Ue SU Ue Oe STUN MITZER & JOOST OLIEMANSTHE ARMED FORCES OF NORTH KOREA ON THE PATH OF SONGUN Stijn Mitzer & Joost Oliemans Helion & CompanyHelion & Company Limited Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre Budbrooke Road, Warwick CV34 SWE England "Tel.01926 499619 Email: info@helion.co.nk Websie: www:helion.co.ak ‘Twitter: @helionbooks Blog: blog helion.coxuk Published by Helion & Company 2020 Designed and typeset by Farr out Publications, Wokingham, Berkshire Cover designed by Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design (www:battlefield-design.co.uk) Printed by Gutenberg Press Limited, Tarxien, Malta ‘Texe © Stijn Mitzer & Joost Oliemans 2020 Colourartwork © Adam Hook, David Bocquelet, Tom Cooper, Anderson Subtil, HI Sueton 2020 ‘Maps drawn by George Anderson © Helion & Company 2020 Every reasonable effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright materia. The author and publisher apologize for any errors or omissions inthis work, and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints ot editions ofthis book. ISBN 978-1-910777-145 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the express written consent of Helion & Company Limited. For details of other military history tiles published by Helion & Company Limited contact the above address or visi our website: hetp://wwwhelion.co.uk. ‘We always welcome receiving book proposals from prospective authorsContents Abbreviations Preface Introduction 1 Korean People’s Army Ground Forces ‘Organisation Strategy Infantey Armoured Personnel Carriers Tanks Anillery Military Engineering Mobile Air Defence Systems 2 Special Operations Force Light Infanery Special Operations Forces 3. Korean People’s Army Airand Anti-Air Force History Organisation Aircraft Indigenous aircraft industry Aircraft modifications ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Air Defence 4. Korean People’s Army Navy Organisation and tacts Building up an indigenous leet Moder shipbuilding indusery Surface Effect Ships Large Ship Construction Gunboats and Missile Boats Fast Attack Craft Very Slender Vessels Hovercraft Submarines 5 Strategic Rocker Force Ballistic Missiles Future developments NADA WMDs Nuclear Weapons Biological and Chemical Weaponry 6 Concluding remarks Bibliography Notes 10 2B 18 21 38 56 B 7 83 84 86 96 oe 105 1 121 12s 134 136 M6 147 152 162 167 170 178 179 182 185 187 197 198 215 218 218 219 221 224 225 226AA AAA AAM AEW&C AFV AGL AIP AP APC ASBM AShM ASW ATGM BYRAAM BWC cas. CBRN cps CEP CIA crws, NC cwc CAISR DEAD DMZ DoD DPRK ECM ELINT ERA cpp GLATGM GNSS Gps GPMG GsD FAC FCS FOB HARTS HE HEAT HEMP HMG TADS IAEA Abbreviations Anti Air-to-air missile ircraft artillery Airborne carly warning and control Armoured fighting vehicle Automatic grenade launcher Air-independent propulsion Armour-piercing Armoured personnel cartier anti-ship ballistic missile Anti-submarine warfare Anti-tank guided missile Beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile Biological Weapons Convention Close air suppore ‘Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Coastal defence system Circular error probable Central Intelligence Ageney CClose-in weapon system Computer numerical eontrol Chemical Weapons Convention Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Destruction of enemy air defences Korean Demiliarized Zone Department of Defence Democratic People's Republic of Korea Electronic countermeasure Electronic intelligence Explosive reactive armour Gross domestic product Gun-launched anti-tank guided missile Global navigation satellite syseem Global positioning system General-purpose machinegun General Staff Department Fast attack craft Fire-control system Forward operating base Hardened artillery sce High-explosive High-explosive anti-tank warhead High-alticude electromagnetic pulse Heavy machine gun Integrated air defence system International Atomie Energy Agency ICBM IFV INS IR IRBM JSA KCBC KCNA KCTY KPA KPAAF KPAGF KPAN LMG LRF LWR MANPADS ‘MaRV MBT MCLC MCLOS MDL MED MIRV MLRS MoD ‘PAF MRL MRBM NADA NATO NBC NLL NPT PCEC PGM PRC PVA RAP RCL RCS. RGB RHA ROK ROKA ROKAF ROKN Intercontinental ballistic missile Infantry fighting vehicle Inertial navigati Infrared Intermediate-range ballistic missile Joint Security Area Korean Central Broadcasting Committee Korean Central News Agency Korean Central Television Korean People’ Army Korean People’s Army Airand Anti-Aie Force Korean People’ Army Ground Force Korean People’s Army Navy Light machine gun Laser rangefinder Laser warning receiver Man-portable air-defence system Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle ‘Main bactle tank Mine-clearing line charge ‘Manual command to line of sight Military Demareation Line ‘Multi-function display Maltiple independently cargetable re-entry vehicle Maliple launch rockee system Ministry of Defence Ministry of People’s Armed Forces Multiple rocket launcher Medium-range ballistic missile National Aerospace Development Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nucleas, biological, chemical Northern Limit Line ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear ‘Weapons Patrol craft escort Precision-guided munition People's Republic of China People's Volunteer Army Rocket-asisted projectile Recoilles rifle Radar cross-section Reconnaissance General Bureau Rolled homogeneous armour Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Army Republic of