LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Prospective Parliamentarians,

At the outset on behalf of the Executive Board, we extend a

warm welcome to all of you and congratulate you on being a
part of the LOK SABHA.

The committee being simulated, would unlike most other

simulations you must have heard of or been a part of; focus on
political intellect, logical intellect, analytical application of
thoughts, and strategic application of thoughts in addressing the
issue at hand.

In committee, Delegates will have the power to take their own

decisions on behalf of their party depending upon how debate
progresses. This calls for a very detailed research and
understanding of the matter at hand. These situations will test
your understanding and application of your Party’s ideology,
your research skills and foremost, your negotiation skills.

Your Executive Board is here to guide debate, and will be taking

part in substantive debate only through any updates and
questions to you. We will refrain from giving our opinion on
matters unless we are ruling on Points of Orders.

Regarding Rules of Procedure, we would ask you to be

conversant in them but not regard them as strict and
unbreakable. Rules of Procedure were made to aid debate, not
hamper it, so we would like to keep the Points of Orders for
usage of personal pronouns to a minimum. Further, we would
love for the delegates to converse amongst themselves and
promptly let the Executive Board know if they wish for any
rules to be amended to improve debate.

We see a lot of delegates come in and expect a cut and dry

debate on the Agenda. Going through a bunch of reports and
reading their conclusions out is not going to work here. What
this Executive Board expects is that you to express an analysis
of the information you have, not to just read out that
information. This will be a fast paced committee, and despite the
tremendous pressure, it will be a refreshing experience from the
usual pace of debate in YPs. Here, you can take action; you can
debate about HOW to take the action instead of only WHY that
action is necessary. If you are well researched and versed in
your Party’s opinions and ideology, be creative with your
solutions, and be proactive!

Kindly note, we are not looking for existing (impractical)

solutions, or statements that would be a copy paste of what the
person you are representing has already stated; instead we seek
an out of the box solution from you, while knowing and
understanding the impending limitations of the person you
represent.

This Introductory guide would be as abstract as possible, and

would just give you a basic perspective on what you can expect
from the committee and areas wherein which your research
should be focused at this given point in time. Given, the
extremely political and volatile nature of the agenda of
committee, your presence of mind and analytical aptitude is
something which we at the executive board would be looking to
test.

Kindly do not limit your research to the areas highlighted further

but ensure that you logically deduce and push your research to
areas associated with the issues mentioned.
The objective of this background guide is to provide you with a
‘background’ of the issue at hand and therefore it might seem to
some as not being comprehensive enough.

I feel that ‘study guides’ are detrimental to the individual growth

of the delegate since they overlook a very important part of this
activity, which is- Research. We are sure however that this
background guide gives you a perfect launching pad to start with
your research.

In the session, the executive board will encourage you to speak

as much as possible, as fluency, diction or oratory skills have
very little importance as opposed to the content you deliver. So
just research and speak and you are bound to make a lot of
sense. If you have any queries please feel free to contact us
anytime.

Eagerly looking forward to host you.

Wishing you all a very good luck.

Ayush Tandon. Yash Vardhan Tripathi.

(SPEAKER , LOK SABHA.) (DEPUTY SPEAKER , LOK

SABHA.)

atandon588@gmail.com yashvardhantrip@gmail.com

+917355149170 +918009962468
 A brief history of india china dispute.
Some crucial dates to be remembered :
The nuclear-armed Asian powers share a long history of mistrust and clashes along their lengthy border.

Asian regional superpowers India and China share a long history of mistrust and conflict along their
lengthy border, and tensions flared this week in their first deadly clash in more than four decades.

The world's two most populous nations and nuclear-armed neighbours have never even agreed on the
length of their "Line of Actual Control" frontier, which straddles the strategically important Himalayan
region

Recent decades have seen numerous skirmishes along the border, including a brief but bloody war in
1962.

Here are some key dates:

Nehru's 1959 Beijing visit India inherited its border dispute with China from its British colonial rulers,
who hosted a 1914 conference with the Tibetan and Chinese governments to set the border.

