— CLASSIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank Eddie Creek, Brian Cul, Robert Forsyth, Manfred Merrick, Mi 0, Ti Ol Peter Petick and Bernd Ravehbach for their kind assistar 0 Al ght reserved, No pat ofthis book may be repr n wb tvieval eystem without permission from the Publisher in wrt Project Eators ishing Layout Artwork: Mark Noison An igen of lan Alan Publishing Ltd, Hershem, Surrey KT12 Printed n England by len Allon Piting Ltd, Hersham, Surrey KT12-4RG.LUFTWAFFE ANTI-SHIPPI ITS “There is definite evidence from recently captured prisoners of & war of several units that the Luftu joushy inter ift torpedo for shipping attacks and that torpedo training is being carried out on a considerably increased. scale. fe has become se ‘ed in the airc Mis toretigence ck) epont NO 219/ ed 7 AQ 19421 oa2z” Anti-Shipping Units BELOW: Henke! He LIL HGsof| KG 26 xin ater sorte over the Mederanean, ‘Noe the high theatre markings ‘Adonai the tyre walls have ten pated with ae antistatic agent made from Symte material Jd not rubber Setting the scene - 1942 Wirt nares os nl esr arth to nowmy sou torte Spo an wel ov mo Harinaven was soparte Ltd rept Geto arvoreTapetos) nese were Ham tpststenich Thomsen, former) Fat of 2/NGr S08, wt wi ha receagetad Ke ons new. Genpeconmnde Han atch nese omeSetting thescenes@ 99 Juss is of 1/KG 102, Note the band sound the fuselage vad ring sum iva telescopic and prepared the offensive avtime assets of turtote to moet this head on The task woul be lot tothe Heinkel 111 6 Torp of L/KG 26, and Junkers 888 of various Staffel’ of KG 30 (oredoninanty Hotm Ha Hermann’s Wl, Gre) fd the Henkel 118 of 1./406 and 1./906, From March 1942 onwards, these units were destined to nicky make their mark aganst Aled shining Meanie. n the Mediterranean, there were two Gruppen ectively invoNed in offensive. mantime operations. Oberst Joachim Hahn's Kr 606. and ay Fichard Link's KGr 608 had been maved fom Lannien' in France. and. Swweskaje in. Russa respectively and fom Deco 1981, were operating over te Mediterranean fom Cotania in Sky. Both Gruppen were invohed in cowendonsl bombing ABOVE Tnqul sorties but as convoys in support of Mata increased, enisippng operations increased, both stings Kamoteuppen being supported by such conventional Junkers BBequipped Kamogescimaderm asKGsa, HENS KG 77 and UG 2 Sinsiae (Over the Alantic, the Uboat war was escalating, especially since Amerca hed Samcka joined the war. However, the antishipping forces assigned te Genit Ulrich Kessler’s Fliegerfiihrer ‘ne cockpit covers fant hed become somenhat depleted bythe other theaves o war. Hot Edmund Daser's 1/40 Started te year badly, when on 2 January 1942, fy Hebert Fate's Focke'Wul 200 of 3G 40 was domaged by Flak and forselanded in Spain’. |. Gruppe then moved north to Trndhein¥aernes in Narch 1942 in support ofthe northern Uboat war and attacks against Arctic convoys KG 40 st few Dornier 2476 under IK Riegerkorps on predominanty conventional bombing missions whilst Haj Rebort Kowalewshi'sIL/KG 40 had fnishec converting fom the Heinkel 111 tothe Condor and was naw the ony Condor Gruppe sill assigned to Pager fier Alani, operating rom Bordeaux Nerigrac The on other fnsiv unit was Ma Friedich Schalimyer’s KG! 108 whch started te yer under IK. Flegertors curmand before moving to Dinard in western Franco and the command of Fegertoher ation in February 1942, Te stage wo 9 ond tho Lufwetfe wa poised to commit aloft antshipingieaft into Date, Forth st two months of 1942, very fow antishipping operations were carted out apart rom a small qumber in the Medteanean and even those aftacks caused minor narvenlences tothe Ales. However, his was all to change in March 1942, 1. Fahe and his erew survived but were Killed in an accident at Oerlandet on 29 October 1942T9435" Anti-Shipping Units An Fw 200 6-4 andor, coded here in 1942,The indiidua irri lewer'G' was back Escalation: March-December 1942 i MG 26 comer ote pedo 8 aed eprtons fe he it wo Mens fe yar Wires so voure entonp mosens were tor andr teteon reece he oa them tone be ented mound Maa Hone, comer tempting to resipy te coped Ilan had the boa fa cover he lose thoy camo to Mat wt whenever Lita cet apaoschd cons or Ma's aoe, thy were ih un Drage a Farther east ws reported that between 238 Fata 1042, Jers 8 tom LG 1 and X77 toate th Hoke 138 tom 0 28h was repre talon m tte he end of tarry 1942) aed at on ttecive attack on two cone Meare, on he Rss Fen Spore atocks vere cried ut gars his sound Sevastopol mth mane sucess Hove soon bose event that he anshipig seve bale ns ok bawesn the Meteor Tepes uns Norway now cosistedHptm Br kes 1/A 26a ares, Hot eter vars 1/406 at Soresia and Hot Eberhard Pers 1/908 at Sovenger Te iter ts ent were bo) Heel 1Seapped, 1/908 hang ran) moved tom westem Farce, The litre BS emus KG 30 wa gereraly based ound Bark nd Brcfoss oa nes acne th comin bombing lean tps les. he et ar attack gant 9 camey on ple on 29 March 1942 ognna 1 bt the ctor ns cse waste weater wnch garry Reed bce the agg fom 17K 26 ard KG 90, sto wo tee shot wee eet Nt as Herne Gruppen Konmanaer oi 30 for day ltr, he aero wes ace an so the Luar ine nate North Se: ts presume tha 1/808 wes teapentie, Tout be neat art vowone bere omar tong a tok lac. Tks o creat wether PO sa had ay menage to ava e Lutte sept tang hated or reo 15 rows. ove tw rtring PO 30 wn et so ow Mrmr 10 Ap 1942, wat not ao uly. Fur oft 16 ship sere Sk ad evel aod as ne fount of K@ 90. te. Gesamacer bon Grdied with two ofthe ings. Aga te ssne bed woner bat poate Pen FNiavk on 21 Ape 1942 Mearfl, beclnthe Mederoneo he 0h 20 Mar 1942, conoy contig te aus sien ship sh Bocanre mose farosene,neconpaned by te teers Gln Carnbok. Pamper Tabet sae tom Asani er Mata, The ew ye cry os net Hs Capt, ten tar 28 poe nd tee subi pated toh north On 32 Maren er nestor ce ‘ck ytlan aera bt Kwa earte th sel talon ster hee was Brg oncom ‘ra en flows wa the Eat ef Site Gand by be on of 22 Wace se et cae rachntmen were 00st at hy aud ot ach Mek anger he cov fre tat ag zs me mom excort no tage ad th al or anmunion to prone elev cove mecoomns sere erred beak cma Hoa fr Mata sped he Broconaive wes il scoped byte cesvvesSavtwotdan Hoste a th Base Cais rd by areas snc edocs ver ely 20 mies fiat ttt ns tena he atari ates, pr was esos ot ‘atin wos evolu to cove te spe a ty eogonces Mel ano age irs sneered teat tak ford by Msserectnt 209 igertbes fem 10/3066 wastes "he Aner soured ol egua tanal coger, by wich tre Boot was Wades ihe water 10 mes an habouEscalation: March- December, @) 101 Meanwfile, the Clan Campbell was tacked and sunk but the Pampas and Tlabot managed 12 ABOVE Ths make to Grand Harbour late on 28 March, tne Breconshire eng towed nto Nambour