CASE DIGEST ON VIOLATIONS OF

THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

(2016-2017)

CASE:

1. RE: COMPLAINT OF ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO AGAINST JUSTICES MARIA

ELISA SEMPIO DIY, RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO, AND CARMELITA SALANDANAN-
MANAHAN, OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CEBU, IPI No. 14-222-CA-J, February 23, 2016.

FACTS:

Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco (complainant) filed a letter-complaint, seeking the

suspension from office of Associate justices Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, Carmelita Salandanan-
Manahan, and Ramon Paul L. Hernando (respondent-Justices) of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City Station, for alleged violations of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
impartiality, and Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 30192 on causing-undue injury or giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to a private party, in the discharge of judicial
functions, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.

The complainant, who is the counsel for the petitioners in CA G.R. CEB SP No. 06984,4
claimed that the respondent-Justices, through their January 17, 2003 resolution in the same
case, appeared to be "trying hard to find faults on the petition for review to justify its
dismissal favorable to respondents xxx without reading the prayer of the said petition." The
complainant's prayer was for the CA to "gives (sic) due course to the PETITION and that an
order issue directing the respondent secretary (of the DENR) to certify the record of DENR
CASE No. 8859 to this Honorable Court (referring to the CA) in order to have the annexes of
this petition authenticated and thereafter for review.

In the assailed resolution dated January 17, 2013, in CA G.R. CEB SP No. 06984, the
respondent-Justices, who are members of the CA Twentieth (20th) Division, dismissed
outright the petition for review filed by the complainant on the following grounds: (1) the
assailed decision of the DENR which is attached to the petition for review is not a duplicate
original or certified true copy thereof; (2) the assailed resolution dated June 6, 2012, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision of the DENR was not attached to said
petition; (3) counsel for petitioners, herein complainant Atty. Pefianco, has no Special Power
of Attorney to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in behalf of
petitioners; and, (4) the notarial certificate also failed to state the office address of the notary
public in violation of Section 2(c), Rule VIII of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
 Justices Sempio Diy and Salandanan-Manahan maintain that the outright dismissal of
the complainant's clients' petition for review (in CA G.R. CEB SP No. 06984), due to the
above-mentioned procedural infirmities, is warranted and supported by the Rules of Court
and by jurisprudence. In a separate comment filed, Justice Hernando contends that the
present administrative complaint is baseless and vexatious and must be dismissed outright
because the remedy for the complainant's case is judicial, not administrative, in nature; that
the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge or justice is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse is available.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Justices violated the New Code of Judicial Ethics?

RULING: No, the Justices did not violate the New Code of Judicial Ethics.

The Supreme Court held that the resulting order, resolution, or decision must have
been rendered based on an "extrajudicial source" in order for a claim of partiality to be upheld
against the judge or justices who issued the order, resolution, or decision. The Supreme Court
further held that as long as decisions made and opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings are based on the evidence presented, the conduct observed by the magistrate,
and the application of the law, such opinions - even if later found to be erroneous - will not
sustain a claim of personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.

In this case, other than the complainant's accusation, the Supreme Court found nothing
in the administrative complaint and in the records to sufficiently convince us that the
respondent-Justices were impartial in issuing their dismissal resolution dated January 17,
2013.

2. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. CASALAN, [FORMERLY A.M. N0.14-4-

115-RTC (REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT [RTC], BRANCHES 13 AND 65, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2385, [FORMERLY A.M. N0.14-4-
115-RTC}, April 20, 2016.

FACTS:

The Judicial Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported that
as of August 8, 2012, Branch 13, Judge Casalan has a caseload of Two Hundred and Twelve
(212) pending cases, comprising of Eighty-nine (89) criminal cases and One Hundred and
Twenty-Three (123) civil and other cases. The Judicial Audit Team of the OCA also reported
that as of August 7, 2012, Branch 65, where Judge Casalan was designated as acting presiding
judge, has a caseload of Two Hundred and Thirty-two (232) pending cases, comprising of
One Hundred and Fifty-three (153) criminal' cases and Seventy-nine (79) civil and other cases.