Beijing has never recognised the 1914 boundary, known as the McMahon Line, and currently claims
90,000 square kilometres (34,750 square miles) of territory - nearly all of what constitutes India's
Arunachal Pradesh state.

The border dispute first flared up during a visit by India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to
Beijing in 1959.

Nehru questioned the boundaries shown on official Chinese maps, prompting Chinese Premier Zhou
Enlai to reply that his government did not accept the colonial frontier.

1962 Sino-Indian War:

Chinese troops poured over the disputed frontier with India in 1962 during a dispute over the border's
demarcation.

It sparked a four-week war that left thousands dead on the Indian side before China's forces withdrew.

Beijing retained Aksai Chin, a strategic corridor linking Tibet to western China.

India still claims the entire Aksai Chin region as its own, as well as the nearby China-controlled Shaksgam
valley in northern Kashmir.

1967 Nathu La conflicts:

Another flashpoint was Nathu La, India's highest mountain pass in northeastern Sikkim state, which is
sandwiched between Bhutan, Chinese-ruled Tibet and Nepal.

During a series of clashes, including the exchange of artillery fire, New Delhi said some 80 Indian soldiers
died and counted up to 400 Chinese casualty.

1975 Tulung La ambush:

This skirmish was the last time shots were officially reported to have been fired across the disputed
border.

Four Indian soldiers were ambushed and killed along the dividing line in Arunachal Pradesh.

New Delhi blamed Beijing for crossing into the Indian territory, a claim dismissed by China.

2017 Doklam plateau stand-off:

India and China had a months-long high-altitude standoff in Bhutan's Doklam region after the Indian
army sent troops to stop China constructing a road in the area.

The Doklam plateau is strategically significant as it gives China access to the so-called "chicken's neck" -
a thin strip of land connecting India's northeastern states with the rest of the country.

It is claimed by both China and Bhutan, an ally of India. The issue was resolved after talks.

2020 Ladakh confrontation:

India on Tuesday said 20 of its soldiers were killed after a violent clash with Chinese forces a day earlier
in the strategically important Galwan Valley on the Himalayan frontier, a dramatic escalation that
represents the first combat fatalities between the Asian powers since 1975.

The clash follows weeks of low-level tensions after several Indian and Chinese soldiers were injured in a
high-altitude fistfight on the border at Sikkim state in early May.

Within days, said Indian officials, Chinese troops encroached across the demarcation line further west in
Ladakh region and India then moved in extra troops to positions opposite.

Last week, both countries said they would peacefully resolve the face-off after a high-level meeting
between army commanders.

But on Tuesday, India revealed that those efforts had gone badly wrong, with both sides blaming each
other.

Beijing confirmed there had been casualties in Monday's clash but gave no further details.
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION ABOUT LADDAKH AND LEH
REGION 
Ladakh through a bifocal lens: a short zoom-in, zoom-out history.
Ladakh history: A short primer on the region, its history, and some of the places where Indian soldiers
are locked in conflict with the Chinese army.

With the border standoff with China in its ninth week, Ladakh, a rugged, high-altitude region that is
generally far removed from the lives and imagination of most Indians, has become part of their daily
conversations and worries. A short primer on the region, its history, and some of the places where
Indian soldiers are locked in conflict with the Chinese army.

Looking back at an ancient land Lying between the Kunlun mountain range in the north and Himalayas
to the south, Ladakh was originally inhabited by people of Indo-Aryan and Tibetan descent. Historically
the region included the valleys of Baltistan, Indus, and Nubra, besides Zanskar, Lahaul and Spiti, Aksai
Chin, Ngari and Rudok.

Major General Dr GG Dwivedi (retd), an expert in Sino-Indian relations who has served in the region,
says, “Located at the crossroads of important trade routes since ancient times, Ladakh has always
enjoyed great geo-strategic importance.”

In the beginning of the first century AD, Ladakh was part of the Kushan empire. Later it changed hands
multiple times, alternating between the kingdoms of Kashmir and Zhangzhung. In 1834, Gen Zorawar
Singh, a general of Raja Gulab Singh who ruled Jammu as part of the Sikh empire, extended the
boundaries of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s kingdom to Ladakh, which till the 15th century was part of Tibet
and was ruled by dynasties of local Lamas

Partition, Pakistan and Chinese occupations:

Immediately after India’s Partition, tribal raiders from Pakistan attacked Ladakh. They captured Kargil,
and were heading for Leh when they were confronted by the Indian Army, who got back Kargil.

