l 'aurre ) " . To her. the c o m i c
bel o n g s to the order of the same as th i s other aspect t h a t truth docs
not alw ay s appreci ate . But i n Ari stophanes' p l a y , the comic e ffect
is c re ated by t he role-re versa l , w hereby t h e arc h a i c rol e s hccome
accentuated and ex agge rated and t h e comic i s t h u s fo u n d in the
excess and transgre s s i o n generated by t h e rc \'crsa l . Thus, the
comic re l i es on the m i metic stance taken hy t h e woman . But i n
order for there to be a happy e n d i n g , t he struggle has lo ht•
resolved and the comic must he c l i rn i n a t l'll .
Irigaray po i n t s to t h e fac t t hat i n gc rw rn l . t h e n1mk ).l'l' m s t o hl·
attributed to the "ot h e r" w i t h i n t lw mascu l i m· l'l·onnmy of t ru t h .
1 02 THE FEM ININE AND NIHILISM
that is, to woman . As such it becomes the mask that she is

expected to wear in the performance of the play between the sexes;
as a repository for that which exceeds truth. As truth's parody and
its ridiculousness, woman has become the repository for that which
must be expelled from and foreign to truth in order for it to "keep
its face". Paradoxically, in Nietzsche's aphorism, woman is both
what is ridiculed and what is elevated as the new (un)truth of the
lie. The irony that underlies all of the aphorism makes the masking
effect of the comic even more ambiguous.
When lrigaray then impertinently transgresses Nietzsche's
advice to remain silent about woman , does she escape the mimetic
trap into which women have traditionally been forced? Can she
possibly overturn the state of affairs that has reigned from Plato to
Nietzsche and thus claim to be capable of speaking diffe rently
about women? Or, does she perhaps attempt to show that no matter
how vehemently she speaks/writes, she will always be silent (to
men) on the question of woman? If every theory of the subject has
always already been appropriated by the masculine, then is it in
fact possible for woman to speak? Will she not always have to pass
for a masculine subject in order to have a language at all, and then
in the process by necessity "lose herself?" Is this what she attempts
to allude to in the title of the chapter, "Veiled lips?" . If her lips are
veiled, does she thereby suggest that women have no language
because their language/body has thus been hidden?
A problem arises for Irigaray in the interpretation of the
mimetic gestures of the hysterical woman who assures the corporal
dissimulation of the comic. As the incarnation of simulation, the
hysteric's gestures and gri maces are characteristically mimetic and
therefore feigned, yet without feigning. Are women to identify
w ith the contortions and convulsions of the tortured hysterical
woman? Isn't her compulsive mimicking of learned gestures of
femininity a tru ly tragic comedy in itself?
But for Nietzsche, woman's mimicking i s supposedly a testi
mony to her status as a work of art. For Irigaray, the performance
of the hysteric yields a different story:
Mastery asserts itself by skirting such naked obscenity . A

disgrace to the whole theater of representatio n . Irreducible
WOMAN'S (UN )TRUTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 03
contortion of a n ature mi micking the residue of a properly

staged mimicry . Why do women , our women, lie so poorly? 1 2
According to Irigaray, the hysteric's explicit sexual gestures

reveal an obscenity that becomes horrific, precisely because the
veils of repression are absent. In Freud's account of the hysteric, he
proposes the following hypothesis, which seems to support Iriga
ray's interpretation of the signification of her gestures:
If it be true that the causes of the hysterical disorders are to be

found in the intimacies of the patient's psycho-sexual life, and
that the hysterical symptoms are the expression of their most
secret and repressed wishes, then the complete exposition of a
case of hysteria is bound to involve the revelation of those inti
macies and the betrayal of those secrets. 1 3
The revelation o f those intimacies and secrets which are spoken

in the hysteric's contorted movements and in her silence, becomes
for lrigaray a dionysian spectacle in which the horrible appears.
But Irigaray does not understand this destructive theater in terms of
the Nietzschean duality between the Dionysian and the Apollonian
described in The Birth of Tragedy. 1 4
For Nietzsche, the Attic tragedy finds its sublime expression i n
the fusion between the two forces generated from the gods Diony
sus and Apollo. The Dionysian finds expression in the choral lyric
as the spirit of music that provides the primordial link with the
spirit of nature in all of its horrific splendor and which has the
power to fragment the unity of the Apollonian force of individu
ation created by the power of illusion that creates the image of the
spectacle.
Th us, when the noble image of Oedipus as the tragic hero in
Sophocles' Oedipus the King 1 5 gradually disintegrated under the
forces of necessity (ananke), what emerges is the raw destructive
power of n ature which has the power to annihilate the ground of
the polis on which the tragic hero rests. The Dionysian wisdom,
wh ich Oedip us i n h is blindness finally sees, is for Nietzsche an
abo m ina bl e e ve n t :
1 04 THE FEM ININE AND N I H ILISM
Indeed , the myth seems to w i s h to whi sper to us that wi sdom,

and particularly Dionysian wisdom, is an unnatural abomina
tion ; that he who by mean s of h i s know ledge plunges nature
i nto the abyss of destruction must also suffer the dissolution of
natu re in h i s own person . 1 6
lrigaray's interpretation of the Dionysian spectacle of the hys

teric does not, however, operate with i n the Nietzschean duality of
dionysiaque
i n d i v i duation and d i s i ntegrati o n , but clai ms that t h i s
i n d icates i n stead a "surplus from before (surplus d'avant)", prior to
any knowledge of unity, wholeness or i n d i vidu ation. The hysteric' s
pri mord i a l fragmentation must therefore not be u nderstood within
the Nietzschean Dionysi an/Apo l lonian duality that presupposes an
establ ished un ity that is subsequently d i sintegrated . Rather, the
frag mentation must i n stead be read as a pri mord i al surplus
"al ways-already-there". In this sense the hy steric exemp l i fies for
Iri garay a primordial multiple fragmentati on from which (an i l lu
sory ) u n i ty might subsequently e merge.
Nietzsche/Freud relegate to the hysteri c the function of the
"other" as the prototype of woman par excellence in an effort to
traverse the lack of v e i l s in a horrific (feminine) n ature . As a
depository for the fantasm of the other (of the same), the hy steric
comes to represent a m i metic veil that is attributed to her in an
effort to d i spose of/deposit i n to her, the other of the same . In other
terms , she comes to signify that which is truly "other' ' , that i s ,
woman as t h e s i mu l acrum, a t t h e same time as s h e funct i o n s as the
' 'truth" of woman as i l l u sory arti fact. In either case, death perme
ate s her art i ficial gestures and seems to be operationalized in the
fi g u re of the hysteric/wo man, whether the des i re is for pleasure or
for pai n .
I n Nietzsche's stance aga i nst Plato n i s m and Chri st i anity and
the i r common pursu it of the "true world" obtai nable through the
v i rt u o u s endeavor of the sage and the p i o u s man , h e posi ts i n h i s
Twilight of the Idols:
( Progress of the i dea: it becomes more subt le, i n sidious, i ncom

prehens i ble it becomes female, i t becomes Chri s t i an . ) 1 7
-
WOMAN'S ( U N )TR UTH : THE DION Y S I A N WOM A N l 05
Nietzsche indicates with t h i s pronouncement 1 8 that if the error

becomes the "truth" of pleasure , then the " i dea" becomes woman .
He thus al i g n s error, woman , and t h e Ch ri st i an . W h at takes p l ace
in the Nietzschean t ran s p osi t i o n of the " i de a" of woman , i s p re
dominantly me re l y a ch a n g e from one realm of representation to
another. In t he Platonic scheme, the "etern al fe m i n i ne" must be de
valued because of her p ri m o rd i a l connection with te mporal and
sensuous, nature. With N i etzsche, the repre sentation c hanges to a
possibility "of a different idea" as a new resource of a(n artistic)
force, with re m n an t s from t h e memory of D ion y s u s It i s in t h i s
.
sense that lrigaray reads h i s j u xtap osition of woman w i th the

Christian.
Nietzsche identifies a p ro g re s s as hav i n g t ake n p l a ce in the
"History of an Error" , which might be read as synonymous w i th
the Hi story of Western Met a p hy s ic s . With the advent of n i h i l
" "
ism , subjectivity becomes p e rspectiva l , and truth become s by

implication void of universal val i d i t y . The idea i s trans fo rmed from
eternal truth to "woman " , now u n de rs tood as the affi rmation of
will to pow er as art in al l of its fi ct i v e splendor. In Spurs, Derrida
speaks of the movement to which woman has been subj ected
throughout the history of W estern me t a ph y sics and points to the
third and final position of wo man that N i et zsche hails in the above
mentioned quote:
In the i nstan ce of the t hird p ro pos it io n , h o weve r be y on d t he

,
double ne gat i o n of the first two, woman i s recognized and

affirmed as an affirmative power, a di ssi mul atress, an artist, a
dionysiac. And no longer is it man who affi rms her. She affi rms
herself, i n and of herse l f, in man . 1 9
However, the fact that Nietzsche pu t s the entire quote from The
Twilight of the Idols in p arenthesis, a ge st ure which mark s dis
tance, signi fies for Iri garay Nietzsche's attempts to cloi ster /(•
feminin in a renewed dis p la y of the idea. N i et z sche further el abo
rates on the importance of di stance in another meditat i on on the
question in The Gay Science :
The magic and the most powerful e ffect of wome n , i s . i n phi lo-
1 06 THE FEMININE AND NIHILISM
sophical l an g ua g e, action at a di stance, a ctio in distans; but this

req u ires first of all a nd above all - distance . 20
But even Nietzsche's new d re s sed - up version of the idea as

woman remains too co l d l y theoretical . And, in its resemblance to
..being", it seems to have become d e v o i d of all sensuality. One
might in fact say that Nietzsche has performed a biting critique of
the history of metaphysics in t he fi g u re of the v ampi re , but in the
process of tran svaluation , he m ana g es to suck the blood out of his
newfound " i d e a" . lrig aray chooses the following w ord s to de scribe
the unfortunate b l o od le t ti n g of woman that has taken p lace:
Something red w a s lacki n g, a hint of bloo d and guts to revive

the w i l l , and res to re i ts stre n g th . A wound . Which h o we ver will
only be ope n ed up in its representation from within that extra
se tt i ng : t he b rackets. 2 1
However, Nietzsche's q uot e has been e l e vate d from an apho

rism consisting of six p oi nt s , all s p el l ed out in nu meri cal order
from one to six. Nietzsche structures h i s apho ri s m in such a way
that under each po i n t he affirms a p ropo s i t i o n which is then fol
lowed by anot her one in p are nt h es i s . Th u s , each poi nt c o ntai n s two
rropos i tion s , the last of which occurs in p are n th e s i s . Under po i nt
number two, the fo llowi ng propo s i t i o n p re ce d e s the one in paren
the s i s quoted b y Irigaray:
2. The true world - unattai nable for now , but promised for the
sage, the p i o u s , the virtuous man ("for the sinner wh o
repents"). 22
In the l i g h t of the P l ato n i c scheme wh i ch has hitherto domin

ated ph i l oso p h y, the "true" wo rl d could only be attaine d in the
tran sce ndent world of th e "idea" thought as e te rn al ly true.
Nietzsc he iron ical ly pos i ts the advent of woman (in t h e i m a ge of
the "eternalfeminine") and the Christian (in the i mage of the p i ou s
man) as progress when these become fetis h i zed i m age s of the idea.
He argues that we must e v e n t ual l y do a w ay with the noti on of t he
�
. . true world" altoget er, someth i n g t h at he proclai ms u n d er poi nt
six in the s a me a ph o n s m :
WOMAN'S (UN)TRUTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOM AN 1 07
6. The true w o rl d - we have abolished. W h at world has

remained? The apparent one perhaps ? But no ! With the true
world we have also abolished the apparent one.
(Noon ; m o men t of t he briefest shadow; end of the lo ng e st
error ; h igh p o i n t of hu m a n i ty ; INCIPIT ZARA THOUSTRA . ) 23
The first thing that I would like to point out in regard to Iriga
ray's interpretation of th e quote, is that the parenthesis is not
exclusively used i n h i s postul ate pertai n i n g to the statement that
the i dea becomes woman ; it is a sty l i st i c device used th ro u g h out
the e nti re ap h or ism and its significance(s) should t he re fo re be
,
considered in relation to the whole aphorism. Second, the paren

thesis does not necessarily and e x c lu s i v e l y connote distan ce and
contai n ment (of le feminin), which I r i g aray chooses to emp h a s i ze .
If meaning is alw ays m u lt i pl e and in flux, then does not Iri g aray
her sel f v i o l ate t h e p ri n cipl e o f p oly sem y in her read ing of
Ni etzsc he' s enfram ing parenthes i s ?
For Irig aray, t h e encirc lement of woman perform ed by t h e
parenthesis symptomatically c o me s to stand for the m ovement of
sign i ficati o n of th e sign per se. S he sees the do uble vei l i ng that
-
takes place of wo
man in Nietzsche's ap h o ri s m as the sur-plus of
ideas th at, doubly enveloped, rel e as es from i t s reserve the making
o r doi ng as the s ig n :
The articulat i o n of two repe t iti o n s of two d ifferent circles

,
around the re - b eg i nn in g , isn't th i s always, and stil l , t h e

way a
sign is made ? And i s "woman" p l u s fe m ini n i ty an ythi ng but
- -
that residue of ideas th at, once it h a s been doubly wrapped up,

se rves to cap ture d oi n g as sign ? 24
The woman as sign respect exemplifies the lack or

in thi s
absence inh e re n t in the re-presentation and as such she gives her
se l f to be that which she is not, an oper ati o n which is a l way s at
-
work in the game of t he "other" . l r i g aray links this l ac k to the

psychoanalytic the ory of castration theori zed both by Freud and
Lacan whereby the q uestion of the (re )presentation of woman
moves from the pos s i b i l i t y of present-in g hersel f (se donner) to
that of gi ving itself as (se donner pour) something . Or else woman
operates in an undecidable between truth and appearances, as in

th e Nietzschean schema. But in all cases, th e feminin i ty of w oman
will still re main the "other" of the same. Even when woman is
elevated into a "new truth" the operat io n of castration remain s
intact.
With Nietzsche, art h a s the capacity to gathe r everything , even
thi n king. But it will always appear as s ometh i ng, which appears
under the s w ay of Apoll o n i an illusion. In this context , Iri garay
poses the following questions:
Castration?25 Wasn't that, precisely, the gesture of repetition

which gave the key to the whole stage set by the same? And
therefore gave it some play, gave the game the possibility: to be
pl ayed. In the second or third degree : the Apo lloni an dream, the
Socratic truth, the simulacrum, (both of them w i thi n a certain
indifference, a repeat that suspends the gash between them,
covers the [female] one and th e other and yet never really doe s
so, still adheri n g to a belief in difference - if o n ly to pl ay w ith
it ). 26
For Irigaray, castration i s but a simulacrum, whose main func

tion is to set the operation into play, even i f it has lost its power of
differentiation:
Castration would merely be some simulacrum - with nothing

added on - unless the other had n othi n g, and is not lent what
she doesn't have, what she would have been allowed only to
take care of. So that she can threaten, by playing or not pl ayin g
according to the charge she has been invested with - of castra
tion . Castration might be interpreted as a simulacrum u sed to
fri ghten oneself, and therefore as a source of ple as ure in co n
tinuing the game . 21
It is thus in the order of the sign that woman is subject to

castration and has to become the depository for absence, death and
lack. As such, woman as sign constitutes the "other'' which the
masculine subject fears above all, since it robs him of his
pos s i bi l ity of mastery.
WOMAN'S (UN)TRUTH : THE DIONY S I A N WOM A S I 09
However, with the advent of N i etzsche. the illusion i n he re n t i n

signification can finally be acknow ledged, w h i c h h e d oe s thmu g h
his philosophy o f nihilism w ith the phra se "God i s dead . . . Th e
simulation necessary fo r th e p l ay of s i g n s t o u n fold e mbraces t h e
(simulated) c astrat i o n that has taken p l a c e i n re lation to p h i lo�o
phy's power to speak totality. But lrigaray asks if th i s mo\'e ,
instead of undermining the posi tion of mastery sought by the
Socratic subject, does not in fact s o l i d i fy the ( i l lusion of) mastery
by incorporatin g ev e rythin g within its arti stic p l a y of the subject i \'e
will, thus reducing it all to a p l ay of sameness :
Perh aps by admitting the part played by i l l u s i o n by c l ai m i n g it

,
openly, airing it publicly, on e is c leared of the burden of a

secret, the guilt of concealment, of the pure and simple assur
ance of being adequate to mastery . Not by l os i n g Especiall y i f .
the scen ari o is now presu med t o be general. Including th i s resi

due : the other would th reaten castrati on . The other? Of the
same? If castration means the same thing as : k i l l h i m . if i t i s
equivalent to death , then the other i s e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e same . Or
else perpetuates the alternation of everything and noth i n g .
Fulfilling the master's desi re. W h i c h he c a n dress u p di ffe rent l y .
accord ing to the h istorical moment . 28
Generally, woman gives herself for ( somethi n g or someone ) .