The OCA directed Judge Casalan to explain why the cases submitted for decision were
not decided within the reglementary period, to expedite the disposition of cases which have
been pending in the docket of the court for eight years or more, among others.

Judge Casalan requested for an extension of 2 months within which to comply with the
memoranda but he failed to comply with the OCA directives until he reached the mandatory
retirement age of Seventy (70) years old on March 2, 2014.

The OCA averred that Judge Casalan had been remiss in his duty to dispense justice
without delay as required under the Constitution and Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides that judge shall perform all judicial duties, including
delivery of reserved decisions efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Casalan liable under the Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct?

RULING: Yes, Judge Casalan is liable under Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court held that a judge is mandated to render a decision not more than
90 days from the time a case is submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3
months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum. Failure to observe said
rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent
sufficient justification for his noncompliance therewith.

The Supreme Court further held that failure to resolve cases submitted for decision
within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution. Moreover, failure to render decisions and orders within the reglementary
period is also a breach of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Classified as less serious charges under Section
9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering decision or order, and violation
of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, are penalized with either suspension
without pay for a period of not less than One (1) month, but not more than Three (3) months,
or a fine of more than Pl0,000.00, but not more than P20,000.00. Hence, the Supreme the Court
upheld the maximum penalty recommended, i.e., a fine in the amount equivalent to Three (3)
months' salary at the time of his retirement, to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity
benefits.

3.WILFREDO F. TUVILLO, v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755; MELISSA

J. TUVILLO A.K.A MICHELLE JIMENEZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, A.M.
NO. MTJ-10-1756, October 18, 2016.

FACTS:

Wilfredo and Melissa Tuvillo are husband and wife. Wilfredo works as a seaman and
is out of the country most of the time. Melissa is a businesswoman with several B.P. Blg. 22
cases filed against her in the MeTC of Makati City. In her desire to have her cases resolved,
she approached the respondent Judge Henry Laron (Judge Laron). The respondent is married
but his wife was in the United States at the time the events of this case transpired. Due to
their frequent interaction with each other, Melissa and Judge Laron became intimate with
each other and their relationship gave rise to these administrative cases.

In his Letter- Complaint for Immorality and Unacceptable Wrongdoing, Wilfredo

Tuvillo alleged that his wife Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron for the resolution of the
cases filed against her; that, in turn, Judge Laron asked money from Melissa and forced her to
produce it whenever he needed it; that they lost all their savings and their two houses and
lots because of Judge Laron's constant requests for money from Melissa; that Judge Laron
would physically hurt Melissa when she could not produce the money he needed. Allegedly,
Judge Laron slept in their house twice or thrice a week during weekends and would picked
up his (Wilfredo Tuvillo) wife and two sons in the morning, and fetched them from school in
the afternoon using either his (Judge Laron) own or Melissa's car.

In his Comment, Judge Laron confessed his affair with Melissa to his wife but
countered that Melissa told him that she was a widow and their relationship was purely
emotional without any sexual liaison.

On the other hand, in her Complaint, Melissa asked OCA that Judge Laron be
investigated because based on his salary as a judge, he could not have acquired their P9
million house. She also claimed that Judge Laron could not have afforded to buy several
Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma televisions, expensive furniture, a Nissan Patrol, and to
send his three children to private schools. Her letter also bore her admission that she was his
mistress for three years.
 In his defense, Judge Laron refuted the alleged sexual liaisons. He likewise denied that
he had asked Melissa for money or that she gave him money.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Laron is guilty of Unexplained Wealth and Immorality?

RULING: The Supreme Court found Judge Laron guilty of Immorality only.

In dismissing the Complaint for Unexplained Wealth, the Supreme Court found that
Judge Laron who was able to explain the source of the money he used to pay for the
construction of his house and the purchase of his vehicle, televisions and furniture. He also
attached copies of the educational plans of his children. On the other hand, Melissa failed to
substantiate her claim that Judge Laron, by his salary, could not afford to buy those
properties and send his children to private schools.

