Today is Thursday, May 02, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164820             March 28, 2007

VICTORY LINER, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.
PABLO M. RACE, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, 1 petitioner Victory Liner Inc. seeks to set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 April 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74010, 2 affirming the Decision and Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 30 July 2002 and 30 August 2002, respectively, in NLRC-CA-029327-01. 3 In
its Decision and Resolution, the NLRC vacated the Decision 4 of Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi (Labor Arbiter Nambi) dated
31 July 2001 in NLRC-NCR-00-09-08922-99 and ordered the petitioner to reinstate respondent Pablo M. Race to his former
position as a bus driver without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and benefits with full backwages computed from the
time of his illegal dismissal in January 1998 up to his actual reinstatement.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

In June 1993, respondent was employed by the petitioner as a bus driver. As a requisite for his hiring, the respondent deposited
a cash bond in the amount of ₱10,000.00 to the petitioner. Respondent was assigned to the Alaminos, Pangasinan - Cubao,
Quezon City, route on the evening schedule. 5

On the night of 24 August 1994, respondent drove his assigned bus from Alaminos, Pangasinan, destined to Cubao, Quezon
City. While traversing Moncada, Tarlac, the bus he was driving was bumped by a Dagupan-bound bus. As a consequence
thereof, respondent suffered a fractured left leg and was rushed to the Country Medical and Trauma Center in Tarlac City where
he was operated on and confined from 24 August 1994 up to 10 October 1994. One month after his release from the said
hospital, the respondent was confined again for further treatment of his fractured left leg at the Specialist Group Hospital in
Dagupan City. His confinement therein lasted a month. Petitioner shouldered the doctor’s professional fee and the operation,
medication and hospital expenses of the respondent in the aforestated hospitals. 6

In January 1998, the respondent, still limping heavily, went to the petitioner’s office to report for work. He was, however, informed
by the petitioner that he was considered resigned from his job. Respondent refused to accede and insisted on having a dialogue
with the petitioner’s officer named Yolanda Montes (Montes). During their meeting, Montes told him that he was deemed to have
resigned from his work and to accept a consideration of ₱50,000.00. Respondent rejected the explanation and offer. Thereafter,
before Christmas of 1998, he again conversed with Montes who reiterated to him that he was regarded as resigned but raised
the consideration therein to ₱100,000.00. Respondent rebuffed the increased offer. 7

On 30 June 1999, respondent, through his counsel, sent a letter to the petitioner demanding employment-related money claims.
There being no response from the petitioner, the respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter on 1 September 1999 a complaint for
(1) unfair labor practice; (2) illegal dismissal; (3) underpayment of wages; (4) nonpayment of overtime and holiday premium,
service incentive leave pay, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay; (5) excessive deduction of withholding tax and
SSS premium; and (6) moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. This was docketed as NLRC-NCR-00-09-08922-99. 8

In its Position Paper dated 27 March 2000, petitioner claimed that respondent was paid strictly on commission basis; that
respondent was a mere field personnel who performed his duties and functions outside the petitioner’s premises and whose time
of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; that petitioner, therefore, was exempted from paying the respondent
overtime compensation, night shift differential, holiday pay and service incentive leave; that notwithstanding the specific
exemptions provided for in the Labor Code, the petitioner gave the respondent benefits better than those received by the other
bus drivers of the petitioner; that during his employment, respondent was charged with and found guilty of numerous offenses
which were sufficient bases for his dismissal; that the prescriptive period for the filing of an action or claim for reinstatement and
payment of labor standard benefits is four years from the time the cause of action accrued; and that the respondent’s cause of
action against petitioner had already prescribed because when the former instituted the aforesaid complaint on 1 September
1999, more than five years had already lapsed from the accrual of his cause of action on 24 August 1994. 9

In his Reply dated 30 June 2000, respondent explained that when he stated in his complaint that he was illegally dismissed on 24
August 1994, what he meant and referred to was the date when he was no longer in a position to drive since he was hospitalized
from 24 August 1994 up to 10 October 1994. Respondent also admitted that it was only in January 1998 that he informed the
petitioner of his intent to report back for work.10

On 31 July 2001, Labor Arbiter Nambi rendered his Decision dismissing the complaint of respondent for lack of merit. He stated
that the prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal case is four years from the dismissal of the employee concerned. Since
the respondent stated in his complaint that he was dismissed from work on 24 August 1994 and he filed the complaint only on 1
September 1999, Labor Arbiter Nambi concluded that respondent’s cause of action against petitioner had already prescribed. He
also noted that respondent committed several labor-related offenses against the petitioner which may be considered as just
causes for the termination of his employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