Although India has always considered Aksai Chin to be part of Jammu and Kashmir, in the 1950s the
Chinese built a highway, called western highway or NH219, connecting Tibet with Xinjiang through this
region, which was more easily accessible to the Chinese than to the Indians, who were across the
Karakoram.

India learnt of this road in 1957, and it was one of the causes of the 1962 India-China war, after which
China strengthened its control over this region. China today claims Aksai Chin to be part of Hotan county
of its Xinjiang province.
Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley, which was part of the Baltistan region north of the Karakoram, to
China following a Sino-Pakistani agreement signed on March 2, 1963.

The strategic importance of Ladakh:

Gen Dwivedi says China’s forays into the region began after the 1949 Communist Revolution, when
Chairman Mao Zedong, a veteran of guerrilla warfare, began consolidating China’s periphery as part of
his expansionist designs.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Tibet in 1951, and then began to eye Ladakh. The reason
was that the road connecting Kashgar in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet (NH 219) had to pass through Aksai
Chin, which was held by Indians but was seldom patrolled by them.

The Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India saw China further strengthening its
military presence in Ladakh to ensure the security of NH 219. India reacted with its ‘forward policy’ as
part of which it began setting up Army posts in the region to prevent Chinese expansion.

“This resulted in the initial clash between the Indian and Chinese forces in the Kongka Pass area in 1959.
Later, Galwan Valley became the scene of action when the Indian Army established a post to cut off the
Chinese post in the Samjunjling area, marking the beginning of the 1962 war,” says Dwivedi.

Pangong Tso, the contested lake:

In the latest faceoff, Indian troops first spied the Chinese on the banks of Pangong Tso. Dwivedi says this
lake, which is one-third in India and two-thirds in China, is of great tactical significance to the Chinese
who have built infrastructure along both its sides to ensure the speedy build-up of troops.

“Chinese incursions in this region aim at shifting the LAC westward so that they are able to occupy
important heights both on the north and the south of the lake, which will enable them to dominate the
Chushul Bowl,” says Dwivedi.

The narrow Chushul valley, which lies on the road to Leh with Pangong Tso to its north, was an
important target for the Chinese even during the 1962 war. It was here that the Battle of Chushul was
fought

Strategic SSN, to the far north:

The area spanning Galwan, Depsang plateau, and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), is called Sub-Sector North
(SSN). Lt Gen B S Jaswal (retd), former northern army commander, says this enclave that lies to the east
of the Siachen glacier is of immense significance given its proximity to the Karakoram Pass, close to
China’s western highway or NH 219 going to Aksai Chin. It’s the SSN that provides land access to Central
Asia through the Karakoram Pass.
Domination of this area is also crucial for the protection of the Siachen glacier, lying between the Saltoro
ridge on the Pakistani side and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese claim line.

The Galwan heights overlook the all-weather Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road, which
connects Leh to DBO at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Autonomous
Region from Ladakh. Domination over these heights allows China to easily interdict this road, says Gen
Dwivedi.

“Occupation of Galwan will neutralise the tactical advantage India gained by building the all-weather
Durbuk-DBO road over the last two decades,” he said.

Last year, the Border Road Organisation (BRO) made this rugged terrain even more accessible by
completing the 430-metre-long Colonel Chewang Rinchen Setu (bridge) across the Shyok river. With this,
the Darbuk route to DBO became available round the year, and the travel time of troops to the SSN was
halved.

Some analysts believe it was this bridge, coupled with the ongoing work on a link road to LAC in this
area, which prompted the PLA to enter Galwan.

The Chinese have also intruded into the Depsang plains near a place called Bottleneck point, an area 7
km away from an ITBP base on the newly-built Darbu-Shyok-DBO road.

They have done it in the past too, most recently in 2013 and 2015, coming almost 15 km inside the
Indian LAC. But on both occasions they were forced to retreat.

