251

252

3.3. ANTIPATER IN DIOGENES LAERTIUS 7.38-83 (STOIC LOGIC)

Antipater is mentioned five times in Diogenes Laertius' account of

Stoic logic. Diogenes Laertius' source in every case is SLA, the author of
the detailed CD exposition of logic:
54. Antipater is mentioned along with Chrysippus and Apollodorus
as upholding the kataleptike phantasia as the criterion of truth. The
whole laudatio of which this is a part may derive from the criterion
section of Posidonius' exposition of logic ("as says Posidonius in his A b o u t
the Criterion" - see §3.2.4). It is not clear whether Posidonius' exposition
took the form of DCD or CD, and if CD, why SLA preferred Crinis' exposition
to that of Posidonius. DL 7.54 = T36.
55. Antipater is mentioned along with Archedemus, Diogenes and
Chrysippus as treating p h o n e as corporeal. The intermediate source is
Crinis, but he has not copied this from Diogenes of Babylon's Dialectical
H a n d b o o k . Diogenes is mentioned earlier in 55 (On Phone, i.e., his
"Phonetics" section of dialectic - see §3.2.3), and is mentioned again in 56
when Crinis returns to him. It is most probable that Crinis' source here is
Archedemus, whose work Crinis refers to as On Phone, indicating that
Archedemus, like Diogenes, arranged dialectic in the order "Semantics" -
" P h o n e t i c s " .1
57. Antipater is mentioned as adding a sixth part of speech (m e s o t e s
or "middle") to the five SLA found reported in Crinis. I suggest (§3.2.4)
that SLA found the reference by a happy chance in Posidonius' On Lexis:
SLA had just finished copying from Crinis the section on the parts of
speech and was now looking for material for the subsequent lexis s e c t i o n .
He was able to go back and insert into the list of the parts of speech the
reference to Antipater. Posidonius had found this sixth part of speech in
Antipater's On Lexis and Things Said.
60-2. While Antipater appears at first to be cited for the first definition
only, it seems to me that he is in fact the source for the whole list of

1
Crinis "had a big head because he understood Archedemus" mevga ejfrovnei

o{ti ejnovei •Arcevdhmon (Epict. D i s s . III 2,15 = SVF III Crinis 1). PW sv Krinis (2)

regards this testimonium as possible evidence that Crinis was a pupil of Archedemus.
All that seems to be certain, however, is that Crinis interpreted Archedemus. It is
only on the PW interpretation of this testimonium that Crinis is dated to the second
century B.C. (e.g., in L&S I, 504). He may have lived somewhat later.
Parts 3.3 Antipater in DL 7.38-83 253
definitions pertaining to definition. Posidonius is mentioned at the
beginning of 60, signifying that Posidonius' Introduction to Lexis is about
to be left by SLA. He turns to Crinis' definition section, where he begins,
as does Crinis, by referring to Antipater. At the end of the list of definitions,
SLA indicates another switch by referring to Crinis (62), and turns back
to Posidonius' Introduction to Lexis (only Posidonius is named, but the
contents pertain to l e x i s). DL 7.60-2 = T26, and will be the subject of the
next section (§3.3.1).
68. This is the only reference to Antipater in the "Semantics" section,
and it is quite tantalizing. Propositions, says SLA, are divided into simple
and non-simple by Chrysippus, Archedemus, Athenodorus, Antipater and
Crinis. It would appear, therefore, that Crinis' source for this section is
not Diogenes of Babylon. The order in which the names are given might
suggest that Antipater was Crinis' source. We have just seen, however (DL
7.55), that Archedemus was quite capable of referring to Antipater, and
he cannot be ruled out here. Furthermore, there is always the possibility
that Crinis' source was Apollodorus whom he mentions near the very
beginning of the "Semantics" section. Crinis tends to mention his immediate
source once unless he is about to leave it or has just returned to it (unless
upon returning he finds an earlier source to refer to, as in the case of DL
7.60). The likelihood that Crinis had access to a work by Apollodorus is
strengthened by the fact that he adds Apollodorus' opinion concerning
k a t e g o r e m a to that of Diogenes (DL 7.58, Apollodorus is unnamed, but cf.
DL 7.64). It is just as possible, however, that Crinis' second source merely
reported Apollodorus' opinion along with others. The author of such a
second source may be guessed at (e.g., Antipater, Archedemus), but there
is too little evidence on which to base a firm identification.