Korea Air Force Republic of Korea NavyROKS RPG R&D SAM SACLOS. SEAD SES SHORAD SIGINT SFIC SkD SLBM sLV SOF SPAAG sPG SPH ‘SPM SRBM SRF SSB Republic of Korea Ship Rocket-propelled grenade Research and development Surface-to-air missile Semi-automatic command to ine of sight Suppression of enemy air defences Surface effec ship Shore range air defence Signals intelligence Submersible fast infiltration erafe Semi knock-down kit Submarine-launched ballistie missile Satellite launch vehicle Special Operations Force Self propelled anci-aircrafé gon Self-propelled gun Self propelled howitzer Sell-propelled mortar Short-range ballistic missile Strategie Rocket Force Sub-surface ballistic (ballistic missile submarine) ‘SSBN SSES TE TEL THAAD UAV UHF UXO. UN us USA USAF USFK USN USSR vip vsv WMD werk Sub-surface ballistic nuclear (nuclear ballistic missile submarine) Stealth surface effec ship ‘Transporter erector Transporter erector launcher ‘Terminal high altitade area defence ‘Unmanned aerial vehicle ‘Ultra high frequency Unexploded ordnance United Nations United Staves United States of America United States Air Force United States Forces Korea United States Navy Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ‘Very importane person Very slender vessel ‘Weapons of mass destruction Workers’ Party of KoreaPreface fhe DPRK. Shrouded in mysticism and secrecy, the nation | represents an absolute unicum for the miliary analyst. No other country in the world manages to attract so much scrutiny to its controversial anties, yer divulge so litle of material importance about its inner workings. This might be at the heare of why this country specifically has gripped our attention for so many years, and drawn us to write this book about ies largely mysterious armed forces. The subject is broad and an aversion towards narrowing down the scope of this project means it has run into numerous delays along the way whilst the word count steadily kept rising. Unpleasant as this may have been in the meantime, this has enabled us to writea more complete treatise ofboth the Korean People Army’ history and its current military convolutions than we could once have hoped for. The common thread found wichin these pageson all matters relaced to the North Korean military is proudly extolled on the cover: “On the Path of Songun” ~itisasubstlefitsing to the subject whichever way you regard it. To the North Koreans, “Songun isthe military first doctrine introduced by Kim Jong Un’s father, Kim Jong Ila supposed masterplan aimed at preserving the nation’ssovereignty. Incidentally, “On the Path of Songun’ isalso the title of one of the DPRK’s many military documentaries ~ a highly ‘welcome source of information for analysts like us. Viewed from another angle however, the phrase embodies the confrontational direction that has come to characterise North Korean polities in recent decades. Plastered across headlines through ever-escalating tensions and an inexhaustible string of missle launches and atomic bomb tests, the question this book aims to answer about North Koreas armed forces is implicit to this subtitle: Where did the path ‘of Songun lead them, and where will it next? Before we introduce the main subject, a couple of clarifications and disclaimers regarding the contents ofthis book. Since all claims made represent the latest analysis of current milicary matters in a ‘country that is notoriously secretive, some are bound to turn out to be incorrect as new information comes to light. Wherever a claim is made thac cannot be established with absolute certainty, it is clarified through appropriate qualifies: plausible, likely, and all variations of like sort. Sources are mentioned for those claims that do not bank on our own work, when they are absent it may be assumed that the claim is cither an original finding ofthe authors or held to be common knowledge. AAs the subject we've written on mainly concerns the DPRK, itis the North Korean romanisation scheme of Korean that we've attempced to adhere to for most Korean names, which differs from those schemes common in the South, In some cases this might be cause for confusion, further cavfication of what exactly is referenced is then usually provided. In similar vein, designations of the Korean People’s Army's various branches are matched to their North Korean analogs, abbreviations of which are adopted as follows: Korean People’s Army, KPA: Korean People’s Army's Ground Force, KPAGF: Special Operations Foree, SOF; Korean People’ Army Air and Anti-Air Force, KPAAF; Korean People’s ‘Army Navy, KPANS; Strategic Rocket Force, SRE! These branches also serve asthe main structure ofthis book, and are treated in the order listed above. Wed also like to express our profound graticude 10 our dear friend Tarao, whose aid in researching and promoting this book has been indispensable. Furthermore, the variety of talented artists chat have contributed to the many wonderful artworks deserve nothing but praise Lastly, wed like to thank our publisher, Duncan Rogers, for his ceaseless patience throughout ‘the numerous expansions and corresponding delays ofthis project. Any questions on this publication or related matters are more than welcome, and may be directed to oryxbook@gmail.com.