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To cite this article: Anne Aly, Anne-Marie Balbi & Carmen Jacques (2015) Rethinking countering
violent extremism: implementing the role of civil society, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and
Counter Terrorism, 10:1, 3-13, DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772
Countering Online Violent Extremism Research Program, Department of Social Sciences and
International Studies, Curtin University, Bentley, Australia
The current state of countering violent extremism (CVE) in Australia and other
Western nations is characterised by definitional dilemmas around its relationship
to the concepts and practice of counterterrorism (CT) and security. While
attempts have been made to engage the civil society sector in CVE through
programmes that provide funding for community groups, these attempts have
largely been focused on empowering Muslim communities in Australia and the
promotion of social harmony between these communities and the broader
Australian community. Such programmes certainly have a place within all
multicultural, multifaith societies, but the conflation of social harmony with
security and protection from terrorism has had a counter effect resulting in the
securitisation of diaspora Muslim communities. In order to efficiently target the
root causes of violent extremism (VE) a reconceptualisation of the paradigm
constituting CVE is required. Such a paradigm should be detached from the
traditional focus on CT and apply a multidisciplinary and multi-layered approach
that engages the voices of unorthodox stakeholders such as formers and victims
alongside those of policy-makers and law enforcement. Using a theoretical
framework based on “smart power”, this article argues that one way to achieve a
more diffuse and broader approach to CVE is by incorporating grassroots citizen
driven initiatives in the formulation of policy-driven CVE.
Keywords: civil society; countering violent extremism; smart power
Introduction
This paper examines one of the main conclusions emerging from the CVE 2013
Symposium: specifically the need to re-evaluate counterterrorism (CT) by re-focusing
soft approaches and integrating both hard and soft approaches into a single,
cohesive agenda (Aly, 2014). As such, the purpose of this paper is to discuss how CT
can move beyond the limitations of hard and soft measures towards a smarter
conception of CT applied through preventative initiatives to counter violent
extremism (VE).
Countering violent extremism (CVE) has, more recently, come to be associated
with the soft side of CT: loosely defined as measures that target the root causes of
terrorism at the societal level. Yet the relationship between CT (traditionally reliant
on hard power instruments) and CVE remains unresolved. Consequently CVE,
like CT, has been driven by top-down approaches that, inherently, favour hard
power. By reconceptualising CVE in ways that recognise and give precedence to
soft power measures and that facilitate the participation of civil society through
grassroots-driven initiatives in the policy-making process, a smarter, more compre-
hensive form of CVE can emerge, both at the national and international level.
Hard and soft forms of power are not neutrally wielded, as Wilson (2008) notes each
form of power is constituted by “… separate and distinct institutions and
institutional cultures …” which regulate member’s “… attitudes, incentives, and
anticipated career paths” (p. 116). As a consequence, hard and soft power is often
seen to be in opposition to each other, with proponents vying for resources and
influence:
[N]either the advocates of soft power nor the proponents of hard power have adequately
integrated their positions into a single framework … Advocates of soft power and public
diplomacy tend to frame their arguments poorly; their positions are often politically
naive and institutionally weak. Meanwhile, hard power proponents, who are politically
and institutionally powerful, frequently frame their arguments inadequately because
they either overlook or believe that they can incorporate the soft elements of national
power that lie outside their traditional purview. (Wilson, 2008, p. 110)
Rethinking countering violent extremism 5
Hard power advocates argue that hard power is the most effective means of
achieving desired results particularly when dealing with rogue states. Coronado
(2005, p. 322) suggests that the reasons why hard power might be preferred to soft
power lie in the short term, often immediate results that hard power offers in
contrast to the long term more diffuse results of social change approaches: “For
some, it [hard power] is a ‘swifter’ and more efficient method to attain objectives,
bypassing the formal and substantive legitimacy of consensus building required by
international law and institutions”.
Soft power proponents on the other hand, argue that it is a more ethical
approach providing an “alternative to raw power politics” (Nye, 2011, p. 81). Soft
power, not only limited to government, can be employed by NGOs, corporations,
institutions and transnational networks. Unlike hard power tactics, soft power
measures are much harder to quantify and often take years to implement before any
measurable results become evident.
