Justifying Circumstances Cases

KurtSeaVe Notes – Crim 1 Digests (Article 11)
G.R. No. L-7037 March 15, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE LAUREL, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
On the night of December 26, 1909, while the girl Concepcion Lat was walking along the street,
on her way from the house of Exequiel Castillo, accompanied by several young people, she was
approached by Jose Laurel who suddenly kissed her and immediately thereafter ran off to his
house, pursued by the girl's companions, among whom was Exequiel Castillo; but they did not
overtake him.
On the 28th, while Exequiel Castillo and Jose Laurel, together with Domingo Panganiban and
several others of the defendants, were at an entertainment held on an upper floor of the parochial
building of pueblo of Tanauan, it is alleged that the said Castillo and Laurel were invited by
Panganiban, the former through his brother, Roque Castillo, and the latter, directly, to come out
into the yard, which they did, accompanied by Panganiban and the other defendants referred to.
After the exchange of a few words and explanations concerning the kiss given the girl Lat on the
night of the 26th of that month, a quarrel arose between the said Jose Laurel and Exequiel
Castillo, in which Domingo Panganiban, Vicente Garcia, and Conrado Laurel took part, and as a
result of the quarrel Exequiel Castillo was seriously wounded. He succeeded in reaching a drug
store nearby where he received first aid treatment; Jose Laurel also received two slight wounds
on the head.
PROSECUTION
Exequiel Castillo testified that while he, together with Primitivo Gonzalez, was in the hall of the
parochial building of Tanauan, attending an entertainment on the night of December 28, 1909, he
was approached by his brother, Roque Castillo, who told him, on the part of Domingo
Panganiban, that Jose Laurel desired to speak with him and was awaiting him on the ground
floor of the said building, to give him an explanation with regard to his (Laurel's) having kissed
Concepcion Lat on the night of the 26th in the street and in the presence of the witness and other
young people; Exequiel Castillo, therefore, left the parochial building, at the street door; that
after he had waited there for half an hour, Jose laurel likewise came down out of the building and
Jose Laurel approached him and immediately took him aside, away from the door of the building
and the others.
Laurel then said to him that, before making any explanations relative to the said offense against
the girl Concepcion Lat, he would ask him whether it was true that he (the witness, Castillo) had
in his possession some letters addressed by Laurel to the said girl, to which the witness replied
that as a gentleman he was not obliged to answer the question; that thereupon Jose Laurel
suddenly struck him a blow in the left side of the breast with a pocketknife, whereupon Castillo,
feeling that he was wounded, struck in turn with the cane he was carrying at Laurel, who dodged
and immediately started to run;
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thereupon Castillo received another knife thrust in the left arm followed by a blow in the left side
from a fist and Castillo, upon turning, saw Vicente Garcia and Domingo Panganiban in the act of
again assaulting him; Primitivo Gonzalez and several policemen approached him calling of
peace; his assailants then left him and witness went to the neighboring drug store where he
received first aid treatment. Castillo further testified that he had been courting the girl
Concepcion Lat for a month; that, because his sweetheart had been kissed by Jose Laurel, he felt
a little resentment against the latter, and that since then he had no opportunity to speak with his
assailant until the said night of the attack.
Primitivo Gonzalez observed that Jose Laurel, who had his hand in his pocket while he was
talking with Exequiel, immediately drew out a handkerchief and therewith struck Exequiel a
blow on the breast; that the latter forthwith hit Laurel, with a cane which he was carrying; that
Laurel, upon receiving a blow, stepped back, while Exequiel pursued him and continued to strike
him; that thereupon Vicente Garcia stabbed Exequiel, who had his back turned toward him and
Conrado Laurel struck the said Exequiel a blow on the head with a cane; that when witness
approached the spot where the fight was going on, several policemen appeared there and called
out for peace.
Lucio Villa, a policeman, testified that on the hearing the commotion, he went to the scene of it
and met Jose Laurel who was coming away, walking at an ordinary gait and carrying a bloody
pocketknife in his hand; that witness therefore arrested him, took the weapon from him and
conducted him to the municipal building; and that the sergeant and another policemen, the latter
being the witness's companion, took charge of the other disturbers.
DEFENSE
Jose Laurel, testified that early in the evening of the 28th of December he went to the parochial
building, in company with Diosdado Siansance and several young people, among them his
cousin Baltazara Rocamora, for the purpose of attending an entertainment which was to be held
there; that, while sitting in the front row of chairs, for there were as yet but few people, and while
the director of the college was delivering a discourse, he was approached by Domingo
Panganiban who told him that Exequiel Castillo wished to speak with him, to which Laurel
replied that he should wait a while and Panganiban thereupon went away; that, a short time
afterwards, he was also approached by Alfredo Yatco who gave him a similar message, and soon
afterwards Felipe Almeda came up and told him that Exequiel Castillo was waiting for him on
the ground floor of the house; this being the third summons addressed to him, he arose and went
down to ascertain what the said Exequiel wanted.
When Laurel stepped outside of the street door, he saw several persons there, among them,
Exequiel Castillo; Castillo upon seeing Laurel, suggested that they separate from the rest and talk
in a place a short distance away; that thereupon Exequiel asked witness why he kissed his
sweetheart, Conception Lat, and on Laurel's replying that he had done so because she was very
fickle and prodigal of her use of the word "yes" on all occasions, Exequiel said to him that he
ought not to act that way and immediately struck him a blow on the head with a cane or club,
which assault made witness dizzy and caused him to fall to the ground in a sitting posture; that,
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as witness feared that his aggressor would continue to assault him, he took hold of the
pocketknife which he was carrying in his pocket and therewith defended himself; that he did not
know whether he wounded Exequiel with the said weapon, for, when witness arose, he noticed
that he, the latter, had a wound in the right parietal region and a contusion in the left; that witness
was thereupon arrested by the policemen, Lucio Villa, and was unable to state whether he
dropped the pocketknife he carried or whether it was picked up by the said officer; that he had
been courting the girl Concepcion Lat for a year, but that in October, 1909, his courtship ended
and Exequiel Castillo then began to court her; and that, as witness believed that the said girl
would not marry him, nor Exequiel, he kissed her in the street, on the night of December 26,
1909, and immediately thereafter ran toward his house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Laurel acted on self defense.
HELD:
YES. Jose Laurel acted on self defense. The SC ruled that it was Laurel who was invited to come
down from the parochial building to the ground floor thereof to make explanations regarding the
insult to the girl Lat, the real suitor of whom was at the time the said Exequiel Castillo. All this is
not mere conjecture; it is logically derived from the above related facts.
Both Jose and Exequiel were attending the entertainment that night in the upper story of the
parochial building. Exequiel was the first who went below, with his cousin, Primitivo Gonzalez,
knowing the Laurel remained in the hall above, and he it was who waited for nearly half an hour
on the ground floor of the said building for the said Jose Laurel to come down. The latter was
notified three times, and successively, in the name and on the part of Exequiel Castillo, first by
Domingo Panganiban, then by Alfredo Yatco and finally by Felipe Almeda.
Meanwhile, for that space of time, Exequiel Castillo was awaiting him, undoubtedly for the
purpose of demanding explanations concerning the offensive act committed against his
sweetheart. The natural course and the rigorous logic of the facts cannot be arbitrarily be
rejected, unless it be shown that other entirely anomalous facts occurred.
If, in the natural order of things, the person who was deeply offended by the insult was the one
who believed he had a right to demand explanations of the perpetrator of that insult, it is quite
probable that the aggrieved party was the one who, through the instrumentality of several
persons, invited the insulter to come down from the upper story of the parochial building, where
he was, and make the explanations which he believed he had a right to exact; and if this be so,
Exequiel Castillo, seriously affected and offended by the insult to his sweetheart, Concepcion
Lat, must be held to be the one who brought about the encounter gave the invitation and
provoked the occurrence, as shown by his conduct in immediately going down to the entrance
door of the said building and in resignedly waiting, for half an hour, for Jose Laurel to come
down.
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After considering these occurrences which took place before the crime, the query of course arises
as to which of the two was the first to assault the other, for each lays the blame upon his
opponent for the commencement of the assault.
Exequiel Castillo testified that after he had replied to Jose Laurel that he, the witness, was not
obliged to say whether he had in his possession several letters addressed by laurel to the girl
Concepcion Lat, Laurel immediately stabbed him in the breast with a knife; while Jose Laurel
swore that, upon his answering the question put to him by Castillo as to why the witness had
kissed his sweetheart, saying that it was because she was very fickle and prodigal of the word
"yes" on all occasions, Exequiel said to him in reply that he ought not to act in that manner, and
immediately struck him a couple of blows on the head with a club, wherefore, in order to defend
himself, he drew the knife he was carrying in his pocket.
It is concluded that it was Exequiel Castillo who, through the mediation of several others, invited
Laurel to come down and that it was Castillo who provoked the affray and it was he who
unlawfully assaulted Jose Laurel, by striking the latter two blows with a cane inasmuch as it is
not likely that after having received a dangerous wound in the left breast, he would have been
able to strike his alleged assailant two successive blows and much less pursue him.
It is very probable that he received the said wounds after he had assaulted Jose Laurel with the
cane, and Laurel, on his part, in defending himself from the assault, employed rational means by
using the knife that he carried in his pocket.
Jose Laurel must be acquitted and held to be exempt from responsibility on the ground of self-
defense. The case falls within paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the
defensive act executed by him was attended by the three requisites of illegal aggression on the
part of Exequiel Castillo, there being a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Laurel, who,
as we have said, did not provoke the occurrence complained of, nor did he direct that Exequiel
Castillo be invited to come down from the parochial building and arrange the interview in which
Castillo alone was interested, and, finally, because Laurel, in defending himself with a
pocketknife against the assault made upon him with a cane, which may also be a deadly weapon,
employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the same.
Under the foregoing reasoning, the other accused, Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia, who
likewise, were convicted as principals of the crime under prosecution, are comprised within the
provisions of paragraph 5 of the said article 8 of the Penal Code, which are as follows:
He who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same
degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided the first and second
circumstances mentioned in the foregoing number are attendant, and provided that in case the
party attacked first gave provocation, the defender took no part therein.
Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia, first cousins of Jose Laurel, as shown in the trial record to
have been proven without contradiction whatsoever, did not provoke the trouble, nor did they
take any part in the invitation extended to Jose Laurel in the name of and for Exequiel Castillo;
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in assisting in the fight between Castillo and Laurel, they acted in defense of their cousin, Jose
Laurel, when they saw that the latter was assaulted, twice struck and even pursued by the
assailant, Castillo; consequently Conrado Laurel and Vicente Garcia have not transgressed the
law and they are exempt from all responsibility, for all the requisites of paragraph 4 of the
aforecited article attended the acts performed by them, as there was illegal aggression on the part
of the wounded man, Exequiel Castillo, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the said aggression on the part of the aforementioned Conrado Laurel and Vicente
Garcia, who acted in defense of their cousin, Jose Laurel, illegally assaulted by Exequiel
Castillo, neither of the said codefendants having provoked the alleged crime.
Exequiel Castillo's wounds were very serious, but, in view of the fact that conclusive proof was
adduced at the trial, of the attendance of the requisites prescribed in Nos. 4 and 5 of article 8 of
the Penal Code, in favor of those who inflicted the said wounds, it is proper to apply to this case
the provision contained in the next to the last paragraph of rule 51 of the provisional law for the
application of the said code.
With respect to the classification of the crime we believe that there is no need for us to concern
ourselves therewith in this decision, in view of the findings of fact and of law made by the court
below upon the question of the liability of the defendants.
By reason, therefore, of all the foregoing, we are of opinion that, with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, we should acquit, as we do hereby, the defendants Jose Laurel, Vicente Garcia,
Conrado Laurel, and Domingo Panganiban. They have committed no crime, and we exempt them
from all responsibility. The costs of both instances shall be de oficio, and the bond given in
behalf of the defendants shall immediately be canceled.
G.R. No. L-28451 August 1, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. NARCISO CABUNGCAL
FACTS:
Narciso Cabungcal invited several persons to a picnic in a fishery of his property in the barrio of
Misua, municipality of Infanta, Province of Tayabas. In the afternoon, they returned in two
boats, one steered by Cabungcal and the other by Anastasia Penaojas.
Nine persons were in the boat steered by Cabungcal, majority of whom were women and among
them Cabungcal’s wife and son and a nursing child, son of a married couple who had also gone
in this boat.
The deceased Juan Loquenario was another passenger in this boat. Loquenario rocked the boat
which started it to take water, and Cabungcal, fearing the boat might capsize, asked Loquenario
not to do it. But Loquenario did not listen, instead continued rocking the boat then Cabungcal
struck Loquenario on the forehead with an oar. Loquenario fell into the water and said that he
was going to capsize the boat. Cabungcal struck Loquenario on the neck with the same oar and
the boat upset.
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Anastasia Penaojas, who steered the other boat, repaired to and arrived to pick up the passengers
who are clinging to the side of the capsized boat, taking them later to the river bank.
Cabungcal, after having thus saved his passengers, proceeded to search for the deceased but was
unable to find him and his body was recovered later.
CFI
Crime of homicide to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the
costs of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Narciso Cabungcal acted in self defense.
HELD:
YES. Narciso Cabungcal acted in self defense. The Supreme Court ruled that Cabungcal is
completely exempt from all criminal liability.
Due to the conditions of the river at the point where the deceased started to rock the boat, if it
had capsized the passengers would have run the risk of losing their lives, the majority of whom
were women, especially the nursing child. The conduct of Loquenario in rocking the boat until
the point of it having taken water and his insistence on this action, in spite of Cabungcal’s
warning, gave rise to the belief that if he did not separate Loquenario from the boat, he will
accomplish his purpose which is to capsize or upset the boat. It was necessary to disable him
momentarily. For this purpose, the blow given him by the appellant on the forehead with an oar
was the least that could reasonably have been done.
And this consideration militates with greater weight with respect to the second blow given in his
neck with the same oar, because, then the danger was greater that the boat might upset,
especially as Loquenario had expressed his intention to upset it when he told Cabungcal that he
was going to capsize the boat.
In view of all the circumstances of the case, in doing what Cabungcal did was in lawful defense
of the lives of the passengers of the boat, two of whom were his wife and child. The recourse of
taking the boat to the shore was not adequate in those circumstances, because that would require
sometime, whereas the deceased might in an instant cause the boat to capsize without giving time
to arrive at the shore.
Cabungcal having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers in the boat and
the means employed having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it was at the cost of
the life of Loquenario, he is completely exempt from criminal liability.
Reversing the judgment appealed from, the appellant is acquitted, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
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G.R. No. 41674 March 30, 1935