Her only be ing w ith in t h i s representational theatre is as t h i s not h
ing that resists representation . As castrated, woman becomes t he
absolute spot in the economy of s i g n s or the absurd in the comedy
of the other. Irig aray chooses to c haracterize th i s ( n on)pos i tion of
woman i n the follow ing terms :
Castrati n g i s the "absolute" spot i n the economy of s i gn s . The

absurd: which is not sublated , nor repeated in any way at al l .
Neit her event, nor phenome non, nor form. nor idcal i t y . . . That
which cannot be represente d . 29
Concealed with i n the economy of the same . woman i s pre

sented as someth i n g that she is not, nume ly femi n i n i t y , w h id1
means that she is a ca strated man . S i mply put , how can sht•
po ss i bl y be castrated when she never i n fact had a penis? Thus, she

can o n l y give he rse l f as this n egati v e of man. Wh at woman i s , can
o n ly emerge as a nothing at the heart of the economy that has
a ttem pte d to contai n her b ei n g w ithin its own sameness.
But for Irigaray, woman c a n n ot be spoken in any of the
denominations h i therto g i ve n to her:
The/a woman i s not t o be reabsorbed i n to truth, or a p peara nc e ,
or se mblances. Pro v ided t h at she sti ll m a n age s to w i t ho l d her

se l f from t he genera l i zation of t he stage set . 30
Woman only ent e rs into this ( mascu l i ne) signi fication as the
object, the st a ke t he re pe t i t ion of a n egat i o n or as de negation She
, - .
has to l en d herself to t h i s p os it i o n of exclusion thought either as

repression, or, a s outside of re p re s e n t a t i o n a l to g ethe r If she
.
appears at a l l it is o nly t o t here b y lose h er s el f

, .
Th i s sy mbol ic murder of wo m an t h rou gh the cate g ory of femi

n i n i t y has found expression in a h ost of roles in t h e course of t he
last centuries, l ri g ara y says:
S ince several centuries of si lence have taken on quite a number

of roles: echo, place, interval, ab y ss , thing, po ss i b il i ty of
repet i t i o n or articulation .
, . . mi rror . . . 3 1
However, this nothing w h ich then has become the ground u p o n

w h i c h the masc u l i ne ed i fi c e has be e n erected, whether we think of
it in terms of the unconscious, w h ich Irigaray contends women do
not have. but are,32 or as the s i lent p ri m ord i a l groun d th a t i s essen
tially undec i dable, nevertheless s i g n al s an outside, an in- itself or an
e l sew here . outside of the e n fram i n g view of t h at which ha s h itherto
been thought.
11
The m aj o r thrust of Irigaray's w riting at t e mp t s to make a b ri dg e to

th i s ··elsewhere", w h i c h she n omin a tes le feminin. Le feminin
d i ffers from fe mi n i n ity in that it does not enter into the ec onom y of
WOMAN'S (UN)TR VTH : THE DIO.V\'SJ.t\' \\'O\ f .\\ III
mimesis other than as that which de fies reprrsenration. J.1 Jh11.'nl·1·

or as silence, but it comes into play on ly with in an t'cononn th.tr ,,
specific to itself, and thus attains its 1 J/ue from ih J1//crcn1

fonn(s).
In Ce sexe qui n 'en est pas un , lrigaray �-�Plores rht.\ m1 1rrh(•·
logic of difference which she claims to ha1e Jiscowed in rhf H'f'I
form(s) of the female sexual organ s. In its/their morpholo!!.1 . 11/tht·�
defy the traditional noti ons of unity, sameness and sol1Ji1y and
speak instead to the principle of multiplicity. difference and /1u1J
ity. Characteristical ly, she descri bes the connection bet" een !he
form(s) of the feminine sex and the traditional paradigm of thought
i n the following way:
If the female sex takes p l ace by embracing itself. by endless I y

sharing and exchanging its l ips, irs edge.i. irs border.� . and the i r
"content'', as i t ceaselessly becomes orher. n o .�tability o r
essence is proper to her. She has a place in rhe opennc$S of" �
relation to the other whom she does nor rake into hmelf. like Oil
whore, but to whom she continuou1/ gin' I h1rth . ' 1
y
In the above, i t i s not a q uestion ofpiiin)! hirth m cmpi rj�.i

th e
sense of the word . Woman i s therefore 11111 deri ved tcum �e
mother, except if one wants to give a lerm for her growl� Ull1C1 to
. certain ��
.
. of hfe.
her gift The mother 1. s a woman accord mg ro �e
a . , life.
8 r.
of accomplishment of this opera11on, rh at is. of g 1 v1 11 1 th.:... ll ut
the/a woman can already su b -srst tier¢ • ..
....� ·
lo be Jmib/e in
1 · �c/J � • s .
·
both the one and th e other. In this way ihe crmtinvou' Y1 o r t � �es :
herself in the other, without ever �1ng proprr '" tiers�y
of '-'_.,_ �
other. Thus, le feminin is total ly foreign io ihr P'''·' '�:�it1B>• �....:� ..
of possessio n i n the se n s e of belonging t io ,0meon r"ll
reflexively, as bel o ng ing to herself.
flcettJC�l: �
At thi s juncture , lrigaray makel /he \/art/mg pri•11''1J ;t �
The '1 emm me g oes beyond "nh

• rnonrennf,,i:Y ·
" VT ·"�...._
.. ,i:re �
e';rf,
' ...-......
-... .-. �
"''� ..."'' ,
· ·
the de mand s of the econo� , 11, .

e
fl,.�.,�
' 1 \i!rtl('nt ..·"·,. ' ,, .,,
........_
..._ �
affects h e rself al r ady ( w i t hrnferir/ " '''" 'u' 1 f'
•
of a sensible s i g n . She has

IJ �"�
n" "'•·rr1<trrri: rrc"'' 1'' ._._,
self under any form w t ha e ver <
1 12 THE FEM ININE AND N I H ILISM
What emerges here is an indirect critique of p h eno me nol o gy

and its proclaimed philosophy of beings, including the s u bj ect
itself. With thi s pronouncement, Irigaray thus separates her think
ing from traditional phenomenologi sts, and even perhaps by impli
cation , Heidegger.
If we are to understand her in the sense that all bei ngs th at
emerge within the phenomenological obj ective are alw ays already
contaminated with the "echo-nomy of (p h a l l ic) truth" as it e merges
from Plato and Aristotle onwards, then le feminin must be un der
stood to reside outside the realm of these confines.
But le feminin does not have to appear at all, and must th erefore
n ot be confined to the erquirements of a (coherent, solid, unified)
phenomenological form in order to be. Her being might con se
q u e ntl y be found in her lack of be in g , and this default of being
might actually also reside in her excess (en plus). What most
clearly seems to be the target here i s the Cartes ian and later phe
nomenolo gical obsession with certainty, first of the subj ect and
subseque ntly of the object that the subject understands/percei ve s.
Another question to Irigaray would be: If le femin in res ide s
outside the p h e no meno lo gi cal framework and perhaps o u t s i de th e
confines of the hermeneutic circle, then how does Irigaray have
access to th i s "elsewhere?" What grants her power to reac h in si de
this domain and to (poeti cally) speak ( it s being), if in fac t it has no
being ?35 By the same token, how can it possibly be any thin g -
multiple, fluid, without l i m i ts , without property and free - flo win g
pleasure if it in fact has no b e in g ? And, what i s the statu s of
-
Irigaray's l an g u ag e when
she makes these pro no un c eme n ts?
Finally, how does the question of nihilism enter into this prob
lematic?
lrigaray clai ms that le feminin defi e s the very possibi lity of
identity and that the pro fu nd ity which woman contains, is o ne that
sub-sists under the g ene r al "echo-nomy" of truth. S ince le feminin
never can be mon o lith i c, she will always encompass multiplicity
within herself(ves). Le feminin exists prior to and is mo re primor
dial than the sy ste m s of thought that have hitherto attempted to
contain woman, whether that be "truth" or "error", which both
belong to the logic of the same.
But le feminin's functioning with i n itself remains Judie , in the
WOMAN'S (U N)TRUTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOM AN 1 13
most open -ended sense of that which i s free an d playful. S he refers

to the worki n g s of le hasard i n the determination of what woman
w i l l be. But she will always gi v e herself as so met hi n g in her ,
words: "Chance - the deal/deal s h er . Can only be dealt out for

what he/she is not."36
This seemingly simple statement contains rather far-reaching
implications if we interpret it to mean that chance determines how
wo man is gi v e n and she w i l l ap p ear only i n terms of what
,
"he '¥''she" i s not. What this seems to suggest is that woman i s

forev er su bjec te d t o the ph enome n o logical a p p aratus fo re i g n to
he r, b ut belon ging to man, who will always attempt to app rop ri at e
her within his phenomenological forms which will in tum negate
and deny her e x i s t e n ce Therefore, she can only "give herself
.
fo r/as " somethin g that she is not.

lrigaray's statement seem s on the one hand to follow in the
He i degg erian path i n her acknowledgement of the rece p ti v e role
given to woman in regard to her pos si bi l i ty for be i n g and she ,
see ms to adhere to the Heideggerian notion of the as-structure in

her lay ing out o f t h e prob le m connected to how woman must "se
donner pou r" s o meth i n g that is essentially foreign to her in order
for her to a ppear at all within the dominan t discourse. On the other
h an d she defies the necessity of appropriation in her th e o ri zin g on
,
le feminin an d seems thereby to fly i n the face of Heidegg er s '
not ion of Ereig nis.

First, i n Hei de gg e r s Being and Time, h e de fine s p he n ome n on
'
"in th e p hen o men o log i cal sense as that which shows itself as
Bei ng as and as a structure of Being".37 Thus, in an atte mpt to gi v e
a p h e no me n o l o g i cal description of the worl d he exhibits th e Being
,
of those entit ies th at he pe rcei v es as present-at-hand w ithi n the

w orld, and then fixes them within concepts that to him are cate
g orical.
Irigaray's objections to this en deavor would, of course, be
manifold. In what she pe rce i ve s to be his privi l e gi n g of s i g ht in h i s
pursuit of the phenomenon, Heidegger would o f course be impli
cated in Platonic mimesis as its oculocentrism. Furthermore, Iriga
ray would then point to He i de gg er s d epe n dance on what she
'
would call the e ch o n omy of tru th in his attempt to frame the

" - "
phenomenon w i t h i n the categorical and the conceptual .

On this basis, lrigaray rejects phenomenology as a valid struc

ture through which le fem in in could be approached. Because le
femin in would yield nothing to be shown within the ph e
nomenological optics, and since it can only see what it has already
seen , it cannot possibly do justice to le feminin's potentiality for
Being.
However, Heidegger's thinking on the question of temporality
as it pertains to the question of Being remains one of the most
important contributions to 20th century thinking, and Irigaray is of
course no stranger to his work. In my previous treatment of the as
structure, I poi nted to Heidegger's emphasis of the (ontological)
difference that exists between the exi stential-hermeneutical "as"
through wh ich Dasein circumspectively understands itself with in a
totality of involvements and the apophantical "as" of the asserti on
that is always derivative of the prior. In Western metaphys ics from
Aristotle onwards, Heidegger clai ms there h as been a forgetfu lness
of this primordial understanding provided in the existentia l-herme
neutical "as" and simultaneously a privileging of the apophanti cal
"as" which obeys the ontical logic of the theoretica l i nte rpret ati on .
It seems to me that Irigaray accepts Heide gger's ob serv ati on
that the kind of interpretation that understands the world apoph an
tically cannot pay heed to the Being question . What i t forget s is
that something is hidden from view in this appropriatio n of the
present-at-hand. Therefore, one might say that Irigaray uses a
Heideggerian path of thinking in her exploration of le fem inin in
the sense that she reveals how it cannot appear as other th an as
"femininity", which shows itself as the negative doub le of the
logical categories that already exi st, that is, i n a sameness to that
which is privileged, namely the mascul i ne, unity, solidity and
sameness.
Even though woman within this "as"-structure has to conform
to this paradigm as a negation of the same, she has sti ll been
appropriated as a negative but indifferent counterpart. Thus, caught
within the "as" -structure of the already exi sting theoretical para
digms, chance, which rules the destiny of this history of being as it
has unfolded itself, has relegated woman to giving herself out to be
the same of the same.
When Nietzsche furthermore th inks woman as the error of
WOMAN'S (U N)TRUTH: THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 15
metaphysics, as that which ironically appears as something differ

ent than what it is, ce qu 'elle n 'est pas, he then posits woman as
becoming and as perpetual change. But for Irigaray, Nietzsche's
positioning of woman as a counterpart to the Platonic scheme of
truth, that is, as erring from the Platonic time of essence, perma
nence and self-identity, cannot possibly let woman's difference
emerge since he remains firmly lodged within this Platonic duality
of truth/error, permanence/change, and self-identity/non-identity.
Thus, woman's profundity has been alternately denigrated or valor
ized within thi s duality, and Nietzsche's contribution does not
radically diverge from that of his previous fellow philosophers.
According to differen t moments in history, "woman" has emerged
both as truth and as error, or even as both, but le feminin has yet to
emerge in its difference.
This observation made by lrigaray opens up the following
questions, only indirectly approached by Irigaray. It brings to the
fore the problem of the as-structure as Heidegger thought it in its
relationship to nihilism, defined as synonymous with the "history
of Being" . lri garay approaches the question of nihilism in terms of
the valorization and devaluation of "woman" as she has figured in
Western metaphysics, and as such she problematizes both
Nietzsche's and Heidegger's thinking on the nihilism question .
Nietzsche defined nihilism in the terms of the fact "that the
highest values devaluate themselves". "Woman" has attained the
status of value within metaphysical thinking and as such "she" had
been subj ect to subsequent devaluation before Nietzsche came
along to "save" woman through his transvaluation. Heidegger, on
the other hand, understands nihilism as the history of Western
metaphysics and therefore as the history of Being, and has pointed
out how the two are inextricably linked. Through his valuative
philosophy, Nietzsche reverses Platoni sm in the sense that that
which was previously devalued is now valued. As a transvalued
value, "woman" i s i mpl icated i n this operation, since she seems to
figure at the center of the nihilism problematic.
lrigaray's treatment of the possible profundity of woman as it is
thought by metaphysics i n general and by Nietzsche in particular
seems to resonate in Heidegger's thinking in his "Nihilism as
Determined by the History of Being". 38 In an attempt to assess
Nietzsche's position in relation to the metaphysical tradition and

his alleged overcoming of nihilism through his valuative will to
power, Heidegger points to the inability of Nietzsche to think the
Being question.
Like most of his predecessors, Nietzsche remains trapped
within metaphysics, but fails to see that metaphysics reaches
deeper than metaphysics itself. That to which it reaches belongs to
a different realm, and appears only as an enigma:
According to its essence, nihilism is the history of the promise,

in which Being itself saves itself in a mystery which is itself
historical and which preserves the unconcealment of Being
from that history in the form of metaphysics. The whole of the
essence of nihilism, to the extent that - as the history of Being
- it bestows itself as an abode for the essence of man, grants
thinking everything that is to be thought. Consequently, what is
given to thinking as to be thought we call the enigma.39
For Heidegger, Being is what gives rise to thought, it "gives

food for thought", and "Being, the promise of the unconcealment
as the history of the secret, is itself the enigma".40 It is therefore
Being itself that gives rise to metaphysics, and it follows that
metaphysics cannot possibly determine the enigma of Being. In
Heidegger's view, "the unworthy game of hide and seek which i s
supposed t o b e played between the irrational and the rational i s
exposed in all its mindlessness" _41
The implication of this is, for Heidegger, that the essence of
nihilism in the history of Being i s not something that can be pro
duced in thought. Rather, that which is given "reality" in meta
physics can only be on the basis of the essential history of Being
itself which allows beings to be through the default of Being.
Heidegger concludes by saying that "[t]he essence of nihilism in
the history of Being takes place as the history of the secret". 42
Irigaray seems on the one hand to rely on Heidegger's thinking
in her attempt to question Nietzsche's reversed valuation of woman
as becoming, as error or as illusion when she ironically echoes
Heidegger by positing: "Full awareness - dissimulation that hides
(itself)/(la p/eine connaissance - la dissimulation qui (se)
WOMAN'S (UN)TR UTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 17
derobe).43 the following , she seems to re s pon d to the above

But i n
assertion made by Heidegger when she claims that woman's pro
fundity cannot be contained i n t h e ha vin g knowledge of a secret:
The dep th of a woman cannot be cl osed up over having -

know le dge of a secret. Except from the p oint of view of the
truth in which she is p l aye d as a s tore (of) dissimulation : her
representation there i n will never ha ve been anything but pre
tense , in a different way. S he i s denigrated or valued according
to the historical moment. And - both at th e same time.44
We have prev i o us l y determined t hat there w as an attempted

al ignmen t between "woman" and B e i n g in Irigaray.45 Here, on
" "
the other hand, it seems that she distances herself from He i degger
as well as from Nietzsche. If woman cannot be u nd erstood in terms
of the Nietzschean (tran s)valuation of her as the untruth of truth,
neither can she be thought through the figure of the secret or the
enigma:
The thing that the de pth of woman is supposed to be the h idi n g

place and hiding mechanism for is what repre sent atio n obliter
ates even from the vi sible . For s h e , also, is visible. But she is
" "
not repeated, "reproduced, in traditional rep re sentati on because

she is already split "within herself'. An d the echonomy in
be i ng cannot account for this.46
What cannot be tho u ght in traditional repre sentation s o f woman

is that she i s always already split, double, or fragmented "within
herself (en elle-meme)" . But this splitting seems to take place on a
phenomenological - and by i mpli c ati on on an on tical level,
e x emp l i fied in the figure of "this sex which is not one". In this
sen se the " be i n g of "woman" exceeds th e boundaries of the uni
, "
fied phenomenon as it is understood in traditional phenomeno

logical terms.
On the other h a n d le feminin seem s to speak of an ontolog i cal
,
difference between that which e merges and th at which le fiminin is

in its difference, that i s , i n its ab se nce If the lo g ic of analog y be a t
.
all operative at thi s level, one m i g h t contend that Irigaray has

1 18 THE FEMININE AND N IHILISM
appropriated Heidegger's radical phenomenology in her projection

of le feminin. As that which in its absence is always already split,
and which only appears as that which it is not, le feminin may be
said to speak of an ontological difference akin to Heidegger's dif
ferentiation between Being and beings.47
Another problem that emerges in thi s context, i s the possible
meaning(s) of "within herself''. We have to assume that we are not
talking about a Kantian notion of an "in itself'', which even the
most stringent phenomenology declares unattainable.48 What
seems to be at stake is an attempted envisioning of an immediacy
that is not implicated in trad itional representations determined by
unity, self-sameness and identity. Instead, what Irigaray attempts to
project is rather different "being(s)":
So, when she touches herself (again), who is "she"? And

"herself''? Inseparable, "she" and "herself'' are part the one of
the other, endlessly. They cannot really be distinguished,
though they are not for all that the female same, nor the male
same. That can be reassembled within some whole. This is to
say again, or further, that it would be impossible to decide
definitively which "of the two" would be "she" and which
"herself''. 49
For Irigaray, this means that discursively, the subject is not

identifiable in its relationship to the obj ect. The "herself (se)" can
not be read reflexively, since there i s no true property of the self
nor is there any identity to "her (elle)". In this sense, they exist
outside the masculine discourse founded upon the self-identity of
the subject and its predicate. In the case of le feminin, Irigaray
projects a new algebra:
x is (to, in, . ) y which sti ll allows passivity to have a place in

. . -
auto-affection, or else a suspension between activity and pas

sivity in the attribution of being - it will never be known
who/what is y in the female.so
Undecidabi l i tywill thus replace certitude and calculability in

the "there" of le feminin. Elle does not possess the instrument that
WOMAN'S ( U N )TR UT H : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 19
wou ld gi v e her access to her own prop ert y , nor to that of the
"other". In her fu nction as " o the r " to the mascu line ec onom y , the/a
woman re ma in s outside of its objective.
But from this posit i on of outsi der, she nevertheless supports its
economy. For i n stance, within the p s y c hoan alyti c framework,
woman figures as castrated , yet she fu n ct io ns as a fear of castra
tion. B u t what i s i mp o rta nt to u nder stand in this mechanism, is that
she can u phol d the logic of predication w i thout there being any
thing proper to her in th i s function . To foresee this would in effect
mean the death of the s u bj ect w h e reb y the g ro u n d is taken away
from the so l i dity of the subject's fo u n dat ion and the collage of the
,
forms will s ub s equ e n t l y crumble . The horror of th e aby sm al

(wounded) woman would appear, and loss of ide ntity would fol
low, a l o s s that can only si g n i fy death . Woman thus lives in death ,
and as the vampire that she is, she c auses the subject to become
anaemic.
But her fun ct i on as death does not e x h au st her being. There is
always that which exceeds death . Woman d oes not die from death,
other than as a s ubj e ct . In fact, sh e remains unmarked by thi s
functioning in her sub-si stence u n d e rly i n g all discursivity, which
for lrigara y g i ves her an ontological status as matiere premiere :
Out of the storehouse of matter a l l forms are born . She brings

them into the worl d , she "produces" . From between her lip s
comes every n e w fig u re : a warm glowing h eat comes out of that
self-embrace and becomes "vi sible" . But once, one single time,
and o n e i n stant on l y : beauty . Afterward or, by default
, and
repetition, there are vei l s . U nl ess there be a d i vi n e reality . 5 1
Thi s st a tu s of matiere premiere a n d the " vi sible hearkens back

"
to Heidegger' s understanding of Be i n g in its relationship to beings.