£C-121 shootdoun @ y Benin ee xurong fark Factor Panghyon Aircraft 1 1st Hivasong-14 Test roy ‘SNonabyon ae : 2 @ussPrebic capture Sea @rwasong ts tert Korea 1 yongyang Bay = eiilntivaton Tune! OKScheonan ae ‘ ere Jolt Security Area gd infitvaton Tunnel 00 BO ate ae atte on = mSeoul owen wo © chp inanphioge @ cisshes and high proline 1 Dicoveredinfration tunnels © Sees rltedto WD programme, Mcoaneous tes Wee THAAD deployment # Sea ; a 2a 1 “ ae " JAPAN ‘Amap of North Korea with the most important locations mentioned in the book. (Map drawn by George Anderson)Introduction Friday, 9:22PM (GMT+9), 26 March 2010. An explosion rocks the ROKS Cheonan, 2 Pohang-classcorverte of the South Korean Navy carrying a crew of 104 on a routine coastal patrol near the disputed waters of Baengnyeong Island and the Northern Limi Line. 'The sheer force of the blast eauses the ship to break in half just minutes later, a hastily scrambled rescue mission failing to save the lives of 46 missing sailors, most of which were ‘rapped aboard the sinking vessel. The Chconan’s active sonar had failed to detect the threat looming in the waters below: a North Korean submarine that had been lurking in the area for the past day. Waiting ata depth of 30 metres for the Cheonan to pass it by, it had kepe its torpedoes ready to seike at an unsuspecting target. After forcing torpedo out of one ofits launch tubes witha violent burst of expanding gasses, che wake-homing device then sought its way to the soft underbelly of the Cheonan, breaking its back with the explosive force of its 250kg warhead. As suddenly as the "unprovoked attack had commenced its effeets would subside again, with the vessel sinking at approximately 9:30PM. ‘The submarine that had caused this tragedy slipped back into the dark waters of the North unnoticed, leaving a nation reeling in grief, anger and confusion in its wake. In the initial chaos following the sinking few knew where to place blame for this great loss of life. The South’ Ministry of Defence (ROK MoD) in its press briefings urged for restraint while an investigation was set up, and some suggested an internal explosion or an old sea mine might have been responsible. But no, the Cheonan’s fare was not decided in an unforcunate split second of some unintended detonation. Instead, as much as weeks before, gears searted turning that would eventually cause the event that brought two nations to the brink of war, and changed the inter- Korean dynamics for the better part of a decade. Still, litte-to-no concrete evidence of the North's culpability in those prior weeks exists, and the first indication that anything out of the ordinary ‘was apace came just over a week before the sinking. Five KPAAF MiG.-29 aircraft forward deployed to Kwail air base and another five MiG-23s at Hwangju indicated a highly unusual state of alereness not seen outside of staged exercises or provocations in the DPRK. At the time, the joint USFK/ROKA Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises were coming to a close, which the North Koreans have sinee their inception condemned as the cover for an invasion of the North ~ chus potentially providing an explanation for this deviation from the norm. Nevertheless, with che exercises having. ended on 18 March, a detachment of two submarines, one Yeono class and one Sang-O class, accompanied by a support ship, let their home portat the Pipagot naval base on the 23rd. Reportedly, vil on its mission to the South the smaller Yeono class subsequently detoured to the westside of Baengyeong Island on the 25th, and there awaited the passingof the ROKS Cheonan. When the suitable target of opportunity had been found and doomed, the North Korean vessels broke off their mission and reberthed at Pipagot on the 28th. In the following months, the resulting ROK investigation swiftly came tothe conclusion that North Korean torpedo indeed .was overwhelmingly likely to have been the culprit for the sinking. Famously, most of its remains (complete with Korean markings) were actually recovered and matched with the schematics of a North Korean manufactured CHT-02D torpedo, Vehement denials and lengehy rebuttals of the investigation’s findings by the Korean Central News Agency (the DPRK's state news) expressed the official North Korean stance on the matter, and tensions between the two nations rose sharply as economic and diplomatic sanetions were imposed by the South. Although the incident was not the frst ease of open hostilities between the two nations in recent history, it was the final nail in che coffin for the relatively stable relations and eloser cooperation brought on by the so-called Sunshine Policy ~ heralding the stare ofa decade of confrontations and mutual animosity. That the pain inflicted by the Cheonan sinking has anything but subsided today was attested by the angry response of many to the choice of sending Kim Yong Chol as the hicad of the North Korean delegation to the closing ceremony of the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. As former director of the infamous Reconnaissance General Bureau, he was accused of having masterminded attacks such as the one on the ROKS heonan, and his continued prominence as a political figure in the North highlights the difficulties that le in store for a possible reconciliation between the two countries. Some have claimed the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan was a mere coincidental strike against a targer of opportunity by an overzealous submarine commander, but in truth the incident fits into the larger context of North Korean