SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE BRIEFS

Preliminary Matters

1. Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan vs. CA and Lourdes Evero Pacana

G.R No. 150206 March 13, 2009
FACTS:
The respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of the disputed parcel of land which
belongs to Juan Gabatan, having inherited the same from her deceased mother who she
claimed as the only child of Juan and his wife, Laureana.
The petitioners, however denied the claims of the respondent and maintained that Juan
Gabatan died single in 1934 and survived by one brother (petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest) and two sisters, Macaria and Justa, and for this reason, they are the lawful
owners of the land.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent declaring her as the owner of the
subject land and ordering the petitioners to RECONVEY it in favor of the respondent.
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court and declared that respondent’s claim of
filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial where the petitioners
could not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized the right of
the respondent’s mother to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s main cause of action which is the recovery of ownership
and possession of property is proper?
RULING:
GR: Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action
for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
XPN: However, the decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the Court relaxed its rule
and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the
party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case,
to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the
status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the
costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE BRIEFS FORNESTE, IRISH CLAIRE O.

General Information
 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE BRIEFS

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent
as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case,
had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same
and consequently rendered judgment thereon.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE BRIEFS FORNESTE, IRISH CLAIRE O.

General Information
2. Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte
G.R No. 198680, July 8, 2013

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with
Damages against respondent Gaudioso.
In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno died intestate leaving behind parcels
of land covered by TCTs.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the said certificates of title, leading to
their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are
Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno and presented evidence to
prove the same. He further claimed that petitioners have no cause of action against
him as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.
RTC ruled in favor of Gaudioso finding that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship
with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper.
RULING: No. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit
for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action because such a declaration
can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination
of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil
case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.
Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the
heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of this civil case.
3. Sheker vs. Estate of Alice Sheker
G.R No. 157912, December 13, 2007
FACTS:
 The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent's commission
due him in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate.
The executrix, respondent herein moved for the dismissal of said money claim against
the estate on the grounds that 1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a
written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent based on the grounds advanced by
respondent.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary
actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings.
2. Whether the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against
respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against
non-forum shopping?
RULING:
1. The petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to
rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions,

the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern
special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of

being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of
special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as
much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions
are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules
of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing,
and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in
any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the
present case.
2. Yes. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and
other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim
against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole
probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the
decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting
letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against
the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for
creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper
disposition of the properties of the estate.

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of
the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot
even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
certification against non-forum shopping.
4. Vda. De Manalo vs CA 2001
G.R. NO. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Pilar and his 11 children
who are all of legal age.
Troadio left several real properties including a business of Machine Shop.
The respondents, who are 8 of the surviving children filed a petition with the
respondent RTC for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On the date of hearing, the trial court issued an order “declaring the whole world in
default, except the government,” and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners
therein.
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of
herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted 10 days within which to file
their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners.
RTC/CA- dismissed the petition.
Petitioner’s contention:
CA erred in upholding the RTC’s orders, which denied their motion for the
outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to
the filing of the petition but that the same have failed. (pursuant to Article
222 of the Civil Code)

The proceeding in the settlement of estate is actually an ordinary civil action

involving members of same family. The case contains averments that are
indicative of its adversarial nature:

ISSUE: Whether the settlement of estate of late Troadio is an ordinary civil action, which is
adversarial in nature. – NO. (Special proceeding = Non-adversarial)

RULING:
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at
bar, shall be controlling.

A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92- 63626 belies petitioners’ claim that the same is in
the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts
required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased personsuch as the fact of death
of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of
Manila at the time of his said death.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts
upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.

The petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceasedwhich are sought to
be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition
leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents
herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo.

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may
be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage
of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as
observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special
and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary
civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section l(j) of the Rules of Court
vis-á-vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.

The petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for
the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio by raising matters that are irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate
court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.