In finding Judge Laron guilty of Immorality, the Supreme Court held that Canon 4,
Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Judge Laron's conduct of carrying on an
affair with a married woman is highly improper.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety both in his professional and private conduct in order to preserve the
good name and integrity of the court. As the judicial front-liners, judges must behave with
propriety at all times as they are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people's sense of justice. These most exacting standards of decorum are
demanded from the magistrates in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the Judiciary. No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness
and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. As the epitome of integrity and
justice, a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion. For moral integrity is not only a virtue but a necessity
in the judiciary.

In this case, the conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting standard. By carrying
an affair with a married woman, Judge Laron violated the trust reposed on his office and
utterly failed to live up to noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the
members of the judiciary. Both Judge Laron and Melissa admitted the affair.

The Supreme Court also held Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for violating
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that judges shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court
or administrative agency. The illicit relationship started because Melissa sought the help of
Judge Laron with respect to her pending B.P. Blg. 22 cases and, apparently, he entertained the
request for assistance.

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court found Judge Laron guilty of
immorality and serious misconduct, and thus, he is meted the maximum penalty of
DISMISSAL from service.

4. TRINIDAD GAMBOA-ROCES, vs. JUDGE RANHEL A. PEREZ, Presiding Judge,

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Enrique Magalona-Manapla, Negros Occidental, A.M. No.
MTJ-16-1887, January 9, 2017.

FACTS:

Trinidad Gamboa-Roces (complainant) claimed that she was one of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case Nos. 451-M and 452-M for unlawful detainer and damages. Complainant further
stated that when Judge Perez was appointed and assumed office, her counsel filed two (2)
separate motions for his inhibition in the two cases on the ground that she was previously
involved in a legal confrontation with Judge Perez himself when he was representing his
parents. Her motions, however, were denied.

Despite the lapse of more than ten (10) months from the time Civil Case Nos. 451- M
and 452-M were consolidated and submitted for decision, Judge Perez failed to decide the
cases.

Judge Perez explained that he was able to finish the final draft of his decision, but in
his desire to have "a perfect decision," he did not immediately forward the draft to his Clerk
of Court as he would still polish it. He, however, got distracted with other issues and matters
in the office.

In its Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that "Judge Perez be found
GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision or order and be ADMONISHED to be more
mindful in the performance of his duties particularly in the prompt disposition of cases
pending and/or submitted for decision/resolution before his court, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same, or any similar infraction shall be dealt with severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Perez is administratively guilty for violation of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct?

RULING: Yes, Judge Perez is guilty of gross ignorance of law.

The Supreme Court held that Sections 2 and 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoin the judges to devote their professional activity to judicial duties and to
perform them, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness. This obligation to render decision promptly is further emphasized in
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which reminds all judges to meticulously observe the
periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases because failure to comply with the
prescribed period transgresses the parties' constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases.

The Supreme Court found that the explanation given by Judge Perez was too flimsy.
His being inexperienced as a newly appointed judge and his explanation that the delay was
not intended to prejudice the plaintiffs are not persuasive because it is his duty to resolve the
cases within the reglementary period as mandated by law and the rules. These excuses only
show his lack of diligence in discharging administrative responsibilities and professional
competence in court management. A judge is expected to keep his own listing of cases and to
note therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly and without
delay. He must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to
monitor the flow of cases for a prompt and effective dispatch of business.

Hence, the Supreme Court orders him to pay a FINE in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00), with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

5. DR. RAUL M. SUNICO, IN HIS CAP A CITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE CULTURAL

CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JUDGE PEDRO DL. GUTIERREZ PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 119, PASAY CITY, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457 [Formerly
OCA I.P.I. No. 14-4291-RTJ], February 21, 2017.