Heidegger say s in Identity and Difference:
We speak of the difference between B e i ng and beings. The step

back goes from what is u nthought, from the difference as such ,
into what gi ves us th o u g ht . That is the oblivion of the differ
ence. The o b l i v i o n here to be t ho ught is the vei ling of the dif
ference as such, thought in terms o f concealment; this v eil in g
] 20 THE FEM ININE AND NIHILISM
has in turn withdrawn itself from the beginning. The oblivion

belongs to the difference because the d ifference belongs to the
ob l i vion . The obl i vion does not happen to the difference only
afterwards, in consequence of the forgetfulness of human
thinkin g . 5 2
Both lrigaray a n d Heidegger emphasize t h e ontological differ

ence between Being and beings, or, i n Irigaray's terminology,
between "fi rst matter (matiere premiere)" and "forms" . The pri
mordial nature of this difference comes to l i ght as that which is
p rior to all emergent beings, as that w h ich g i ves rise to them.
lrigaray' s d i scourse pays heed to the fi gure of the mater-ial aspects
of giving birth, whereas in Heidegger' s language, emphasis is put
on the "giving" as present-ing in lan guage. B oth , however, insist
on the difference i nherent between this gift-giving and what is
gi ven as we l l as the obl i v ion that enshrouds it. Le feminin is for
lrigaray this obli vion of the difference that cannot be thought in
Western metaphysics. Heidegger puts it in the following word s :
T h e difference between Being a n d beings is t h e area within

which metaphysics, Western thinking i n its entire nature, can be
what it is. The step back thus moves out of metaphysics into the
essential nature of metaphysics . [ ]
. . . [D]i scourse about Being
and beings can never be pinned down to one epoch in the h i s
tory of the clearin g of "Being". Nor does discourse about
"Being" ever understand this name in the sense of a genus, an
empty generality under which the historically represented doc
tri nes are being subsumed as individual cases. "Being" ever and
always speaks as desti ny, and thus permeated by tradition . 53
Like le feminin, Heidegger' s Being can never assu me any

identity, but in its unfolding in the clearing of history , it will
always be appropri ated by trad ition and thus always appear as
beings, different from Being. The "as-which" that appears belongs
to and i s determi ned by tradition and its destiny is claimed in the
event o f appropriation [Ereignis] . L i kew i se le feminin will never
,
appear in d i scourse as that which it i s , but al ways as th at to which

tradition , in its event of appropriation, subjects it; therefore, it h as
WOM AN'S ! U N )TR UTH THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 121
appeared as truth , aby ss. death, untruth , art, i nterval, excess etc .
Tradition in th i s sen se dete r m i n e s the destiny of every being.
This is w h e re the q u est ion of te mporal ity enters the s cen e . In
this co n te x t , it see ms appropriate to mention Heidegger's p i vo tal
contribution to t h is prob lem i n h i s h i g h l y i n fl ue nt i al works Being
and Time and On Tim
e and Being . Th ro u g h o u t h i s oeuvre,
t e m pt e d to t h i n k t h i s question as it emerges in the
Hei deg ger h a s at
metaphy sic al t rad i t i o n
. I n On Tim e and Being, Heid egger w tes :
ri
'
Wh at i s in t i me and i s t h u s determi ned by time, we cal l th e

temporal . [ . . . ]
T i me and the tempora l mean what i s peris hable,
w hat p as s es aw
ay i n the course of time. [ . . . ] B ei n g and time
�
de e rm i ne eac
h other rec iprocally, but in such a m ann er t at �
neit her can t h e
forme r - B e i n g - be addressed as s o met h m g
te m po ral no r c
an t he latt r - time - be addressed as a being . 54
e
Irig aray un der s tand

s be a u t y as that unique m oment at whic h the
form is · gi ve n
·
bi rth . Howe ver, w i th the even t of approp nati o n , t he
· ·
form p
asse s m to temp ora l ity . S i multa neously, the ve1· 1 mg, · th e
·
do b l i n g o
u cc ur s as a m o m e n t o f v i o l e n c e , wh e reby th e levres that
gave bi rth to
the se for m s are b e i ng violate d in the shroudi ng
ob li v i o n of
thi s or i g i n ary b i rt h place .
.
By q u o t i n g N i etzsc h e ' s a p h o ri s m # 3 39 in its en tirety, Iri g aray
rev ea l s ho w N ietzsch e ' s v w of vita fe mina remains c l ou d e d by
ie
th e v e i l i n g th
at h id es w o m an from h i s view . In his celebrat i on o f
be auty i n th
e form of the wo man , N i etzsc he clai ms the most pow
e "'.ul m agic of i
l fe to be "covered b y a ve i l interwoven with gold , a
e
v l l o f ea
b utiful pos s i bi l i ti es , sp a rkl i n g w i th prom ise, re s i stance,
b sh l ne s s , m o
� fu c kery , pity , a nd sed uction. Yes , life is a woman " .
55
t o the Greeks and t h ei r praye r to the gods:

Ni etz sc he h e re refers

tw ice and eve n t h re e t i me s . " 56 In her rea d
"Ev er y th i n g beaut i ful
i ng , lri garay show s how
Ni etzsc h e fai l s to un ders tan d that it is the
repet i t i o n that weaves the vei l of gold tha t cover beauty and thus
s
pre v e n t s it from reemer g i n g .
For I ri g aray , be a ut y can only emerge o n c e . It i s in the dou b l i n g
and the repet i t i o n that beauty i s v i ol ated, becau se , what i s released
in tim e passes away an d can not possibly be rec all e d . This letting
be i n the open i n g is someth i n g that Western metaphysics cannot
1 22 THE FEMININE AND NI HILISM
tolerate in its attempt to master its beings. Contrary to this desire to

fix and master beauty into controllable representations, infinitely
repeatable, Irigaray projects her vision of this different production:
Sub-sists the death-life that does not reach, or renounces?

individuation in order to keep hold of the self-embrace, near
ness, simultaneity . . . She remains, close, but foreign to mastery,
to any form of sublation into the ever threatening representa
tion . Buried in the deepest "depths", primitively; in the swamps
of oblivion .57
Already with the Greeks, in their two-fold division between

mortals and gods, there occurred a privileging of the Apollonian
mask of individuation with the ensuing devaluation of the destruc
tive voluptuousness of the Dionysian force. But in Irigaray's view,
the birth of both of the gods occults the anterior past of a form
figure from whence they sprung forth, and that is always singular:
that is apparent, and still tangible. She is beautiful and also has
that fragility that comes to her as a result of no longer touching
everything: from being distinguished as such in the moment
when she first makes her appearance. But dead from (this)
birth ?58
This originary "first matter (matiere premiere)" that touches the

"whole" exists prior to the coming to be of any gods or mortals.
Irigaray refers to it as "earth (terre)", the earth that sustains their
growth as the figure of the mother that has the power to give life.
Yet, i n Western cultures, man's visible (self)erection i n his
solitary detachment from the mother-earth is threatened by death
precisely through this cutting off from his maternal roots. What
follows is an oblivion of and a repression of the indebtedness to
th is "primary mater-ial" through the insistence on an endless
repetition of thi s unique coming to presence in the production of
abstract forms, which are eternal because they have no origin.
The justification for the symbolic murder of the "primary
matter" and the subsequent valuation of eternal ideal forms is to
avoid that which belongs to the sensuous:
WOM AN'S (UN )TR UTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 23
[... ] pai n and pleasure , the v i olence of the senses, expenditure, a

nearness without di stinction , . . . b lood .59
Irigaray asks if this valuat i o n of the supra- sensuous alongside

the devaluation of the sen suous real m that takes place with the
Greeks doe s not in effect mark the i n itial refusal and the negation
of the "mater-ial" that i n augurates the ethico-pol itical order of
patriarchy.
The in fancy of p at r i a rchy finds express ion , among other figu
rations, i n Greek myt hol o g y . Paradoxically , it is to a woman that
the necess ity of the den i al of the mother is attributed. Athena, the
goddess of truth and the protectress o f the polis, exemplifies for
Irigaray th e appropri ati on of woman in this patriarchal order. Con
ceived in t h e fore- head of Zeus, the God of god s, she inaugurates
this order that builds its edifice on the death , denial, and absence of
the mother.
Femininity, as it emerges wi t h i n this mythos,60 becomes a
doubling of the law of the Fa t her as God i n order to assist him in
the total ity of h i s c reat i o n . Situated in the middle, between the
gods abo v e and men , the gods below, Athena is the mediator, the
benevolent d o - g oo d er w h o acts in the n a me of neutrality, that is, of
justice.
However, this neutral i t y i s only apparent. In truth, her loyalties
are always o n the side of the father. Iriga ray quotes Aeschylus '
Oresteia,61 wh e re Athena decl ares her positi o n as follows:
There i s no mot her an ywhere who gav\! me b i rth and, but for
,
marriage, I am al ways for the male with all my heart, and

strongly on my father' s side.62
Feminin i ty thus defined functions as an intermediary simu

lacrum that al lows the false to p ass for the true , and w h ich effaces
the difference between . For Iri g aray femininity becomes in
,
Socratic think i n g th i s secret of the pro ducti o n : the absence of the

mother and the prod uct i on of the chi ld solely by th e male. Like
Athena, Apol lo i s abhorred by the tho ug h t of bei n g likened to his
mother's b l ood- l ine and h e j o i n s i n A th en a s lamentation on the
'
evils of m a t e r n a l cont a m i n ation when h e utters:

The mother is no parent of that which is called her child, but

only nurse of the new-planted seed that grows. The parent is he
who mounts. A stranger she preserves a stranger's seed, if no
god interfe re . I w i l l show you proo f of what I have explai n ed .
There can be a father w ithout any mother. There she stands, the
l ivi n g witness, d aughter of Olympian Zeus, she who was nev er
fostered in the dark of the womb yet such a child as no go dd ess
cou ld b r i ng to birth .63
Between Athena and Apollo th e re is no difference, they both

espouse and speak the law of the father, even if this speech is cleft
in an ambiguous logos that originates from the oracle. Inte res t
i n g l y , t h e o rac l e s pea k s t h roug h a c l e ft in the earth, but its connec

tion to the e art h mot h e r has been completely silenced. What is
-
h ea rd is e x c l us i vel y the words of the father - the sky-god, whose

,
truth i s di sseminated i n the fig u re and t h e words of the daughter as

we l l as the son .
What c haracteri zes t h e i r speech i s sameness. lri garay claims
that this g e net ic error transposes the scene of truth to the realm of
a p pearan ce by i n s t i tu ti ng the ( see m i ng ) re i g n of fe min i n i t y Athena
.
comes to represent t h e c i rc u l ar i ty of t h e apparent, i nto which we

have subsequently become trap p ed :
Reaso n a ble , e v e n sp e c ul a t i v e a l i ttle warlike: armed to the

,
teeth, but a medi ator nevertheless . Between the high and the
low, and all the extremes , but w i t h the d i re c tio n alw ays being
proj ected from the same point. To make a c i rc le, perhap s . 64
The S oc ratic sys t e m through w h i ch t h i s new p at r ia rc h a l order

speaks fi n d s its p ri m a ry express ion a n d s y m b o li s m in the figures of
A t he n a and Apol l o . Thu s , fe m i n i n ity (and masculin ity) be come s
d i ssemi nated in t h e t h i n k i n g of the father. I rretrievably, t h e mother
is lost and w o m a n appears as vei l ed , devo i d of her origi nary
beauty , and u n able to touch herse lf in her wholeness. Her b od y
cloaked, only her face a p pear s and Athena's lips can only s peak a
,
p at e r n a l language.
The the me of matricide , on w h i c h the patri archal o r d e r rests,
fi g u res l i k e w i se at the heart of t he trag ic conflict in the Oresteia,
WOMAN'S (UN)TRUTH: THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 25
where a murder has been committed, namely that of the mother of

Orestes, Clytaemestra. In his revenge of the death of his father,
Agamemnon, Orestes kills his mother and her new lover, his
cousin Aegisthus. Interestingly, it is Apollo who incites Orestes to
commit matricide. After the deed has been committed, Orestes is
hounded to insanity by the Furies, who are the protectresses of the
ancient law of the mother.
In their Dionysian connectedness to the earth and to the ancient
spirit of the Fates, the Furies are predominantly invisible, but they
express in their paradoxical form the connection between phusis
and temporality. They are supposedly grotesque midgets who are
small like children, but are as ancient as the earth and emit an
unbearable stench, since they are in a perpetual process of decom
position. These life-death figures protect the blood-lines and will
ensure the vengeance of the mother-murder.
The strife that occurs between the Furies, who in the last play
of the trilogy, The Eumenides, form the chorus, and the younger
gods, Athena and Apollo, is curiously resolved when Athena per
suades the Furies to accept her juridical intervention which is
decided by the castin g of a ballot among the c itizens of Athens. As
a compensation, she assures them that they have not lost the battle,
but that the tribunal solution is just and she promises them in
recompense a new dwelling-place :
In complete honesty I promise you a place of your own, deep

hidden under ground that i s yours by right, where you shall sit
on shining chairs beside the hearth to accept devotions offered
by your citizens. 65
The prime agent behind this solution, is of course Zeus, the god
of words, who sees it in his interest to institute the juridical system
in the polis, whose integrity is assured by the protection of his
daughter/mouth-piece Athena. Aeschylus settles this conflict in
such a way that j u stice, under the sway of persuasion, gains
ground . The Furies are from now on forever buried and silenced in
their deep and subterranean abode.
But what is el iminated with them is the memory of the older
order of the mother, from whose blood everything emerges, but
who must be forgotten in order for the patriarchal Socratic logic to

reign. The tragedy ends with peace, but the price paid for this
peaceful situation has been the silencing of the ( m)other:
In the primeval dark of earth-hollows held in high veneration

with rights sacrificial bless them, all people, with silence. 66
Yet another step in the development of the patriarchal order

occurs when Socrates subsumes art under the dominance of truth .
Socrates derives his form-ideas from Apollo, but h i s beauty , whi ch
previously displayed itself freely in art, now becomes s ubservient
to the "Good". The only way in which the Dionys iac survi ves, is in
the pathos of death, which now attains the status of the supreme
good. It is in this context that Irigaray interprets Soc rates' desi re for
death, that is, as signifying that he is connected to the dionysi an. 67
In th is sense, Socrates repays his debt to the primordi al mother
nature:
Those wrenching contradictions that he bore within himself are

resolved by his death that pays off the debt knowledge owes to
the primitive-mother-nature. The life of Socrates i s still a trag
edy. But this first and last hero of theory would leave to his
posterity only the symbolic repetition of (his) death: the death
"for a laugh" of the philosopher whose potion is the log os .68
But the repercussions of this decisi ve shift will prove to be

detrimental to the figuration of woman in Western metaphysics.
With Socrates, the dominance of the forms (morphe) over mat(t)er
hule i s already sedimented, and the value of the ex-static teleologi
cal pursuit of the "Good/ldea(l )" becomes the ruling principle that
equates truth with the will to live a good life. Henceforth, all pas
sions are ordained towards this unique cause, or any excesses that
emerge in the pursuit of the "truthful life" are all channelled to
wards and resolved in divine possession .
The outcome of this ancient strife between matter (hule) and
form (morphe), between Dionysus an d Apollo, between the
Mother, be it as the matiere premiere/Gaia and as Clytaemestra
an d z.eus and Agamemnon , or between the Furies and the younger
WOM AN'S (UN )TRUT H : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 27
gods, constitutes in al l its i mpl ications a fatal blow to how woman

is thought in the Occ ident.
In L 'oubli de / 'air chez Martin Heidegger, Irigaray elaborates
this argument by s h o w i n g how in the Socratic schema the privileg
ing of logos in rel ati on to phusis as the emergent, becomes pivotal
in this regard :
La phusis est touj ours deja soumise a la technique et a la sci

ence: cel les du logos. Que l qu e chose de la croissance des etants
physiques s'oublie d an s la phusis du logos. Le phuein des etants
physiques s'oublie dans la metaphy sique de l'etre. La nature est
recree par le logos. D a n s l'oubli que ce qui est ainsi refait garde
aussi ses qualites physiques. Que l'economie de l'etant physique
se rappel le touj ours dans toute fabrication de l'homme. Que
le corps v ivant comrne Gestell y laisse toujours des traces.
Oubliees, elles i n s i stent comme l i mpen se et l'impensable du
'
monde que l' homme s'est fabrique.69
lrigaray subsequently questions w hether Heidegger does not in

fact reduce phusis to techne, as well as phuein to logos.10 She
acknowledges that Heidegger has been able to retrace metaphysics
towards that which , in the be g i nn i n g was lost and remains hidden
,
in it. But accord i n g to Irig a ray , Heidegger remains trapped in his

own privileging of language:
logos. Cherchant
Mais il de rneu re dans s o n architechtonique: l e
dans l'oubli de cel le-ci la cause de la perte, alors que c'est elle
qui la determ ine. Que la perte et son oubli proviennent d'une
architechne : du lo g os meta-physique . 7 1
Despite these architecton ic attempts to enframe woman within

the technocratic l a n g u a g e of metaphysics, woman remains the
"untouch able " . Even Hei degger' s attempts to retrieve that which
has been l o st w i l l ulti mately fai l in Irigaray's view, since he is
pri vileg i n g l a n gu a ge as the key to the mystery. Logos will in this
context have to be un der s tood in the Heideggerian sense of lan
guage, a n d not in the trad it i onal sense of "logic" 7 2 .
But for I ri garay, H e i d egger's statement that "language is the

house of Being" already attests to the fact that phusis can only
appear i n language and not in its materiality. What i s at stake for
her, i s the resurrection of phusis as the memory of the fluid materi
al i ty fro m whence everyth ing e merges , but that cannot be i n
language such as it has evo l ved in the West. The resource of thi s
pri m o rd i al mat(t)er resists the appropriat i n g gesture of logos and
w i l l never become its p roperty .
It is in this sen se that we have to u nderstand the i m portan c e

i mp u t ed to the goddess A t h e n a . As a semblant of woman , her
woman -ness rema i n s hidden, and only her paternal face appears.
A n d as the purveyor of tru th, Athena e x e mp l ifie s the seducti ve
power of appearance . Re g a rd l e s s of h e r preference for the mascu
line, she refuses marriage and asks of her father to g i v e her eternal
v i rgi ni ty. In fact, she is a virile (wo)man "in drag" and as such
exempl i fies the ambi valence in God's rel ati onsh i p to the mother
and to w o m a n :
Ce q u ' o n appelera, desorma i s , la t r o m pe r ie des femmes. Qui

n 'est qu'une proj ec t i o n du Pere . Paree, l a feminite - l 'apparaitre
de la pen see du pe re sur le pouvoir fem i n i n . S'attributant la
p u i s s a nc e maternelle, l'aval ant, l ' i ntrojectant, i i en g e n d re , pro
duit cette fille qui (ne) se donne pour ce qu'elle n 'est pas : un
simulacre emprunte par le Dieu pour l'assi ster dans s o n oeuvre,
etab l i r son e m pi re Du semblant qui preten d se passer de c o rps
. ,
de mort . Le regne de la seduction dans l 'apparence la verite.73 -
Pallas Athena i s for Iri garay a (wo) man , vei led with the dis
course of the father, and w h o se persuasion an d seduction fi nds its
power i n h er fe m i ni n i ty which forever separates he r from the
,
w o m a n s h e m i g ht h a v e b e e n
.
I ri g ara y quotes Nietzsche's aphorism # 60 in The Gay Science

to elaborate on t h i s po i n t Interest i n g l y , th i s is the same ap h or i s m
.
which Derrida a pp ro p r i ates i n the o p e n i n g of Eperons. In t h i s

passage Nietzsche i s s i t t i n g by t h e sea-shore, m usi n g on the t h u n
derous noise of the surf that Posei don the earth-shaker makes when
he discovers t h e mag i c image of a sai lboat which g l i d e s si lently a t
a d i stance :
WOM A N S ( l ' '." l T R l . T H T H E DION Y S I AN WOMAN 1 29
Oh, what g h o st l y beaut y � H o w mag i c al l y it to u ch e s me ! Has all

the calm and tac i t u rn i t y of t h e world embarked o n it? Does my
happiness itse l f s i t i n th i s q u i e t p l ace - my happier e go , my
second, de p a rt ed sel f? N ot to be dead and yet no lo n ge r alive?
A spiritl ike i n terme d i ate bei n g : q u ietly observing, gliding,
floating? As the boat that w ith its w h ite sai ls moves like an
immen se butterfly ove r t h e d ark s e a Yes ! To mo ve over exis
.
tence ! That s it ! That w o ul d be something ! 74