Further, Labor Arbiter Nambi opined that respondent was not a regular employee but a mere field personnel and, therefore, not
entitled to service incentive leave, holiday pay, overtime pay and 13th month pay. He also ruled that respondent failed to present
evidence showing that the latter was entitled to the abovestated money claims. The fallo of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the causes of action in this case rooted from the purported illegal dismissal of Pablo M. Race on
August 24, 1994 when he figured in a vehicular accident, or on October 10, 1994 when he was released from the hospital, and
he filed his complaint only on September 1, 1999 after a lapse of more than five (5) years, the action has long prescribed, aside
from the fact that there is absolutely no evidence that respondent Victory Liner, Inc. is guilty of unfair labor practice and unjust
dismissal, in addition to its specific exemptions from the letters of Article 82 of the Labor Code, as amended, the complaint and
money claims are hereby DISMISSED by reason of prescription and for utter lack of merit and total absence of legal and factual
basis in support thereof.11

Respondent appealed to the NLRC. On 30 July 2002, the NLRC promulgated its Decision reversing the decision of Labor Arbiter
Nambi. It ordered the reinstatement of the respondent to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and benefits with full back-wages computed from the time of his illegal dismissal in January 1998 up to his actual reinstatement.
It held that the respondent’s cause of action accrued, not on 24 August 1994, but in January 1998, when the respondent reported
for work but was rejected by the petitioner. Thus, the respondent’s filing of complaint on 1 September 1999 was well-within the
four-year prescriptive period. It also ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed by the petitioner as the latter failed to accord
him due process. It found that the petitioner did not give the respondent a written notice apprising him of acts or omissions being
complained of and a written notice informing him of the termination of his employment. In conclusion, the NLRC stated:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent-appellee’s company is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant-appellant
to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and benefits with full backwages computed from the time
of his illegal dismissal on (sic) January 1988 up to his actual reinstatement. Except for this modification, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.12

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision alleging, among other things, that the award of backwages to
the respondent computed from January 1988 up to the promulgation of the NLRC Decision on 30 July 2002 was unlawful and
unjust considering that respondent was employed only in June 1993. The NLRC, however, denied the same for lack of merit in its
Resolution dated 30 August 2002.

Petitioner assailed the NLRC Decision and Resolution, dated 30 July 2002 and 30 August 2002, respectively, via a Petition for
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. On 26 April 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition, and found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC. It ruled that the NLRC committed a simple typographical error when it stated in the fallo that
the backwages of respondent shall be computed from January 1988 instead of January 1998 because in the paragraph prior to
the dispositive portion, the NLRC categorically declared that the full backwages of the respondent was to be computed from
January1998. In addition, the NLRC has indicated in its Statement of Facts that respondent was hired by the petitioner sometime
in June 1993. It also held that the respondent’s filing of complaint on 1 September 1999 was within the four-year prescriptive
period since the cause of action accrued when the respondent reported for work in January 1998 and was informed that he was
considered resigned. It ratiocinated that respondent did not abandon his work and, instead, continued to be an employee of
petitioner after he was discharged from the hospital, viz:

Race did not abandon his work and continued to be an employee of Victory Liner, and their contemporaneous conduct show this.
He has his pay slip covering the period of August 1-15, 1998 (p. 114, record), he was consulting the company physician who
issued him receipts dated October 28, 1996 and July 21 1997 (p. 115, record), and he wrote a letter dated March 18, 1996
addressed to Gerarda Villa, Vice-President for Victory Liner, signifying his intention to be a dispatcher or conductor due to his
injured leg (p. 116, Record). Further, annexed to Victory Liner’s Consolidated Supplemental Position Paper and Formal Offer of
Evidence with Erratum is Exhibit "6-A-Race" (p. 56, record) submitted before the Labor Arbiter, where Race stated before the
investigator that after his release from the hospital he reported to Victory Liner twice a month. He also said that he filed for a sick
leave which was approved for the maximum of 120 days. After his sick leave, he filed for disability leave, and this was also
approved and ran until sometime in May 1997.13

It also found that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of due process in terminating the employment of
respondent. The decretal portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. 14

Petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
HELD IN THE ASSAILED DECISION THAT:

A.

THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF RESPONDENT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED DESPITE HAVING
BEEN FILED AFTER FOUR (4) YEARS AND NINE (9) MONTHS FROM THE ACCRUAL OF THE ALLEGED ACTIONABLE
WRONG;
B.

