[G.R. No. 127371.

April 25, 2002

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL

AUTHORITY, Petitioners, v. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC., Respondent.

Facts:

On January 21, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform Policy
for the power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2 of which provides:

Continue direct connection for industries authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of Understanding
of 12 January 1981, until such time as the appropriate regulatory board determines that direct
connection of industry to NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility
or cooperative. Determination shall be based in the utility or cooperatives meeting the standards of
financial and technical capability with satisfactory guarantees of non-prejudice to industry to be set in
consultation with NPC and relevant government agencies and reviewed periodically by the regulatory
board.

Pursuant to such Cabinet Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co.
(CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise 3 to distribute electric power to the municipalities of
Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of the province of Misamis
Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition entitled In Re: Petition for
Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector, docketed as ERB Case No. 89-430. The
petition sought the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power
Corporation (NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCOs franchise area. 4

The ERB issued a notice of public hearing which was published in the newspapers and posted in the
affected areas. It likewise furnished NAPOCOR and the Board of Investments (BOI) copies of the
petition and directed them to submit their comments.

After hearing, the ERB rendered a decision granting the petition.

NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, holding that the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and
therefore, the assailed decision became final and executory and could no longer be subject of a petition
for review.

On a petition for review on certiorari, this Court affirmed the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Judgment was entered on September 22, 1993, thus rendering final the decision of the ERB. 

To implement the decision in ERB Case No. 89-430, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation
(PSC), Petitioner, and advised the latter of its desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken
from NPC (NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO. PSC is an entity operating its
business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate (located in the Municipalities of Tagoloan and
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, covered by CEPALCOs franchise). The Estate is managed and operated
by the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA).  PSC refused CEPALCOs request, citing its contract for
power supply with NAPOCOR effective until July 26, 1996.
To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against
CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17, docketed as Civil Case No.
94-186. They alleged, inter alia, that there exists no legal basis to cut-off PSCs power supply with
NAPOCOR and substitute the latter with CEPALCO since: (a) there is a subsisting contract between
PSC and NAPOCOR; (b) the ERB decision is not binding on PSC since it was not impleaded as a party
to the case; and (c) PSC is operating within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, a franchise area of PIA, not
CEPALCO, pursuant to Sec. 4 (1) of P.D. 538. Moreover, the execution of the ERB decision would
cause PSC a 2% increase in its electrical bills.

Issue:

In the present case, the only issue for our determination is whether or not injunction lies against the final
and executory judgment of the ERB.

Ruling:

We rule in the negative.

The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes
the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or
otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when
facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested
party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in
the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.

Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing
that facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change
in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier
narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly
disregard the rule on finality of judgments.

We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as
public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. Public interest requires that
proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta
movere prescribes that what had already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this
principle does not commend itself to sound public policy.

Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a
review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court.  Settled is the rule that where
the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in
terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.  Hence, the trial court,
being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing
that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is
intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction.