Ection He Executive Power Shall Be Vested in The Resident of The

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1. THE EXECUTIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
SEC 2. No PERSON MAY BE ELECTED PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS A

NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, AREGISTERED VOTER, ABLE TOREAD AND WRITE, AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE ON
THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, AND A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING SUCH
ELECTION.
Q.AssumingthatFernandoPoe,Jr.wasanillegitimatechildofanAmerican mother and a Filipino father, would

he be a natural born Filipino citizen?
A.Yes.Providedpaternityisclearlyproved,anillegitimatechildofaFilipino father is a natural born Filipino

citizen. Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004.
Q. In whom is executive power vested?

A. In the President, who is both "Head of State" and "Chief Executive."
Q. What is the significance of being "Head of state?"

A. What ClintonRossiter said aboutthe American Presidentin TheAmerican
Presidency can be said about the Philippine President:
He remains today, as he has always been, the ceremonial head of the government of the United States,
and he must take part with real or apparent enthusiasm in a range of activities that would keep him
running and posing from sunrise to bedtime if he were not protected by a cold-blooded staff. Some of
these activitiesaresolemnor evenpriestlyinnature;others,
277
ARTICLEVII
278
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 12-13 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
through no fault of his own, are flirtations with vulgarity. The long catalogue of public duties that the
Queen discharges in England, the President of the Republic in France, and the Governor-General in
Canada, is the President's responsibility in this country, and the catalogue is even longer because he is
not a king, or even the agent of one, and is therefore expected to go through some rather undignified
paces by a people who think of him as a combination of scoutmaster, Delphic oracle, hero of the silver
screen, and father of the multitudes.
Q. What is the significance of being "Chief Executive?"
A.Thismeansthatheistheexecutiveandnooneelseis.Inthelanguageof Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67

Phil. 451, 464 (1939), the President is "the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.
The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory
capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson 'should be of the President's bosom confidence,' and,
in the language of Attorney General Cushing, 'are subject to the direction of the President.'"
Q. Absent a statute authorizing the President to ban the return of Mr. Marcos, does he have the power
to impose the ban?
A. The Constitution says that executive power shall be vested in the President. It also
enumeratescertainspecificpowers.The enumeration,however, does not exhaust the totality of executive
powers. Tradition recognizes that the powers of the President are more than the sum of enumerated
executivepowers.Thedutyofgovernment"toserveandprotectthe
people"aswellastoseetothe"maintenanceofpeaceandorder,the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotionof the generalwelfare"arguetowardstheexistenceof"residualunstated powers."
Marcos v. Manglapus, et al., G.R. No. 88211, September 15,1989. (The decision was 8-7. "This case is
unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile
after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the
countryandwhowithintheshortspaceofthreeyearsseekstoreturn, is in a class by itself)."
NOTE: On reconsideration the Court added: "The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions
Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
279
of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of
Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating
to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power."
October 27,1989.
Besides, what the Court calls residual powers also come under the duty of the President to ensure that
laws are faithfiilly executed. See Article VII, Section 17.
Q. May the President dispose of state property?
A. The President may not convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress. Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990).
Q. What is executive privilege?
A. In simplest terms, it is the power of the President to withhold certain types of information from the
courts, the Congress, and ultimately the public. The teaching on executive privilege may be culled from
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006. and Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008;
September 4,2008.
Q. What types of information are covered by executive privilege?

A.Thetypesofinformationincludethosewhichareofanaturethat
disclosurewouldsubvertmilitaryordiplomaticobjectives,or information about the identity of persons who
furnish information ofviolationsoflaw,orinformationaboutinternaldeliberations comprising the process
by which government decisions are reached.
Section 2(a) of E.O. 464, upheld as valid by the Supreme Court in Ermita, enumerated the following as
privileged. These are taken from earlier decisions:
1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this
executive order;
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security
should not be divulged;
280
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees.1-2 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
3.
4. 5.
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements;
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings; Matters affecting national security and public order.
Ermita said, "Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge
of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the
fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligationin a
particular case."
Put differently, the Court said that a claim of privilege may be valid or not "depending on the ground
invoked t o justify it and the context in which it is claimed. For in determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within
one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural
setting." From this the Court concluded that it is not for one claiming executive privilege "to unilaterally
determine that respondents' duly- issued Subpoena should be totally disregarded."
Q.Howdoesexecutiveprivilegerelatewiththepowerofcompulsory process of Congress?
A. "While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to complywithitsdemandsforinformation ...Onlyoneexecutive
officialmaybeexemptedfromthispower—thePresident."
Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Q. How must the claim of executive privilege be stated?
281
A. Another point whichthe Court emphasized in Ermita was that a claim of privilegemustbestated
withsufficient particularitytoenable Congress or the court to determine its legitimacy. "Absent then a
statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege,
thereisnowayofdeterminingwhetheritfallsunderoneofthe
traditionalprivileges,orwhether,giventhecircumstancesin
whichitismade,itshouldberespected."Thelackofspecificity renders an assessment of the potential harm
resulting from disclosure impossible. However, Congress must not require the
executivetostatethereasonsfortheclaimwithsuchparticularity
astocompeldisclosureoftheinformationwhichtheprivilegeis meant to protect.
Q. What can be learned from Neriv. Senate?

A. Senate v. Ermita was followed by Neri v. Senate. In a Senate hearing
involvingacontractwithaChinesefirm,Neriinhiscapacityas ChairmanofNEZwasaskedthreequestions:
(a)Whetherthe Presidentfollowedupthe (NBN) project;(b)Whetherthe
PresidentdirectedhimtoprioritizetheZTE?(c)Whetherthe
Presidentsaidtogoaheadandapprovetheprojectafterbeing told about the alleged bribe? Neri claimed
executive privilege.
The type of executive privilege claimed here was "presidential communication privilege." Presidential
communication is presumptively privileged; but the presumption is subject to rebuttal. Thus, whoever
challenges it, must show good and valid reasons related to the public welfare. The Court
ruledthattheSenatefailedtocontrovertthepresumption. 1 Neri v. Senate2 held that that communications
between the President and "operationally proximate" advisers are presumed to be privileged and one
challenging it must show cause why it should not be considered so. But these musts be limited to com-
munications with the President. Moreover, the decision itself, once reached, unless it is about
confidential military or diplomatic matters, can become a matter of public
'G.R. No. 180643, March 25,2008. Reconsidered September
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008; September 4, 2008. 2 , 2008.
282 15-16
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
concern. Certainly, for instance, if a decision reached is criminal, it cannot be privileged.
Q.CouldtheCourthaveaskedforanincamerasessionforNerito explain his claim within the hearing of the

Court alone.
A. Such a procedure, followed by American practice, could have enabled the Court to sift what was
privileged and what was not and then toallowtherevelationofwhatwasnotprivileged.ButtheCourt
didnotusetheprocedure,andreliedinsteadonpresumption. Thus the Chief Justice commented that
executive privilege was established by guesswork.
The decision, if applied to criminal cases, has the dangerous effect of blocking discovery of wrongdoing
by the mere claim of presumptive privilege.
NOTE: A lesser anomaly in the decision is its rejection of the manner in which the Senate approved its
show cause order to Secretary Neri. The Senate approved the order through the collection of a sufficient
number of signatures and not in a meeting. The Court found this to be an invalid procedure. But is it for
the Court to tell the Senate what its voting procedure should be? As our own Court said in 1960, "Courts
have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.TM Provided, of course, private rights are not violated.
The Court too does modify or even dispense with its own rules. What is good for the goose should be
good for the gander.
Q. Is the President immune from suit?
A. Although the new Constitution has not reproduced the explicit

guaranteeofpresidentialimmunityfromsuitunderthe1973 Constitution, presidential immunity during
tenure remains as part of the law. What has been rejected by the new Constitutionis the expansive
notion of immunity in the Marcos Constitution. Once out of office, how
Sees.15-16
ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 283
ever, even before the end of the six year term, immunity fornon-
officialactsislost.SuchwasthecaseofJoseph Estrada. The cases filed against him were criminal in
character. They involved plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
could these crimes, especially plunder whichcarried the death penalty, be covered by a mantle of
immunity for a non-sitting president. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
arenotactsoftheStateandtheofficerwhoactsillegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing
as any other trespasser. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710- 15, March 2,2001.
Q. PetitionerBeltranarguesthat "thereasonswhichneces- sitate Presidential immunity from suit impose a

correla- tive disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may be bringing herself tin- der the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit.
As to testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or
per- jury. Does the incumbent President's immunity fromsuit prevent her from suing?
A.TherationaleforthegranttothePresidentofthepriv-
ilege of immunity fromsuit is to assure the exercise of presidentialduties and functions free fromany
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all
of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided atten- tion. But this privilege of immunityfromsuit
pertains to
the President by virtue of the office and may bfc invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any
other person
in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant
cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such
accused. Moreover, there
is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded,
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
The choice of whether toexercise the privilege or towaive it is hers.
284
Soliven v. Judge Makasiar, Beltran v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 8287, November 14,1988.
NOTE: In Clinton v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a sitting Presidentdoesnot
enjoyimmunityfrom suit for unofficial acts committed before his term.
SEC. 3. THERE SHALL BE A VICE-PRESIDENT WHO SHALL HAVE THE

SAME QUALIFICATIONS AND TERM OF OFFICE AND BE ELECTED WITH AND IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE PRESIDENT. HE MAY BE
REMOVED FROM OFFICE IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE PRESIDENT.
THE VICE-PRESIDENT MAY BE APPOINTED AS A MEMBER OF THE CABINET. SUCH APPOINTMENT REQUIRES NO CONFIRMATION.
Q.WhatisthefunctionoftheVice-President?
A.HisonlyconstitutionalfunctionistobeonhandtoactasPresidentwhen needed or to succeed to the

presidency in case of a permanent vacancy
intheoffice.ThePresidentmayalsoappointhimasaMemberofthe Cabinet. Such appointment does not need
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
SEC. 4. THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL BE

ELECTED BY DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT
FOLLOWING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION AND SHALL END AT NOON OF THE SAME DATE SIX YEARS THEREAFTER . THE PRESIDENT
SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION. No PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED AS PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS SUCH FOR MORE
THAN FOUR YEARS SHALL BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO THE SAME OFFICE AT ANY TIME .
No VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO SUCCESSIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR
ANY LENGTH OF
TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS
ELECTED.
UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE HELD ON THE SECOND
MONDAY OF MAY.
THE RETURNS OF EVERY ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-

PRESIDENT DULY CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF EACH PROVINCE OR CITY , SHALL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS,
DIRECTED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE. UPON RECEIPT OF THE CERTIFICATES OF
CANVASS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE SHALL, NOT LATER THAN THIR
Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 285
TY DAYS AFTER THE DAY OF THE ELECTION , OPEN ALL THE CERTIFICATES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IN JOINT PUBLIC SESSION, AND THE CONGRESS, UPON DETERMINATION OF THE AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION
THEREOF IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW, CANVASS THE VOTES.
THE PERSON HAVING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES SHALL BE PROCLAIMED ELECTED,
BUT IN CASE TWO OR MORE SHALL HAVE AN EQUAL AND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES, ONE OF
THEM SHALL FORTHWITH BE CHOSEN BY THE VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF
BOTH
HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS, VOTING SEPARATELY.
THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASSING OF THE CERTIFICATES.
THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONT E ST S RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE.
Q. How are the President and Vice-President elected? A. By direct vote of the people as specified in
Section 4.
Q.Whohastheauthoritytocanvassthevotesandproclaimthewinner?
A. Congress. The proclamation of presidential and vice-presidential winners is a function of Congress

and not of the Comelec. Macalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157013, July 10,2003.
Q.May Congressdelegatethepreliminarycountofvotesinapresidential electiontoaJointCommittee.
A. Yes, provided that the Committee report be submitted for approval by the Congress as a body. Lopez
v. Senate and House, G.R. No. 163556, June 8,2004.
Q. May Congress continue the canvass even after the final adjournment of is sessions?
A. Yes. The final adjournment of Congress does not terminate an unfinished presidential canvass.
Adjournment terminates legislation but not the non-legislative functions of Congress such as canvassing
of votes. Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee, June 22, 2004.
286 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees.
15-16
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
Q.Incanvassingthevotes,canCongresslookintotheauthenticityanddue execution of the certificates of

canvass, or is its function merely ministerial?
A. The function of Congress is not merely ministerial. It has authority to examine the certificates of
canvass for authenticity and due execution. For thispurpose,Congressmustpassa lawgoverning their
canvassing functions.
Q. In the event of a contest "relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President," who shall be judge?
A. The Supreme Court.

Q. Macalintal challenges the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal as
unconstitutional.
A. The Presidential Electoral Tribunalis no other than the Supreme Court itself. The new provision in the
1987 Constitution simply constitutionalizes the decision of the Supreme Court in Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA
at 761. Macalintal v. PET, G.R. No. 191618, November 23,2010.
Q. Can Susan Roces, widow of Fernando Poe, Jr. intervene and/or substitute for him, assuming
arguendo that the protest could survive his death.
A.No.Thefundamentalruleapplicableinapresidentialelectionprotestis Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It

provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this
express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning
an on-going election contest. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, P.E.T. CASE No. 002, March 29, 2005.
Q. Protestee de Castro contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest
errorsonthestatementsofvotes(SOV)andcertificatesofcanvass (COC). Decide.
Sees. 15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 287

A. The validity, authenticity and correctness of the SOVs and COCs are under
theTribunal'sjurisdiction.Theconstitutionalfunctionaswellasthe
powerandthedutytobethesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtothe election, returns and qualification of the
President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
IncludedthereinisthedutytocorrectmanifesterrorsintheSOVsand COCs. Legarda v. De Castro, P.E.T. CASE
No. 003, March 31, 2005.
Q.AfterFidelRamoswasdeclaredelectedPresident,defeatedcandidate Miriam Defensor Santiago filed an

election protest with the Supreme Court. Subsequently, however, while the case was pending, she ran
for the office of Senator and, having been declared elected, assumed office as Senator. What happens to
her election protest?
A.WithherelectionandassumptionofofficeasSenatorsheisdeemedto
haveabandonedherprotest.ASenator'stermissixyears.Itisapublic trust. She has made a pact with the
people that she would serve for six years. Defensor-Santiago v. Fidel Ramos, P.E.T. Case No. 001,
February 13,1996. See dissent.
Q. WhatarethetermsofthePresidentandVice-President?Maytheybe re-elected?
A. Both the President and the Vice-President are elected for a term of six years which begins at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election.
"ThePresidentshallnotbeeligiblefor anyreelection."
"No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the cont inuity of the service for the
full term for which he was elected."
Q. If a Vice-President succeeds to the presidency, may he run for President at the end of the termto
which he succeeded as President?
A. "No person whohas succeededas President andhas served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time."
288 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 12-13 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
SEC. 5. BEFORE THEY ENTER ON THE EXECUTION OF THEIR OFFICE, THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, OR THE ACTING PRESIDENT
SHALLTAKETHEFOLLOWING OATHORAFFIRMATION :
"I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I WILL FAITHFULLY AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY FULFILL MY DUTIES AS PRESIDENT (OR
VICE-PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT) OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESERVE AND DEFEND ITS CONSTITUTION, EXECUTE ITS LAWS, DO
JUSTICE TO EVERY MAN, AND CONSECRATE MYSELF TOTHESERVICE
OF THE NATION. SO HELP ME GOD." (IN CASE OF AFFIRMATION, LAST SENTENCE WILL BE OMITTED)
SEC. 6. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE AN OFFICIAL RESIDENCE. THE SALARIES OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE
DETERMINED BY LAW AND SHALL NOT BE DECREASED DURING THEIR TENURE. No INCREASE IN SAID COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT
UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE TERM OF THE INCUMBENT DURING WHICH SUCH INCREASE WAS APPROVED. THEY SHALL
NOT RECEIVE DURING THEIR TENURE ANY OTHER EMOLUMENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OTHER SOURCE .
Q.WhatwillbetheinitialsalaryofthePresidentandoftheVice-President under this Constitution?
A.SeeArticleXVIII,Section17.
SEC.7.THEPRESIDENT-ELECT ANDTHEVICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT
SHALL ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS.
IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS TO QUALIFY, THE VICE-PRESIDENTELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL
HAVE QUALIFIED.
IF A PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN, THE VICE-
PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED .
IFATTHEBEGINNING OFTHETERMOFTHEPRESIDENT,THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED OR SHALL HAVE BECOME PERMANENTLY
DISABLED, THE VLCE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT.
WHERE NO PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN OR SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, OR WHERE
BOTH SHALL HAVE DIED OR BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN
CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT
UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A
ViCE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.
THE CONGRESS SHALL, BY LAW, PROVIDE FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH ONE WHO IS TO ACT AS PRESIDENT SHALL BE SELECTED UNTIL A
PRESIDENT
OR A VICE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR INABILITY OF THE OFFICLIILS MENTIONED
IN
THE NEXT PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.
Q. What different vacancy situations are contemplatedin Section 7? A. In general, Section 7 deals with
vacancysituations which exist at the
beginning of the term of the presidency.
The first two situations are (1) when a President has been chosen but he fails to qualify at the beginning
of his term, and (2) when no President has yet been chosen at the time he is supposed to assume office.
In both cases the Vice-President becomes acting-President until a President qualifies.
The third situation is (3) when the President-elect dies or is permanently incapacitated before the
beginning of his term. In this case, the Vice-President-elect becomes President.
The fourth and fifth situations are (4) when both the President and Vice-President havenot yet been
chosen or have failed toqualify, and
(5) when both shall have died or become permanently incapacitated at the start of their ter m. In such
situation, the Senate President or the Speaker•-inthatorder—actsasPresidentuntilaPresidentorVice
-President qualifies.
The sixth situation is (6) when the officials mentioned in situation (4) and(5) shall have died, or shall
have becomepermanently incapacitated, or are unable to assume office. In such situation, Congress will
decide by law who wiill act as President until a President or Vice-President shall haive been elected and
qualified.
SEC.8.INCASE OF DEATH,PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENX
SHALL BECOME THE PRESIDENT TO SERVE THE UNEXPIRED TERM. IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE,
OR RESIGNATION OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE -PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT 0<F THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SHALL THEN ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT
OR VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED.
290 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sec. 17 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
THE CONGRESS SHALL, BY LAW, PROVIDE WHO SHALL SERVE AS PRESIDENT IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR
RESIGNATION OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT. HE SHALL SERVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED
AND QUALIFIED, AND BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RESTRICTIONS OF POWERS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS AS THE ACTING PF RESIDENT.
Q. What vacancy situations are contemplated in Section 8?
A. The vacancy situations described here occur after the office has been initially filled.
The first situation is (1) when the incumbent President dies, or is permanently disabled, is removed, or
resigns. The vacancy created is thus permanent. In this situation the Vice- President becomes President.
The second situation is (2) when both the President and the Vice President die, or are permanently
disabled, are removed, or resign. In such case, the Senate President or the Speaker — in that order —
shall act as President until a President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The third situation is (3) when the Acting President dies, or is permanently incapacitated, is removed, or
resigns. For such situation, Congress will determine by law who will act as President until a new
President or Vice-President shall have qualified.
Q. How can the assumption of the presidency by Vice President Gloria Macapagal
ArroyointhemiddleofJosephEstrada'stermbejustified.
A. Ina dividedopiniontheSupremeCourtheldthatJosephEstradahad resigned thereby leaving the office