nearly two days le 18 81 [ter As ffoadng commenced, the Luftatfe continued Rs onslaught egainst the three ships, one 2/KUFIGr 506s then being sunk and the other seutled to prevent Is cargo of ammunition ftom exploding. Fnaly, on “nes See the evening of 26 March, alone Junkers 88 scored four direct nits on the Breconshire which caused sal -ping aire tat wes quick brought under contol ony for itt le up again early the newt day. Eventual, mim the devastated Breconshire senk, together with Is precious caro. fae The Al four merchantmen had been lst which was a considerable blow to Malta's Mein, the loss of serait ashe thelr cargoes hampering Malta's offensive and defensive capabilities forthe coming months. The turner Luftuette prevented neary 90% of the ammunition being cared by the Pampas and Talaot trom Tan x AM 7? being oeaded: no cargo was offoaded ftom the Breconshire and, obvicush, Glan Campbel, The sppcmuracs with losses suffered by the Luftwaffe during the attacks on these convoys were just fve aircraft on RIMGS 2 Mach a Messerschmit 109 fom 20./J6 $3 flown by Ufa set Fankhauser and four Junkers 26 Smet flown by Lt Hermann Jana of 3./KG 54, Lt Walter Kipimillr of 2./606 and Lt Hernann Damask and Cars un Fw Herbert Augustin of 2./806. a The tempo of the air war over and around Malta continued in April 1942, the depleted RAF fer (MGI resourees being reinforced by Spits of 601 and 603 Squadrons fying off the cartier USS Wasp on 20 Api. The folowing month caw a slight respite, the German bomber forces bein redistributed to otter rons or around the Mediterranean, continu beng supped by KGr 608 and KGr 806, However, further east, the Royal Nay nts atoms to hamper Als cornays, was taught a plnfl leon as to the potency of at power. 1/16 4 commanded by Hum Joachim Helbig, and tl/L6 1, commanded by fist’ Gernerd Koll, voth high enverenced bomber plots, were ideally situated atKakon n ret to Intercept Alied worships preying on Ads convoys between Italy and Benghaz. On the morning of 11 May 1942, Ne Junkers 885 of L/LG 1 ona routine armed reconnaissance south of Grete spotted four Bitish destroyers 100 klornetres south of the island. Te presence of HMS Lie), HMS Kling, HMS Jackel and MS Jervis was reported back to Waklon and eary in the afternoon, 14 lunkers 88s from |. Gruppe led by Hot Helbig took off to attack. EachTga7" Anti-Shipping Units ‘Ju 88 A-/Trop of Mediterrancan sun Iearics an upper fuselage scheme of Due (RLM 789 over a lower scheme of the GUM 65).This scheme was used ‘on some LG 1 machines or filfon set agaist a ‘bite shield The the port engine ‘coming is ‘crew to observe the engine ol level. aircraft carried two 500 kg and two 250 kg bombs and these were successfully dropped fon the luckless destroyers, despite the best efforts of Beaufignters of 272 Squadron which were escorting the warships. HMS Lively was hit by bombs dropped by fw Otto Leupert of 4. Staffel and following near misses from other aircraft, she quickly sank, Two hours later, I. Gruppe carried out a second attack without success but that evening, a further seven aircrat, again led by Hptm Helbig, attacked out of the setting sun. This time HMS Kipling and HMS Jackal were hit by bombs dropped by Hotm Helbig and Obits Mo lik, Gerhard Brenner and Gerhard Backhaus. The Kipling sank fast and the Jackal was set on fire, The only remaining destroyer, Jervis, was lucky not to have suffered the same fate and it was left to her to try and tow the Jackaf back to Alexandria but by eary the following morning, it was obvious that the Jackal would not make it. With 620 survivors taken on board from the three other destroyers, the Jervis ‘sank the hulk of the Jackal north-east of the African coast. t would appear that the air war over the Mediterranean in the following months would be much cuieter, the Luftwaffe being hampered by inereasing numbers of fighter aircraft from Malta. However. ‘of note were the two convoys attempting to make for Malta in the midle of June 1942. it had been decided 10 sail convoy Harpoon eastwards from Gibraltar and convoy Vigorous out of Alexandria, Harpoon sailed on 12 June and a day later was being shadowed by the Luftwaffe. The convoy was escorted by the carriers Eagle and Argus and it was the Hawker Sea Hurricanes and Fairey Fulmars from these carriers that had to initially parry Axis attacks, predominantly from the Regia Aeronautica. The first freighter was torpedoed and sunk on 14 June, a second on 15 June with another two being 0 badly damaged that it was decided to deliberately sink them. The attacks on 45 June were attributed to L./KG 54 and KGr 806, the latter unit being credited with sinking the two damaged freighters before they could be deliberately sunk by the Ales. With just two freighters left, protection came from Malta's fighters as Fit. Lt. Laddie Lucas of 249 Squadron reported: “The Ju 885 were flying straight and level in quite tight boxes of four aircraft each. They hadn't ‘seen us coming out of the darkening eastern sky. | gave the instructions... Lint and Watty [PIt, Offs. Ozzie Linton and Les Watts) would take the starboard box and Jonesie (Pit. Off. F E Jones] and I the one to port..The rear gunners never saw us as we attacked upwards from undemeath against the dark waters below...t was difficult to see the results but Watly and reckoned that we had shared an 88 between us, Jonesie got another flamer while Lint and I felt we had severely damaged an additional 88 apiece. It would appear that the unsuspecting Junkers 88s were from 2./806 and were flown by the ‘Staffel Kapitéin, Obit Kurt Kehrer, and Uffz Heine Kaufmann; neither crews survived. Meanwhile, convoy Vigorous was not as lucky. Just after setting sall, two freighters had to turn back due to technical problems: one of them was later sunk in Tobruk harbour during an air rai. For the next two days, the convoy was harried by |,/KG 64 and I,/LG 4, accounting forthe freighter Bhutan ‘and damaging the Potaro. However, It was the threat of the Italian battleships Littoria and Vittorio Veneto that forced the decision for the convoy to turn back The cost to the Luftwaffe was minimal and Mata continued to struggle on against overwhelming ‘odds for another two months when the next major attempt was made to resupply the island. During the two months, the martime air war far to the north of Europe continued to escalate. Following the return of QP 40, at the end of April 1942, it was the turn of PQ 15 and QP 14. Both were heavily escorted by cruisers and PQ 15 was escorted by the battleships King George V and the USS Washington. However, despite attacks by U:toats, it was not until 1 May that the frst air attacksEscalation: March- pony ay ‘materialised against QP 14; no ships were hit. The following day it was the turn ef PQ 15 which was having its run of bad luck. The day before Kng George V had rammed and sunk the destroyer Punjabi whose exploding depth charges then damaged the battleship. On 2 May 1942, PQ 15's escort sank in terror the Polish submarine Jastrzeb, all of this taking place before the Luftwaffe attacked on the ‘morning of 8 May. It was left to six aircraft from I./KG 26 led by the acting Gruppen Kommandeur and Staffel Kopitin of 3./KG 26, Hotm Bert Eicke to carry out the lowlevel attack. Two Heinkel 111s were claimed as shot down and another badly damaged: one loss was the aircraft commanded by Obit Kurt Sauer, Staffer Kapitn of 2./KG 28; Sauer would be awarded the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold posthumously just over a month later. The attack resulted in the sinking of the Botavon and Cape Corso, the latter explodirg spectacularly, and badly damaging the Jutland which was later sunk by a boat; the remaining 22 ships arrived unccathed at Murmansk on 5 May 1942, Aircraft failed to Intercept QP 11 which wes subsequently attacked by U-boats and German warships. The next action occurred on the evening of 14 May 1942 and involved the cruiser Trinidad which was returning from Murmansk after being repaired following, damage incurred during PQ 13 in March 11942. She and her escort were discovered of the North Cape and attacked by KG 30 and elements from | /KG 26. However, it was a lone and unidentified Junkers 88 that set the cruiser on fire with two hits; with the fre out of control, the Trinidad was scuttled the following dey. Iwas not unti the end of May 1942 that the next conveys materialised. QP 12 returned unscathed but PQ 16 was heavily attacked by 2 and 3./KG 26, KG 30 and Heinkel 115s of 1./406 and 1./906 between 25 and 29 May 1942, sinking sic ships, including the catapult armed merchantman Empire Lawrence, and damaging numerous others, Analysis of the tactics adopted in the attacks makes Interesting reading: Bombing Attacks: The Naval Authorities attribute the [Luttwaffe's] successes during the period of the most intensive eperations from 1116 to 2130 hours on 27 May chiefy to the fact that the weather at the time was clouds but not completely overcast. The Junkers 88 pressed home their attacks during this period to @ much greater extent than when the sky was cloudless or completely overcast. The aircraft are reported to have dived at 60 degrees to a height of about 1000 feet before releasing their bombs of which they are reported to have carried four. Torpedo Attacks: The operations by torpede-carrying aircraft do not appear to have been very successful. The aircraft approached fying iow and released their torpedoes at bout 40 feet. There {s tie Information en ranges but itis known that the only hit obtained was the result of random shots from 4000 yards and that, in general, the attacks were not pressed home.104¢@ Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units Heinkel 135 coded ‘commanded by Obie firmer 2 uy 1942.The fight shows their If this was true of PQ 16, PQ 17, which set sail from Reykjavik on 27 June 1942, was to receive ‘readtul punishment. Much has beer written about this convoy of 36 ships, two of which were forced to turn back. Close escort consisted of six destroyers and four corvettes with two British and two American cruisers and destroyers in support, whilst distant cover was given by the battleships Duke of York and the USS Washington as well as the cartier Victorious and numerous cruisers ‘and destroyers. ‘The first air attack was not carried out until 2 July when Hptm Herbert Vater’s 1./406 attempted ‘an unsuccessful torpedo attack, Vater being shot down by antiaircraft fre from HMS Fury. Vater’s seaplane was forced to ditch away from the convoy and as HMS Wilton approached to pick up Vater ‘and hie erow, the Heinkel 148 commanded by Obit Karl Hermann Burmeister, picked up the survivors, ‘and took off again, returning safely 10 Sorreisa. Two days later, it was the turn of 1./906, the only ‘success being the freighter Christopher Newport sunk by the Staffel Kapitan Hptm Eberhard Peukert. Two more major attacks would ocour later in the day and are best described in Cajus Becker's Angriffshohe 4000: “At 1930, a Staffel from KG 30 at Banak max the ships and no hits were registered, fe the first attack...but their bombs fell all around Bert Eieke, Eicke “An hour later a larger formation appeared in the siy...1,/KG 26 led by...Hpt ordered his 25 Heinkel 1118 to execute a pincer movement and they came i from several directions. low over the water‘rmarere this vara wate with ‘ional xed MC 151 20'mm cannon Emblem of 1,/KGLF.Gr 406 Heinkel He 115 € of 1,/Kii.FI.Gr 406 ‘This aircraft typifies the standard factory splinter pattern of RLM 72/73 with RLM 65 undemeath. The unit code “K6" and the Staffel letter “H’ wore painted in black with the individual aircraft letter ‘E’ in white. The unit emblem has been painted on the nose just aft of the nose gunner's glazing.EFT. A Meinke He 111 6 converted cay torpedoes belonging to 6G 26, sands eady fora mission on amaltild in southern Prance The strat coded IH¥BP sith the inva irra eter in yellow on a white Mediterranean theatre fsclage huand-The emblem of KG 26's painted spinners have ao been pained yellow forthe Stflelcolowe Note the togpedocs have yet vo be armed. Emblem of Ko 26 Heinkel He 111 H6 of 6./KG 26 Although operating in the Mediterranean theatre this torpedo-catrying He 111 H.6 retained the factory splinter pattern of RLM 70/74 on the uppersurfaces but the RLM 65 undersides had been overpainted in black. Note how carefully the ground crew have painted around the underside wing Balkenkreuz. The unit code “2H’ and the Staffel letter ‘P” were also black with the individual aircraft letter ‘8’ being painted in the 6. Staffel colour of yellow. This colour was also applied to the undersides of the engines and also the spinners, with the on of the ach ‘wae left in RLM 71. Another unusual feature is Mediterranean Theatre band painted InEscalation: Maren Decoy ay “Ut Konrad Hennemenn? [1 Staffel] had set himself to torpedo a major warship. Now, as they came in, only destroyers and other lesser vessels lay anead. The rest were all ‘merchantmen. He found himself wrapped in ‘a curtain of projectiles and smoke. Finaly is torpedo struck the 4,941 ton freighter Navarino but at the same time his aircraft suffered multiple hits. ft crashed into the water not far from his victim and sank ‘also hit was the Heinkel of Lt Georg Kanmayr (1. Staffel). Dazzled by the sunlight reflected from a patch of mist, he never hoticed he was headed for a destroyer. The fist shell smashed the canopy, wounding both Kanmayr and this observer, Fw Felix ‘Schlenkermann, but they managed to ditch {and al four ofthe crew were rescued by the same British destroyer that had shot them down. ABOVE: Ajunkens J of R77 oe Hptm Eicke's torpedo struck the 7,177 ton American freighter William Hooper which was Getty yous” anandoned and later sunk by U334..." receive some i Simo 211.12 The treat of German surface warships, specially the Tipit, Lutzow, Admiral Scheer and Admiral ume 211V' Hipper now forced the Royal Navy to make @ terrible decision. On the evening of 4 July 1942, the ground sa. Note support crises were crdered to withdraw end the unprotected convoy ordered to scatter. 