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT WITH FULL BACKWAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS CONSIDERING
THAT THE TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY PETITIONER WAS LEGAL AND JUSTIFIED. 15

Anent the first issue, petitioner insisted that respondent had already abandoned his work and ceased to be its employee since
November 1994; that the alleged "pay slip" for the period August 1-15, 1998 was not actually a pay slip but a mere cash
advance/monetary aid extended to the respondent as the large amount of ₱65,000.00 stated therein was clearly inconsistent and
disproportionate to the respondent’s low salary of ₱192.00 a day; that the petitioner merely accommodated the respondent as its
former employee when the latter consulted the petitioner’s physician on 28 October 1996 and 21 July 1997; that the respondent’s
letter dated 18 March 1996 to the petitioner’s Vice-President Gerarda Villa was only an application for the position of dispatcher
or conductor and that such application was not granted; and that the foregoing circumstances cannot be considered as an
indication of employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondent. 16

Moreover, petitioner asserted that although the respondent reported for work twice a month after he was discharged from the
hospital, it does not imply that the respondent was still considered as an employee at that time by the petitioner; that it allowed
the respondent to have a 120-day sick leave because the latter was a former employee; and that it granted disability leave to the
respondent since the latter was a former employee and that respondent’s application for disability leave implied an admission on
the part of the respondent that he was no longer fit to work as a bus driver. 17

Petitioner also asseverated that, based on the four-fold tests in determining the employer-employee relationship which includes
the payment of wages and power to control the conduct of the employees, the respondent was no longer its employee upon the
latter’s discharge from the hospital in November 1994 because at such time, the respondent was no longer fit to work as a bus
driver and respondent did not render services to the petitioner. Thus, petitioner reasoned that it had no more power to control the
conduct of, and it no longer paid any wages to, the respondent. 18

Petitioner also argued that the cause of action of respondent had accrued on 10 November 1994; that from 10 November 1994
up to November 1998, the respondent did not render any services to nor filed a case or action against the petitioner; that the
respondent’s filing of a complaint against petitioner on 1 September 1999 was clearly beyond the four-year prescriptive period
allowed by law; that if the reckoning period of the accrual of a cause of action would be the time when the written demand was
made by the respondent on the petitioner, then the four-year prescriptive period would be interminable as it could be extended to
one or more years; that this is not the spirit or intent of the law; that otherwise there is no more need to provide the four-year
prescriptive period as any complainant may simply allow the lapse of four years and file the action thereafter and that it would be
considered as a compliance by simply making a purported demand for reinstatement after more than four years. 19

These contentions are devoid of merit.

It should be emphasized at the outset that as a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor
cases. Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor
Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in the present case, this Court may delve into the records and examine for
itself the questioned findings.20

In illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four years from the time of his dismissal within which to
institute a complaint. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff must be brought within four years. We explained the rationale in the case of Callanta v. Carnation
Philippines, Inc.,21 thus:

[O]ne’s employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable
wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Clearly
then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of
one’s dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as
contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four years.

The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker. It is settled that
in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of action accrues from the time the employment of the worker was unjustly
terminated.22 Thus, the four-year prescriptive period shall be counted and computed from the date of the employee’s dismissal up
to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of employment. 23

Proceeding therefrom, we shall now discuss and determine when the respondent’s cause of action accrued in order to ascertain
whether the same had already prescribed.

It is error to conclude that the employment of the respondent was unjustly terminated on 10 November 1994 because he was, at
that time, still confined at the Specialist Group Hospital, Dagupan City, for further treatment of his fractured left leg. He must be
considered as merely on sick leave at such time. Likewise, the respondent cannot also be deemed as illegally dismissed from
work upon his release from the said hospital in December 1994 up to December 1997 since the records show that the
respondent still reported for work to the petitioner and was granted sick and disability leave by the petitioner during the same
period.24

The respondent must be considered as unjustly terminated from work in January 1998 since this was the first time he was
informed by the petitioner that he was deemed resigned from his work. During that same occasion, the petitioner, in fact, tried to
convince the respondent to accept an amount of ₱50,000.00 as a consolation for his dismissal but the latter rejected it. 25 Thus, it
was only at this time that the respondent’s cause of action accrued. Consequently, the respondent’s filing of complaint for illegal
dismissal on 1 September 1999 was well within the four-year prescriptive period.

It is also significant to note that from 10 November 1994 up to December 1997, the petitioner never formally informed the
respondent of the fact of his dismissal either through a written notice or hearing. Indeed, it cannot be gainfully said that
respondent was unlawfully dismissed on 10 November 1994 and that the cause of action accrued on that date.