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ
FACTS:
On the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida Vistada; his sister,
Baltazara Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of
Remedios and asked her to go with them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the
house of Maria Inguit.
About nine o'clock Remedios and her friends started home. They were followed about five
minutes later, according to Enrique Bautista, by the deceased Francisco Rivera, who had been
playing cards in the house where the wake was held. He was accompanied by Enrique Bautista.
Rivera and Bautista overtook Remedios’ party. When they reached a narrow part of the path,
Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time the members of Remedios’ party were walking in
single file. Baltazara Ramos was in the lead and Remedios was the hindmost. She was about two
brazas (braza is a unit of length in some Spanish speaking countries) from the person
immediately ahead of her. Francisco Ramos, the only one of Remedios’ companions that was
called to testify, heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios ,mio". He went back and found that
Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast.
The wounded man was taken to the hospital, where he died the next afternoon.
Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place where
Francisco Rivera was. He found that Enrique Bautista was with the wounded man, and that
Remedios had started back towards the house of mourning. He overtook her. She had a knife in
her hand. When they reached the house of Maria Inguit, Remedios de la Cruz stuck the knife into
a table and said that she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her.
PROSECUTION
Enrique Bautista testified that Remedios waited on the right side of the path near some guava
trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right hand when he arrived in front of her;
that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while Remedios turned around and returned to the
house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya).
He further testified that Remedios stabbed Rivera before either of them had said anything; that
the distance between him and Rivera was about one foot; that he did not see any of the
companions of Remedios after they reached the path and had to walk one behind the other.
DEFENSE
Remedios testified that after they had passed a fork in the trail and reached a narrow part a man
suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and
seized her in her private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her
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down; that when she felt weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she
got a knife from her pocket, opened it, and stabbed him in defense of her honor.
She further testified that the man who attacked her did not say anything; that she asked him who
he was but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help, saying "Madre mia;
Dios mio"; that when she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her nearest companion;
that when she was face to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize
his face in the darkness and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera.
She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fan knife in question was
in a pocket of the overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off with her friends without
having an opportunity of changing her clothes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remedios De La Cruz acted in self defense.
HELD:
YES. Remedios acted in self defense.
We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one of the
witnesses for the prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself said that he
could scarcely see anyone in the darkness; that he did not see any of the companions of
Remedios.
It appears from the evidence that Rivera had been making love to Remedios, and also to another
girl named Felicisima Sincaban; but the finding of the trial judge that Francisco Rivera and
Remedios were engaged, that she was madly in love with him and was extremely jealous of
Felicisima Sincaban is not sustained by the evidence of record.
Remedios stabbed Rivera only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and
undoubtedly could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In other words she
desisted as soon as he released her.
The evidence shows that an officer of the Constabulary went to see the injured man about eleven
o'clock that night in the hospital, but it does not appear that Rivera told him anything about the
circumstances under which he had been stabbed.
Remedios is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old.
We do not believe her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is to be noted that almost
immediately after the incident in question took place, the appellant said she stabbed Francisco
Rivera because he embraced her. It is not improbable that she was reluctant to relate in the
presence of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit the details of what had occurred.
We are convinced from a study of the record that Rivera did in fact grab hold of Remedios on the
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night in question, and whether he intended to rape her or not, taking into consideration that it was
a dark night and that Rivera grabbed her from behind without warning and without making
himself known and refused to say who he was, and in the struggle that followed touched her
private parts, and the fact that she was unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, we
are of the opinion that she was justified in making use of the pocket-knife in repelling what she
believed to be an attack upon her honor, -since she had no other means of defending herself.
Remedios claims to have cried, for help, but so far as the record shows her cries were not heard
by any of her companions. Whether she did in fact cry for help, as claimed by her, or failed to do
so because of the suddenness with which Rivera grabbed her and the fright which it naturally
caused, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, we still think she is exempt from
criminal liability.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant is acquitted,
with the costs de oficio.
C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
FACTS:
Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San
Pablo, Province of Laguna. In the evening of September 20, 1942, the Amado Capina had been
courting Avelina in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before the fatal night,
Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while
it was being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached
her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and Amado thereupon suddenly
embraced and kissed Avelina and touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and
quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to
herself, until the following morning when she informed her mother about it. Since then, she
armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of Avelina, and entered
the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing
her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her
side.
Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand
of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an
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attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably
did not realize what he was doing.
Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the
following morning. Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for
the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end the
conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been
falsely boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had
even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and
that Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon
of that same day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to
the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the
other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it
was quite bright as there were electric lights.
Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door.
Amado upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, went to the bench on which Avelina
was sitting and sat by her right side, and Amado placed his hand on the upper part of Avelina’s
right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue pulled out with her right hand the fan knife, which she had in a pocket of her
dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right
hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base
of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was
necessarily mortal.
Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding and
staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he
approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him Avelina said: "Father, I
could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later.
Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and
asked her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa
aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at your
disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not
to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him.
Nicolas and Avelina went home and locked themselves up and waited for the arrival of the
municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that
night, and questioned them about the incident, Avelina immediately surrendered the knife and
informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous
acts and conduct of Amado and went with said policemen to the police headquarters.
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CFI
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted for the crime of murder, of which
Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day
of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in
the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the
period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Avelina acted in self defense.
HELD:
NO. Avelina did not act in self defense. The Supreme Court states that, the attempt to rape a
woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense,
inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her
very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the
offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be
considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor
from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and
Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in
the defense of her honor.
In the instant case, if Avelina had killed Amado Capina, when Amado climbed up her house late
at night on September 15, 1942, and entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping
her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could
have been perfectly justified in killing him.
But when Amado sat by the side of Avelina on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel
and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel
was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside
the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped.
And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon
him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and
circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal
liability.
But the fact that Avelina immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the
barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed Amado, immediately after the incident,
11
and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the
said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities; and the further fact that she had acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon
such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-
control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor.
Avelina further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish
his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one
single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her
favor.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased
Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, Avelina
committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at
least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor.
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should
be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision
correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine
Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree,
to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently, with the modification of judgment
appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four
months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000,
and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal
penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given
the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered
confiscated. So ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIOSCORO ALCONGA, et al. (G.R. No. L-162,
April 30, 1947)
Facts:
Prosecution
On the night prior to the incident, several persons were playing blackjack, including one
Maria de Raposo, the victim, and the appellant in the house of one Mauricio Jepes. Maria and the
appellant partnered with each other for the game, Maria as the player and the appellant acting as
a spotter to which they communicate to each other using signs. It appears that on that night, the
deceased victim have suffered series of loses in the game because of Maria and the appellant’s
teamwork. Upon discovering what the appellant had been doing, the victim expressed his anger
at the latter to which an exchange of blows occurred following an exchange of words. The
12
intervention of the maintainer of the games was able to quell them but the victim, before leaving
the house uttered to the accused that “tomorrow morning I will give you a breakfast”.
On the morning of May 29, 1943, while the accused, Alconga, was in the guardhouse
performing his duties as home guard, the victim came along and said “Coroy, this is your
breakfast”, the victim then swung his pingahan, the accused was however able to avoid the
blow by falling to the ground under the bench where he was sitting, with the intention to crawl
out of the guardhouse. A second blow was then given by the victim, hitting the bench. The
accused was able to get out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen. While on the act of
delivering the third blow, the accused, while in a crawling position, fired his revolver at the
victim causing the latter to fall to the ground. Rising to his feet however, the victim tried to stab
the accused with his dagger, but the latter was able to parry the same with his bolo. A hand-to-
hand fight ensued thereafter.
As the victim sustained several wound, he ran away from the accused but the latter
followed him, and after running a distance of about 200 meters, the accused overtook the victim
and another fight took place during which a bolo blow, which slashed the cranium of the victim,
was delivered by the accused causing the victim to fall to the ground, face downward. Alconga
was thereafter turned to proper authorities where he surrendered a revolver, a bolo, and a dagger.
Injuries sustained by the victim
1. Head injuries: Wound in the parietal region and contusion on the crown of the head,
wounds in the lower jaw, broken skull
2. Arm injuries
3. Wounds in front of the neck
4. Right and left chest: gun shot wound under the right nipple; wounds caused by bolo
5. Cuts in the fingers
6. Other minor injuries
Defense
The accused invoked a plea of self-defense.
RTC Ruling
The RTC convicted the accused of Homicide with two mitigating circumstances in his
favor: Voluntary Surrender and Sufficient Provocation on the part of the victim.
Issue/s:
WON the lower court erred in not appreciating the plea of self defense of the accused.
SC Ruling:
Plea of self-defense of the accused
The Court ruled that the lower court properly denied the plea of self defense of the
accused. It is observed by the court that the fight between the appellant and the victim consisted
13
of two stages. The first stage occurred when the deceased assaulted the appellant without
sufficient provocation on the part of the latter. That in response to such aggression, the appellant
managed to have the upper hand in the fight, inflicting several wounds upon the deceased, on
account of which the latter fled in retreat. That from this moment, the appellant could have
chosen to stay where he was. During this initial stage, the plea of self defense may properly be
appreciated in the appellant’s favor, since in this stage, there was an unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim and that the appellant had not given any provocation, furthermore, the
appellant was in a crawling position when the victim swung his third blow against the former.
However, by the second stage of the fight, the accused pursued the victim. In this
stage, he cannot not therefore be in self defense since the unlawful aggression from the victim
had already ceased the moment the victim fled from him. There can be no defense where there
is no aggression. Moreover, the victim had sustained many additional wounds from the accused
during the second fight as compared to the first fight where after such the victim was able to run
a distance of 200 meters away from the accused.
Mitigating Circumstances present
The Court held that only the mitigating circumstance of Voluntary Surrender was
correctly appreciated by the lower court. The Court in this case failed to appreciate the mitigating
circumstance of Sufficient Provocation from the victim because for provocation in order to be
a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. In the case
at bar, it was clear that during the second stage of the fight, where the victim tried to flee, no
provocation at all was given by him. The only provocation, if any, was imbibed in the aggression
which he started on the first stage of the fight when he swung a pingahan at the accused.
Nevertheless, the utterance of the deceased; “This is your breakfast”, cannot be considered
sufficient for the Court to appreciate the same as sufficient provocation because such is
meaningless, and the attack itself, from the first stage of the fight coming from the victim,
constituted the provocation. Such utterance merely preclude the attack.
United States v. Rivera not applicable in this case
The Court in the case of US v. Rivera elucidated that “one defending himself or his
property from a felony violently or by surprise threatened by another is not obliged to retreat but
may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself from danger.” The same doctrine was
however in applicable in this case. Here, from the very start, the appellant was the holder of a
stronger weapon, which is the revolver and a dagger as against the weapon of the victim which is
a pingahan (a piece of bamboo). Moreover, during the fight, the appellant had demonstrated
superior fighting abilities compared to the victim when he shot the victim on his right breast, and
that the victim received several bolo wounds while the appellant was uninjured. If therefore he
can easily overpower the victim, there must a positive showing to persuade the Court that
he had not yet secured himself from danger after shooting the weakly armed victim in his
right breast and giving him several bolo slashes in different parts of his body.
Fallo:
14
As thus modified, the judgement appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE ENCOMIENDA (G.R. No. L-26750, August 18,
1972)
Facts:
The instant case is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance convicting
the accused of Murder aggravated by Recidivism but mitigated by Voluntary Surrender for
the death of one Severino Cabaral.
Prosecution
Testimony of Patrolman Esmenino Delo
Patrolman Esmenino Delo testified that he was with policeman Federico Ong at police
outpost number 2 when one Franklin Ancheta reported that Severino Cabaral was wounded in
the yard of the accused Jose Encomienda. They thereafter proceeded to the yard of the accused
and saw Severino mortally wounded in a kneeling position in from of the stairs of the house of
the accused and could not raise his head. He was also unconscious but still breathing. Delo
further testified that Severino had made an ante mortem statement which he inscribed on a piece
of paper, in Ilcano dialect, which was duly signed by patrolmen Mateo Castillo and Eufemio Del
as witnesses. Such declaration points to the accused as his assailant who stabbed him. That
thereafter, they brought the victim to a private clinic after which he tried to search from the
accused but to no avail. He also testified that when he went back to the yard of the accused, they
found blood stains in the yard and in front of the stairway of the house. They also saw blood
stains on the stairs of the house and a box of water mixed with blood. Thereafter, they went back
to the municipal building where they saw the accused being interrogated by police inspector
Casimiro Aguinaldo who told them that the accused surrendered to the municipal building,
presenting a bolo and a .32 caliber revolver together with live bullets and four empty shells
contained in an envelope. The hands of the accused were not examined for powder burns as they
did not know the procedures thereof, and that the accused told him that it was the victim who
fired at him.
Wounds sustained by the victim
1. Wound #1: Forehead (Mortal)
2. Wound #2: Left wrist (Non-mortal)
3. Wound #3: Above the wrist (Non-mortal)
4. Wound #4: Below the armpit
5. Wound #5: Above the waistline
Defense
Testimony of the appellant
15
The appellant averred that he was a tenant of hacienda Doña Nena, and that the victim
Severino Cabaral was the hacienda overseer. He testified that the land he was working on was
recorded in the name of his late father. He further averred that one week before May 30, 1965,
the victim, Severino went to his house and invited him to go to the latter’s house and thereafter
told him that he could no longer work on the land since the land he was working on was is not in
his name. that he was not mad when the victim told him about the same. On the third time when
the victim went to his house however and told him that he can no longer work in the hacienda
anymore and that he will be removed as tenant, a confrontation occurred. The victim was
standing beside the stairs while the accused, who is also beside the stairs, was cutting wood with
a bolo. When the accused asked the victim why he was being removed as tenant when it was his
means of livelihood, the victim replied that he had no right to work on the land since it was not
in his name. to which he countered that the victim had no right to remove him for he was only a
messenger and also a tenant like him in the hacienda. It was at this point that the victim became
angry and drew his revolver. The accused testified that he was able to grab the victim’s right
hand which was holding the revolver, with his left hand and that he managed to force the victim
to lean on the stairway where he pinned the victim’s right hand. During their struggle, the
revolver fired four times continuously. He then struck the victim’s right forearm with his bolo.
That when the victim wanted to get the gun with his left hand, he boloed the victim’s left arm.
He also averred that he shook the victim’s right arm downward causing the gun to fall to the
ground. When the victim tried to pick up the gun, he stepped backward and hacked the victim’s
forehead, causing the victim to fall backward on the stairway. The victim slowly got up and
washed his forehead with the water from the box nearby. That after such event, he went to the
municipal building and surrendered himself along with the weapons to police inspector Casimiro
Aguinaldo.
RTC/CFI Ruling
The CFI convicted the accused of Murder aggravated by Recidivism but mitigated by
Voluntary Surrender.
CA Ruling
Since the punishment for murder is death, the case was elevated directly for an automatic
review before the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: WON the lower court erred in not appreciating the plea of self-defense of the accused.
Arguments before the SC
Prosecution:
The prosecution continued to rely on the ante mortem statement made by the victim. No
testimonial evidence for the state as to how and why the incident occurred was offered for there
were no eyewitnesses presented.
SC Ruling:
Validity of the dying declaration of the victim
16
The Court held that the ante mortem statement of the victim is bereft of essential details
as to the motive and circumstances surrounding the incident, and that it has failed to generate the
moral certainty as to the culpability of the appellant. It is also doubtful whether the victim
could hear or understand the three questions propounded at him, or could clearly mumble
his three answers thereto or even nod his head. The policemen themselves testified that the
victim was unconscious although still breathing. On the other hand, the averments made by the
appellant is enhanced by its detail and by the fact the appellant immediately surrendered to
the police authorities despite the fact the he was already laboring under a handicap by
virtue of his previous conviction as an accomplice to the crime of murder, which would
ordinarily impair his trustworthiness.
Plea of self defense appreciated
The Court appreciated the plea of self-defense by the accused in this case. Three essential
elements of self-defense must concur before it can be properly appreciated. To wit:
a. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack/ aggression
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault ot at least threatened assault of immediate and
imminent kind. In the instant case, when the deceased drew his gun, appellant grabbed with his
free left hand the victim’s right hand holding the revolver, forced the victim to lean on the stairs
and pinned the victim’s right hand also on the stair. During their struggle the revolver fired four
times and he hacked the victim’s right forearm. When the victim tried to get the gun with his left
hand, the appellant boloed the victim’s left arm and then shook the victim’s right arm until the
gun fell to the ground. When the victim tried to pick up the gun, appellant stepped back and
hacked the victim’s forehead, after which he himself picked up the gun so as to prevent the
victim from retrieving the same. The drawing of the gun with the intention of using it
constituted illegal aggression. There was therefore a real danger to the life or personal
safety of the accused.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. When the law requires
RATIONAL EQUIVALENCE, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors,
the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the
instinct, more than the reason, the moves or impels of defense, and the proportionateness
thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such
injury. In emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason
but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation, and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold
the act irresponsible in law for the consequences. In the case at bar, the appellant was only
17
trying to prevent the victim from using his revolver. He did not intend to kill the victim. The
appellant could have continued hacking the victim, but he did not. He only boloed the victim’s
left forearm because the victim tried to get the gun from his right hand. It was only when the
victim tried to pickup the gun, after he shook the latter’s right arm causing the gun to fell on the
ground, that the appellant boloed his forehead. The accused had no time to coolly deliberate
on whether he could save himself by just kicking the gun away or by just pushing or boxing
the victim or stepping on the hands of the deceased to prevent him from getting the gun
and firing the same at him. The immediate danger to his life precluded such serene
rationalization on his part.
Moreover, it must be noted that despite the fact that the accused was able to win the
possession of the gun from the victim, the latter did not sustain any gunshot wounds. The
accused did not use the revolver against the victim to finish him off nor did he continue hacking
the deceased with his bolo. He was free to do either as the victim was completely immobilized.
Instead, the accused allowed the victim to wash his wounds with water in appellant’s own
wooden box.
Lack of Sufficient Provocation on the part of the accused
There was no provocation given by the accused during the incident. In fact, he was the
one provoked by the victim. He was just in his yard cutting wood when the victim came and told
him that he was to vacate the land he was tilling which was his source of livelihood. Yet with all
provocation, the appellant simply told the victim that the latter had no right to eject him as
he was also a mere tenant on the hacienda. Certainly, this retort was no justification for the
victim to draw his gun.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgement is hereby reversed, the accused-appellant is hereby
acquitted, and his immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered. The .32 caliber
revolver with serial No. 15446 is hereby ordered forfeited to the government and the Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to deliver the same for record purposes to the official headquarters of
the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The bolo is ordered returned to the
appellant. With costs de officio.
People vs. Boholst-Caballer 61 SCRA 180 (1974)