Only one of the references has an immediate bearing on the issue

of the division and exposition of Stoic philosophy. This is DL 7.60-2 = T26,
which will be considered in the next section (§3.3.1). The results of the
analysis of T26 may then help to place Antipater within the development
of the division of philosophy as reported in DL 7.39-43, 84, 132 (§3.3.2) and
of its exposition, as exemplified by the expositions of logic in DL 7.43-82
(§3.3.3).
254

3.3.1. DL 7.60-2 (T26): The Definition List

DL 7.60-2 forms the greater part of the definition section of dialectic

in the Long Account. Von Arnim attributes to Antipater what appears to
be the first definition of definition and the definition of outline,1 to
Chrysippus what appears to be the second definition of definition,2 to
Diogenes of Babylon the definitions from genus to subdivision,3 and to
Crinis the definition of partition.4 These attributions seem to have been
generally accepted.5 In order to see what may be attributed to whom, the
passage should be seen in its context:
60 poivhma ("poem") defined as a l e x i s , "as says Posidonius in his I n t r o d u c t i o n

to Lexis."
End of lexis se c tion.
Beginning of definition section.
- o{ro" (definition) defined, "as says Antipater in his On Definitions, I."

- (<ijdivou> ajpovdosi"), "as says Chrysippus in his On Definitions."

- uJpografhv (outline) defined.

- gevno" (genus) defined - 61 ej n nov h ma (mental image) defined.

- ei\ d o" (species) defined.

- diaiv r esi" (division) defined.

- aj n tidiaiv r esi" (contradivision) defined

- uJ p odiaiv r esi" (subdivision) defined - 62 -

- merismov" (partition) defined, "as says Crinis."

- ajmfiboliva (ambiguity) defined as a l e x i s .

- dialektikhv (dialectic) defined, "as says Posidonius."

- dialektikhv (dialectic) defined, "as says Chrysippus."

End of "Phonetics" - 63 -
Beginning of "Semantics"

1
First def. SVF II, 226b, both deff. SVF III Ant. 23.
2
SVF II, 2 2 6 b .
3
SVF III DB, 25.
4
SVF III Crinis 2. The definition of partition is attributed to Crinis also by
PW, sv Krinis (2).
5
On definitions of definition, L&S I, 194 (§4.2.2ff.); on Crinis, L&S I, 504.
Parts 3.3.1 - DL 7.60-2 (T26) 255
Diogenes Laertius' source for the Long Account of Stoic logic (SLA)
used Posidonius' Introduction to Lexis for the l e x i s section. He is used for
the whole of 59, where one of the two vices and all but one of the five
virtues of l o g o s are defined in terms of lexis. The definition of p o e m is
then given in terms of lexis, but it is only here that Posidonius and his
work are referred to. It is at this point that SLA leaves Posidonius and, I
suggest, returns to Crinis, his main source for the "Phonetics" section. In
a similar manner, he refers to Crinis only when he leaves him to return
to Posidonius. Crinis is used for the definition section, but he is poor on
definitions outside the field of definition itself. SLA finds in Posidonius a
definition of "ambiguity" (it is defined in terms of l e x i s) and two definitions
of dialectic with which he rounds off the "Phonetics" section - one is by
Posidonius himself, and one is attributed [by Posidonius] to Chrysippus.
Crinis is not referred to at the beginning of the definition section.
SLA follows Crinis in attributing the definition of definition to Antipater,
and the following term to Chrysippus. There is then no occasion to refer
to Crinis until the final definition, when SLA is about to turn to Posidonius
for supplementary definitions.
So much for SLA. What of Crinis himself? Did he find the definition
section in his main source, Diogenes of Babylon's Dialectical Handbook?
This appears unlikely. SSA and Crinis both reveal that Diogenes of Babylon's
Dialectical Handbook was arranged "Semantics"-"Phonetics", and SSA shows
that this old order dealt with definition (at least g e n o s and eidos) in the
"Semantics" section. Crinis himself begins with "Phonetics", and he is
writing about definition at the end of this section. His exposition of logic
is CD. The DCD exposition of logic preceded and influenced the CD exposition
of logic. Crinis must have had some acquaintance with earlier DCD if not
CD expositions of logic. In these expositions, the definition section was
more developed than in the RD exposition of logic. Crinis, while copying
and adapting Diogenes of Babylon for the most part, would have looked
elsewhere for a suitable definition section.
Crinis' definition list therefore derives from Antipater, directly or
indirectly, and certainly not through Diogenes of Babylon. It remains to
be asked whether Antipater composed the passage as it now stands. Did
Antipater write a mere list of definitions? My translation of the text is to
be found in T26 Comm. A summary of the list is to found above in this
section.
256

