59. Heirs of Bang v.

Sy
GR No. 114217, 150797 | 13 October 2009 | Nachura, J.
APOLINARIO | Topic: Provisional Support
Case Summary: This is a consolidation of 2 cases involving the judicial partition of the estate of Sy Bang and the
guardianship proceedings of Sy Bang’s surviving spouse, Rosita Ferrera-Sy. Petitioners are the children of Sy Bang
from his first marriage, while Respondents are his children from his second marriage with Rosita. Respondents filed a
Complaint for Partition against Petitioners before CFI. CFI rendered 3 partial decisions. The third one held that the
properties, businesses, and assets in the name of Petitioners form part of the estate of Sy Bang. On the other hand,
CFI deferred resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition of the properties in the names of
Respondents. CA affirmed so the Petitioners elevated the case to SC. In the SC, Rosita filed a Motion for Payment
of Widow’s Allowance, alleging that her late husband Sy Bang left an extensive estate, and that properties of
the estate were found by CFI to be conjugal properties. She claimed that since the death of Sy Bang, she was
not given any widow’s allowance as provided in Rule 83, Sec. 3. Petitioners opposed on the ground that Rosita
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving any claims against Petitioners. SC granted Rosita’s motion and ordered
Petitioners to jointly and severally pay P25K as widow’s allowance to be taken from Sy Bang’s estate, and every month
thereafter until the estate is finally settled. Petitioners filed an MR. Respondents claimed that Rosita was not in
possession of her full faculties when she affixed her thumb mark in the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age,
frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. They also asserted that they filed a petition for guardianship with
RTC over Rosita’s person and properties. SC denied Petitioners’ MR.

In the guardianship proceedings, the Respondents filed a motion to Order Court Deposit of Widow’s Allowance Ordered
by SC. RTC granted the motion. Petitioners filed this Petition for Review with SC to declare the Guardianship court to
have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow’s allowance. The jurisdiction of the guardianship
court is limited to determining whether Rosita was incompetent and upon finding the affirmative, appointing a guardian.
A widow’s allowance can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Petitioners also filed a motion to include Respondents
as likewise liable for the payment of the widow’s allowance as heirs of Sy Bang as they may also hold assets of the
estate of Sy Bang. They argued that it is a denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single them out as the
ones responsible for the allowance. They also asserted that the Regional State Prosecutor found probable cause to
charge respondents with falsification of 3 marriage contracts between Sy Bang and Rosita. This constituted a prejudicial
question on whether they should comply with the widow’s allowance.

SC held that a finding of probable cause does NOT conclusively prove the charge of falsification against Respondents.
Until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her
widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang. Furthermore, the widow’s allowance is chargeable to Sy
Bang’s estate. It must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names of Respondents form part of the
estate remains unsettled since this petition questioning the CFI’s 3rd Partial Decision remains pending. OTOH, there
has been a categorical pronouncement that Petitioners are holding properties belonging to Sy Bang’s estate. The fact
that the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying with the
payment of the allowance. Properties of the estate have been identified, thus, these properties should be made
to answer for the widow’s allowance of Rosita. In any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate. Finally, SC agreed
with Petitioners that the RTC, as guardianship court, exceeded its jurisdiction. A court hearing a petition for
guardianship has limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widow’s allowance. The “court”
referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3 is clearly the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is that the
widow’s allowance is to be take from the common mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent. Thus, it
is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of the widow’s allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts.
GR 114217 – Petitioners: Heirs Of Jose Sy Bang, Heirs Of Julian Sy And Oscar Sy, 1 Heirs Of Jose Sy Bang,
and Heirs Of Julian Sy And Oscar Sy || Respondents: Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro
Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, And Rosita Ferrera-Sy.

G.R. No. 150797 – Petitioners: Iluminada Tan, Spouses Julian Sy And Rosa Tan, Zenaida Tan, And Ma. Emma
Sy || Respondents: Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, Florecita Sy, Rolando Sy, Lourdes Sy, Rosauro Sy, Sy, Julieta Sy, And
Rosita Ferrera-Sy

Facts:
CASE 1 (GR 114217)
1. Respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against Petitioners before CFI.
 a. Petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first
marriage to Ba Nga
i. Petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of Sps. Jose Sy Bang &
Iluminada Tan [bali apo ni Sy Bang]
b. Respondents Rolando, Rosalino, Lucio, Enrique, Rosauro, Bartolome, Julieta, and Florecita [all
surnamed Sy] are the children of Sy Bang by his second marriage to Rosita Ferrera-Sy.
2. Sy Bang died intestate in 1971 leaving behind real and personal properties including several
businesses.
a. The parties had an out-of-court conference where they agreed that the management, supervision, or
administration of the common properties and the entire estate of Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in
the hands of Petitioner Jose, with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of the other heirs.
i. Function of bookkeeper was delegated to Julian [Petitioner];
ii. Function of management and operation of the business of cinema of the common ownership was
delegated to Rosauro [Respondent]
b. They also agreed that the income of the 3 cinema houses would exclusively pertain to the
Respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of the Civil Case for judicial
partition.
c. OTOH, the income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses shall petain to
Petitioners.
3. CFI rendered 3 partial decisions. The first decision was based on a compromise agreement between
Rolando, and Jose & Julian. The second one was based on the pre-trial order.
a. The 3rd Partial Decision held that all properties, businesses, or assets, their income,
produce, and improvements, as well as the rights, interests, or participations in the
names of Petitioners shall be declared as forming part of the estate of Sy Bang, including
the properties in their names which are enumerated in the complaints and all those properties
which the Petitioners may have concealed or fraudulently transferred in the names of other
persons.
b. It also declared Petitioners and Respondents as heirs of Sy Bang and ordered partition among
them after the extent of the estate had been determined.
c. The partial decision also deferred resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for
partition of the properties in the names of Respondents Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando,
and Enrique. [basically yung na kela Petitioners dineclare nang part of estate, pero yung kela
Respondents dinefer]
4. Petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that the CFI Judge patently shown
partiality in favor of the Respondents. Motion was denied.
a. CFI Judge issued 2 orders: (1) Appointing Lucita Sarmiento as Receiver and denying Petitioners’ MR;
and (2) Cancelling the lis pendens annotated at the back of the TCTs in the name of Bartolome, Rosalino,
and Rolando [Respondents]
i. CFI also approved the bond posted by the Receiver, and Bartolomen, Rosalino, and Rolando
[nag file sila bond since cinancel yung lis pendens]
b. While the Mandamus petition was pending, Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before
SC. SC issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from taking any other action in Case 1 and restraining the
effectivity and compliance with the CFI Orders [fact 4.b] and the denial of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings [fact 4]. SC referred the case to CA.
5. CA denied due course in Petitioners’ petition and dismissed the same for lack of merit.
a. It held that CFI Judge acted correctly and in accordance with Rule 36, Sec. 4 which provides
that in an action against several defendants, the court may render judgment against one or
more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.
b. The decision of CFI to defer resolution on the properties in the name of Respondents would not
affect the resolution on the properties in the names of Petitioners, since the properties were
separable and distinct, such that the claim that the same formed part of the estate could be the
subject of separate suits.
6. Petitioners elevated the case to SC praying for the nullification of the 3rd Partial Decision and for SC
to direct CFI to receive further evidence. They alleged that the CA decision was rendered in violation of
their rights to due process. [They’re saying kasi na CFI did not give them enough time to present their
evidence, it rendered the 3rd Partial Decision before they could present their additional evidence.]
 7. [IMPORTANT] Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance, alleging that
her late husband Sy Bang left an extensive estate, and that properties of the estate were found by CFI
to be conjugal properties. She claimed that since the death of Sy Bang, she was not given any
widow’s allowance as provided in Rule 83, Sec. 3.
a. Petitioners gave their comment on the motion, arguing that the Rules specifically provides that
the allowance is granted only during the settlement of the estate and that this shall be taken
from the “common mass of property” during the liquidation of the inventoried properties.
i. Considering that the case before CFI was for a special civil action for partition under
Rule 69, Rosita is NOT entitled to widow’s allowance.
b. SC granted Rosita’s motion and ordered Petitioners to jointly and severally pay P25K as
widow’s allowance to be taken from Sy Bang’s estate, and every month thereafter until
the estate is finally settled.
8. Petitioners filed an MR arguing that Rosita and Enrique Sy had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
where they waived any past, present, and future claims against Petitioners, and thus, should be
dropped as parties. As consideration for their waiver, Rosita and Enrique received P1M and a 229-sq.m
land.
a. Respondents argued that it is ridiculous for Rosita to give up her share in the estate which had
already been ordered partitioned by CFI, to the prejudice of her 7 children. Also, they claimed
that Rosita was not in possession of her full faculties when she affixed her thumb mark in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age, frequent illness, and her lack of ability to
read or write.
i. They also asserted that the filed a petition for guardianship with RTC over
Rosita’s person and properties. [This is CASE 2]
ii. Rosita never received a single centavo of the P1M allegedly given to her.
iii. To justify their argument, Respondents presented 4 copies of the Sinumpaang Salaysay
which all had contradicting contents, which shows that Rosita would sign any document,
no matter the contents, upon the request of any of her children.
b. Petitioners tried to rebut the argument by claiming that Rosita intended to oppose to the
guardianship petition, and by presenting a sworn certificate by Rosita’s physician that she is
physically fit and mentally competent.
c. SC denied the MR.