Gen Dwivedi says SSN is critical to India also because it offers maximum scope for military collaboration
between China and Pakistan against India by virtue of its location bordering the Siachen glacier.

SOME OF THE EXPANSIONIST POLICY EMPLOYED BY CHINA ALL

OVER THE WORLD ARE :
1)BUILDING PORTS IN ALL PLACES OF THE WORLD 
TOP NEWS

DefenceView in App

China is expanding its access to foreign ports: Pentagon

The Chinese navy's Luyang II Class guided missile destroyer Jinan at the Mumbai harbour on Monday
July 20, 2015. (Representative image)
WASHINGTON: China is expanding its access to strategic foreign ports like Pakistan's Gwadar and Sri
Lanka's Hambantota to pre-position the logistic framework necessary to support the growing presence
of its military in the Indian Ocean and beyond, the Pentagon said.

The People's Liberation Army's efforts to obtain access to commercial ports in Africa, the Middle-East
and South Asia would align with its future overseas logistic needs and meet its evolving naval
requirements, said the Congressionally-mandated report on the increasing Chinese military power which
was released by the US Department of Defence Tuesday.

China in 2015 announced its intention to build military facilities in Djibouti, citing reasons "to help the
Navy and Army further participate in UN peacekeeping operations, carry out escort missions in the
waters near Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and provide humanitarian assistance".

"China is expanding its access to foreign ports, such as in Gwadar, Pakistan, to pre-position the logistic
framework necessary to support the PLA's growing presence abroad, including normalising and
sustaining deployments into and beyond the Indian Ocean," the Pentagon said.

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is likely to use commercial ports and civilian ships to support
its international and domestic logistic operations, resupply, replenishment and maintenance, it said.

China's territorial claims in the resource-rich South China Sea are driving major logistic developments in
the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

The reclaimed territory in the South China Sea by China is equipped with harbours and berthing areas
that are capable of accommodating large naval ships, increasing the PLAN's ability to exercise control of
critical SLOCs, it said.

According to the report, China's military strategy reflects its drive to establish a coherent, unified
approach to managing national security in a world where Beijing perceives that China's expanding
interests have made it more vulnerable at home and abroad.

While it calls for a peer-to-peer cooperative relationship with the United States, Beijing also believes
that the presence of the US military and the US-led security architecture in Asia seeks to constrain
China's rise and interfere with its sovereignty, particularly in a Taiwan conflict scenario and in the East
and South China Seas.

"Since at least the 1990's, Beijing has repeatedly communicated its preference to move away from the
US-led regional security system and has pursued its own regional security initiatives in support of what it
views as a natural transition to regional predominance," the Pentagon said.

Authoritative Chinese documents, the report said, highlight the Korean Peninsula as an area of
instability and uncertainty, and express concern regarding unsettled territorial disputes along China's
border with India, which periodically result in tense standoffs like the one that occurred in the summer
of 2017 in the disputed Doklam region.
Observing that China's maritime emphasis and concern with protecting its overseas interests have
increasingly drawn the PLA beyond the country's borders and immediate periphery, the report said the
evolving focus of the PLA Navy — from "offshore waters defense" to a mix of offshore waters defense
and "open-seas protection" — reflects China's desire for a wider operational reach.

"Since 2009, the PLA has incrementally expanded its global operations beyond the previously limited
port calls and UN peacekeeping missions. The PLAN has expanded the scope and frequency of extended-
range naval deployments, military exercises, and engagements," it said.

The establishment in Djibouti of the PLA's first overseas military base with a deployed company of
Marines and equipment, and probable follow-on bases at other locations, signals a turning point in the
expansion of PLA operations in the Indian Ocean region and beyond, the Pentagon said.

These bases, and other improvements to the PLA's ability to project power during the next decade, will
increase China's ability to deter by military force and sustain operations abroad, the report said.

Noting that China is currently building its first domestically-designed and -produced aircraft carrier, the
Pentagon said the primary purpose of this vessel will be to serve a regional defense mission.

"Beijing probably also will use the carrier to project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly
into the Indian Ocean," it said.

The carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 and is expected to enter into service by 2019.

China's efforts to enhance its presence abroad, such as establishing its first foreign military base in
Djibouti and boosting economic connectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st
Century Maritime Road under the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI), could enable the PLA to project power
at even greater distances from the Chinese mainland, it said.

"In 2017, Chinese leaders said that the BRI, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South
Asia, Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin
America, demonstrating the scope of Beijing's ambition," the Pentagon said.

Sri Lanka has handed over the control of the southern sea port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year
lease, triggering concern over Beijing's efforts to expand influence in the region.

2 THE SALAMI SLICING TECHNIQUE 

NEWS

WHAT IS SALAMI SLICING?

In military parlance, the term salami slicing is described as a strategy that involves divide and conquer
process of threats and alliances to overcome opposition and acquire new territories.
Experts define salami slicing as a series of many small actions, often performed by clandestine means,
that as an accumulated whole produces a much larger action or result that would be difficult or unlawful
to perform all at once. The term is typically used pejoratively.

In the context of China, salami slicing denotes its strategy of territorial expansion in the South China Sea
and the Himalayan regions. Many believe that Doklam standoff was the result of China's salami slicing
tactics in the Himalayas.

CHINA'S SALAMI SLICING TACTICS

China is the only country which has been expanding its territorial jurisdiction post-World War II at the
expense of its neighbours. This expansion has taken place in both territorial and maritime regions.

Acquisition of Tibet, capture of Aksai Chin and annexation of Paracel Islands are some of the glaring
example of Chinese expansionist policy. China follows a particular pattern in acquiring a territory in its
neighbourhood.

China first stakes claim on a territory and keeps repeating its claim at all platforms and on all possible
occasions. It launches a propaganda disputing the claim of the other party to such an extent that the
territory in question is recognised as a dispute between China and the other country. In resolving the
dispute, China uses its military and diplomatic might to gain a part of it.

This strategy of territorial expansion by China is referred to as salami slicing, a term which is a
modification of phrase, salami tactics. This was coined Hungarian communist politician Matyas Rakosi
during 1940s to describe his strategy to the non-Communist parties by "cutting them off like slices of
salami." Salami slicing is also known as 'cabbage strategy' in military parlance.

3). STRING OF PEARLS

With reports of China mulling to establish a naval base in Pakistan doing the rounds, India may once
again worry about the much talked about Chinese doctrine of ‘String of Pearls’ to contain both lands as
well as the maritime footprint of India in the region.

‘String of Pearls’ refers to a geopolitical theory to the network of Chinese intentions in India Ocean
Region (IOR). Precisely, it refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities developed
by China in countries falling on the Indian Ocean between the Chinese mainland and Port Sudan.

The doctrine has been discussed and debated for years and India’s ‘Look East Policy’ was always seen as
an answer to Chinese ‘String of Pearls’.

But first, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and now its macro form of One Belt One Road
(OBOR) under which China will construct variou s land and maritime trade routes are also seen as a part
of China’s larger military ambition.
India has already been encircled by Chinese military and commercial facilities and if as reported, Chinese
naval base comes up on Pakistan soil, that’s going to be the possible last cog in the chain of pearls
encircling India.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
1) INDIA MODERNISING ITS AIRFORCE AND NAVY 

a)The defence acquisition council has decided to buy 21 Mig 29  and 12  SU-30 MKI FIGHTER JETS from
Russia .out of which 12 SU-30 MKI WILLL BE license made BY HAL while 21 mig 29 will be developed in
russia itself 

b )INDIAN NAVY TO IMPLEMENT "MAREECH" -a DRDO developed ANTI TORPEDO SYSTEM in most of its
warships ,destroyer and submarines .

3)On 1st july 2020 India has raised voice against China in UNHRC on the hong kong issue .India
represented by mr RAJIV KUMAR CHANDRA has said india has its eyes on the disturbance created in
hong kong because many Indians live in hong kong 

4) GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS BANNED 59 CHINNESE APPS

India bans 59 Chinese apps including TikTok, Helo, WeChat, ShareIT, UC browser and shopping app
Clubfactory are among other prominent apps which have been banned.