FACTS:
(PROSECUTION) - Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty,
were married, at a ceremony solemnized by the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church in
Ormoc City.2 The marriage was not a happy one and before the end of the year 1957 the couple
separated. Late in the evening, Francisco Caballero and two companions, namely, Ignacio
Barabad and Kakong Sacay, drank "tuba" in a certain house in barrio Ipil. At about midnight,
Francisco Caballero and his companions proceeded home. On the way, they saw Francisco's
18
wife, Cunigunda, standing at the corner of the yard of Igmedio Barabad Cunigunda called
Francisco and when the latter approached her, Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a
knife marked by the prosecution as its Exhibit C. Francisco called for help to his two
companions who upon seeing that Francisco was wounded, brought him to the St. Jude
Hospital.3 Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the hospital, personally attended to the victim and found
a "punctured wound on the left lumbar region measuring 1 inch externally" (Exhibit B). First aid
was given, but because there was a need for blood transfusion and the facilities of the hospital
were inadequate to provide the necessary treatment, Dr. Samson suggested that the patient be
transported to Cebu City.4 In the meantime, Cunigunda Caballero had gone to the Police
Department of Ormoc City, surrendered to desk sergeant Restituto Mariveles and informed the
latter that she stabbed her husband.5 While Francisco Caballero was confined at the hospital, he
was interrogated by Patrolman Francisco Covero concerning the identity of his assailant and he
pointed to his wife Cunigunda. The questions propounded by Pat. Covero and the answers given
by the victim were written down in a piece of paper on which the victim affixed his thumbmark
(Exhibit D) in the presence of his brother, Cresencio Caballero, and another policeman,
Francisco Tomada. Francisco Caballero was brought to Cebu City on board the "MV Ormoc" but
the trip proved futile because the victim died at noontime of the same day from the stab wound
sustained by him.
(DEFENSE)- After her marriage to Francisco Caballero, appellant lived with her husband in the
house of her parents in barrio Ipil, and their marriage, although not a harmonious one, was
blessed with a daughter; her married life was marked by frequent quarrels caused by her
husband's "gambling, drinking, and serenading", and there were times when he maltreated and
beat her; after more than a year she and her husband transferred to a house of their own, but a
month had hardly passed when Francisco left her and her child, and she had to go back to live
with her parents who bore the burden of supporting her and her child; her daughter became sick
and she went to her husband and asked for some help for her sick child but he drove her away
and said "I don't care if you all would die"; then in one the evening, she went out carolling with
her friend, Crispina Barabad, and several men who played the musical instruments; at about
12:00 o'clock midnight they divided the proceeds of the carolling in the house of Crispina
Barabad after which she went home, but before she could leave the vicinity of the house of
Crispina, she met her husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her dress
and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch."; she replied: "What
is your business. Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us"; upon
hearing these words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with
you. I will kill you all, I will kill you all"; Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her face
until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground, to keep herself from falling she held on
to his waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the
left side of his body; because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her back to the
ground; her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her saying. "Now is the time
I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"; because she had "no other recourse" as she was being
choked she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the left side of his
body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh; when she finally released herself from the hold
of her husband she ran home and on the way she threw the knife; then in the morning of she went
19
to town, surrendered to the police, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn by her on
the night of the incident ; Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look for the weapon but because
they could not find it the policeman advised her to get any knife, and she did, and she gave a
knife to the desk sergeant which is the knife now marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution.
Did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of her person?
The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification
in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger or
peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a
human being. To the Classicists in penal law, lawful defense is grounded on the impossibility on
the part of the State to avoid a present unjust aggression and protect a person unlawfully
attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require that the innocent succumb to an
unlawful aggression without resistance; while to the Positivists, lawful defense is an exercise of a
right, an act of social justice done to repel the attack of an aggressor.
As part of this law is the settled jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act must
prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of the aforecited circumstances, the
rationale being that having admitted the wounding or killing of his adversary which is a felony,
he is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court
the fact of legitimate self-defense.
RTC - In this case of Cunigunda Caballero. the trial court did not find her evidence clear and
convincing, and gave these reasons for its conclusion: a) appellant's testimony is inherently
improbable as brought out by her demonstration of the incident in question during the trial of the
case; b) there was no wound or injury on appellant's body treated by any physician: c) appellant's
insistence that the weapon used by her was Moro hunting knife and not Exh. C is incredible; d)
she gave contradictory statements concerning the report made by her to the police authorities that
she was choked by her husband; and e) her husband's abandonment of her and her child afforded
the motive behind appellant's attack.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was self-defense on the part of the accused.
RULING: We are constrained, however, to disagree with the court a quo and depart from
the rule that appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts
testified to by the witnesses.
An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give due
importance to one piece of evidence which more than the testimony of any witness eloquently
confirms the narration of appellant on how she happened to stab her husband on that unfortunate
night. We refer to the location of the wound inflicted on the victim.
Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand
choking her neck, appellant, as she said, had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted
at the left side of her husband's belt and plunge it at his body hitting the left back portion just
20
below the waist, described by the attending physician, Dr. Cesar Samson, as the left lumbar
region. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong
indication of the truth of appellant's testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband
bent over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side
of the man's belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.
We do not agree with the trial judge's observation that as demonstrated by the accused it was
physically impossible for her to get hold of the weapon because the two knees of her husband
were on her right thigh "which would have forced her to put her right elbow towards the
ground"(see p. 9 of Decision), for even if it were true that the two knees of Francisco were on his
wife's right thigh, however, there is nothing in the record to show that the right arm of the
accused was held, pinned down or rendered immobile, or that she pressed her elbow to the
ground, as conjectured by the trial judge, in such a manner that she could not reach for the knife.
On the contrary, as indicated earlier, accused testified and so demonstrated that she was lying flat
on her back, her husband kneeling over her and her right arm free to pull out the knife and strike
with it.
The trial judge also referred the a demonstration made by appellant of that portion of her
testimony when she was held by the hair and pushed down to the ground, and His Honor
commented that "She could not be falling to the ground, as shown to the Court by her,
considering the fact that the pushing was to and fro as shown in her demonstration." The trial
judge, however, failed to consider that it is humanly impossible to have an exact and accurate
reproduction or reenactment of an occurrence especially if it involves the participation of persons
other than the very protagonists of the incident being re-enacted.
In that demonstration, accused represented the victim while she in turn was impersonated by the
court interpreter, and so it was difficult if not impossible for the two to give an accurate
reenactment considering that the accused assumed a role not hers during the actual incident and
the court interpreter played a part which was not truly his. At any rate, the accused showed how
one hand of her husband held her hair while the other pushed her down by the shoulder, and to
portray how she in turn struggled and tried to push back her husband to keep herself from falling,
she "pulled the interpreter (representing the accused) to and from." The fact is that Francisco
succeeded in forcing appellant down to the ground as portrayed by the latter when, following the
foregoing demonstration, she was asked by the private prosecutor to show how she stabbed her
husband — a matter which is discussed in pages 8 and 9 of this Decision.
It is this particular location of the wound sustained by the victim which strongly militates against
the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Ignacio Barabad. This witness declared that on
that night when husband and wife met on the road, Cunigunda called Francisco and when the
latter was near, she immediately stabbed him. If that were true, that is, husband and wife were
standing face to face at a distance of one-half meter when the stabbing occurred, it would have
been more natural and probable for the weapon to have been directed towards the front part of
21
the body of the victim such as his abdomen or chest, rather than at his back, left side, just above
the left thigh.
In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions of the
incident object of the accusation, the Court in its search for the truth perforce has to look for
some facts or circumstances which can be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or
improbability of a testimony, for after all the element of probability is always involved in
weighing testimonial evidence, so much so that when a court as a judicial fact-finder pronounces
judgment that a set of facts constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal
knowledge but as the result of an evaluating process of the probability or improbability of a fact
sought to be proved.
Thus, in People vs. Aquino, L-32390, a decision of the First Division of this Court penned by
Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, the plea of self-defense of the accused-appellant was
sustained on the basis of certain "physical and objective circumstances" which proved to be of
"decisive importance" in ascertaining the veracity of the plea of self-defense, to wit: the location
of the wound on the right side of the throat and right arm of the deceased, the direction of the
trajectories of the bullets fired by the accused, the discovery of bloodstains at the driver's seat,
the finding of the dagger and scabbard of the deceased, and so on.
In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the location of the fatal wound as a
valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Another, is the lack of motive of appellant in attacking and killing her husband on that
particular night of January 2. Although it is the general rule that the presence of motive in the
killing of a person is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the identity of the
assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not disputed, as in this case,
nonetheless, the absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between two
antagonistic theories or versions of the killings.
We disagree with the statement of the court a quo that appellant's motive for killing her husband
was his abandonment of her and his failure to support her and her child. While appellant
admitted in the course of her testimony that her marriage was not a happy one, that she and her
husband separated in the month of October, 1957, and since then she and her child lived with her
parents who supported them, nevertheless she declared that notwithstanding their separation she
still loved her husband. As a matter of fact, appellant had been living with her parents for several
months prior to the incident in question and appeared resigned to her fate. Furthermore, there is
no record of any event which occurred immediately prior to January 2 which could have aroused
her feelings to such a degree as to drive her to plan and carry out the killing of her husband.
On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a reason for attacking his wife,
Cunigunda. Meeting his wife unexpectedly at past midnight on the road, Francisco reacted
angrily, and suspecting that she was out for some bad purpose he held her by the collar of her
22
dress and said: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." This was followed
by a slapping on the face until Cunigunda's nose bled, pulling of her hair, pushing her down to
the ground, and strangling her — all of which constituted the unlawful aggression against which
appellant had to defend herself.
Next to appellant's lack of motive for killing her husband, is her conduct shortly after the
occurrence. As soon as the sun was up that morning, Cunigunda went to the city and presented
herself at the police headquarters where she reported that she stabbed her husband and
surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night. On this point, the trial judge stated that
appellant made contradictory statements in her testimony concerning the report made by her to
the police authorities, for while at the start she declared that she did not report the "choking by
her husband", she later changed her testimony and stated that she did relate that fact.
We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony of appellant on direct
examination and nowhere is there a positive and direct statement of hers that she did not report
that she was choked by her husband. What the trial judge asked of appellant was whether or not
she told the police about the fist mark on her face and her answer was "No, sir, I forgot." And on
appellant's cross-examination, there was no question propounded and therefore there was no
answer given on the subject-matter of appellant's report to the police concerning the incident
except for the following:
COURT:
Q Did you show that dress to the police authorities the following day?
A I was not able to wear that, Your Honor, because it was torn out.
Q You did not bring that to the police authorities?
A I showed it to the police authorities, and they told me to keep it, not to touch it.
We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in appellant's testimony which was singled
out by His Honor as one of his reasons for discrediting her plea of self-defense.
That appellant made it clear to the police that she stabbed her husband because he attacked her is
confirmed by no less than the prosecution witness, Patrolman Restituto Mariveles, who was on
duty at the desk when appellant arrived at the police headquarters. This witness on cross-
examination declared:
Q And she also told you that on that night previous to the incident her husband Francisco
Caballero beat her up, is that right?
23
A She told me that she was met on the way by her husband immediately after carolling and she
was manhandled by her husband and when she was struggling to get loose from her husband she
happened to take hold of a knife that was placed under the belt of her husband and because she
was already half conscious she did not know that she was able to thrust said knife to the stomach
of her husband.
It is indeed regrettable that the statements made by appellant to the police upon her surrender
were not taken down in writing to serve as a faithful and reliable account of her report,
nevertheless, We are satisfied by the fact, which is not disputed, that of her own accord appellant
went to the police authorities early in the morning, informed Policeman Mariveles that she
stabbed her husband because he manhandled her which rendered her "half-conscious", and
brought and showed the dress she wore during the incident which was torn by the collar and with
blood stains due to the bleeding of her nose. Another policeman, Joventino de Leon, who at the
time was property custodian of the Ormoc City police, corroborated appellant's testimony
concerning the dress marked Exhibit 1 for the defense. If there was no clear and positive
statement in appellant's testimony either on direct or cross examination that she informed the
police that she was choked by her husband, it was because, as we noted, no question was
propounded to her on that point.
While we are on this subject of appellant's surrender, mention is to be made of the knife marked
as Exhibit C for the prosecution. In her testimony, appellant stated that Exhibit C was not the
knife actually used by her in stabbing her husband because the true weapon was her husband's
Moro hunting knife with a blade of around six inches which she threw away immediately after
the incident; that when she was asked by Pat. Mariveles to look for the weapon and she could not
find it, she was advised by policeman Cabral who helped her in the search to get any knife and
surrender it to the desk officer and so she took the knife Exhibit C and presented it to Pat.
Mariveles. This testimony of appellant was taken against her by the court a quo which held that
her declaration could not have been true. We find however no strong reason for disbelieving the
accused on this point. Appellant does not deny that she turned over Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles
as the knife with which she stabbed her husband but she claims that she did so upon advise of
another policeman, Pat. Cabral, and it is quite significant that the latter was not called upon by
the prosecution to refute such declaration. There is sincerity in appellant's attempt to rectify a
misstatement made by her to Pat. Mariveles and We are inclined to believe and in fact We do
believe that the fatal weapon must have had indeed a blade of around six inches as stated by
appellant for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region to the victim's large intestine and
cause the discharge of fecal matter
All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant case.
The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out above.
24
The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is likewise present.
Here we have a woman who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered
almost unconscious by the strong pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of
any weapon within her reach to save herself from impending death. Early jurisprudence of this
Court has followed the principle that the reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-
defense does not depend upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
And so the fact that there was no visible injury caused on the body of the appellant which
necessitated medical attention, a circumstance noted by the trial court, is no ground for
discrediting self-defense; what is vital is that there was imminent peril to appellant's life caused
by the unlawful aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's belt afforded
appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself from being
strangled and choked to death. What this Court expressed in the case of People vs. Lara
Is very true and applicable to the situation now before Us, and We quote:
It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human nature does not
act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-
preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this case, that a person has reasonably
acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold
the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences.
Equally relevant is the time-honored principle: Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity knows no
law.
The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is,
adequate enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense.
Undoubtedly appellant herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or
attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for Francisco to be
angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not
justified in inflicting bodily punishment with an intent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All
that appellant did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her
husband, which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon being
confronted by her husband for being out late at night, accused gave a valid excuse that she went
carolling with some friends to earn some money for their child. was indeed within the Christmas
season during which by tradition people carol from house to house and receive monetary gifts in
a Christian spirit of goodwill. The deceased therefore should have given some consideration to
his wife's excuse before jumping to conclusions and taking the extreme measure of attempting to
kill his wife.
25
DISPOSITION: IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused-