In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by
the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have
a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. So it
should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
5. Natcher vs. CA
G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Sps. Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel
of land. Upon the death of Graciana, Graciano, together with his six children entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate.
Said heirs executed and forged an “Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
Property with Waiver of Rights”. Graciano then donated to his children a portion of
his interest in the land leaving only a small portion registered under his name.
Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano
sold his land to his wife Patricia. Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and
his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
Private respondents filed a complaint alleged that upon Graciano’s death, petitioner
Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein petitioner resulting in
the cancellation and the issuance of title in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
RTC ruled that the sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. Although the
deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded
as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of
the deceased.
CA reversed and set aside the lower court. CA ruled that it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court
a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action
for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement
of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

RULING: No. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined
as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or motion.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent
fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made
or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined
by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction,
is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of
the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No.
471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the
proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly
pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
6. Montaner vs. CA
G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Luisa, a Roman Catholic, was married to deceased Alejandro at a Catholic
Church .
Private respondents Disangcopan and her daughter Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a
complaint for judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court,
alleging (among others) that deceased Alejandro is a Muslim and that they are his
first family.
Luisa filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss.
The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint.
The private respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal, then allowed private
respondents to adduce further evidence, the court further ordered the continuation of
trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.
The petitioner elevated the case to SC.
The petitioners contended that the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is an
ordinary civil action against a deceased person.

ISSUE: Whether the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is an ordinary civil
action against a deceased person.

RULING: No. The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a
special proceeding. Special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." The Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules
on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.

Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and,
subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of
the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse
parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil
action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A
civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are
either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a
party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite
adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not
being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement
of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities,
and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
7. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Absolute Management Corporation
G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013
FACTS:
SHCI filed a complaint for sum of money against AMC. SHCI alleged in its
complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of plywood and
plyboards covered by Metrobank Checks. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General
Manager.
Chua died and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced.
SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered items.
In its answer AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chua’s transactions with
SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to
hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.
Metrobank filed a motion for bill of particulars, seeking to clarify certain ambiguous
statements in AMC’s answer.
The RTC granted the motion but AMC failed to submit the required bill of
particulars.
Hence, Metrobank filed a motion to strike out the third-party complaint. Metrobank
admitted that it deposited the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and
Hardware, a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed.
RTC denied Metrobank’s motion. The RTC categorized Metrobank’s allegation in the
fourth-party complaint as a "cobro de lo indebido" – a kind of quasi-contract that
mandates recovery of what has been improperly paid. As such claim, it should have
been filed in a Special Proceeding not before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint.
Based on the statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogat generali, the CA
held that Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court is a special provision that should
prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. The
latter applies to money claims in ordinary actions while a money claim against a
person already deceased falls under the settlement of his estate that is governed by the
rules on special proceedings. If at all, rules for ordinary actions only apply
suppletorily to special proceedings.
Metrobank asserts that it should be allowed to file a fourth-party complaint against
Chuas estate in the proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-party complaint was filed
merely to enforce its right to be reimbursed by Chuas estate in case Metrobank is held
liable to AMC. Hence, Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply.
ISSUE: Whether Metrobanks fourth-party complaint against Chuas estate should be allowed.
RULING: Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to
ordinary civil actions while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against
the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x x x must therefore prevail over the
general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.
We read with approval the CAs use of the statutory construction principle of lex specialis
derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the
deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the
rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely
apply suppletorily.
Settlement of Estate (Rule 73-90)
8. Virginia Garcia Fule vs. CA
G.R No. L-40502. November 1976
FACTS:
Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters
of administration alleging that Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places.
At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix
over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia, the widow contending
that:
1. The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his
death certificate and therefore have an improper venue, therefore the CFI of
Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.
CFI denied the motion.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court, making Preciosa the administratix.
Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present case?
2. What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 mean?
RULING:
1. No. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the
merits or the substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It
is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is
situated. Venue is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on
convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it
may be waived or stipulated by the parties.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate.

2. “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the

personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be
the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death.

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special
administratix.
9. Vda. De Reyes vs. CA
G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989
FACTS:
Respondent administratrix, Pilar is the surviving spouse of Antonio de Zuzuarregui,
Sr., while petitioner Beatriz and the other heirs of said estate are the illegitimate
children of the decedent.
Among the real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land in Rizal. The
petitioner did not have a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she relinquished
her right thereto "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property."
Respondent administratrix and the other three distributees filed a motion to reopen
Special Proceedings for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in
the description of the parcel of land. According to them, the correct land area is
803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781 square meters.
Heirs of Beatriz filed their opposition to said motion.
CFI Rizal granted the motion.
CA Affirmed.
The petitioner claims that she would not have relinquished her share in said parcel of
land if the true area was not fraudulently concealed from her at the time the project of
partition was executed. She further contends that the fact that the description of the
area as 83,781 square meters was repeated several times is sufficient evidence to
show that such was the area intended in the project of partition.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in allowing the motion to reopen Special Proceedings
for purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error.