31 the mame anny merchantmen tied to make for the islands of Novaya Zemlya before heading south for Archangel but" "Heme there were easy pickings for the Luftwaffe and U:boats. On § July, another six Heinkel 115s trom 41,/908 led by Obit Wolfgang Herwartz carried out an ineffective torpedo attack and from then on, it was predominantly KG 30 and the U-boats who preyed on the helpless freighters. A total of just 14. surviving freighters and two rescue ships eventually arrived at Archangel between 9 and 28 July; 24 had been sunk by U-boats and the Luftwaffe; the German warships did not venture forth until 5 July oy which time the convoy had scattered. There would now be no further convoys to Russia for another two months. ‘The next two months saw @ reorganisation and re-designation of the Luftwatie's mantime units KGr 606 became |./KG 77, the old I./KG 77 being redesignated 1,/KG 6, which would be 2 conventional Kampfgeschwader. The former Kommodore of KGr 608 had aready been given command of KG 6 as i began forming but for this maritime pilot, his tenure would be short On 3 June 1942 whilst on a transfer flight in @ Messerschmitt 108 from Sta/KG 6, Ritterlreuz holder Obstit Joachim Hahn was shot down into the sea by two Spitires of 401 Squadron flown by Fit Lt E C Neal and Fit Sgt S C Cosburn, north-east of Le Treport. KGr 806 row became II,/KG 4 and together with |./KG 77 remained in the Mediterranean. In France, Maj Gerd Roth's KGr 106, which had continued to fly precision attacks against both mainland and meantime targets, was redesignated I./KG 6. However, not all of the Gruppe Uwansterrea. Despite the Battle of the Atlantic escalating, Fleyerfitrer Aantik’s ait assets were stil @ shadow of their former selves. The Alles had realised that German Uboats had to transit the Bay of Biscay to either get to their patrol areas orto return, sometimes with thelr Uboats damaged. Accordingly there was an inerease in Allied aircraft ying from south-west Britain to attack Ltboats, Short Sunderland fying boats and more conventional Vickers Wellingtons an Armstrong Whitworth Whileys met with some ‘successes and could avo‘! German fighter or coastal parol aircraft as long as they kept well out of thelr range. It quickly became oovious to Flegerfitver Atlant that they needed some form of longrange fighter cover to protect boats and more vulnerable aircraft such as the Focke Wulf 200. These fighters could also intercept the British anti-submarine aircraft and any aircraft transiting the Bay of Biscay as well as being able to defend themselves, 2. Hernemann was posthumously awarded the RKterarevz on 3 September 1942 for his actons.108 ¢@ Luftwaffe AntShipping Units No solution was obvious but early in 1942, the latest Variant of the Junkers Ju 88 night fighter, the C-6, was coming Off the production line and someone must have remembered the experiences of Obit Herbert Bénsch’s Z/KG 30 in Norway in 11940 when its Junkers 88 ©:2s cartied out longrange escort, interception and groundattack missions. Accordingly, on of ‘about 10 June 1942, four Junkers 88 C&S appeared at Bordeaux airfield and from then on, there would be a cramatic change in the air war over the Bay of Biscay. The new unit seems to have had a series of designations Zerstérerstatfel/KGr 106, Zeistorerkommando/KG 6, IIL7KG 40 and even IV/KG 40. Some of the aircraft carved @ mix of °3E" (KG 6) or "FB (KG 40) codes which adds to the confusion. It is possible that the initial commanding fier of, this unit was Hetm Carlhanns Weymar, who was then killed on nove 22 July 1942 when his Junkers 88 calided with a Condor flown by Fw Alfred Praschl of 8./KG 40 during ptm Gerd air combat training. However, the accepted intial Gruppen Kommandeur wes Deutsches Kreuz in Gold Minaskert0o, and Ritterkreuz holder Hptn Gerd Korthals, former Staffel Kapitan of 2./KGr 100 and 8./KG 51. wa ily ‘The first recorded kill came on 15 July 1942 when Fw Henny Passier shot down a Wellington of saccenfull bomber 344 Squadron, with the loss of all of the Czech crew; the first dacumented report of a kill fr the new LUSIRG Sri” unit, which also saw its first loss, was recorded by Luftfotte West on 11 September 1942: een awarded the ‘20 July 1942: Two Wellingtons shot down by Lt (Kal) Stéffler. Junkers 88 coded ‘KO’ 1210 Era hours. We climbed at once and started our attack. In the frst and second attacks, we used all of our 1542 andthe Buns. Hits were seen on the fuselage, wing and starboard engine. Pleces of the wing flew off, the Bcesrew on ‘enemy caught fre, the undercarriage was lowered and the plane hit the water. Then @ Second —pr10M: ae inet oat Welington appeared thing from north to south. it immediately turned west 50 we cimted and view o the Kommandeurof tacked, eu guns were red. During te st atack, we encountered neaydetenswe fre and our nhc WiKG 40. He plane was hit several times. The enemy then caught fe but by this time t St8fler andthe cbserver famed Pa Sie fw [August] Moller were out of action. The Ju 88 was in danger of erashing $0 Bordturker Ofw Gerbil i sate October 9 $s November 19 (Augst] Werner climbed im the cook anc managed t gin het Tuning a wide cle to Oca Starboard Just sing alors, lad came Io sgt With the starboard engne on re, Ofw emer Nt eS ‘managed io aton and tow ot te canopy oo. Two hours later he was poked up by @ raven” WhetoEscalation: March- December @) 109 as LEED. Ayu 86407 ‘down the starboard sie contains equipment for adjusting the steting mechanism ofthe and gathered rewiitions/speedT9 ay Anti-Shipping Units tropical out ‘sane bis nt Sink 6 wes ade the 21 December 1942 we KG 77 and ws credited with Sing 98,000 BR &fshipping He fee hts ot is tl fas the KGr 606 dae sade Lt Stoffier was posthumously credited with the destruction of two Wellingtons, one flown by Pit Off Alan Houston of 15 Operational Training Unit, who was delivering his Wellington to North Africa; he and his crew were never seen again. The other flown by Fit St Smallwood was luckier, he and his crew managed to escape and unknowingly