vacant. The judgment that Estrada had resigned was based on two statements of Estrada just befor e he
left Malacanang and on the diary of Angara publishedin the Inquirer. Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738,
March 2, 2001; G.R. No. 146738, April 3, 2001.
Q. Four related petitions were filed (1) asking that Estrada stop "exercising the powers and authority of
the President under the Constitution" and "to yield the Presidency to his constitutional successor, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo." (2) that "the occupation of the Office of [the President]of the Philippines by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyois constitutional and legal with the fullsupport of the Filipinopeople
and other foreign countries.," (3) asking for a "definitive mling on whether or not Joseph Estrada is still
the President" and, hence, "exempt from all criminal suits," and (4) praying "th at the proclamation and
oath-taking of Madame Arroyo ... be declared null and void
. . . " or that she be "declared acting President and President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President-on-
leave ..." Decide.
A.1.Petitionsareessentiallyfor declaratoryreliefoverwhich
the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction; 2. as petitions
for prohibition and mandamus they fail to allege, much less
show, lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of jurisdic-
tion on the part of "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministe- rialfunctions,"whichRule65oftheRulesofCourtrequires
to be alleged and proven before the extra-ordinary writ of prohibition may be issued; 3. petitioners
have no legal standing;
4. they may not be treated as quo warranto because a plea for quo warranto must be commenced(a) by
the solicitor general,
(b) by a public prosecutor, and (c) by "a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." None of the petitioners qualify in law to commence
the action. Lozano, et al. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146579, February 6, 2001.
Q. When the Senate President or Speaker becomes Acting Pre- sident, does he lose the Senate
presidency or the speakership?
A. No.
SEC. 9. WHENEVER THERE IS A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, THE
PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE A VICE-PRESIDENT FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WHO SHALL ASSUME OFFICE UPON CONFIRMATION BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS,
VOTING SEPARATELY.
Q. How is a vacancy in the vice- presidency filled?

A. See Section 9. (Note that previous constitutions did not have a
rule for filling such vacancy. Note also that, by not limiting the choice to the Senate, the President is
given a wider range of choices.)
SEC. 10. THE CONGRESS SHALL, AT TEN O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING

OF THE THIRD DAY AFTER THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT OCCURS, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES
WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL AND WITHIN SEVEN DAYS ENACT A LAW CALLING FOR A SPECIAL ELECTION TO ELECT A PRESIDENT
AND A VICE-PRESIDENT TO BE HELD NOT EARLIER THAN FORTY-FIVE DAYS NOR LATER THAN SIXTY DAYS FROM THE TIME OF SUCH
CALL. THE BILL CALLING SUCH SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE DEEMED CERTIFIED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SECTION
26,ARTICLEVIOFTHISCONSTITUTION ANDSHALLBECOME LAWUPON
ITS APPROVAL ON THIRD READING BY THE CONGRESS . APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CHARGED
AGAINST ANY CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIRE ME NTS OF PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 25, ARTICLE
VI OF THIS CONSTITUT I O N. THE CONVENING OF THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE SUSPENDED NOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION
POSTPONED. NO SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CALLED IF THE VACANCY OCCURS WITHIN EIGHTEEN MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE
OF THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
Q. What must Congress do in case a vacancy occurs in the offices of President and Vice-President?
A.SeeSection10.
SEC. 11. WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT S TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAEXR OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS
OFFICE, AND 1UNTIL HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH
POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED BY THE ViCE-PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT.
WHENEVER A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET
TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO
DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL IMMEDIATELY
ASSUME THEPOWERS
AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT.
THEREAFTE R, WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT S TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT NO INABILITY EXISTS, HE SHALL REASSUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE. MEANWHILE,
SHOULD A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE
PRESIDENT
IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE , THE

CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS
SHALL CONVENE, IF IT IS NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULESANDWITHOUT NEEDOFCALL .
IF THE CONGRESS, WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST

WRITTEN DECLARATION, OR, IF NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN TWELVE DAYS AFTER IT IS REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE, DETERMINES BY A TWO-
THIRDS VOTE OF
BOTH HOUSES, VOTING SEPARATELY, THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO
DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT
SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT; OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE
EXERCISING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.
Q. The matter of deciding whether the President is so unable to discharge the

functionsofhisofficethatsomeoneelsemusttakeoverfromhimcan
createagovernmentcrisis,especiallyifthePresidentisunwillingto concede his inability. How is a question of
inability resolved?
A. See Section 11.
NOTE: IN Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001; G.R. No. 146738, April 3, 2001, the Court
said that Estrada did not merely temporarily hand over the exercise of presidential powers
toGloriaMacapagal Arroyobut resignedfromthepresidency.
SEC. 12. IN CASE OF SERIOUS ILLNESS OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PUBLIC
SHALL BE INFORMED OF THE STATE OF HIS HEALTH. THE MEMBERS OF THE
CABINET IN CHARGE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, SHALL

NOT BE DENIED ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT DURING SUCH ILLNESS.
Q. What kind of illness is envisioned by Section 12?
A. Section 12 envisions not just illness which incapacitates but also any serious illness which can be a
matter of national concern. (Incidentally, Section
12 grew out of a lesson learned from Soviet Russia. Nothing to do with local history!)
Q. Who has the duty of releasing the information?
A.Thesectiondoesnotspecifytheofficeronwhomthedutydevolves.Itis
understoodthattheOfficeofthePresidentwouldberesponsiblefor making the disclosure.
SEC. 13. THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, AND THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS SHALL NOT, UNLESS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT DURING SAID TENURE.THEYSHALL
NOT,DURING THEIR TENURE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PRACTICE ANY OTHER PROFESSION, PARTICIPATE IN ANY BUSINESS,
OR BE FINANCIALLY INTERESTED IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE, OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED
BY THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY

THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES . THEY SHALL STRICTLY AVOID
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR OFFICE .
THE SPOUSE AND RELATIVES BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY
WITHIN THE FOURTH CIVIL DEGREE OF THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT DURING HIS TENURE BE
APPOINTED ASMEMBERS OFTHECONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS, OR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OR AS SECRETARIES, UNDER
SECRETARIES, CHAIRMEN OR HEADS OF BUREAUS OR OFFICES,

INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES .
Q. What are the prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family? on his relatives?
A.SeeSection13. Q.IfanUndersecretarysitsinthePEZABoardmeetingsfortheSecretary,
does he also have the disqualification of the Secretary?
A.Yes.AstheUndersecretaryhimselfadmitted,henoseparateorspecial appointment for such position. Since

the Secretary of Labor is prohibitedfromreceivingcompensationforhisadditionalofficeor employment,
such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of
Labor. Bitonio v. COA, G.R. No. 147392, March12,2004.
Q.MaythePresidentialLegalCounselbemadePCGGChairman?
A. Since the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel has the duty of giving
independentandimpartiallegaladviceontheactionsoftheheadsof
various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving other presidential
appointees, he may not occupy a position in any of the offices whose performance he must review. Such
would involve occupying incompatible positions. Thus he cannot be PCGG
Chairman and Chief Presidential Legal Counsel at the same time of time
since the PCGG answers to the President. Public Interest Group v Elma, G. R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006.
Q. President Aquino issued E.O. No 284 which read in part:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations x x x
Valid?
A. Invalid. This in effect gives to the President and the rest of her official family
thebroadexceptionsfoundinSection7,Par.2,ofArticleIX-Bwhichis
thegeneralruleforpublicofficials.Section13,Art.VII,however,isthe
exception.a[W]hileallotherappointiveofficialsinthecivilserviceare allowed to hold other office and
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of theirpositions,members oftheCabinet,theirdeputies andassistants
maydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedbytheConstitutionitself."
CivilLibertiesUnionv.TheExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.83896, 22 February 1991.
Q. What is the meaning of "directly" or "indirectly?" Does the fact that the accused, a PCGG
Commissioner, has not signed any document submitting to DECS a bid of the family corporation of which
he is member justifyquashing the information?
A. Quashal is not justified. The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD
No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "pursuit of private business . . . without the permission required by
Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or
employee in the civil service. Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85468, September 7,1989.
SEC.14.APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY ANACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN EFFECTIVE, UNLESS REVOKED BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT
WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OR REASSUMPTION OF OFFICE .
Q. Does an Acting President possess powers to appoint?
A. Yes, but his appointments may be revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his
assumption or reassumption of office.
SEC.15.TwoMONTHSIMMEDIATELY BEFORE THENEXTPRESIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE
OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.
Q. Are there time periods when appointments may not be made?
A.Yes.SeeSection15.Notethatifitisnecessarytomakeappointments during this period, only temporary