RULING: No. It is clear that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by
inadvertence in the project of partition.

It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or
omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after
the judgment has been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general
rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter
had become final.

That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle
the entire estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to
intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided
because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties
held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.

Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was
to make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that
they did not make any further disposition of the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters?

It is, therefore, a logical and credible explanation that the omission of the zero between the
figures "8" and "3" converted "803,781" to "83,781", a product purely of clerical oversight.
Petitioner's lamentations of injustice in the partition are demonstrably unfounded.
10. Uriate vs CFI of Negros
G.R. No. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
FACTS:
Juan Uriarte died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines.
Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of Juan, filed a petition
for intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased at CFI Negros Occidental.
However, said petition was opposed by the nephews of Juan stating there is a valid
will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested.
Then, the nephew filed a settlement of the estate in the Court of Manila on the basis
of the alleged will of the deceased.
Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating
that the court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the
case.
The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement in the
CFI Negros.
Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of CFI Negros.

ISSUE: Whether the intestate settlement should be dismissed.

RULING: SC held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules
on the settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings. Thus, in case at bar, intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of
the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to
the testate proceeding.
11. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin
G.R. No. L-33929, September 2, 1983
FACTS:
A duplex-apartment house in Sampaloc, Manila owned by Filomeno and Socorro
Tabligan was built by Candido Ramos, a duly licensed architect and a building
contractor for P32, 927. Spouses paid 7,139 only; hence the architect used his own
money to finish the construction of the duplex-apartment -25,788.50.
Spouses Tabligan obtained from PSB 3 loans in the total amount of 35,000 to
complete the construction of the duplex apartment. To secure the payment of the
loans, the spouses executed 3 PNs and 3 Deeds of REM which were registered with
ROD Manila. TCTs were free from all liens and encumbrances at that time.
Spouses later failed to pay their monthly amortizations. The petitioner bank
foreclosed the mortgages then consolidated its ownership over the property in
question, and TCT was issued by the RD of Manila in the name of the petitioner
bank.
The private respondent filed an action against spouses to collect on unpaid cost of the
construction and later succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary attachment over
the property- later adverse claim annotated at the back of the TCT.
TRIAL COURT: in favor of Architect but writ of execution unsatisfied.
Architect wrote letter to PSB for the delivery to him of his pro-rata share over the
property. PSB refused to pay

ISSUE: Whether architect is entitled to claim a pro-rata share in the value of the property in
question.
BANK: De Barretto vs Villanueva- not the proceedings contemplated- there must be an
insolvency proceeding or other liquidation proceeding; architect's lien did not acquire the
character of a statutory lien equal to PSB's registered mortgage
RAMOS: proceedings in trial court can qualify as a general liquidation of the estate of the
spouses Tabligan because the only existing property of spouses is the duplex apartment.
RULING:
The proceedings in the court do not partake of the nature of the insolvency proceedings or
settlement of a decedent's estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to COLLECT THE
UNPAID COST of the construction of the duplex apartment.
Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem
which are binding against the whole world regardless of whether the persons having interest
were notified or not- they are equally bound. Although lower court found that there were no
known creditors other than the plaintiff and defendant herein. It will not bar other creditors in
the event they show up and present their claims against PSB claiming that they also have
preferred liens against the property involved.
12. Cuenco vs. CA
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing
in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator
died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon
City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife
(widow), filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last will
and testament, where she was named executrix.
Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court
held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have
acted on the probate proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate
proceedings in the Quezon City court.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on ground of
lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA
favored Lourdes holding that CFI Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court
ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to
the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of
the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition
for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow
and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating
that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance
of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last
will.
 Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes'
intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave
the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other
courts.

2. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the
intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could
the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the
Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must
exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do.
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the
Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the
estate

Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal:

Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu
court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case except
when want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had
improper venue: the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the
question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole
proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same
rank in another province is too obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair imposition
upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and
settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have
to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she has an important matter of the estate
to take up with the probate court.
13. Vda De Chua vs. CA
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
FACTS:
Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo and
they begot two sons. Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the
guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.
Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir
of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City
and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to
settle said matters.
In support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following documents: (1)
photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the
name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City;
(3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that
he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and
1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; and,
(5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was
Davao City.
Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse
of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the
deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having
proven his status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but it
decided in favor of herein respondents.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Chua has a legal standing to file the motion to dismiss.
RULING: No. Section 4 of Rule 79 of the Rules of Court states that only an interested person
may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or
contingent.
In the present case, the petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the
decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which
Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy
of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence
rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence.
14. Ramos vs. CA,
G.R. No. 42108 December 29, 1989
FACTS:
15. Romero vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012
FACTS:
16. Vda de Manalo vs. CA
G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001
*Please refer to case number 4.
17. Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte
G.R. No. 198680 , July 8, 2013
*Please refer to case number 2.
18. Roberts vs. Leonidas
G.R No. L-55509. April 1984
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died and was survived by his second wife
(Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage
(Juanita and Ethel)
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel
The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to probate and was issued upon
consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.
Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in
Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of
administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to
account for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine.
Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the
compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm
died testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack
of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
RULING: Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil
Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249;
Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a
person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate
case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition
and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings
sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be
served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
19. Reyes vs Mosqueda
G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990
FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and
the children of his late sisters, herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr.
Pascual filed Special Proceedings in the CFI for the administration of Pascual’s
estate.
Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included alleging that these
were donated to her in a donation mortis causa.
This was granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI
from enforcing the order.
Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in a deed of
donation inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of
the donation.
When she reached the age of majority, she had the donation registered but found out
that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for reconstitution of title
which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her
name.
Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Ofelia’s TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for
recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes.
The CFI issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelia’s TCT was null and
void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula
2. Whether or not the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos

RULING:
1. Yes. It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator.

If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

2. Yes. Settled is the rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the
determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa.
This Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or
"mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on
the provisions stated in such deed.
It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein, and
not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the
disposition made.

There is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a

donation inter vivos.

The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of
love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the
donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the
donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor.

The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in
relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the
donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the
execution of the deed of donation.
20. De Leon vs. CA
G.R. No. 128781 , August 6, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner, Teresita N. De Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of their
father Rafael C. Nicolas in a special proceeding.
The private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositor–applicant in the intestate
proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas,
during his lifetime, had given real properties to his children by gratuitous title and
that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of
the estate of the decedent.
Ramon then filed an Amended Motion for Collation specifying the properties to be
collated.
The RTC ordered the subject properties to include for collation.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the properties subject
of the Order "were already titled in their names years ago" and that titles may not be
collaterally attacked in a motion for collation.
The RTC denied the motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to
determine whether titled properties should be collated citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court which provides that the final order of the court concerning questions
as to advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on
the heir.
Teresita filed an MR for the order denying the original MR.
The RTC issued an Order requiring Ramon to prove whether the properties were
given gratuitously or for a valuable consideration and removed Teresita from her
position as administratrix on the ground of conflict of interest considering her claim
that she paid a valuable consideration for the properties transferred to her and are this
not subject to collation.
Teresita filed another MR, which was denied.
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the order directing the
inclusion of the enumerated properties in the estate had become final for failure to
appeal the order of collation.

CONTENTIONS: Petitioners claim that the properties were sold to them rather than
donated, that the Order was interlocutory and non-appealable, and that they were
deprived of due process. Private respondent contends that due process was afforded to
petitioners when petitioner resolved the issue of collation after hearing.

ISSUE: Whether the order directing the inclusion of the enumerated properties in the estate
was final.

RULING: (The petition is partly GRANTED) NO.

RATIO: The order (directing the inclusion of the enumerated properties in the estate) and all
other orders emanating from said order are merely provisional or interlocutory, without
prejudice to the heirs, administrator or approving parties to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title (in other words, since the order is
interlocutor, any conflicts regarding title over the properties can be resolved in an ordinary
action).
The CA committed an error in considering the order as final or binding upon the heirs or third
persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
was ruled in Garcia v. Garcia:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the properties of the deceased has supervision
and control over said properties. The court thus has inherent power to determine the
properties included/excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the courts’ attention to the fact that certain
properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts’
duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be
attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the
intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership
of said properties.
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of
title provisionally. Probate courts have limited jurisdiction and questions of title can only be
settled in a separate action.
All the court can do is determine whether they should be included in the property. Sec. 2,
Rule 90 of the ROC, which provides that the final order shall be binding, is invoked by the
petitioner. The Order of exclusion or inclusion is NOT a final order and is interlocutory in the
sense that it does not settle once and for all the title to the lots.
Sec. 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of Sec. 1. The RTC and CA erroneously
referred to it as an order of collation when it is nothing more than order of inclusion. The
motion for collation was filled in the early stage of the intestate proceedings and nothing
indicates that the debts have been paid nor the net remainder determined. In other words, the
issue on collation is still premature and the Order was merely for inclusion. Even assuming
that the assailed Order is a collation and a final order, it would have no force and effect upon
the parties. Only a final order is appealable and a final order must contain the facts and law on
which it is based (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The Order in this case does not state
the reasons for ordering collation. Thus, it never could have become final and would be
inoperative.
21. Pereira vs . CA,
G.R. No. L-81147, June 20, 1989
FACTS:
Andres de Guzman Pereira died without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse
of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira
Nagac.
Private respondent instituted a Special Proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the decedent.
The petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent.
The Regional Trial Court appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac, administratrix
of the intestate estate of the decedent.
Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC's decision.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration for the following reasons:
o The death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively
to her, being the sole beneficiary
o The savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the
PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several
receipts;
o The only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between
the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the
deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what
properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She
points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for
purposes of administration;
2. Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts
left by the decedent; and,
3. Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased,
the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
RULING:
1. The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending.