provocations that have typified its aggressive foreign policies since its founding. These planned provocations often serve as che basis for the rise co power of an important figure within the WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea) or KPA, or otherwise are conducted for symbolic reasons, to prove loyalty, oreven simply asan act of revenge. As anticipatory measures the DPRK nowadays usually mobilises fighter aircraft, air-defence systems and anti-ship missiles in the general vicinity of where a resulting confrontation might take place. In committing acts that fall shore of ouerighe triggering a war, the DPRK has been able toseriously influence its neighbours, and inthe least retain its place in the international sporlighe given that is economical and political influence are nowadaysinsuffcient co do so. The potentially colossal humanitarian and financial catastrophe brought on by the onser of full-scale hostilities has in ehe past often been enough to discourage the ROK and USA from retaliating militarily, hough only through exercising great restraint. As ie happened, ie would nor take long before another incident pushed the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war once more as result ofa provocation by the North. Supposedly responding to a South Korean artillery exercise which targeted watersacross the NLL, abattery ofsix 122mm MRLs and possibly a number of 76mm coastal defence artillery pieces fired a devastating barrage upon Yeonpyeong Island. Occurring on 23 November, the surprise attack was conducted in the same year as the ROKS Cheonan sinking, and caught the ROKA units stationed on the island completely unawares. Much of the seven square kilometre large island burned down in the resulting carnage, and two military, as well as two civilian, lives were claimed (North Korean casualties from return fire remain uncertain). Extensive preparations to the artillery exchange, including the redeployment of the offending MRL battalion on the adjacent Kangnyong Peninsula, the setting up of a secure land communications line to this unit and che mobilisation of several other asses, ineluding a flight of five MiG-23 fighter aircraft, in the hours preceding the attack, are all indicative of the deliberate prior intent ofthe attack. Furthermore, the characteristics of the rocket launch itself similarly implied a well-prepared and calculated provocation, refraining from escalating with heavier barrages whilst the artillery power to do so ‘was present in abundance.* South Korean artillery swifily initiated rerum fire (hough it was later deemed to be largely inaccurate as a direct result of North Korean jamming of the AN/TPQ-37 ‘weapon-locating radar), to which a smaller second bombardment was conducted in answer? Incidents such as these, whether they occur close to the DMZ or even in entirely different nations, are the staple of incer- Korean relations and provide a stark reminder of the fact that a renewed conflic is never far away. Given that the economical and technological situation in the two Koreas are nowadays ‘more in contrast than any two bordering countries in the world, the reason why this threat remains so potent might be obscure t0 some. However, despite the fact chat in the pase decades the KPA has suffered much in terms of technological prowess and overall upkeep relative to its Southern neighbour, in considering its current strength its ability to import weapons and technology from abroad (especially before the sanctions regime) is often underestimated, and the capabilities ots indigenous military industry even moreso. Some of these acquisitions lean on old relations with like-minded governments, others simply exploit che black marker; others sill are of surprising sophistication, and suggest some larger geopolitical game is at play, presumably motivated by a Russian and Chinese desire to uphold North Korea's status as buffer zone between these ‘ountriesand Western-aligned South Korea. Ie isthe latter category that has allowed the DPRK to reverse-engineer or otherwise copy sensitive weapons systems and technologies such as the $-300 air- defence system, Kh-35 anti-ship missile and an advanced 300mm multiple rocket launcher, not to mention a myriad of developments related to its ballistic missile programme. Research, development and particularly the production of these systems (often within short timeframes) by the Norch Koreans is impressive, peshaps indicative of an outside influence that has aided them. Whatever the cas, it has not only enabled a revival of the KPA as a fighting force, but also helped keep the DPRK's military exports competitive during an age of ever-tightening sanctions. North Korean arms stemming from the past half-century remain abundant across the globe, and as it produces (or formerly produced) many of the weapons systems Soviet-aligned nations were supplied with, itis a popular source for affordable maintenance and upgrades. Its efforts at keeping these ~ now illegal ~ exports a secret constitute some of the roughest challenges to the UN in dealing with the nation, each year spawning extensive investigations and expansions of sanctions. Were it not for the unrelenting pressure exerted on other UN members to adhere to the embargoes in place, North Korea ‘would likely be a major arms exporter, generating much revenue for a state known for its economic hardship, as well as allowing it to regain