ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner, vs.

HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR

G.R. No. 88291 May 31, 1991; G.R. No. 88291 June 8, 1993

Presented by:
Rachel Anne Z. Bautista
 FACTS AND ISSUE
▪ On November 3, 1986, Commonwealth Act No. 120 created the NPC as a public corporation to undertake the development of
hydraulic power and the production of power from other sources. Effective March 10, 1987, Executive Order No. 93 once again
withdrew all tax and duty incentives granted to government and private entities which had been restored under Presidential
Decree Nos. 1931 and 1955 but it gave the authority to FIRB to restore, revise the scope and prescribe the date of effectivity of
such tax and/or duty exemptions.

▪ On June 24, 1987 the FIRB issued Resolution No. 17-87 restoring NPC's tax and duty exemption privileges effective March 10,
1987. On October 5, 1987, the President, through respondent Executive Secretary Macaraig, Jr., confirmed and approved FIRB
Resolution No. 17-87. Though the issues raised was resolved by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 88291, the issues was again
brought to the Supreme Court for the second time by the petitioner in G.R. No. 88291.

▪ ISSUE:

Whether or not the powers conferred upon the FIRB by Section 2(a), (b), and (c) and (4) of Executive Order No. 93 "constitute
undue delegation of legislative power and is, therefore, unconstitutional.”
 RULING:

No.

With the growing complexities of modern life and the many technical fields of governmental functions, as in matters
pertaining to tax exemptions, delegation of legislative powers has become the rule and non-delegation the exception. The
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide direct and efficacious solutions to
many problems attendant upon present day undertakings. The legislature could not be expected to state all the detailed
situations wherein the tax exemption privilege would be restored. The task may be assigned to an administrative body like
the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB).

When E.O No. 93 (S'86) was issued, President Aquino was exercising both Executive and Legislative powers. Thus, there was
no power delegated to her, rather it was she who was delegating her power. She delegated it to the FIRB, which, for
purposes of E.O No. 93 (S'86), is a delegate of the legislature. Clearly, she was not sub-delegating her power.

And E.O. No. 93 (S'86), as a delegating law, was complete in itself — it set forth the policy to be carried out and it fixed the
standard to which the delegate had to conform in the performance of his functions, both qualities having been enunciated
by this Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. For delegation to be constitutionally valid, the law must be complete in itself and
must set forth sufficient standards.