Francisco vs Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino 415 SCRA 44

Case Title

GR No. 160261 / November 10, 2003

G.R. No. / Promulgation Date

Justice Carpio Morales

Ponente

Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico,
Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.

On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”

Issues:
Whether or not Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review?

Ruling:
No.

In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
“judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of
powers” of the different branches of government and “to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.”

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness,
its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced
to a minimum.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution
is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,
resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary
the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.

Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more
on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.

Doctrine: Doctrine of Checks and Balances