appointments can be extended and only to the executive department.
Q. Does this rule apply to appointments to the judiciary?
A. According to In re: Appointment of Valenzuela, AM 98-0501 SC, November 9, 1998 the provision
applies to the judiciary. However, according to De
Castrov.JudicialandBarCouncil,G.R.No.191002,April20,2010and
May1,2010.itdoesnotapplytoappointmentstotheSupremeCourt. See dissent.
Q. Petitioners seek the recall of the appointments of the fourteen (14)

privaterespondentsbeforetheCSConthegroundthatthesewere
"midnightappointments"bytheMayorforbiddenunderArticleVII, Section 15 of the Constitution. Decide.
A. The prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits
localelectiveofficialsfrommakingappointmentsduring
thelastdaysofhisorhertenure.DelaRamav.CourtofAppeals,G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001.
SEC. 16. THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINT ME NT S, APPOINT
THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTME NT S , AMBASSADORS , OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS
AND CONSULS, OR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT.
THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE APPOINTMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE , IN THE COURTS,
OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS.
THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR
COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR
UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.
Q. What is the nature of the appointing power?

A. It is executive in nature, Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, 283 (1927).
Q. What followsfrom the fact that the appointing power is executive in nature?
A. Since appointment to office is an executive function, the clear implication is

thatthelegislaturemaynotusurpsuchfunction.Thelegislaturemay create an office and prescribe the
qualifications of the person who may holdtheoffice,butitmayneitherspecifywhoshallbeappointedto such
office nor actually appoint him. The "appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the [President],
upon which, no limitations may beimposedbyCongress,exceptthoseresulting...fromthelimited exercise of
power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office." Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903,
911(1954).
NOTE: The appointing authority of the President, however, should not be confused with the authority of
the legislature to impose additional duties on existing offices. Thus, under the 1935 Constitution, while it
was clearly the prerogative of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court, Roxas v.
Lopez,
17 SCRA 756 (1966) upheld the authority of Congress to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
consisting of the Chief Justice and the Justices of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the
act did not create a new office nor specify who should hold the office but merely imposed additional
duties . and powers upon the Supreme Court and consequently upon whoever may be the incumbent
Chief Justice and Associate Justices. Id. at 770.
Q. Does the power to appoint include the power to decide who among various choices is the best
qualified?
A.Yes,providedthatthepersonchosenhasthequalificationsprovidedby law.
Q. Is the absence of recommendation of the Secretary of justice to the President fatal to the
appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit for prosecutor?
A.Theanswerpivotsontheproperunderstandingoftheprovisionofthe Revised Administrative Code of 1987

(Book IV, Title III, Chapter II, Section 9) to the effect that —
"All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary."
Appointment calls for discretion on the part of the appointing authority. The power to appoint
prosecutors is given to the President. The Secretary of Justice is under the control of the President.
Hence the law must be read simply as allowing the Secretary of Justice to advice the President. The
doctrine in San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 is not applicable because the stress there was on the
constitutional mandate on local autonomy. Bermudez, et al. v. Secretary, G.R. No. 131429, August
4,1999.
Q. What is the scope of the President's appointing power?
A.Section16enumeratestheofficerswhoareappointedbythePresident: "The President shall . . . appoint the

heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint."
In addition to the above, he also appoints Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
(Article Vni, Section 9), the regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the Chairmen and Members
of the Constitutional Commissions [Article IX, B, Section 1(2); C, Section 1(2); D, Section 1(2)], the
Ombudsman and his Deputies (Article XI, Section 9).
Q. What is the significance of the above enumeration?
A.TheenumerationmeansthatCongressmaynotgivetoanyotherofficer the power to appoint the above

enumerated officers.
Q. May the appointing authority be given to others?
A. Appointing authority may also be given to other officials than the President. Thus Section 16 says:
"The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." Rufino v Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21,
2006 interpreted this to mean that, when the authority is given to head of collegial bodies, it is to the
chairman that the authority is given and not to the body. But he can appoint only officers "lower in
rank," and not officers equal in rank to him. Thus a Chairman may not appoint a fellow member of a
Board.
Q. What appointments need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments?
A. Only those enumerated in Section 16.
This is different from the law under the 1935 Constitution where the general rule was that all
appointments made by the President needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointments unless
exempted by Congress from the need for confirmation Moreover, "ad interim appointments" under the
second paragraph of the Section 16 are immediately effective.
Q. Did the appointment of a sectoral representative require confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments?
A. Yes. The sectoral representative fell under the clause "other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution." Quintos-Deles, et al. v. Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 83216,
September 4,1989.
Q. Does the appointment of the Commissioner of Customs need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments?
A. No, since the office is not one of those mentioned in the first sentence of Article VII, Section 16, nor is
it specified elsewhere that such appointment needs consent of the Commission. Sarmiento v. Mison,
156 SCRA 549 (December 17,1987).
Q. Does the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights require the consent of
the Commission on Appointments?
A. No, since the office is not one of those mentioned in the first sentence of Article VII, Section 16, nor is
it specified elsewhere that such appointment needs consent of the Commission. Bautista v. Salonga,
G.R. No. 86439, April 13,1989.
Q. Do appointments and promotions in the Philippine Coast Guard need confirmation?
300
A. No. The Coast Guard is a civilian unit. Soriano v. Lista, 447 Phil. 566 (2003).
Q. May Congress expand the list of those whose appointment needs confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments?
A. No. Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), although still with some dissents, definitively ruled that
Congress may not expand the list of appointments needing confirmation. The case involved R.A. 6715
which required that the Chairman and Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission be
appointed by the President with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Court
reiterated its ruling in Mison and Bautista saying that the list in the first sentence of Section 16 of those
whose appointment require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is exclusive, adding that
the list may no be expanded by statutory legislation. The same doctrine was followedin Tarrosav.
Singson, 232SCRA553(1994),with reference to the appointment of the Central Bank Governor and also in
Manalo v. Sistoza, et al., G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999, with reference to the appointment of the
head of the Philippine National Police.
Q. Is the promotion of senior officers of the PNP subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment as required by the PNPlaw?
A. No. Congress may not expand the list of those needing CA confirmation. Besides, PNP officers are not
members of the Armed Forces but are civilians. Manalo v. Sistoza, et al., G.R. No. 107369, August
11,1999.
Q. When a law creating an office is silent as to who should appoint the corresponding officer, who
should?
A. The President.
Q. What are "ad-interim appointments?"

A. They are appointments made by the President during the recess of
Congress (during whichthe Commission on Appointmentsdoes not meet).
Q. Is an ad-interim appointment temporary?
A. No. Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be

withdrawnorrevokedbythePresidentatherpleasure,andcaneven be disapproved or simply by-passed by
the Commission on Appointments.Forthisreason,petitionerclaimsthatanadinterim appointment is
temporary in charac
ter and consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. An
ad interim appointment is permanent. Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002.
Q. What is the effectivityand duration of ad-interim appointments?