Hard power and soft power are far more nuanced than simple definitions of
coercion versus attraction. Soft instruments can be used in hard ways and vice versa.
It is instead, more useful to think of hard power as being purposeful in its application
and finite in its effect. Soft power can be both purposeful and non-purposeful and
potentially infinite in its effect. Neither soft power nor hard power alone is very
effective in achieving the goals of foreign policy. As Wilson (2008) suggests the
integration of these two approaches into a single framework that effectively balances
hard and soft power is challenged by the institutions and contexts which govern each
form of power. Armitage and Nye (2007) refer to the combination of hard and soft
measures as “smart power”: “by complementing US military and economic might
with greater investments in soft power, America can build the framework it needs to
tackle tough global challenges” (p. 1). Their recommended approach calls for a shift
in the way the US Government thinks about security. Although Nye recognises the
significance of coercive tools, he contends that the US Government must develop
ways in which to grow the US soft power to harness the dynamism found within civil
society and the private sector.
Hard and soft are comparisons that are also made in the CT space. Hard CT
most commonly refers to defensive measures such as target hardening, military
intervention, intelligence and punitive measures. Soft CT is proactive, designed to
address root causes and support for terrorism. More recently, soft CT has come to be
referred to as CVE—encompassing measures as varied as de-radicalisation pro-
grammes, education, development programmes, conflict management, community
empowerment and counter narratives. In the CT arena, the disconnection between
hard and soft measures is also evident. Punitive measures introduced in Australia,
Canada, the UK and elsewhere respond to the phenomenon of foreign fighters in
ways that reflect hard power. The confiscation of travel documents of those
suspected to be planning to travel to Iraq and Syria in support of the Islamic State
is implemented by State institutions and law enforcement agencies who have limited
authority or interest in prevention and intervention. Meanwhile, broad-based
prevention initiatives that have the potential to interrupt radicalisation in the early
stages are reliant on the capacity of the non-government sector.
6 A. Aly et al.
Towards smart CT
Following the 9/11 attacks and the unprecedented impact thereof, the notion of a
“war on terror” has essentially become a universal term employed in both popular
and official discourse. The USA’s official CT response—the war on terror—has
virtually come to dominate the global CT discourse, influencing government policy
around the world (Sandler, 2011). In this sense, the meaning-making practice of CT,
through which we understand the definition and primary purpose of CT, has evolved
within a discourse associated with an offensive military hard line, largely focused on
securitisation and primarily targeting Islamist forms of VE.
From the first declaration of “war”, it was clear that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
New York would frame the conditions for hard power to shape the CT response and
define the roles of significant actors in international security. As the world watched
the capture and demise of Osama Bin Laden on 2 May 2011, almost a decade after
the attacks, scholars reasonably argued that the prolonged war on terror failed to
eradicate the threat of international terrorism. While the hard power approach of the
war on terror succeeded in decimating the operational and tactical capacity of AQ
central, the belief that the destruction of training camps would lead to the demise of
AQ’s affiliates and its ideology was misplaced. The wisdom of employing a
conventional “hard” military response against an unconventional enemy whose
regenerative capacity relies on its ability to employ “soft” strategies of influence and
mobilisation has, rightly, been questioned. In the media and public arena, the “war
on terror” became the dominant frame in reference to a range of diverse responses to
9/11 from military action in Afghanistan and Iraq to local Muslim community
initiatives in the suburbs of Sydney. Attempts by political leaders in the USA,
Australia and the UK to clarify that the war on terror was not a war on Islam failed.
Instead the “war on terror” was constructed in the public imagination as a cultural/
ideological clash between the culturally progressive West and the culturally resistant
Islam. Importantly, rather than improve the US (and Western) soft power capacity
in the Muslim world, this construction of the “war on terror” did irreparable damage
not only to the US capacity to influence but also to that of the Western world.
American and British intelligence agencies report that the use of hard power in Iraq
without a balanced and effective soft power strategy has increased rather than
reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past decade or so.
Consequently, the need to get smart about CT, more than ever before, has become
important and necessary.