As to the alleged abandonment of work by the respondent on 10 November 1994, it should be emphasized that two factors must
be present in order to constitute an abandonment: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason;
and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship. The second factor is the more determinative factor and is
manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work. The intent to
discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. Mere absence from work does
not imply abandonment.26

It is apparent that respondent did not abandon his work. His absence from work for a long period of time was obviously due to
the fact that he was still recuperating from two operations on his fractured leg. Petitioner knew this very well. In fact, petitioner
shouldered the respondent’s medication and hospital expenses during the latter’s confinement and operation in two
hospitals.27 Moreover, when the respondent was able to walk, although limping heavily, he still reported for work to the petitioner
and was granted sick and disability leave. 28 Clearly then, respondent did not abandon his job on 10 November 1994.

In the same vein, the employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondent cannot be deemed to have been
extinguished on 10 November 1994. It should be borne in mind that there are four tests in determining the existence of employer-
employee relationship: (1) the manner of selection and engagement; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of
the power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. The so-called "control test" is commonly
regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.
Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. 29
Applying the aforecited tests, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent continued even after the
latter’s discharge from the hospital in December 1994 up to 1997. Respondent had reported for work to the petitioner after his
release from the hospital in December 1994. Subsequently, respondent was also granted a 120-day sick leave and disability
leave by the petitioner.30 Respondent also availed himself of the services of the petitioner’s physician on two occasions after his
release from the hospital in December 1994. 31

On the other hand, the petitioner failed to establish the fact that the respondent ceased to be its employee on 10 November
1994. Except for its flimsy reason that the sick leave, disability leave and physician consultations were given to the respondent as
mere accommodations for a former employee, the petitioner did not present any evidence showing that its employer-employee
relationship with the respondent was extinguished on 10 November 1994.

Evidently, these circumstances clearly manifest that petitioner exercised control over the respondent and that the latter was still
under the employment of the petitioner even after December 1994.

Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner’s assertion that the respondent’s cause of action accrued on 10 November 1994
must fail.

Apropos the second issue, petitioner contended that the order for the reinstatement of the respondent as bus driver was
unconstitutional for being tantamount to involuntary servitude; that when the respondent filed his complaint for illegal dismissal,
the latter no longer desired to be reinstated to his former position as bus driver; that the respondent’s unwillingness to be
reinstated as bus driver was also evident from his letter to the petitioner where the respondent manifested his intention to be
hired as a dispatcher or conductor; and that to reinstate the respondent as bus driver despite the fact that it is against his will is
involuntary servitude.32

Petitioner also argued that the order for the reinstatement was contrary to law; that as a common carrier, it is obliged under the
law to observe extra-ordinary diligence in the conduct of its business; that it will violate such obligation if it will reinstate the
respondent as bus driver; that to allow the respondent to drive a bus, despite the fact that the latter sustained a fractured left leg
and was still limping, would imperil the lives of the passengers and the property of the petitioner; and that the award of
backwages to the respondent was unjustified. 33

The Labor Code mandates that before an employer may legally dismiss an employee from the service, the requirement of
substantial and procedural due process must be complied with. Under the requirement of substantial due process, the grounds
for termination of employment must be based on just or authorized causes. The following are just causes for the termination of
employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Abandonment of work, or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment, may be a just cause
for the termination of employment under paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code since it is a form of neglect of duty.

As earlier discussed, the petitioner insisted that respondent had already abandoned his work on 10 November 1994 and, thus,
the latter’s employment was deemed terminated as of such date. We, however, found that there was no abandonment of work on
the part of the respondent. Petitioner also alleged that respondent was guilty of insubordination as well as gross and habitual
neglect in the performance of his duties for reckless driving and for being involved in several vehicular accidents. 34 The records,
nonetheless, failed to show that the said charges were proven and that respondent was duly informed and heard with regard to
the accusations. Since the petitioner, as an employer, is burdened to prove just cause for terminating the employment of
respondent with clear and convincing evidence, and that petitioner failed to discharge this burden, we hold that respondent was
dismissed without just cause by the petitioner.

It has been established that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement of substantial due process in terminating the
employment of respondent. We will now determine whether the petitioner had complied with the procedural aspect of a lawful
dismissal.

In the termination of employment, the employer must (a) give the employee a written notice specifying the ground or grounds of
termination, giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; (b) conduct a hearing or conference
during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and (c) give the employee a written
notice of termination indicating that upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.35

Petitioner miserably failed to comply with the foregoing requirements. There was nothing in the records which evinces that
petitioner had sent a written notice to the respondent informing him of the ground or grounds of his termination or the reason why
he was deemed resigned. It does not also appear that the petitioner held a hearing or conference where the respondent was
given the opportunity to answer the charges of abandonment, insubordination and habitual neglect of duty against him. Neither
did the petitioner send a written notice to the respondent informing the latter that his service is terminated after considering all the
circumstances.