FACTS:

Dr. Sunico, in his capacity as the President of the Cultural Center of the Philippines
(CCP), alleged that the latter entered into a five (5)-year lease contract on a property owned
by CCP with Felix Espiritu (Espiritu), who operated his Yakitori Dori Bar and Grill
Restaurant on the leased property.
 After the termination of the lease contract, CCP demanded that Espiritu settle his
outstanding obligation but the latter expressed his interest to renew the lease for another 5
years; CCP refused, and disconnected the water and electric supply.

Consequently, Espiritu filed an Action for Specific Performance before Judge

Gutierrez, who was on leave. Espiritu's application for a 72-hour and 20-day TRO were
denied for lack of merit. CCP disconnected the water and electric supply.

On July 24, 2012, Espiritu filed an Ex Parte Manifestation with Motion for
Reconsideration and Status Quo Ante Order, which was immediately granted by Judge
Gutierrez. Judge Gutierrez also granted Espiritu's Motion for the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction. CCP filed a Motion for Reconsideration; after more than five months, Judge
Gutierrez issued an Order, deniying the Motion.

Dr. Sunico sought respondent judge's inhibition. During the hearing, respondent judge
stated that Dr. Sunico's motion was improper, since certiorari was the better remedy. He also
asked Dr. Sunico if it was possible to give Espiritu an extension of the lease contract. Dr.
Sunico filed a Petition for Certiorari.

After four (4) months from the filing of the motion for inhibition, respondent judge
issued an Order, stating that he shall inhibit from the case provided that the petition for
certiorari before the CA is granted and that he is found to have gravely abused his discretion
in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. CA found respondent judge
Gutierrez gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Orders as Espiritu was not entitled to a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Dr. Sunico filed a reiterative Ex-Parte Motion for Immediate Inhibition of respondent
judge. Dr. Sunico filed a letter-complaint before the OCA. He alleged that respondent judge
has been partial from the very start.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Gutierrez violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct?

RULING: Yes Judge Gutierrez violated the New Code fo Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court finds that respondent judge's stubbornness to cling to the subject
case for unknown reason is disturbing. The decision of the appellate court implies that it
should not have been difficult for respondent judge to determine whether Espiritu was
entitled to an injunctive writ. Respondent judge should have been guided by this ruling and
should have refrained in further issuing orders which tend to favor Espiritu without factual
or legal basis. However, instead of rectifying his errors or inhibiting from the case at once,
respondent judge appeared to be unperturbed and insisted in hearing the case.

The respondent judge inhibited himself from hearing the subject case only on
November 25, 2014, i.e., after numerous motions for inhibition filed by CCP and after the
filing of the administrative complaint against him. In other words, there were several valid
and significant grounds for him to inhibit from the case voluntarily yet he refused to do so for
unknown reason. His defiance of the court's rulings and his continuous efforts to entertain
Espiritu' s motions in effect unjustly extended the latter's lease contract which had long
expired. The totality of the circumstances and the actuations of the respondent judge
attendant to the case, clearly lead to the inescapable conclusion that the respondent judge
evidently favoured Espiritu, a clear indicium of bias and partiality that calls for a severe
administrative sanction.

6. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, vs. JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017.

FACTS:

These are consolidated administrative proceedings, charging respondent Judge Eliza B.

Yu, the Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pasay City for
gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross insubordination, oppression, and conduct
unbecoming of a judge leveled by various complainants.

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu)

The then Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano G. Colasito issued a Memorandum
dated February 9, 2011 prescribing the schedules for night court service of all Pasay City
MeTC Judges and employees effective February 14, 2011. Under the Memorandum, MeTC
Branch 47, presided by respondent Judge Yu, was assigned night court duties every Friday.
But Judge Yu did not desire to comply, and dissented to the assignment. She also
communicated her reservations about the night court by letter directly to DOT Secretary Lim,
pointing out that the DOT's request for the establishment of the night courts was supported
neither by statistical data nor by any study. After rendering a lengthy discourse on the flaws
of establishing night courts, she ended her letter with a request for additional compensation
and security in case she would undertake night court duties. Due to the continued refusal by
Judge Yu to render night court service, Executive Judge Colasito was prompted to assign
additional night court duties to the other MeTC Judges and their personnel.