'
To Irigaray , w h e n N i etzsche l ater likens t h e sailboat to women

and believes t h at h i s better sel f is l o d g ed within these qu i et dream
like magical be i n g s t h at g l i de past him at a distance, h e inevitably
venerates the deathl ike pre sence of w o men as "a s pi ritlike inter
mediate bein g" . Like the sa i l b o at which see min gl y ho v e rs over the
sea in its veiled d i s ta n c e , so do women for Nietzsche float over
existence. In fact, he de s p i se s the th o u g ht of havi n g to listen to the
clattering noise th at act u al l y occurs on the sa i lb o at while it sails, as
he abhors th e thought of ha v i n g to l i ste n to the petty chatter of
women up close .
Only at a di stance do t h e y have the e ffe c t o f d e athly beauty, and
only as such can they be to lerated. Iri garay interprets this in such a
way that N i et z sche c a nnot stomach women's physical presen ce nor
her natural bein g . W h at she might be, in herself and for herself, has
to be silenced . Th u s , the task of the philo soph er becomes to
enforce th is separation to c re ate a distance, which for him is a
prerequisite for beauty to e me rg e . But for Irigaray, this means to
violate, to steal and to veil t hat which her nature might allow
woman to be:
By nature, (a) w oman would seem to be at least double. Her

" ope r at i o n " would be to double. But, naturally, the him/her that
is n e are s t The him/her that is so near that the figure, the s hape,
.
even when v i sible, are blurred in the i mmed iacy of this "act" .
With no di scri mi nati on of model or reproduction. With no
interval that can be framed between the one and the oth er .
Infi n i te growth , iron ic prol iferation of the nat ural that it was,
perh a p s necessary to l i mit for fear it would ruin mastery. As it

sank beneath an ever more.75
1 30 THE FEMININE AND NIHI LISM
In her fertile coming and going and in the i ncessant interlacing

of her multiple forms which thwart any opposition between a here
and a there, woman remains forever in the open . This proximity,
claims lrigaray, is what threatens man's desire for mastery, and
consequently, he has always attempted to separate her proliferation
by penetrating it with a pointed object, be it with a stiletto, a
dagger, a pen, or even an umbrella or a sai l . 7 6
But in his attempt to pry open and create borders and demarca
tions between that which is naturally open-ended and close-knit,
man will, according to Irigaray, only di scover the "fantomes" that
he himself has created in the interval - dreams of life and death.
Thus, what is cut off from her in this suture, is nothing that she
could possibly lose, because it never belonged to her in the first
place.
Nietzsche furthermore emphasizes h i s dread for woman's nature
in the preceding aphorism # 59, where he states:
When we love a woman , we easily conceive a hatred for the

nature on account of all of the repulsive natural functions to
which every woman is subj ect. We prefer not to think of all
this; but when our soul touches on these matters for once, it
shrugs as it were and looks contemptuously at nature: we feel
insulted ; nature seems to encroach on our possessions, and with
the profanest hand at that. 11
Instead of confronting this horrific nature, Nietzsche prefers to

think about soul and form. What he recommends, is for the artist to
ignore nature by dreaming and fantasizing.
In this way, the "somnambulists of the day" can rejoice in
loving and hating and desiri n g - woman , without ever having to
confront her nature. Only dissimulated can (woman's) nature be
loved. Like Zarathoustra, the somnambulist stri ves to reach the
heights where he feels elevated high above profane nature and only
then is free to pursue his lofty artistic contemplation . And like the
Greeks, Nietzsche needs the Apol lonian mask of the dream and the
illusion in order for him to stomach Dionysus' horrific splendor.
The qui ntessential accompl i shment for a woman is, for
Nietzsche, to become a replica of the ideal male, who is heroic,
WOMAN'S (UN)TR UTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 131
lofty , s u bl im e and royaI .78 In the play of per fect mi mi cry woman ,
may give voice to the sub lime mascul ine soul, without d iffe ren ce .
This c o u l d be ac h ieved i n the theatre w h e re woman could give the

i mpres s i on of possess i n g such p rec i o u s characteristics. However, i t
cou ld on l y be ach ieved on one condition : that any trace of the
maternal of t he "housew ifely" be co m p lete ly erased . Thus, the aim
is to c reate in w oman an i m mac u l ate mimesis of the heroic male,
dev oid of any sexu al d i fference.
Irigaray i n tro d uces the fi g u re of A ria d n e to i l l u strate this ce le
bratio n of th e p erf
ected copy of t he masculi ne. Like that o f At h ena
�
,
h e my th of Ari
adn e speaks of the young maiden whose pu rpose it
is to serve he r father,
Minos, and her man , Theseu s. In the lik eness
of th e spi der,
she i nc essan tly s p i n s the thread that Theseus uses to
�on que r the Mi notaur
by holding on to the thread and thus secur
in g h is sa fe re
turn from the labyrinth. Nietz sche repeatedl y cele
b rate s th e in l
te l i g ence and i n ventiveness of Ariad ne.79 Ye t nob od y
�as c ap abl e of s av i n g Ariadne from her desti ny . After she had
ai ded Thes eu s
t o w a r d s h i s glorious v ictory o ve r the M inotaur, she
�as gi ve n to h i m by her father. B ut, al a s he left her alone on an
,
isl an d, an d dep
arted w i t h her si ster Phae dra as his new lover.
W hat i s i m p orta n t for Iri g aray about N ietzsche's hai ling of
At h e n a an
d Ari adne i s th at t hey are b ot h young v i rg in s whose
�re at ne ss c on s i s t s in
the fact that they are replicas of th e mascu
?
h e An
. d , most i mportan t l y , they disp lay no evide nce of s e x u al
di fference. Thei r v i rtue
lies i n the fact that they can be v i e wed as
do ub les of t h e males. B ut in so d o i n g , t hey separate from the ir o wn
n atu re, wh ic h has to be c l o ak e d i n order for them to be obj e c t s of
ex ch an g e b e t w e e n ma les. The h ymen/marriage is always i n play as
th e break i n g- poi n t between the one and the other, but alway s
within t he eco n o m y of t h e same:
S i n c e th e c u r re nt e x c h a n ge rate is perhaps no m o re tha n a

semb l ance o n the i n s i d e of sam e n e s s , a passage from same to
same . W h i c h expl a i n s t h e need for disguises : cu t between the
male one and the other - the other of the s am e that is - which
,
would m a n a g e to estab l i s h rel ati o n s h ips o n ly by means of dis

g u i se . B y an extra layer of d i ss i mulation: that is loaded upon
the woman . That the fem a l e i s re d u c e d to .so
Pe r se p h o ne, another young v i rgi n , together with Athena and

Ariadne, thus constitute t h e " h ymen " between the two realms
which man, in his alienation from h imself, has created. As the
intermediary between the two, the virgin is exchanged and is in
that way dissimulated. Th e sep arat i o n between the celestial and the
terrestrial , the li g h t and the dark, the tru th and its reverse, reality
and its shadow etc . , fi nds t h e l i m it of d em arcat i o n in the figure of
t h i s i nte r mediary young (wo)man . In this sense, Persephone i s
g i ven b y the g o d above, Ze u s , to his brother, Hades, in an
exchange that steal s , veils, and violates her for t h e second time .
Her i g no ran ce i s t h e cul p r i t . The daughter of Demeter, the
g odde ss of the earth and the grai n , Pe rsep h o n e has flouri shed as a
young girl close to her mother's g ard en of fruits an d flowers, and
has been completely sheltered fro m death. With the arrival of
Hades , this i dy l l i c state i s shattere d , and she van ishes without a
trace to the u n de rw o r l d . Th i s abd uc t io n devastates D eme te r , her
mother, but she is u n ab le to ret race her d au g h te r behind the veil of
death .
For I r i garay , the abduction signifies th i s forced separation,
w i l led by the gods in the name of necessity, that s t e als the daughter
away from the mother in order to i m p ose death/pha l l u s between
the two, fo rc i n g the young g i r l to move from blissfu l i g no r an t
v i rgi ni ty to the semblant and fe i g n i n g world of femini n i t y :
Persephone - the voice snatched away t o death, with n o trace

left of the k i d n apping. From Kore to Persephone, the passage
m us t b e fo rg o tten . From h e r to her(self) there must be no pos
sible con necti o n . Between the n a t u ra l l y v i rg i n little g i r l and the
robbed/raped woman - paralyzed i n her becomi n g when she
fall s i n to an abyss a l ien to her: death for t h e men - the inte r
v en t i o n of a pre t e n se , of a sembl ance of fe m i n i n i ty , would see m
to prevent any turn i n g back . 8 1
B eca u se s h e h a s traversed t h e l i n e t h at demarcates t h e two

rea l ms, she has acq u i red a w i sdom of the d i ffe re nce between the
two. Th u s , w h e n she is reu n i ted with her m o t he r , she witn esses the
flouri sh i n g of l i fe of spri n g a n d su mmer t h at fo l l o w s , but when she
has to ret urn to Hades , she e x periences t h e death and barrenness of
WOMAN'S ( U N)TRUTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 33
winter. Thi s difference becomes for Irigaray one between proxim

ity (to herself and to her mot h e r ) and propriety (her status as
Hades' p rop e rty ) that exemplifies the difference· between the will of
the mother as opposed to the will of the father. I n Irigaray's inter
p ret at i on, the one mean s a life in abu n da nc e and growth whereas
t he other means a life of J ac k , of death a n d of dep ri v at ion of h er
freedom . Irigaray describes Pe r seph o ne ' s life during the cold
season as follows:
Persephone becomes the ice be i n g Truth of any production that

.
has been cut off from the natural world. Henceforw ard enslaved
to a mi rag e t echn i q ue that separates her fro m herself. Veiled
w ithout with i n , the Kore i s arre s te d i n her bec o m ing. Immor
tall y a n d never more a v i rg i n . s2
B u t t h i s inte r p re tati on fa i l s to take into account the tradition

that exi sts of mythical and poe t ic figures who s upp o s edl y have
made the same t r ip . Perse p hone is in pr i v i l e g ed company as one of
the few select who is ad m itt e d to traverse the l i mit. Onl y t he poets,
such as Homer, Ovid, Virg i l , and Dante83 have had the power to
g u ide their h e roe s , Ody sseus, O rphe u s Aeneas and Dante through
,
the u n de r w or ld . Pers e p h o ne ' s virgi nal bea u ty i s what gains her

access to the .fo rb i d de n realm for mo rtals , w hereas Orpheus' music
was w h a t gra nt ed him access.
In each case, the c haracters, whether mythical or poetic, have
gai ned access to the underworld and the u n i que insight that the
j ou rney pr o v i d e s because of their e xtra ord i n ary qualiti e s .
- A
rec u rri n g theme that emerges in a l l of t he s e stories, i s the ine v i t a
b i l ity of de a t h and the i m p o s i t io n of t e mporal i ty on h u m an l i fe .
Understood i n this manner, Persephone's abdu c ti on t o Hades
seems to convey the i mposs ibil ity of an i dy l l i c t e mpora l exi s t e nc e.
The my t h a l so seems to portray he r l i fe i n t h e garden as a young
gi rl as an exi s t en c e that c an n o t last, but that she l ike every mortal
has to enter i n to the world of te m p o ra l i t y and b y i mp l i cation , of
v i olence . Furthermore, Persephone's m o v e m en t fro m one real m t o
anot her comes to mark t h e passi n g of time throu gh the c ha n g i n g of
the seasons, and therefore to be a part of n a t u re , and n ot something
th at i s hosti l e or fore i g n to i t .
1 34 THE FEMININE A N D NIHILISM
According to Irigaray, Persephone's insight might in fact give

rise to a new plurality, outside the domain of the specular objec
tive, and which circumvents the square as well as the circle.
Persephone exceeds all horizons, but in her differentiated being
she remains always familiar to the other, without appropriating it.
It is interesting to note lrigaray's attempt at undermining all of
the constituents (world, the hermeneutic circle, horizon etc.) of the
Heideggerian discourse on Dasein's Being-in-the-world84 in the
following description of this new plurality that Persephone affirms:
Thus is ceaselessly engendered the expression of her "world"

that does not develop within any square or circle or. . . and
remains without l i mit or boundary. Anything occurring in that
world is wedded in movement, if it remains an other that self
embraces. Passive and active, feeling without feeling ressenti
ment. This rhythm, barely perceptible even to "small ears", sub
tends, nourishes, and accompanies others, like a background of
air and light and warmth without appearing to do so. Tactile
substrate destined to be forgotten, when the eye and the ear
alone wish to marry/make merry.ss
What Irigaray here affirms, is a rather far-reaching attack not

only on Nietzsche's limited understanding of woman, but also an
attack on all phenomenology of appearance, including Heidegger's.
Her deconstruction of the multiple figurations of woman in
Nietzsche show his compl icity in the metaphysics of identity,
presence and propriety, even when it finds expression in illusion,
dream and art.
Furthermore, her reading of the pri vi leged symbols of feminin
ity such as the hysteric as well as the Greek goddesses Athena,
Ariadne and Persephone reveal how woman has been enframed as
that which she is not. Through a notion of feminin ity, woman's
being ranged from connotations such as death , abyss, interval,
intermedi a ry, truth , untruth , l ie, art, etc . However, what they all
have fai led to confront, is le fiminin as the total potential of
woman , wh ich cannot be appropri ated into any fixed form/idea.
Nor can it be spoken in language.
Whi le she has appropri ated the Heideggerian path of inquiry in
WOMAN'S ( UN)TR UTH : THE DIONYSIAN WOMAN 1 35
her attempt to deconstruct dominant modes of thinking about

women, Irigaray eventually rejects what she considers to be his
privileging of the logos, or as she formulates it, of language. In her
view, Heidegger, l i ke all of h i s predeces sors, cannot confront
woman' s mater-iality, but i n s i sts on the transcendance of woman
into some realm that depri ves her of her fluidity and her multi
plicity. The following quote from L 'oubli de l 'air chez Martin
Heidegger seems to articulate Irigaray's quest for a sensitive im
mediacy that yet has to be explored and which still seems to incite
fear in those who seek to unravel "the profound essence of the
Dionysiac (/ 'essence profonde du dionysiaque)":
Does not bei n g find its foundation in a sensible immediacy as

yet un spoken? In a si lence of that which secretly nourishes
thought? The forbidden/un spoken and the undecidable in the
relationship between man and nature which escapes his logos.
Which gives itself (to be) in the unnamed site where the organs'
contribution to all their meani ngs/senses gather. A given/gift
which it proj ects in (to) a world and its objects. Thus recreating
the whole, and maki ng of everything the whole, and of the
whole everyone, without the secret of this production ever
being apparent to it.86
Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche constitutes thus an attempt

at invoking this dormant, silent, but still fecund resevoir of
profound difference, namely the Dionysian woman , or, lefeminin.
Conclus ion
How, then , does Irigaray t h i n k sex ual difference and the question
of le feminin in the l i g h t of the n i h i l i s m problematic as it is tho ug ht
by Nietzsc he and H e i d eg g er? Most (feminist) appropri ations of
Irigaray have been o b l i v i ou s to this problematic as well as the
broader p h i l os oph ical i m p l i c ati on s of Iri garay's work. What seems
to be the predo m i n a n t preoccupation i n most of the appropriations
on which I focu sed in my first ch apter, is the search for an
effecti ve methodology that can be a ppl i ed in the quest for
"woman " .
In th i s respect, psychoan a l y s i s has gai ned a privi leged position,
and most read i ngs o f I r i gara y exclusively center on her psychoana
lytic works and e x tract fro m them a critical metho dology for read
ing other work s . In my v i e w , what is lost in thi s approach is any
sen s i ti v i t y to the p h i l o sophi cal i nquiry in which Iri g aray is
engaged, th at i s , her i nterrogation o f t h e phi losophical tradition
from Plato on ward s in her p u rsuit of the question of sexual differ
ence.
Furthermore, c o n fu s i on rei g n s as to lri garay's position v is a vis - -
mimesis as i t re l ate s to the pos s i bi l ity o f s peaking the femi n i n e