CASE 2 (GR 150797)

9. Respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before
RTC.
a. Rosauro, who sought to be named as the special guardian, filed with Guardianship Court a
Motion to Order Court Deposit of Widow’s Allowance Ordered by SC.
b. RTC granted the motion and ordered Petitioners to deposit to the court the widow’s
allowance. MR of Petitioners was also denied.
c. CA likewise ruled in favor of Respondents.
10. Petitioners filed this Petition for Review with SC praying for the reversal of the CA decision and to
declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow’s
allowance.
a. The jurisdiction of the guardianship court is limited to determining whether Rosita was
incompetent and upon finding the affirmative, appointing a guardian. A widow’s allowance can
only be paid in an estate proceeding.
b. They also questioned the RTC’s omission of the phrase that the allowance should be “taken
from the estate of Sy Bang”
11. Thereafter, the Respondents kept filing motions with SC for the execution of its Resolution granting
Rosita the widow’s allowance and for the ordering of Petitioners’ Imprisonment until compliance.
a. Petitioners kept opposing and reiterating their previous arguments (i.e. Rosita’s waiver through
the Sinumpaang Salaysay). [literal puro sila motion nakakastress]
i. Rosa Tan, in particular, also argued that she had no participation in the management of
the family business or Sy Bang’s estate and that after her husband’s death, she inherited
 nothing. [namatay na kasi yung mga talagang anak ni Sy Bang na petitioners so ang
natira nalang yung mga anak at asawa nilang tatlo sa sobrang tagal netong kaso na to
kaloka]
ii. They also argued that the marriage of Sy Bang and Rosita was void, hence, Rosita
cannot claim for the widow's allowance. [ang lala i swear]
b. On motion of Respondents, SC issued a warrant of arrest and directed NBI to detain
Petitioners until they complied.
i. Petitioners then filed an urgent manifestation of Compliance and expressed their
willingness to deposit the allowance with the SC cashier. They reasoned that the
money to be deposited was their own and does not belong to Sy Bang’s estate. They
reiterated that they hesitated in complying only because of the charges of falsification
against Rosita, the Sinumpaang Salaysay, and the pendency of the guardianship
proceedings.
ii. Later, they informed SC that they had deposited the checks in favor of Rosita with RTC.
SC lifted the warrants.
iii. Respondents opposed arguing that the checks amounting to P1M were hardly a
full compliance considering that the widow’s allowance now amounted to about
P4M.
12. Petitioners filed a motion to include Respondents as likewise liable for the payment of the
widow’s allowance as heirs of Sy Bang as they may also hold assets of the estate of Sy Bang.
They argued that it is a denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single them out as the
ones responsible for the allowance.
a. They also asserted that the Regional State Prosecutor found probable cause to charge
respondents with falsification of 3 marriage contracts between Sy Bang and Rosita. This
constituted a prejudicial question on whether they should comply with the widow’s
allowance. The criminal cases proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a widow.
13. Respondents argued that they should not be held liable for the allowance because RTC, as affirmed
by CA, already ruled that the estate of Sy Bang comprised of the properties in the names of Petitioners.
a. They also claimed that the marriage of Rosita and Sy Bang has been recognized by the courts
in several cases––(1) case for recognition of Rosita’s citizenship, (2) guardianship proceedings,
and (3) partition proceedings.