The function of resolving whether a certain property should be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the
competence of the probate court.

However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
2. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had
left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.

An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception,
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may
agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator.

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings.

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on
the circumstances of each case. If the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator
is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to
ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be
achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration.

There is no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two
surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there
are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs
are not in good terms.

The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as

administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for
her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who
supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a
compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
deceased.

3. With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary to delve into the issue of who, as between the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be
preferred to be appointed as administratrix.

Hence, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita
Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without
prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the
property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira.
22. Neri, et al vs Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
FACTS:
Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as
natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon,
Alicia, and Visminda executed an extra-judicial settlement of the estate with absolute
deed of sale, adjudicating among themselves homestead properties, and thereafter,
conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P80,000.
The children of Enrique, herein petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of sale of
the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)
before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the 5-
year prohibited period.
The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria as additional
plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of
Anunciacion from her first marriage.
However, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied
knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and
sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and
laches.

RTC: The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordered the annulment of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale
occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and
Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial
authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. Also, it rejected the
defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the
subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.

CA: CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It held that, since Eutropia and
Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject
properties, they were not bound by it. But, it did not preclude them from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs. Also, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the
subsequent sale as valid and binding with respect to Enrique and his children, holding that
as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares. While recognizing
Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale
when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.
ISSUE: Whether the extra judicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale is valid.
RULING: No. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated.
Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa
and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding
upon them and consequently, a total nullity.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the
respondents is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein. It
cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of
Anunciacion from the moment of her death and that, as owners thereof, they can very well
sell their undivided share in the estate.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in their behalf without the
proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is
unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code. Records,
however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute
deed of sale.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not
binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectively been
disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell
and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally
transfer."
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
23. Sampilo vs CA
G.R. No. L-10474, February 28, 1958
FACTS:
Tolete died intestate leaving parcels of land. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de
Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters.
Without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that Tolete
left no children, or respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children
neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the
legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the properties.
This affidavit was registered in the Register of Deeds. On the same day, she executed
a deed of sale of all the parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo which was also
registered in the Register of Deeds. Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of
land to Honorato Salacup and this sale was also registered in the Register of Deeds.
On the other hand, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the
estate of Tolete and having secured her appointment as administratrix.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the
affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands
sold to him and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said
properties.

CFI: CFI ruled in favor of Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication and
the deed of sale are all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of
the four parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights
of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated.

CA: CA ruled that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication by the trial court
was correct but that the annulment of the deeds, insofar as one-half of the properties,
conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the
deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that the deeds of
sale are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the
portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's
right of action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not
prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
It is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after the affidavit of
adjudication was registered in the Register of Deeds, the right of action of the administratrix
has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of two years as
Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: No. There are two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section
1, it
is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the
extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section
596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4,
the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the
extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made
expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein
or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or
had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear
that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the
estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the
period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights
or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to
remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not
take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement,
there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to
them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal
provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is
an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or
distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the
decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect
is made, either directly or by implication.