(parter .femme). Irigaray decon structs the Platon ic notion of mime
sis, and even t h o u g h she p u rsues a strategy of mimicking in her
attempt to subvert w h at s h e considers to be the phal-logo-centric
trad i tion , she never c l a i ms to have found a new language which
mi rrors le femini11 . I f th i s l a n guage exists at a l l , it i s at best as a
possi b i l i ty t h a t does n ot coi n c i d e w i t h the logic of mimesis as it is
thought by P l ato o n ward s . Rather, par/er femme cannot be con
tai ned with i n a spec u l a r l o � i c , but e x i st s as muc h in its absence as
i n i ts potential presence. Fi nally, what is completely s i lenced in

these appropriations, is Irigaray's meditation on the Pre-Socratics
and her attempt at retriev i n g the forgotten q uestions that these
thinkers raised. In this context, she evokes the words logos,
aletheia and phusis in her read i n g of what she cal l s "Nietzsche's
oracular discourse".
Moreover, related to and i n preparation for these appropri a
tions, the question of appropri ation per se was raised, which prob
lematizes l!ow anything "comes to be" in language and how it is
subsequently present-ed to the i n q u i ring subject for interpretation .
Through Heidegger's notion of Ereignis, I opened up this ground
i n g terrain to question i n g . It revealed that "the event of appropria
tion" has remained unthought in all of these interpretations of Iri
garay's work. By i mplication , the Being of the texts in question i s
never i nterrogated, but is i n stead taken for gran ted a s someth i n g
"ready-to-hand" that can b e objectified a n d then scrutinized in
terms of its ideological content, its "rhetoric" or its " value" as a
"di fferent" discourse within the i n stitutional technology of aca
demia.
Due to a consi stent ski rti n g of the ontological questions that
ground any interpretative endeavor, I fel t the need, in my second
chapter, to address i n greater detai l the theoretical preli mi naries
connected to these problems . Therefore, by approaching the ques
tion of " woman" in terms of the inextricable l ink between "wo
man" and the postmodern notion of ecriture as posited by Jacques
Derrida, I discu ssed the ensuing i mplication s for the question of
sexual d i fference when confronted with this new philosophical
terrai n .
The problem o f i n terpretation was furthermore outlined by
show i n g how it i s predi cated upon an ontological pre-understand
ing that circumspecti vely u nderstands in a fore-havi ng, prior to any
i n terpretative exposi tion . Finally, in an in-depth study of the n i h i l
ism proble matic , I addressed the major rubrics of Nietzsche's
thinking on nihilism as well as Heidegger's meditation on Nietz
sche as exempl i fied in h i s "mighty tome" , Nietzsche.
When N i etzsche t h i n k s n i h i l i s m a t t h e e n d of t h e 1 9th century,
he predicts the epi stemolog ical cri s i s that i s about to happen and
t h rough h i s a s t u te a n a l y s i s , he fore sees the malaise of modernity
CONCLUSION 1 39
that fol lows. For Nietzsche, however, nihilism means "the

devaluation of all val ues", which i n its destructive stance obliter
ates the certitude that allowed the phi l osopher of the past to make
universal claims. The remedy to this i mpotence is the Nietzschean
overman who affirms a new position , based on h i s own perspec
tival subjectivity which artistical ly appropriates the world in "a
grand sty le".
In his Nihilism volume on Nietzsche, Heidegger demonstrates,
however, that Nietzsche's attempt at overcoming metaphysics
throug h his trans valuative stance sti l l confines him with i n the
metaphysics that he attempts to overcome . B y positing a Cartesian
subjectivity that wills through valuation, Nietzsche i n itiates a new
metaphy sics, w h ich Heidegger calls a metaphysics of val uati on. In
my treatment of Nietzsche, I alig n myself with Heidegger's
assessment of the problem, and i n so doing, I del ineate the
Heideggerian meditati on on the essential con nectedness between
N i etzsche and Descartes, despite Nietzsche's own refutation of
Descartes' p h il osoph y .
I t i s w i t h i n t h e problematic of n i h i l i s m that I approach , i n my
third chapter, Irigaray's re a d i n g of N ietzsche's Thus Spoke Zara
thoustra in her work Marine Lo ver of Friedrich Nietzsche. Irig aray
i n itiates "a l over's d i scourse" with Nietzsche, in which she
attempts to l isten in on h i s most muted language in Zarathoustra .
S he thereby tries to de c ipher that which has been silenced i n h i s
writings, namely t h e foundati onal ground o n w h i c h he erects h i s
phi losophy o f w i l l t o power. What i s at stake is not so much what
"stands there" in terms of textual evidence ; rathe r Iri garay seeks to
find that within Ni etzsche which he hi mself could not decipher,
namely the " i m memorial waters" from which everything eme rges.
Th i s absence i s thought by Irigaray in terms of a symbol i c
m u rder of the (M )Other, t h e matri x , or, the elementa l (amniotic)
w aters from whence all l i v i n g beings originate . Furthermore, lriga
ray shows that, in his fra ntic endeavor to repress and deny h i s
pri mord i a l con nectedness t o this locus, t h e phi losopher has e rected
a philosoph i c language that a l i e n ates him from th i s matrix w h i l e
pos i t i n g h i s own se l f-engende ri n g wit h i n a tran scendental realm.
Even though Nie t zs c h e critic i zes the metaphysical tradition
which claims to have s ep a ra t ed the man of reason from his ele m en -
tal and material being, h i s own tran svaluation of "woman's mate

riality" as the untruth of truth, stil l remains fixed within the Pla
tonic paradigm which he ventures to undo. According to lrigaray,
by projecting the concentric circle of the subject that wills power,
Nietzsche' s overman attempts to appropriate every being within h i s
o w n perspectival subjectivity, a n d in so d o i n g , he simultaneously
expel s the (M)Other.
Moreover, in his pursuit of the "higher man'', Nietzsche pro
jects an elevated and lofty world in which Zarathoustra reigns . 1 In
h i s flight to the mountains and in h i s quest fo r the eternal return of
the same, Iri garay sees Nietzsche as being a complice in the denial
of, and the escape from , the el emental (mother) earth that made h i s
birth possible. Zarathoustra declares his love t o eternity, as the
only "woman" that he could Jove. In so doing, Iri g aray interprets
Nietzsche as s hunning that which woman is in her n atural ele
ment. 2 In stead, he is completely enamored by h i s own narcissistic
proj ecti ons. Con sequently, he i s deaf to Echo's declaration of love
for him. Pe rh aps l i ke Echo's tragic love for Narcissus, Irigaray's
"lover's di scou rse" to Nietzsche fal l s on deaf ears ?
B u t in I ri g a ra y s i n sertion of t h e forgotten g ro u n d in Nietzsche' s
'
th inking b y cal l i n g o n the p ro fo u n d logos of t h e absent nocturnal

i mmemorial waters wh ich she posits as the (M )Other matri x, I read
an attempt at rais ing an ontol ogical question . In so doing, she
6q uates the w ithd ra wa l of the ( M ) O th e r with Heideggers's notion
of the withdrawal of Being w h i l e evok ing the Pre- Socratic notion
phusis, which was the word through which the Pre-Socratics
t hou g ht all emergent bei n g s . However, due to the Roman appro
phusis i n the fi rst c e n t u ry A . D . , which tran s l ate d thi s
pr i a t i o n of
word as natura, part of the Pre- Socrat i c meditatio n is lost. Conse
quently, Irigaray comes to u n d e rsta n d the ( M) O the r as th i s lost
ontologi cal g rou nd as "that w h i c h g i v e s b i rth" i n t h e Roman sense
of natura. What she i n ad ve rten t l y does in the p roc e s s , is to name
th at w h i c h can not be named , n am e l y B e i n g . As a result, the
( M )Other as a pote n t i a l ontol ogical g ro u n d becomes me taph y si cal
t h rough and throu g h .
A s suc h , t h e ( M )Other re p res e n t s a tran svaluated value that has
been willfully s i l enced and suppressed by a sworn conspiracy
among the l o n g l i ne of p h i losophers t h at predate lrigaray, i nc l u d -
CONCLUSION 141
ing Nietzsche. Irigaray diagnoses the cause of this de fi c i enc y to be

in a subjective e rro r. Thi s is where Irigaray's meditation on the
ontological groun d of Nietzsche's ' th ink i ng depart s most rad i cal ly
from that of Hei degge.y; In Heidegger' s view, th e withdrawal of
Being as the grou nd fo� all emergents, is n ot �ffected by the su b
ject , but i s rather a default of Being i t s elf. That is, B eing is as
bei n g s preci se l y in the withdrawal of Being i tself. And, mo st im
po rtantly, this state of affa irs cannot be caused nor remedied by the
human s u bj ect, since B eing is what gives this subject a be i n g
through t h i s default.
In my fourth C h apte r , I perform an i n - depth i nterrogatio n of
Irigaray's reading of Nietzsche's p os i t i n g of "woman" as "the
untruth of truth". She rad i call y differs from Nietzsche ' s basic
presupposition that " not h i n g i s more fo reign to woman than truth"
by clai mi n g that " u n t ru th " i s never foreign to truth, but rather
proper to it as an extension of the logic of the samf.-,
In her chap t e r cal led "Uvres violies' ' , I riga ray carefu lly exam
ines selected aphori sms from Beyond Good and Evil, The Gay
Science, Twilight of the Idols and The Birth of Tragedy whi c h
speak to the q u estion of "woman" and "truth". Nietzsche' s argu
ment res t s predo m i n antly on the above assertion in which ,woman
come s to represent the simulacrum, beaut y or i l lusion that is truth's
" ot h er" . Irigaray convincingly uncovers how th i s dup l icates, even
when i t reverses, the Platonic division between "truth" and
" i l l usion", a schema which has objectifi ed "woman" within a
bi n ary opposition of di fference that has nothing t o say about how
wom a n m i g h t d i ffer in herself
B y b e ing rel e gat e d to a host of signifiers,/'woman" has come t o
s i g n i fy a l l that which s he is n o t , and which he has at te mp t ed to
expel from h i s o w n b e i n g . Con sequently, "woman" has been repre
sented as that which she is not, n a m e l y " fe mi n i n i ty ". Th o u g h t
with i n the N ietzschean d u a l i ty of the Apol l oni an and the
Dionysian , "woman" re p re se n t s for N i et z sc h e the incarnation of
the m a g i c o f the A p o l l o n i a n mask of i l l u s i o n . B y vi e wi n g "femin
i n i ty'' as the ( u n )truth of "woma n " , N i etzsche i s h orrified when he
fathoms w hat h e r nature m i g ht be . Therefore, he p re fe rs to
conte m p l a te her in her (projected) beauty , but at a distance . For
l r igaray, ' ' w o m a n " thus defi ned o n l y becomes yet a n o t h e r si g nifier
1 42 THE FEMININE AND NIHI LISM
that has been attributed to "woman" i n t h e h i st ory of W � stem

metaphys i cs As such, it is not much d i fferent fro m t ho se s i g ni fi ers
.
that she has been gi ve n prior to Nietzsche.

In my assessment of I ri garay's argument, I evoke th e Hei de g
gerian i nte rte x t of the "as-structure", wh ich I believe enters into
Irigaray's t hin kin g on the fi g ura t i o n of "woman" as that which she
i s not. According to Irigaray, because all of Western metaphysics
has always already been appr opri ated by the masculine, "woman "
can on ly spe ak in the absences and blind s pots3 that evoke the
traces of an "elsewhere" i n that lang uage. As that which is to tally
foreign to the economy of truth, u n i t y and mastery, lrigaray
proj ects this "elsewhere" in le feminin.
Given the oculocentri sm of - our phi losophical tradition in
general an d of phenomen ology in parti cul a r , Irigaray envi sages le
feminin to res ide outside this p ri v i l e g i n g of the vi s i b l e . In thi s
" "
sense, she del i be rate l y attempts to circumvent ph e n o me n ol o g y ,

i nc l u d i n g that of Heidegger. However, in her attempt at t h i n ki n g
that which does not appear, but which withdraws in its own com
i n g to be, He i deg g er s meditation on the "as-structure" seems to
'
have become a d i ffere n t avenue that open s up the possibility of

thinking le feminin.
Le feminin t h u s beco mes the undecidable w h i c h defi e s
(self-)identity , a n d w h i c h thus challenges t h e entire foundation for
our metaphysi"cal l a n g u ag e Bereft of s u bje ct i ve i de nt i ty, repre
.
sentational language cannot deliver its object of mastery . There

fore, in its subversive (non)being, le feminin s i g n i fi es the death of
the subject. However, a c c ord in g to Irigaray , that does not exhaust
its (n o n ) be i n g Rather, le feminin subsists u n derly i n g a l l d i s
.
c u rs i vit y as "matiere premiere''.

It is i n this sense that Irigaray's t h in k in g resides in the pro x i mi ty
of that of Hei degger. Like le feminin , Be i n g can never assume any
i d en ti t y but in i t s unfo ld i n g in the cleari n g of h i s to ry , it will
,
al ways be appropriated by tradition a n d t h e re by always app e a r as

b e i n g s i n its ontological difference from B e i n g . Fu rthermore , bot h
He i d eg ge r and lr i g a ray e m ph a s i z e t h i s o n to l o g i c a l d i fference,
w h i c h i n Irigaray's term i n o l ogy is ex pressed in the d i fference
between "matiere premiere" and ( v i si b l e ) "formes". But w he rea s
Iri garay's d i scou rse pays heed to t h e fi g u re of t h e (M )Ot her as the
CONCLUSION 1 43
form- en ge n der i n g force, He i degge r i n ste ad emphasi zes the "gift"

gi ven by B e i n g in pre se n t i n g whatever appears in Language.
When it comes to woman's nature, all has yet to be discovered,
claims Irigaray. In her read i n g of Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy ,
she resurrects the Nietzschean notion of the Di on ysi an , but by
di vo rci n g it from its d ependen c y on the Apollonian. In so doing,
she projects the horrific and de str ucti v e aspect of Le feminin
th rou gh a revi sed notion of D io n y su s . By re tu rn i ng to the Greek
tragedi e s , and in part i c ular to Aesc hy l u s ' Oresteia, Irigaray
atte mp ts to retrieve the hidden vestige of Le feminin through the
fi gure o f D i o n ys u s .
In Iri g aray ' s re - re ad i ng, the mythic and tra g i c figures from t h is
remote past remi n d us of the p rim o rdi a l strife that took place
among the Greeks i n te rm s of the question of sexua l difference. By
carefu l l y s cruti n i z i ng the Ol y m p ian gods4 and the function within
this m y tho l o g y of the younger gods, Athena a n d Apo l l o , Iri ga ray
shows how sexual d i fferenc e i s eradicated in these fig ure s , how
th ey both sp e a k and represent t he Law of the fath e r, Zeus. As a
copy of the mascul ine, At hen a (and for that m atter Ariadne)
embodies the pat r i arc h al order in i t s denial and murder of th e
(M)Other.
O n l y i n th e y o u n g virgin goddess Persephone does Irigaray
identify a resonance of the p rim ord ial goddess Gaia and her
chth onic allies, the Furi es . N ot on ly does the destiny of the young
abd ucted P e r se phone exe mpli fy the d estin y of "woman" in the
"
West an d her "Levres vioLees'', but h er fi gu re al s o e m bodi e s w hat
m i g ht be nominated Iri garay ' s ideal : a difference within .
Pers ep ho ne knows the realm of de ath and i ts ruler, Hades, but at
the same time, she knows and ack n ow l e d ges her love for and her
loyalty to the world of ap p ea ran ce s and her mother, Demeter. In
her s uperi or k no wle dg e , she tr a v ers es both rea lm s , and in h er
movement, temporal ity unfolds.
It is my contention that the Heideggerian meditation on the Pre
S oc rat i c words logos, aLetheia and phusis in addition to his think
ing on the q ue stio n of the o nto l o g i c al difference form some of the
most i mportant inter-texts i n Irigaray 's writing on se x u a l d i ffer
ence. I have attempted to uncover the basic constituents of her
rea d i n g of N i etzsche (and Hei degger) and thereby to point to th e
way i n which the Heideggeri an i nq u i ry has provided an avenue to

think the question of sex ual d i fference d i fferently .
In Irigaray's read i n g of Nietzsche, she follows in h i s path when
it comes to his appropri ation of Plato. A s I have prev iously noted
in a footnote in Chapter IV ,5 most of N ietzsche's philosophy rests
on thi s bas ic assumption that there exists in Plato a "ragi n g dis
cord" between "art" and "truth". However, as Heidegger shows i n
t h i s quote, Plato's word eidos has not been thoroughly exhau sted i n
terms of i t s potential mean i n g s . Traditionally, in metaphysical
language it has come to represent "the idea(l)" i n its (non)-visible
form . What Hei degger suggests, h o wever, i s that Plato also names
i n the word eidos "that w h i c h constitutes the essence i n the audi
ble, the tasteable, the tactile, in anyth i n g t h at is i n any way acces
sible". 6
What t h i s quote implies for my project, i s the possibi l ity it
opens up for a new read i n g of Plato in the sense that i t undermines
the traditional oppo s i t i on that has been erected between the sen
suous and the supra- sensuous, between the v i s ible an d the non
v i s i ble. Th is read i n g would i n turn seri ously compromise Irigaray' s
read i n g of N ietzsche, w h ich rests w i th i n the same appropriation of
P l ato.
If we were to pursue the i mp licati ons of th i s startling read i n g of
Plato, what would h appen to the question of sexual difference such
as it has been posited by lrigaray ? Wou ld her whole premise
crumble, that i s , t h at in Western metaphysics there has been a
den ial and a repression of the ( M )Other th ought as the material
matri x that allows everyth i n g to be? Cou ld it be that language has
already appropri ated her t h i n k i n g i nto a path out of w h i c h she
can not will herself and w h i c h i t might take centuries to undo? Or,
cou ld it be that n i h i l i s m, as the " h i story of B e i n g " has fi nally
caught up w i t h her project and t h u s p l u n ged le fem inin i n to the
aby smal n oth i n g to w h i c h a l l be i n gs are eventu a l l y desti ned?
Notes
Introduction
I. Luce I ri garay , "Sexual D i fference" , tran s. Sean Hand, in Margaret Whit
ford , ed . The lrigaray Reader (Ox ford : B as i l B l ackwe l l , 1 99 1 ) , p. 1 65 .
2. M arti n Hei degger, Being and Tim e , trans. John Macquarrie & Edward
Robi nson (New York: H arper & Row, 1 962), pp. 24-25 . A l l subsequent
references to Hei degger will be made to avai lable English translations of
his work .
3. "Sexual Di fference", p . 1 65 .
4. I bi d . , p. 1 66 .
5. Luce lrigaray, Speculum de l 'a utre femme (Paris: Les Editions d e M i nuit,
1974). A l l references will be made to the Eng l i sh tran slati on, Speculum of
the Other Woman, trans. G i l l i an C . G i l l ( Ithaca : Corne l l Uni versity Press,
1 98 5 ) . Thi s quote i s taken from the opening of the section enti tled
" S peculu m" , p. 1 3 3 .
6. See " Le genre femi nin" i n Sexes et parentes (Pari s: Les Ed itions de
M i nuit, 1 987), pp. 1 1 9- 1 3 8.
7. Most academic disciplines are sti l l governed by i nstrumental thi nk i ng
based on assertive and deducti ve logic, and the domi nant mode of this
book will inevitably be both descri pti ve and representational. Within this
frame of thought, the comfortable categories such as author, text, con
sciousness etc. , are taken for granted, and become the secure references
upon which a "sou nd" argumentation rests. Even though attempts will be
made to work against the grai n of this prescribed logi c , I will li kewise be
forced to operate with i n this i maginary field of delimitation.
8. Luce I rigaray , Ce sexe qui n 'en est pas un (Pari s : Les Ed itions de Mi nuit,
1 977). A l l refe rences wi l l be m ade to the English translation of this work
by Catheri n e Porter and Carolyn Burke, This Sex Which Is Not One
(I thaca: Cornell U n i vers i ty Press, 1 985).
9. Jacques Lacan, "The mirror stage as formati ve of the function of the I as
reveal ed i n psychoanalytic experi ence", trans. Al a n Sheridan (New York :
Norton , 1 977), pp. 1 -7 .
J O . Speculum , p . 1 42 .
J l . "Sexu al Difference", The lrigaray Reader, pp. 1 65- 1 66.
1 2. Lu ce I rigaray , A mante marine de Friedrich Nietzsche (Pari s: Les Ed itions
de M i nu i t , 1 980) . All subsequent references will be made to the G i l l i an C.
Gill's En g l i s h translation of the book , Marine Lover of Friedrich

Nietzsche (New York: Columbia U ni versi ty Press, 1 99 1 ).
1 3 . My read i n g will be based on the concept of intertextuality a s i t is intro
d uced by Julia K ri ste v a in R e vo l u ti o n i n Poet i c Langu age
" in The
"
Kristeva Reader, e d Tori! Moi (Oxford : B a si l B l ackwe l l , 1 986), p. 1 1 1 :

.
The term intertextuality de n o t e s this t ra n s po s it i o n of one (or several)

s i gn s y s te m ( s ) into another; but si nce thi s term has oft e n been u n derstood
-
in t h e banal sense of " st ud y of sources", we p refe r the term transposition

bec ause it specifies that the passage from o n e s i gni fy i n g system to another
demands a new arti culation of the th e ti c - of enunci ati ve and denotati ve
positionality.
1 4. I n Le corps-a-corps avec la mere ( Mo nt re al : Les Ed i ti on s de l a pleine
l u ne , 1 98 1 ) l ri gara y h i nts at wh at t h i s p a t h might be when she makes the
fol l owin g statement (pp. 45-46):
Je di r a i s que dans la parole de Zarathoustra, la parole est beau c ou p
p l u s o racu l a i re [ q ue celui de P l ato n] q u e l le se rap p roc h e de certaines pa
, '
roles pre s o c r a ti q u e s , que de c e qu i e s t e nte nd u a ujo u rd hu i co m me fi ct ion

' .
My translation:
I would say that i n Zarathoustra's s p eec h , l a ng u age i s much more
o racu l ar [ t h a n that of Plato] , that it co m e s close to certain Pre-Socratic
words, that w h i c h tod a y is u nd e rs too d as ficti o n .
1 5. See Fri ed ric h Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: V i n tage Books, 1 967), p. 9. A l l su b seq u ent references will be
mad e to Kaufmann's English trans lations of Nietzsche's works.
1 6. The concept of transvaluation i n Nietzsche i s perh a p s best i l luminated in
Thus Spoke Zarathoustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann i n The Portable
Nieti.sche ( N e w York : The V i ki n g Press , 1 968), pp. 1 03-442 .
1 7. Martin Heidegger, Le tte r o n Humanism", i n Ma rtin Heidegger: Basic
"
Writings, trans . Frank A. C ap uzzi ed. Davi s Farre l l Krell (New York:
,
Harper & R o w , 1 977), p. 2 1 3 .