The passage containing the three terms pertaining to division may indicate
that Antipater's work has been adapted. The examples given for the
definitions of division, contradivision and subdivision are not entirely in
keeping with the definitions. Subdivision is defined as a division of a
division, but it is exemplified by a division of a contradivision (Step 1.
good, not good; step 2. good, bad, indifferent). Furthermore, the result of
the subdivision (good, bad, indifferent) is actually a simple division. The
example for division given earlier in the list (rational, irrational) appears
to exemplify contradivision.
There must have been more in Antipater's work which would help
to explain these anomalies. It seems, for instance, that the example given
for division (rational, irrational) is of the sort by which there can be
only two proximate species of the genus: i.e., by dividing according to the
possession of reason, the proximate species of animal are two only.
Contradivision, on the other hand, is a half-way stage, as demonstrated by
its example's subsequent subdivision. The proximate species of being are
three, if divided according to goodness, and contradivision has produced
only two: subdivision produces three. Subdivision, then, seems at one
point in Antipater's discussion to have been treated as the division of
division (it is so defined), referring to the creation of a new tier of
species; but at another point (as exemplified), contradivision and
subdivision were treated as stages in the division of a genus into more
than two proximate species. The anomalies may best be explained if
Antipater's original work did not consist merely of a list of definitions,
but contained an analysis of division in which these terms appeared and
were discussed.
Another indication that Antipater's work was not simply a list of
terms defined, but a discussion of definition, is the location of the definition
of "mental image" (e n n o e m a). It comes after the definition of "genus" but
before the definition of "species". The original author of a mere list of
definitions would have kept "genus" and "species" together. Note that
"genus" and "species" are the two terms mentioned in SSA to represent
Diogenes of Babylon's definition section. A treatment of "mental image",
however, would not have been out of place in a discussion of "genus",
especially when "mental image" was part of the definiens of "genus".
The adaptation of Antipater's work seems to have consisted in
Parts 3.3.1 - DL 7.60-2 (T26) 257
summarizing the discussion, or rather reducing it to a mere list of
definitions which do seem to have been included within the discussion.
Here follows a preliminary reconstruction of Antipater's On
D e f i n i t i o n s I, making some use of the findings of §4:
1. The first part raises for discussion a certain type of horos o r
definition (it is a logos, and not all types of horoi are l o g o i). It is compared
with the idiou apodosis, perhaps as the most similar to it of the various
types of dialectical apodosis (the idiou apodosis may be a l o g o s) . It includes
the most accurate type of horos, and may indeed be meant to refer only to
the most accurate type of h o r o s .1
2. One type of less accurate horos is the "outline". Some of the
definitions of it here indicate that the original discussion concerned
epistemology. Definitions and outlines could explain how wise and unwise
men think, perceive and conceive. "Genus" and "mental image" may have
belonged to this discussion.
3. "Species", division, contradivision and subdivision may continue
the previous discussion on epistemology, which here analyses the process
of creating definitions.
4. The discussion of the division of genera into species must be only
one part of the larger discussion on the creation of horoi, and in particular
the accurate horos first indicated by the "analysis" definition (step 1).
The "partition" does not belong to this discussion, but may have been
included by Antipater to point out the difference between division (into
species) and partition (into topics). Alternatively, it is Crinis' summary of
a discussion of partition he found later in Antipater's work.
For a detailed analysis of T26, see especially §4.2.3 and §4.3.