The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is
applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in
the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

There is nothing in Section 4 of Rule 74, or in its source (Section 596 of Act 190), which
shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar
against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third
persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a
different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to
be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines
the statute.
24. De Rosario vs Cunanan
G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the CFI subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L.
del Rosario, who died in a plane crash, wherein the CFI dismissed its petition for
settlement and partition of estate.
The petition shows that the instant case was filed under the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court. CFI ruled that while it may be true that a
petition for summary settlement is allowed under the aforequoted provision of the
rules, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of which
does not exceed P10,000.00, The instant petition, however, clearly alleges that the
value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to
P33,000.00 which is obviously over and above-the value of the estate allowed under
the rules. The action taken by the petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under
an intestate proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same has not been
complied with.

ISSUE: What is the required amount of the estate for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a
petition for summary settlement of estate?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 34: Summary settlement of estates of small value. In a litany of
precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case of Utulo vs. Pasiono, it is uniformly held that
for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of estate under the
rules, the requirement that the amount of the estate involved should not exceed P10,000 is
jurisdictional.
25. Gerona vs. De Guzman
G.R. No. L-19060, 1964
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and
Placida de Guzman. Petitioners claimed that Placida who already died was a
legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz.
After the death of his first wife, Marcelo married Camila Ramos, who begot him
several children, now the respondents in this case.
Petitioner alleged that when Marcelo died, respondents executed a deed of "extra-
judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Respondents had thereby succeeded in cancelling the TCT in the name of their father
and new TCTs were issued in their own name.
Petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their but respondents refused to
heed said demand.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners’ mother, the deceased Placida
de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being
merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners’ action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Trial Court dismissed the Complaint stating among others that petitioner’s action has
already prescribed. The Court of appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s Decision.

ISSUE: Whether the present action for partition of the latter’s estate is not subject to
the statute of limitations of action?

RULING: NO. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under
an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement stating therein that they are
the sole heirs of the deceased, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name,
they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set
up a title adverse to them.
It is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based
upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of
limitations.
DOCTRINE: Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under
an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the
moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
26. Mercado vs. Santos
G.R. No. 45629, September 22, 1938
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for probate of a will of his deceased wife. There being no
opposition thereto, the Court admitted the same. It appears on record that 16 months after the
allowance of the will, a complaint for forgery of the probated will was instituted by the
intevernors against the petitioner in San Fernando, Pampanga but it was dismissed. Three
months after it was dismissed, the same intervenor charged the petitioner for the second time
with the same offense but this time it was filed in Mexico, Pampanga. After investigation, it
was also dismissed. Nine months after the dismissal, the same intervenor charged the
petitioner for the third time with the same offense but it was again dismissed. Dissatisfied,
intervenor filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Court of first instance which was
granted. As a result thereto, Petitioner for the 4 th time was arrested and filed a bond. The case
proceeded to trial. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the will alleged to
have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is
conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The motion was overruled and the
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari but it was denied

ISSUE: Whether the probate of the will is a bar to the subsequent criminal prosecution of the
petitioner for the alleged forgery of the said will?
RULING: YES. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is
usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and
was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine
and not a forgery. 
Furthermore, the Code of Civil Procedures also provide that “no will shall pass either the real
or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal
to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate
shall be conclusive as to its due execution”.
The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any
proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
DOCTRINE:
No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the
Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of
a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
27. Maninang vs. CA
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta died at the Manila Sanitarium. She left a holographic will stating
that all her real properties and personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad
Maninang. Petitioner Soledad filed a petition for probate of the will of the decedent.
Aseneta who as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of the decedent. He filed a
motion to dismiss of the testate case on the ground that the holographic will was null
and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and therefore,
intestacy should ensue.
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still
the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent
Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.
The lower court dismissed the testate case and CA denied petitioner’s certiorari and
rule that the trial judge’s order of dismissal was final in nature and therefore appeal is
the proper remedy.

ISSUE:
1. WON a Court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate
Case?
2. WON a Court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of a will during probate?

RULING:
1. YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because
unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
2. NO. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine
if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."

DOCTRINE: Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
28. Mc Micking v. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil 219

FACTS: Margarita Jose, a Filipino citizen who died in China leaving an estate consisting of
personal property located in the Hongkong and PH. Engracio Palanca was appointed as
administrator of the estate of the deceased and Mariano Ocampo, Lao Sempco and Dy
Cunyao became his sureties. After execution of bond, Palanca took possession of all the
property of the deceased with the total amount of $60k HKD. Mariano Ocampo died
leaving a will. Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of the estate of Mariano while
private respondent Pio de la Guardia Barreto qualified as one of the sureties of said Velasco.
Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the
property of the deceased including all his debts and liabilities. CFI affirmed and approved the
partition. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, Velasco
delivered to the heirs of Mariano Ocampo all of the property of the decedent leaving in the
hands of said administrator no property or thing of value belonging to the said estate.