1 8. L u ce Irigaray, Sexes et parent es (Paris : Les Ed iti ons de Minuit, 1 987), p.
1 07 :
C e st prob a b l e m e nt a cette c on c e p t i o n du lien entre le sujet et le Ian
'
gage que Jacques Lacan a p r i s sa d efi ni ti on de l'i nconscient. L'expression

"L'i nconscient est structure comme u n lan g ag e est bien proche de celle
"
de Martin H e idegger : "L'homme se comporte comme s'il etait le c re ate u r

et le maitre du langage, alors que c e st celui -ci au contraire qui est et de
'
meure so n souverai n . " (cf. "L'Homme habite en po e te , dans Chemins, "
Galli mard, 1 962).

The t ran s l a t i o n i s my own (e x c e p t the reference to Heidegger from
Poetry, Language, Thought). In cases w here there are no translations
avai lable in Engl ish, I re fe r to t he French te x t s If I pro v id e my o wn
.
translation, I a l s o include the quote i n the o r i g i n a l .
1 9 . Luce I riga ra y Erhique de la difference sexuelle ( Pari s : Les Editions de

,
M i n u i t, 1 9 84), p. 1 22 :
Le l an gage pour formel q u ' i l s o i l s'est nourri d e sang, d e chai r
, , ,
d'elements matcriels. Q u i et quoi l'a n ou rri ? Comment payer cette de tte?

NOTES 1 47
De v ons - nou s produi re des m ecan is me s de plus en plus formels, tech

niques, q u i se retournent contre l'ho m me, tel l'aboutissemenl i nverse de
cette mere qui Jui a donne un corps vivant? Et qu'i l craint a la mesure de
l ' i m p aye entre e l l e et lui .
20. S e e M arti n Hei degger and Eugene Fink, Heraclitus Seminar: 1 96616 7,
trans . C harles H. Seibert ( A l aba m a : U n i ve rsity of A labama Pre s s , 1 98 2 ) .
2 1 . Being and Time, pp. 1 49- 1 68 .
2 2 . Jacques Lacan, "Traduction d e 'Logos' d e Heideg ge r" , w Psychanalyse, I
( 1 9 5 6 ) , p p . 5 9-7 9 .
23 . See Luce Iri g aray , Le lan gag e des dements (Pari s : Editions M ou ton,
1 9 7 3 ) ; Parler n 'est jamais neutre ( Pari s : Les Editions de M i nuit, 1 985) ;
and ed. Luce l ri garay , Sexes et genres a travers les langues: elements de
communication sexuee (Paris : Grasset, 1 9 9 1 ) .
Chapter 1
l. In the wake of Post-s t ructural i s m and its cri t iq u e of " ide nti ty ' ' , feminists
have become i ncreas i ng l y rel u ctant to em brace this category i n fear of
becomi n g easy targets fo r attacks which would l abel the m as
"metaphy s i cians of pres e n ce " . Traditional denomi nations such as

"feminist", w h i c h were based on the i n teg r i ty and solidity of the t hi n k i ng
(po l i t i c a l ) s u bj e c t , does not take i nto account any excess and difference
that might e xceed the bou ndaries of such an i d en t i ty .
2. Jane Gal lop , The Daughter's Seduction : Feminism and Psychoanalysis
(Ithaca: Corn e l l Un i ve rs i ty Pres s , 1 982 ) .
3. See Eli zabeth L. B e rg , "The Third Woman", Diacritics (Summer 1 98 2 ) ,
1 2, p . 1 6.
4. Tori ! M o i , Sexual/J'extual Politics (New York: Methuen, 1 985), pp.
1 27 - 1 49.
5. See M argare t Whit ford, Luce lrigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine
(London: Routledge, 1 99 1 ) ; ed. Marg are t Whitford, The lrigaray Reader
(Oxford : B asi l B lackwel l , 1 99 1 ) and Margaret Whi tford, " Speak i ng as a
woman: Luce l rigaray and the fe m a le i maginary . " Radical Philosophy 2 1 :
1 8-28 .
6. See El i zabeth G ross , " Ph i l osophy , subj ectivity and the body: Kristeva and
I ri garay" in E . G rosz and Pateman, eds , Feminist Challenges: Social and

Political Theory (Sydney: A l len & Unwin , 1 9 86) pp. 1 25--43 ; E l i zabe t h
Gross, " l ri garay an d sexual di fference" A ustralian Feminist Studies 2
(A u t um n 1 986) 63-77; Elizabeth G ro s s , " Ir i g aray and the di v i ne" Local
Consumption Papers, no. 9; E l i zabet h Gross, "Derrida, lrigaray and
deconstru c t i o n " , in "Lcftw right", Intervention 20 ( 1 986) 70-8 1 ; El i zabeth
G rosz, "Noles towards a corporal fe m i n i s m " . Australian Fem in ist Studies
5 (Summer 1 987) 1 - 1 6; Elizabeth Grosz, "Desire, the body and re c en t
French fe m i n i s m s , Intervention 2 1 -22 ( 1 9 88) 28-3 3 ; Eli zabeth Grosz.
148 THE FEMINI N E A N D NIHILISM
Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists ( Syd ney : A l len & U n wi n ,
1 989).
7. Naomi Schor, "Th i s Essenti alism Which Is Not One", differences 1 (2);
3 3-58.
8. See M argare t Wh i t fo rd , " Lu ce I rig a ray a n d the Female Imaginary:
Speaking as a Woman", Radical Philosophy (Summer 1 986), 43 , p. 3 .
9. See Sherry Turkle fo r an i n depth account o f the polemics between lriga
ray and Lacan in Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud's French Revolution
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M IT Press, 1 978).
I O . S ee Heidegger's essay ''The E nd of Me ta p hysi cs and the Task of Think
i ng" in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Staumbach (New York: Harper &
Row, 1 969), pp. 5 5-73 .
1 1 . See for example Den i se R i ley, "Does Sex H ave a History" New Forma
tions ( S pring 1 987) ; Stanton, Domna C . , "Difference on Tri al : A Critique
of the Maternal Me ta phor in Cixous, Iri garay, and Kris teva", i n The Poet
ics of Gender, ed . Nancy K. Mi ller (New York: Columbia Uni versity
Press, 1 986).
1 2. Th i s i s p a rti cularly true within the more politically oriented facti on of the
feminist movement. In this context, names like M oni q ue Wittig, Monique
Plaza and other contri butors to the journal Feminist Issues have taken the
lead i n warning against what they perceive to be Iri garay's excessive intel
lectualization of the problem and her so-called a - hi stori c al approac h .
1 3 . Se e ' 'Th i s Essentialism W h i c h ls Not One", where s h e elaborates on these
different forms of essentialism, which sh e nominates the "Liberationist
C ri t i q ue " , the "Linguistic Critique", the "Metaphysical Critique" and the
"Feminist C ritiqu e" res pec ti ve ly .
1 4. See Tori l Moi in SexuaVfextual Politics, p. 1 39 :
Deconstruction i s i n other words self-confessedly parasitic upon the
metaphysical di scourses i t is out to subvert. It follows that any attempt to
formulate a gene ral theory of femininity w i l l be metaphysical. Thi s is
precisely I ri ga ray ' s di lemma: having shown that so far femininity has been
produced ex c l u si vely in relation to the logic of the Same, s h e falls for the
temptation to produce her own positive theory of femininity . But, as we
have seen, to defi ne "woman" is necessarily to essentialize her.
1 5 . Se e Heidegger's meditation on the q ue s t i o n of hi story and its pri mordial
connectedness to temporality i n Being and Time, pp. 427-42 8 :
If the q ues tio n of h i stori ca l i ty leads us back to these "sources", then
the locus of the problem of hi story has already been decided. Thi s locus i s
not to be sought in hi storiology as the science of hi story . Even if the
problem of "h i story " is treated i n accordance with a theo ry of science, not
only a i m i ng at the "epi stemolog ical" c lari ficati on of the historiological
way of grasping things (S i m me l ) or at the logic with which the concepts
of hi stori ological pr e s e nta t i on are formed (Rickert), but doing so with an
orientation towards "the side of the object" , then as long as the question i s
for mu late d t h i s way , h i s to ry beco mes i n pri nc i p l e accessible o n l y a s the
Object of science. Thus the basic phenomenon of hi s tory which is prior to ,
a n y the m a t i z i n g by hi stori ology and u n d e r l i e s i t , has been i rretrievably pu t

NOTES 1 49
aside. How hi story can become a possible object for h istori ol ogy is some
thing that may be g a t here d only from the kind of Being which belongs to
the historic al - from h i storical i t y , and from the way it is rooted i n tempo
rality.
1 6. Mo st "political" di scourses, and particu larly Marxist discourse, posit
i deology as the ground for all di scursi ve practic es . In th i s respect, there i s
a project i on of a "contextual base", usually expressed i n the triad, the
"hi storical", the "econom ic" and the " po l itic a l" . What rem ains unthought
in th i s i nterpretation, is th e ontological understanding on wh ich thi s triad
rests. lri garay's contribution might in part be at tri bu ted to the fact that she
calls for a return to the ontological problemati c, which reveals ho w
"Marxism", "Feminism" or any ot her -ism has always already been p�e
written in the ph i losoph i cal language and its m ajor phi losophemes. There
fore, if change is to occur, there h a s to be enac ted an intervention in rel a
tion to this ontological ground . Wheth er thi s is possible or how it will be
done, are que sti on s which she diligently pursues.
1 7 . "This Essentiali sm", p. 1 9 .
1 8. This Sex, p. 76.
19. It is i nteresti ng to note that lri g aray has become the privi leged figure
wi thi n this new prol i fe ration of readings that app ro pri ate h e r writing s as a
me th od to read e v eryth i n g from Plato, the Medieval My stics , Shakespeare
to H .D. The following l i st prov ides references to a se lectio n of articles
which all ' use l ri garay in terms of a new read i ng strategy that claims to
have d i scovered "di fference : " :
Barbara Free man, "l rigaray a t The Symposium: Sp e aking Otherwise",
Oxford literary Review 8, ( 1 9 86), Nos. 1 -2 : Sexual Difference;
Shirley Neu m an, I m po rti n g Difference" in Amazing Space: Cana
"
dian Women Writing, e ds . Shi rley Neuman and Smaro Kambou reli
(Edmonton : Lo ng s po on Press, 1 986);
Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick, Between Men: English Uterature and Male
Homosexual Desi re (New York : Columbia Universi ty Press, 1985);
Patri cia Parker, Literary Fat Ladies: Rhetoric, Gender, Property
(Londo n : M ethuen , 1 987);
Sara Beckwith, " A Very M aterial Mysticism: the Medieval Mysticism
of Margery Kempe" in Medieval Literature: Criticism, Ideolo gy, and
History (New York : S t . M artin Press , 1 986);
Eli zabeth A. Hirsh, " H . D . , Modernism, and the Psychoanalysis of
Seeing", Literature and Psychology, 3 2, 3 ( 1 986), pp. 1 - 1 0.
20 . Ereig nis is usually translated as " t h e event of appropriation", and as such
it ha s been the target of much debate. This translation might in fact be
so m ew hat mi sleading. I n On Time and Being , Heidegger warns again st
how Ereig nis must not be thought (p. 20):
What the name "ev ent o f A ppro pri ati o n " names can no longer be
repre sented by means of the c urren t meaning of the word ; for in th at
mea ning "event of A pp ropriation " is understood in the sense of oc cur
ren ce and happen i ng - not in te r m s of A ppro p riat i n g as the ex te ndi n g and
send i n g w h i c h open s and prese rve s .
2 1 . On Time and Being , pp. 1 2- 1 3 .

22. I n Lacanian psychoanalysis, fo r example, the Other o r the unconscious is
thought i n terms of th e pri vati ve, as that which does not appear, but which
nevertheless enters i nto the unfoldi ng of the "now". I n this sense, Lacan is
interested i n considering the unconscious, not· as an entity, but as a
process of disclosure. The Being of the unconscious thus comes to signify
the disclosure of Dasein concei ved as a presence made up of absence. Thi s
interpretation of Lacan's " Dasei n psychoanalysis" h a s sometimes been
attributed to his early work, especi ally in connection to h i s w ork The Lan
guage of the Self. The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis, trans.
Anthony Wi lden (New York: Delta Books, 1 968).
23. On Time and Being , p. 1 4.
24. Ibi d . , p. 1 4.
25 . Ibi d . , pp. 1 5- 1 6 .
26. Ib i d . , pp. 2 1 -22.
2 7 . Heidegger here deve lops I m manuel Kant's understandi ng of a priori,
w h ic h he defines in h i s Critique of Pure Reason , trans. Norman Ke mp
Smith (New York : St. Marti n Press, 1 929). I n the following, Kant
emphasi zes the a priori as the inner necessity , a sensible intuition of s pace
and time (p. 67):
I n the course of th i s investi gation it will be found there are t w o pure
forms of sen sible i ntuition, serv i n g as pri nci ples of a priori knowledge,
namely space and time.
28. Ibid . , pp. 22-23 .
29. Being and Time, pp. 279-3 1 1 .
30. In The Question Concerning Technology, trans . W i l l i am Lowi tt. (New
York : H arper & Row, 1 977), Heidegger defines the word Gestell (p. 20) :
Accordi ng to ordinary u sage, the word Gestell [frame) means some
k i nd of apparatu s, e.g. a book rack. Gestell is also the name for a ske leton.
And th� employment of the word Ge-stell [Enframing) that i s now
requ i red of u s seems equally eerie, not to speak of the arbitrari ness with
which words of a mature language.
Heidegger furthermore elaborates on his selection of thi s word in the
following ( p . 2 1 ) :
The word stellen [ t o set upon) i n t h e name Ge-stell [Enframing) not
only means ch a l l e n ging. At the same ti me it should preserve th e sugges
ti o n of another Stellen from w h i c h it stems, namely, that produc i ng and
presenting [Her- und Dar-stellen) w h ic h , i n the sense of poiesis, l e t s what
presences come fort h - e.g. , the erecting of a st atue in th e temple precinct
- and the chal lenging orderi ng now under consideration are i ndeed fun
damentally di fferent, and yet they remain rel ated in their essence. B ot h are
ways of revea l i n g , of aletheia . I n En framing, that unconcealment comes to
pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology re vea l s the
real as standing-reserve. Thi s work is therefore nei ther on ly a hu man
activity nor a mere means within this acti vity. The merely i nstrumental ,
merely a nth ro p o l ogic a l defi n i ti on o f techno logy i s therefore in pr i nc i p l e
untenab l e . And it cannot be rounded out by bei ng referred back to some
NOTES 151
metaphysical or re ligious explanation that undergrids it.

3 1 . M arti n H eidegger, On the Way To Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New
York : H arper & Row, 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 35 .
32. See Jean B aud r i l l ard fo r an excellent analys i s o f the worki ngs o f modem
cyberneti cs and i t s relationship to homogenized i nformation through the
development of a mass culture of mass-produced "knowledge" in Simu la
tions, trans. Pau l Foss et al. (New York : Semiotext(e) Inc . , 1 983).
33. In regard to the field of literary criticism, i t i s possible to subsume the
Russian Formalists, the Prague School , Julia Kristeva, the Tel Quelians as
well as Todorov i n to this group of theori sts who sought to formalize lan
guage and to m ake i t an object of study .
34. See On the Way To Language, p. 1 34.
35. Ibid . , p. 1 3 5 .
36. See Lacan's understandi ng o f the subject's entrance into the symbolic
order as an order that always pre-exists u s and into which we are neces
sari ly subjected in o rder to be i n language .
Chapter II
1. Jacques Derrid a , Sp u rs: Nietzsche's Styles/Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche
(Chicago: The Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1 978).
2. Ibid . , p . 7 1 .
3. Ibid. , p . 5 7 .
4. See A lice A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity
(Ithaca: Cornel l Uni versity Press, 1 985). In her chapter called ' The
Woman- i n-effect", Jardine explores the new configurations of woman and
modernity . I quote:
Woman, as a new rhetorical space, is inseparable from the most radi
cal moments of most contemporary di sciplines. To limit ourselves to the
ge neral set of wri ters in focus here, "she" may be found in Lacan's pro
nouncements of desire ; Derrida' s i nternal explorations of writing;
Deleuze's work on becoming woman; Jean-Fran�ois Lyotard calls for a
femin i ne anal ytic re lation; Jean B audrillard' s work on seduction; Fou
cau lt's on madnes s ; Goux's on the new femi ninity; Barthes's in general;
M i chel S erres's de s i re to beco me Pene lope or Ari adne [ ... ) "She" i s cre
ated from the c l ose explorations of semantic chains whose elements have
changed textual as wel l as conceptual pos itions, at least in terms of a val
orizati o n : from time to space, the same to other, paranoia to hysteria, city
to la byri nth, mastery to nonmastery, truth to fiction. (p. 38)
5. Jacqu es Derrida, Positions, trans . A lan Bass (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Pres s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 26.
6. Derrida's t h i n k i n g on the "always-already-structure" i s somewhat analo
g ous to Heidegger's notion of a "fore- having", and will be dealt with i n
g re ate r deta i l later i n the chapter under the question o f pre-understanding.
The maj or d i ffe rence betwee n the two, however, seems to lie i n the fact
1 52 THE FEMININE AND N IHILISM
that Derrida operates within a psychoanalytic framework as a foundational