appellant acted in the legitimate defense of her person, and We accordingly set aside the
judgment of conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio.
Rodel Urbano vs. People 576 SCRA 826 (2009)

FACTS:
(PROSECUTION) - the victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the
Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just arrived from a picnic in
the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other co-workers, they drunk beer in
a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which
Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting, petitioner asked why Tomelden, when
drunk, has the penchant of insulting petitioner.
The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued
throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by
eyewitness Orje Salazar, on Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden
was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not caught him and
prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him
unconscious.
Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the LIWAD general
manager where he spent the night. He remained in the compound the following day. Upon
arriving home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day, Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight
the previous night and of his having been rendered unconscious. He complained of pain in his
nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to immediately bring him to the Lingayen
Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated left index
finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.
Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness, headache, and other pains. The
attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of drowsiness and frequent vomiting.
Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison Memorial Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where
the attending physician, Dr. Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury,
secondary to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage."
Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital until 3:00 p.m., and, due to financial
constraints, was thereafter discharged despite signs negating physical condition improvement.
Upon reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain,
prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano
again attended to him. This time, things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden
appeared to be semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant.
26
Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
(DEFENSE) - Defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting
that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s
death.
RTC - RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged. WHEREFORE, the
prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of the crime
of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court
in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
CA - affirming the conviction of petitioner, but awarding moral damages to the heirs of
Tomelden. In the light of the foregoing, the appeal of the accused-appellant is DISMISSED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The appellate court held that the commission by petitioner of the crime of homicide, as defined
and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), had been proved beyond
moral certainty of doubt, pointing to the lucky punch as the proximate cause of Tomelden’s
hospitalization and ultimately his death. And like the RTC, the CA found no qualifying
circumstance to increase or lower the penalty.
ISSUES – 1. Whether or not CA erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding [him]
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
2. Whether or not CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient

provocation on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of
the petitioner.
RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.
1. Homicide Duly Proved. It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the fistic injury Tomelden
sustained was not "the main underlying cause of his death." In this regard, petitioner draws
attention to the fact that the fist fight in question happened on September 28, 1993. Tomelden,
however, died only on October 10, 1993 or 12 days thereafter and that, during the intervening
days, particularly September 29, 1993, the deceased regularly reported for work. Moreover,
petitioner avers that days prior to the fateful incident of September 28, 1993, Tomelden failed to
come to work as he was suffering from malignant hypertension and that this circumstance greatly
engenders doubt as to the proximate cause of the victim’s death. Petitioner, thus, contends that he
could only be adjudged guilty of physical injuries.
We are not persuaded.
27
The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioner’s lucky punch hitting Tomelden right
smack on the face. And even if Tomelden’s head did not hit the ground as his co-workers averted
that actuality, that punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right after the
September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and out of the hospital complaining of
headache, among other pains, until his demise on October 10, 1993, or 12 days after the blow
that made Tomelden unconscious.
Significantly, Dr. Arellano testified conducting an autopsy on the body of Tomelden and stressed
that the "softened portion of the scalp over (R) occipito-temporal area about 5 inches above and
posterior to the (R) ear" of the victim could have been caused by a fist blow. She also opined that
the fist blow which landed on Tomelden’s head could have shaken his brain which caused the
cerebral concussion; and that the cause of the victim’s death was "cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident.
The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano, buttressed by that of
Rosario who related about her husband’s post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly
establish beyond cavil the cause of Tomelden’s death and who was liable for it.
The CA observed aptly:
It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events that transpired
during the fisticuff incident x x x more specifically the landing of the "lucky punch" on the face
of [Tomelden], taken together with the result of the medical examinations and autopsy report
which described the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident" that we are convinced
that the "lucky punch" was the proximate cause of [Tomelden’s] death. The prosecution had
satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident that transpired on September 28, 1993 that
the victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve days later x x x. It is
moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to report for work during the
intervening days x x x.
We find no reason to depart from the doctrinal rule that great weight is accorded the factual
findings of the trial court, particularly with respect to the ascertainment of the credibility of
witnesses. There was absence of any ill motive on the part of x x x Salazar who in fact testified
that he was a friend of both [petitioner] and [Tomelden]; more so on the part of the attending
physicians.
Petitioner’s suggestion that Tomelden succumbed to heart ailment and/or that his death was the
result of his malignant hypertension is untenable, given that the post-mortem report yields no
positive indication that he died from such malady.
28
2. Mitigating Circumstances Present. Petitioner next contends that the mitigating

circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part
of the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner’s favor.
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential

element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party
capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the
wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is
present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation
was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given
by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person
defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.
In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the
one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
Petitioner’s unrebutted testimony on the events immediately preceding the fisticuff and earlier
dovetails with the testimony of Salazar.
In gist, petitioner testified being, in the afternoon of September 28, 1993, in the nearby town of
Bugallon for a picnic. He was with Tomelden and several others, including Dominador Navarro,
Chairperson of LIWAD. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered goat’s meat and drank
beer. When it was time to depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden, then seated in
another table, to prepare to leave.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he had no business stopping
him from further drinking as he was paying for his share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner
returned to his table to report to Navarro. At that time, petitioner saw that Tomelden had already
consumed 17 bottles of beer. In all, the group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half hours
before returning to the LIWAD.
Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him,
calling him "sipsip" just to maintain his employment as Navarro’s tricycle driver. Tomelden
allegedly then delivered several fist and kick blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him
despite his evasive actions. Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation,
landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter’s blows.
It is abundantly clear from the above transcript that the provocation came from Tomelden. In
fact, petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid
a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when petitioner’s lucky
punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and
killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the Court appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
29
immediately preceding the shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the latter challenged him to a
fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating circumstance should not be
considered in favor of petitioner.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be
presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered
when attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner
tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of
Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight.
And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the
LIWAD’s general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and would
be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-
knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was commensurate to the
potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that
lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial means
to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at
Tomelden’s face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium
that he never intended so grave a wrong as to kill the victim.
When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that
it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
We find no reason to modify the award of civil indemnity and moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision, in the light of the presence and the appreciation of two
mitigating circumstances in favor of petitioner, hereby MODIFIED by decreasing the term of
imprisonment. As thus modified, petitioner Rodel Urbano is hereby sentenced to serve an
indeterminate prison term of from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with whatever
imprisonment he has already served fully credited in the service of this sentence. The rest of the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE v. VIRGILIO CAABAY (G.R. Nos. 129961-62, August 25, 2003)

Facts:
Two Information was filed before the RTC charging the appellants with MURDER for
the deaths of Paulino Urbano and Aliguer Urbano.
30
Prosecution:
There has been a land dispute between the Urbanos and the Caabays over the boundary of
the farmlands that they cultivated. It appears that Paulino Urbano, the victim, had previously
lodged a complaint against the accused, Virgilio, which was resolved by the barangay captain by
delineating the boundary of the said farmlands. On June 27, 1994, the Spouses Urbano were at
their farmland. Paulino was then cutting the overgrown grasses using a bolo while Adelina, his
spouse, was cooking dahoon ng sili. Thereafter, Adelina asked her husband that they should go
home but Paulino told his wife to go ahead as he was still drying his clothes from sweat. Rodrigo
Caabay, one of the accused, then walked by and commented to what Paulino was doing and
conversed with Adelina. After which Adelina decided to go home and leave her husband.
Adelina testified that as she was just meters away from their house, she saw her son,
Aliguer Urbano, rushing to where his father was and he was armed with a bolo. She testified that
when she looked back to her husband, she was shocked to see the accused, Virgilio and his
children who were each armed with bolos, hacking Paulino on the neck and right hand. That the
accused Rodrigo hacked Paulino on his back causing him to fell on the ground. She further
testified that as Aliguer tried to run away from the scene, Virgilio and Esteban ran after him and
overtook him. thereafter, they ganged up on him and stabbed him. The Caabays then proceeded
to place the cadavers of the victims side by side. As Adelina was shocked and petrified, she went
home and on the following morning, she reported the incident to Barangay Captain Sualog where
she positively identified Virgilio and his sons, Esteban, Valentino, Rodrigo, and Isidro as the
assailants.
Cause of Death:
a. Paulino – Cardio-respiratory arrest, hemorrhage due to incised and stab wounds.
b. Aliguer – Cardio-respiratory arrest, hemorrhage due to incised wounds.
Defense:
Testimony of Virgilio Caabay:
Virgilio Caabay admitted the killing and interposed self defense as his defense. He aver
that he was adept at defending himself since he studied martial arts. He testified that at around 5
pm on the day of the incident, he was outside feeding their pigs while his son Esteban was
transferring their cow to another place. He then saw Paulino within the boundary of his farmland,
destroying his fence. Virgilio then confronted Paulino, to which the latter said “Bakit? Ano?”.
Virgilio further testified that Aliguer, who was near the banana trees, and was armed with a bolo,
suddenly tried to hack him from behind. That when he turned around and faced Aliguer, the
latter struck him with the bolo, hitting him on the face and the left ear. Paulino also hacked him
but he was able to parry the thrust with his right hand. He then cried for help. Responding to
such, his son, Esteban, armed himself with a piece of wood and immediately rushed to his father.
It was then when Aliguer tried to hack Virgilio on the head twice but the latter was able to wrest
the bolo away from Aliguer and held Aliguer’s hands and used him as a shield against Paulino
who was poising to stab him. Virgilio then pushed Aliguer forward causing the latter to fell on
31
the ground. Virgilio then proceeded to stab him several times. As he saw Esteban squaring off
with Paulino, he then thrust the bolo at the latter and also hacked him several time. As a result of
which, Paulino’s right hand was severed and fell to the ground while its fingers still clenching
the bolo.
Thereafter, they proceeded to Barangay Adela where they borrowed a motor boat so they
can travel to a hospital to have their wounds treated. Virgilio finally testified that his wife
destroyed the bolos after the incident.
Testimony of Esteban Caabay
Esteban corroborated the testimony of his father. He averred that he was grazing cow in
their farmland when he saw Paulino and Aliguer, each armed with a bolo, hacking his father.
That as he heard his father cried for held, he then picked up a piece of wood from the fence and
rushed to defend his father. He testified that he sustained wounds on his left and right arms and
on the left side of his neck. He also testified that his father hacked Aliguer to death as he called
to him for help. He also averred that he struck down Paulino. He and his father then fled from the
scene and proceeded to Barangay Adela where they borrowed a boat from one Iyok Awit. From
there they proceeded to the house of Councilor Danilo Malayas whose boat they borrowed so
they can go to the hospital and have their wounds treated.
Both of them, Virgilio and Esteban averred that the wounds they sustained were caused
by a sharp bolo and that the same were serious and could have caused their deaths.
Testimony of Isidro and Valentino Caabay
Isidro and Valentino denied any involvement in the incident. They claimed that they were
employed by Danilo Malayas at Barangay Adela which is about three (3) kilometers away from
the scene of the crime and would take three (3) hours on foot to reach the same. They also
averred that they were at work until 6 pm, and that they were only informed that their father,
Virgilio and their brother Esteban, were hacked and was confined in a hospital. By reason of
which they rushed to the hospital on board a motor boat owned by the Malayas.
Testimony of Danilo Malayas
Danilo corroborated the testimony of Isidro and Valentino as he confirmed that the two
had been working in his farm. At around 4 pm, he went home leaving Isidro and Valentino
behind. That around 6 pm to 7 pm, Virgilio and Esteban arrived, wounded, and asked him to lend
his motor boat to ferry them to the hospital, to which he agreed. He then told Isidro and
Valentino what happened when they arrived.
RTC Ruling:
The trial court rendered its judgement convicting the appellant with Double Murder for
the deaths of Paulino Urbano and Aliguer Urbano. The court appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of treachery and abuse of superior strength.
CA Ruling:
32
Because the penalty imposed by the RTC is Death, an automatic review before the
Supreme Court was then effected.
Issue/s: WON the lower court erred in not holding that the appellants acted in self-defense when
they killed the victim.
Arguments before the Supreme Court:
1. The lower court erred in giving credence to Adelina’s testimony since she failed to
reveal the identity of the assailants to the policemen who conducted an on-the-spot
report of the incident and to the barangay captain.
2. That appellant Valentino and Isidro could not be possibly involved as they were
working in the Malayas farmland when the incident occurred. Only the appellant
Virgilio and Esteban were involved since they were the only ones who sustained
injuries.
3. That the lower court erred in not holding that appellants Virgilio and Esteban
acter in self-defense when they killed the victims.
Comments of the OSG
The lower court did not err in giving credence to the testimony of Adelina since she
positively identified the appellants as assailants and that the same was corroborated by physical
evidence on record.
SC Ruling:
Probative weight of the testimony of Adelina
Adelina has positively identified the appellants as the assailants during the direct
examination where is pointed and identified each of the accused as the killers of his husband and
son. As to the alleged non-involvement of Valentino and Isidro, the Court ruled that the facts that
Adelina is Paulino’s widow and Aliguer’s mother add more credence to her testimony. It is in
her natural interest to secure the conviction of the killers of her loved ones. Thus this deters
her from implicating persons other that the real culprits, for otherwise, the latter would
thereby gain immunity. Furthermore, the appellants Valentino and Isidro have the burden to
prove their alibi during trial with clear and convincing evidence that they were in such a place
other than the situs criminis such that it would be physically impossible for them to have
committed the crimes. In the instant case, assuming arguendo that they were working at the farm
of Danilo Malayas during the incident, it was not physically impossible for them to have been at
the scene of the crime since it would only take one and a half hours to travel from the Malayas
farmland to the scene of the crime.
Self-Defense by Virgilio and Esteban
The Court found that the defense of self-defense interposed by Virgilio and Esteban is
untenable. The accused failed to prove their plea of self-defense with clear and convincing
evidence. The elements of the Defense of a Relative are the following:
33