were responsible for the new German unit's first oss. There would be mary ‘more such combats and losses for both sides in the next two year. ‘The final change to the Luftwaffe's maritime order of batle was the renaming of Ill/KG 26 as |./KG 1 and the forming of a new I. Gruppe from KGr 506. The new Il./KG 26 was the first Gruppe to now fy torpedo attacks. The new Gruppe, commanded by Hptm Ernst. Heinrich Thomsen, formerly of KGr 606 and 1,/KSG 2, moved from Leeuwarden in Holland to Grosseto in May 1942 and then moved to Rennes in France in the middle of July 1942. A few conventional bombing attacks then took place, the first oss being the Junkers 88 ‘commanded by Lt KurtGinther Desamari which crashed near Leiden ‘on 28 July 1942, However, the capture of Obyhr Ginther Kndbel and his crew of 9. Staffel two nights later was fortuitous as the initia Ineligence report reveate: “This aircraft started at Rennes at 0130 hours to attack the eastern outskirts of Birmingham....skirted the Scillies and then flew northwards to Cardigan Bay, then tuming east to Birmingham. The Tight was made at lowlevel, rising only near the Bimingham balloon barrage. After dropping the bombs, the pilot continued on an easterly course, the intention being to land at ‘Soesterberg. While crossing the coast near Caister at about 50 feet, the aircraft was fit in the tal by AA fre, went out of control and plunged into the sea. The crew somehow managed to scramble ‘out and were ail captured unturt. The unit and aircraft lettering have been obtained from interrogation. POW said that a short time ago the whole of KGr 506 was renamed Il, /KG 26 and transferred from Leeuwarden to Rennes...This crew has been at Rennes about a week and this was their first operational sortie from that base. No mention was made in the initial interrogation of torpedo operations but a later report, which ‘combined the interrogations of this crew and of Lt Georg Kanmayr's crew captured on 4 July 1942 gave fan eight page detailed analysis of torpedo tactics and training in the Luftwaffe. The report noted: “Tere is defnite evidence from recently captured POWS of several units that the Luftwaffe has become seriously interested in the aircraft torpedo for shipping attacks and that torpede training Js being carried out on a considerably increased scale, “One pointer to the fact that this development is being taken seriously is that Oberst Harlinghausen has been appointed Lufttorpedo Inspizient Inspector General (Torpedoes) ‘and has beer placed directly under Géring himself...” Worryingly for the British the report gave @ warning of future operations: “KGr 506, which has been renamed Il,/KG 26, commenced torpedo traning on Ju 88s on 1 May ‘and by the middle of July the whole Gruppe had been retrained. They were then transferred to Rennes with the intention of carrying out torpedo attacks on shipping off the south-west coast of Engiand and mn the Western Approaches, the Irish Sea and the Bristol Channel. “POW from this unit expected that torpedo attacks in this area could be commenced in the very near future and made special reference to shipping plying between Plymouth and the Bristol Channel ports. The unit is also at readiness to make torpedo attacks on troopships, port etc in the event of an attempted invasion of France.Escalation: March- mony a LEFT jo 88817 Sb torpedo on the starboard ince rack zn alternative ‘mounting of the Fu 200 Hoenee dae Instead ofthe ‘conventional nose ‘poles outbowd of the port engine and the more ‘conventionally touted on the That attack came four nights later as another report st ed! “At 2353 hours BMT on 3 August 1942, the Master of the largest vessel in a small merchant ‘convey bound from Portsmouth to Milford Haven heard the sound of aireraft approaching from the ‘south. The moon was not yet up and no aircraft could be seen but their presence was confirmed by the escort. There was no sound of Eboat engines. 15 minutes later, @ gunner thought he saw {an aircraft and opened fire. Almost immediately afterwards the ship was struck by a torpedo which wrecked the engine room. Subsequent examination showed that a second torpedo had entered the Ship, apparent through the hole made by the frst, but hat not exploded possibly because the ‘explosion of the first torpedo had injured the mechanism. The ship was towed into Plymouth with 2 large hole in the side This attack was carried out by 44 aircraft from I./KG 26, now led by Hptm Emst-Ginther Méller since Hotm Thomsen had been badly injured in an accident on 21 July 1942.3 They claimed to have sunk or damaged six ships totalling 20,000 BRT but the only casualty was the 6,841 BRT EF Ciervo which was the ship torpedoed 13 kms off Start Point Wis possible that a second attack against @ convoy was Lnsuccessfully attempted the following night and shorty AESATZUNG D&S KAMFFILUGZEUGES, afterwards, lIl/KG 26 transferred to Banak in northern JU884D+FN Norway. For the moment, the scene of bettie was again concentrated on northern Norway and the Mediterranean, There would be one more series of attacks against ‘ctic convoys before the end of 1942 and as with the end of 1941, it was the presence of escort carters that made the difference, On 2 September 1942, convoy PQ 48 left Loch Ewe in Scotland with over 40 merchantmen. Minaful of What had happened to PQ 17, this time the escort was different. Close escort was provided ty 17 warships and the escort cartier Avenger with her escort of two destroyers. A further two forces were in support; close cover was given by the AA cruiser Seyila, with 16 destroyers and three cruisers. Distant cover was provided by the battleships Anson and ‘Duke of York, a light cruiser and destroyers to the northeast of leeland, Added to the submarine patrols were 2 total of 40 major warships preparing to take on the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwatte The Luftwaffe forces facing PQ 18 were in the region of 15 Heinkel 115s of 4./406 and 1./906 at Sorresia and Billejord respectively, 46 Heinkel 1118 of |/KG 26 at Bardufoss and Banak, and cost 3. The Messerschmitt 108 he was fying crashed in an accident at Angers, injuring him, Obie Peter Bethge and Utfe Werner Meyer.T9477" Anti-Shipping Units RIGHT: § dramas photograph takes from Junkers Ju 8 ‘cade ADEN own by LW Exkens ofthe they sank inthe S July 1942. 