Consequently, the OCA submitted a memorandum to the Court, recommending that

her insubordination, gross misconduct and violation of The New Code of Judicial Conduct be
docketed as an administrative complaint against her.

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821, (Hon. Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito v. Hon. Eliza B. Yu)

This administrative matter emanated from the Letter-Complaint of Judge Emily L. San
Gaspar-Gito of MeTC Branch 20, whereby the latter imputed to Judge Yu conduct
unbecoming of a judge for constantly sending alarming messages with sexual undertones via
Facebook and electronic mail.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Yu violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct?

RULING:

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813

The Supreme Court held that Judge Yu's expression of her dissent against A.O. No. 19-
2011 was misplaced. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence
of the judiciary. The Supreme Court further held that regardless of her reasons for dissenting,
she was absolutely bound to follow A.O. No. 19-2011. Indeed, she did not have the unbridled
freedom to publicly speak against A.O. No. 19-2011 and its implementation, for her being the
Judge that she was differentiated her from the ordinary citizen exercising her freedom of
speech and expression who did not swear obedience to the orders and processes of the Court
without delay. Her resistance to the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 constituted gross
insubordination and gross misconduct, and put in serious question her fitness and worthiness
of the honor and integrity attached to her judicial office.

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821

The Supreme Court held that its reading of the “meal stab” messages supports the
studied conclusions by CA Justice Abdulwahid that they did contain sexual insinuations that
were ostensibly improper for a Judge to write and send to another. The messages, however
they may be read and understood, were at least vexatious and annoying. In any case, the
sender showed her deep-seated proclivities reflective of conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Judiciary.

Further, the barrage of messages, most of which were sent within the same day, makes
us believe that they had all come from Judge Yu. Although she insisted that Judge San
Gaspar-Gito had sent the "meal stub," Judge Yu did not offer any plausible explanation on the
other messages containing sexual innuendos. It is notable that the Facebook and Yahoo
messages started in August 2009 when Judge Yu was still a public prosecutor. Nonetheless,
she could still be disciplined for such acts committed prior to her appointment to the
Judiciary because her internet stalking of Judge San Gaspar-Gito continued after she had
herself become a MeTC Judge in Pasay City on January 12, 2010 and lasted until July 2010.

Thus, the Supreme Court found Judge Yu guilty of Gross insubordination and conduct
unbecoming of a Judicial Official, among others. Accordingly, she is dismissed from serive
and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment.

7. ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, vs. PRESIDING JUDGE EXEQUIL L. DAGALA,

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, DAPASOCORRO, DAP A, SURIGAO DEL NORTE,
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017.

FACTS:

An unnamed resident of San Isidro, Siargo Island, Surigao Del Norte, wrote to report,
among others, an altercation involving his neighbors and Judge Exequil L. Dagala. According
to the unnamed complainant, on September 29, 2015, he was in his hut when he witnessed an
argument between his neighbors and Judge Dagala over the ownership of his neighbor's lot
and the trees planted thereon (September 29 incident). There, he saw Judge Dagala walking
back and forth, shouting invectives at the lot's occupants and brandishing an M-16 armalite
rifle to intimidate them. He further claims that while police officers were at the scene, they
did nothing to pacify the situation. Complainant alleged that no inquiries were made as to the
legality of the logging activities being undertaken at Judge Dagala's apparent behest nor his
authority to carry a high-powered firearm. According to the complainant, while his neighbors
were able to take photos and make a video recording of the incident, they were too afraid to
file a complaint against Judge Dagala and instead wanted to arrange for a confidential
transmittal of their evidence to the Office of the Ombudsman. The complainant also
recounted rumors of Judge Dagala's involvement in illicit activities, namely: illegal drugs,
illegal fishing, illegal gambling, illegal logging, maintaining a private army, owning high-
powered firearms and having several mistresses.
 In his investigation report, Executive Judge Canoy reported that the altercation
described in the complaint arose from an existing boundary dispute among owners of
adjacent lots in the area. One of the disputants allegedly sold the trees planted on the
contested lot to Dagala. According to Judge Canoy, the chief of police could not confirm
whether Judge Dagala was armed with a high-powered weapon at the time but that the
incident was subject of an ongoing police investigation. He concluded, however, that unless
the anonymous complainant comes forward and substantiates his allegations, the complaint
should be dismissed.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct further discreet investigation.