A. They are effective immediately, without need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
but the effectivitylasts "only until disapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenext
adjournment of the Congress."
Q. What is the difference between an ad-interim appointment and an appointment in an acting

capacity?
A.(1)Theformerrefersonlytopositionswhichneedconfirmationbythe Committee on Appointment while
the latter is also given to those which do not need confirmation.
(2) The former may be given only when Congress is not in session whereas the latter may be given even
when Congress is in session.
Q. The President made appointments of Acting Department Secretaries while Congress was in session.
The appointments were challenged on the grounds that: (1) the administrative Code says that, in the
absence of a Secretary, the Undersecretary performs his functions; (2) appointments of acting
secretaries need confirmation; (3) For its part, respondent says that since the petitioner-senators are
not members of the Commission on Appointment, they have no standing to challenge the act of the
President.
A. (1) Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation
toappointautomaticallytheundersecretaryashertemporaryalter
ego.Analterego,whethertemporaryorpermanent,holdsaposition of great trust and confidence. Congress,
in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego
should be.
(2) The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person
302
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sec. 17 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the
permanent appointee. Moreover, the law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch."
(3) As to standing, yes, since the Commission on appointments is independent of the Senate, senators
who are not members of the CA may not act in their behalf. Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13,2005.
SEC. 17. THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE CONTROL OF ALL THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS, AND OFFICES. HE SHALL ENSURE
THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.
Q. What is the power of control?
A. The power of control has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in
theperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethejudgmentofthe former for that of the latter." Mondano v.
Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143,148 (1955).ItissuchpowerwhichhasbeengiventothePresidentoverall
executiveofficers,fromCabinetmembersto thelowliestclerk.This is an element of the presidential system
where the President is "the ExecutiveoftheGovernmentofthePhilippines,andnoother.The heads of the
executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson 'should be of the President's bosom confidence,' and, in the language of
Attorney General Cushing, 'are subject to the direction of the
President."'Villenav.SecretaryofInterior,67Phil.451,464(1939). Also, Lacson- Magallanes Co. Inc. v. Pano,
21 SCRA 895 (1967).
Q.Section31ofE.O.No.292(AdministrativeCodeof1987)providedan
incentiveawardsystemforgovernmentemployees.On21February 1992, President Aquino issued A.O. No.
268 enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. On 19
January 1993, President Ramos issued A.O. No. 29, which limited the amount of incentive
Sec. 17 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 303
benefits for 1992, enjoined head of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior
approval from him, and directed the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount. Petitioners are
officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive
benefits for 1992. They assail the constitutionalityof A.O. Nos. 29 and 268 on the ground that:
1) theyviolate the provisions of E.O. No. 292 and, since the latter is a law, it prevails over executive
issuances; and
2) theyencroach upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures to
strengthen the merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules, regulations and standards governing
the incentive awards system of the civil service. Decide.
A. 1)BothA.O.Nos.29and268wereissuedinthevalidexerciseof presidential control over the executive

departments. "The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of
incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of
the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from
the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources."
Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 109406,110642,111494, 112056 and 119597, September 11,1998, pp. 59-
60.
2) The President did not encroach upon the authority of the CSC to grant benefits to government
personnel. A.O. Nos. 29 and 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits,
but merely regulated the grant and amount thereof. Fixing the amount of the incentives is not the duty
of the CSC. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego. Id. at 60-61.
Q.Whatisthedoctrineof"qualifiedpoliticalagency?"
A. The doctrine, recognizing that the Constitution has established a single and not a plural executive,
postulates that "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
304 3-4
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive." Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 and 463. Thus, a decision of a
department secretary, when not reprobated by the Executive, is the last step in the process of
"exhausting administrative remedies." E.g., Demaisip v. Court of Tax Appeals, 106 Phil 237 (1959). But
see Calo v. Fuentes, 5 SCRA 397 (1962) and Ganob v. Ramos, 27 SCRA 1174 (1969).
Thus, too, the Executive Secretary when acting "by authority of the President," may reverse the decision
of another department secretary. Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895 (1967). By authority of the
President, he also has the power to modify, alter or reverse a construction of a statute given by the
Secretary of Justice. Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr., 197 SCRA 771 (1991)
Similarly, the action of the Secretary of the DENR, exercising the President's power to reorganize, is
presumed to be the action of the President. DENR v. DENR Employees, G.R. No. 149724. August 19,2003.
Q. Does the power of control include the power to reorganize executive offices?
A. It has been held, moreover, that the express grant of the power of control to the President justifies an
executive action to carry out the reorganizationofanexecutiveofficeunderabroadauthorityoflaw.
AnakMindanaov.ExecutiveSec.,G.R.No.166052,August29,2007; Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA.
G.R. No. 167324, July 17,2007;
Reorganization can involve the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or even abolition of
positions by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. While the power to abolish an office is
generally lodged with the legislature, the
authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such abolition, is
permissible under present laws. Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 160093, July 31,
2007.
NOTE: The President's power of control means his power to reverse the judgment of an inferior officer.
It may also be exercised in his behalf by Department Heads. Thus the Secretary of Justice may reverse
the judgment of a prosecutor and direct him to withdraw an information already filed. Such action is not
directly reviewable by a court. One who disagrees, however, should appeal to the Office of the President
in order to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing it to court. Orosa v. Roa, G.R. No. 14047,
July 14, 2006; DENR v. DENR Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003.
It has been held, moreover, that the express grant of the power of control to the President justifies an
executive action to carry out the reorganization of an executive office under a broad authority of law.
Reorganization can involve the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or even abolition of
positions by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. While the power to abolish an office is
generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch,
which may include such abolition, is permissible under present laws. Anak Mindanao v. Executive Sec.,
G.R. No. 166052 , August 29, 2007; Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17,
2007; Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 160093, July 31,2007.
NOTE: Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI, appeal to the Office of the
President should be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of the President to review acts of
department secretaries will be rendered illusory by mere rules of procedure. However, such "executive
control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the
corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the
executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more
in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence,
constitutionally subject to this Court's rule-making power. The Rules of Procedure we reissued by the
Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts. Phillips Seafood v. BOI, G.R. No.
175787, February 4,2009.
3-4
Q. May an Assistant Executive Secretary, acting for the President, reverse a decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Resources?
A. Yes, under the well established doctrine of "qualified political agency." Roque v. Director of Lands, L-
25373, July 1,1976.
Q. May the Director of the NBI ignore or defy the order of the Secretary of Justice?
A. The acts of the Secretary of Justice in the ordinary course of the performance of his duties are acts of
the President which are controllingoverallexecutiveofficers.Hence,theNBIDirectormust obey. De Leon v.
Carpio, October 12,1989.
Q. Compare the power of control with the disciplinary power of the President.
A. From cases decided so far, the following synthesis of the power of control
maybemade.AsdefinedinMondanov.Silvosa,supra,itis"thepower of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgmentoftheformerforthatofthelatter."Thispower,however, "merely applies to the exercise of control
over the acts of the subordinateintheperformanceofhisduties.Itonlymeansthatthe President may set
aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate intheperformanceofhisduties."Ang-
Angcov.Castillo,9SCRA619, 629(1963).Thepowerofcontrol,therefore,isnotthesourceofthe
Executive'sdisciplinarypoweroverthepersonofhissubordinates.
Rather,hisdisciplinarypowerflowsfromhispowertoappoint:"The power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint." Id. at 630. Moreover, this inherent disciplinary power has been made subject to
limitation by the legislature through the tatter's power to provide for a
civilservicesystemoneofwhosemainfeaturesissecurityoftenure: "No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended or dismissedexceptforcauseasprovidedbylaw."ArticleIX,B,Section 2(3). Hence,
it can be said that while the Executive has control over the "judgment" or "discretion" of his
subordinates, it is the legislature which has control over their "person."
Q.DoesthePresidenthavecontroloverofficersofgovernment-owned corporations?
A.Yes.However,itissubmittedthatsuchpowerovergovernment-owned corporations comes not from the

Constitution
Sec. 17 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
307
but from statute. Hence, it may also be taken away by statute. See NAMARCO v. Area, 29 SCRA 648
(1969). Bernas, CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 131-132. (Would it make
any difference now that the Constitution makes a distinction between government owned corporations
with original charter and those with derivative charter?)
Q.WhatisthesignificanceofthesecondsentenceofSection17whichsays "HE SHALL ENSURE THAT THE LAWS

BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED?"
A.ThismeansthatthePresidentcandowhateverisneededtoensurethat
laws,generalorspecial,arefollowed.Forthisreason,themajorityof the CourtinBiraogov.
TruthCommission,G.R.No.192935, December 7, 2010, upheld the power of the President to create a
Truth Commission althoughtheCommission was invalidatedforviolation of the equal protection clause.
Q. What is the power of supervision?
A.Itisthepowerofasuperiorofficerto"ensurethatthelawsarefaithfully
executed"byinferiors.Thepowerofsupervisiondoesnotincludethe
powerofcontrol;butthepowerofcontrolnecessarilyincludesthe power of supervision. (The power of the
President over local governments is only one of general supervision. See Article X, Sections 4 and 16.)
SEC. 18. THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WHENEVER IT BECOMES NECESSARY , HE MAY CALL OUT SUCH ARMED FORCES TO
PREVENT OR SUPPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE , INVASION OR REBELLION. IN CASE OF INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY
REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY DAYS , SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
OR PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW . WLTHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS FROM THE
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL
SUBMIT A REPORT IN PERSON OR IN WRITING TO THE CONGRESS. THE CONGRESS, VOTING JOINTLY, BY A VOTE OF AT LEAST A MAJORITY
OF ALL ITS MEMBERS IN REGULAR OR SPECIAL SESSION, MAY REVOKE SUCH
PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION, WHICH REVOCATION SHALL NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THE PRESIDENT. UPON THE INITIATIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS
MAY, IN THE SAME MANNER, EXTEND SUCH PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY THE CONGRESS , IF
THE INVASION OR REBELLION SHALL PERSIST AND PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT .
THE CONGRESS, IF NOT IN SESSION, SHALL, WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR

HOURS FOLLOWING SUCH PROCLAMATION OR SUSPENSION, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT NEEDOF ACALL .
THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW, IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING

FILED BY ANY CITIZEN, THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OR THE EXTENSION THEREOF AND MUST PROMULGATE ITS DECISION THEREON WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM ITS
FILING.
A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT SUSPEND THE OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOR SUPPLANT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CIVIL
COURTS
OR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES, NOR AUTHORIZE THE CONFERMENT OF JURISDICTION ON MILITARY COURTS AND AGENCIES
OVER CIVILIANS WHERE CIVIL COURTS ARE ABLE TO FUNCTION, NOR AUTOMATICALLY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT.
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT SHALL APPLY ONLY TO PERSONS
JUDICIALLY CHARGED FOR REBELLION OR OFFENSES INHERENT IN OR DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH INVASION .
DURING THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT, ANY PERSON THUS ARRESTED OR DETAINED SHALL BE JUDICIALLY CHARGED
WITHIN THREE DAYS, OTHERWISE HE SHALL BE RELEASED.
Q. What is the significance of the Commander-in-Chiefship of the President?
A. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18,
isthatacivilianPresidentholdssuprememilitaryauthorityandisthe
ceremonial,legal,andadministrativeheadofthearmedforces.The Constitution does not require that the
President must be possessed of militarytrainingandtalents,butasCommander-in-Chief,hehasthe power
to direct military operations and to determine military strategy.
Normally,hewouldbeexpectedtodelegatetheactualcommandof the armed forces to military experts; but
the ultimate power is his. "As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the
naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may
deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy." Fleming v. Page, 9 How 603, 615
U.S. (1850).
309
Q. What specific military powers are given to the President by the Constitution?
A. The President,as Commander-in-Chief,isauthorizedbySection18under specifiedconditions,(1) to call
out sucharmedforces to prevent or suppresslawlessviolence,invasion,orrebellion,(2)tosuspendthe
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law.
Q.UnderwhatconditionsmaythePresidentcalloutthearmedforcesto prevent or suppress lawless violence,

etc.?
A. "[W]henever it becomes necessary."
Q. When the President calls out the armed forces, is his action subject to judicial review?
A-Itmaybegatheredfromthebroadgrantofpowerthattheactualuseto which the President puts the armed

forces is, unlike the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not subject to judicial
review. He is authorized"wheneverit becomesnecessary,[to] call out [the]
armedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence."Whatwassaid by the American Supreme Court in
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat 19 U.S. (1827) which Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971) said was not
applicable to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must be considered applicable
to the broad power to make use of the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
[insurrection,] or rebellion." "The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen," declared the
American Court, "belongs exclusively tothePresident,and... hisdecisionisconclusiveuponallother
persons." Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat at 30.
Q. What is a writ of habeas corpus? the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? What is suspended by the
President, the writ or the privilege?
A. The answer to these questions are discussed under Article III, Section 15.
Q. To whom does the suspension of the privilege apply?
A."Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritshallapplyonlytopersons judicially charged for rebellion or

offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion."
310
Q.WhatisthedutyoftheStateafterarrestsanddetentiononthebasisof the suspension of the privilege?
A. "During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released."
Q. What is "martial law?"
A. Martial law is essentially police power. This is borne out by the constitutional text which sets down
"public safety" as the object of the exerciseofmartiallaw.Publicsafetyistheconcernofpolicepower.
Whatispeculiar,however,aboutmartiallawaspolicepoweristhat, whereas police power is normally a
function of the legislature executed by the civilian executive arm, under martial law, police power is
exercisedbytheexecutivewiththeaidofthemilitaryandinplaceof "certain governmental agencies which for
the time being are unable to cope with existingconditions in a localitywhichremainssubjectto the
sovereignty." In the language of Justice Black, it authorizes "the military to act vigorously forthe
maintenance of an orderly civil government." Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,323 (1946). Or in the
language of Justice Stone, it is:
the exercise of the power which resides in the executive branch of the government to preserve order
and insure the public safety in times of emergency, when other branches of the government are unable
to function, or their functioning would itself threaten the public safety ... It is the law of necessity to be
prescribed and administered by the executive power. Its object, the preservation of the public safety
and good order, defines the scope, which will vary with the circumstances and necessities of the case.
The exercise of the power may not extend beyond what is required by the exigency which calls it forth ..
.Id. at 335-6.
Q. Is the scope of "martial law" powers a fixed concept?
A. What emerges from the above observations on martial law as police

poweraswellasfromthetextoftheConstitutionisthatmartiallawis
aflexibleconcept.Martiallawdependsontwofactualbases:(1)the
existenceofactualinvasionorrebellion,and(2)therequirementsof
publicsafety.Necessitycreatestheconditionsformartiallawandat the same time limits the scope of martial
law. Certainly, the necessities createdbyastateofinvasionwouldbedifferentfromthose
311
created by rebellion. Necessarily, therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous executive action needed to
meet the varying kinds and degrees of emergency could not be identical under all conditions.
NOTE: Because of this amorphous shape of martial law power, the Marcos Supreme Court arrived at the
following conclusions:
1. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus;
2. That the President of the Philippines, "as Commander- in-Chief and as enforcer or administrator of
martial law . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law
essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social
liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or
insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a world recession,
inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed
countries ..."
3. That the President of the Philippines, as legislator during the period of martial law, can legally create
military commissions or courts martial to try not only members of the armed forces but also civilian
offenders for specified offenses.
This summary is taken from Gumaua v. Espino, 96 SCRA 403,403-7 (February 29,1980).
The new Constitution, however, rejects the above Marcos Court pronouncements and now says
categorically: "A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to {miction, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ."
Q.Whatlimitationsonthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeandthepowerto impose martial law have been

formulated in the new Constitution?
A.Ingeneral,thelimitsthathavebeenimposedare:(1)atimelimitofsixty days;
(2)reviewandpossiblerevocationbyCongress;(3)reviewand possible nullification by the Supreme Court.
3-4
Q. Specifically, what are these limits?
A. "In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safely requires it, he may,
foraperiodnotexceedingsixtydays,suspendtheprivilegeofthewrit of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial laworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,the
PresidentshallsubmitareportinpersonorinwritingtotheCongress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Me mbers i n regular or special session, may re voke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
UpontheinitiativeofthePresident,theCongressmay,inthesame
manner,extendsuchproclamationorsuspensionforaperiodtobe
determinedbytheCongress,iftheinvasionorrebellionshallpersist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filedby anycitizen,the sufficiencyof the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing."
Q.HowdoesCongressvotewhendecidingwhethertorevokeorextendthe suspension of the privilege or the

imposition of martial law?
A. The Senate and the House of Representatives vote "jointly." This is a
departurefromthegeneralrulethatthetwoHousesvoteseparately when deciding an issue. The purpose of
the departure from the general rule is to facilitate the override of the suspension or the imposition.
Q. Is the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege a political question?
A. No. Whatever doubt there may have been under the former Constitutions, the new Constitution now
categorically states that the "Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate pro
313
ceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing."
Q. Petitioners argue that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" by President Arroyo is violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the
constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place in EDSA III on May 1,2001, and
that the declaration of a state of rebellioncannotbeanexceptiontothegeneralruleontheallocation of the
governmental powers. Decide.
A.Section18,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionexpresslyprovidesthat"[tlhe PresidentshallbetheCommander-in-
Chiefofallarmedforcesofthe Philippinesandwheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsuch armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion ..." It was held in Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora,(G.R.No.141284,August15,2000)thatthefactualnecessity
ofcallingoutthearmedforcesissomethingthatisforthePresidentto decide.Hehasavastintelligencenetwork
togatherinformation,some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
securityofthestate.Intheexerciseofthepowertocall,on-the-spot decisions maybe imperativelynecessaryin
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
AlthoughtheCourt,inapropercase,maylookintothesufficiencyof
thefactualbasisoftheexerciseofthispower,onthebasisofitspower to determinegraveabuseofdiscretion,this
is nolongerfeasiblewhen the proclamation has already been lifted. Lacson v. Secretary Perez,
G.R.No.147780,May10,2001; Sanlakasv.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004.
Q.WhenthePresidentexercisestheoptiontocallonthearmedforcesdoes he thereby acquire new powers

including emergency powers?
A.No.ItsimplymeansthatheiscallingontheArmedForcestoassistthe police. But this does not give her

additional powers. Lacson v. Secretary Perez,G.R.No.147780, May 10, 2001; Sanlakas
v.ExecutiveSecretary, G.R.No.159085,February3,2004.Certainly,forinstance,itdoesnot authorize
warrantless
314 3-4
Q
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
arrests. David v. Erfnita, G.R. No. 171409, May 3, 2006. And a President can claim emergency powers
only when these are granted to her by Congress under Article VI, Section 23.
What power does he have over the military?
Since the President is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces she can demand obedience from military
officers. Military officers who disobey or ignore her command can be subjected to court martial
proceeding. Thus, for instance, the President as Commander in Chief may prevent a member of the
armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry. A military officer who disobeys the President's
directive may be made
to answer before a court martial. Since, however, Congress has the power to conduct legislative
hearings, Congress may make use of remedies under the law to compel attendance. Any military official
whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have
the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Gudaniv. Senga,
G.R. No. 170165, April 15. 2006.
Sees.
NOTE: Since the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the power to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege has
been used only once. President Arroyo declared martial law in Maguindanao on the occasion of the
Ampatuan massacre but
she lifted it within weeks. What Presidents have done instead
has been merely to make use of the third Section 18 power, that is, to call on the Armed Forces to help
the police maintain order. But this does not give her additional powers. Lacson v. Secretary Perez, G.R.
No. 147780, May 10, 2001; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004. Certainly,
for instance, it does not authorize warrantless arrests. David v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171409, May 3,2006.
Moreover, the President can claim emergency powers only when these are granted to her by
CongressunderArticleVI,Section23.
SEC. 19. EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT, OR AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, THE PRESIDENT MAY GRANT
REPRIEVES, COMMUTATIONS, AND PARDONS, AND REMIT FINES AND FORFEITURES, AFTER CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT.
HE SHALL ALSO HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT AMNESTY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE
CONGRESS.
Q. What is the purpose of the grant of the power of executive clemency?