27 Junkers 88s of IIl/KG 26, all of which were torpedo capable, Added to this were a further 60 Junkers 88s from KG 30 at Banak and 30 Junkers 87s of |,/StG 5 at Kirkenes. There were also Focke-Wulf 200s from I./KG 40 available for ong range reconnaissance and attack. The convoy was first located to the north of Iceland on 8 September but it was not until 413 September that the frst attacks materialised. It was left to Obstt Erich Bloedorn’s Junkers 88 of KG 20 to split and distract the defences, which would allow 26 Heinkel 111s from Maj Werner Klimper's 1./KG 26 and 17 Junkers 88s from l/KG 26 led by Hptm Klaus Nocken of 7./KG 26 to ‘carry out a torpedo attack, whilst 17 Junkers 88s from 1./KG 30 would carry out conventional attacks. This fist attack saw forthe first time what was called the ‘Golden Zange™ tactic of hing at sea-level: ‘extended line abreast, approaching the convoy from directly abeam, the formation ‘combing’ the ‘convoy. These tactics are best described in an earlier intelligence report: “The feature of torpedo tactics on which the Luftwaffe lays most stress Is the value of the mass attack, especially on convoys and escorted capital ships, on the principle that if enough torpedoes are released, some at least are bound to find their mark “it fs considered essential to attack from several directions at once in order to counter any evasive ‘action. Furthermore, the attack must be So organised that all torpedoes are released as nearly simuttaneousty as possible. Another major point of German tactics is that units are being taught to ‘approach their target at sea-level, rising to 45 metres for the actual release... A third feature is the ‘combined use of torpedo aircraft and dive-bombers according to a carefully smnchronized programme. 4, erally Gaiden Pincers.Escalation: March- December @) 113 “The intention is to send in divebombers before the torpedo attack in order to throw the convoy into confusion and distract the attention of the defences...The tactics of torpedo aircraft are as allows. A major attack by a whole Gruppe takes place in two waves, the first one minute after the ve bombers and the second two minutes after the first. The aircraft approach the convoy head- on at sealevel in shallow vic and when nearing the convoy, change formation fist into tine abreast ‘and then on an R/T signal from the leader, they then turn into attack, each singling out its own target...The port torpedo is released first...as soon as both torpedoes have veen released, the afcraft makes a steep climbing turn and then dives down to sea-level...” PQ 18 was already prepared for the attaccs but stil eight freighters were hit, all elther sinking Immediately or later being sunk by their escorts. A follow-up attack later in the afternoon by 1./406 was ineffective, thanks to the weather, whilst further minor attacks that evening resulted in the shooting down of a deferding Hurricane and two Heinkel 116s. The next day, concerted attacks by Ubosts, bombers and torpedo aircraft were launched, the main target being the carrier Avenger. Again, the defences were alerted and the carrier was spotted too late for an effective attack by IIL/KG 26. The next attack occurred just after lunchtime, quickly followed by another torpedo attack by I./AG 26 together with Junkers 885 from Maj Werner Baumbach’s Ill. /KG 30; just one freighter was sunk. From then on, the attacks were generally ineffective, not helped by poor weather. Of the 40 original ships, 27 reached Archangel on 417 September but were stil subject to air altacks. Until 20 September: just one freighter was hit but this time, she was successfully beached and her cargo saved. Of the 13 sunk by enemy action, 10 were credited to aircraft, and three to U-oats. PQ 18 proved to be the high point of the Luftwaffe’s torpedo operations; never again would so many aircraft be thrown against a single target. It also was 2 low point in respect of the aircraft and trained crews lost; 44 aircraft were shot down, of which 38 ‘wore torpedo aircraft. Fron KG 26's viewpoint, they lost 87 aircrew killed or missing, losses that would seriously hamper any future operations. Howover, ‘8 with the carrier Audacit/’s impact in 1941, the impact of Avenger and her sitcraft in 1942 was similaty important for future Arctic convoys and the potency of the Luftwaffe, (On 26 September 1942, convoy QP 14 airived at Loch Ewe having lost three freighters, a destroyer ‘and a minesweeper to U-toats; the Luftwaffe had no impact on this convoy at all, it was stil licking its ‘wounds past PQ 18, No further major convoys would occur until December 1942 and even then, the convoys, JW 51A and B were not attacked ty aircraft, even If W 1B provoked what would later be sumbach det) of sccomplisied ant shipping pilot as ‘evidenced by bis swan ofthe swith Obie Helmet ‘Weinrich who was Staffel Kapicn 7 JKG 30. swanled the Ritterkaeur on 22 Jaswaey 1985144.°@ Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units AHOVE® 9.086 0f F7KG 30, ced Process of having twuced up ‘note at tree large to be naval vesels With the larger on bomb bursts Femaining four scl appear to cfcer on the et called the Battle of the Barents Sea. Finally for 1942, the scene of battle switched yet again to the Mediterranean where, together with the southern Atlantic, the focus of the Lufwaffe’s antisipping ‘operations remained until mid:19.44. Operation Pedestal in August 1942 was the last major convoy consisting of 13 freighters and a tanker attempting to bring much needed supplies to Malta. AS with PQ 18, the escort was massive totalling four carriers, two battleships, seven cruisers and 24 destroyers. Things began badly when on 10 August 1942, U-73 sank the carrier Eagle and with it nearly 25 percent of the fighter aircraft needed to protect the convoy. Then, on the evening of 11. August, there was a concerted attack by 30 conventional Junkers 88S and six Heinkel 111s of the expetienced torpedo unit 6/KG 26 which had recently moved from Saki in the Crimea to Grosseto. No hits were scored and a Junkers 88 of 1./KGr 806, this unit on one of its last missions before being designated IIL/KG 54, was lost. The next day, the attacks continued as pilot Uffz Adolf Hoffmann of 3./KG 54, recorded in his der ‘Attack on farge English Anverican convoy consisting 4 aircraft carriers, 3 warships, 21 freighters ‘and 20 destreyers/cruisers. First attack by 18 aircraft. Heay flak and lots of fighters. Freighter hit. One of the warships was shooting with its heavy guns. Very heavy defences. 