1
The idiou apodosis, or rendition of the peculiar (i d i o n), predicates its
subject in such a way that it could refer to no other species, or even no other
individual subject. Thus the predicate "animal: capable of laughing" must refer to a
human; "animal: capable of laughing: sitting: here" may refer to only one particular
human (§4.2.2). Aristotle goes further and distinguishes one type of idion w h i c h
also explains the essence of its subject, and calls this idion the horismos. The
horismos of human is "animal: capable of reason (rational): mortal". The horismos i s
necessarily a logos, being a compound of the subject's genus and one or more specifying
differentiae. The idion may be a logos (e.g., "animal: capable of laughing"), but need
not be (e.g., "capable of laughing"). The genus (e.g., "animal") is a horos but not a
logos (§4.2.1).
258

3.3.2. Antipater and DL 7.39-42

As was noted at the beginning of §3.1, the haeresiographical account

of the Stoic divisions of philosophy fails to mention Antipater even once.
The subsequent source analysis allows us to conclude that Antipater is
mentioned by neither of that account's two haeresiographical sources
(§2.2.5). One cannot conclude from this silence, however, that Antipater
had no views on the division of Stoic philosophy. One may reasonably
assume that a major Stoic, a leading dialectician, a pupil of Diogenes of
Babylon and the teacher of the teacher of Posidonius, would have some
views on the division of Stoic philosophy. The following discussion is
based on that assumption.
I argue that Diogenes Laertius has used one source for 7.39-48 (SSA).
SSA is no earlier than the first century B.C., since it mentions Phanias, a
pupil of Posidonius. The expositions of ethics and physics in SSA have not
been recorded. SSA has used for the Stoic divisions of philosophy and for
the exposition of logic two haeresiographical sources: one bases its division
of logic on Diogenes of Babylon (Rhetoric/Dialectic), and the other derives
from a later source ([Definition]/Criterion/Dialectic - §3.2.3). The RD
account derives from the exposition of logic composed by Antipater's
teacher, Diogenes of Babylon; it is unlikely to have been influenced by
Antipater, although, of course, this does not automatically rule out the
possiblity that Antipater himself adopted the RD division of logic. The
(D)CD account is later, and therefore better placed chronologically to be
influenced by Antipater's views on division, although again, one should
not automatically assume that Antipater did influence this method of
division. Since the influences of Antipater on division are not to be found
in the RD account, DL 7.42-48 may be set aside, and our attention will be
focussed on DL 7.39-42, where we have to some extent managed to
disentangle the (D)CD account from the RD account (DL 7.41-2: §3.2.3).
The RD source treats rhetoric and dialectic as t e c h n a i . They are
technai of speaking well, with regard to different forms of speech. The
treatment of rhetoric and dialectic as the t e c h n a i of speaking well is
pre-Stoic. From at least the time of Chrysippus, dialectic dealt with much
more than speech in the form of question and answer. It already included
Parts 3.3.2 - Antipater and DL 7.39-42 259
epistemology, semantics and phonetics.1 The reassessment of logic,
therefore, by the time of Diogenes of Babylon, was well overdue.
The (D)CD source reports the later divisions of logic. The DCD division
precedes the CD division. The parts of logic are referred to as aspects
( e i d e), not t e c h n a i , implying that it is with the DCD reorganization of
logic that the L o g o s is divided according to philosophia. The idea that
p h i l o s o p h i a is the active aspect of the t e c h n e of arete, and s o p h i a is its
theoretical aspect may not have been new, but its systematic application
to the contents of philosophy does seem to have been revolutionary. The
parts of philosophy - logic, physics, ethics - are transformed into the
three possible t o p o i of human activity (the use of logos = thought/language;
observation of L o g o s = the cosmos; interaction with the environment
according to l o g o s [= the theoretical aspect of a r e t e]). Philosophy, then, is
partitioned into these three topoi. On the other hand, the s o p h i a or l o g o s
which is applied in any of these activities is the same s o p h i a , but it is
applied differently in each case. For this reason, the logos kata ten
p h i l o s o p h i a n is not partitioned into t o p o i but divided into aspects (e i d e) .
As philosophy, so also logic. The t o p o i of the DCD division of logic are the
types of human activity pertaining to the use of logos = thought/ language.
The parts of the logical eidos are divided into eide. They are the one
s o p h i a or logos applied in different ways to the various subtopics of the
logical topos.
The RD division of logic was in effect already CD by the time of the
reorganization. The innovation was the systematic application of the idea
of the t e c h n e of a r e t e in all fields of philosophy which granted the CD
division of logic a rational and coherent justification. The controversial
aspect of the reorganization was its DCD division of logic. To elaborate on
the changes:
1. Dialectic was officially transformed from a t e c h n e concerning
speech in the form of question and answer to the episteme (=t e c h n e) of
what is true, false, and neither. The new function was not chosen
arbitrarily, but reflected the changes within dialectic which had already
1
The definition of dialectic as peri; shmaiv n onta kai; shmainov m ena