b. Reasonable Necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression of the victim
c. In case of provocation given by the person being attacked, the one evading the
attack, defense had no part therein.
It is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no
unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel. For unlawful aggression to
be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Furthermore, the accused must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution
because even if the evidence of the prosecution is weak, the same could no longer be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.
In the case at bar, the Court has failed to give credence to the plea of self-defense of the
accused because of the following reasons;
1. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Adelina which is fortified with
physical evidence on record testifying that the appellants hacked Paulino on the neck
and cut off his arm.
2. The victim Paulino sustained ten incised wounds and one stab wound, while Aliguer
sustained seven incised wounds. Certainly the testimony of Virgilio that he was not
armed and that of Esteban that he was only armed with a piece of wood would not lie.
Considering the nature, location and number of the wounds sustained by the victim,
self-defense cannot be appreciated. (Reasonable necessity of the means employed)
3. The testimony of Virgilio that he was able to defend himself properly because he
learned martial arts was self-serving.
4. The appellants failed to surrender the bolos and the piece of wood to the authorities.
Also, they have failed to present Virgilio’s wife to explain why she destroyed the
bolos used by the victims. The bolos could have been used as evidence for self-
defense.
5. The unlawful aggression offered by the victim Aliguer had already ceased when the
latter fell to the ground after the accused, Virgilio held his right hand and used him as
a shield. Virgilio is therefore not justified to kill Aliguer especially when there is no
evidence that Aliguer attacked Virgilio when he felled to the ground. (Unlawful
aggression)
6. The fact that the appellants sustained injuries does not prove that they acted in self-
defense or in defense of a relative.
The crime committed by the Appellants
The trial erred in convicted the appellants with murder. The crime should be Homicide.
The Court failed to appreciate treachery in the case at bar for the following reasons:
34
1. Adelina did not see how the assault started so she could not testify if the appellants
deliberately adopted a sudden and unexpected method of attack which deprived the
victims of an opportunity to defend themselves.
2. Treachery was not alleged in the information.
Fallo:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Virgilio Caabay, Esteban Caabay, Valentino
Caabay, and Isidro Caabay are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. R-3733 and R-3734. The said appellants are sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua for
each crime; and are directed to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Paulino Urbano P50,000 as
civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages; and to the heirs of Aliguer Urbano the amount of
P50,000 as moral damages. Costs against the appellants.
People v. Alexander Salva (G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002)

Facts:
Two Information were filed before the RTC against the accused, brothers Alexander,
Ferdinand and Rolito Salva, for Murder and Frustrated Homicide for the death of Palmero
Milanes and for the injuries suffered by SPO1 Mariano Cura.
Prosecution:
On January 10, 1995, Palmero Milanes was driving a passenger jeepney going to Tanay,
Rizal when the accused, Ferdinand Salva waved at them and tried to stop the jeep and uttered
“Putang ina mo”. After failing to stop the said jeep, Ferdinand took a tricycle and followed the
jeep. Milanes however maneuvered the jeep and went to the police outpost to seek assistance.
Responding to the same, SPO1 Cura, along with other troops boarded the jeepney. Milanes, Cura
and the conductor were all seated in the front seat. They then proceeded to Tanay to find
Ferdinand so they can settle a small damage caused by Milane’s jeep to the former’s tricycle.
Upon reaching Barangay Aldea, they were caught in a traffic jam. While waiting for the traffic to
ease up, they sighted Ferdinand who also recognized the jeep. Ferdinand then alighted from his
tricycle and went to the jeepney, grabber Milanes out of the jeep and they grappled with each
other. While Milanes’ head was under Ferdinand’s armpit, the appellant suddenly stabbed
Milanes’ back twice with a fan knife.
During the fight, SPO1 Cura attempted to make a warning shot when the appellant also
stabbed him. They grappled for the possession of the gun afterwards. Ferdinand thereafter freed
Milanes and helped the appellant in grappling SPO1 Cura’s gun when it suddenly fired, hitting
Rolito Salva’s foot. Thereupon Milanes went back to his jeepney attempting his escape.
However, Ferdinand was able to get the gun of SPO1 Cura and shot Milanes. Milanes
consequently died while SPO1 Cura survived after receiving medical treatment.
Defense:
35
Testimony of Ferdinand Salva

Ferdinand Salva averred that he was driving his own tricycle with his brothers Rolito and
Alexander. As they reached San Ildefonso Lines Terminal, they were caught in a traffic jam.
Suddenly, the victim, Milanes, alighted from a jeep and boxed Rolito. Ferdinand then tried to
stop Milanes from boxing his brother. But then he saw SPO1 Cura pointing a gun against Rolito.
He parried the gun causing it fire and a bullet hit Rolito. SPO1 Cure then pointed his gun at him
but he was able to hold Cura’s wrist and the two of them grappled for the gun until both of them
reached the driver’s seat of the jeep. It was then that the gun fired, hitting Milanes. As the gun
fell to the pavement, he then grabbed the gun and ran towards Pillila where he surrendered.
Testimony of Rolito Salva
Rolito corroborated his brother’s testimony and added that during the struggle for the
gun, it accidentally fired and a bullet hit Milanes. He further testified that prior to the incident,
the jeep of Milanes caused damage to the tricycle of Ferdinand when it suddenly stopped. That
he reported such incident to his brothers and they tried to look for Milanes. He finally averred
that he has filed an attempted homicide case against SPO1 Cura for the injuries that he sustain
during the incident.
Testimony of Alexander Salva
Alexander testified that he was at Hulo, Pillila, Rizal on an errand to get money from his
employer. That while he was on his way to Tana, his brother, Ferdinand saw him and asked him
to board the latter’s tricycle. They continued on the way going to the tricycle terminal in Pillila
but they were caught in a traffic jam. Then, he saw a man box Rolito and thereafter heard
Ferdinand trying to stop the man. He also saw Ferdinand push away the man after the former had
put his arm around the latter’s neck. Alexander testified that another man arrived and hit his
brother Rolito with a “yantok”. Alexander got off the tricycle when he saw the Rolito has been
shot. He then had grabbed a fan knife from the tricycle’s tool kit and swung it against the boxer
who turned out to be the victim. He then saw someone poke a gun at Rolito but Ferdinand
parried the gun. It however fired and a bullet hit Rolito. Ferdinand then ordered him to bring
Rolito to the hospital.
RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered its judgement convicting Alexander Salva of Murder and
Ferdinand Salva of Homicide for the death of Palmero Milanes. As for the injuries of SPO1
Cura, the court a quo also convicted Alexander Salva of Frustrated Homicide. Ferdinand and
Rolito was however acquitted in this case.
Issue/s:
1. WON the credibility of the witness was duly established
2. WON the Treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance and of
Defense of Relatives as a justifying circumstance
36
3. WON the lower court erred in convicting the appellant of murder and frustrated
homicide.
Arguments before the Supreme Court
Alexander Salva
He claims that he cannot be liable for murder since the stab wounds of Milanes were not
the cause of his death but rather from the gunshot wound. He also assails the Decision of the trial
court in appreciating Treachery as he insists that he stabbed Milanes in defense of his two (2)
brothers. He also averred that Ferdinand cannot be liable for homicide because Milanes was
accidentally hit by the gun in course of Ferdinand and SPO1 Cura grappling for the gun. Finally,
he argued that the identity of the person who shot Milanes was not duly established.
As for the frustrated homicide case for the injuries of SPO1 Cura, Alexander averred that
he was merely acting in defense of his brothers. He adds that his offense should only be physical
injuries since he had no intention to kill Cura and it was Milanes who provoked them while it
was SPO1 Cura who hit his brother with a yantok
SC Ruling:
Credibility of the witness
The Court ruled that the assessment of the credibility of the witness by the trial court is
generally accorded with great respect. In the case at bar, during trial, the surviving victim
positively identified as offenders that appellant and his co-accused and is corroborated by the
testimony of eyewitnesses. Moreover, the said testimonies were further strengthened by the
official report stating that the cause of death of Milanes was hemorrhage resulting from
gunshot wounds in the trunk of his body.
Defense of Relatives
The Court failed to appreciate the plea of defense of relatives of the appellant. The Court
found that the element of reasonable necessity for the action taken as well as the means used
was wanting. In this case, the weapon used and the grave wound inflicted on the victim negate
the reasonableness of appellant’s action taken allegedly in defense of his relatives. The appellant
failed to prove such defense with positive and convincing evidence.
Nature of the offense
Alexander Salva must be convicted of Homicide only and not murder. For Treachery to
be properly appreciated by the court, the following are the requisites:
a. That the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
b. Such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.
37
The Court in this case failed to appreciate treachery as a qualifying circumstance since
the victim was not completely helpless during the commission of the crime. Milanes were then
accompanied by armed policemen after he sought assistance from them. Also, the incident
happened at past 7:00 am during a traffic jam. Thus the victim is not completely helpless.
Moreover, treachery is not present when the victim had a heated argument with one of the
malefactors and that treachery cannot be considered when the meeting between the victim
and the accused was only accidental. These circumstance belies that the accused consciously
adopted the mode of attack. In view of the foregoing, the offense committed by the appellant was
only Homicide and not murder.
Frustrated Homicide of SPO1 Cura
The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant for frustrated homicide. The Court
held that the intent to kill of appellant was reflected by the weapon he used, as well as the
number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim. The doctor who treated the wounds
of SPO1 Cura testified that the wounds he sustained were mortal, that were it not for timely
medical intervention, SPO1 Cura could have died from the said stab wounds.
Fallo
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. In
Criminal Case No. 1476-T, appellant ALEXANDER SALVA is found guilty of Homicide. He
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further
ordered to pay jointly and severally with his co-accused Ferdinand Salva, the heirs of
PALMERO L. MILANES, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P12,000 as actual
damages but only P50,000, as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 1486-T, appellant ALEXANDER SALVA is found guilty of Frustrated
Homicide, and he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of
prision correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium,
as maximum. He is also ordered to pay SPO1 Mariano Cura the amount of P46,770.65 as actual
damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as attorney’s fees.
DOROTEO TOBES v. CA and People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 127441, October 1,
2005)
Facts:
The provincial prosecutor filed with the RTC an information charging the accused
Wilfredo Pollentes and Doroteo Tobes with Murder for the death of one Joel Escareal.
Prosecution
Joel Escareal was walking towards the door of AM Disco house, while fixing up the
zipper of his trousers on his way, when accused Wilfredo Pollentes came out of the door and
38
confronted the later why he threw bottles at him. Pollentes was then holding the shoulder of the
victim, and after uttering statements, suddenly boxed the victim on his chin, causing him to fall
on the ground, face up. As he was about to rise, Pollentes poised to box him again. Joel then
drew his .38 caliber revolver from his waistline and shot Pollentes who immediately retreated to
the street. Joel then stood near the door of the AM Disco House looking at the accused as he ran
away. Suddenly, the accused, Doroteo Tobes went out of the door, placed his arm around the
neck of Escareal and hurled him on the ground. Escareal’s revolver then landed near his foot.
When Escareal was about to get up, Tobes then picked up the firearm and shot him on his left
temporal area. Escareal died from such shooting. The revolver was then surrendered to the police
by Tobes.
Defense
The accused interposed the defense of self-defense or defense of a stranger.
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled that the accused Doroteo Tobes is guilty of Homicide while the accused
Wilfredo Pollentes is guilty of Slight Physical Injuries.
CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification, increasing the award of civil
indemnity.
Issue:/s
1. WON there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
2. WON the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative/stranger, sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the victim, passion and obfuscation and voluntary
surrender may be appreciated in favor of petitioner.
Arguments before the Supreme Court:
1. The petitioner admitted the killing of Jose Escareal but interposes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense or defense of a stranger.
2. The petitioner insists that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the deceased or passion or obfuscation may be appreciated in his favor.
SC Ruling
Self-Defense or Defense of a Stranger
The plea of self-defense or defense of a stranger of the petitioner would not lie. The
following are the requisites of self-defense:
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to the victim
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself, which must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
39
In the instant case, the burden of proof is shifted to the accused when he interposed the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. He must therefore prove, with clear and convincing
evidence, such self-defense otherwise conviction would follow from his admission that he
killed the victim. Delving into the elements of self-defense, the petitioner is not justified in his
act of killing the victim because when he attacked the victim, the aggression offered by the latter
against the other accused, Pollentes no longer existed. The victim was merely standing on his
back to the door as he watched Pollentes walked away. A person defending a relative or
stranger must find out who the aggressor was before undertaking the defense. Thus, when
the petitioner attacked the victim, he was not defending himself. In the absence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
Mitigating circumstances present
The Court ruled that there was no threat or provocation directed at petitioner, and
consequently he could not have been provoked into passion or obfuscation. However, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated in the petitioner’s favor.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition and affirms the decision sought to be reviewed,
with costs.
JOVITO CABUSLAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. No. 129875, September 30, 2005
Facts:
An Information was filed against the petitioner, Jovito Cabuslay, Senior Inspector Celso
Gomera Regencia, SPO4 Rosello Rodriguez Canoy, C2C Nilo Rico Montebon and C2C Gerry
Orillaneda Cane for Murder for the death of Paquito Umas-as.
Prosecution
Paquito Umas-as, earns a living as a collector of payments for assorted articles which he
sold on credit. In the collection of such payments, Paquito used a motorcycle. Prosecution
witness Leonicio Zaragosa, a refrigeration technician helper, along with one Felix Lauriana,
when a Hammer truck parked in front of them. For the truck, alighted four policemen. The
policemen thereafter halted the herein victim who was riding his motorcycle. The police asked
for his identification card (ID), and as he reached for his ID on his left pocket, one of the
petitioner, who was identified by Zaragosa, opened fire at the collector whose right hand was
then raised. The other four policemen meanwhile had their firearms pointed at the collector. It
appears that the petitioner emptied the magazine of his M-16 armalite at the victim. The collector
then fell on the ground and was placed on board the Hummer truck and was brought to the
hospital. The victim however was dead on arrival.
40
The examinations conducted on the victim’s body revealed that the victim was negative
for gunpowder nitrates. The post-mortem examination on the body of the victim showed that the
cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds. A total of
eight (8) gunshot wounds, each of which were fatal.
Defense:
Testimony of Police Superintendent Jubail
Spt. Jubail manifested that prior to such incident, he received an intelligence report of a
plot to assassinate the Mayor and Vice-Mayor, as well the Governor and his family.
Responding to the same, he dispatched a team of PNP personnel to conduct mobile checkpoints
along the national highways in several municipalities to check on people who would possibly
carry out the plot. Eventually, the Vice-Mayor and the Governor was assassinated. He further
testified that the team headed by Senior Inspector Celso Regencia which includes the petitioners,
established a mobile checkpoint at the national highway for the purpose of intercepting armed
men who intend to carry out the assassination plot. That around 8:30 am, a man riding a red
Honda motorcycle approached the checkpoint. The rider was allegedly wearing a black bonnet,
sunglasses, sweatshirt and gloves that covered half portion of his fingers.
Testimony of Senior Inspector Regencia
Senior Inspector Regencia testified that he signaled the motorcycle rider to stop at the
right side of the road. That he then asked for the rider’s ID who pretended to reach for his wallet
but instead pulled out a gun. He then heard a gunshot followed by the numbing of his thigh. As
he then rolled to the ground, he heard a volley of gunshots after which the petitioner approached
him. He later found out that it was the petitioner who shot the victim. He further testified that he
ordered his men to load the rider to the truck. He testified that the victim was still alive when he
was loaded on the Hummer but was pronounced dead on arrival upon reaching the hospital. He
then turned over the rider’s motorcycle, sunglasses and revolver to the police station.
Furthermore, to prove that he was wounded during the incident, Regencia showed three
scars caused by the gunshot wounds.
Testimony of Jovito Cabuslay
Jovito corroborated the testimony of Senior Inspector Regencia. He averred that the latter
had directed an approaching motorcyclist to stop at the right side of the highway and heard
Regencia asked the rider for his ID. That he then saw the victim shoot Regencia, and as it is in
his belief that the victim would target him next, he shoot him with his M-16. He therefore
asserted that he only acted in self-defense and only defended his superior officer. He then insists
that he has no criminal liability as the elements of defense of a stranger which are: Unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression of the victim, lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and that
finally he was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other motives, are present.
SANDIGANBAYAN Ruling
41
The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner of the crime of Homicide. It rulled that the
testimony of Zaragosa was “categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and consistent”. The
Court also rulled that there were grave deficiencies in the evidence of the defense because of the
following reasons:
a. The physical existence of a handgun (revolver) which was allegedly used by the
victim was not duly established during trial,
b. The affidavit of the witness for the defense was taken under intimidating
circumstances,
c. The medical certificate purportedly evidencing that Regencia had been shot
bears no probative value since the same was issued by a different doctor other
than the one who treated the wounds of Regencia
d. The number of gunshot wounds inflicted upon the victim betrays the petitioner’s
claim of reasonable necessity of the means used to repel the unlawful aggression
allegedly offered by the victim.
Issue/s: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in not appreciating the plea of self-defense or defense of
a stranger of the petitioner.
Arguments before the Supreme Court
Comments of the OSG
The OSG manifested that the Office of the Ombudsman should have represented the
people in this case since it was elevated to the Supreme Court from the Sandiganbayan, and that
the petitioner should be acquitted because the evidence of the prosecution was weak and that the
ponente of the appealed decision was not yet a member of the Third Division of Sandiganbayan
when the witnesses testified and when the parties presented their evidence.
Comments of the Ombudsman
The Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor sought the
dismissal of the instant case on the ground that the defense had failed to impeach the credibility
of the prosecution witness and that the plea of self-defense offered by the petitioner was
contrary to human experience.
SC Ruling:
The efficacy of the decision of the Sandiganbayan
The Supreme Court ruled that the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the
fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It
ruled that since the Sandiganbayan is a collegial body which arrive at its decisions only after due
deliberation, the ponente of the assailed Decision cannot then be interpreted as his alone. The
said Decision then had gone due deliberation from the members of the Third Division of
Sandiganbayan and was arrived at after the concurrence of the required majority vote.
Plea of self-defense and in defense of a superior officer (stranger)
42
One who invokes self-defense effectively admits responsibility for the killing. The person
claiming such defense must therefore show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed
acted in self-defense or in defense of a relative, or a stranger. The elements of self-defense are as
follows:
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.
The aforementioned elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and that
the person making the defense cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the
strength of his own evidence because even if the evidence of the prosecution is weak, it
could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. Moreover, for
the defense of a stranger may be appreciated, the following requisites must concur:
a. Unlawful aggression by the victim,
b. Reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it,
c. That the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil
motive.
Unlawful aggression of the victim
Unlawful aggression is the first and primordial element of self-defense. Without it
the justifying circumstance cannot be invoked. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is
nothing to prevent or repel. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack or a threat to attack,
positively showing the intent of the aggressor to cause injury. It presupposes not merely a
threatening or an intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or an
imminent danger thereof, which imperils one’s life or limb. Aggression to be unlawful, must be
actual and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting
to self-defense or to other whom that person is seeking to defend.
In the case at bar, the plea of self-defense by the petitioner cannot lie since there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The Court failed to give credence to the assertion
of the petitioner that he believed that he was the next target of the victim so he shoot the latter in
self-defense. The Hummer jeep was behind him and was parked in such a manner that it was
obscured by Muslim houses. The victim therefore could not have seen the hummer jeep and
therefore the petitioner, thus he could not have been targeted. The threat that was claimed by the
petitioner was therefore illusory and hence there is no unlawful aggression. Moreover, another
policeman, Cane, was on top of the Hummer manning the machine gun. if Regencia had indeed
been shot, then Case was better situated to defend him and not the petitioner. A gunfire would
surely take the attention of other police officers who were only meters away from the scene of
the crime. Moreover, the Court found it incredible that Pacquito would dare to challenge five
policemen who were in full battle gear, at a checkpoint, and armed only with a handgun. The
same is contrary to human experience and human instinct.
43
Reasonable necessity of the means employed by the petitioner to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression
Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression, the Court ruled that the means
employed by the petitioner was unreasonable. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What
the law requires is rational equivalence. The number of wounds suffered by Paquito, negate
the claim of self-defense or defense of a stranger. The victim sustained eight (8) fatal gunshot
wounds from the shooting. Had the petitioner merely defended himself from the victim’s
unlawful aggression, one shot to immobilize him would have been enough. The other seven shots
were therefore unreasonable, even more so that fact that petitioner aimed for the victim’s vital
organs. It therefore follows that, considering the nature and number of wounds of the victim, the
petitioner was induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive and that he was set on killing
the victim. Moreover, the armalite of the petitioner has a selector that switches from single shot
to automatic. The defense of the petitioner that his gun suddenly went on automatic from single
shot was untenable since it was him who was in possession of the said firearm.
Lawful Performance of the petitioner’s duty as Police Officer
There are two elements for this justifying circumstance lie in court, namely:
a. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and
b. That the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
The Court ruled that the aforementioned two elements were wanting in the instant case.
The victim was not committing an offense at the time of the incident since petitioner had not
sufficiently proved that the victim fired at Regencia. It follows therefore that killing the victim
under such circumstances cannot be considered as a valid or due performance of the petitioner’s
lawful duty. Performance of duties do not include murder. Murder is never justified,
regardless of the victim.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dater 25 June 1997 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 19586 finding petitioner GUILTY of Homicide is partially AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (a) the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as actual damages is
deleted; and (b) petitioner is ordered to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as indemnity ex
delicto. No costs.
People vs. Jesus G. Retubado 417 SCRA 393 (2003)