Issue/s and Holding:

CASE 2 (GR 150797) - GRANTED [Andito yung topic so eto muna hehe]

W/N Rosita shall be given a widow’s allowance? – YES

Rule 83, SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive herefrom, under the direction of the
court, such allowance as are provided by law.

Art. 188 NCC. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but
from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to
them.

● SC noted that it has been 13 years since SC ordered Petitioners to pay Rosita her monthly widow’s
allowance. They fought tooth and nail against paying, grudgingly complying only upon threat of
incarceration.
● SC held that a finding of probable cause does NOT conclusively prove the charge of falsification
against Respondents.
 ○ Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
○ A finding of probable cause needs to rest only on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt.
● HENCE, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and Rosita
is entitled to receive her widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang.

On whether Respondents shall like be liable for the payment of the allowance – NO
● The widow’s allowance is chargeable to Sy Bang’s estate. It must be stressed that the issue of
whether the properties in the names of Respondents form part of the estate remains unsettled since
this petition questioning the CFI’s 3rd Partial Decision remains pending.
○ OTOH, there has been a categorical pronouncement that Petitioners are holding properties
belonging to Sy Bang’s estate.
● [DOCTRINE] The fact that the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is no
excuse from complying with the payment of the allowance.
○ Properties of the estate have been identified, thus, these properties should be made to answer
for the widow’s allowance of Rosita.
● In any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate.

On whether the guardianship court exceeded jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow’s
allowance – YES
● SC agreed with Petitioners that the RTC, as guardianship court, exceeded its jurisdiction.
○ A court hearing a petition for guardianship has limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to
enforce payment of the widow’s allowance.
○ SC emphasized that its order granting the allowance did NOT arose from the guardianship
proceedings but from the partition proceedings.
● The “court” referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3 is clearly the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also
crystal clear is that the widow’s allowance is to be take from the common mass of property forming part
of the estate of the decedent.
○ Thus, it is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of the
widow’s allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other courts.
● Paciente v. Dacuycuy: the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot
actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed.
Where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, . . . the
determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or
conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship
proceedings.

Ruling: Case 1 is DENIED; Case 2 is GRANTED.

CASE 1 (GR 114217) - DENIED

On the propriety of CFI’s 3rd Partial Decision
● CFI’s decision is in the nature of a several judgment. It ruled on the status of the properties in the names of
petitioners, while deferring ruling on the properties in the names of Respondents.
● A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-
parties.
○ ITCAB, Petitioners each held a separate and separable interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.
○ The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect the determination of the
obligations of the others. That the properties in the names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy
Bang estate did not preclude any further findings or judgment on the status or nature of the properties in
the names of the other heirs.
 ● However, notwithstanding the trial court's pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate cannot be partitioned or
distributed until the nal determination of the extent of the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations
under Rule 90, Section 1 have been settled.
○ Payment of the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate
tax must first be made.
○ Settlement may be made before payment of the obligations mentioned only if the distributees gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court, conditioned upon the payment of the said obligations within such time as
the court directs.
● Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action of partition.
○ Catapusan v. CA: In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property,
unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership.
● The 3rd Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating the proceedings for partition. By its very nature,
it is but a determination based on the evidence presented thus far. There remained issues to be resolved by the
court. There would be no final determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the court's examination of
the properties in the names of Respondents.

On the appointment of Receiver

● As conclusively found by CA, petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Counsel for the petitioners
submitted their opposition to [the] petition for appointment of a receiver led by private respondents. Such
appointment was made upon verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are
mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the same

On the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens

● The ling of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the
power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated
by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona de or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the
judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.
● While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is to be exercised within
the express connes of the law.
○ As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of
the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused
it to be recorded.
● As found by CA, Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were able to prove that the notice was intended merely to
molest and harass the owners of the property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was also proven
that the interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be annotated, was only 1/14 of the assessed value of the
property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were ordered to post a P50,000.00 bond to protect
whatever rights or interest Oscar Sy may have in the properties under litis pendentia.