("pertaining to things signifying and signified") is attributed to Chrysippus at DL

7.62 (SLA). The order should be reversed. Diogenes of Babylon divided dialectic into
shmainov m ena and fwnhv (unattributed at DL 7.43 [SSA]) or pravgmata kai; shmainovmena
and fwnhv (unattributed at DL 7.63 and 7.55 [SLA]).
260

taken place. The exposition of Diogenes of Babylon shows that dialectic

was already concerned more with the aim of dialectic, the attainment of
truth, than with the art of asking and answering questions per se.
2. In the reorganization, rhetoric appears to have been subsumed to
dialectic. Some of its contents may already have been discussed in dialectic
prior to the reorganization, so this change would not have been too
c o n t r o v e r s i a l .1
3. The separation of the criterion section from dialectic was natural,
but only once the old idea of logic had been revised. That is, only once
logic as the two t e c h n a i of speech had been replaced by a much wider
concept of logic - that concerning the relations between language, thought
and reality - could the criterion be considered as a legitimately independent
aspect of logic. Since Stoics seem to have been treating logic in this wider
sense for some time, the reorganization of rhetoric, dialectic, and the
criterion would have been welcome; it was certainly long-lasting.
4. The same cannot be said for the new third eidos of logic, the
definition section. In the new scheme of things, this definitional eidos
corresponded to a perceived t o p o s of activity pertaining to the use of
language/thought distinct from the criterional and dialectical t o p o i. The
(D)CD source reports that some "stripped away" the definitional eidos.
Why they did so will be considered in later sections, after an analysis of
the testimonia concerning definition and criterion. Of interest here is
that they did so. We have indeed seen that SLA, and his source, Crinis,
relegated the definition section back to dialectic.
The strict systematization of philosophy according to the concept of
the t e c h n e of a r e t e is exemplified by the new DCD division of logic, and
the most characteristic feature of this division is the definitional aspect. I
suggest that Antipater was the originator of the DCD division of logic, and
consequently, that he was the systematizer of philosophy according to

1
Posidonius appears to have discussed rhetoric as an aspect of dialectic, if
indeed, rhetoric was divided into phonetics and semantics. Kidd, 198 (F44 comm.)
remarks: "… Posidonius was in the habit of importing Stoic dialectical classifications
into contemporary debates on rhetorical technicalities…" Kidd is referring to his
F189 = Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria III. 6.31-8, where Posidonius is said to have
classified s t a t u s (=stavsi") in rhetorical theory into two genera, vox (=fwnhv) and

r e s (=pra' g ma), each of which was further subdivided.

Parts 3.3.2 - Antipater and DL 7.39-42 261
the concept of the techne of arete. The present argument will confine
itself to the findings of §3, and is intended merely to establish the
plausibility of the suggestion.
We observed in the previous section (§3.3.1) that Antipater devoted
at least one work to a discussion of definition. This fact in itself is not
enough to suggest that Antipater established a definitional eidos of logic.
More significant is what we find in this discussion of definition. A clear
distinction appears to have been maintained, and possibly explicitly
established, in this discussion between a division into e i d e and a partition
into topoi. Such a distinction is nowhere else recorded in Stoic remains.
This distinction, furthermore, is not maintained in later accounts, such as
SSA itself, elsewhere in Diogenes Laertius, or in Sextus Empiricus (§3.1.2).
If the distinction had been made before Antipater, it had not been applied
systematically to the partition of philosophy and the division of the l o g o s
kata ten philosophian (the distinction is not explicit or even apparent,
for example, in Diogenes of Babylon's RD division of logic). It seems very
likely that it was the reorganization of philosophy which made the
distinction necessary, and that it was only while the structure of philosophy
was so conceived that the distinction was maintained. Since the distinction
is made explicitly by Antipater alone, it is possible that Antipater was
responsible for the systematic partition of philosophy into t o p o i (areas of
activity), and the division of the logos kata ten philosophian into e i d e
(aspects of the one l o g o s / s o p h i a). He may have claimed or even believed
that he was merely elaborating on views already expressed by Zeno,
Chrysippus, Apollodorus, Syllus, Eudromus and Diogenes of Babylon. It is
claimed by SSA that these Stoics (all suspiciously before Antipater) and
Posidonius divided the logos kata ten philosophian (DL 7.39). I suggest
that SSA's (D)CD source is drawing here on Posidonius who obtained his
information from Antipater.1 Did Antipater's predecessors really all divide