The investigation yielded that Judge Dagala sired children with three different women and is
the owner of Sugba Cockpit in Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, and thereafter sold the same
to one Marites Borchs.

In his Comment, Judge Dagala admitted that he was separated from his legal wife, and
sired three children from different women. He also admitted that he used to own a cockpit.
He, however, denied the illegal activities, i.e., illegal drugs and illegal logging. Meanwhile,
the OCA received a Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash disk by mail from "a concerned citizen"
containing a video recording of the September 29 incident complained of.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Dagala violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct?

RULING: Yes, Judge Dagala violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court found that Judge Dagala is guilty of immorality for siring a child
out of wedlock during the subsistence of his marriage. Immorality is a recognized ground for
the discipline of judges and justices under the Rules of Court. The New Canon of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to avoid “impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities.”

Time and again, this Court has reminded judges that their acts of immorality are
proscribed and punished, even if committed in their private life and outside of their salas,
because such acts erode the faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice
and in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The public's continued faith and
confidence in our justice system is no less a victim of the commission of acts of immorality by
a judge. The resulting harm to the justice system vests the State with the interest to discipline
judges who commit acts of immorality, independent of the view or feelings of the judge's
spouse and their children.
 Here, the record is clear. The certificate of live birth of "B's" male child indicates that
Judge Dagala is the father as shown by his signature in the affidavit of acknowledgment of
paternity. The date of birth (March 24, 2008) is during the subsistence of Judge Dagala's
marriage to "A," there being neither proof nor allegation that said marriage was annulled or
voided in the meantime. Judge Dagala himself admits to the paternity of his son with "B." He
does not dispute the entry in the certificate of live birth attesting to his paternity. He admits
his mistake and merely pleads for the Court's forgiveness.

8. ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II, vs. PROSECUTOR OFELIA M. D. ARTUZ,* A.C. No. 7253;
ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II, vs. JUDGE OFELIA M. D. ARTUZ, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT IN CITIES of ILOILO CITY, BRANCHS, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, August 29, 2017.

FACTS:

There are two (2) consolidated cases filed by complainant Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II
(Nava) against respondent then Prosecutor, now Presiding Judge, Ofelia M. D. Artuz (Artuz)
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City, Branch 5, (MTCC, Br. 5): (a) A.C. No. 7253
that sought to disbar Artuz, then a Prosecutor at the time of the filing of the petition; and (b)
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-1911-MTJ) that sought to nullify the
nomination and appointment of Artuz as Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Br. 5, for being
patently illegal, improper, and irregular.

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717

Nava alleged that Artuz is unfit and incompetent to be appointed as a trial judge as she
faces "several criminal and administrative cases, the nature of which involves her character,
competence, probity, integrity and independence which should not have been disregarded in
her application to the judiciary."

Nava reiterated that during her incumbency as a public prosecutor, Artuz received
numerous judicial fines and admonition for tardiness, absences without prior notice, and lack
of interest to prosecute cases. In fact, some of the cases she handled were dismissed due to her
dismal performance. Further, Nava narrated specific incidents showing Artuz's character as
vindictive, oppressive, and discourteous.

In her defense, Artuz alleged that the nullification case is a desperate retaliatory move
on Nava's part because of the disbarment case she filed against him, where he was found
guilty of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months. She claimed that the charges filed against her were already dismissed or outrightly
not given due course. She thus prayed that the nullification case be dismissed, since she met
all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for a judicial position.

After investigation, it was found that Judge Artuz failed to explain why she omitted or
falsely answered the subject questions in her PDS submitted before the JBC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Artuz violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct?