The failure of the war on terror to effectively eradicate the threat of international
terrorism is more complex than a simple hard/soft power balance. It is not simply a
matter of too much hard power and not enough soft power. Arguably the limitations
of the hard power approach and the need for parallel soft power approaches was well
recognised as evidenced in the Psychological Operations employed in Afghanistan in
an attempt to influence public opinion about the military intervention. Such attempts
failed to contain the propagation of al Qaeda ideology through a dedicated and
sustained communication strategy that incorporates the dissemination of master
narratives and local narratives through a plethora of media platforms.
The re-construction of the war on terror as a war on Islam was instead effectively
co-opted by AQ and its affiliates as a powerful rally cry to potential recruits and
sympathisers. The belief that the war on terror was a thinly disguised attempt to
undermine global Islam was no longer limited to conspiracy theorists and 9/11 truth
Rethinking countering violent extremism 7
seekers, but has become popularised among Muslims around the world. The initial
intention of constructing the 9/11 attacks and the coalition response as a just and
necessary war in order to consolidate domestic support became misplaced as the
USA effectively lost control of the narrative. Instead, the narrative of a just war
became and remains a central driver in the recruitment campaigns of Islamist
terrorist organisations. Among Muslims who interpreted jihad as a call to duty in
defence of Islam, and who may not have supported the use of violence during
peaceful times, the war on Islam was an instant and effective justification for armed
conflict. In addition, the idea of fighting as soldiers in a war to protect the faith
proved a potent motivator to action among disparate groups and individuals.
In 2010, the Obama administration made a strategic decision to change the way
that the US Government talked about the conflict announcing that they were not at
war with “jihadists”, ‘Islamists” or “terror”. In place of the “war on terror”, President
Obama began referring to the “war on al-Qaeda” referring to AQ as the enemy and
AQ’s Muslim victims as allies. The new terminology reflected a much needed and
long-neglected understanding of the importance of language in CT. The attempt to
shift the language of the war on terror, however, came too late. By 2010 AQ’s
jihadist ideology was already well entrenched and polls revealed an increasing wave
of anti-American sentiment throughout the Middle East and other Muslim majority
countries. US public diplomacy efforts to change negative perceptions among people
in the Arab world largely met with failure. The task of undoing a decade of damage
done by a prolonged military campaign required more than a shift in the language of
war. Subsequently governments have had to contend with the reality that now
presents itself in the form of what has been variously dubbed a “war for hearts and
minds” and a “battle of ideas”. Western governments in particular are playing a
game of catch up in attempting to construct viable and effective counter narratives
that challenge the ideological foundations of the Salafi Jihadi narratives. It is within
this context that the notion of CVE has developed within government policy as a
way of capturing and coordinating soft efforts and mechanisms in the CT space.
CVE
Defining the notion of “CVE” has proved to be a difficult undertaking as the term
initially developed out of government policy rather than scholarship (Nasser-Eddine,
Garnham, Agostino, & Caluya, 2011). Nasser-Eddine et al. conclude that through-
out CVE literature it appears to be a phenomenon that often stands as if it was
something self-evident and taken for granted. The term is typically cited in the
context of strategies that either aim to respond to or prevent violence, often within
the policy sphere.
CVE is also often understood in relation to VE, which implies that the ways in
which VE is conceptualised informs how counter strategies are developed and
applied (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Moreover, the mode in which CVE is
understood often reinforces and reproduces interpretations of VE. Recognising this
relationship is crucial as the ways in which VE is conceptualised enables and favours
particular responses while reducing or excluding others (Bacchi, 2009; Crelinsten,
2014; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011).
Hard and soft offer a useful, though arbitrary, framework for distinguishing
between different types of approaches to terrorism and VE. While much of the CT
practice post-9/11 favoured the hard approach, the relatively new focus on CVE
8 A. Aly et al.
gun activity and VE among young people. As expected, the review found no
empirical studies or case studies on educational approaches to preventing VE. It did,
however, identify seven types of preventative initiatives that could be transferrable to
the CVE context and provide some good practice guidelines for CVE education.
These include taking an evidence-based approach, working collaboratively and
involving cooperation from school personnel (Sheikh, Sarwar, & Reed, 2010).