some of the influence decades of isolation have bereft it of. OF course, the days where the DPRK could boast of substantial ‘economic gains and widespread political clout have long gone. In an age then where its adversaries enjoy a massive technological and ‘economical advantage, and its traditional allies for the first time show hesitation in their resolve, the KPA faces an unclear future Will ic increasingly adhere to Kim Jong Unis Byungjin Line (see below) and give its economy room for recovery, or willie continue along che path of Songun?Korean People’s Army Ground Forces G= powers typically upkeep massive armies for self defence or protection of their interests abroad. As a rule, those possessing the largest populations or most prosperous economies correspond with being able to suseain the largest armed forces. This is just the firse point at which the KPA stands out like a sore thumb amongst its peers. With a population of some 25 nillion and a GDP that only escapes derision by the difficuley in its estimation, its standing forces compete with the absolute top contenders on the international stage in terms of active personnel “This vase military apparatus has over the years resorted to a vatiety ‘of curious racties 10 supply its forces with a correspondingly ‘excessive amount of equipment, the result of which has generally not been favourable to its international image. Nonetheless, its efforts at maintaining a force of tis size have been anything if not realistic, and they are the sole reason its operational capabilities are not to be underestimated even afier decades of what can arguably be perceived as stagnation, In fact, on the technological front the KPA's Ground Forces are undergoing one of the largest uphcavals since their foundation, albeitas yet on a limited seal. Before discussing modern day developments however, it is worth painting an accurate picture of its origins, which helps to explain some of the unique characteristics exhibited by the KPA. The DPRK actually celebrates two separate founding dates, the first ring to the foundation of resistance army against the Japanese, retroactively named the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army,‘ on 25 April 1932, and the second as the modern KPA on 8 February 1948. Although ie is the former that has been incorporated in the flags of the various military branches, the second has been once again acknowledged in recent years and celebrated since 2018 as well. This peculiar duality in its Foundations is reflected even in the essing the importance of guerrilla warfare and the ereation of “second front” modem-day tactics employed by the modern KP y in South Korea alongside conventional large-scale operations. “These large-scale operations would likely still much resemble the ones conducted during the early stages of the Korean War, with North Korean doctrines focussing on a blitz-type atcack with the aim of swifily decapitating the South Korean army and occupying the South. (Ofcourse, such planning also has co take into accoune che vast changes that have occurred since the Korean War, or the Fatherland Liberation Warasitis known in the Norch. Triggered by the division of Korea after the end of the Second World War, tensions between the communiscbacked regime of the North led by Kim Il Sungand that of the South under Syngman Rhee led to an open invasion of the South on 25 June 1950, Although che consensus is that the invasion — which was extensively planned prior eo this date — 10 ‘The flag of the Korean Peoples Army Ground Force. ‘The opposite side's similar but features the WPK ‘emblem, (Denelson83 via Wikimedia Commons) commenced with a North Korean offensive, clashes along the 38th Parallel thae divided the two sides had been initiated frequently by either side and the North Korean narrative remains that the South attacked fitst? With an army both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to the ROKA Kim Il Sung managed to take Seoul in just two days and destroy the majority of opposing forces in under a ‘week. Caught off-guard by the invasion, the US response through the United Nations was unable to halt the North Korean offensive, often lacking appropriate armament to counter the North’ armour which it had received from the Soviet Union in the build-up before the war. By August all chat was lef was a small pocket around the south-eastern city of Pusan where the overextension of the North Korean supply lines and extensive bombing led to a stalemate that would hold for over a month before KPA forces were all but exhausted. Subsequent landings of troops at Inchon near Seoul led to the recapture ofthe capital and the decimation of retreating KPA forces, followed by the capture of Pyongyang on 19 October and ‘much of the North’ territory. This prompted China, under strong encouragement of Mao Zedong, to dedicate its newly designated People's Volunteer Army into the fight, fighting back UN forces to beyond che 38th Parallel through a series of massive offensives which essentially sidedlined the KPA’ and, by extension, Kim I] Sung’s role forthe rest ofthe war. Although still hesitant ro directly involve itself, che Soviet Union also stepped up its efforts and began flying sorties over Chinese-held territories, further escalating the war with the first large-scale jet-on-jer aerial engagements, On the ground, the PVA and UN forces slowly entered into a deadly stalemate