A. That Section 19 gives to the President the power of executive clemency is a tacit admission
thathumaninstitutionsare imperfect andthat there
areinfirmitiesintheadministrationofjustice.Thepowertherefore exists as an instrument for correcting
these infirmities and for mitigatingwhateverharshnessmightbegeneratedbyatoostrict application of the
law.
Q.Whataretheformsofexecutiveclemency?
A. They are: reprieves, commutations, pardons, remission of fines and forfeitures, amnesty.
Q. May the president extend executive clemency for administrative penalties?
A. Yes. The Constitution makes no distinction with regard to the extent of the pardoning power except
with respect to impeachment. Llamas v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991.
Q. What are reprieves, commutations, and remission of fines and forfeitures?
A. A reprieve "postpones the execution of an offense to a day certain." People

v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 (1937), and a commutation "is a remission of a part of the punishment; a
substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed." Id. at 111. Remission of fines and
forfeitures is a self-explanatory term. However, it should be noted that remission of fines and forfeitures
merely prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of forfeited property; it cannot have the effect
of returning property which has been vested in third parties or money in the public treasury.
Q. After serving sentence for six years, accused was released and placed under house arrest. Was his
sentence effectively commuted to six years?
A Yes. Commutation does not have to be in any specific form. The fact that he was released after six
years and the fact that house arrest is not a penalty leads to the conclusion that the penalty had been
shortened. Drilon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91626, October 3,1991.
3-4
Q. Define pardon.
A. United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (U.S. 1833), defines it thus:
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrustedwiththeexecution ofthelaws,which

exempts theindividual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the Court... A pardon is a deed, to
the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then
be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in
a court to force it on him.
Q.Aretheabovedefinitionandcharacteristicsofpardonapplicabletothe Philippine concept?
A.Itissubmittedthatadistinctionmustbemadebetweenabsoluteand conditional pardon. Absolute pardon

is complete even without acceptance;whereas "aconditionalpardonhasnoforceuntilaccepted
bythecondemned.Thereasonisobvious.Theconditionmaybeless
acceptabletohimthantheoriginalpunishment,andmayinfactbe more onerous." See Cabantag v. Wolfe, 6
Phil. 273,278 (1906).
Q. Petitioner was a teacher with the rank of Principal I. Convicted of a criminal offense, he was
sentenced to one year imprisonment and disqualification to hold public office. Subsequently he was
given absolute pardon and restored to "full civil and political rights." He applied for reinstatement and
was given the position merely of classroom teacher. Is he entitled to his old rank of Principal I?
A. It is true that one who is given absolute pardon has no demandable right to reinstatement. Monsanto
v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. 78239, February 9,1989. However, since the petitioner in this instance was actually
reinstated and there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution of his rank, justice and
equity dictates that he be given his former rank of Principal I. Sabello v. Department of Education, G.R.
No. 87687, December 26,1989.
Q. Petitioner, an assistant treasurer, was convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents
and received
a penalty which included temporary absolute disqualification to last during the period of her sentence.
The conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court but she filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending
reconsideration she was granted absolute pardon. Is she entitled to reinstatement to her former
position even without a new appointment?
A. No. Pardon removes all penalties and legal disabilities. But it does not restore legal office already
forfeited. Since, however, her disqualification has been removed, it qualifies her to apply for a new
appointment. Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 78239, February 9,1989. See dissents.
Q. What happens, however, if a pardon is given because he was acquitted on the ground that he did not
commit the crime?
A. Such a case would be different from Monsanto. Reinstatement and backwages would be due. Garcia
v. Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356 (1993).
Q. Where conditional pardon has been granted, who determines whether the condition has been
violated?
A. The President, and the President alone. The convict's acceptance of the conditional pardon carries
with it acceptance of the President's authority. Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987). See dissent of
Cruz, J.
Q. What is the effect of pardon when extended to one who has a pending appeal?
A. Since pardon can be extended only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the
person withdraws his appeal and thereby allowshisconvictiontobefinal.Peoplev.Salle,Jr.,G.R.No.103567,
December4, 1995. (ThiscorrectsPeoplev. Crisola, 128SCRA1(March 2,1984), which said that clemency
terminates the appeal.
Q. May the president extend executive clemency for administrative penalties?
A. Yes. The Constitution makes no distinction with regard to the extend of the pardoning power except
with respect to impeachment. Llamas v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15,1991.
3-4
Q. What is amnesty?
A. Amnesty "commonly denotes the 'general pardon to rebels for their
treason and other high political offenses,' or the forgiveness which one sovereign grantsto the subjects
of another,who have offended by some breach of the law of nations." Villa v. Allen, 2 Phil. 436,439
(1903).
Q.Aconvictedprisonerclaimstobecoveredbyageneralamnesty.Maya court order his release in a habeas

corpus petition?
A.No.Hisproperremedyistosubmithiscasetotheproperamnestyboard, in this case, the COMELEC. De Vera

v. Animas, L-48176,14 August 1978.
Q. What are the differences between pardon and amnesty?

A. Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 85 Phil. 642 (1949) enumerates them thus:
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes
of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offense, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work restoration of the rights to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence" (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which is charged
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
NOTE: The distinctions made here should be understood in the light of the later cases of Monsanto and
Garcia above which hold that pardon can have the effect of restoring rights such as the right to hold
public office or the right of suffrage.
Q. What is the legal nature of a tax amnesty?
A. It is a "general pardon or intentional overlooking of its authority to impose penalties on persons

otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of revenue or tax law, [and as such] partakes of an absolute
forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it..Republic
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69344, April 26, 1991, quoting Commission of Internal Revenue
v. Botelho Corp., 20 SCRA 487. (QUERY: May the President grant tax amnesty without legislative
intervention? See next case.)
Q. By P.D. 1840 the President granted tax amnesty. To be valid does this amnesty require the
concurrence of the Batasan?
A. Under the 1973 Constitution, the Court answered this in the negative. What the President did by
issuing P.D. 1840 is exercise his legislative power under Amendment 6 which does not require
concurrence of the Batasan but is concurrent with the legislative power of the Batasan. Legaspi v.
Minister of Finance, G.R. 58289, July 24,1982.
Q. May the President now grant tax amnesty?
A. It is submitted that the President cannot grant tax amnesty without the concurrence of Congress. The
President now does not have the legislativepowerof President Marcosunderthe1973Constitution.
Q. May "reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remission of fines and forfeitures" be given before
conviction?
A. No. These can be only granted "after conviction by final judgment." This a return to the rule under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions and a rejectionofthe1981amendmentwhichdidawaywiththeneedfor prior
conviction. This is to prevent the President from preempting the action of the judge.
Q. What are the constitutional limits on executive clemency?
A. Section 19 sets down three limitations on the power of executive clemency: (1) it cannot be exercised
over cases of impeach
320
ment; (2) a grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress. (3) In addition, Article IX, C, Section 5 says: "No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation of the Commission [on Elections]."
Q. May political offenders be given executive clemency without the concurrence of Congress?
A. Yes. They may be given individual pardon after conviction.