discourse, and the "always-already" seems to, i n some way , structurally be
related to Freud's notion of the unconsciou s . Thi s is perhaps best i l lus
trated i n h i s work on Freud's magic writi ng- pad in "Freud and the Scene
of Writing" in Writing and Difference , trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1 978), pp. 1 96-23 1 .
7. See Jacques Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writi ng" in Writing and
Difference, tran s. AlanBass (Chicago: University of Chi cago Press,
1 978), pp. 1 96-23 1 .
8. Spurs, p. 73.
9 . I bi d . , p . 7 3 .
1 0. M a rt i n Heidegger, Being a n d Time (New York: Harper & R o w, 1 962), p.
191.
1 1 . Ibid . , p. 1 92.
1 2. Ibid . , p. 1 89 .
1 3 . Ibid . , p . 1 94.
1 4. Ibi d . , p . 1 95 .
1 5 . Ibid . , p. 1 99 .
1 6. I b i d . p . 200.
,
1 7 . Ibid . , p. 20 1 .
1 8 . See Marti n Heidegger's Early Greek Thinking , trans. David Farrel l Krell
and Frank A. Capuzzi ( New York: H arper & Row, 1 975).
1 9. Ibid . , p . 202.
20. Fri edrich Ni etzsche, The Will to Power ed . and trans. Walter K aufmann
(New York : Vi ntage Books, 1 967).
2 1 . Ibid . , p . 9.
22. Friedrich Ni etzsche, Thus Spoke lii rathoustra, in The Portable Nietzsche,
trans . and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York : The V i k i ng Press, 1 968), pp.
1 03-439.
23 . Tne Will to Power, p. 7.
24. Ib i d , p . 7.
.
25 . M arti n Hei degger, Nietzsche. Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. David Farrel l
K rel l (New York : Harper & R o w , 1 982).
26. Ib id . , p. 4.
27. Ibid . , p. 200.
28. Ibi d . , p. 200.
29 . The Will to Power, p. 1 3 .
30. Ibid. , p . 1 7 .
3 1 . I b i d. , p. 407 .
3 2 . Ibid . , p. 1 4.
3 3 . lii rathoustra, p. 96.
34. The W i l l t o Po wer, p. 289 .
3 5 . Ibi d . , pp. 35-36.
36. 7,arathoustra, p. 1 25 .
3 7 . Ibi d . , p p . 1 26- 1 27.
38. Nihilism, p. 6 .
39. Ib i d . , p. 9.
NOTES 1 53
40. I b i d . , p. 1 0.
41. In fac t. H e i degger c l a i m s that t h i s was the p h rase that sparkled h is interest
in N i etzsche's thou g h t and w h i c h i n i t i ated what was to become a decade
of m e d i t ati on on N i etzsche.
42. I bi d . , p . 5 3 .
43 . I bi d . , p . 8 3 .
44 . I b i d . , p. 8 6 .
45 . I b i d. , p . J OO .
46. I b i d. , pp. 1 04- 1 05 .
47. I b i d . , p . 1 07 .
48. Ibid. , p . 1 08 .
49. I b id . , p . I 2 1 .
50. I b i d . , p . 1 34.
51. Ibid . , p . 2 1 9 .
52. I b i d . , p . 22 1 .
53. I b id . , p . 2 2 5 .
Chapter III
I. Se e also Luce Iri garay, Passions etementaires (Pari s: Les Ed iti o ns de
M i nu i t , 1 9 8 2 ) . I n t h i s work, lrigaray poetically explores the pa s s ion s in
the i r elemental nature a s an ex pression of the cosmic con nect i on bet wee n
th e body and the four e lement s : a i r , fire, water and earth.
2. Th es e same fi gures l i kewise take ce nt er sta ge in Speculum of the Other
Woman .
3. Marine lover, p. 3 .
4. Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. R o lfe Humphries (Bloomington : Indiana
U n i versi ty Press , 1 955), p. 6 8 .
5 . I b i d , p. 69 .
.
6. Speculum, p . 264.
7. l r i g ara y develops this t ho u g h t of the i nvis i b l e air in L 'oubli de l'air chez
Martin Heidegger. She a rg u es t ha t H e i degge r has fo rgotten the elemental
ai r as that which n ou r i sh es a l l emerg ent, i ncluding language.
8. Marine Lo ver, p. 4.
9. I b i d . p. 4.
,
1 0 . Ibi d . p . 4 .
,
1 1 . Ibid. , p . 5 .
1 2. Ibi d . , p . 5 .
1 3 . I b i d . p. 5 .
,
1 4 . Sec a l s o Helene Ci xous, "The L au g h of the Medusa", trans. Keith and

Pau l a C o h e n in New French Feminisms, eds. I. de Courtivron & E. Mark s
(New Y o rk S hocken Books, 1 98 1 ), pp. 245-265 .
,
1 5 . 'Zarath ou.ftra, p . 1 22.

1 6 . Marine Love r, p . 6.
1 7 . I b i d. , p . 6.
1 8. Ibid . , p . 7 .
1 9 . Jacques Derrid a , Dissemination , trans. B arbara Johnson (Chicago: U n i
versity o f Chi cago Press , 1 98 1 ) , pp. 2 1 2-2 1 3 .
20. Marine Lover, p. 7 .
2 1 . I ri gara y plays on t h e homonym between t h e "entre" (between) e n d the
"antre" (cave/wo mb) in "Plato's Hystera" in Speculum.
22. See Spurs, p. 7 I .
23. Nihilism, p. 2 1 0.
24. Nihilism, p. 1 9 2 .
2 5 . Ibid. , p. 1 9 3 .
26. Marine Lover, p p. 7-8 .
27. Ibid. , p. 9.
28. Zdrathoustra, p. 340.
29. Marine Love r, p. 2 3 .
3 0 . Ibid . , p . I O.
3 1 . Ibid . , p. 9 .
3 2 . Ibid. , p. 9 .
3 3 . Ibid. , p. 1 1 .
34. I b i d . , p. I I .
3 5 . Freud , who experi mented with the model which preceded that of
Ni etzsche, namely the mathematical-logical model i ni ti ated by the Greeks,
ended up with the third model , the thermo-dynamic model . He borrowed
his concept of a "complex" from thi s scienti fi c field. The energy theory on
which thermodynamics is based can be outlined in the following short
hand: first, the conservation of energy ; second, a tendency towards death.
In h i s work Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New
York: Norton, 1 959) Freud speaks of this tendency in the fol lowing
statement (p. 3 2 ) :
If we are t o take i t as a t ru t h that knows no exception th at everything
livi ng dies for internal reasons - becomes i n o rganic once agai n - then we
shall be compel led to s ay that the aim of all life is death and , looking
backwards , that in a n ima te things existed before living ones.
36. The Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans . Carolyn Burke. Ithaca: Corn ell
Uni versity Press. (Forthco ming)
37. Ethique , p. 1 20:
La science psychoanalytique s'appu i e sur les deux premiers principes
de la thermodynamique, qui sous-tendent le modele de Ia libido scion
Freud . Or ces deux pri ncipe s apparai ssent plus i somorphes a la sexu alite
mascu line que fe minine. Celle-ci etant moins sou mise aux altemances de
t e n s ion - d e ch a rg e , a la conservation de l'energie requise, au maintien
d'etats d'equ i l i bre, au fonctionnement en c i rcu i t clos et rou vert par satura
tion , a la reversibi l i te du te mps, etc .
3 8 . Irigaray refers to the Belgian Nobe l laureate i n Chemistry, llya Prigogi ne
( 1 9 1 7- ) . who has devel oped a c r i t ique of the second law of thermodynam
ics. Pri gogi ne's reinterpretation proposes that "in conditions that are suf
ficiently far from equ i l i bri u m , fluctuations of order in random system
could sud d en l y stabi l i ze. The resu lting ' d i s s i p ati v e structu res' - the most
NOTES 1 55
dramatic of which i s l i fe itself - would last i ndefinitely, taking energy out

of the environments and 'dissipating' entropy back into them." Quote
taken from 1 987 Current Biog raphy Yearbook, ed . Charles Moritz (New
York: The H . W. W i l son Company , 1 987), p. 447.
I n ad d i ti on to h i s i mpressive scienti fi c production, Prigogine co
authored Order out of Chaos (New York : Bantam Books, 1 984) with the
chemist, phi losopher, and scienti fic hi storian Isabelle Stengers, a work
� hi c h ex pounds h i s theories for the lay man.
3 9. Eth iq ue , p. 1 20 :
La sexual i te fem i n i ne s'harmoniserait peu t - et re mieux - s'il faut
evoq uer u n m odele scientifique - avec ce que Prigogine appelle Jes struc
ture s "di s s i pat i ves", qui fonctionnnent par echange avec le monde
exterieur, qui procedent par paliers d'energie et dont l'ordre ne revi en t pas
a l a recherc he de I 'equ i l i bre mais au franc hisse ment de seuils correspon
dant au depassement du desordre ou de l'entropie sans decharge.
40. Mar!ne Lo ver, p. 1 1 .
4 1 . Nihilism, p. 7 .
42. The Will to Power , # 6 1 7 , p.
3 30 .
43 . Marine Lo ver, p . 26.
44. Ibi d. , p . 60.
45 . See Mau rice B lanchot, ' 'The Gaze of Orpheus" in The Gaze of Orpheus,
tran s . Ly d i a Davi s , ed . P . Adams S itney (Barrytown, New York: Station
H i l l P res s , 1 9 8 1 ) . In t h i s essay , B l anchot muses u pon the poetic si gn i fi
can ce(s) of Orpheus' descent i n to Hades i n an attempt to retrieve Eury
dic e, a n atte mpt which to h i m is emblematic of th e power and powerless
ne ss of art ( p . 99) :
Yet Orp heu s' work does not consist in securing the approach of this
"p oint" [ Eu ryd ic e , as the limit of what art can attain] by de sce nding into
the depth s. H i s work i s to bring it back into the day l i ght and in the day
l i g ht give it fo rm, fi g u re and reality. Orpheus can do anyt hin g except look
t h i s "p oint" in the face, look at the center of the night in the night. He can
descend to it, he can draw i t to h i m - an even stronger power - and he can
draw i t upwards , but o n l y by keeping his back turned to it. This turning
away is the on ly way he can appro ac h i t : this i s the mean i n g of the con
cealment revealed in the night. But in the i mpulse of his migration
Orpheus forget s t h e work he has to accompli sh, and he has to forget it,
becau se the ulti mate requ i rement of hi s i mpu lse is not that there should be
a work , but that someone should stand and face thi s " p o i n t" and grasp the
essence where this essence appears, where it is es sen ti a l and essenti ally
appearanc e : in the heart of the night.
4 6 . Marine Lo ve r, p . 5 6 .
47 . Ibid . . pp . 56-5 7 .
48 . Ibid. , p . 6 1 .
49. M arti n Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manhe i m
(Ne w York : A nchor Books, 1 96 1 ) , p. 1 1 .
50 . Thi s i m pl i e s that modern French has appropriated this prior Roman
i n terpretation of the Greek words, and that the original Greek me anings
are hidden from view from the modem speaker. This does not, however,
indicate an i l l w i l l on the part of the speaker. All i t says is that lrigaray, in
her read i ng of the Greek word, understands it in terms of the Roman
translation/appropriation that occurred in the 1 st century A . D .
5 1 . Marti n Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New
York: Harper & Row, 1 969), pp. 50-5 1 .
52. Marti n Heidegger, Poetry, lAnguage, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter
(New York : Harper & Row , 1 97 1 ), p. 42.
53. Marine Lover, p. 5 8 .
54. Ibid . , p. 46.
5 5 . See Book X I I in The Odyssey of Homer, tran s. Richmond Lattimore (New
York : H arper & Row, 1 965), pp. 1 86- 1 87 .
5 6 . Spurs, p. 3 8 .
57. For Derrida, the always-already-structure for a past passivity that is older
than presence and essence and that can never be fu l l y activated in the pre
sent. In i ts "absolute past", the always-already effaces itself and retreats,
leaving behind a mark/trace or a "signature", which can be re-traced in the
thing from which i t withdraws. S i nce the always-already can never be pre
sent itself, it is not a trace of an already consti tuted p resent. As such , it can
only be thought negati vely, as a cond i tion of "possibility of i mpossibi l i ty"
of essence, which for Derrida gi ves ri se to his notion of indetermi nacy .
58. Marine Lover, p. 48 .
59. Ibi d . , p p . 48-49.
60. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", trans. Frank A . Capuzzi in
col laborati on with J. Glenn Gray i n Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed .
David Farrell Kre l l (New York : Harper & Row, 1 977), p. 1 93 .
6 1 . Marti n Heidegger, On Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New
York : Harper & Row, 1 972), p. 56 .
62. Ibid. , p. 7 1 .
6 3 . Speculum, p . 262.
64. Ibid. , p . 263 .
65. Luce lrigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, pp. 262-263 .
66. On Time and Being, p. 7 1 .
67. Identity and Difference, p. 59.
68 . Ibid. , p. 60.
69. See Le corps-a-corps avec la mere , p. 43 :
Je voulais faire a l'ori gine u ne espece de tetralogie qui aurai t aborde le
probleme des quatres elements : l 'eau . l'air, le feu , la terre, appliquee a des
phi l osophes p l u s proches de nous, et aussi mettre en cau se la tradition
phi losophique, notemment du cote du femi nin. II faut i nterroger ce qui ,
dans u ne tradition presocrati que, a ete refoule, censure, oublie de
l'elementaire.
70. Martin Heidegger, "Logos" (Heracl i tus, Fragment B 50) in Early Greek
Thinking, tran s. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (London/New
York : H arper & Row , 1 975), pp. 59-78.
7 1 . See Chapter I : "Theoreti cal Prelimi nari es."
7 2 . Being and Time, p . 59.
NOTES 1 57
73. Early Greek Th in king, p. 7 1 .

74. Marine Lo ver, p . 64.
75. Ibid . . p. 6 5 .
76. Ibid . , p. 67.
77. Nihilism , p . 2 1 4.
78. Marine Lo ver, p. 6 9 .
79. Ibid . , pp. 69-70.
80. Eperons, pp. 70-8 2 .
8 1 . See Margaret Whi tford, Luce lrigaray: Ph ilosophy in the Feminine.
82 . Marine Lo ver, p. 70.
84. Ibid . , p. 72.
85. For an i n -depth study of the inter-relationship between Lou A ndre as
Salome and N ietzsche, see Carolyn Arthur M artin, ''The Death of 'God,'
the Li mits of 'M an,' and the Meanings of 'Woman : ' The Work and the
Legends of Lou Andreas-Salome." Diss. University of Wisconsin-Madi
son , 1 98 5 .
87. Ibid . , p . 7 2 .
88. Marine Love r, p. 7 1 .
8 9 . Speculum, p. 1 3 3 .
90. See "The B lind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry" in Speculum, where
Irigaray deconstructs Freud's essay on " Femininity " in New Introductory
Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey (New York: Standard
Edition, V o l . X X l l , 1 93 3 ) .
9 1 . See Luce I ri garay, "Women's Exile", Ideology and Consciousness, Vol . 6 ,
n o . l ( 1 9 77 ) .
9 2 . Et h iq uc , p . 1 4 :
I I est vrai que, pour que !'oeuvre de Ia difference sexuelle ail lieu , ii
faut une revo lution de pensee , et d'ethique. Tout est a reinterpreter dans
Jes relations entre le sujet et le discours, le sujet est le monde, le sujet et le
cosm ique, le micro et le macrocosme.
9 3 . See Naomi Schor's simi lar conclusion in "Thi s Essentiali sm Which Is Not
One", where she reads lrigaray's theoretical explorations of sexual differ
ence as a transva luati o n . (p . 2 1 )
94. See my del i beration on the connection between Nietzsche and Descartes
as vie wed by Hei degger in Chapter I I , pp. 23-3 2 .
9 5 . See for example Irigaray's reading o f Lacan i n ' 'The 'Mechanics' of Fluids"
i n This Sex Which ls Not One , pp. 1 05- 1 1 6 .
Chapter IV
Fr i ed rich N i c t 1.schc , n,·yond Good and Evil: Prelude 10 a Philosophy of
I.
th<' Fu t11n- .tra n s . Walter Kaufmann (New York : Vintage Books , 1 966).
2. See Heidegger's essay "The R ag i n g Di scordance between Truth and Art"