along the 38th Paralel, where Fighting first erupted. After reconquering Seoul in January 1951, a setback which infamously led General MacArchur to consider the use of nuclear weapons, the city traded hands a fourth time just over ewo months later, leaving it completely in ruins. Afier June however, the fone remained almost entirely stable for another two years, while sporadie effortsat negotiating an armistice did litde to diminish the f intensity of a series of battles and the bombardment of targets. in the North. With both sides coming to the realisation that a breakthrough was nowhere in sight, a Korean Armistice ‘Agreement was reached on 27 July 1953, detailing the cessation of hostilities until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, as well as. the creation of the DMZ. ‘This heavily monitored border continues to divide the two Koreas to this day as a final peace treaty never materialised — meaning that they have technically remained at war ‘A North Korean armoured formation equipped with T-34 tanks and SU-76 self- propelled guns enters Seoul on 27 June 1950, just two days after the KPA crossed the 38th Parallel. (Korean Central Broadcasting Committee (KCBC)) ever since. Although much of the Korean Peninsula was practically razed to the ground through years of fighting with negligible territorial gains by citherside asa result, the DPRK, still considers the outcome a victory, and celebrates 27 July as Victory Day. Of cours, this may be influenced by the fact that it adheres to a completely different narrative about the course of the Korean War, with wildly diverging statistics pertaining to the amount of lives and equipment lost on either side. The total number of UN military casualties is put at 1,567,128, of which 405,498 were “US imperialist soldiers of aggression” — close to three times the numbers reported by the US DoD.’ The freshly established Korean People's Army, despite having been built up and consequently almost entirely destroyed during the war sill came out ofthe fighting bereer equipped and organised than it had ever been, initially supporced by hundreds of thousands of Chinese forces, by the end of the 1950s the KPA stood mostly cn its own legs, numbering some 3 ,000 personnel and inheriting advanced equipment mainly from the Soviet Union, Nonetheless it ‘was now actually outnumbered by the ROK, which albeit lacking in modem equipment and hampered by economic difficulties, managed to upkeep a standing army of some 650,000." Although modernisation of ts branches during the 1950s and 60s ensured it ‘maintained thin technological edge, this situation mainly persisted in the direct post-war era. The status quo shifted when, in the late 1960sand 1970s, the KPA entered adefiningperiod, one that would The drastic increase in military spending and subsequent build-up ofthe KPA manifested itself inthe delivery of thousands of tanks from the Soviet Union and China, including ‘these Chinese Type-59s seen here during a military exercise. (KCBC) drastically transform its Ground Forces in size and equipment as well as overall doctrine. In accordance with its newly established Juche idea far reaching efforts were made to dramatically increase military spending and set up an indigenous industry for producing most of the equipment required for its ground forces. Such plans were for instance outlined during the 2nd WPK conference on 5 October 1966 during which Kim Il Sung called for an emphasis con development of the defence industry.* Milicary spending was adjusted accordingly, falling just shore of half the total budget, in contrast to the 31.2 percent allotted to che military previously! Although it would take decades before the Songun policy would be officially instituted, the push for modernising its defence industry in the late 1960s and 70s was de Facto the frst practical instance of it. Ie is no coincidence that the period immediately following the 1966 conference saw a steep rise in intet-Korean clashes such "as the infamous 1968 Blue House raid, 1968 Pueblo incident and 1969 EC-121 shootdown, but also many more minor skirmishes resulting in the deaths of hundreds. ‘These years of dramatically increased hostilities have so far becn unsurpassed in intensity Aespie the decades of virtually unabating animosity between the ‘two countries since. Aside from deadly encouncers along the DMZ, the period was also the backdrop to numerous infiltrations by the North mainly along the Souths coastline, bur also including the hijacking of a Korean Air Lines’ YS-11 together with ies 50 crewmembers and passengers. Although South Korea responded in kind with raids and incursions into the DPRK, hostilities were primarily instigated by che North in a deliberate campaign likely aimed at bringing about regime change in the South. The costly ‘operations yielded lite success that helped realise such a goal, and hostilities died down again towards the end of 1969.” That tensions remained high is attested to by the shootdown of a US helicopter by South Korean forces in 1974, who were ancieipating a North Korean raid on the presidential palace.