Importantly, reconstructing VE as a social phenomenon creates a platform for
recognising the role of civil society in CVE. Among the civil society actors whose
voices can be harnessed in CVE are survivors and formers, not only for informing
the construction of counter narratives, but also as powerful and authentic sources of
counter narratives. In a recent report by the International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism (“CVE and Community Resilience in Nigeria,” 2014) in Hague, the vital
role that civil society organisations (CSOs) can play in helping governments produce
effective CVE policies was highlighted in the following:
Due to their work and their formal and informal relationships in the north of Nigeria,
some of these organisations have a profound understanding of the historic background
of Boko Haram and other extremist groups, their functioning, convictions and
mobilising force. Therefore it is crucial to engage with these CSOs when looking for
an effective strategy to counter these threats and to identify ways in which they could
cooperate with government forces in a broad counter violence strategy.
Nye suggests that government support for soft power should go beyond funding
civil society-based programmes. Rather governments need to change the political
culture that preferences hard power tools (police, intelligence and defence agencies)
in order to ensure that soft programmes flourish and succeed. Nye (2011) also
suggests that by engaging with non-traditional or unorthodox actors, government
will be better placed to understand and respond to local issues and situations.
One way to achieve this shift in political culture is by applying the concept of
“transversal politics”. Transversal politics “recognises the differential power positions
among participants in the dialogue, but it nevertheless encompasses these differences
with equal respect and recognition of each participant” (Nira Yuval-Davis as cited in
Stump & Dixit, 2013, p. 164). Transversal politics therefore offers a mechanism for
inclusivity in the policy development process by requiring governments to
ensure that:
(1) Soft power advocates are heard equally within the world of policy decision-
making2; and
(2) A diverse set of voices and actors are actively and equally encouraged to
take part in, listened to and utilised as soft power tools.3
A second challenge to smart CVE is the historically inherited framing of VE as a
security issue. As discussed earlier, the securitisation of VE effectively limits the
range of responses to those that are coordinated and implemented through hard
power mechanisms. Importantly it also limits the popular construction of VE and
defines VE as an issue that can most effectively be addressed through punitive and
defensive measures. In such an environment, civil society groups with a CVE focus
are faced with the challenge of changing public perception of their cause in order to
garner popular support for their programmes. To do this, they must contest the
dominant politicised construction of VE, effectively creating a counter narrative to
the official discourse. As a result, these groups are seen to be working at odds with
the government rather than in cohesion with them. An example is the social media
campaign developed by the Western Australian-based People against VE. The
campaign, entitled “Violent extremism has many faces” is aimed at raising public
awareness of VE by utilising visuals that depict a variety of violent extremist forms
(right wing nationalist and Islamist). While the campaign received funding support
from the Australian Government, the campaigns central message competes with the
dominant official message which constructs VE as primarily an Islamic issue.
Shifting the political culture to accommodate and include the civil society sector as
actors in CVE can also address the challenge of securitisation framing by aligning
official messages around CVE with those of CSOs in order to support and facilitate
the success of civil society-driven programmes.
The overly simplified dominant discourse focusing on hard CT—evident
throughout the war on terror period—has largely proved counterproductive, forcing
governments to rethink how they approach the transnational issue of terrorism and
VE. Therefore, it is vital to highlight the fact that how we talk, frame and
conceptualise VE will ultimately determine how we approach CVE.
Smart CVE involves the effective amalgamation of hard and soft power tools
into a single framework. This does not presuppose that CVE should be entirely
detached from hard power and singularly vested in a soft power base. Rather, it
12 A. Aly et al.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. This is very different to the current role that government ascribes to its citizens—whereby
they are expected to stay alert and watch their neighbour and their suburbs for any
suspicious behaviour.
2. In order for this to happen Wilson (2008) and Armitage and Nye (2007) suggest that the
current institutional arrangements are a major stumbling block and governments’ must
restructure in order to allow for soft power to be practiced on a coordinated front.
3. This refers to a multilateral approach—one where we bring together the voices of policy-
makers, practitioners-in-the-field (including NGOs, formers, etc.), police, intelligence and
defence.
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