THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (ARTICLE VIII, 1987 CONSTITUTION)

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in

such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Section 1, Article VIII,
1987 Constitution)

Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress
concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its
creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of
judicial power. However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the
rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative power.

The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” It has thereby
expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were
legally demandable and enforceable.

The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under

the 1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a former
Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed provisions on
the Judiciary.

Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of

judicial review and the great responsibility of the Judiciary in maintaining the
allocation of powers among the three great branches of the Government. (Maria
Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No.,
209287, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])
Judicial Power and the Political Question Doctrine

The Political Question Doctrine

Baker v. Carr remains the starting point for analysis under the political
question doctrine.

In Tanada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer “to those

questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.” (Vinuya, et al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G.
Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28. 2010, En Banc [Del Castillo])

Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No.
225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc (Peralta)

The petitioners failed to show that President Duterte committed grave

abuse of discretion when he allowed the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the “Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).”

Held:

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that

there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to
check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch.
Truly, the President’s discretion is not totally unfettered. X x x. At bar,
President Duterte x x x acted within the bounds of the law and
jurisprudence, Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocate, the
Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos
of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the Framers of our
Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any
stage of a person’s development, from the time he or she becomes a
person to the time he or she leaves this earth.

There are certain things that are better left for history – not this
Court – to adjudge. The Court could only do so much in accordance with
clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is ultimately for
the people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a task that may require
the better perspective that the passage of time provides.
Vinuya, et. al. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, et. al.,
G.R. No. 162230, April 28. 2010, En Banc (Del Castillo)

The SC may not compel the President to take up the cause of the
petitioners (comfort women during World War II) against Japan. That will
violate the doctrine of separation of powers for that is a political question – a
question in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated by
the Constitution to the President as the chief architect of our foreign policy and
as the spokesman of the nation in matters of foreign relations. The most that the
SC may do is to exhort her, to urge her to take up petitioners cause – but not to
compel her.

In matters of foreign policy, the Executive and the Judiciary must speak
with just one voice to avoid serious embarrassments and strained relations with
foreign countries. Elaborating, the Court held:

“To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present

political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe
or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority
for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the
courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department
has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

“In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US

Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.’

“It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international

relations, embarrassment – perhaps serious embarrassment – is to be
avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation
which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not
Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in times of war. He
has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form
of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

“X x x
 “The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy
interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the
Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

Requisites for a Proper Exercise by the Court of its Power of Judicial Review

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question

involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case. Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most
important. (Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566,
710 SCRA 1, 89, Nov. 19, 2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])

It is well-settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity

of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the
following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual
case of controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. In this case, the absence of the first two, which are the most essential,
renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. (Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al.
v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016,
En Banc [Peralta])

The Meaning of an “Actual Case or Controversy”

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal

rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must
be contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law or jurisprudence. Related to the requisite of an actual case or
controversy is the requisite of “ripeness,” which means that something had been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. Moreover, the
limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of the government. Those areas pertain to questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. As they are concerned
with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial
review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited
by Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the
judiciary the power to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear
Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc
[Peralta])

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. (Republic
Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, 556 Phil. 83, 91-92 [2001]) The rule is
that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable
– definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that
is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 281,
304-305 [2005])

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the

requirement of ripeness (Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty [LAMP] v. The
Secretary of Budget and Management, GR No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373,
383). A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of (The Province of North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 589 Phil. 387, 481 [2008]). (James M.
Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014,

The Moot and Academic Principle

An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable

controversy because the issued involved have become academic or dead, or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties (Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 792, 800 [1998]). Time
and again, courts have refrained from even expressing an opinion in a case
where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more
justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of
no practical use or value (Barbieto v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 184646, October 30,
2009, 604 SCRA 825, 840). (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., GR
No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc [Villarama])

Exceptions to the Moot and Academic Principle

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence dictates that “the

‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise
moot, if first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec.
Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 93, Nov. 19, 2013, En
Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])

Locus Standi

Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question,

locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such party has no
standing. (Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et
al., G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc [Peralta])
 Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 641 SCRA 244,
254, citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755 [2006]). Specifically, it is
“a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for
more than just a generalized grievance.” (Id., citing Jumamil v. Café, 507 Phil. 455,
465 [2005], citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632-633
[2000]) However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court
has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter
of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 151)

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993,
224 SCRA 792, we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. (Id. At 804-805)
(Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510,
September 16, 2014, En Banc [Villarama, Jr.])

Taxpayers’ Suit

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral
Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016)

Suits Filed by Concerned Citizens

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the

issues are of transcendental significance, or of paramount public interest. In
cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to
fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.
(Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R.
No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc [Peralta])
Suits Filed by Members of Congress

In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or the
institution to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress
cannot be upheld. (Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C.
Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc [Peralta])

The Liberalization of the Rules on Legal Standing

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers

to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which
allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen
suits in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest,
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.” (See ANNOTATION TO
THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES) (Most Rev.
Pedro D. Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16,
2014, En Banc [Villarama, Jr.])

Facial Challenge
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., (GR No. 204819,
April 8, 2014, En Banc [Mendoza])

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as

a First Amendment Challenge, is on that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the
First Amendment (See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 [1987]). These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.

has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes
(Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357 [2008]; Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265 [2004]; Estradfa v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 [2001]),
it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
(Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 594 Phil. 305, 316 [2008]). The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously

alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH (Reproductive Health) Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No,. 203335,
Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc (Abad)

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial

challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The
inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio
T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, “we
must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these
doctrines are used to mount “facial” challenges to penal statutes not involving
free speech.”

In an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his

constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due process,
lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness.
Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of
the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not before
the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

The Void-for-vagueness Doctrine and the Doctrine of Overbeadth

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism

Council, et al. (G.R. Nos. 178552, 178581, 178890, 179157, & 179461, 5 October
2010, En Banc (Carpio-Morales)

In addition, a statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it

lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks

an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute “on its fact,” not merely “as applied for”
so that the overbreadth law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling” deterrent
effect of the overbreadth statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbreadth law’s “very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties.

The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged.
Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

Xxx

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the

criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful
conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not free speech. It is
true that the agreements and course of conduct were in most instances brought
about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because that conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive
interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of speech and press would make it
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of
trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.

The Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Section 5[5], 1987 Constitution)

In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service

Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, The Court ruled that the provision in
the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts
it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot
operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the
Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. (GSIS v. Heirs of Fernando F.
Caballero, G.R. No. 158090, 632 SCRA 5, 14-15, Oct. 4, 2010, 2nd Div. [Peralta])