* By the early to mid-1970s North Korea was producing. increasing amounts of indigenous weaponry as pare ofits strive to become self-sufficient. Many components still needed tobe sourced from abroad however, and the new policies were leaving clear marks ‘on the stumbling North Korean economy, casting doubt on their cffectiveness. Nonetheless, the KPA once again began to take shape 45 an invasion force, its tacties drawing heavily from experiences gained during the Korean War. Based on the success of North ‘Vietnam in capturing the South in 1975 and ee failure to instigate a revolution through the South Korean populace, itis believed ‘that Kim Il Sung asked China for support in engaging in another st South Korea? With the Sino-Soviet split, Cultural Revolution and perceived Chinese inaction in the Vietnam War having deteriorated Sino-Korean relations (although they were since on the mend), as well as Mao Zedong's poor health at the time, its perhaps not surprising chat this request was denied. Stil, a confrontational attitude continued to typify North Korean policies throughout the 70s. In fact, in November 1974 the first of four tunnels burrowed directly under the DMZ. was found, followed by additional discoveries in 1975, 1978 and 1990. These “Tunnels of Aggression” often measured more than a kilometre in length, running over a hundred metres deep through bedrock. In effect, they would allow invading forces to circumvent the heavily fortified border area and instantly overtake the ROKA’s border guards and vast minefields — a tactic which could potentially have very high payoffs in the initial stages of open hostilities. Another high-profile incident of the 70s serves to illustrate che murual animosity and high tensions between the two nations at the time and is known as the axe murder incident. In this deadly cash over the eucting/ trimming of a tee near the DMZ, two US Army officers were kal either side accusing the other of starting the fighting. “The incident was followed by a tense stand-off berween forces at the DMZ while US forces cut the tree down, acareflly measured show of force aimed at displaying resolve without escalating the situation. Even though the ineidene was likely purely che result of the level of animosity between opposing force at the border, the precariousness of the situation is wellillustrated by the fact that ‘Kim II Sung appears to have genuinely believed the USA planned the incident in advance as a provocation.” I is interesting to note 2 that until the mid-1970s, US intelligence vastly underestimated developments undertaken by the North Koreans to modernise and ‘expand their miliary in che years prior. Assessments of inventory holdings, armoured fighting vehicles and numbers of deployed personnel often diverged from actual values almost by a factor of two, and an invasion could well have caught the DPRK's opponents completely off guard asa result." The 1970s also brought on gradual souring in relations ‘between the DPRK and the USSR, caused mainly by Kim Il Sung’ policy to attempt to maintain equal relations beeween China and the Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet spit. Another important factor was North Koreas tendency not to uphold its end of trade agreements and payments and the Soviet Union's resulting ‘eluctancy to provide economic aid." The same problem plagued its tclations with other traditionalallies the usual explanation provided for which was that the economy was fling short of projections due to the necessity to invest in the defence industry. Thus, while new ‘weapons systems could no longer be comfortably acquired from the Soviet Union, North Korea had now established a capacity to produce equipment in virtually every category for its armed forces. This double-edged sword still reverberates in the DPRK's current economic and military situation, despite having its roots in the policies adopted half a century ago. An additional, historically highly significant reason for the downturn in relations between the DPRK and the USSR is the North’ insistence the Soviet Union should ad ic in constructing a nuclear reactor for research purposes (request firs filed a early as 1958 and even partially granted, bue which only became a true stumbling block in the 1970s). Despite the drought in deliveries from the Soviet Union between 1975 and 1985, slighty offset by a mending in relations with China starting in the 1970s, the North’ Ground Forces continued o expand gradually into the 1980s until by che end of the Cold War it had transformed into the over-sized gargantuan we know it as today. At that point, active forces numbered some 850,000 personnel — an increase of half a million since the end of the Korean War — with reserves coming in at around five million.” ‘The 1983 downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by a Soviet Interceptor put a strain on slowly budding relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea for a while, and combined with visits by Kim Il Sung to the Soviet Union in 1984 and 1986 they heralded a period of rapprochement between the two nations. This prompted the Soviet Union to agree to the construction of at least cone nuclear reactor and renewed deliveries of advanced weapons systems by the mid-1980s."