2043 hours sunset attack... one ship exploded into the skies, another six bursing. Terrific Flak. Landed 2230 hours -enemy night fighter over the airfield.” Attacks that day were carried included such units as 1, and L/LG 2, 6./KG 26, I./KG 54, KG 77, KGr 806 and Stuces from |,/StG 3, the latter unit badly damaging the carrier indomitable. Two freighters were abandoned and a thi, the Deucalion, exploded, as witnessed by Adolf Hoffmann, Stil under attack by both the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica, by 15 August the last stip, the tanker Ohio, laden with vital aviation fuel, limped into Grand Harbour. Four other freighters had preceded her and despite the loss of another nine ships, the supplies they brought were crucial angthird "The application of this eamoathyge pattern was fou toe ena eecive when Junkers Ju 88 A-4s of 8./KG 77 It Is not known for certain whether the RLM 79 pattern was applied over the splinter pattem of RLM 70/71, although it Is likely. Each aircraft appears to have had the random snaking lines of RLM 79 light sand-yellow painted in various patterns, presumably at the whim of the painters, over the uppersurfaces. The German term for this kind of application was called ‘Arabesken’ (Arabesque). None of the ieraft carty the unit code of 3Z of the white Mediterranean Theatre band around the fuselage as they had been overpainted. The Staffel letter ‘S' was painted in black, as was the individual alrcraft letter ‘K’ which was thinly outlined in red, the Staffel colour. It is also Possible that the spinner tips may have been painted In red.146¢@ Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units ‘rethead view of a einkel He 111 series in ib. In particular note the typical factory pple splinter patter it RIM wealkway and 2ccess pots the fuscia Bakenreve has signified a turning point in the Mediterranean maritime war. Malta could continue to defend herself and to go on the offensive, something witnessed by Ufz Adolf Hoffmann® in his diary entry for 21. August ‘when, whilst on a search for enemy submarines off Corfu, he witnessed an RAF torpedo attack on an {Axis tanker which was hit in the bows and began losing oll. ‘The months that followed were much quicter until the start of November 1942 when all of KG 26 ‘ound itself operating from Grosseto and Il./KG 30 found itself operating fiom Comiso as a result of Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of Algeria. A number of crews from KSG 2, some experienced and ‘others just finishing their training, were also sttached to KG 26 which caused some confusion and Interest to their captors after 2 number were shot down and captured. Although a number of ships were damaged or sunk, notable Luftwaffe losses during the Invasion were Hptm Karl Barth, Kommandeur of I./KG 26 who hae been awarded the Ritterkreuz on 14 December 1940 fer ant-shipping operations with 3/506, and the Kommandeur of ll,/KG 26, Hotm Kleus Nocken. The latter was rescued ane would be awarded the Ritterkreuz a year later. For the remainder of the year, KG 26 and the existing Kampfgeschwadern maintained their sights ‘on both Malta and the increasing convoys that now transited the Mediterranean. However, it was now clear that the tide as starting to tum in that region and that any sinkings had litle adverse effect on the Anglo-American forces now very much on the offensive; 1943 would see this trend continue '5. Adolf Hoffmann would fll tim {0 one ofthese right fighters on 17 October 1942 when he was shot wn ‘over Catania airfield by Fg Of Charles Crombie of 89 Squadton; he and two other members of his erew led in the eranEscalation: March-December @ 117 (e-Wulf Fw 200 Photo Gallery118 @ Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping UnitsEscalation: March-December @ 119 Indicator 15 Longe tin 14 Directional ran 15 Longa trim 21 Gyrocompast120 @ Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units engine checks 112KG 40 caries the eamouttage scheme ofthe 1941/42 period ‘sith ts unit marking F8+GH pated on both sides ofthe Fselige and repeated beneath the wings The Geschwader code 19 appeared helow the por Individual irra eter Gand Stall eter were apaied ‘white and black respective The individual eter paimted on the ‘outlined in whiteEscalation: March-December @ 121 fuseloge ofa pprecate come with a this turret - some reverted tothe carer Fw 19 9p), Inaproved the Condor redesigned and lazing in the ‘ener gondota122 © Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units svc ne the ear spe Tatkenkreue with the area's ‘igual eter Pinte in red an ABOVE: ‘This Fw 200 6-4, WNe O141, coded FHEEW of 12.(Enp/KG 40 probably photosraped at Vaernes 21 August 1942, was di its anishipping operations and pressed in service during ai operations The Condor ‘Achilles Hec was the hast 1 wich fAdapted for continwpus operations and the stain imposed on the sframe. Embodying vitally no strctorl strengthen imadequate in operational service. There were numerous examples of the rar spar fling with fee ofthe wing a evinced above on a hard landing, These srctral problems were contiEscalation: March-December @ 123124 © Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping UnitsEscalation: March-December @ 125 nh basicaly simile tothe C3 it itered Bt te outboard wing panels, but Condors soon standidised on the FG 200 Hoheatwiel which was used in Conjunction wich spproach Some Cos used both types of radar, ut these were an exception,126 © Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping UnitsFr 20 C3 of KG 40 undergoing maintenance on the ramp-The C3 embodied major strengthening 1o the sain spa and fuempt co curb the structural failures This model so saw the introduction ofthe low drag Ew 19 hydraulically operated ret witha singe 7.9 mm machine gun Escalation: March-December @ 127 Merignac All aircraft of KG 40 Carrie the wor fuselage nose aft o the cockpit1286@ Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units BELOW: AKG 40 Turning Point - 1943 7229 208 wry eras ad bay forthe Fee 2008 of HS 40, Dung a attack on rasablanca on New Year's Eve by 12 Condors from Ill. Gruppe, two aircraft from 8 Staffel, one flown by Hpum Fritz Hoppe, forcelanded at San Pablo in Spain, both aircraft being interned ard later used by the Spanish. Another Condor flown by Obit Gunther Graber, Staffer Kapitén of 7./KG 40 was believed to have e-ashed near Gran Canaria with the loss of all of the crew, whilst a further Condor retumed with a wounded gunner. Meanwhile, much further north, a Condor of 2./KG 40 shadowing ‘convoy JW 51B on New Year's Day went missing: Obit Dietrich Weber and his crew were never seen ‘again, Just under two weeks later, aircraft and crews from I./KG 40 were moved eastwards, to operate {rom Stalino in supnort of German troops at Stalingrad, something that a number of crews had already started doing in the Mediterranean at the end of October 1942 when they went to Lecce in Raly to support the Afrika Korps’. Re-designated KGrzbV 200, the Russian detachment would lose three crews ‘and five aircraft in just over two weeks before the fall of the Stalingrad pocket. For the Junkers 88 C6s of V./KG 40, 1942 had seen them finish on a high. With the Allied buildup in North Africa continuing, the numbers of aircraft