Q. Must an accused confess guilt of the crime charged in order to avail of
amnesty as a defense?
A. Yes. Vera v. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963); People v. Pasilan, 14 SCRA 694 (1965).
SEC. 20. THE PRESIDENT MAY CONTRACT OR GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH THE
PRIOR CONCURRENCE OF THE MONETARY BOARD, AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. THE MONETARY
BOARD SHALL, WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE END OF EVERY QUARTER OF THE CALENDAR YEAR , SUBMIT TO THE CONGRESS A COMPLETE
REPORT OF ITS DECISIONS
ON APPLICATIONS FOR LOANS TO BE CONTRACTED OR GUARANTEED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE FOREIGN DEBT , AND CONTAINING OTHER MATTERS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW.
Q. May the President contract or guarantee foreign loans?
A. Yes, but only with the "prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law."
Q. What is the responsibility for approving foreign loans and for guaranteeing loans given to the
Monetary Board?
A. Because it has expertise and consistency to perform the mandate and since such expertise or
consistency may be absent among the Members of Congress.
Q.WhyistheMonetaryBoardrequiredtogiveareportofactiontakenon loans and guarantees?
A.InordertoallowCongresstoactonwhateverlegislationmaybeneeded toprotectpublicinterest.
Q. The Financing Program for foreign loans instituted by the President extinguished portions of the
country's pre-existing loans through either debt buyback or bond-conversion. The buyback approach
essentially pre-terminatedportionsofpublicdebtswhilethebond-conversion scheme extinguished public
debts through the obtention of a new loan
byvirtueofasovereignbondissuance,theproceedsofwhichinturn
wereusedforterminatingtheoriginalloan.Petitionerscontendthat
buybackorbondconversionarenotauthorizedbyArticleVII,Section 20.
A.ThelanguageoftheConstitutionissimpleandclearasitisbroad.Itallows the President to contract and

guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions
as to whichkindsofdebtinstrumentsaremoreonerousthanothers.This
CourtmaynotascribetotheConstitutionmeaningsandrestrictions that would unduly burden the powers of
the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a
sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of
judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act. Spouses
Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13,2005.
SEC. 21. No TREATY OR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT SHALL BE VALIDANDEFFECTIVEUNLESSCONCURRED INBYATLEASTTWO-THIRDS

OFALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.
Q. What are some of the foreign relations powers of the President?
A. They are: (1) the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements; (2) the power to appoint
ambassadors and other public ministers, and consuls; (3) the power to receive ambassadors and other
public ministers accredited to the Philippines; (4) the power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic; (5) the power to deport aliens.
Q. What is the President's role in entering into international agreement?
A.ThePresidentnegotiatestreatiesandinternationalagreements.Inthe negotiationphaseoftreaty-
making,theexecutivemaycompletely excludes Congress. However, the fruit of the
3-4
Q. What international agreements require ratification by the Senate?
A. "While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the

Constitution,lessformaltypesofinternationalagreementsmaybe entered into by the Chief Executive and
become binding without the concurrenceofthelegislativebody. [UsaffeVeterans Association,Inc. v.
Treasurer of the Philippines, 105 Phil. 1030] The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is a
valid and binding international agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The
privileges and immunities granted to the WHO under the Host Agreement have been recognized by this
Court as legally binding on Philippine authorities. [World Health Organization v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino,
48 SCRA 242]" Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco and Sons, 148 SCRA 36,3940 (1987.
(How is this affected by the new provision of the 1987 Constitution?)
Q. What norm may be followed for determining whether an agreement needs concurrence of the
Senate or not?
A.Ingeneralitcanbesaidthatagreementsthatarepermanentandoriginal should be embodied in a treaty

and need Senate concurrence. Agreements, however, which are temporary or are merely
implementations of treaties or statutes do not need concurrence.
Q. What law governs the Visiting Forces Agreement: Article VII, Section 21 or ArticleXVHI, Section 25?
A. Both. As to the manner of ratifying the treaty, Article VII, Section 21 applies. As to whether the
agreement needs Senate ratification, Article XVHI, Section 25 applies. Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 138570, October 10,2000.
Q. Does it need ratificationby the Senate?
A. Yes, Because Section 25 of Article XVII covers not just bases but also troops. Bayan v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10,2000.
executive's negotiation does not become binding treaty without the concurrence of "at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate."
Q. How about the needed ratification by the U.S.?
A.WeareboundtoacceptanofficialdeclarationbytheU.S.thatwhatis
neededtomaketheirconsentatreatyhasbeensatisfied.Bayanv. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570,
October 10, 2000.
Q.PursuanttotheextraditiontreatywiththeUnitedStates,arequestwas made by the U.S. for the extradition

of Mark Jimenez. While the petitionforextraditionwasbeingevaluatedbytheDepartmentof Justice and
before the filing of an extradition case in the proper court, a
requestwasmadebyJimenezthatdocumentscomingfromtheUS related to the extradition request be made
available to him. The requestwasgrantedbyJudgeLantion.WhereupontheSecretaryof Justice asked the
Court to reverse the lower courts order. Decide.
A.DuringtheevaluationstageintheofficeoftheDepartmentofJusticethe subject of the extradition request

does not have the right to notice and hearing. P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty providesthetimewhenanextraditeeshallbefurnishedacopyofthe
petitionforextraditionaswellasitssupportingpapers,i.e.,afterthe filing of the petition for extradition in the
extradition court, "An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional
safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition
pursuant to a valid treaty." As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation
stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminaryinvestigation,thedueprocesssafeguardsinthelatterdo not necessarily apply to the former.
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000.
Q. May the President be compelled to submit a treaty to the Senate for concurrence?
A.PriortohisousterfromthepresidencyPresidentEstradahadsignedthe
TreatyontheInternationalCriminalCourtbuthedidnotsubmititto
theSenateforconcurrence.NeitherdidPresidentArroyo.Effortsto compel the Executive Department by
mandamus to submit the document to the Senate was rebuffed by the Court. The Court said that
thedecisiontoenterornottoenterintoatreatyisaprerogativesolely of the
324
President. Thus unless the President submits a treaty to the Senate there is nothing for the Senate to
concur in. Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005.
NOTE: The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by
our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department
has already decided thatitistothebestinterestofthecountrytowaiveallclaimsofits nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
Thewisdomofsuchdecisionisnotforthecourtstoquestion.Vinuya,et al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
162230, April 28, 2010.
Q. Who has the power to deport aliens?

A. Tan Tong v. Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 934, 936 (1955) answers the
question thus:
The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of
state, it is vested in the Executive by virtue of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on
the subject (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41) There is no provision in the Constitution nor act of the
legislature defining the power, as it is evident that it is the intention of the law to grant to the Chief
Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to
effect or iiyure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which the
deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.
SEC. 22. THE PRESIDENT SHALL SUBMIT TO THE CONGRESS WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE OPENING OF EVERY REGULAR SESSION, AS
THE BASIS OFTHEGENERALAPPROPRIATIONS BILL,ABUDGETOFRECEIPTSAND EXPENDITURES AND SOURCES OF FINANCING , INCLUDING
RECEIPTS FROM EXISTING AND PROPOSED REVENUE MEASURES .
Q. What is the basis for the general appropriations bill passed by Congress? A. The budget of receipts
and expenditures prepared by the President.

Ection He Executive Power Shall Be Vested in The Resident of The

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THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

SEC 2. No PERSON MAY BE ELECTED PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS A

Q.AssumingthatFernandoPoe,Jr.wasanillegitimatechildofanAmerican mother and a Filipino father, would

A.Yes.Providedpaternityisclearlyproved,anillegitimatechildofaFilipino father is a natural born Filipino

Q. In whom is executive power vested?

Q. What is the significance of being "Head of state?"

Presidency can be said about the Philippine President:

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 12-13 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q. What is the significance of being "Chief Executive?"

A.Thismeansthatheistheexecutiveandnooneelseis.Inthelanguageof Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67

Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Q. May the President dispose of state property?

Q. What is executive privilege?

Q. What types of information are covered by executive privilege?

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees.1-2 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q.Howdoesexecutiveprivilegerelatewiththepowerofcompulsory process of Congress?

Q. How must the claim of executive privilege be stated?

Q. What can be learned from Neriv. Senate?

'G.R. No. 180643, March 25,2008. Reconsidered September

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008; September 4, 2008. 2 , 2008.

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

concern. Certainly, for instance, if a decision reached is criminal, it cannot be privileged.

Q.CouldtheCourthaveaskedforanincamerasessionforNerito explain his claim within the hearing of the

Q. Is the President immune from suit?

A. Although the new Constitution has not reproduced the explicit

ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 283

Q. PetitionerBeltranarguesthat "thereasonswhichneces- sitate Presidential immunity from suit impose a

THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 12-13 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

SEC. 3. THERE SHALL BE A VICE-PRESIDENT WHO SHALL HAVE THE

A.HisonlyconstitutionalfunctionistobeonhandtoactasPresidentwhen needed or to succeed to the

SEC. 4. THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT SHALL BE

THE RETURNS OF EVERY ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-

Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 285

A. Congress. The proclamation of presidential and vice-presidential winners is a function of Congress

Q.May Congressdelegatethepreliminarycountofvotesinapresidential electiontoaJointCommittee.

Q.Incanvassingthevotes,canCongresslookintotheauthenticityanddue execution of the certificates of

A. The Supreme Court.

A.No.Thefundamentalruleapplicableinapresidentialelectionprotestis Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It

Sees. 15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 287

Q.AfterFidelRamoswasdeclaredelectedPresident,defeatedcandidate Miriam Defensor Santiago filed an

288 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 12-13 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q.WhatwillbetheinitialsalaryofthePresidentandoftheVice-President under this Constitution?

SHALL ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS.

IF A PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN, THE VICE-

ViCE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.

Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 289

beginning of the term of the presidency.

290 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sec. 17 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

Q. What vacancy situations are contemplated in Section 8?

A. Ina dividedopiniontheSupremeCourtheldthatJosephEstradahad resigned thereby leaving the office

Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 291

Q. How is a vacancy in the vice- presidency filled?

292 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 12-13 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER

SEC. 10. THE CONGRESS SHALL, AT TEN O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING

WHENEVER A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO

Sees.15-16 ART. VII - THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 293

IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE , THE

IF THE CONGRESS, WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST

Q. The matter of deciding whether the President is so unable to discharge the

A. See Section 11.

SEC. 12. IN CASE OF SERIOUS ILLNESS OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PUBLIC