FACTS:
44
(PROSECUTION) – One day, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s
younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack
and gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was
having dinner with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr., The Cañons and the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to
the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay captain considered the matter closed.
The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel Cañon, Jr.
Then, 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a day and decided to go home
after a day’s work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo
Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with Marcial Luciño
saw him. "Noy, why is it your son did something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the
appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook Emmanuel, grabbed
and pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored the appellant and
pedaled on until he reached his house. His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of their
house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep.
Undeterred, the appellant continued following Emmanuel.c
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The
appellant told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the
appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her
hand on her husband’s shoulder to pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the
forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Norberta
shouted for help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought
Emmanuel to the Tuburan District Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter. Dr. Ivar G.
Arellano, the Municipal Health Officer, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Emmanuel and
prepared a report thereon.
Possible cause of death:
1. Gunshot wound at the head (left side) with injury to brain and meninges
2. Hypovolemic shock secondary to loss of blood (Severe loss of blood)

The appellant surrendered to the police authorities but failed to surrender the firearm he used to
kill the victim. Forensic Officer Myrna P. Areola of the PNP Regional Office subjected the
appellant to paraffin tests. The Chemical Analysis of the paraffin casts gave the following
results:
Findings:
45
1. POSITIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his left hand cast.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw
2. NEGATIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his right hand cast.
(DEFENSE) - The appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely
performing a lawful act with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victim’s
death. He testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his
room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun with his right hand. Emmanuel’s trigger finger
was outside the trigger guard, and he held the firearm with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing
that he would be shot, the appellant took hold of Emmanuel’s right hand with his left, and pulled
the gun towards Emmanuel’s stomach. The appellant grabbed Emmanuel’s free hand with his
right hand, and the old man almost fell on his knees to the ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The
appellant pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun suddenly went off.
The bullet hit Emmanuel’s forehead. Norberta fled from the house. For his part, the appellant
rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table before entering his
bedroom. When he went back to the dining room to get the gun, his younger sister, Enrica told
him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun. He found Edwin outside their house near the
church, and the latter told the appellant that he threw the gun into the sea. When the appellant
asked his brother to show him where he threw the gun, Edwin refused to do so.
RTC – The Trial Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder under Art. 248 R.P.C. and sentences the accused to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
APPEAL: The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a lawful act of defending himself
when he grabbed the victim’s hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally fired and the bullet
hit the victim’s forehead. The accident was not the appellant’s fault. The appellant asserts that
when he wrestled with the victim for the possession of the gun, he was merely defending
himself. He contends that he had no intention of killing the victim, as he merely wanted to talk to
his son. If he had wanted to kill the victim, he could have easily done so when he met the latter
for the first time. Moreover, the appellant submits, he did not commit any felony; hence, under
paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he is not criminally liable for the death of
the victim. In the alternative, the appellant asserts that he should be convicted only of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery is wanting. He and the victim had a heated exchange of words before they grappled for
the possession of the gun. Such heated discussion had already forewarned the victim and placed
him on guard; thus, treachery cannot be legally considered.
ISSUES: Whether or not the action of the accused was an accident without fault or intention of
causing it while the accused was performing a lawful act with due care
RULING : The contention of the appellant has no merit.
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another provided that the following requisites are present: virtual 1aw library
46
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not an accurate translation of the Spanish
Penal Code. The phrase "an injury" does not appear in the first paragraph in the Spanish Penal
Code. Neither does the word "injury" appear in the second subparagraph of the Spanish Penal
Code.
The phrase "state of necessity" is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the
classical theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a
situation of grave peril, actual or imminent. The word provided covers diverse juridical rights,
such as right to life, honor, the integrity of one’s body, and property belonging to another.
It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional
provocation of the party invoking the same.
A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a state of
necessity is justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, a "state of necessity" is a justifying circumstance. The accused does not
commit a crime in legal contemplation; hence, is not criminally and civilly liable. Civil
liability is borne by the person/persons benefited by the act of the accused. Crimes cannot
exist unless the will concurs with the act, and when, says Blackstone, "a man intending to do a
lawful act, does that which is unlawful, the deed and the will act separately" and there is no
conjunction between them which is necessary to constitute a crime. Others are of the view that
such act is a cause for exclusion from being meted a penalty; still others view such act as a case
of excluding the accused from culpability.
According to Groizard, rights may be prejudiced by three general classes of acts, namely:
(a) malicious and intentional acts;
(b) negligent or reckless acts;
(c) acts which are neither malicious, imprudent nor negligent but nevertheless cause damages.
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with
clear and convincing evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the
accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence
of the prosecution because if such evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense,
the evidence of the prosecution can no longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a
state of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts by the trial court, its calibration of the
testimony of the witnesses of the parties and of the probative weight thereof as well as its
47
conclusions based on its own findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misapplied cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. We have
meticulously reviewed the records and find no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court
that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and
malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.
First: When Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other in the porch
of their house, she went down from the balcony towards her husband and placed her hand on the
latter’s shoulders. She was shocked when the appellant pulled out his handgun and deliberately
shot the victim on the forehead
Second: After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He surrendered to
the police authorities, but failed to surrender the gun he used to kill the victim. The appellant’s
claim that he placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to change his
clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that
he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
The appellant never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the victim
in a state of necessity.
Third: The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim. The victim ignored the
appellant as the latter talked to him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets, in the poblacion
of Tuburan. The appellant was incensed at the effrontery of the victim, a mere pedicab driver.
The appellant followed the victim to his house where the appellant again confronted him. The
appellant insisted on talking with the victim’s son but the victim refused to wake up the latter.
The appellant, exasperated at the victim’s intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his shirt
and shot the victim on the forehead. It was impossible for the victim to survive. With the
appellant’s admission that he shot the victim, the matter on whether he used his right or left hand
to shoot the latter is inconsequential.
We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present
case to qualify the crime to murder.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He turned
himself in to the police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his arrest.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity 18 to the heirs of the deceased. In
addition, the heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 19 and the
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 since no sufficient proof of actual damages was
offered.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant

Jesus G. Retubado alias "Jessie" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE
defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
48
suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.
People vs. Rolando Dagani, et al. 499 SCRA 64 (2006)