1
Posidonius may already have mentioned Antipater and would have had no
need to mention him again in quoting from him the list of earlier philosophers.
SSA's (D)CD source simply copied the list from Posidonius and added Posidonius'
name. Incidentally, if this list of philosophers was found by SSA in his (D)CD
source, then the reference to Zeno of Tarsus dividing philosophy itself may well
have been found by SSA in his RD source which, after all, is based on Diogenes of
Babylon, one of Zeno's many pupils. This further strengthens the argument that it
was SSA who manufactured the controversy between the Stoics on the question of
262

the logos kata ten philosophian? A self-evident fact would not have needed
such elaboration. Even accepting Antipater's claim that his illustrious
predecessors did indeed divide the logos kata ten philosophian, it is still
reasonable to conclude that their practice was implicit and required
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .1 Antipater, in making the practice explicit, would have
been concerned to show that his innovations were orthodox. Posidonius
seems to have understood and adopted Antipater's emphasis on the division
of the logos kata ten philosophian since his animal simile represents an
attempt at illustrating the essential unity of the logos kata ten philosophian
(§3.1.3).2
A further point which may go back to Antipater himself is the
observation that some "strip away" the definitional eidos (DL 7.41; §3.1.4).
We are fortunate to have a fragment of Antipater preserved by Plutarch
( De St. rep. 1052A-B = F36) which shows that Antipater himself used this
verb, that he used this verb in connection with the "stripping away" of
eide, and that "stripping away" did not mean the legitimate removal of an
eidos. As I read Plutarch's text, the "aspect strippers" are rebuked for
having a basic conception of gods even less specific than is natural (F36
comm.). The "stripping away" of the definitional eidos, therefore, is not a
positive or even a neutral report concerning the removal of a wrongly
located section. It is a critical comment to the effect that the definitional
eidos is a real aspect of logic, and to deny it is to have a less specific
conception of logic. There appear to be two options regarding the origin
of the remark that some "strip away" the definitional eidos, of which the
second is the most likely:
1. The comment was made by an advocate of Antipater's DCD division
of logic - but whoever was writing in support of the definitional eidos
against other Stoics who relegated the definition section to dialectic might
have been expected to mention Antipater as an authority for his view.
Furthermore, we might have expected our sceptical sources to jump on a
y q
what was divided (§3.1.1).
1
The Stoic logos kata ten philosophian, one aspect of the Stoic Logos, m u s t
be distinguished from the plural logoi kata philosophian to be found in Aristotle
E.E. 1217b21-3, Pol. 1282b19 (my thanks to Jaap Mansfeld for bringing Aristotle's
use of the phrase to my attention).
2
This does not mean that Posidonius necessarily agreed with Antipater's
definitional e i d o s of logic.
Parts 3 Conclusion: Antipater's Parts of Philosophy 263
major Stoic disagreement over definition. They do, but the disagreement
involves Antipater personally (T30).
2. The comment derives from an attack made by Antipater against
his fellow Stoics. Whether they choose the RD or the CD division of logic,
Antipater could show that these people "strip away" the definitional eidos
- i.e., they make the conception of the logical eidos less accurate than it
should be by ignoring one of its natural aspects. It is possible that SSA's
(D)CD source has once again copied only a section of a work derived from
Antipater in which Antipater's name is not mentioned because it has
been mentioned before (or will be mentioned later). Note that the verb
"strip away" retains the present tense it would have had in Antipater's
work. This does not imply, however, that SSA's (D)CD source used Antipater
directly.