In view of the fact that the petitioner neglected to observe the substantial and procedural due process in terminating the
employment of respondent, we rule that the latter was illegally dismissed from work by the petitioner.

Consequently, the respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement as provided for under Article 279 of the Labor Code.

It appears, however, that respondent was not seeking reinstatement. In his complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner,
respondent stated:

RELIEF

Complainant/s pray/s for the following:

Reinstatement: No More.36

Respondent also sent to the petitioner a letter applying for the position of a dispatcher or conductor. 37 In the said letter, the
respondent explained that since he cannot drive anymore due to his leg injury, he was willing to be hired as a dispatcher or
conductor. The abovestated facts obviously show that respondent was unwilling to be reinstated as a bus driver.

Even assuming that respondent is willing to be reinstated as petitioner’s bus driver, the reinstatement is still unwarranted. There
is a serious doubt as to whether the respondent is physically capable of driving a bus based on the following undisputed facts: (1)
respondent was operated on and confined twice in two different hospitals for a fractured left leg; (2) steel plates were attached to
his fractured leg;38 (3) each confinement lasted for a month; (4) after his discharge from the second confinement, respondent was
still limping heavily; (5) when respondent had reported for work to the petitioner in January 1998, he was also limping; 39 and (6)
respondent does not have a medical certificate which guarantees that his leg injury has already healed and that he is now
physically capable of driving a bus.

It should be stressed that petitioner is a common carrier and, as such, is obliged to exercise extra-ordinary diligence in
transporting its passengers safely.40 To allow the respondent to drive the petitioner’s bus under such uncertain condition would,
undoubtedly, expose to danger the lives of the passengers and the property of the petitioner. This would place the petitioner in
jeopardy of violating its extra-ordinary diligence obligation and, thus, may be subjected to numerous complaints and court suits. It
is clear therefore that the reinstatement of respondent not only would be deleterious to the riding public but would also put
unreasonable burden on the business and interest of the petitioner. In this regard, it should be remembered that an employer
may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his
interests.41

Based on the foregoing facts and circumstances, the reinstatement of the respondent is no longer feasible. Thus, in lieu of
reinstatement, payment to respondent of separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service is in order. 42

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as it prays for the non-reinstatement of respondent. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 26 April 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74010, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Petitioner is ordered to pay the respondent, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay of ONE (1) MONTH PAY for every year of
service, and full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from 1 January 1998 up to
the finality of this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision/Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision/Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Foonotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 18-34.

 Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios with Associate Justices Sergio L. Pestano and Vicente Q.
2

Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 39-48.

3
 NLRC records pp. 119-135 and 148-149.

4
 Rollo, pp. 58-67.

5
 Id. at 49.

6
 Id. at 51-52.

7
 Id. at 52.

8
 Id. at 53-57.

9
 NLRC records, pp. 32-49.

10
 Id. at 70-72.

11
 Id. at 97.

12
 Id. at 130.

13
 Rollo, p. 45.

14
 Id. at 47.

15
 Id. at 25.

16
 Id. at 25-27.

17
 Id. at 27-28.
18
 Id. at 28.

19
 Id. at 28-29.

20
 Tres Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House, 446 Phil. 388, 401-402 (2003).

21
 229 Phil. 279, 288-289 (1986).

22
 Ramos v. Our Lady of Peace School, 218 Phil. 708, 712 (1984).

23
 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople, G.R. No. 57642, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 250, 259.

24
 NLRC records, pp. 55-57.

25
 Id. at 52.

 Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158693, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 605-
26

606.

27
 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 23.

28
 Ramos v. Our Lady of Peace School, supra note 22.

29
 Abante, Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing and Parts Corp., G.R. No. 159890, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 368, 379.

30
 Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 26.

31
 NLRC records, p. 115.

32
 Rollo, pp. 31-32.

33
 Id. at 32-34.

34
 NLRC records, pp. 32-49.

35
 Id. at 607; Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

36
 Id. at 3.

37
 Id. at 116.

38
 Id. at 55.

39
 Rollo, p. 71.

 New Civil Code, Article 1733: ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons
40

of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
 the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. (Italics supplied.)

41
 NLRC records, p. 607.

42
 Electruck Asia v. Meris, G.R. No. 147031, 27 July 2004, 435 SCRA 310, 321-322.

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