* Although this period was shore-ived, for by 1987 the North Korean economy began to falter in earnest and the Soviet Union once again sought to enhanee its ties with South Korea, it allowed the DPRK to gain access to new and much- needed military technologies. While the economic turmoil brought on by the fll of the Soviet Union prevented it from applying most of these to is ground forces during the stagnation of the 1990s, efforts were nonetheless undertaken to incorporate them into the indigenous industry. With prospeets of a renewed conflict over North Koreas fledgling nuclear programme continuing to trouble the peninsula, che military maintained a slow growth both in size and equipment modernisation. Production of indigenous fighting vehicle persisted commensurately, but at a slower pace than during the massive modernisation efforts of the 70s and 80s. In order to¢ the army remained at lease superficially at an advantage to South even through the hardships of che 1990s, including a famine killing hundreds of thousands which was monikered “Ihe ‘Arduous March” in North Korea, the Songun policy was offically insticuted afer Kim Jong Il took to power, despite being practically in effect since the 1960s. Regardless, che 1990s and early 2000s mainly constituted a period of decay, during which meaningful production of new weaponry and upkeep of the general armed forces was sidelined for the development of new technologies, including ballistic missile systems. Only after the economy made a slight recovery in the late 2000s, coinciding with the death of Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un’s takeover at the end of 2011, exercises and military modemisation began once again in earnest. “The development of new weapons systems in the previous decades was consolidated with their actual production, and Kim Jong Un's Byuingjin Line policy adopted in March 2013 redirected much of the R&D budget to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Having inherited a generally technologically outdated, vastly oversized rnlitary apparatus from his ancestors, che new leader is now faced with finding solutions to keep the KPA’s Ground Forces relevant in an era of sanctions and inereased threat of nuclear wat Organisation ‘That the leadership is aware of these challenges isa fact surprisingly frankly admitted. For all its selfaggrandising and over-the-top propaganda the KPA is anything if not realistic in its effores to mitigate chem, with Kim Jong Un calling for “the development of [weaponry] which may outrun the enemies’ numerical and technical advantages” on more than one occasion.” As Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, Chairman of the Seate Affairs Commission, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Kozea and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Kim Jong Un is in full control and command over every aspect of Nosth Korea's military apparatus. He has the power to direct al elements of the military, and thus also any modernisation efforts aimed at revitalising the Korean People’s Army so as to remain a legitimate fighting force in che 21st century. In these roles, Kim Jong Un is pictured making visits co units much more offen than his father and appears intent on micromanaging affairs for beter of worse. North Korean ZiL-130 trucks carrying infantry line the road from horizon to horizon in an impressive display of numerical might. (KCBC) ‘As such, hes responsible for sweeping changes in military doctrine and the operational capacity of the KPA as a whole, but aso for inspecting whether the paint job on specific aircraft is properly maintained or a new type of equipment that aids in river-erossing needs to be developed. As Supreme Leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Unalso overscesa vast political body controllingall aspects of ie in the DPRK. The most vital of theses the State Affairs Commission, which is the foremost political organ of the DPRK, and decides upon everything of importance to the country and its course ‘The State Affairs Commission replaced the National Defence Commission in 2016 to widen its focus on matters other than defence. The Chaieman of the State Affairs Commission is elected by North Korea’ Supreme People's Assembly (parliament). This of course is a symbolic process only, as the Chairman has always been the leader of the Kim dynasty. The State Affairs Commission ‘comprises the General Staf Department, which exercises command ‘over the whole of the Korean People’s Army, as well as the Minisery ‘of People's Armed Forces (MPAF), which is responsible for military diplomacy, construction and military logisties and procurement ‘of arms, munitions and equipment.” The MPAF’s acquisition/ production plans are then passed on to the Central Military Commission, which is subordinate to the WK, which has £0 formally approve them, Several commands in between link all these ‘organisations together and additional administrational commands farther complicate the picture, but these surpass the scope of this book." ‘To ensure fall political liability of the whole of the KPA and the DPRK, several internal intelligence organs exist that are tasked with maintaining the political ideology of all KPA members, to prevent coups, defections and to look for corruption. ‘These ‘organs serve as the link between the leadership, the WPK and the KPA. ‘The most pervasive one is the General Political Bureau, also known as the General Political Department, which is responsible for maintaining the political ideology of the KPA’ service people through the deployment of political commissars to army units. Although technically under the command of the General Political Bureau, the Military Security Command — also known as the Military Security Bureau — is another organ which is de facto under the control of the Ministry of State Security which in euen 3