Meanwhile, Palanca was removed as administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo Sempco
and petitioner, Jose Mc Micking was appointed instead. Palanca was removed from the office
by reason of the fact the he failed and refused to render an account of the property and funds
of the estate of Margarita Jose. At the time of his removal, he was indebted to the estate in the
sum of P41k.

For the default of Palanca, petitioner McMicking filed a claim in the amount of P30k to the
estate of the private respondent, Pio de la Guardia Barreto as surety of Doroteo Velasco who
is the administrator of the estate of Mariano ocampo who in return is the surety of Engracio
Palanca.

CFI: Ruled in favor of the defendant, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may claim against the defendant as the surety of Doroteo
Velasco.
RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Court based its decision
upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barreto was
surely would not have been liable himself had his action been commenced against him.
If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be too. [doctrine]

At the head of the law of administration of the PH stand sections 596 and 597 of the Code of
Civil Procedures. They are as follows:

SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. —

Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and there are
no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs
may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves,
duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see
fit, without proceedings in court.

SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall appear, at any time
within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts
outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall
be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of
the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the
real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the
full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may
have been made”

These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent
without proceedings in court. The provisions which they contain are extremely important. The
wisdom which underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of every people which
maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be
deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and imperative reasons and then
only so long as is necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons effective.
29. Mang-Oy vs CA
G.R No. L-27421 September 12, 1986
FACTS:
Old Man Tumpao had three children in his first wife, who are the private respondents in this
instant case. His first wife died and he got himself a second wife who had two children. The
children of his second wife are adopted due to the practice of Igorots. Old Tumpao executed
a last will and testament, wherein, in the dispositive portion he appointed private respondents,
Bandao Tumapao to carry or fulfill the said testament and has the power to dispose the
decedent’s property.

The will was read by the beneficiaries named therein who at the time were already occupying
the portions respectively allotted to them. (Beneficiaries: Banda Tumpao, Lambia, Abito, Jose
and Labet) .

Twenty years later, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided
the properties of the decedent among themselves only and exclude the other beneficiaries.
Due to the partition the old title of the land was cancelled and another one was issued in favor
of the three respondents.

The petitions filed a complaint or the reconveyance.

RTC: Ruled in favor of the petitioners

CA: Revered the decision of the RTC. CA ruled that the will is inoperative since it is not
probated yet.

ISSUE: Whether the will and testament be duly allowed even without being probed in court?

RULING: Yes. In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved or allowed in court. [Doctrine]

However, the document maybe sustained by Art. 1056 of the Old Civil Code which was the
law in force at the time the document was made. The law says: “If the testator should make a
partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far
as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.”

Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter vivos, which is a
consequence of its special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is
sustained by the provision of Art 1056, Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when
the beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and confirmed with the disposition made by Old
Tumpao.
30. Nufable vs Nufable , G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999

FACTS:
Edras Nufable died leaving a last will and testament disposing his properties in favor of his
four children; Angel, Generosa, Vilflor and Marcelo. The will was admitted to be probated. A
fewmonths after the will was probated, the same court approved the settlement estate entered
into by the heirs, whereby they agreed that the parcel of land owned by Edras Nufable,
located in Negros Oriental would remain undivided for community ownership. However,
Angel and her spouse mortgaged the said property to Development Bank of the Philippines,
which was later foreclosed because the spouse becomes delinquent in their payments. Years
after, Petitioner Nelson, son of Angel purchased the property to the bank. Respondents,
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo filed a complaint for the annulment of sale by the Bank to
Nelson.

Lower Court: Dismissed the case.

CA: Reversed the decision of the lower court and declared respondents as rightful co-owners
of the subject property entitled to possession of ¾ of the same, and Nelson to ¼.
Petitioners filed this present petition contending that the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Edras Nufable did not determine the ownership of the land in question as
against third parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent
probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right of ownership of petitioner
Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in question from, and as acquired property of the
Development Bank of the Philippines.