transiting the Boy of Biscay had increased dramatically. On 23 December they had bounced a formation of P.38 Lighthings of the 82nd Fighter Group led by an A-20 Boston of the 47th Bomb Group, shooting down a P-38 and the A20 without loss. ‘Then on 30 December they bounced another formation of P-39 Airacobras of the 68th Observation Group, shooting down one. However, the day was marred by the loss of Hotm Helmut Dargel, the Gruppen Kommandeur. Darge! had taken command of the Gruppe folowing the death of the experienced Hptm Gerd Korthals on 3 November 1942 in a freak accident. In ts first six months of ‘operating over the Bay of Biscay, the Gruppe had shot down a sfoad number of British and American aircraft, forcing the RAF to increase the numbers of Coastal Command Bristol Beaufighters to combat the “Junkers Menace’. However, V./KG 40 had lost two Gruppen Kommandeur and two Staffel Kapitan to date, two of them in needless accidents. All four were experienced pilots whom the Gruppe needed in the coming months, as shown by two combats at the end of January 1943 when, four crews from V./K@ 40 were shot down. The following accounts are taken from the Coastal Command Intelligence Summary: {L The Mediterranean detachment ended n February 1943.Turning Point @ 129 29 January 1943: Four 248 Squadron Reaufighters. sighted whilst fying at 50 feet two Junkers 88 two miles astern, also at sea level. Formation Immediately changed course, (2) aircraft. attacking one enemy aircraft and [2] the other. In the first case...enemy aircraft's starboard engine caught fre; second aireratt then made two attacks, first aircraft making final attack as enemy aircraft was fluttering along, the wave tops on one engine. The port engine then caught fire and enemy aircraft dived into the sea. Meanwhile, the other two aircraft were attacking the second enemy aircraft. First Beaufighter made fist attack and sustained some damage from return fire. Second Beaufighter attacked, registering hes and dense clouds of white smoke were emitting from enemy aircraft's port engine. First Beautighter then delvered a final attack and enemy aircraft's starboard engine caught fie and enemy aircraft was seen to orash into the se2, burning furiously, and then appeared to disintegrate into burning patches. ‘The combat the following day, which also involved 248 Squadron, was equally spectacular but not so. one'sided our 1 88s were sighted tree miles dstant..Beaufightes closed (0 win 300 yards of nearest enemy srr and st Beautgterdenered attack fom aster, its were Seen register an port tine of enemy aia which was observed tobe on fre: tun tre was experienced but no hits wore registered. Beater orokeauay'o starboard and afew scons later, enemy area was Seen to crash in the sea and break yp. Beauighter then commenced to climb and another RINON. 9/8 Unidetied aca wes observed pursuing 0 second which was 0 fre sudden ursung aeatt rm was seen to explode and both machines dived ino the sea es aa, The cambat on 29 January had ost the ves of Ofw Johannes Keel and Uz Pau Peschotf and their Ses Nah 14 7KG 40, and OWv Georg Hever ond thar eres bt they acounted forthe Beaters wn by fw ar Fa Ott leon Cunningham and Sgt Swart Eel of 246 Squodron. The lows of Hum Rice, another Sper le told wih one of the Beauties, whist the eter was edited to Uf igen Hele. frst two maths of 1943 vere relatively ut in the drole, somoye BW BA and B had arivet nd dperted with minimal Lutvae Imerference whist convoy IW 62 to Russia and FA 52 from Russi In January 1943 sow gins JW 52 on 28 Jorery 2843 by 2,/408 remuted in the loss of two Merkel 1186 commended by Lt Hone Georg, Schmidt and ‘15 al but asepecars fom tho Ltt’ artishippng aera iventry, 1/406 being1309@ Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units A Ju88 C6 of tack in within the un They ae from et Heinz Ofbrech, ipim Within 7 October 1948), Messcrechit Galle 11 pail the last unit to operate this aircraft Until October 1944 and 1./906 being redesignated 8./KG 26 in July 1943, In February 1943, convoy JW 53 arrived in Russia without any losses whilst the return convoy, RA 53 in March 1943 lost ust three freighters, to Uboats. No further convoys now took place until August 1943 and even then, it would be the ‘Kriegsmarine that played the major part: the Luftweffe's antishipping War in the seas off Norway did not recommence until late 1944 by Which time it was too late to affe the outcome of the wat. In the Mediterranean, 1./KG 26, now commanded by Ma/ Werner Kiimper who, at the end of January 1943, would hand over to Hptm Herbert Vater, former Staffel Kapitan of 1. /406, was operating fut of Decimomanu in Sardinia whils: Hptm Georg Teske's I./KG 26 was operating out of Villacdro in Sardinia. Both Gruppen were still operating the Heinkel 111 and would continue to do so until July 1944 (|, Gruppe) and June 1943 (I. Gruppe). The Junkers 88S of Hptm Klaus Nocken's L/KG 26 were still operating out of Groseto. Furthermore, it was a clear sign that the ant-shipping, war was still of importance to the Luftwaffe that at the end of January 1943, Generaimaj Martin Harlinghausen was given command of ll. Flegerkorps with specific responsibility for anti-shipping ‘operations in the Mediterranean, However, despite the increased Allied presence, anti-shipping operations in the Mediterranean for the first half of 1943 were not as major as 1942. Notable dates wore 6 February when seven Heinkel 1118 and seven Junkers 885, led by Obit Rusi Schmidt of 4./KG 26, attacked the convoy KMS 8 off Algiers sinking the Canadian corvette Louisburg and torpedoing te freighter Fort Babine for the loss of two Heinkel 111s. On 22 March 1943, KG 26 struck again, sinking the troopship Windsor Castle; amazingly, only one man out of the 3,000 on board was killed A the Luftwaffe began to take primacy over the Regia Aeronautica for anti-shipping operations, it was inevitable that German losses would start to rise, Bordmechaniker UftzAnton Temmen was posted ‘0 IIL/KG 26 in 1943 and recalls: “About half way through 1942, 1 was posted to Lilbeck Blankensee. Here, at IV./KG 26, commanded by Major Fritz Gehring, crews were formed and ‘ying training began with nighe tying, cross country flights and fow level fying over the sea. From there, we were transferred to the Torpedo Ausbildungsschule at Grosseto; arter special taining, we were assigned to 8./KG 26, Hptm Klaus Nocken, GruppenKommandeur of I,K 26 met us (five or six crews) at Grosseto. At that time, IM. Gruppe was jn Vilacidro and Hptin Nocken introduces himself with the words “Gentlemen, we are fying to Sardinia and we are not going to land Lunt the fowtevel formation fying is perfect.” AnOVE, Th right Ue Nother 1948) to Kipp