FACTS:
(PROSECUTION) - The said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and use of personal violence upon one
ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX by then and there shooting him with a .38 caliber revolver,
thereby inflicting upon the said ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX mortal gunshot wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued where the prosecution adduced
evidence to establish the following:
At about 4:45 in the afternoon, a group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran
(Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound
of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. All of a
sudden, appellants, who were security officers of the PNR and covered by the Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, entered the canteen and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved
Miran, causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while Santiano shot Javier
twice at his left side, killing the latter.
(DEFENSE) - Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to investigate a
commotion at the canteen. Upon reaching the place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to
enter, while the former waited outside. Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle
of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani,
but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the canteen, Santiano heard gunfire
and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun which
belonged to Javier. During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a
warning shot. He heard Javier's gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the canteen. Santiano
then shot Javier from a distance of less than four meters.
Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of
official duty as PNR security officers. They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish
treachery and conspiracy.
RTC - WHEREFORE, finding both accused Otello Santiano y Leonida and Rolando Dagani y
Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Art.
49
248, RPC, with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
granting them the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Furthermore, the RTC held that appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted to squeeze the
trigger of the .22 caliber gun when he pointed it at Dagani; that during the course of the struggle
for the possession of the .22 caliber gun, the danger to the life of the accused ceased to be
imminent; that in grappling for the weapon, Dagani "controlled" the hands of Javier and pushed
them away from his body; that the appellants failed to produce the two empty shells as physical
evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by Javier; that no points of entry or bullet markings on
the walls of the canteen were shown; that, in light of these findings, no unlawful aggression was
present on the part of the victim; that the appellants failed to prove that they were on official duty
at the time of the incidence; that, since it was not established that Javier actually fired his gun,
the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of the due
performance of an official duty; that the appellants were acting in conspiracy; that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing, considering that Javier had been shot while his
hands were being held by Dagani and as his body was out of balance and about to fall; and that
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of the
appellants.
CA - The CA affirmed the findings of fact as well as the salient portions of the RTC
Decision, but deleted the award of attorney's fees and the per appearance fees of counsel since,
the CA reasoned, the instant case is criminal in nature which is under the control of the public
prosecutor, and, additionally, the RTC failed to justify this award in the body of its Decision.
And last, the CA found that the RTC erroneously applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law since
the penalty for Murder, at the time of the incident, was reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible
penalty to be imposed in its entirety, regardless of the attending mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was self-defense on the part of the accused
2. Whether or not the accused acted in the lawful performance of an official duty.
RULING: 1.SELF-DEFENSE - Appellants argue that the courts a quo misappreciated the facts
and erred in finding that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. They insist
that the victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver at the time he was struggling with
appellant Dagani; that the former "could have easily killed the latter;" that, given the fact that
Javier had been drinking, "it is quite probable for Javier to act harshly and aggressively towards
peace officers such as the accused;" and that Javier actually fired three shots from his .22 caliber
gun.
We are not convinced.
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the
killing was legally justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be able
to prove to the satisfaction of the Court the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this
extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this burden by clear and convincing evidence.
50
When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack
of criminal intent of the accused. Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression
by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. All these conditions must concur.
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was
taken against the aggressor. To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to
inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite probable" that Javier, during the course of the
struggle for the firearm, "could have easily killed" the appellants are uncertain and speculative.
There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
just speculative.
To sum up the matter, we quote the findings of the CA: The defense was unable to prove that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to present evidence that
the victim actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and no
bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier also tested negative for gunpowder
residue. Moreover, the trial court found appellant Dagani's account of the incident to be
incredible and self-serving. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without
any proof of the existence of its requisites.
Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of
the danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and
grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no
longer any unlawful aggression that would have necessitated the act of killing. When an
unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no
right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. When Javier had been caught in the struggle
for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant
Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable extent, and
undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict the
excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already
ceased.
The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful
aggression are reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means
employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense.
What the law requires is rational equivalence. he circumstances in their entirety which surround
the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and Javier, such as the nature and number of gunshot
wounds sustained by the victim which amounted to two fatal wounds,[22] that Dagani was able
51
to restrain the hands of Javier and push them away from his body, that Dagani was larger than
Javier and had finished Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) hand-to-hand combat training,
and Javier, as admitted by the appellants, was inebriated at the time of the incident,[25] do not
justify appellant Santiano's act of fatally shooting the victim twice.
All things considered, the appellants' plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent
evidence. The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.[27]
Whether the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact. Like alibi, the affirmative defense
of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove. This Court, therefore, finds no reversible error on the part of the
courts a quo in rejecting the claim of self-defense.
Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful performance of their official duties.
They specifically aver that they had been ordered by their desk officer to proceed to the canteen
in response to a telephone call stating that there was a group "creating trouble;" that they were in
the call of duty and exercising their functions and responsibilities as members of the PNR Civil
Security Office to preserve peace and order and protect the lives and property in the PNR
Compound; and that, invoking jurisprudence, as security officers in the performance of duty, like
the police, they must stand their ground and overcome the opponent, and the force that may be
exerted must differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense.
2. LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A DUTY - The defense failed to prove that the security officers
were in fact on duty at the time they were at the canteen. The trial court gave weight to the fact
that the appellants were unable to submit their daily time records to show that they were on duty
at the time. Appellants' assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by
PNR Security Investigator Rolando Marinay's testimony that PNR security officers work in two
12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon him
cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of appellants' due performance of an official
duty.
As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger to the life of the appellants had been
neutralized when Dagani grappled with Javier and restrained his hands; that Javier had been
thrown off-balance; that Dagani had been specially trained for these purposes; and that Javier
had been drinking immediately prior to the scuffle, this Court holds that the fatal injuries that
appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed to be necessary consequences of the
performance of his duty as a PNR security officer. While it is recognized that police officers if
indeed the appellants can be likened to them must stand their ground and overwhelm their
opponents,
People v. Ulep, this Court counseled:
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and
under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without
52
bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the
necessity to kill. It may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a
dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal,
action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police
officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor
oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to
the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and
within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law
enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons
they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing
with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also
human beings with human rights.
CONSPIRACY –
But this Court cannot agree with the findings of the courts a quo that the appellants were in
conspiracy.
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions. Other than the plain fact that the victim had been shot
by one of the accused while being held by a co-accused, there is no other evidence that the
appellants were animated by the same purpose or were moved by a previous common accord. It
follows that the liability of the accused must be determined on an individual basis. While no
formal agreement is necessary to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from
the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet, conspiracy must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.
This Court has held that even if all the malefactors joined in the killing, such circumstance alone
does not satisfy the requirement of conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor
simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. Conspiracy must be shown to exist
as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. Thus, even assuming that
Javier was simultaneously attacked, this does not prove conspiracy. No evidence was presented
to show that the appellants planned to kill Javier or that Dagani's overt acts facilitated that
alleged plan. The prosecution did not establish that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the gun
from Javier and in the process, held the latter's hands, was for the purpose of enabling Santiano
to shoot at Javier. The prosecution had the burden to show Dagani's intentional participation to
the furtherance of a common design and purpose or that his action was all part of a scheme to kill
Javier. That Dagani did not expect Santiano to shoot the victim is established when Santiano
testified that Dagani "seemed to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as Javier
gradually fell to the ground. And since Dagani's conviction can only be sustained if the crime
had been carried out through a conspiracy duly proven, in view of the failure of the prosecution
to discharge that burden, this Court is constrained to acquit him.
TREACHERY –
53
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the
victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact that the
victim was unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an
advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered
defenseless. The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be
shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from
the intended victim. For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been
preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the part of
the latter. Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that the
manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime
itself.
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the assault by the appellants had been
deliberately adopted as a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Javier and without
the latter having the opportunity to defend himself. Other than the bare fact that Santiano shot
Javier while the latter had been struggling with Dagani over the possession of the .22 caliber gun,
no other fact had been adduced to show that the appellants consciously planned or predetermined
the methods to insure the commission of the crime, nor had the risk of the victim to retaliate been
eliminated during the course of the struggle over the weapon, as the latter, though struggling, had
not been completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must emphasize that the mere
suddenness of the attack, or the vulnerable position of the victim at the time of the attack, or yet
even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves make the attack treacherous. It
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the means employed gave the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that such means had been deliberately or
consciously adopted without danger to the life of the accused.
For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the helpless position of Javier as merely
incidental to the attack, and that the decision to shoot Javier was made in an instant.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED.
Appellant Otello Santiano y Leonida is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence from eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
Rufino S. Mamangun vs. People 514 SCRA 44 (2007)

FACTS:
(PROSECUTION) - at about 8:00 in the evening, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan a

certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, "Magnanakaw Magnanakaw." Several residents
54
responded and thereupon chased the suspect who entered the yard of Antonio Abacan and
proceeded to the rooftop of Abacan's house.
At about 9:00 o'clock that same evening, the desk officer of the Meycauayan PNP Police Station,
upon receiving a telephone call that a robbery-holdup was in progress in Brgy. Calvario,
immediately contacted and dispatched to the scene the crew of Patrol Car No. 601 composed of
Team Leader SPO1 Andres Legaspi, with PO2 Eugenio Aminas and herein petitioner PO2
Rufino S. Mamangun; and Patrol Car No. 602 composed of Team Leader PO3 Sandiego San
Gabriel, with PO2 Carlito Cruz and PO2 Hobert Diaz. With the permission of Abacan, petitioner
Mamangun, PO2 Diaz and PO2 Cruz went to the rooftop of the house whereat the suspect was
allegedly taking refuge.
The three policemen, i.e., petitioner, Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched
the rooftop. There, they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance,
petitioner Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the
man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras (Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect.
Contreras died from the gunshot wound. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Benito B. Caballero
yielded the following findings:
The cause of death was "Shock due to massive external and internal hemorrhage due to multiple
gunshot wounds in the left arm side of the thorax, penetrating the left lung and vertebral
column." There were several wounds caused by one (1) bullet.
As shown on the sketch of human body attached to the Certificate of Death, and as testified on
by Dr. Caballero, the bullet entered through the "lower third of the left arm, left side of the
thorax and it penetrated the left lung and vertebral column and that is where the slug was found."
From a layman's appreciation of the sketch, the bullet entered the outer, upper left arm of the
victim, exited through the inner side of the said upper left arm, a little lower than the left armpit
and the slug lodging on the victim's back where it was recovered at the vertebral column.
From the foregoing admitted or undisputed facts, the prosecution and the defense presented
conflicting versions as to how the fatal shooting of Contreras by petitioner Mamangun actually
happened.
According to Ayson, the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, he accompanied the three
policemen (Mamangun, Diaz and Cruz) to the rooftop of Abacan's house. He was following
petitioner Mamangun who was ahead of the group. They passed through the second-floor door of
the house to the rooftop. The roof was lighted by an incandescent bulb from an adjacent house.
He was beside Mamangun when they saw, some four to five arms-length away, a man whom he
(witness) recognized as Gener Contreras. Mamangun pointed his .45 cal. pistol at the man, who
instantly exclaimed, "Hindi ako, hindi ako!" to which Mamangun replied, "Anong hindi ako?"
Before he (Ayson) could say anything, Mamangun fired his gun, hitting the man who turned out
to be Contreras. He (witness) approached the victim who was then lying on his left side
unconscious. He brought down the victim and they rushed him to the hospital where he died at
about 10:00 o'clock that same evening.
55
(DEFENSE) - PO2 Mamangun, along with PO2 Cruz and PO2Diaz, denied the presence of
Ayson at the rooftop during the shooting incident. Corroborating one another, the three testified
that they were the only ones at the scene of the shooting, and that it was dark. They claimed that
each of them, with Mamangun on the lead, went on separate directions around a water tank. As
they met each other at the other side of the tank, PO2 Cruz pointed to a person crouching at the
edge of the roof of the garage. Thinking that the person was the suspect they were looking for,
Mamangun chased said person. They announced that they were police officers but the person
continued to run in a crouching position until Mamangun caught up with him and shouted,
"Pulis. Tigil," whereupon the person suddenly stopped, turned around, faced Mamangun, and
raised a stainless steel pipe towards the latter's head but Mamangun was able to evade the attack.
This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person on the left arm. All three claimed that it was only
at this point that PO2 Cruz and Diaz approached Contreras who told them, "Hindi ako. Hindi
ako." Mamangun went near Contreras and asked, "Why did you go to the rooftop? You know
there are policemen here." Contreras was thereafter brought to the hospital where he died. After
the shooting incident, Mamangun reported the same to the desk officer, POI Filomeno de Luna,
who advised him to remain in the police station. De Luna directed Police Investigator Hernando
Banez to investigate the incident. That same evening, Investigator Banez went to the place where
the shooting happened. Banez allegedly found a steel pipe about three (3) feet long on the
depressed portion of the roof.
SANDIGANBAYAN - the Sandiganbayan came out with its decision finding the petitioner
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of only the crime of HOMICIDE.
In so finding, the Sandiganbayan did not appreciate the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength to qualify the
killing to Murder. But even as the said court rejected the petitioner's claim that the shooting was
justified by self-defense, it nonetheless ruled that the crime of Homicide was attended by an
incomplete justifying circumstance of the petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty
as a policeman, and also appreciated in his favor the generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
WHEREFORE, the accused, RUFINO S. MAMANGUN, is hereby found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised
Penal Code, and taking into account the attendance of one (1) privileged mitigation (sic)
circumstance, one generic circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from Three (3)
Years and Three (3) Months of prision correctional as minimum, to Seven (7) years of prision
mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a lawful fulfillment of exercise of a duty
RULING: Petitioner insists that the shooting, which ultimately caused the demise of Contreras,
was justified because he was repelling Contreras' unlawful attack on his person, as Contreras was
then about to strike him on the head with a steel pipe.
We are not persuaded.
56
Having admitted the fatal shooting of Contreras on that night, petitioner is charged with the
burden of adducing convincing evidence to show that the killing was done in the fulfillment of
his duty as a policeman.
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised
Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted
in the performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police officer, was responding
to a robbery-holdup incident. His presence at the situs of the crime was in accordance with the
performance of his duty. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a
necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt
him from criminal liability.
As we see it, petitioner's posturing that he shot Contreras because the latter tried to strike him
with a steel pipe was a mere afterthought to exempt him from criminal liability.
We see no plausible basis to depart from the Sandiganbayan's findings that there was no reason
for the petitioner to shoot Contreras. The latter was unarmed and had already uttered, "Hindi po
ako, Hindi po ako" before the petitioner fatally shot him on the left arm. Prosecution witness
Ayson, who was then behind the petitioner when the latter shot Contreras, testified that to the
victim's utterances, the petitioner even responded, "Anong hindi ako," and immediately shot
Contreras.8 As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan:
Besides being self-serving (with respect to the accused) and biased (with respect to his co-
policemen-witnesses), We find (1) the claim of the accused and his co-policemen-witnesses that
the victim (Contreras) attacked the said accused and (2) their seemingly "positive" identification
of the stainless steel pipe (more of a rod) as his weapon, to be of doubtful credibility, for the
following reasons:
(1) We have no doubt that, as claimed by PO2 Carlito Cruz and PO2 Hobert Diaz, the three
policemen appropriately identified themselves as police officers as they started chasing the man
they saw "crouching," and, as claimed by accused PO2 Rufino Mamangun, that, as he was about
to catch up with said man, he shouted, "Pulis! Tigil!" With all these introductions and
forewarnings, it is utterly incredible and contrary to human experience that, that man, later
identified to be Gener Contreras and admittedly not the person they were looking for,
purportedly armed only with a stainless steel "lead" pipe (more of a rod) would suddenly stop,
turn around and attack one of the three policemen who were chasing him, one after the other,
with drawn guns.
(2) When the victim (Gener Contreras) fell down after being shot by accused PO2 Mamangun,
and as the latter went near the fallen victim, said accused asked, "Why did you go to the rooftop.
You know there are policemen here." He admits that he did not ask the victim, "Why did you try
to hit me, if you are not the one?" This admission clearly belies the claim of the police-witnesses
57
that Gener Contreras attacked the accused policeman with an iron pipe when he was shot, for the
accused should have asked the latter question.
(3) The location of the entry of the bullet fired by accused Mamangun which is at the outer left
arm at about the bicep of the victim and its trajectory as it penetrated his body hitting his vital
organs along the way belies the claim of the accused that the victim was facing him and had just
missed his head with an iron pipe, as instead the victim must have instinctively shielded his body
with his left arm.
Moreover, petitioner's pretense that Contreras struck him with a steel pipe is intriguing. As it is,
petitioner did not report the same to Police Investigator Banez when he reported back to the
police station after the shooting incident. It was only when a lead pipe was recovered from the
scene and brought to the police station that petitioner conveniently remembered Contreras trying
to hit him with a pipe. Such a vital information could not have escaped the petitioner's mind. We
are thus inclined to believe that the alleged actuation of Contreras, which could have justified
petitioner's shooting him, was nothing but a concocted story to evade criminal liability. Indeed,
knowing that he shot Contreras, the least that the petitioner should have done was to bring with
him to the police station the very pipe with which Contreras tried to attack him. As borne by the
evidence, however, it was only after a police investigator referred to the scene that the lead pipe
surfaced.
The alleged contradictions cited by the petitioner, i.e. where the victim was shot, where he died,
and as to whether Ayson left his house after the shooting incident, are but minor details which do
not affect Ayson's credibility. We have held time and again that few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details and not in actuality
touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair his credibility. Quite the contrary, such
minor inconsistencies even tend to strengthen credibility because they discount the possibility
that the testimony was rehearsed.9
For sure, the record reveals that Ayson's answers to the questions propounded by the defense
counsel are clear and categorical. As to where the victim died, Ayson clarified that the victim
was already at the rooftop even before the arrival of the police officers. As to why he was not
able to warn Mamangun that the victim was his relative, Ayson explained that he was not able to
utter any word because when Contreras said "Hindi ako. Hindi ako," petitioner suddenly fired at
the latter.10 As to the claim that Ayson was also on the roof, record shows that the robbery-
holdup happened at around 8:00 in the evening. Before the policemen arrived, Ayson and
Contreras were already pursuing the robber.11 Ayson also testified that when the victim was shot
by the petitioner, the former fell on his left side unconscious; that he did not leave his house after
the incident because he was afraid that the policemen would detain him.12
Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying

circumstance in this case. For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or established facts, the
most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to justify a claim of self
defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of unlawful aggression,
petitioner's plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail.
58
To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the
petitioner's firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen
responding to a reported robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as
well as when he was trying to effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally
shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary
justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating
circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras.
Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras who
was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the Sandiganbayan in convicting the petitioner
of the crime of Homicide attended by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
justifying circumstance of having acted in the performance of his duty as a policeman and the
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
DISPOSITION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision
of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in all respects.
Pat. Edgardo Herrera, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 579 SCRA 32 (2009)
FACTS:
(PROSECUTION) - Reynaldo Ong was the manager of Chow Chow Restaurant which was
owned by Spouses George Go, one of the victims, and Edna Ong Go, located at 5 Country
Homes Commercial Center, Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Ong was the
younger brother of Edna Go. At about 4:00 am of December 28, 1989, Ong heard two
explosions. He proceeded to the third floor of the restaurant to check on what had happened and
as he looked down, he saw accused Pat. Roberto Barrera and his friend lighting firecrackers at
the back of restaurant. Ong descended the stairs toward the ground floor of the restaurant where
he saw the victims George Go and Shi Shu Yang. George Go asked for some firecrackers from
him and proceeded to the kitchen to light the firecrackers. From a distance outside the restaurant,
accused Barrera shouted, "Pare, meron pa ba?" (asking if there are still firecrackers) to which
George Go responded, "Marami pa." ("There are still plenty.") After George Go responded in the
affirmative, accused Barrera went to the restaurant armed with a .38 caliber pistol tucked in his
waist. George Go then went upstairs, took his .45 caliber pistol from an attache case, tucked it in
his waist, and went back to the kitchen. Moments later, accused Barrera approached George Go,
introduced himself as a Paranaque policeman, and disarmed him (George Go) of his licensed .45
caliber pistol. Barrera then shouted at his (Barrera's) companion, a policeman, who was upstairs,
"Ilabas mo iyong mahaba" (ordering the companion to bring out the long firearm) while
59
commanding George Go to come out as he had went to the parking lot to hide there. Ong pleaded
with Barrera and told him that George Go would surface only if Barrera would not shoot him. As
soon as George Go emerged from the parking lot, Barrera said, "Tarantado kang Chekwa ka, ako
yung nagbigay sa iyo ng sobre" (uttering invective upon the victim with the use of the pejorative
term for Chinese as he referred to his Christmas solicitation from the victim who gave him
twenty pesos (P20) and two t-shirts). George Go was quiet. Barrera also demanded that George
Go present the license of his firearm which the latter readily showed. Barrera then told George
Go that he would bring the firearm to the police station for verification. He then called the police
station informing them that he had just disarmed George Go.
At about 6:00 a.m. of that same day, George Go and his Taiwanese friend, the victim Shi Shu
Yang, were brought to the ParaÃ±aque Police Station. Reynaldo Ong proceeded, but went back
to the house to inform Edna Go, wife of George Go, to go to the police station. When she arrived
at the police station, Edna Go saw her husband, who was making a telephone call, and Shi Shu
Yang. She heard Barrera demanding George Go to produce his license to carry a firearm. Barrera
also told George Go to undergo medical examination, but the latter refused. Thus, Barrera,
together with the petitioners and accused Alcalde, shoved George Go to the wall and made him
and Shi Shu Yang ride a police car waiting nearby. They took the victims to the Paranaque
Community Hospital for medical examination. Thereafter, the two were brought to Timothy
Street along Multinational Village where they were shot to death.
Edna Go also testified that George Go was an agent of Stanley Work Sales and operator of Chow
Chow Restaurant. She said she had spent for the wake and funeral of her husband and, estimated
the expenses for the wake to be at around P10,000 as she was not able to keep the receipts.
However, she presented the receipt issued by La Funeraria Paz amounting to P11,500 as
expenses for the casket and funeral services. She stated that she was in a state of shock and
became frightened upon learning of the death of her husband.
Cristina Winterhalter y Siscar, a resident of nearby Saint Anthony Street, witnessed the killing of
the two victims with the use of a pair of binoculars lent to her by a neighbor, as she viewed it
from a distance of about 80 to 90 meters. She testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of December 28,
1989, she was standing by the window, waiting for her daughter and an Italian neighbor to come
home, when she noticed a Ford Fiera patrol van, with "Paranaque Police Mobile" appearing on
both sides, parked along Timothy Street. From a distance of between 80 to 90 meters, she saw
seven persons inside the van, two seated in front while five stayed at the back. When the van was
parked, she saw two men alight from the backseat, one was in civilian clothes (referring to Pat.
Alcalde) and one in police uniform and carrying a rifle (referring to Pat. Barrera). They were
followed by George Go and an unidentified man in black shirt. They took out Shi Shu Yang who
was seated at the back. The one seated at the passenger side was petitioner Herrera while
petitioner Mariano was the one driving the van. Petitioner Mariano went to the front area of the
van and wrote something on a piece of paper. Pat Barrera hit George Go on the face and,
together with petitioner Mariano, they fired about 20 successive shots at the victim. They also
kicked Shi Shu Yang and fired about four times. Petitioner Herrera also fired at the victims lying
on the pavement. They placed the bodies of the victims inside the van and headed for Fortunate
Village. Winterhalter and a neighbor went to the crime scene and found bloodstains on the
60
pavement, a set of dentures, and a pair of eyeglasses. Later, she executed a sworn statement
before the NBI to narrate what she witnessed.
At around 7:00 p.m., Dr. Garcia also conducted an autopsy on the body of Shi Shu Yang in the
said funeral parlor. The Autopsy Report indicated that Shi Shu Yang sustained three gunshot
wounds.
(DEFENSE) - Edna Go came to office requesting Col. Pureza for assistance with regard to her
husband's case, but he told her to await for the outcome of the investigation as the cases for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Resisting Arrest were already filed with the Prosecutor's
Office and it would be inappropriate for him to intercede in the case. While he was talking with
Go, SPO4 Ticzon called to inform him about a shooting incident involving the husband of Go.
Since he was not sure if George Go was already dead when the call came in, he did not relay the
information to Go. Thereafter, he came to know that George Go was brought to the Paranaque
Community Hospital by petitioners and accused Barrera and Alcalde, together with one Shi Shu
Yang. As a result of the investigation conducted, he and the other police officers filed a case for
homicide against two of their policemen based on the evaluation report of their investigator. He
turned over the petitioners and the accused to the NBI for investigation. The two (2) reports
stated that one of the victims was carrying a caliber 45 firearm and that said firearm was
forwarded to the PCCI laboratory for verification and also for the purpose of determining if it
was previously involved in a crime and to the Firearms and Explosive Unit for the issuance of a
certification as to the veracity of its license.
SPO4 Glenn Fuentes Ticson testified that he was assigned as Duty Investigator at the CID,
Paranaque Police Station and, as such, was tasked to investigate criminal cases referred to him
by their Desk Officer or immediate supervisor. Antonio Batola, Duty Officer, reported to him
about a shooting incident and that the victims were already brought to the Paranaque Community
Hospital. He and Pat. Oscar dela Cruz immediately proceeded to the said hospital and upon
arrival, the hospital personnel informed them that the victims were pronounced dead on arrival.
The victims were identified through their identification cards. The bodies of the victims
sustained multiple gunshot wounds and were bathed in blood. When he was informed that the
victims were brought by four (4) policemen, he interviewed two (2) of them (accused Barrera
and Alcalde) and they admitted having shot the victims but claimed self-defense. He called up
their Station Commander informing him about the shooting incident involving ParaÃ±aque
policemen. He retrieved the service firearms belonging to the two accused and proceeded to the
scene of the crime past noon. The people within the vicinity told him that while they did not see
the actual shooting incident, they heard successive gunshots. The patrol van used by the
petitioners and the two accused suspects was left in the hospital and, later brought to the police
station. Ticzon declared further that after the incident, he instructed his co-investigator to get the
statement of the wife of the victim George Go at the Chow Chow restaurant. Prior to the
shooting incident, he was informed that George Go was previously arrested by accused Barrera
in connection with a case for Illegal Possession of Firearms. He was familiar with the people in
Timothy street to avoid traffic in going to the police headquarters. On the same day of the
shooting incident, he requested the NBI to conduct an autopsy on the cadaver of the victims.
Thereafter, he prepared two (2) reports which he submitted to Col. Pureza at about 9:00 o'clock
pm. The pictures of the police van used in transporting the deceased to the hospital were taken at
61
about 3:00 0 clock p.m. at the police station but he had nothing to do with the taking of those
pictures. The extent of his investigation with respect to the shooting incident from the beginning
to the end and before the case was turned over to the NBI are all included in Exhibit 1. upon
arrival at the police headquarters coming from the scene of the crime, he reported to Col. Pureza.
Before the turn-over of the case to the NBI, Col. Pureza assigned Pat. De la Cruz and Pat.
Octavio to assist him in the investigation of the incident. As head investigator, his duties include
any request for autopsy and paraffin tests but he did not recommend that paraffin test be
conducted upon the two victims. Before the turn-over of this case to the NBI, he did not gather
the firearms involved in this case for ballistic examination. The Cal. 45 firearm recovered from
George Go was in the custody of Col. Pureza which was turned over by Pfc. Biong but he does
not know if Col. Pureza signed any receipt for said firearm. He only saw the serial no. of said
firearm, which was tampered, in the office of Col. Pureza in the afternoon.
SPO3 Gil Labay y Cantor declared that he was assigned at the Physical Identification Division of
the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City and among his duties was to perform
macro-etching on firearms and motor vehicles. On January 8, 1990, he examined one (1) Cal. 45
bearing serial no. 198842. His findings showed that there were signs of filing and grinding on the
metal surface where the serial no. is located. His examination was based upon the letter-request
of the Station Commander of the Paranaque police station. Said request was received by their
duty officer but they did not retain a copy of the receipt that was issued to the requesting party.
He does not know if said firearm was first submitted to the PC Crime Laboratory and said
firearm was received by one Pat. Bustillo. the serial number of the firearm was tampered and he
did not see the original serial number of the said firearm. In the course of his examination, he
could not determine the approximate period of time when the allege.d tempering of the firearm
was made because of the super-imposition of the number. He did not verify from the Firearms
and Explosive Unit whether the firearm was licensed or not.
SANDIGANBAYAN- Convicted each of the petitioners of two (2) counts of MURDER.
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' joint motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a fulfillment or lawful exercise of a duty according to the
accused.
RULING:
The Court affirms the conviction.
Intertwined with their argument that they were acting in self-defense, petitioners want this Court
to appreciate the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official acts.
This contention has no merit. In order to consider the defense of fulfillment of a duty, it must
be shown that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence
of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. There was no showing
that petitioners should resort to inflicting injuries and even to the extent of killing the victims as
62
there was no resistance at all from them when they were apprehended. The two victims were
handcuffed and unarmed while the petitioners and the other police officers were armed with
pistols and a rifle. Aida Veloria Magsipoc, Supervising Forensic Chemist of the NBI, per
Chemistry Report, conducted the paraffin test on George Go and Shi Shu Yang which yielded
negative results, thus showing that the victims never fired a gun and were totally defenseless in
the face of the fully armed police officers.
Petitioners anchor their argument that they merely acted in self-defense. This contention has no
merit. The accused who invokes self-defense thereby admits having killed the victim, and the
burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the
confluence of the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
Moreover, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and
unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense or defense of
stranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
oneself. The victims were repeatedly shot at close range and on vital parts of their bodies, thus
indicia that the police officers really intended to kill them. Clearly, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties on the part of the petitioners and the other police officers
does not apply.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of showing that public
respondent Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error. The Decision of public respondent
Sandiganbayan, finding petitioners Pat. Eduardo Herrera y Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano
y Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals for two (2) counts of murder and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction during the time of their sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification for
public office is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Luis A. Tabuena vs. People 268 SCRA 332 (1997)
Facts:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president’s
office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985 memorandum of
then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena
received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential
Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In
obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of
Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by
means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25
Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB
extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check
63
for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor
Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which,
Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the
office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar
circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25
Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986
for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check
for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested
him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk
of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office.
It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the
amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and
Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the
justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of
the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the combined questions of
the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena
and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12
October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.
Held:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. Tabuena acted in
strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It
carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is
patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the
urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Records show that
the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic
of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as
an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional
basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to
review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in
the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.
64

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KurtSeaVe Notes – Crim 1 Digests (Article 11)

G.R. No. L-7037 March 15, 1912

G.R. No. L-28451 August 1, 1928

G.R. No. 41674 March 30, 1935

Whether or not Remedios De La Cruz acted in self defense.

YES. Remedios acted in self defense.

C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946

As thus modified, the judgement appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

People vs. Boholst-Caballer 61 SCRA 180 (1974)

Q You did not bring that to the police authorities?

The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out above.

DISPOSITION: IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused-

Rodel Urbano vs. People 576 SCRA 826 (2009)

2. Whether or not CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.

We are not persuaded.

The CA observed aptly:

2. Mitigating Circumstances Present. Petitioner next contends that the mitigating

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential

PEOPLE v. VIRGILIO CAABAY (G.R. Nos. 129961-62, August 25, 2003)

a. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim

People v. Alexander Salva (G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002)

Testimony of Ferdinand Salva

JOVITO CABUSLAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN

People vs. Jesus G. Retubado 417 SCRA 393 (2003)

2. Hypovolemic shock secondary to loss of blood (Severe loss of blood)

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant

People vs. Rolando Dagani, et al. 499 SCRA 64 (2006)

Rufino S. Mamangun vs. People 514 SCRA 44 (2007)

(PROSECUTION) - at about 8:00 in the evening, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan a

WHEREFORE, the accused, RUFINO S. MAMANGUN, is hereby found GUILTY beyond

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a lawful fulfillment of exercise of a duty

We are not persuaded.

Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying

SANDIGANBAYAN- Convicted each of the petitioners of two (2) counts of MURDER.

Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' joint motion for reconsideration.

The Court affirms the conviction.

Luis A. Tabuena vs. People 268 SCRA 332 (1997)

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