RULING: No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its subsequent probate do not affect
the title of Nelson. At the time when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of
Edras had already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Accordingly, for the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the
Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was admitted or that the Settlement of
Estate was approved. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable
specifically referred to the subject property in stating that “the land situated in the Poblacion,
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in common
for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a house
therein.” It was there for the will of the decedent that the subject property should undivided,
although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years pursuant to Article 870 of the
Civil Code [Doctrine]. Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject
property to DBP on March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property.
Angel’s right over the subject property was limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso share. As co-
owner of the subject property, Angel’s right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that
portion that may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is
the rule that a co-owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property.
Hence, The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio Nufable “had no
right to mortgage the subject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said property was
limited only to 1/4pro indiviso share of the property in question.”

Pastor Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
31. Pastor Jr. vs. CA
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
FACTS:
Pastor, Sr. died in Cebu City and was survived by his wife Bossio (but died
eventually), their two legitimate children Pastor, Jr. and Sofia (all foreigners) and an
illegitimate child, Quemada who is a filipino citizen.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will
of Pastor, Sr. with CFI Cebu, a probate court.
The probate court, upon motion of Quemada and after an ex parte hearing, appointed
him special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr., whether or not covered or
affected by the holographic will.
Quemada as special administrator, instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action
for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate which were in the names of the
spouses who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by
inheritance.
Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the
order appointing Quemada as special administrator.
The probate court on the other hand, issued an order allowing the will to probate in
their order on December 5, 1972. Appealed to the CA, the order was affirmed. On
petition for review, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution
and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT.
For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, Quemada filed pleading
after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject
of said legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed these pleadings on the ground of
pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the CFI Cebu. All
pleadings remained unacted upon by the probate court.
The probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon
objection of Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit,
no hearing was held.
While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the probate court issued the now
assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of
the royalties payable and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not
inofficious. [There was absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972 had previously resolved the issue of ownership
of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic
will.]
The oppositors sought reconsideration primarily on the ground that the PROBATE
COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of
the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely
passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.
PASTOR, JR. and his wife filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the order and the
writ of execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The petition was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the questions of ownership and the intrinsic validity of the holographic were
resolved by the Probate Court with finality in the case at bar?
RULING:
NO. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. It
confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety
of appointing a special administrator. It allowed and approved the holographic will with
respect to its extrinsic validity and declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must
proceed “subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of
real and personal properties.”
32. Nuguid vs Nuguid 17 SCRA 449

FACTS:
Rosario without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate were survived by her legitimate
parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will
be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

The probate court held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" dismissing the petition.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: PROCEDURAL ISSUE

RULING:
The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon,
by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
therein.
The parties shunted aside the question of whether the will should be allowed probate. For
them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors,
in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will
intrinsically a nullity?
If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up
once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result:
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for
solution.
33. Fernandez , et al vs Dimagiba
GR L-23638, October 12, 1967
FACTS: The late Benedicta de los Reyes had left a will instituting Ismaela Dimagiba, now
respondent, as the sole heir of her estate. Later, Dimagiba petitioned for the probate of the
will but Dionisio Fernandez, et. Al, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed
oppositions to the probate asked on the ground of forgery, estoppel by laches of the
proponent, and among others. After trial, the CFI found that the will was genuine and
properly executed and also overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the
probate of the will. The oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but said Court
held that the decree admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of opportune
appeal. Oppositors then appealed to the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate
had become final for lack of appeal
2. Whether or not the order of the CFI, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-
appellants had likewise become final

RULING:
1. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will
and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person
may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or
judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will. There being no controversy that the probate decree
of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.
Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon
which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly
dismissed.

2. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249,
that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily
designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court,
and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a
non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the
order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently
unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
34. Alejo vs. CA
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate. Private respondent
opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament’s body nor the
signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. The
trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will,
its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for
the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed
by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said decision holding that the decedent did not comply
with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It further found that certain dispositions in the
will were either unsigned or undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the
erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the will should be disallowed for noncompliance with Articles 313 and 314
of the NCC.

RULING: No. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign
and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).

In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:

1. Whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
2. Whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3. Whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will
was executed; and
4. Whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the
grounds for disallowance of wills.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. The object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud;
accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other
formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable
handwritten by the testator.
35. De Perez vs Tolete
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the
spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the
entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in
Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that
since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued
that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled
to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills
were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed
RULING:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with
the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429;
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the
first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact -
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to
notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a
nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should
be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first
time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication
and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator, . . . "
36. Phil. Commercial and Industrial Bank vs Escolin 56 SCRA 266

FACTS: Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their
whole estates should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and
alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter
spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who
predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr.
Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges’ estate, the brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they could inherit.