RULING: Yes, Judge Artuz violated New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court finds that Judge Artuz is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
and Falsification of official document for her false statements in her two (2) PDS and for her
willful defiance of Court directives.

Proceeding from these definitions, the Court agrees that Artuz deliberately and
calculatedly lied in her answers to the subject questions in her two (2) PDS to conceal the
truth and make it appear that she is qualified for the judgeship position which she now holds.
Indeed, it is inconceivable for her not to have been aware of any of the pending cases against
her since an administrative case filed against her had been pending before the DOJ since
October 23, 2003, or long before she submitted her application with the JBC. Had she
disclosed this material fact in her October 28, 2005 PDS, the JBC may have disqualified her
from nomination for judgeship, or disregarded her application. Because of this intentional
omission, the judiciary may have lost someone truly deserving of the judgeship post.
Moreover, when she filed her November 6, 2006 PDS, Artuz was already clearly aware of the
pending charges against her before the Ombudsman, i.e., OMB-V-C-06-0219-D, OMB-V-C-06-
0220-D, and OMB-V-C-06-0221-D, all of which appear to have been filed, at most, in the early
part of 2006, and received by the Ombudsman on March 24, 2006 through the March 16, 2006
Indorsement of RSP Laurea. In several cases, the Court has held that a duly accomplished
PDS is an official document and any false statements made in one's PDS is ultimately
connected with one's employment in the government. An employee making false statement
in his or her PDS becomes liable for falsification.

Artuz, as a member of the Bar, is presumed to be a learned individual, who knew, and
is in fact expected to know, exactly what the subject questions called for, what they mean, and
what repercussions will befall her should she make false declarations thereon. Obviously, she
knew that she was committing an act of dishonesty, but nonetheless decided to proceed with
this action, in her October 28, 2005 PDS, and even tenaciously repeated the same in her
November 6, 2006 PDS submitted after she had been appointed to the judiciary.
9. ATTY. EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, vs. JUDGE EMMANUEL P. PASAL, Presiding Judge,
Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18,
2017.

FACTS:

On June 21, 2012, the heirs of Enrique Abada (Abada's heirs), represented by his wife
and children, filed a case for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33060, and Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale,before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Opol, Misamis Oriental,
against Atty. Tamondong's client, Henmar Development Property Inc. (Henmar), docketed as
Civil Case No. 2012-06-04.

Subsequently, Henmar, through Atty. Tamondong, filed an Omnibus Motion (Ad

Cautelam) which prayed for, among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint based on the
following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of Henmar; (b) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and/or improper venue; and (c) prescription and/or laches. In an
Order dated March 26, 2013, the MTCC denied the motion to dismiss of Henmar. Henmar
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was also denied by the MTCC in an Order dated July
4, 2013.

Aggrieved, Henmar filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary

Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the RTC,
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 2013- 184. The case was raffled to Branch 38, presided by
Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal.

On December 23, 2013, Judge Pasal issued a Resolution, dismissing the Petition for lack
of merit.

Henmar filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On February 24, 2014, Judge Pasal
deemed the Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar as already submitted for resolution.
However, even after more than six months, Judge Pasal had yet to resolve the said Motion.

The OCA recommended that Judge Pasal be found GUILTY of gross inefficiency
and/or neglect of duty arising from undue delay in resolving a motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pasal violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct?
RULING: Yes, Judge Pasal violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court held that Judge Pasal administratively liable for undue delay in
resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 filed by
Atty. Tamondong, on behalf of Henmar, in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184.

Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."

Judge Pasal's unexplained delay in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration is

inexcusable, unwarranted, and unreasonable. Judge Pasal failed to heed the consistent
reminder of the Court for judges to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-
honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with
dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions
for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the
Judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Judge Pasal's failure to resolve
the Motion for Reconsideration within the 30-day reglementary period is not excusable and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions upon him.

Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal is found GUILTY for his undue delay in the resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 filed by Henmar
Development Property, Inc. in Special Civil Action No. 2013- 184, for which he is FINED in
the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00).