in his fi rst volume on N iet z s c he , The Will to Power as A rt, tr an s . David
Ferre l l Krell (New York : H arper & Ro w , 1 979) , pp. 1 42- 1 50. In th i s
essay h e d i s c u s s e s t he fol l owi n g statement from Nietzsche, which
Nietzsche j o tte d down i n 1 88 8 d u ri ng h i s pre para t i o n for The Birth of
Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: V i n t a ge B ooks , 1 967 ) :
V e ry ear ly i n m y l i fe I to ok the q ues t i o n of the rel at i on o f art to truth
seriously: and even now I stand in holy d read in the face of this di scor
dance. ( X I V , 3 68 )
3. Beyond Good and Evil, # 2 3 2, p. 1 63 .
4. Marine Love r, p . 77.
5. Interestingly, becau se I ri g aray re ads P l a t o t h roug h N i e t z s che , s he acce p t s
N i etz sc he ' s u n d e rstand i n g of what eidos means in Plato de s p i te the fact
that she diverges from h i m when it co mes to the Nietzschean use of this
appro p riat i o n of Pl ato. Heidegger, however, di s agre es with Nietzsche in
hi s essay " Th e Q u e st i on Co n c e rnin g Technology", i n The Question Con
cerning Technology and Other Essays where he s ho w s how the Platonic
eidos has bee n re d uc t i v e ly app ro pri ate d :
We, l a te born , are no longer i n a p os i tio n to appreci ate the signifi
cance of Plato's dari ng to use the wo rd eidos for that which in everything
a n d i n eac h particular thing en d u re s as present. For eidos, i n the common
s peech, meant the outward aspect [Ansicht] that a visible thing offers to
t h e phy s i c al eye. Plato exacts of this word, however, so m e t hi n g u t te rl y
extraord inary : that it name what preci se ly i s not and never w i l l be pe rce i v
able with physical eyes . But even this i s by no means the full extent of
what is extrao rdi n a ry here. For idea names not only the nonsensuous
aspect of w ha t i s p h y si c a lly visible. Aspect (idea) n a me s and is, also, that
which constitutes the essence of th e a udible, the tasteable, the tactile, in
e very th i n g that is in any way accessible. (p. 20)
W h at H ei d eg ger b ri n g s to light in this quote mi ght in fact u pset both
the Nietzschean a pp ro p ri at i on of Plato an d Iri g aray ' s ensuing cri tique of
Nietzsche. By c rea t i n g "a ragi n g discordance" between the supra-sensuous
eidos as truth a nd the sensuous material as art, Ni etzsche and the do m i
n an t me t ap h y s ic a l trad i ti on before h i m have left ou t the material potential
i n the Pl a t o n ic u nders tanding of the idea(!).
N ietzsc h e ' s work rests upon th i s rad i c a l se p a rati on between the two
realms, and l rigaray's re ad i n g l ikewise rests on thi s fu n da mental assump
tion. Th e q ues t i o n would have to be posed , however, con c ern i n g what the
poss i bl e i mplications of Hei d egge r' s i n si g h t m i g ht bring to lrigaray ' s
t h i nk i n g on le feminin.
6. B ey o n d Good and Evil, # 2 3 2 , pp. 1 62- 1 63 .
7. I b i d . , p . 1 63 .
8. I b i d . , # 2 3 2 , p. 1 64 .
9. A ris t o p h a n e s . Lysistrata , tran s . D o ug la s s Parker, e d . W i l liam Arrowsmith
(New York : New American Li brary , 1 964).
I 0. I b i d . , p. I 0 I .
1 1 . The pri me exam p l e of t h i s tragi c d i s i n tegration i s found i n the fate o f
NOTES 1 59
Oedipus, who i s both b l i nded , robbed of his kingdom and exiled from the
pol i s .
1 2. Marine Lo ve r, p . 7 8 .
1 3 . Sigmun d Fre u d , Do ra : A n A nalysis o f a Case o f Hysteri a , ed. Phi lip Rieff
(New York : C o l l i e r Book s, 1 96 3 ) , p . 22.
1 4. Fri ed rich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, tran s . Walter Kaufmann (New
York : V i ntage Bo oks , 1 967 ) .
1 5 . Sophoc l e s , Oedipus the King i n Greek Tragedies: V o lume I , ed s . David
Greene and David La tti more (Chicago: The U n i ve rsity of Chicago Press,
1 942).
1 6. The Birth of Tragedy, p . 69 .
1 7 . Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche, p. 485 .
1 8 . Thi s passag e is i nc l u d ed un d e r the section "How the 'True World' fin al l y
became a Fable", whose first part is called "History of an Error." I refe r to
the passage i n C h a pte r I w h en dea l i ng with D erri da ' s reading of H ei degge r
and N i etzsc he on the question of the "History of an Error" in Eperons.
1 9 . Spurs, p. 97 .
2 0 . Fri ed r i c h Ni etzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufm ann (New
York : V i n tage Books, 1 974), # 60, p. 1 24.
2 1 . Ma rin e Lover, p . 79.
22. Twilight, p . 4 8 5 .
23 . Ib id . , p. 4 8 6 .
24 . Ma rin e Love r, p . 7 9 .
2 5 . Th e que st i o n of castrat i on (of woman) in t h e scenography of the same
l i kewise con st i tu t e the focus i n lri g a ray ' s cri t i que of the Freudian para
digm of sexual identity and psycho-sexual development in her essay "La
tac h e aveugle d'un v i e u x re ve de s y metri e " in Speculum, pp. 9- 1 62. In a
deco ns tructi ve gesture , lri garay sets ou t to unm as k Freud's i ll u so ry posi
ti o ni ng of hi m s e l f as the phi losopher-scienti st- thinker who attempts to
s pe a k the "tru th" of female sexuality. Even though lrigaray grants Freud
t h e func tion as "undermi ner" of West ern ph i lo s op h i cal di scourse of certi
tu de th ro u gh h i s i nt rod uct ion of the unconscious and its specific mecha
n i sms , she nevertheless sees in his p roject a phallic posi ti o ni ng as law
m ak er and truth-s peaker, w hic h mus t al way s rely on the so lid grou n d of
su bj ect i v e c onsc i ous n e s s and the re liabi lity of the l ogos u n de rst ood as
re ason ab le l a n gu a ge . The female bo d y becomes then invaded by this mas
cu l i n e cartography - a morp h o - l o gi c of the m as cu l i ne , i so m orph i c wi th
the m a sc u l i n e sex w h i c h priv i l e ge s u nity , the stable form of the self, of the
s pe c u l ari z e d v i s i ble, in short of the e recti on , which of course stands for
th e bec o m i n g o f the form.
I n Freud's e n d e a vo r to co n s truc t a th eo ry of (mascu li ne) sexuality in
w h i c h the peni s gains a fe t i s h i ze d position of norm or "y ards tick" against
wh i c h fe male s e x u al i ty i s compared or measured, woman's body and
sex u a l i ty c a n not fu nction as ot he r than "lack", "deficiency" or "non
pre s encc . " H er fa i l u re to e x h i b i t only one organ becomes in phallocentric
op t ics an e v i dence of her not having any sex, thus a cas trate d man.
'Th ro u g h h i s a p propri ation of the femal e bod y , Freud i s c apable o f e recti n g
1 60 THE FEM I N I N E AND NIHILISM
a th eo ry of female sexu a lity which i s based o n a mode l that i s fundamen

t al l y fo rei gn lo her and lo the myopti c phallic v i s i on renders "un rien a
voir" . Wo m a n thus comes to represent this " n o th i ng to see" th at gai n s the
s i gn i fi c at i o n both of penis envy bestowed upon her as well as a "horri fic"
vision of t he castrated man, which feeds his own "fear of c astration".
26. Ibid . , p . 80.
27. I b i d . , p. 80.
28. Ibid . , p . 87.
29. Ibid . , p. 8 3 .
30. I b i d . , p. 8 3 .
31. Ibi d . , p . 8 5 .
32. See Luce I ri garay , "Women's Exi le", Ideology and Consciousness, Vo l . 1
(May 1 977), pp. 57-76, an interview w i t h Lu c e I ri g ar ay which was first
publi shed unde r the title "K vinne r i eksil" in Seks samtaler om psykiatri,
eds . S. Haugsgj erd and F. Engelstad (Oslo: Pax Forl ag , 1 978). I rig aray
he re s ta te s :
Anyway, one di scovers here the question of th e criteria of un i vers al ity
which dominate the whole Wes tern th o u g h t , and thus psych oanal y si s .
When one defines the u n c on s cio u s in te rm s of un i ver s a l characteri stics,
one does not wonder whether these characteri stics are valid for women
al so. I d o not think that women, in fact, h ave a n un con s cious ope rati n g in
the same way as th at of men. Even the fact that women possess an uncon
sciou s i s not s el f- ev i den t . It is po ss i bl e that one has been i mposed on
the m . But to s ay that wo ma n ' s se x u a l i t y i s n atu rall y s u bject to processes of
repre s s i o n , sublimation etc . , that's very doubtfu l . I wo ul d rather frame the
fo l l owi ng que s t i o n: are women not, partly, the unconscious? [My empha
s i s ] That i s , is th ere not in what has been h i s to ri cal l y constituted as the
'unconscious,' some censored, repressed e l e me nt of the feminine? Certain
functional criteria attributed to the unconsciou s , like non-contradiction,
conti guity, etc . , are, I think, close to fe male s exu al i ty and language. (pp.
69-70)
3 3 . Marine Lo ver, p. 86.
34. Marine Lover, p. 86.
35. S h osh an a Felman has posed similar qu e s ti o n s to I ri g aray i n her article
entitled "The Critical P h al l ac y " , Diacritics (Winter 1 975). I quote :
If " th e woman" is preci sely t he Other of any conceivable Western
theoretical locu s of speech, how c an the woman as such be speaking i n
thi s book ? Who i s spe a k ing here, and who i s as sessin g the otherness of
the woman? I f, as Luce I rigaray suggests , the woman's silence or the re
p re s si o n of her capacity to s pe ak , are constitutive of phi losophy and of
th e oret ic al d i scourse as su ch , from what t heo re ti c al locus is Luce Irigaray
hersel f speaki ng in order to develop her own theoretical discourse about
women ? Is she spe a ki ng as a woman, or in the place of the (si lent)
w o m a n , for t he woman, in the name of th e woman? Is it enough to be a
w oma n in order to speak as a woman? Is " s peaki n g as a woman" a fact
d e te rmi ned by some biological condition or by a s t rate gi c , theoretical
position, by anatomy or by culture? What i f "speaking as a woman" were
NOTES 161
not a si m p l e "natural" fact, could not be taken for g r an ted ? (p 3).

3 6 . Marine Lo ver, p . 90 ( m y translati on) :
"Le hasard - la donne. Ne peut se donner que pour ce qu'i l/e l le n'est pas."
37. Being and Time , p. 63 .
3 8 . Thi s is the t i t le for t h e second part of Hei degger's Nihilism volume, pp.
1 97-2 5 2 .
3 9 . Nihilism, p . 2 28 .
40 . I b i d . , p . 228.
4 1 . Ibid . , p . 229.
4 2. I bi d . , p . 233.
4 3 . Marine Lover, p . 89; Amante marine, p. 95.
44. I b i d . , p . 8 9 .
45. See C hap t e r I I I .
46. Marine Lover, p . 89.
4 7 . See Heidegger's Identity and Difference.
48. See I m manuel K a n t, The Critique of Pure Reason , tran s. Norman Kemp
S m i t h (New York : St. Mart i n ' s Press, 1 9 65 ) .
49 . Marine Lover, p . 90.
50. I bi d . , p . 9 I .
5 1 . I bid . , p . 9 2 .
5 2 . Identity a n d Differen ce, pp. 5 0-5 1 .
5 3 . Ibid . , p . 5 I .
54. On Time and Being , p . 3 .
55. The Gay Science, p . 2 72.
56. Ibid . , p . 27 1 .
57. Marine Lo ver, p. 94 .
58. Ibid. , p. 94.
59 . I b i d . , p . 94.
60. " Mythos" is u s u a l l y t r an s l a t e d as "the tel l i n g word" which creates man i n
h i s world, that i s , i n h i s i nterre l ations h i p wi t h t h e cosmos, t h e go ds and
other bei n g s .
6 1 . Aeschy lus, Oresteia, trans. R i c h mond Latt i more ( C hi c ago : The Uni versity
of Chi c ag o P ress , I 9 5 3 ) .
6 2 . I b id . , The Eumenides, p . 1 6 1 . I I . 7 3 6-7 3 8 .
6 3 . Ibid . , p . 1 5 8 , I I . 6 5 8-666.
64. Ma rine Lo ver, p . 96.
65. The Eumenides i n the Oresteia , p . 1 6 3 . 1 1 . 804-807 .
66. I b id . , p. 1 7 1 . 1 1 . 1 03 6- 1 039 .
67 . See Plato's Apology , tran s . Moses Hadas ( C h i c ago: Gate way Edi t i o n s ,
1 95 3 ) .
6 8 . Ma rine UJ l'e, p . 9 8 .
69 . L 'o ubli d e / 'air. p . 8 1 .
70. See M art i n H e i d egger ' s "The Q u e s t i on C o nce r n i ng Technology" in Tlze
Question Co11cerni11gTechn ology and Other Essays. tran s . W i l li a m
Lo w i t t ( New York: H a rper & Row . 1 97 7 ) . p p . 3-3 5 . I n t h i s essay .
Hei degger est a b l i shes a conne c t i o n bet ween the a p p ropriations of teclme
in Western metaphy s i c s and reve a l s how it has g i ve n rise to the predo m i -
nantly technological enframing of science and phi losophy .

7 1 . l 'oubli de l 'air, p. 8 1 .
72. See Chapter I I I on the question of the appropri ati on of logos i n Roman
language i nto "reason" and "adequati on".
73. Amante marine, p . 1 09. I t should be noted that truth i n thi s context is not
t o be confounded with aletheia i n the Pre-Socrati c u n de r sta nd i n g of the
word. Athena exempl ifies truth in the sense of the repetition , mimesis or
correspondence that speaks of truth's relationship to appearance.
74. The Gay Science, # 60, p. 1 23 .
75. Marine lover, p p . W4- 1 05 .
76. I n Spurs, De rr i d a attempts to open u p Ni etzsche's text t hro u g h the meta
phors of the sai l and of the u mbrella, which in Derrida's view , both have
the potential to contai n a di fference within, that i s , they might signify both
a pha l l i c and a vaginal i mage due to thei r multiple forms contai n ing both
the (phallic) poi nted object as wel l as the ( vag i n al ) fo ld s
.
77. The Gay Science, # 59, p. 1 22.

78. Ibid. , # 70, p. 1 27 .
7 9 . I n t h e following passage from Beyond Good a n d Evil, Dionysus, i n the
voice of the phi losopher, l ikens A ri adne to a man by making the following
remarks :
Thus he once said: "U nder certai n ci rcumstances I love what is
hum an " - and with this he alluded to Ariadne who was prese n t - "man is
t o m y mind a n agreeable, courageou s, i nventive animal that has no equal
on earth ; it fi nds its way in the labyri nth. I a m wel l disposed towards him:
I o fte n reflect ho w I m ig h t yet advance h i m a n d make h i m stronger, more
evil, and more profound than he i s. " (# 295, p. 236)
80. Marine lover, p . 1 1 1 .
8 1 . I b id . , p. 1 1 3 .
82. Ibi d . , p . 1 1 4.
83. See The Odyssey of Homer, Ovid's Metamorphoses, V i rgil's A eneid and
Dante's Inferno, where the re s pective poets guide their characters to the
underworld i n order to provide them with a pri vi leged (poetic) acces s i nto
that which "cannot be seen", but which nevertheless s hape s the de s t i ny of
each and every one of them, namely mortality, the u l ti mate signifier of
t e m po ral i ty .
84. See Being and Time, Part 1 , Section I I .
8 5 . I b id . p p . 1 1 5- 1 1 6.
,
86. L 'oubli de l ai r p. 1 30:

' ,
L'etre ne trouve-t-i l son fondement dans une immediatete sensi ble

encore im par l e e ? Dan s un si lence sur ce q u i ali mente secretement l a
pe n see? L'indit OU l i ndicib l e d'un rapport de l' homme a une nature echap
'
pant a son logos. Se donnant au l ieu innomme du rassemblement de

l 'apport des organes de tous ses sens. Re�u qu ' i l rep roj e tte en un mo nd e et
ses choses . Recreant ai nsi le tout, et fai sant de chacune toutes, et de toutes
chacu ne, sans que le sec ret de cette production lui ap p arai s s e jamais.
NOTES 1 63
Conclusion
I. It is pos s i b l e to object t o I ri garay 's somewhat sel ec ti v e re ading of Zara
thoustra in regard to h i s " fl i ght" by emphasizing that he embodies both
realms, th a t i s , the "transcendental" (through the fi gu re of the eagle) as
wel l as the " m a ter i al " (throu gh the figure of t h e serpent). Furthermore, it
is interesting to n o te that a l l of N ietzsche's irony in hi s proje ctio n of Zara
thoustra seems to be completely lost in l r ig a ray ' s readi ng .
2. What see m s to be lost in Iri g a ra y ' s i nterpretatio n of Zarathoustra's pro
nouncement. i s that N i etzsche uses the figure of "woman" to think the
question of ti me rat her than speaking of the soc i al class of women .
3. This is p er h a p s the way in w h i ch lrigaray fal ls back into a Lacanian phe
nomenology o f " p re sence" and "absence" as put forth i n his "Dasein psy
choanalysis" of h i s earlier production.
4. O n e cou l d , however, posi t that Zeus , as o p p osed to Athena and Apollo,
represents the "law of the Mother" i n hi s ac cepting to ki ll Cronos as
requ ested by R he a. However, i n the Attic tragedy , the gods are being
defi ned more and more in terms of thei r relationship to the polis, thereb y
gradua l l y be c o m i n g i nscri bed i nto the "Law of the Father".
5. See Chapter 4, note # 5, pp. 236-237, where I i nclude a re fe re nce to
H ei deg ger ' s readi n g of Plato o n the question of eidos.
6. The Question Concerning Technology, p. 20.
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The Feminine and Nihilism Luce Irigaray With Nietzsche and Heidegger

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The Feminine and Nihilism:

Luce Irigaray with

© Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget AS) 1994

Published with a grant from the Norwegian R es earch Council

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

Printed in Norway by NS Foro-Trykk, Tnagsrad 1994

CHAPTER I: Reading Irigaray and the Question of

CHAPTER II: Theoretical Preliminaries ............. . . ...... .. . ...... 31

CHAPTER III: A Lover's Discourse? Echo and

CHAPTER IV: Woman's (Un)Truth:

CONCLUSION ... . ............. .... ....................... ....... ............... .. . .. 137

NOTES ········· · · · · · · ····· · · · · · ····· · · ····· ··································· · 145

Bergen, June 1994

When Luce lrigaray pronounces that sexual difference constitutes

[f]or the work of sexual difference to take place, a revolution in

One of Irigraray's most famous pronouncements from Speculum

interconnectedn ess between the current global state of affairs and

such as Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, linguistics, Marxist

important to ask how Irigaray understand s the ground or the B eing

In thi s projected "radical convulsion" of language, Irigaray

nosis of the malaise of contemporary philosophy ironically and

her may prove to be partially fruitful in providing her with new

But when Irigarary sets out to think through Nietzsche's ph i ­

losophy of will to power in all its complexity, the question of

Or, does lrigaray's thinking on th i s primary locus of the

It is pr obab ly from this co nception of the relationsh ip between

(cf. "Poetically Man D we l l s in Poetry, Language, Thought,

tr ans . by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971,

Another question to be pursued i n relation to lrigaray s work, i s

pre u n d erstan ding that informs the following statement co n cerni n g

La n g u age no matter how formal it is, h as nourished itself by

blood, by flesh, by elemental matter(s). By whom and by what

tum ag a inst man? Is such an inverted result caused by this

In another p assage from the same work, Irigaray invokes (in a

Heid egger s contribution reveals the difficulties involved in any

appropriative rea d i n g of text s It also serv es to a lert atte ntion t o t he

p rob l e ma tic of la n g ua ge as it intrudes up on an y the oret ic al i nte r­

way for both Lacanian psychoanalysis and Derridean deconstruc­

As Nietzsche has become the battleground on which the philo­

philosophical works, and, like most of her predecessors, focuses

It is interesting to note that few critics ha v e seriously attempted

not adhere to the demarcations and the categories through which it

My argument is contrario: that Irigaray's production of a posi­

the question posed by Irigaray's attempts to theorize feminine

specificity - which is not to be confused with "defining"

of a strategy of miming, a masquerade to which women have

woman, to try to recover the place of her exploitation by dis­

In her parodic stance against and within masculine discourse,

sense, the strategy of mimesis follows Nietzsche's thinking on the

This pa rt i cula r form of appropr iatio n treats her work as a tool

What is lost in thi s form of app r op riati on is the complex medi­

left with an army of ( s ome ti mes) well-intentioned readings , which

In the above synoptic assessment of what I consider to be some of

a m od ality of stu d y , or represen tation s of "woman", the question of

Heidegger deliberates on the privative aspect of what appears, in

Presence means: the constant abiding that approaches man,

Something is given now, and this something is Ereignis. Thus,

nent of "now".22 For Heidegger, howe ver, Ereignis s i gnal s the

For time itself is nothing temporal, no more than it is something

the " open n ess

ness provides the p rimordia l space that allows space as we usually

the character of denial and withholding. It uni fies in adva nce

Thus, what is being said about the eve nt of Appropriation""

must he thought absolutely negatively. W hat is he re i n Ereignis is

But when Irigarary sets out to think through Nietzsche's ph i

p rob l e ma tic of la n g ua ge as it intrudes up on an y the oret ic al i nte r

way for both Lacanian psychoanalysis and Derridean deconstruc

As Nietzsche has become the battleground on which the philo

My argument is contrario: that Irigaray's production of a posi

woman, to try to recover the place of her exploitation by dis

What is lost in thi s form of app r op riati on is the complex medi

In order to be where we are, we human beings remain commit

the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche which must be ac

As the appropriation of understand ing, the interpretation oper

If, w h e n one is engaged in a p art icu l ar concrete kind of inter

In the development o f Western metaphysics, Aristotle's under

God " h as lost His power over bei n g s a n d over th e d ete rm i n a

For Nietzsche, nihilism is an i n e v i table and inescapable p h e

As such, reactive n i h i l i s m can only surv i ve through ressenti