India-China standoff: GOI bans 59 Chinese apps including TikTok, SHAREit

The government banned 59 Chinese mobile applications, including top social media platforms such as
TikTok, Helo and WeChat, to counter the threat posed by these applications to the country’s
“sovereignty and security,” it said in a press release late on Monday. ShareIT, UC browser and shopping
app Clubfactory are among the other prominent apps that have been blocked amid rising tensions
between India and China following clashes at the border two weeks ago.

The government said the applications are engaged in activities “prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity
of India, defence of India, security of state and public order.” The ban has been imposed under Section
69A of the Information Technology Act read with relevant provisions of the Information Technology
(Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009, it said. The govt
also cited complaints about data on Indian users being transferred abroad without authorisation.

The move could come as a blow to China’s Digital Silk Route ambitions, eroding the valuation of the
companies. It could also lead to more countries following India’s cue and acting against these apps,
sources told ET.

A top official said the government had considered all aspects before taking the decision. “These apps
have been there for a long time, and there are some privacy and security issues with them including
risks of data going out of the country,” said the person.
The statement from the Ministry of Electronics and IT (MeitY) said it had received complaints from
various sources, including several reports about the misuse of some mobile apps for stealing and
surreptitiously transmitting users’ data in an unauthorised manner to servers outside India.

Ban Recommended by Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)

“The compilation of the data, its mining and profiling by elements hostile to national security and
defence of India, which ultimately impinges upon the sovereignty and integrity of India, is a matter of
very deep and immediate concern which requires emergency measures,” it said. “There have been
raging concerns on aspects relating to data security and safeguarding the privacy of 130 crore Indians. It
has been noted recently that such concerns also pose a threat to sovereignty and security of our
country.”

The Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, part of the MHA, has sent an “exhaustive recommendation
for blocking the malicious apps,” the press release said.

The Internet Freedom Foundation said, “This is not a legal order issued under Section 69A. Our first ask
is transparency and disclosure.” The activist group tweeted such cases needed to be considered
individually and not in the aggregate.

“There is legitimacy in concerns of data security and citizens’ privacy,” it said. “This may be achieved
through regulatory processes that emerge from objective, evidence based measures. This ensures
credible action that protects individual liberty, innovation & security interests.”

‘LEGALLY SOUND’

Analysts said the move will impact the Chinese apps.

“From a tactical perspective, it puts enormous economic pressure because these apps were heavily
reliant on Indian markets. From a legal perspective, it is sound because grounds like national security are
difficult to challenge in a court of law,” said Santosh Pai, partner at Link Legal, who tracks Chinese
investments in the country. “If this is going to be the new state of affairs, we need to see whether Indian
apps will fulfil the need or American apps will take market share.”

Investors in Indian social apps say that competition will come down due to the ban on Chinese apps.

“The competitive threat will go down. But a lot of apps in India are inspired by the deft engineering of
Chinese apps. Overall the ecosystem's ingenuity will slow down,” said Deepak Gupta, founding partner
at WEH Ventures, which has invested in Indian video blogging platform Trell.

TREATIES  SIGNED BY INDIA AND CHINA 

Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control
in the India-China Border Areas November 29, 1996 (New Delhi). The Government of the Republic of
India and the Government of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the two
sides), Believing that it serves the fundamental interests of the peoples of India and China to foster a
long-term good-neighbourly relationship in accordance with the 'five principles of mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, Convinced that the maintenance of peace
and tranquility along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas accords with
the fundamental interests of the two peoples and will also contribute to the ultimate resolution of the
boundary question, Reaffirming that neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by
any means or seek unilateral military superiority, Pursuant to the Agreement between the Government
of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Maintenance of
Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, signed on 7
September, 1993, Recognizing the need for effective confidence building measures in the military field
along the line of actual control in the border areas between the two sides, Noting the utility of
confidence building measures already in place along the line of actual control in the India-China border
areas, Committed to enhancing mutual confidence and transparency in the military field. 

But in the recent clashes we have seen violation of this agreement by Chinese solders,we need to have a
strong bilateral and diplomatic talks on this issue also .