3 CONCLUSION: ANTIPATER AND THE PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY

The following is based on the findings of §3 only, and is intended to

be a preliminary outline upon which a fuller account may be based.
Fuller accounts will be given at the end of subsequent sections dealing
with Antipater's philosophical testimonia.
If Antipater was indeed the only Stoic, or one of very few Stoics,
both to make explicit the distinction between philosophy and the l o g o s
kata ten philosophian, and to apply the distinction, it seems reasonable to
ascribe to him the following propositions regarding the partition of
philosophy and the division of the logos kata ten philosophian. His
originality may lie in the systematic application of earlier Stoic ideas,
rather than in the ideas themselves. His originality with regard the
definitional and criterional parts of logic is more pronounced, but may
be appreciated only after an analysis of the relevant testimonia:

1. Virtue is a t e c h n e , a composite of theory and its practice.

2. The practice of virtue is philosophy; this must be partitioned into
three t o p o i to correspond with the human agent's three possible modes of
activity. The logical, physical, and ethical t o p o i are the areas of mental
reflection, external observation, and interaction with the environment,
respectively.
3. The theory of virtue is wisdom, and the whole of wisdom with
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respect to a particular t o p o s is the eidos (aspect) of wisdom corresponding

to that topos. Thus the logical t o p o s of philosophy is paired with the
logical eidos of wisdom.
4. The doctrinal l o g o s or exposition of the theory of virtue reflects
the logos kata ten philosophian with its division into three e i d e (logic,
physics, ethics). The order of the exposition, however, does not reflect
the logos kata ten philosophian. Order is necessary because of the inability
of humans to comprehend the l o g o s in one go. Students of Stoic doctrine
must study logic first, since logic deals with our grasp of l o g o s itself,
without which, the physical and ethical aspects of the l o g o s cannot be
g r a s p e d .1
5. It would appear that the divisions of logic also follow a definite
paedagogical order. While the definitional, criterional and dialectical t o p o i
are t o p o i because they exhaust the modes of activity within the logical
topos,2 they also seem to be in a definite paedagogical order, although, of
course, one part could not be taught to the exclusion of the others.3 It may

1
Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus, Archedemus and Eudromus choose the order
logic, physics, ethics (DL 7.40). Cf. the importance attached to dialectic by the
sources of Ammonius = SVF II, 49; Alexander = 49a; Plutarch = 53; Epictetus = 54
(which adds Cleanthes to the list). Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus are not renowned
for their systematic presentation of Stoic doctrines, suggesting that a later Stoic has
interpreted them as putting logic first. None of the Stoics mentioned is later than
Antipater, and he is one of the great Stoic dialecticians. Perhaps he is the source for
some, at least, of the accounts showing the priority of logic. Archedemus would be
another strong candidate.
2
Ierodiakonou develops an argument based on sources which emphasize the
exhaustiveness of division and the inexhaustiveness of partition. For her discussion
of the differences between division and partition, see Ierodiakonou, 131-4, and esp.
132 for her comments on Cic. Top. 28; 30; 33-4; SE M. 11.10-17; Alex. Aphr., in Top.
93,27-94,2; Mart. Cap., De Nupt. Phil. et Merc. 3.352-4; Boethius, in Top. 1105B-1106C.
In practice, partition could have been as exhaustive as division, e.g., tw'n ajgaqw'n

ta; me;n ei\nai peri; yuchvn, ta; d• ejktov", ta; d• ou[te peri; yuch;n ou[t• ejktov". DL

7.95 (with examples of each). Given that the Stoic division and the Stoic partition
resulted in the same three logical, physical and ethical parts of philosophy, I
suspect that the degree of exhaustiveness was not part of the original Stoic distinction.
3
DL 7.40 kai; th;n paravdosin mikth;n ejpoivoun; Plut. St. rep. 1035E-F.
Parts 3 Conclusion: Antipater's Parts of Philosophy 265
be from this time on that definitions were conceived as an excellent
paedagogical tool for speedy assimilation of knowledge (cf. Galen, T29).
This was not Antipater's original intention, as will become apparent during
our analysis of the definition and criterion sections.
6. Antipater would not have known any of the similes associated
with the division of the logos kata ten philosophian, with the possible
exception of the "field" simile. Posidonius and his "animal" simile opened
the floodgates.
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